SOCIAL GEOGRAPHIES AND THE STUDY OF POVERTY

By Frank Hansen, Associate Professor, Institute of Geography and Geology, University of Copenhagen

My article deals with the perspectives and the subject matter of social geography and the study of poverty in EU15. Its purpose is threefold: First it discusses the social geography of inequalities and argues for an approach focusing upon the transformation of regional class - family structures and the unequal labour market integration (with its material living conditions) of the resulting social groups as an autonomous subject and as a precondition for the study of the social segregated daily lives at a local level. Secondly it argues for the importance of studies of poverty at the regional level besides the traditional ones at the national level, and illustrates the complexity of such studies and the role of social geography in such studies. Thirdly it argues that social geography is a central part of the study of regional poverty differences, but due to the complexity and the multi-causality of the regional poverty problems a broader, multidisciplinary approach is needed. It also has to include relevant elements from other parts of an emergent human geography. The article is divided in 5 parts. It starts with two discussions of the key concepts of article. In the first section I discuss the traditional understanding of social geography and relate it to the new cultural geography and the lessons from the cultural turn. In section two I deal shortly with the concept of poverty. Then follow two studies of the size and of many-facetted character of poverty. The first analysis, at the national level, is focusing upon the amplitude of poverty, its social structure and the ability of the welfare regimes to combat the poverty. The second analysis, at the regional level, focus once more upon the amplitude of the poverty differences and relates them to differences in employment growth, labour market integration/ family changes and to demographic differences. The fifth part is the conclusion.

1. SOCIAL GEOGRAPHIES AFTER THE CULTURAL TURN

Social geography has a long tradition as the study of differences in ways of life either in the sense different cultural groups (e.g. French regional geography or the school of Chicago) or occupational groups (e.g. social area studies) (Hamnett 1996, Jackson and Smith 1984). Those studies were to a large extent descriptive. In 1970 Pahl defines social geography as the study of socially defined populations in their spatial setting and sees it as a conflict over scarce resources (Pahl 1970). The focus on inequalities is clear and related to the power relations in society. The approach is further developed by the radical geographers, where social inequalities are related to class and capitalism (Harvey 1973, Peet 1972). A theoretical based social geography of redistribution becomes a norm and a tradition. This is still the case by Hamnett 1996. In his introduction to his reader he defines social geography and tries to delimitate it in relation to economic, political and cultural geography. Social geography is the study of social structures, social activities and social groups across a wide range of human societies (pp 3). For him social groups can be race, class, gender and ethnicity, along with household and family structures and the issues can be health, housing, education, crime but also festivals or carnivals (op cit pp 4). Social geography has a field of its own the social separated from those of economic, political and cultural geography, but it has to relate itself to the economic, the political and the cultural. How stays unclear! Hamnett underlines that it is difficult to draw the borderline between social and cultural geography. By including phenomena like carnivals and festivals, he seems to include issues from the heartland of cultural geography into social geography. In the nineties cultural studies have

been very influential in British human geography and have almost replaced the traditional social geography. So it is not surprising that he opens the door for parts of the new cultural geography in a reader, which mainly is a broad approach to the geography of social inequalities. The problem is not the cultural turn but the hegemonic position of cultural geography in British human geography. It cannot replace the social geography of redistribution, but it can supplement it (Martin 2001, Mohan 2004, Pain et. al. 2001). And I think that we can extract some lessons from it, which can give us a better understanding both of social geography and of the separation and relation between the two: Cultural geography, in its pure form is the study of identities, cultural groups and connected activities, consumption and places. It is about shared cultures, identifications and belongings. But it is also about othering, recognition and mis-recognition (symbolic violence), which is the base for a social geography of recognition. Further the (mis-) recognition of cultural groups also has profound social, material consequences and has to be integrated in our understanding of social inequalities, dealt with in the social geography of redistribution. Finally, gender and family culture and religion are together with social segregation important for our understanding of the family formation, which plays an important role in the unequal access to material resources. The tradition of redistribution leaves us with another major problem, not discussed by Hamnett: Which social groups are we talking about and how are they formed? They are not just given to us from the statistics! The social inequality perspective focus upon phenomena like income, material well being and housing, which are basically problems related to class and family transformations and access to income (regarding the active population) or access to pensions and social transfers (regarding people out of work). That means that we have to understand the dynamics of social stratification as an interaction of class, gender, ethnicity and age in order to understand those inequalities (See Bradley 1996 for an excellent argument for this point of view). The drama of the inequality dynamics plays itself out through the interaction between the changing production and the families, hoping for social mobility and access to a (more interesting) work and or a more stable and higher income for one, two or even more family members. And the scene is the daily activity space, the daily commuting areas; that means the regional scale, not the local. For those reasons the traditional social geography of redistribution has to focus on the class and family formation at the regional level as its starting point. One of the subjects of that tradition is the study of income poverty; it will be my subject in the empirical analysis that follows. As underlined by Lister the study of poverty also includes the relational symbolic aspects of poverty and therefore is it also part of the social geography of recognition (Lister 2004 pp 8 and 24). But I shall only focus upon class and family and the social inequalities of redistribution. I leave gender, ethnicity and age out of the analysis because the lack of space, even they also are important social stratification dynamics related to the class family inequalities.

2. THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF POVERTY

Before starting the analysis I shall briefly deal with the concept of poverty. Poverty is a valueloaded concept (Weber 1977/1904, Gilje and Grimmen 2002). That means that you cannot define the concept or tell, how many people that live below the poverty line without making a value judgments about what you mean with poverty (Lister 2004)! This raises a couple of important questions you have to answer beforehand. Why is the study of poverty important and who have the right to define the concept? Regarding the first question the answer is that poverty is regarded a serious problem social problem in your country and that your country, by signing international agreements and declarations is obligated to combat poverty. Following the ethical ideas of Weber I can answer the second question by stating that it cannot be the scientists (Weber 1977/1904). The definition of poverty has to be agreed upon in the political processes, which leaves us with more options: either by the ordinary people or by the politicians or both?

Again it can be argued that the politicians can be morally obliged by international agreements. In the case of EU it is becoming a common norm to use the concept of income poverty and to use the 60% of the median family income as the limit to delimitate the possible group of people living in poverty (Lister 2004). Still following the ethical ideas of Weber it is the duty of the scientist to investigate the empirical consequences of choosing other definitions and other limits, f. ex. a poverty line at 50% or 70% of the median family income. And the results are really different regarding the amplitude and the social structure of poverty (Eurostat 2004)! In social science there has been a long debate over the concept itself. If one should choose a broad or a narrow, a purely material, an absolute or a relative definition, are some of the issues discussed? (See Gordon 2004, Gordon and Townsend 2000, Lister 2004 or Flaherty and others 2004). I shall only touch the last issue. I choose a narrow, material relative concept of poverty, because it has become the norm of EU and because it makes international comparisons easier. But also because the difference between the absolute and the relative concept is not that great! You cannot define absolute poverty without relating it to national standards for diets, education, health, housing etc. and to the costs to have access to those items and activities. Therefore you cannot have a common international standard in economic terms anyway and the difference between that concept and the concept of relative poverty becomes not so great. But choosing a relative income based concept of poverty and a poverty line at 60% of the median family income some important reservation have to be mentioned: It is a measure of the relative income distribution and the percentage of families below the line chosen in a given area. It is just a warning signal, because all the families below it do not have to be living in poverty. If this is the case or not has to be investigated in an analysis of the groups included. It doesnt tell us anything about the persistency and the seriousness of the poverty and has to be combined with other indicators like the Laeken ones (Eurostat 2004, Stewart 2003). It is only a rough indicator of a basic material aspect of poverty and do not tell anything about the range of material deprivation and its consequences. To do that the perspective has to be broadened. With this reservation in mind I shall begin my analysis. In the study I use the risk of poverty line defined by EU as 60% of the equivalent median household income after social transfers both pensions and other types of income transfers, not including transfers in kind, which can be very important too. Before this line was called the poverty line, but Eurostat has changed its language in recent years, even if the content of the concept has not been changed. I am worried about this change of vocabulary, if it entails that the problem of poverty is taken less seriously. As I take the poverty line as an important warning signal, I shall continue to use the old expression.

3. NATIONAL DIFFERENCES OF POVERTY IN EU 15

I have grouped the data by welfare state regimes in accordance with the original division by Esping- Andersen supplemented by a fourth regime as proposed by more authors (EspingAndersen 1990, Arts and Gelissen 2002). I do this because the income of the household are calculated after social transfers, which according to the regime theories depend upon the type of regime, its generosity and its politics of social redistribution. The last character I see as one of the constitutive elements of the regime (Hansen 2003). I have excluded the Netherlands and Portugal from the analysis, because I regard them as hybrids. From table 1 (see next page) first I shall underline the much lower level of poverty for working peoples compared to non-working ones. In all the countries except Luxembourg, which seems to be a very special case, the rate of poverty is more times higher for the non-working population. For the working population the percentage for the South is higher than for the other regimes, among which there are overlaps. Scandinavia plus Germany and Belgium have a bit lower figures than the other ones, but the difference is insignificant. Generally speaking the rate for

wageworkers is low and below 8% everywhere. So a household, with wage labour working, is in all cases almost sure to be out of poverty.

Table 1. Poverty among working and non-working people 2001

Poverty rate by employment and household characteristics 2001
Regime Socio-demo. DK Wage labour Self-employed Total working Total non-working Working: Living alone with children Working: Living with other adults not at work - Plus children Source: Eurostat2005
1 15 3 22 4 2

Corporative North FI
4 17 6 21 6 6

Liberal BE
3 10 4 22 8 10

Corporative S. IE
6 16 7 35 15 27

SE
2 22 3 19 6 10

AT
3 24 6 19 11 12

DE
4 5 4 16 22 10

FR
6 25 8 22 16 26

LU
8 2 8 13 17 16

UK
5 16 6 28 22 17

IT
7 18 10 24 11 33

EL
5 25 13 28 17 20

ES
7 20 10 24 29 26

It can seem surprising, but it can be explained mainly by two factors: First, the income includes social transfers. So in case of a very low salary the income of the household will be supplemented by a social assistance benefit. Further all the countries have minimum salary schemes and the size of the group only receiving a minimum salary is generally small (Eurostat 2006). Secondly we must remember that it is an indicator of the relative distribution of income. So because of the low level of the replacement rates and in some cases of the short duration of the most generous benefits, the social benefits is generally much lower compared to money income. It should be economically remunerative to work instead of being a client of transfers. Or in a harder ultra liberal version: The low levels of benefits should force people to work. Therefore we have to expect that the different clients of the welfare state will be in an even worse situation compared to the working persons. The less generous the welfare state the more its clients will be among the poor ones, and the less the working population will be in that group even in the case of a relatively low minimum salary. In the case of workers or self-employed households, where the family situation is troublesome- like lonely parents or only one adult at work- the rate of poverty is therefore also clearly higher (table 1). Regarding the lonely mothers the level of poverty is low only in the Scandinavian countries plus Belgium. Otherwise the rate is 11% and normally above 15%. The figures are high in three cases not following the division of regimes: Spain, Germany and UK. For the situation of the lonely mothers the relative wage level and the generosity of the welfare regime are of outmost importance. Some researchers have proposed to use the well being of the lone mothers as the ultimate test of the excellence of an up to date social security system (Borchorst 1998). In households with more adults and kids but only one at work the percentages are even higher and very high in the South plus the liberal regimes, especially, Ireland but also in France. Again the three socio-democratic regimes are located at the lowest level, but some of the corporative countries perform almost as good. The rate of poverty for self-employed persons and its variation is very high across the regimes. The picture tells us about a type of employment that faces very different situations in different sectors and different regions, having very unequal access to a stable income. It also tells us that they must be in very precarious situations in a lot of countries and regions where the national poverty rate is above 15% and up to 25%. All the countries in the South have high figures. If one wants to understand the picture a detailed contextual analysis of each county and its regions is needed. That is not my intention (For the great internal differences in the share of regional selfemployment of total employment see Eurostat Regional Statistics).

As already mentioned the poverty is much higher for the non- working groups of the population. Seen in total the figures are highest in the case of liberal regimes and in the Southern corporative ones. But they are also surprisingly high in the other regimes, except Luxembourg. Table 2. Poverty among non-working persons 2001
Poverty rate for different types of non working persons 2001
Regime Socio-demo. DK Unemployed Retired Other inactive Total non-working The numerical difference from the total average Source: Eurostat2005
23 23 22 22 2

Corporative North FI
21 20 22 21 2

Liberal BE
32 21 21 22 12

Corporative S. IE
54 39 33 35 25

SE
19 16 22 19 6

AT
23 16 22 19 10

DE
34 13 18 16 23

FR
30 17 26 22 17

LU
48 8 16 13 43

UK
49 24 30 28 27

IT
51 13 33 24 43

EL
39 32 23 28 20

ES
37 18 24 24 19

The liberal regimes have generally high levels of poverty regarding all three groups, whereas the socio- democratic regimes in general show moderate and uniform figures. If Luxembourg is excluded this is also partly the case in the corporative North, minus persons living from unemployment benefit or assistance. A relative discrimination of unemployed people seems to take place. This is the case in a lot of countries (see table 3). The regimes of the corporative South have generally taken high figures, except for the retired peoples in Italy and Spain, where we can talk about a positive discrimination. In order to analyse the policy of welfare priorities (discriminations) I have made an extra table on the basis of table 2, by simply subtracting the specific poverty rate from the total poverty rate. I regard the difference as an indication of the relative priority (discrimination) among the groups. A minus means a negative priority and vise versa.

Table 3. The difference between the total and the specific poverty rate 2001.
Poverty rate for different types of non working persons subtracted from the total poverty rate 2001
Regime Socio- demo. DK Unemployed Retired Other inactive Source: Eurostat2005
-1 -1 0

Corporative North FI
0 1 -1

Liberal BE
-10 1 1

Corporative S. IE IT
-23 15 -5

SE
0 3 -3

AT
-4 3 -3

DE
-18 3 -2

FR
-8 5 -4

LU
-35 5 -3

UK
-21 4 -2

EL
-11 -4 5

ES
-13 6 0

-19 -4 2

As it can be seen, in almost all the countries outside Scandinavia the persons, unemployed have a relative low priority compared especially to the retired ones. That means that the level of replacement of the unemployment benefit is relative low. In some of the countries pensions have a high priority, like Italy and to a lesser extend Spain. The generosity of the welfare regime is very important in the case of non-working population, which income is depending either upon other family members and/or the social transfers from the welfare state. And we saw that the liberal regimes and the Southern corporative regimes were the less generous ones, especially in relation to the group of unemployed. In general we can say that a crucial aspect of the welfare regime is its ability to combat poverty in the country. It has been an important part of EU social policy since the Lisbon summit 2001. In

table 4 I have calculated the reduction of the poverty rate due to social transfers. The poverty rate before social transfers is calculated using the family income including pensions, which is regarded as income for (old) people permanent out of work. The poverty rate for EU15 is then 25% (Eurostat). After social transfers it is reduced to 15%, a reduction of 40%. As it can be seen from table 4 the ability of poverty reduction varies a lot among the different types of regime. It is minor in the corporative South and a bit below average in the case of the liberal regimes. Table 4. The Reduction of the poverty rate due to social transfers 2003
The redistribution effect of social transfers 2003 EU-15
Regime % Rate of reduction due to transfers % Poverty rate after transfers Socio-Demo DK
69 12

Corporative North FI
68 11

Liberal BE
50 15

Corporative S. IE
32 21

SE
62 11

AT
50 13

DE
38 15

FR
50 12

LU
57 10

UK
38 18

IT
14 19

EL
13 21

ES
14 19

My calculations using data from the Eurostat database,2003 or latest year(see also Eurostat 2004).

In the corporative North the percentages is a bit above average, whereas Luxembourg comes very close to the redistributing capability of the socio-democratic regimes in Scandinavia. This ranking of regimes is not always as clear as the data from 2003 indicates, but it is very persistent pattern anyway.

4. REGIONAL DIFFERENCES OF POVERTY IN EU 15.

There exist very few studies of poverty at the regional level. In general EU does not collect data to make this type of analysis. All the indicators EU authorities decided to use in their analysis and discussion of poverty is national data except for one indicator: the variation of the regional unemployment (Stewart 2003). Such a decision, made by the EU politicians is very problematic. Because it means that the data for an in depth study of the regional differences of poverty, do not exist. Figure 1. Poverty rates in EU regions (1994-5), share of the population, living in households below 60 percent national median income

(Source Stewart 2003)

From my point of view it is very problematic for two reasons: Poverty is created in regional commuting regions and should be dealt with at that level and the regional differences are much greater, than the differences between the national states (fig 1 and 2). I shall therefore rely upon the study made by Stewart (2003). She is using data from Luxembourg Income Study and have organised the data by NUTS level-1 region (Stewart pp 342). In many cases the sample is just too small to be certain, that the poverty rate in a given region is really higher or lower than that in its next neighbour. For that reason she has calculated the 95 percent confidence intervals for each poverty rate. They are shown at figure 2 as vertical lines, where the value is located in the middle. As shown is can be seen that even if these intervals are overlapping, we can talk about real great differences in all the big countries (IT, DE, UK, FR) including Spain (ES). In the case of Italy the wealthier regions in the North are below 10%, whereas the poorest three ones are above 30% with Sicilian in the neighbourhood of 50%! A recent study from UK 2001/2002 shows a variation from 18% to 38% (Flaherty and others 2005). Their findings correspond neatly the range of differences in Stewarts study. But even a cautious reading tells that the regional differences are important and greater than the correspondent ones between the nations. The value for Denmark on the map must be wrong; it should be like the Swedish one. Further the regional differences can be exaggerated because the regional differences of costs of living, first of all the housing costs are not taken into consideration. UK data show that the rate of poverty is clearly when it is calculated after paid housing costs than before. In 2001/02 the difference was 22% versus 17.5% (Flaherty and others. 2005). So the problem about the housing costs and their geographical variation has to be taken seriously! The lack of information of the relative size of the informal sector is also a problem. We know that there are important differences among the nations, but they could be even greater at the regional scale (See Cousins 1998 about national differences). Figure 2 Poverty rates in EU regions (1994-5), share of the population living in households below 60 percent national median income %

50 40 30 20 10 0 ES IT SE FI AT DE UK FR BE LUX NE

The regional variation within the single nation is mainly caused by two factors: The first one is the great differences in the labour market integration and the corresponding change to a dual income family. Stated in another way we can say, that there are a lot of regions that lacks employment opportunities. Since 2001 it has become a hot issue in EU because employment is seen as the best medicine against the problem of lagging regions and against that of poverty. Therefore employment rate targets were set up to fulfil in 2010: 70% in the case of the overall employment and 60% for the female employment rate. As it can be seen from the

map of the employment rate in 2005 most nations and regions are far behind (The EU Commission 2007 pp 25). Only four countries (DK, SE, NE and UK) have reached the goal and a few others seem to reach it in 2010. Most nations will not be able to reach the goal and EURO 27 as a whole wills not do it either, it seems. Seen at the regional scale there are many regions far, far behind with large employment deficits compared to the target. Even if a region has come closer to the EU 15 average of GDP/CAP many regions have not witnessed a corresponding growth of employment or it has in a lot of cases even been negative (Martin). It is much easier to catch up in economic terms than in employment terms. In those cases the class and family transformations have been blocked, and have forced the peoples to continue as self-employed, housewives or to leave the regions. One consequence of this lack of social transformations is the slow increase of the female employment rate, which therefore still is at a very low level, compared to the men (see Fig 3 and Forsberg and others).

Fig 3

Female employment rate 2002

The other essential factor is the regional differences of the relative size of the group of the nonworking persons living from unemployment benefits, pensions or other social benefits. Its size depends partly upon the ability to create employment in the region partly upon the selectiveness of the out migration of people in order to find a way to live, basically to find a job in another region with better employment opportunities. The out migration from the poor regions of Southern Europe has been enormous, especially in the sixties and partly in the seventies, but it has continued later at a much smaller scale (Champion and Vandermotten 1997).

Besides the problems caused by the employment deficit and the blocked social transformations outside and inside the family many of poor regions also is characterized by a relative low educated population, which doesnt give a promising prospect for the future in a Western EU of knowledge economy.

5. CONCLUSIONS
Social geography must be regarded as two forms: The social geography of distribution and the social geography of recognition. Therefore it makes sense to talk about the mis-recognition of poor people as an extra burden, which can have severe consequences for their self-esteem and social integration. The two forms are related because (mis-) recognition very often has socio material consequences. Feminisation of poverty can count as an example. Exactly for these reasons is it not enough only to analyse the stratification processes from a class-family perspective; other dynamics like gender, ethnicity and age etc. have to be integrated in the perspective. Nevertheless, the subject matter of the social geography of redistribution is the class-family transformations and the segregated lives of the different types of class-family units, at the regional and local level. Stated through a space metaphor: it is dealing with positioning (where and how) of the class families inside, at the margin at or outside the social space of production and/or inside, at the margin at or outside the spaces of social security (family and/or welfare society) as a way to analyse their access to material means of existence and their outcomes. The study of regional poverty is such a study. Because poverty is produced in the daily lives of class-families and because the social consequences of poverty are lived in the daily activity spaces, the regional scale is the reasonable scale of the study. National comparative studies can be of some help, but they mask as shown the real amplitude of the problems; they do not relate them to regional growth employment problems and are not sensible enough to the contextual nature of the problems. That dont mean than the national scale not is of importance in the analysis too. Relevant national policies (the welfare state policies) are as shown of great importance. The same is the case with the hegemonic gender and family culture if it exists at the national level. Also the EU level has to be included, if relevant! These arguments entail that the social geographical study of regional poverty has to relate itself to other fields/ disciplines of human geography and rely on insights from those disciplines. First it has to understand the mechanisms behind the regional economic and occupational growth, but it also has to see the changing production from a social inequality perspective. Second it has to understand the mechanisms behind the changing gender, ethnicity and family cultures, but it also has to understand their consequences for the social inequalities studied. Third it has to understand the mechanisms behind the changing relevant policy areas (growth-employment, welfare, equal rights), but it also has to understand the consequences of the changes for the social inequalities studied. What I have partly shown and partly argued is that a study of poverty, (like other studies?) within the social geography needs a multidisciplinary attitude with a foundation in social geography, with a relevant knowledge of the other disciplines and their theories, but also with a courage to pass the ontological borders and analyse the realities there from a social geographical perspective.

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