Article

VIII, Section 1
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme

Court and in such lower courts as may be established

by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

 1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body.

It cannot be abolished nor may its membership

or the manner of its meeting be changed by
mere legislation. (Art. 8 4)
2. The members of the Supreme Court may not
be removed except by impeachment. (Art. 9
2)
3. The SC may not be deprived of its minimum
original and appellate jurisdiction as prescribed
in Article VIII, Section 5. (Art. 8 2)

 4. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court

may not be increased by law without its advice or

concurrence. (Art. 6 30)
5. Appointees to the judiciary are now nominated by
the Judicial and Bar Council and no longer subject to
conrmation by Commission on Appointments.
(Art. 8 9)
6. The Supreme Court now has administrative
supervision over all lower courts and their
personnel. (Art. 8 6)

 7.

The Supreme Court has exclusive power to

discipline judges of lower courts. (Art 8 11)
8. The members of the Supreme Court and all lower
courts have security of tenure, which cannot be
undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary.
(Art. 8 11)
9. They shall not be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions. (Art. 8 12)

 10. The salaries of judges may not be reduced during

their continuance in oce. (Art. 8 10)

11. The judiciary shall enjoy scal autonomy (Art.
83)
12. Only the Supreme Court may order the
temporary detail of judges (Art. 8 5[3])
13. The Supreme Court can appoint all ocials and
employees of the judiciary. (Art. 8 5[6])

 A. Judicial Power, where vested

Judicial power shall be bested with the Supreme

Court and in such other courts as may be

established by law.

B. Denition of Judicial Power

The duty of the court of justice to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable

 What is the broadened concept of judicial

power?
The power to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

 A. Denition
It is the power and authority of the court to

hear, try and decide a case.

Power to Determine
If the Court has
Jurisdiction

Power to Enforce its

Determination
Power to Control its
Execution

B. Role of Congress
The Congress shall have the power to dene,

prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the

various courts. (Art. Sec. 2)
No law shall be passed increasing the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided
in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence (Art. VI, Sec. 30)

In order to decongest the cases pending

before the Supreme Court, the Congress
passed a law which provides that the
judgement of the Court of Appeals in
criminal cases imposing a penalty of
reclusion perpetua is final and executory
and that said decision may not anymore be
questioned by whatever procedural means.
IS THE LAW CONSTITUTIONAL?

The law is unconstitutional. While it may be true

that the Congress shall have the power to define,
prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts, it may not deprive the Supreme
Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5, Article VIII. Under Section 5, Article
VIII, the Supreme Court has the power to review,
revise, modify or affirm decisions of the lower
court in criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

!Facts: Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major

stockholder and President of PROMAT Construction

Development Corporation which was engaged in
the construction business. Private respondent
Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT
participated in the bidding for government
construction projects, and private respondent,
reportedly taking advantage of his ocial position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship.

!Their aair lasted for some time, in the course of

which, private respondent gifted PROMAT with

public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his oce. When
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship,
private respondent refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner
led an administrative complaint against private
respondent.

!Ombudsman

found private respondent guilty of

misconduct and meted out the penalty of
suspension without pay for 1 year. After private
respondent moved for reconsideration, the
Ombudsman discovered that the private
respondents new counsel had been his classmate
and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself. The
case was transferred to respondent Deputy
Ombudsman who exonerated private respondent
from the administrative charges. Petitioner
appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.

!Issue: Whether or not Section 27 of RA

6770 which provides for appeals in

administrative disciplinary cases from
the Oce of the Ombudsman to the SC
in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is valid

Held: The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude

appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Under
the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a
petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and nal orders of the courts enumerated in
Sec. 1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and nal orders
of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to be
brought to the CA on a veried petition for review,
under the requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which
was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize

an appeal to the SC from decisions of the
Oce of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates
the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the
Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.

1. Congress may not deprive the Supreme

Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated

in Section 5. (Art. 8 2)
2. No law shall be passed reorganizing the
Judiciary when it undermines the security of
tenure of its Members. (Art. 8 2)
3. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may not be increased by law except
upon its advice and concurrence. (Art. 6 30)

 A. Composition

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be

composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, ve, or seven
Members. Any vacancy shall be lled within
ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

!B. Qualication

Section 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the

Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme
Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for
fteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the
practice of law in the Philippines.
(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualications of judges of
lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof
unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the
Philippine Bar.
(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven
competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS
1. SC Chief Justice
2. Secretary of Justice
3. Representative of

Congress

REGULAR MEMBERS*
4. Representative of

IBP
5. Professor of Law
6. Retired Member of
Supreme Court
7. Representative of
private sector
*Subject to conrmation of
Commission on
Appointments

 Function

of JBC. JBCs principal function is to

recommend to the President appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

Rationale for Creation of JBC. The Council was

principally designed to eliminate politics from the

appointment and judges and justices. Thus,
appointments to the Judiciary do not have to go
through a political Commission on Appointments.

 Appointment

Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court

and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by

the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no
conrmation. For the lower courts, the President
shall issue the appointments within ninety days
from the submission of the list.

!Why at least 3? The reason for requiring at least

three nominees for every vacancy is to give the

President enough leeway in the exercise of his
discretion when he makes his appointment. If
the nominee were limited to only one, the
appointment would in eect be made by the
Judicial and Bar Council, with the President
performing only the mathematical act of
formalizing the commission.


By Impeachment. The Members of the

Supreme Court are removable only by

impeachment. They can be said to have
failed to satisfy the requirement of good
behaviour only if they are guilty of the
oenses which are constitutional grounds
of impeachment.

 Grounds for Removal*

1. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
2. Treason;
3. Bribery;
4. Graft and Corruption;
5. Other High Crimes
6. Betrayal of Public Trust

*(Article XI, Section 2)

!A Supreme Court Justice cannot be charged

in a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding,

because the ultimate eect of either is to
remove him from oce, and thus circumvent
the provision on removal by impeachment
thus violating his security of tenure (In Re:
First Endorsement from Hon. Raul
Gonzalez, A.M. No. 88-4-5433)

 General Power (Judicial Power)

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

1) To decide all cases involving the

constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or
o p e r a t i o n o f p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c r e e s ,
proclamations, orders, instructions,
ordinances, and other regulations.
v Article VIII, Section 4(1)
v

!2)

Exercise original jurisdiction over cases

aecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.
!Article VIII, Section 5(1)

 (3) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or arm

on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules

of Court may provide, nal judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or

validity of any treaty, international or executive

a g r e e m e n t , l a w , p r e s i d e n t i a l d e c r e e ,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax,

impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty

imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any
lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question
of law is involved.

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law.
All other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc.
All cases involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations.
Cases where the majority votes cannot be obtained in
division.
Cases where the SC modies doctrine or principle of
law.

!NO. Decision or resolutions of a division of a

court is not appealable to en banc. Decision

or resolution promulgated by a division is
actually a decision or resolution of the
Supreme Court. SC en banc is not an
appellate court with respect to the decisions
or resolutions of a division. Each division is
not considered as inferior to SC en banc.

 Article VIII, Section 5(5)

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,

and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplied and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain eective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.

 THUS:

SC has the power to promulgate

rules concerning:
1. The protection and enforcement of

constitutional rights;
2. Pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts;
3. The admission to the practice of law,
4. The Integrated Bar;
5. Legal assistance to the underprivileged.

 HOWEVER: SC power to promulgate rules

has limitations:
1. Such rules shall provide a simplied and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases.
2. They shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade.
3. They shall not diminish, increase, modify
substantive rights.

 One

of the limitations on SC rule making

power is that it must not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights.
Substantive law vs. Procedural law
Substantive law creates, denes and
regulates rights while Procedural law
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion

What is involved in this case is the

Constitutionality of R.A. 972 (Bar Flunkers Act of
1953). This law provided that those bar
examiners who obtained a certain grade from
1946 to 1955 should be allowed admission to the
bar.
It should be noted that at that time, the 1935
Constitution gives the Congress the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules
promulgated by the SC.

In determining whether the law is valid the SC

distinguished the authority to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the actual admission to practice through the
application of these rules.
According to the Court, the rst is a legislative or
quasi-legislative function and in it the legislature
had been given a revisory role subordinate to the
role of the Court. The second is a judicial function
and the legislature exercised no revisory role.

!In this case, Atty. Edillon the requirement of

membership in the Integrated Bar as a pre-

condition for the practice of law. Specically,
Atty. Edillon questioned the payment of dues
as condition for continued membership in the
Integrated Bar.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the

Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the
Bar examinations. All that integration actually does
is to provide an ocial national organization for the
well-dened but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to

associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or
vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses.
The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneciaries of
the regulatory program the lawyers.

We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the

Court, under its constitutional power and duty to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which
power the respondent acknowledges from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration.

 This is a petition to disqualify Atty. De Vera to

be elected a governor of IBP Eastern

Mindanao.
Atty. De Vera contended that the Court has
no jurisdiction over the controversy as it
involved internal matter which is primarily
governed by IBP By-Laws.

 The contention of Atty. De Vera is untenable.

Section 5(5) confers on the Court the power to

promulgate rules aecting the IBP. Implicit in
this constitutional grant is the power to
supervise all activities of the IBP including the
election of its ocers. Even the IBP By-Laws
recognizes this power of the Supreme Court. In
fact Section 44 thereof gives the Court the
power to remove members of Board of
Governors.

!It is the power of the Supreme Court

to declare a law, treaty, international

or executive agreement, presidential
d e c r e e , p r o c l a m a t i o n , o r d e r,
instruction, ordinance or regulation
unconstitutional.

!ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY

!IT MUST BE RAISED BY A PROPER

PARTY
!I T MUST BE RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST PROPER OPPORTUNITY
!IT MUST BE NECESSARY TO THE
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE

 Actual case or controversy involves conicts

of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal

claims susceptible of judicial resolutions.
There is no actual case or controversy if the
petitioners merely ask for opinion or the case
is already considered moot.
The controversy must be denite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of the
parties having adverse legal interest.

Corona vs. Senate

The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the

proceedings in the Senate. It was dismissed for being

moot.

PACU vs. Secretary of Education

Petitioner questioned the regulation of the respondent

requiring private colleges and universities to operate to

rst obtain permit before they can operate.

PHILCONSA vs. Villareal

It was a petition to compel the Speaker to produce the

book accounts of that body in which were recorded the

amounts appropriated by legislators for their allowances.

 A proper party is one who has sustained or

is in immediate danger of sustaining an

injury as a result of the act complained of.
Unless and until such actual or potential
injury is established, the complaint cannot
have the legal personality to raise
constitutional question.

 Is

substantial or potential injury rule

absolute?
Jurisprudence allow the liberal approach
to standing. When the subject in issue is of
transcendental interest to the public, the
Court entertain the suit even if those suing
have no personal or direct interest such
that they are stand to suer harm.

 What are the exceptions to the general

rule on standing?

Overbreadth doctrine
Taxpayer suits
Third party standing
Doctrine of transcendental importance.

!The overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool

developed for testing "on their faces" statutes

in free speech cases, also known under the
American Law as First Amendment cases.
!Simply put, the validity of the law may be
facially challenged if it tends to reach and
make punishable the constitutionally
protected speech.

Why is this an exception to the general rule on

standing?
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent eect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very
existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent eect on the speech of those
third parties.

 In other words, anybody, not necessarily the

one actually aected or would tend to be

aected by the statute, may challenge the
validity of the law on its face.
Thus, the general rule on standing does not
apply.

 Third party standing is the right of the litigant

to bring suit in behalf of third party.

Third party standing to be applicable the
following requisites must be present:
Injury-in-fact
Close relation to third party
Hindrance to third partys ability to protect his

or his interest

Ordinance No. 7774: An Ordinance

Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishment in the City of Manila

The Petitioners in this case are owners of the

motels whose business will be greatly aected
by implementation of the ordinance. None of
the patrons who avail of short-time services or
wash up schemes questioned the validity of the
ordinance.
Petitioners assail the validity of the Ordinance
on grounds of due process: 1) as to them,
deprivation of property; 2) as to their patrons,
restriction of their liberty.

Can petitioners invoke as ground for the

invalidity of the Ordinance that which is properly
invocable by their patrons who were not
impleaded or part of the suit?

"We have recognized the right of litigants to

bring actions on behalf of third parties,
provided three important criteria are satised:
the litigant must have suered an injury-in-
fact, thus giving him or her a "suciently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute; the litigant must have a close
relation to the third party; and there must exist
some hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests.

 Herein, it is clear that the business interests

of the petitioners are likewise injured by the

Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of
their customers for their continued viability
which appears to be threatened by the
enforcement of the Ordinance.

 Taxpayer

suit may be allowed if the case

involves expenditure of public funds,
provided it can be shown:
That he has sucient interest in preventing the

illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation

That he will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
enforcement of the questioned statute.

T h e P r e p a r a t o r y C o m m i s s i o n o n
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by
President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43)
in order to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987
C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d t h e m a n n e r o f
implementing the same.

 Petitioner

disputes the constitutionality of

the PCCR on Two Grounds.
First, he contends that it is a public oce which

only the legislature can create by way of a law.

Secondly, petitioner asserts that by creating such
a body the President is intervening in a process
from which he is totally excluded by the
Constitution the amendment of the
fundamental charter.

 A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to

raise a constitutional issue when it is

established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law
or the Constitution. Thus payers action is
properly brought only when there is an
exercise by Congress of its taxing or
spending power.

 In this case, there is no exercise by Congress

of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR

was created by the President by virtue of E.O.
No. 43, as amended by E.O. No. 70. Under
section 7 of E.O. No. 43, the amount of P3
million is appropriated for its operational
expenses to be sourced from the funds of
the Oce of the President.

The appropriations for the PCCR were

authorized by the President, not by Congress.
In fact, there was no an appropriation at all.
The funds used for the PCCR were taken from
funds intended for the Oce of the
President, in the exercise of the Chief
Executives power to transfer funds pursuant
to section 25 (5) of article VI of the
Constitution.

 In

a strict sense, appropriation has been

dened as nothing more than the legislative
authorization prescribed by the Constitution
that money may be paid out of the Treasury,
while appropriation made by law refers to the
act of the legislature setting apart or
assigning to a particular use a certain sum to
be used in the payment of debt or dues from
the State to its creditors.

 Political

questions doctrine constitutes

another limitation on the power of judicial
review. This is one class of cases which the
Court refuses to touch.
But what is political questions? When can
we say that an issue in a case is a political
question?

 T h o s e q u e s t i o n s w h i c h u n d e r t h e
Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government.
Tanada vs. Cuenco

Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political

complexion if:
"Textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department.

In other words, if it is clear from the language

of the constitution that the resolution of the

issue is committed to a coordinate political
department.

Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political

complexion if:
A lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it.
Or it is impossible for the court to decide
without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.

Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political complexion

if:
The impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of
government.
An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made.
The potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.

Baker vs. Carr: Cases are of political complexion

if:
The impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of
government.
An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made.
The potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.

However, because of the expanded denition of

judicial power under the 1987 Constitution, the
criteria of political question in Baker vs. Carr are
not applicable.
But, it should not be misconstrued that the 1987
Constitution has not nullied the long standing
doctrine on political question. They are still
applicable but not as frequently applied during the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution when the Philippine
was under the dictatorship.

 Arroyo vs. De Venecia, August 14, 1997

Where the issue was whether the Court

could intervene in the case where the

House was said to have disregarded its
own rule. The Court said it could not
because the matter of formulating rules
and implementing those rules belongs to
Congress.

 Santiago vs. Guingona, November 18,

1998
The Court refused to intervene in the
dispute as to who would occupy to the
position not created by the Constitution
but by the Rules of the Senate.

 International

Catholic Migration vs.

Hon. Calleja, September 28, 1990
The conferment by the executive of
diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question which the courts
cannot look into.

 The Supreme Court has rejected the view that

an unconstitutional act confers no rights,

imposes no duties, and aords no protection
whatsoever. Instead, the Court has adopted
the view that before an act is declared
unconstitutional, it is an operative fact
which can be a source of rights and duties.
This is the doctrine of operative fact.

 Article VIII, Section 6. The Supreme Court

shall have administrative supervision over all

courts and the personnel thereof.
Article VIII, Section 11. The Supreme Court
en banc shall have the power to discipline
judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon

M a y t h e O m b u d s m a n i n v e s t i g a t e
irregularities in the performance of a judge
independently of any administrative action
taken by the Supreme Court?

 NO
Maceda vs Vasquez
The power of administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court includes the power to discipline
judges of the lower courts or judiciary personnel. The
exclusivity of this power is zealously guarded by the
SC. Thus, as held in Maceda vs. Vasquez, the
Ombudsman may not investigate a judge
independently of any administrative action of the
Supreme Court.

 Judge Caoiles vs. Ombudsman

Likewise the Ombudsman cannot determine for

itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint

against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel led before it, referred to Supreme
Court for determination as to whether an
administrative aspect is involved therein.