PRELIMINARY ARCHAEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS AT SITE 40KN220, FORT HIGLEY, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE

Submitted To:

Knoxville Civil War Roundtable P.O. Box 313 Knoxville, Tennessee 37901 Submitted By:

MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. 9725 Cogdill Road Knoxville, Tennessee 37932 Authored by: Paul G. Avery, RPA Principal Investigator Graphics By: Chad Caswell Casey Scott

MACTEC Project 3047-09-0004 September 2009

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many individuals and groups assisted with the successful completion of this project. First, I would like to thank Joan Markel and the East Tennessee Civil War Alliance for their efforts in making this project happen. Joan provided much of the background information on the history of the fort and has provided support and guidance throughout the project. My thanks goes to the Knoxville Civil War Roundtable and the Tennessee Civil War National Heritage Area for funding the project. All archaeological projects are team efforts, and I am fortunate to have a great team to work with. Neal Engel, Dan Marcel, Andrew Weidman and Morgan Wilson all contributed to the field work and their efforts are greatly appreciated. A special thank you goes to GIS Specialists Chad Caswell and Casey Scott who prepared the graphics included in this report. Their expertise and creativity in how the data was presented were major contributions to the success of the project. Pat Garrow of MACTEC provided technical expertise for the project and I thank him for his efforts. Emmett Brown served as MACTEC Project Manager. Finally, thanks to Dr. Charles H. Faulkner for making the call that got us involved in the beginning. Thanks, Charlie!

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. II LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ IV I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 PROJECT AREA .................................................................................................. 1 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................ 4 The Civil War in Knoxville .................................................................................. 4 Fort Higley ............................................................................................................ 9 III. METHODS .............................................................................................................. 14 Mapping .............................................................................................................. 14 Metal Detection ................................................................................................... 14 IV. RESULTS ................................................................................................................ 17 V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 44 VI. REFERENCES CITED ........................................................................................... 45

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LIST OF FIGURES Page 1. Project area location map. .......................................................................................... 2 2. The 1864 Poe Map, drawn to show the Union and Confederate positions around Knoxville. The location of Fort Higley and surrounding landmarks are marked for clarity. ................................................................................................................. 12 3. The extant house, facing east. .................................................................................. 13 4. The driveway from Cherokee Trail to the house, facing southwest. ....................... 13 5. MACTEC archaeologists mapping the site.............................................................. 15 6. The metal detector at work. ..................................................................................... 16 7. Plan view of Fort Higley. ......................................................................................... 18 8. Three-dimensional model of Fort Higley, facing north-northeast. .......................... 19 9. Three-dimensional model showing features, facing north-northeast. ...................... 20 10. Three-dimensional model of Fort Higley, facing northwest. ................................... 21 11. Three-dimensional model showing features, facing northwest. .............................. 22 12. Plan view of the western peak. ................................................................................ 23 13. Gun platform, facing northwest. .............................................................................. 24 14. Southern parapet, facing west. ................................................................................. 24 15. Western parapet, facing north. Note the embrasure in the northern parapet. ......... 25 16. Trench at the base of the western parapet, facing north. ......................................... 25 17. Cross-section of the redoubt. ................................................................................... 26 18. Location of detected metal artifacts. ........................................................................ 28 19. Cross-section of the primary trench. ........................................................................ 29 20. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the western peak, facing east. .......................................................................................................................... 29 21. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the western peak, facing west. ......................................................................................................................... 30 22. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the eastern peak, facing west. ......................................................................................................................... 30 23. The interior rifle trench, facing northeast. ............................................................... 31 24. The historic road, facing southeast. ......................................................................... 32 25. Ramp into the fort, facing northeast. ....................................................................... 32 26. Road from the ramp to the redoubt inside the fort, facing southwest. ..................... 33 27. One of the depressions located north of the redoubt being swept with the metal detector. .................................................................................................................... 33 28. Stone feature in the cluster of depressions east of the redoubt. ............................... 34 29. Test unit location map. ............................................................................................. 36 30. Test Unit 1, profiles. ................................................................................................ 37 31 . Test Unit 1, facing east. .......................................................................................... 38 32. Test Unit 2, profiles. ................................................................................................ 39 33. Test Unit 2, facing west. .......................................................................................... 40 34. Test Unit 3, profiles. ................................................................................................ 42 35. Test Unit 3, facing east. ........................................................................................... 43

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I. INTRODUCTION

On November 26, 1863, Captain Orlando M. Poe, Chief Engineer of the Department of the Ohio, rode to the south side of the Holston River to the ridges overlooking Knoxville. Accompanied by Major General Ambrose E. Burnside, who was concerned about continuing Confederate troop movements south of Knoxville, Poes mission was to lay out a series of defensive works on the hills along the approaches to town. The westernmost of these lay west of the incomplete Knoxville and Charleston Railroad line and approximately 600 yards east of Confederate positions on Armstrong Hill. This position consisted of a two-gun artillery epaulement surrounded by trenches for infantry (United States War Department [USWD] 1890b:294-303). Known as Fort Higley, Poes work never saw combat and was largely concealed by forest after the war. Fort Higley was recorded as archaeological site 40KN220 by Sam Smith and Ben Nance during their survey of Civil War sites in Tennessee in 1997 (Smith and Nance 2003). By 2005, the site of Fort Higley was facing destruction as the area was being considered for residential development. The site was listed on the Civil War Preservation Trusts Top 10 Endangered Battlefields in 2005 (Fitts 2005) and on Knox Heritages Fragile 15 list in 2007 (Knoxville News-Sentinel [KNS] 2007). A portion of the property was placed back on the market in 2008 and was purchased by the non-profit Aslan Foundation with the intent to preserve it (Hickman 2008). The Fort Higley property is now being considered for inclusion in a 1,000-acre preservation corridor planned for South Knoxville (Davis 2008). Funding for preliminary archaeological research at the fort was obtained from the Tennessee Civil War National Heritage Area (TCWNHA) by the Knoxville Civil War Roundtable (KCWR) in December 2008. Archaeologists with MACTEC Engineering and Consulting, Inc. (MACTEC) performed the field investigations in April 2009. The preliminary work included detailed topographical mapping of the extant fortifications and the surrounding area, along with metal detection of selected areas within the site. In addition, three test units were excavated at strategic locations within the site. Mr. Paul G. Avery, RPA, served as Principal Investigator and Field Director for the project. Mr. Avery was assisted in the field by Dan Marcel, Neal Engel, Andrew Weidman, and Morgan Wilson. PROJECT AREA

The project area is located on a high, steep ridge top approximately 500 meters southeast of the south bank of the Tennessee River (Figure 1). The ridge on which the fort is situated is bound on the north by Cherokee Trail, on the east by a railroad, and on the south by an unnamed tributary of Goose Creek. The earthworks encompass two small peaks connected by a narrow saddle. The peaks are at an elevation of approximately 335

meters above mean sea level (amsl) while the saddle lies at slightly more than 330 meters amsl.

Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 1. Project area location map.

Extant features include trenches, which form a rough hourglass-shape around the peaks and the artillery position, which was located on the northwestern-facing side of the western peak. The terrain is steep, with relatively open forest along the crest of the ridge and dense undergrowth on the side slopes. The eastern peak is enclosed by a high chain link fence, which surrounds a modern house. A dirt driveway leads from Cherokee Trail to the east along the side of the ridge toward the house.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The following historical summary of the Civil War period in the Knoxville area is very brief and is intended only to provide context for the study of Fort Higley. The majority of this material is taken from published sources. THE CIVIL WAR IN KNOXVILLE

As the possibility of war become more likely by the end of 1860, the people of Tennessee had to decide whether or not to secede from the union. A vote in February 1861 on whether a convention should be held to discuss secession revealed that Knox Countians were overwhelmingly against even considering it. But the attack on Fort Sumter in April forced a decision to be made. Governor Isham Harris recommended that the state join the Confederacy, but put the issue to a vote of the people. The state as a whole voted overwhelmingly to secede, but this was primarily due to the large plantation owners of Middle and West Tennessee who relied on slave labor. East Tennesseans, on the other hand, subsisted primarily on small farms or on small businesses and owned few slaves. Therefore, most of East Tennessee, including Knoxville and Knox County voted against secession, with more Confederate sympathizers residing in Knoxville than in the rural areas (Rothrock 1946). The strategic importance of East Tennessee was readily apparent to the new Confederate government, which stationed troops across the region even before the June vote. The railroads running through Knox County provided one of the few links between the North and South. East Tennessee was also an important source of pork, poultry, and produce, as well as horses and mules. By July 1861, regular Confederate forces under the command of General Felix Zollicoffer had occupied Knoxville. Zollicoffer was under orders to be lenient with Union sympathizers in the hope that they would convert to the side of the Confederacy. Unionists, led by men such as William Parson Brownlow, whose Knoxville Whig newspaper was vehemently anti-Confederate, remained vocal in their opposition (Rothrock 1946; Temple 1995). In October 1861, Jefferson Davis ordered everyone in East Tennessee to take an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. Many pro-Union citizens left the state rather than take the oath, while many others took it rather than leave, although their sympathies did not change. Union resistance came to a head and Confederate leniency ended on the night of November 8, 1861, when five railroad bridges, including the East Tennessee and Virginia Bridge at Strawberry Plains and the Lick Creek Bridge in Greene County, were burned by groups of Union sympathizers. Enraged by this act, Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin ordered that anyone found guilty of bridge burning be hanged. Six Greene County men were arrested for their role in the burning of the Lick Creek Bridge,

five of whom were hanged. These bridges were rebuilt and became the focus of numerous skirmishes throughout the war (Rothrock 1946; Temple 1995). By 1863, the Confederate forces in East Tennessee had passed to the command of General Simon Buckner. Confederate defeats in Tennessee at Fort Donelson and Fort Henry forced General Braxton Braggs Army of Tennessee to retreat to North Georgia. As a result, Buckner was ordered to march to Georgia with as many troops as he could spare to reinforce Braggs forces (Rothrock 1946). He departed Knoxville on June 27th with 3,000 soldiers, leaving the city protected by between 1,000 and 2,000 men. This is surprising in light of the raid on Knoxville by Union Calvary under Colonel W. P. Sanders only one week before and word of a large Union force arriving near Jamestown on June 26th (USWD 1889a, 1889b). Sanders raid began on June 14, 1863, when he left Mt. Vernon, Kentucky, with 1,500 mounted troops and a battery of artillery. They reached Montgomery, Tennessee, on June 17th, and sent a small force to Wartburg about one mile away to attack a group of Confederates said to be there. Sanders men completely surprised them, capturing 104 men and a large amount of supplies. After paroling the prisoners and destroying the supplies, the raiders marched toward Kingston. After learning that the approaches to Kingston were heavily guarded, Sanders headed toward Lenoirs Station, which he reached by the morning of June 19th. There the raiders captured 65 artillerymen, their cannons, and another depot full of supplies. The depot and rail cars were burned, along with a cotton factory. From there, they traveled along the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad toward Knoxville, stopping every mile to destroy the tracks and the telegraph lines. They encountered the pickets on the outskirts of Knoxville at approximately 7 oclock that evening. Sanders left a force on the west side of the city, but moved the bulk of his troops around the city, cutting off the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad east of the city (USWD 1889a). At dawn on June 20th, Sanders moved into Knoxville along the Tazewell road, where he found the city well defended. The raiders captured 31 men, two artillery pieces, and 80 horses around the city. From Knoxville, they proceeded along the railroad toward Strawberry Plains, destroying bridges and depots as they went, including a covered bridge over Flat Creek. From there, they left the railroad, crossing to the south side of the Holston River where they attacked the bridge. During the skirmish with Confederate troops guarding the bridge, the Union cavalrymen captured 139 men, five artillery pieces, and a large amount of supplies and destroyed the bridge. On June 21st, the raiders returned to the railroad and moved toward New Market, destroying track as they went, burning the bridge over Mossy Creek, and capturing 120 men and a large amount of stores. From this point, Sanders decided to leave the area via the mountains as it had become clear that Confederate forces under General Samuel Jones were in pursuit (USWD 1889a). From New Market, Sanders led his forces to the north where they crossed the Holston River at Hayworth (sic) Bend on their way to Powder Springs Gap on Clinch Mountain. He planned to pass through the mountains via Rogers Gap but was blocked by

Confederate forces there. With the enemy behind him and in front, he led the raiders along a small mountain path, requiring the destruction and abandonment of his artillery pieces. They succeeded in passing through Smiths Gap and reached Boston, Kentucky, on June 24th, having two killed, four wounded, and 13 missing. The raid was very successful, resulting in the capture and parole of 461 prisoners and the destruction of miles of railroad, numerous bridges, depots, and tons of supplies (USWD 1889a). The first large scale Union offensive to retake East Tennessee began on August 16, 1863, when Major General Ambrose Burnside, Commander of the Army of the Ohio, and 15,000 men of the Twenty-Third Corps under General Hartsuff left Kentucky. On September 1st, the Union forces had reached Kingston. Colonel John W. Foster, in command of the Second Cavalry Division, arrived in Knoxville the next day, followed by Burnside and the main force on the 3rd. They met little resistance, but learned upon their arrival that Cumberland Gap was still occupied by Confederate forces. Burnside and a small detachment from the Twenty-Third Corps marched to the gap, where they arrived on September 9th. Burnside demanded the surrender of the 2,500 troops garrisoned there, which he received, prompting him to write in his report (USWD 1890a:549), We were now in possession of all the important points in East Tennessee, and in the midst of friends. On September 14th, having returned to Knoxville, Burnside ordered the Twenty-Third Corps to advance into upper East Tennessee, except for one brigade which was to stay in Knoxville. Cavalry forces had already advanced into this region, with Colonel Foster coming into contact with a large force under Confederate General Jones. By the 16th, orders had arrived for Burnside to recall his troops and send them south to assist Rosecrans at Chickamauga, Georgia. Burnside issued the order and telegraphed to Kentucky to have the Ninth Corps join him at Knoxville. By the time he returned to Knoxville on September 24th, this order had been rescinded. The Ninth Corps arrived with 6,000 men on the 30th (USWD 1890a). By the end of September 1863, the Federal advance had reach Bulls Gap, between Morristown and Greeneville. Burnside sent the Ninth Corps up the valley to support the forces already there. On October 10th, contact was made with Confederate forces at Blue Springs between Bulls Gap and Greeneville. The Union cavalry skirmished with the Confederates through most of the day. Colonel Fosters mounted troops were sent around their rear to cut off any avenue of retreat. By 5 oclock that afternoon, the Federal infantry advanced, driving the Confederates out of their lines. They retreated that night, but the Union forces pursued them across the Watauga River, where Foster was supposed to have cut them off. Unfortunately for the Federals, bad roads prevented Foster from arriving in time to prevent the Confederates from escaping. After the battle, the Ninth Corps returned to Knoxville (USWD 1890a). In late October, Burnside had extended his forces south to Loudon to guard the river crossing. Word had come that a large force of Confederates was moving toward East Tennessee; so on October 28th, Burnsides troops crossed to the north bank of the river and removed the pontoon bridge that they had constructed there. The bridge components

were sent by rail to Knoxville, where it was reconstructed, connecting Knoxville with southern Knox County (USWD 1890b). By early November, it was known that General Longstreet was in command of between 20,000 and 40,000 troops intent on invading East Tennessee (USWD 1890b). On November 14th, the advance guard of Longstreets column made contact with Burnsides troops at Lenoirs Station. The Confederates built a bridge between Loudon and Lenoirs Station, putting a small force across ahead of the main column to try and take the high ground around Loudon. Burnsides troops were able to hold the Confederates in place, but he ordered a retreat toward Knoxville the next day. Skirmishing continued through the day, with the Union army moving up the road toward Knoxville (USWD 1890b). As Longstreets troops advanced, Burnside continued to retreat toward Knoxville. On November 16th, he sent General Wilcox to Cumberland Gap with a small force to ensure communication with the north if the telegraph lines were cut, which they were that night. Realizing that his ability to reach Knoxville via the Kingston Road was in jeopardy, he sent General Hantrafts Division of the Ninth Corps ahead of his main force to take the junction near Campbells Station where he would join the road to Knoxville. Failure to capture this point would have allowed the Confederates to cut off the Federal retreat. Hantraft arrived well ahead of Longstreet, and by 11 a.m. the entire Federal force had passed onto the Kingston Road. Burnside immediately established defensive positions, and was attacked by the Confederates at noon. The Federals held their position, but Burnside ordered a withdrawal to a more favorable position, which they reached late that afternoon. After another attack by the Confederates which was repulsed, the Federals departed the field for the relative safety of Knoxville (USWD 1890b). Back in Knoxville, Burnside prepared to defend the city. It had been decided that Knoxville and East Tennessee must be held. The reasons for this were clearly stated in a report by Lieutenant Colonel James H. Wilson, Assistant Inspector-General, to General Grant on November 13, 1863 (USWD 1890b:265) as follows: it is of the first importance to hold East Tennessee, because doing so he draws an ample supply of bread, meat, and forage from the rich country between the Clinch River, Rogersville, and the great Smoky Mountains, for his entire force protects and encourages a large population of loyal people, and deprives the enemy of a source of supplies of the greatest necessity to him. By the 18th, the Federals were ready for the attack that they knew was imminent (USWD 1890b). On November 17th, Burnside ordered the cavalry forces under now Brigadier General Sanders to dismount and hold the Confederates approximately one mile from the defensive lines getting established in Knoxville. They accomplished this mission, and Burnside recalled them on the 18th when the defensive positions were complete. Unfortunately, Sanders had been wounded earlier that day and died on the 19th in Knoxville (USWD 1890b). Burnside (USWD 1890b:275) wrote, The service lost, in the death of General Sanders, one of the most noble spirits, and we, his comrades, a beloved and faithful friend.

By November 23, 1863, the Confederate siege of Knoxville had begun in earnest, with almost constant shelling into the town and skirmishing along the defensive line. Burnsides force consisted of approximately 12,000 troops, not including numerous Unionist citizens who had volunteered to assist them. Longstreet commanded between 20,000 and 23,000 menmostly hardened veterans from the Army of Northern Virginia. Late on November 28th, the Confederates drove the Union pickets to within 80 yards of Fort Sanders on the northwest corner of the defenses. The fort was begun during the Confederate occupation of Knoxville, and continued by Lieutenant S. N. Benjamin, who commanded the fort under Burnside. It was named Fort Sanders in honor of the fallen General Sanders. The defenses of the fort included a deep, narrow ditch in conjunction with high earthen walls. Strands of telegraph wire had been strung before the ditch to entangle anyone approaching the fort (USWD 1890b). During the night of November 28th, Lieutenant Benjamin prepared for the attack that he knew would be directed at his position. At 6:30 the next morning, the Confederate artillery began a barrage that lasted 20 minutes but did little damage. Shortly after the barrage ended, the infantry advanced, fired a volley of musketry, then charged. Those who were not killed or entangled crossing the open ground toward the wall of the fort soon reached the ditch. Upon entering the ditch and attempting to scale the wall, they were slaughtered. Union artillery fired triple loads of canister shot into the massed troops while riflemen inside the fort and on the lines adjacent to it fired into them as well. Another charge was mounted with the same result. Only 13 Union soldiers were killed (USWD 1890b). The battle at Fort Sanders marked the end of major action in Knoxville. On December 2nd, Burnside received word that General Sherman was en route to Knoxville with 25,000 men. The morning of December 5th saw the withdrawal of Longstreets forces, lifting the siege of Knoxville, which would remain in Federal hands for the duration of the war. Sherman arrived on the 6th, but it was decided to send him elsewhere as the immediate threat to Knoxville had ended the day before (USWD 1890b). On December 7th, the pursuit of Longstreet into upper East Tennessee began, with 10,000 troops from the Ninth and Twenty-Third Corps under Major General John G. Parke comprising the Union force. General Burnside, having suffered from poor health earlier in the year, was replaced by Major General John G. Foster as commander of the Army of the Ohio on December 11th (USWD 1890b). Foster continued with the pursuit of Longstreet, who was at Rogersville by the 14th. On December 17th, having discovered that Shermans troops were not with Parke, Longstreet attacked, pushing the Federal troops from Bean Station and forcing their retreat to Blains Crossroads. Longstreet moved across the Holston to Morristown, where he went into winter quarters, although cavalry skirmishes continued on a daily basis. This culminated in a large cavalry engagement at Mossy Creek on December 29th, where the Confederates were defeated (USWD 1890b). Longstreet and his troops were recalled to the Army of Northern Virginia early in 1864.

The last effort of the Confederate army to retake East Tennessee came in November 1864 when General Breckinridge advanced into the region with approximately 3,000 cavalry and infantrymen. He attacked Union forces under General Gillem at Bulls Gap, forcing their retreat to Knoxville (National Park Service [NPS] 2002). By November 18th, Breckinridge had advanced through Strawberry Plains to the outskirts of Knoxville, but he was pushed back by Federal troops under General Ammen, including 1,500 reinforcements from Chattanooga. General Stoneman, who had recently taken command of Federal forces near Knoxville, pursued Breckinridge toward Virginia (USWD 1894). Stoneman successfully pushed the Confederates into Saltville, Virginia, where the Union forces destroyed the major salt works located there. In his December 27, 1864, report on his actions in East Tennessee and Southwest Virginia (USWD 1894:807-808), Stoneman wrote that at Saltville, In prisoners, our captures amount to 34 officers, 845 enlisted men, and 2 newspaper editors. These last were sent as a Christmas present to the proprietor of the Knoxville (Rebel) Ventilator. The proprietor of the Knoxville (Rebel) Ventilator was William Brownlow, who had returned to Knoxville after the siege. He goes on to write that East Tennessee is free from any organized body of the enemy, thus marking the end of major military action in East Tennessee. FORT HIGLEY

Following the repulse of the Confederate advance south of the river on November 25, 1863, at Armstrong Hill, the Union command recognized the need to fortify their position in that area. As a result, a series of small, earthen forts were planned on the heights to guard the approaches to the city from the south. The officer in charge of placing and designing the works was Captain Orlando M. Poe, serving as Chief Engineer for the Department of the Ohio and attached to Burnsides Army of the Ohio. On November 26, Poe, in the company of Burnside, visited a hill south of the river that was approximately 600 yards from Armstrong Hill. While they were there, Poe laid out the positions of an artillery epaulement for two guns (USWD 1890b:298). The next evening, November 27, Poe again visited the area south of Knoxville, as he wrote (USWD 1890b:298): The enemy still appeared to threaten us on the south side of the river. I again carefully examined the heights opposite Knoxville, this time accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock. After consultation, it was decided that no change should be made in the line I had previously selected, and that we ought to begin at once the construction of works. Commenced a battery for two guns and a line of rifle-pits on the first hill west of the Maryville railroad.

It is apparent from this quote that the work on Fort Higley began that day. According to Hess (2009), much of the work was conducted by men from the First and Second Brigade of the Third Division of the Twenty-third Corps. It appears that freed slaves, referred to as contrabands were also employed in the construction of the works. Poe wrote (USWD 1890b:302); here I feel it my duty to refer to the great value of the services of the contrabands. Tractable and willing (many of them came to me and volunteered to work), they did an amount of work which was truly astonishing. Day and night they worked without a murmur. For the first week they labored regularly eighteen hours out of the twenty-four, and during the whole siege, out of nearly 200 that we had at work, only 1 asked to be excused, and he only for one afternoon. It is unclear when the fortifications were completed, but work continued south of the river well beyond the end of the siege on December 4. Burnside issued General Order 37 on December 11, which named the works surrounding Knoxville for men who had fallen during the various actions in the area. Fort Higley was named for Captain Joel P. Higley of the Seventh Ohio Cavalry who was killed on October 10, 1863, at the Battle of Blue Springs (USWD 1890b:312). Poe provided an excellent description of the terrain and works south of the river in his report to Burnside of January 13, 1864 (USWD 1890b:301-302). On the south side of the river the ground rises into a series of prominent points, the highest of which is about 350 feet, and is directly opposite Knoxville, the prolongation of Gay Street passing directly over it. These knobs formed a range quite close to the river bank, with a wide valley beyond them. It was all important to us that at least three of these knobs should be held. We actually held four of them, commencing with the first hill east of the Louisville road and counting down the river. As already stated, the enemy made several attempts to get possession of these heights, the first being made on Sunday, November 15, by a heavy force of cavalry, under the command of Wheeler, which was repulsed by Sanders division of cavalry, which had been guarding the right bank of the Little Tennessee, and had gradually fallen back before Wheelers heavier force. Sanders was assisted by Camerons brigade of infantry. From these heights an artillery fire can be delivered in front of each flank of the lines on the north side of the river. Commencing with the most easterly hill (which we called Sevierville Hill) and numbering them 1, 2, 3 and 4, our works were as follows: On No. 1, only rifletrenches; on No. 2, Fort Stanley; on No. 3, Fort Dickerson; on No. 4, Fort Higley. Nos. 1 and 2 were connected by rifle-trenches, while Nos. 3 and 4, though not connected, each was well provided with rifle-trenches to cover the infantry supports of the batteries. With sufficient time this disposition could be very much improved by making the several forts of such a character (building bomb-proofs for stores and cisterns for water) that each would be self-reliant.

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Beginning in December 1863, Poe supervised the survey and mapping of the terrain and the disposition of both the Union and Confederate lines. The resulting map (Poe 1864), referred to herein as the Poe map (Figure 2), provides a clear and apparently accurate picture of the locations of the various works and their relationship to the terrain and other features, such as the river and the existing road system. Although Union forces occupied Knoxville through the end of the war, it is not known how long Fort Higley was garrisoned or by whom. By 1865, it appears that Fort Higley had been abandoned as it was not mentioned in Brigadier General Z. B. Towers April 4 report on his inspection of the Knoxville and Chattanooga defenses (USWD 1897:213216). In the ensuing years as Knoxville began to grow, Fort Higley somehow avoided destruction during development. This may be due to the steep terrain on which the fort was constructed. Sometime during the mid to late Twentieth century, a house was constructed on the eastern peak (Figure 3), which may have damaged intact Civil War deposits, but does not appear to have impacted any earthworks. The house is now surrounded by a high chainlink fence topped with razor wire, which encloses an area of approximately 0.67 acres, including the house. A dirt driveway extends approximately 360 meters from Cherokee Trail to the house (Figure 4). The driveway destroyed a portion of the rifle trench to the south of the western peak, but this appears to be the extent of the disturbance to the earthworks. Fort Higley was recorded as archaeological site 40KN220 by Sam Smith and Ben Nance during their survey of Civil War sites in Tennessee in 1997 (Smith and Nance 2003). The site now stands ready to become a vital link in the Knoxville Urban Wilderness and Historic Corridor planned for South Knoxville.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 2. The 1864 Poe Map, drawn to show the Union and Confederate positions around Knoxville. The location of Fort Higley and surrounding landmarks are marked for clarity.

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Figure 3. The extant house, facing east.

Figure 4. The driveway from Cherokee Trail to the house, facing southwest.

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III. METHODS

The preliminary archaeological research at Fort Higley included detailed topographical mapping of the earthworks and surrounding area along with a metal detector-sweep of selected areas and the excavation of a sample of detected artifacts. In addition, three test units were excavated in strategic locations. MAPPING

The primary goal of this project was the creation of maps showing not only the location of the works on the landscape, but also the vertical relationship of the works with the surrounding terrain. To accomplish this task, a Nikon Total Station transit connected to a TDS Recon data collector was used to record a series of points across the landscape (Figure 5). A datum point (1000 North, 1000 East, 100 meters elevation) was established to the west of the western peak between the artillery position and the outer trench. Lines of points were recorded perpendicular to given features in order to ensure that the features were clearly visible on the resulting maps. Sufficient points were recorded to produce a plan map of the area as well as to construct three-dimensional representations of the features using appropriate GIS software. Selected points were also recorded using a Trimble GeoExplorer XH GPS receiver, which enabled the placement of the recorded points in real space. The GPS was also utilized in areas not accessible to the transit. The GPS data was imported into Trimble GPS Pathfinder Office, converted to ESRI shapefiles and then opened in ArcMap. The Total Station data was exported to a spreadsheet and then imported into ArcMap. Background images such as aerials, topographic maps, and historic maps were geo-referenced and then imported into ArcMap. Geo-referencing a map involves establishing its location in the real world. Geo-referenced aerials and topographic maps were obtained from the USGS. The Poe (1864) map was geo-referenced by MACTEC. Once all the data and maps are integrated into ArcMap, the data can be manipulated to color code certain features and other elements, such as legends and a scale, are added. METAL DETECTION

Selected portions of the site, including the artillery emplacement, portions of the trench and other identified features, were swept using a metal detector. Two Fisher M-Scope 1225-X Automatic Metal Detectors were used to conduct the survey. A low discrimination setting (0-1) was used to ensure that small, ferrous metal artifacts were detected. This can be problematic in areas where mineralized soils are found as false positives may occur. This problem was noted across the site, but areas where colluvium

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Figure 5. MACTEC archaeologists mapping the site. had gathered, such as within the trenches, were especially prone to false positives. To counteract this problem, the discrimination setting was set slightly higher (4), which still allowed for the location of ferrous metal artifacts. The highest sensitivity setting (10) was used to allow for the detection of more deeply buried metal artifacts. Once an artifact was detected, the pinpoint function was used to more accurately locate the object. A non-conductive pin flag was then used to mark the location. Each detected artifact was given a sequential number. The location of each artifact was recorded using the Total Station. The proper technique for using the metal detector calls for the coil to be held parallel to and as close to the ground surface as possible. This was difficult in many areas of the site as small trees and thick leaf litter obscured the ground. In areas where the leaves were particularly thick, such as the trenches, a yard rake was used to expose the ground surface (Figure 6). The scope of work for this project allowed for the excavation of 10 artifacts from areas selected by the field director, not to exceed 50. Artifacts chosen for excavation were removed using a shovel and screening the soil until the artifact was recovered. The soils were screened through -inch mesh and a record of the soil conditions encountered and the material present kept in the field directors notes. Modern refuse, such as bottle caps or wire nails, or fragments of barbed wire were not retained for analysis.

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Figure 6. The metal detector at work.

TEST UNIT EXCAVATION Test units were located to explore specific surface features, including a depression and the gun platform within the redoubt. The test unit located to examine the depression measured one meter by two meters while the two within the redoubt measured one meter by one meter. The units were excavated by arbitrary 10 centimeter levels to the sterile subsoil. All excavated soil was screened through -inch mesh. After excavation, scale drawings of representative profiles were prepared and the unit was photographed, both in profile and plan view. Soil descriptions and other information pertinent to each unit were recorded on standardized forms.

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IV. RESULTS

The plan map and three-dimensional models of the site were created using the 2,885 data points recorded during this project. The plan map includes all of the features recorded, including a road south of the fort that was recorded using the GPS (Figure 7). The threedimensional models include only the features in the immediate area of the fort (Figures 811). The major features recorded included the artillery redoubt, the primary rifle trench, an interior rifle trench, a portion of the ramp into the fort and a series of depressions located on the southeastern end of the fort. The modern dirt driveway leading to the extant late Twentieth century house was also included, along with the historic road located south of the fort. The artillery position located on the western peak was the primary reason for Fort Higleys construction (Figure 12). The extant features associated with this position include a flat, slightly depressed area, probably the gun platform (Figure 13), surrounded by earthen walls on three sides with a broad trench to the south and west. The walls, which are the parapets that protected the guns and their crews (Figures 14 and 15), are low and broad, covering the north, south and west sides of the gun platform. A depression in the northern wall near the northwest corner may mark the location of an embrasure, an opening in the parapet (Figure 16) where the gun would have been placed (NPS 1998). Two slight depressions in the western parapet may also be remnants of embrasures. The trench is broad and relatively deep and runs parallel to the base of the western and southern parapets (Figure 16), but extends slightly beyond the northern end of the parapet toward the outer rifle trench. It is likely that the parapet is not as high or steep as it was originally constructed due to erosion. Likewise, the trench was probably deeper with steeper sides than its current form. A cross-section of the redoubt is presented in Figure 17. Poe (USWD 1890b:298) described the artillery position as an epaulement for two guns. An epaulement is defined as a semi-circular parapet protecting a single cannon, typically ditched in front (NPS 1998:84). A different definition is provided by Smith and Nance (2003:246), who define an epaulement as an earthen wall constructed on the open ends or flanks of a battery fortification to protect the flanks from enemy fire. Some sources use the term to denote both the front and flanks of the parapet of a battery. Portions of both definitions would seem to apply to the extant features noted at Fort Higley, but neither seems to apply completely. Based on its current form, the artillery position fits the definition of a redoubt better than an epaulement. Redoubts were completely enclosed and constructed in the form of a square, polygon or circle depending on the terrain (NPS 1998). Although there is no enclosure on the eastern side of the position at Fort Higley, it closely resembles the general form of a redoubt.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 7. Plan view of Fort Higley.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 8. Three-dimensional model of Fort Higley, facing north-northeast.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 9. Three-dimensional model showing features, facing north-northeast.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 10. Three-dimensional model of Fort Higley, facing northwest.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 11. Three-dimensional model showing features, facing northwest.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 12. Plan view of the western peak.

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Figure 13. Gun platform, facing northwest.

Figure 14. Southern parapet, facing west.

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Figure 15. Western parapet, facing north. Note the embrasure in the northern parapet.

Figure 16. Trench at the base of the western parapet, facing north.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 17. Cross-section of the redoubt.

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As originally mapped by Poe (1864), the artillery emplacement at Fort Higley more closely resembled a redan in form. A redan consists of a parapet with two faces constructed in a vshape with an open back (NPS 1998; Smith and Nance 2003). It is possible that the position was constructed originally as a redan, with only the two parapets facing west and south. This seems unlikely, however, as the primary threat to Fort Higley lay to the northwest. The entire surface of the redoubt was swept with the metal detector, including the gun platform, both sides of the parapet and the trench. Ten of the 74 detected artifacts were excavated (Figure 18). The only materials recovered were modern metal refuse, primarily bits of rusted barbed wire fencing. None of this material was retained for analysis. It should be noted that an apparent looter pit was located just off the northern end of the western wall of the parapet. It is likely that the area has been extensively swept by collectors, which may account for the lack of Civil War-period artifacts. To provide protection for the artillery redoubt, a rifle trench was constructed that generally followed the contour of the hill below the peaks and saddle between them (see Figures 7, 9 and 11). The primary rifle trench would have measured approximately 858 meters in length. As recorded, approximately 742 meters (86.5 percent) of the trench is extant. This trench is generally well defined, especially to the north and west of the western peak (Figures 19-21). The profile of the primary rifle trench is generally u-shaped, with a slightly angled base on the uphill side. The trench is less well defined and in some areas very difficult to see on the southeastern slope of the eastern peak (Figure 22). Gaps in the trench were noted on the north side of the slope just east of the saddle and in three places on the southeastern slope of the eastern peak. The largest gap occurs where the modern dirt driveway crosses the line south of the western peak. Metal detection in small sections of the primary rifle trench produced only one detected artifact, which proved to be a false positive, likely due to soil conditions. MD10 was excavated within the trench north of the redoubt (see Figure 18). Another trench within the area encircled by the primary rifle trench was shown on the Poe (1864) map on the southeastern side of the eastern peak (see Figures 7, 9 and 11). The interior rifle trench was thought to have been destroyed by the construction of the house, but was located during this survey in extremely thick brush (Figure 23). This trench is much more shallow and narrow than the primary trench. Its purpose within the defensive works is unclear. Fort Higley was constructed just north of road that would have connected it with Fort Dickerson to the east. It is not known if the road was constructed after the forts were built or before. Regardless, this made the transport of artillery pieces, men and supplies to the forts much easier and would have facilitated reinforcement of either position had it been necessary. Poes (1864) map clearly shows this road as well as a smaller road leading directly from it to Fort Higley.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 18. Location of detected metal artifacts.

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Prepared By/Date: CLC 7/29/09 Checked By/Date: PHG 7/30/09

Figure 19. Cross-section of the primary trench.

Figure 20. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the western peak, facing east.

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Figure 21. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the western peak, facing west.

Figure 22. A portion of the primary rifle trench on the north side of the eastern peak, facing west.

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Figure 23. The interior rifle trench, facing northeast. The larger of the two roads was located during this project (see Figure 7). The extant portion of the road begins at Cherokee Trail at the same point where the modern gravel drive begins. The route leads to the northeast as the road generally follows the contours. The road is wide and deeply cut into the side of the steep hill in places (Figure 24). It was mapped using the GPS as it was not practical to use the Total Station. Two trails, later found to lead to the Log Haven community, were noted diverging from the road. Mapping of the road halted at a point where it turned to the north as this was near the project boundary. The smaller road that lead to Fort Higley was not identified during this study, but a portion of the ramp into the fort is extant (Figure 25). The ramp is oriented in a southwest to northeast direction and may have intersected the smaller road as shown on the Poe (1864) map. Remnants of the ramp leading to the redoubt are present as well in the form of a slightly flattened area on the crest of the ridge (Figure 26). Other features noted within the fort included two clusters of relatively small, round depressions (see Figures 7, 9 and 11). The first cluster included five depressions and was located on the side slope above the primary trench north of the redoubt (Figure 27). The second cluster was located just west of the saddle on the south slope and included eight depressions. The depressions were generally shallow and were approximately eight feet in diameter. The function of these features is unclear, but they may have been used as rifle pits before the rest of the works were completed. Both clusters appear to be arranged in rough rows, which may indicate that they were excavated as part of shelters for the troops

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Figure 24. The historic road, facing southeast.

Figure 25. Ramp into the fort, facing northeast.

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Figure 26. Road from the ramp to the redoubt inside the fort, facing southwest.

Figure 27. One of the depressions located north of the redoubt being swept with the metal detector.

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Figure 28. Stone feature in the cluster of depressions east of the redoubt. stationed at the fort. It is possible that they were excavated down then covered with a tent to provide better protection from the elements or that they represent some other form of dugout shelter, such as those noted on Sevierville Hill (Kim et al. 1993). Another isolated depression was located outside the primary trench southwest of the redoubt. All of the depressions in the cluster north of the redoubt were swept with the metal detector, which resulted in the location of just four artifacts. Three of these were identified as Twentieth century debris in the two depressions closest to the redoubt, but no Civil War-period artifacts were recovered. In the second cluster, 13 artifacts were detected in two depressions. The area around a cluster of stone on the southeastern edge of one depression caused the metal detector to beep almost continuously (Figure 28). Labeled MD 8, this area was excavated, but no artifact was recovered. A layer of burned clay was encountered however, that accounts for the false positive. This burned layer certainly indicates that a fire was maintained in this area for some time. This evidence combined with the presence of the stones immediately adjacent may indicate that a crude fireplace or hearth was located here. The presence of the depression immediately adjacent to the burned area may further indicate that the depression was used as some form of shelter while the fort was occupied.

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A detected metal artifact was excavated as Shovel Test 1 in the next depression to the northeast of the one just described. The shovel test was located to examine the fill within the depression and to recover the metallic artifact. The resulting profile indicated that only a thin layer of organic topsoil covered the clay subsoil inside the depression. No artifacts were recovered from the excavated fill. Following completion of the metal detection and the preparation of the maps, MACTEC archaeologists returned to the site to excavate a small number of test units (Figure 29). Test Unit 1 was located to investigate one of the depressions located in the cluster north of the redoubt while Test Units 2 and 3 were located inside the redoubt behind the west parapet. Test Unit 1 measured one meter by two meters and was oriented generally north-south in order to bisect the southern (down-slope) edge of a large depression north of the redoubt. The southern end of the test unit was located near the center of the depression, with the unit extending just beyond its northern margin. Soils within the depression were relatively shallow, while those encountered on the slope were much deeper (Figures 30 and 31). A dense root mat covered the entire surface of the test unit, but was considerably thicker in the southwestern portion. Within the depression, the root mat was underlain by a dark, reddish brown sandy, silty loam. This soil zone lay directly on the red clay subsoil in the western part of the unit, but overlay a zone of dark brown silty sand on the east side. The silty sand layer extended across the unit to the south, lying immediately beneath the root mat. The surface of the subsoil was found to be generally level within the depression, but appeared to follow the slope of the terrain to the north. A large root mold crossed the unit from east to west was noted on the surface of the subsoil. In addition, a small area of charcoal and fragments of burned earth were noted in the northeastern corner of the unit. This appeared to be an incidental inclusion as no evidence of an in situ feature was visible. It remains unclear what the function of the depressions might have been. The irregular base and numerous root related off-shoots typical of remnant tree falls were not present within this feature. However, the reason that the depression would have been dug in this form and in this location is not known. It should also be noted that no artifacts were recovered from any level in Test Unit 1 and no evidence that the depression had been utilized for any length of time was discovered. Test Unit 2, which measured one meter by one meter, was located in the northwest corner of the gun platform between a potential embrasure in the western parapet and another in the northern parapet. It was hoped that an examination of this area would provide evidence in the form of features or artifacts that would allow for the verification that the depressions noted in the parapets were indeed embrasures for artillery pieces. The soils encountered in Test Unit 2 were very shallow, with a surface root mat covering a five to twelve centimeter-thick zone of dark, reddish brown organic silt loam, which directly overlay the red clay subsoil (Figures 32 and 33). The subsoil was encountered no more than 14 centimeters below the ground surface, but a small area was excavated an additional 20 centimeters to ensure that no prepared surface had been placed in this area. No evidence of this was encountered, and no artifacts were recovered.

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Figure 29. Test unit location map.

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Figure 30. Test Unit 1, profiles.

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Figure 31 . Test Unit 1, facing east.

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Figure 32. Test Unit 2, profiles.

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Figure 33. Test Unit 2, facing west.

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Test Unit 3 also measured one meter square and was located in the southwestern corner of the gun platform where the parapet is tallest. Soils were similar to those encountered in Test Unit 2, only shallower (Figures 34 and 35). The red clay subsoil was encountered at a depth of approximately eight centimeters below the ground surface. A scattering of charcoal was noted within the root mat and the underlying organic silt loam on the northern end of the unit, and two ceramic sherds were recovered from immediately beneath the root mat in this area. The sherds included a small portion of the base and footring of a cream-colored ware (CC-ware) plate, which likely dates to the mid-19th century. The other sherd was small portion of a hard-paste porcelain vessel. No decoration was visible on either sherd. Both sherds could date to the Civil War occupation of the site, but this cannot be verified at this time. While no evidence was encountered that would verify the location of the embrasures or as to what specific activities were taking place within the redoubt, it is apparent from the test units that the gun platform itself was graded to the clay subsoil. This is logical since a stable surface would have been necessary to support a piece of artillery. Little soil has gathered behind the parapet from erosion or from natural processes in the intervening years. The lack of artifacts was somewhat surprising as the metal detector sweep of this area produced numerous hits, although those that were excavated proved to be primarily fragments of fencing wire. The overall lack of artifacts recovered from the test units was surprising and may be the result of several factors. It is known that metal detector hobbyists and relic hunters have visited the site frequently for many years. The shallow soil would make recovery very simple, although the proximity of the clay subsoil lead to many false positives during this survey. It is possible that much of the Civil War-era material has been removed by collectors, but they typically leave nails and other iron hardware expected within and around an artillery position. No evidence of illicit digging was noted within the test units or immediately around them, although holes were noted on the western parapet and in a large depression where a detected metal artifact had been excavated during the current survey. No artifact was recovered from the depression during the survey and the hit was determined to be a false positive. Another option is that the occupation of the fort was of such short duration by so few people that little material was left behind. This is highly speculative as it is not known exactly how many soldiers manned Fort Higley or for how long. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the fort was occupied for a short period of time (see USWD 1897:213-216). Soldiers with little to occupy their time would likely have been required to keep the area policed regularly. It may be that much of the refuse from the occupants was deposited in a specific, and yet undiscovered, location, leaving only small amounts of refuse elsewhere. At this time, the answer to this question is not known, but more evidence may be found by future archaeological research.

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Figure 34. Test Unit 3, profiles.

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Figure 35. Test Unit 3, facing east.

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V. CONCLUSION

In April 2009, MACTEC archaeologists performed preliminary archaeological studies at Fort Higley (40KN220) in Knoxville, Tennessee. The site includes the location of Fort Higley, which includes the extant artillery redoubt, primary rifle trench, an interior trench, the ramp into the fort and a series of depressions thought to be rifle pits or shelters. The fort was constructed during the siege of Knoxville in the fall of 1863 and was apparently abandoned by 1865. No fighting is known to have occurred at the fort. The current study included the detailed topographical mapping of the extant earthworks that made up the fort and a metal detector sweep of small portions of the works. In all, 2,885 data points were recorded which were used to construct the maps contained in this report. A metal detector sweep of the redoubt, sections of the trench and the depressions detected 92 metal artifacts but produced none attributable to the Civil War activities at the fort. Three test units were excavated, including one in a depression north of the redoubt and two within the redoubt itself. Only two artifacts were recovered, but information was obtained on the construction of the fort. The unit in the depression, Test Unit 1, revealed that the depression was probably not the result of a fallen tree, but did not provide sufficient evidence to determine the function of this feature. Test Units 2 and 3, located inside the redoubt, revealed that the gun platform had been graded to the subsoil and that little soil had accumulated in the years since the war. Plans call for the inclusion of the site within the proposed Knoxville Urban Wilderness and Historic Corridor, where it will likely be a major attraction. Care should be taken with clearing of trees and brush so that the earthworks are not disturbed. Likewise, the construction of any trails or access to the site should be planned to avoid further disturbance. Should it be necessary to disturb the ground within the site, regardless of the presence or lack of earthworks, further archaeological research should be conducted prior to the disturbance.

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VI. REFERENCES CITED

Davis, Marti 2008 1,000-acre Preservation Corridor Announced in S. Knox. Knoxville NewsSentinel 17 October. Fitts, Deborah 2005 Civil War Preservation Trust List of Endangered Battlefields. Civil War News. Electronic document available at http://www.civilwarnews.com/archive/articles/endangered_battlefields.htm Hess, Earl J. 2009 Report on Fort Higley, Knoxville. Ms. on file, Knoxville Civil War Roundtable, Knoxville. Hickman, Hayes 2008 Group Protects Historic Enclave: Foundation Buys Land with Ties to Civil War to Prevent Development. Knoxville News-Sentinel 18 August. Kim, Yong W., Gary D. Crites, Charles H. Faulkner, Lance K. Greene and Amy Lynne Young 1993 The Sevierville Hill Site: A Civil War Union Encampment on the Southern Heights of Knoxville, Tennessee. Edited by Charles Bentz and Yong W. Kim. Tennessee Anthropological Association Miscellaneous Paper No. 17, University of Tennessee Transportation Center Report of Investigations No. 1. University of Tennessee Transportation Center, Knoxville. Knoxville News-Sentinel (KNS) 2007 A List of the Fragile 15. Knoxville News-Sentinel 15 May. National Park Service (NPS) 1998 Guide to Sustainable Earthworks Management. Prepared by the National Park Service, Washington, D.C., in association with the Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation, Atlanta. 2002 Civil War Soldiers and Sailors System. Electronic document available at http://www.itd.nps.gov/cwss. National Park Service, Washington, D.C. Poe, Orlando M. 1864 Topographical Map of the Approaches and Defences of Knoxville, E. Tennessee Shewing the Positions Occupied by the United States and Confederate Forces During the Siege. Office of the Chief Engineer, Department of the Ohio.

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Rothrock, Mary Utopia (editor) 1946 The French Broad-Holston Country: A History of Knox County, Tennessee. Knox County History Commission, East Tennessee Historical Society, Knoxville. Smith, Samuel D. and Benjamin C. Nance 2003 A Survey of Civil War Era Military Sites in Tennessee. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Archaeology, Research Series No. 14. Temple, Oliver P. 1995 East Tennessee and the Civil War. Reprinted. Overmountain Press, Johnson City, Tennessee. Originally published 1899, by the author. United States War Department 1889a The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 23, Part I. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1889b The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 23, Part II. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1890a The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 30, Part II. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1890b The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 31, Part I. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1894 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 45, Part I. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 1897 The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 49, Part II. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.

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