T8 B20 Witness Materials 1 of 2 FDR - GAO and DOT - 1st Hearing (1st Pgs For Ref) 259

First Open Hearing
Witness Information/Material
Mar 31-Apr 1 2003

United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony
Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. V.S. Senate
9:30 a.m. EDT

Thursday
AVIATION SECURITY
July 25, 2002
Transportation Security
Administration Faces
Immediate and Long-
Term Challenges
Statement oi' (Irraid I,. Dillingham,

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
A O
Accountability * Integrity * Reliability
GAO-02-971T
GAO Testimony
Before the Subcommittees on Transportation, Senate
and House Committees on Appropriations
For Release on Delivery

Expected at
2:00 p.m. EDT
Thursday,
AVIATION SECURITY
September 20, 2001
Terrorist Acts Illustrate

Severe Weaknesses in
Aviation Security
Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues
GAP
GAO-01-1166T
GAP
Accountability • Integrity * Reliability

Washington, DC 20548
August 30,2002
The Honorable Tom Davis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Technology
and Procurement Policy
Committee on Government Reform
House of Representatives
Subject: National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges

Dear Mr. Chairman:
On June 7,2002, we testified before your Subcommittee on technology and
information sharing challenges confronting our nation's approach to homeland
security.1 Addressing the challenges—particularly making sure that the right
information gets to the right people at the right time and making good use of
—^ technology—is essential to making sure the nation's strategy is sustainable and
' effective. Effective information sharing will also be critical to success for the
proposed Department of Homeland Security, both to assist in the integration of the
agencies and programs being consolidated within the new Department, and to ensure
the sharing of relevant information with state and local governments and the private
sector. This letter responds to specific questions you had related to our testimony.
Our answers are based largely on the research and analysis supporting our testimony
and past GAO findings. Our work was conducted in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards from June through August 2002. Your
questions, along with our responses, follow.
1. One of the barriers identified by various witnesses to effective homeland
security is interagency cooperation, which was largely attributed to "turf"
issues. What incentives have been provided to or could be used by agency
managers to encourage more effective cooperation and coordination of
information pertaining to homeland security?
'U.S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness: Integrating New and Existing Technology
and Information Sharing Into an Effective Homeland Security Strategy, GAO-02-811T (Washington,
D.C.: June 7,2002).
GAO-02-1048R National Preparedness Challenges

OIG Item Details http://www.oig.dot.gov/itern_details.php?item=57
OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer
Department of Transportation
O f f i c e of I ns p ctor Genera!
Item: Aviation Security in the United States - Testimony before the joint House-Senate
Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee
Date: September 20, 2001
Type: Testimony/Statements
Control #: CC-2001-308
Summary: In testimony before a joint House-Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee

hearing, the Inspector General addressed the governance, organization, and delivery of
aviation security. Given the scope and complexity of the security challenge, coupled
with a longstanding history of problems associated with the aviation security program,
the Inspector General recommended consideration be given to vesting this
responsibility in one central Federal organization or not-for-profit Federal corporation.
Based on OIG's recent reports in this area, the Inspector General also identified
changes needed to supplement and enhance current security programs, especially in the
areas of screening checkpoint security, airport access controls, and airport
identification media.
Files: file
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lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Item Details http://www.oig.dot.gov/item_details.php?item=57
Office of inspector Genera
Item: Aviation Security in the United States - Testimony before the House Aviation
Subcommittee
Summary: In testimony before a House Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee

hearing, the Inspector General addressed the governance, organization, and delivery of
aviation security. Given the scope and complexity of the security challenge, coupled
with a longstanding history of problems associated with the aviation security program,
the Inspector General recommended consideration be given to vesting this
responsibility in one central Federal organization or not-for-profit Federal corporation.
Based on OIG's recent reports in this area, the Inspector General also identified
changes needed to supplement and enhance current security programs, especially in the
areas of screening checkpoint security, airport access controls, and airport
identification media.
Files: file
ID TXT file
lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Item Details http://www.oig.dot.gov/item_details.php?item=57

mmmmmmmmmammmmmmmmm
Oepcirtirtent of Transpor ujfkn • •^^^^^^••^^^^H
O f f i c e of I ns pie c t r General
Item: Actions Needed to Improve Aviation Security - Testimony before the Committee on
Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, Restructuring and the District of Columbia, U.S. Senate
Control*: CC-2001-313
Summary: In a joint hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs and the
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring and the
District of Columbia, U.S. Senate, the Inspector General addressed the governance,
organization, and delivery of aviation security. Given the scope and complexity of the
security challenge, coupled with a longstanding history of problems associated with the
aviation security program, the Inspector General recommended consideration be given
to vesting this responsibility in one central Federal organization or not-for-profit
Federal corporation. Based on OIG's recent reports in this area, the Inspector General
also identified changes needed to supplement and enhance current security programs,
especially in the areas of screening checkpoint security, airport access controls, and
airport identification media.
Files: H PDF file

n TXT file
lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Item Details http://www.oig.dot.gOv/i tem_details.php?item=62
Deportment of Tra
Office of Inspector General
Item: Status of Airline Security After September 1 1 , 2001
Date: November 14, 2001
Summary: The Inspector General testified at a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on
Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, regarding the status of
airline security since September 1 1 . The IG said that the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Department have taken steps to tighten security. OIG
observations across the country confirm that security is noticeably tighter now than
before September 1 1 .
The IG noted, however, there are still alarming security lapses and some systemic
vulnerabilities that need to be closed. He recommended that FAA take the following
correction actions: (1) ensure that air carriers maximize the use of bulk explosives
detection machines for screening passengers' checked baggage; (2) issue the final rule
on certification of screening companies to improve the screening of passengers,
baggage, and cargo; (3) establish standards for measuring security screener
performance based on computer-assisted testing and unannounced testing of screeners
by FAA; (4) strengthen controls to prevent access to secure areas of the airport by
unauthorized individuals; (5) conduct criminal history checks for all individuals,
including current employees, who have unrestricted access to secure areas of the
airport; and (6) strengthen controls in cargo security, particularly the process for
certifying indirect air carriers (freight forwarders) and assessing indirect air carriers'
compliance with cargo security requirements.
Files: PDF file

TXT file
lofl 3/21/03 12:11PM

.Focus on Aviation Safety http://www.oig.dot.gov/aviation_safety.ph
| OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer
FAA's Oversight of Airline Operations and Maintenance Practices
The United States operates one of the safest and most complex aviation systems in the world. The
responsibility for maintaining this high level of safety is shared among FAA, the air carriers, and
aircraft manufacturers. In this regard, it is important to note that FAA and the aviation industry rely
on a series of overlapping controls to ensure that aircraft are maintained safely. The Nation's safety
record is impressive, but accidents have pointed to questions about whether or not FAA's oversight
of air carriers is operating as it should.
Each year since 1998, OIG has identified aviation safety as one of the top management challenges
facing the Department. During the same time period, OIG issued several audits on aviation safety,
especially FAA's oversight of airline operations and maintenance practices. OIG also conducted
numerous criminal investigations involving aviation safety.
In April 2002, Alexis M. Stefani, Principal Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, testified before
the House Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation regarding OIG'swork on aviation safety. The
FAA and the union representing FAA inspectors also testified.
Air Transportation Oversight System

On April 10, 2002, OIG issued its report on FAA's Air Transportation Oversight System (ATOS).
ATOS is FAA's new approach to air carrier safety oversight. We found that ATOS is conceptually
sound because it is data-driven, targets inspector resources to the highest risk areas, and results in
comprehensive solutions to safety problems.
However, the system is not reaching its full potential, and significant challenges to full
implementation still exist. First, FAA needs to finish developing key elements of ATOS;
specifically, its processes for analyzing ATOS inspection results and for ensuring corrective actions
are implemented for weaknesses found in air carrier maintenance and operations systems. Second,
FAA needs to better prepare its inspectors to carry out ATOS by improving inspector training and
locating qualified inspectors where they are needed most. Third, FAA needs to establish strong
national oversight and accountability to ensure consistent ATOS field implementation. FAA agreed
with our recommendations and has indicated that corrective actions are underway.
FAA's Oversight of Airline Maintenance Practices

On December 12, 2001, OIG issued a report on FAA's oversight of airlines, internal maintenance
systems, known as Continuing Analysis and Surveillance Systems (CASS). CASS is the system air
carriers use to monitor the effectiveness of their aircraft maintenance and inspection programs. In
addition to CASS, air carriers rely on FAA-approved maintenance procedures, qualified mechanics,
and their own inspector workforce to inspect and approve the repairs performed.
FAA's Oversight of Repair Stations

On January 31, 2002, OIG initiated a review of FAA's oversight of air carriers use of aircraft repair
I of 5 3/21/03 12:04 PM
OIG Item Details http://www.oig.dot.gOv/i tem_details.php?item=62
Dcp9fIfi'MBrU 0? Tiaf
Item: Status of Airline Security After September 1 1 , 2001
Date: November 14, 2001
Summary: The Inspector General testified at a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on
Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia, regarding the status of
airline security since September 1 1 . The IG said that the Federal Aviation
Administration and the Department have taken steps to tighten security. OIG
observations across the country confirm that security is noticeably tighter now than
before September 1 1 .
The IG noted, however, there are still alarming security lapses and some systemic
vulnerabilities that need to be closed. He recommended that FAA take the following
correction actions: (1) ensure that air carriers maximize the use of bulk explosives
detection machines for screening passengers' checked baggage; (2) issue the final rule
on certification of screening companies to improve the screening of passengers,
baggage, and cargo; (3) establish standards for measuring security screener
performance based on computer-assisted testing and unannounced testing of screeners
by FAA; (4) strengthen controls to prevent access to secure areas of the airport by
unauthorized individuals; (5) conduct criminal history checks for all individuals,
including current employees, who have unrestricted access to secure areas of the
airport; and (6) strengthen controls in cargo security, particularly the process for
certifying indirect air carriers (freight forwarders) and assessing indirect air carriers'
compliance with cargo security requirements.
Files: PDF file

TXT file
lofl 3/21/03 12:11PM

Testimony
^ N Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency

Management Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives
NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS
INTrGAOHEGRATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR EFFORTS

IS CRITICAL TO AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
Statement of Randall A. Yim
Managing Director, National Preparedness
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to discuss issues critical to developing and coordinating a national strategy to better
prepare our nation against terrorist events. Although we can never be 100 percent secure from terrorist attack, nor 100
percent prepared to respond to any contingency, we can be better prepared and more secure.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, federal, state, and local governments have a shared responsibility in preparing for
catastrophic terrorist attacks. But the initial responsibility falls upon local governments and their organizations—such
as police, fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies—which will almost invariably
be the first responders to such an occurrence. For its part, the federal government historically has provided leadership,
training, and funding assistance. In the aftermath of the September 11 th attacks, for instance, about one-quarter of the
^ $40 billion Emergency Response Fund was dedicated to homeland security, including funds to enhance state and
local government preparedness.
Because the national security threat is diverse and complex and the challenge is highly intergovernmental, national
policymakers must formulate strategies with a firm understanding of the interests, capacity, and challenges facing
these governments. My comments today are based on a body of GAO's work on terrorism and emergency
preparedness and policy options for the design of federal assistance,,^-, as well as on our review of many other
studies, roi
In my testimony, I reiterate GAO's call, expressed in numerous reports and testimonies over the past years, for the
development of a central focus and a national strategy that will improve national preparedness and enhance
partnerships between federal, state and local governments to guard against and respond to terrorist attacks. The
establishment of the Office of National Preparedness (ONP) under the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) and the establishment of the Office of Homeland Security (OHS) under the leadership of Governor Ridge
are important and potentially significant initial steps. We recognize that the President, in his proposed 2003 budget,
has announced that the OHS will propose such a national strategy later this year. As it conies together, we believe that
key aspects of this strategy should include:
• A definition and clarification of the appropriate roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and
local entities. Our previous work has found fragmentation and overlap among federal assistance programs. Over
40 federal entities have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal efforts have resulted in a lack of
accountability, a lack of a cohesive effort, and duplication of programs. As state and local officials have noted,
this situation has led to confusion, making it difficult to identify available federal preparedness resources and
/"""^ effectively partner with the federal government.
• Direction and guidance for federal agencies and partnerships with state and local governments,
and the private sector to better coordinate their missions and more effectively contribute to the overarching
I of 22 3/25/03 11:36 AM
http://www.gao.gov/atext/d03263.tx
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
x—^attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
he original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2002:
Mass Transit:
Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:
GAO-03-263:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-263, a report to Congressional Requesters:
December 2002:
MASS TRANSIT:
Federal Action Could Help Transit Agencies Address Security Challenges:
GAO Did This Study:
About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation

systems, and transit systems are the mode most commonly attacked. In
light of the history of terrorism against mass transit and the terrorist
attacks on September 11, GAO was asked to examine challenges in securing
transit systems, steps transit agencies have taken to improve safety and
security, and the federal role in transit safety and security. To address
these objectives, GAO visited 10 transit agencies and surveyed a
representative sample of transit agencies, among other things.
What GAO Found:

Transit agencies have taken a number of steps to improve the security of
their systems since September 11, such as conducting vulnerability
assessments, revising emergency plans, and training employees. Formidable
challenges, however, remain in securing transit systems. Obtaining
sufficient funding is the most significant challenge in making transit
systems as safe and secure as possible, according to GAO survey results
and interviews with transit agency officials. Funding security
improvements is problematic because of high security costs, competing
budget priorities, tight budget environments, and a provision precluding
transit agencies that serve areas with populations of 200,000 or more
from using federal urbanized area formula funds for operating expenses.
In addition to funding challenges, certain characteristics of transit
agencies make them both vulnerable to attack and difficult to secure.
For example, the high ridership and open access of some transit systems
makes them attractive for terrorists but also makes certain security measures,
x like metal detectors, impractical. Moreover, because all levels of the
government and the private sector are involved in transit decisions,
coordination among all the stakeholders can pose challenges.
Iof32 3/27/03 12:55 PM

http://www.gao.gov/atext/d03297t.tx
This text file was formatted by the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part of a
longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.
Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and

International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform:
United States General Accounting Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 11:00 a.m. EST
in New York, New York,
Monday, November 18, 2002:
Container Security:
Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and

Challenges :
Statement of JayEtta Z . Hecker

Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-03-297T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on

National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,
House Committee on Government Reform:
Why GAO Did This Study:
After the attacks of September llth, 2001, concerns intensified over

the vulnerability of U.S. ports to acts of terrorism. One particular
concern involves the possibility that terrorists would attempt to
smuggle illegal fissile material or a tactical nuclear weapon into
the country through a cargo container shipped from overseas . This
testimony discusses the programs already in place to counter such a
ttempts, new initiatives now under way to enhance the nation's security
against such attempts, and the key challenges faced in implementing
these various efforts.
What GAO Found:
U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material

or nuclear weapons, but these programs are limited in several respects.
They focus on screening a small portion of total cargo as it enters the
country, and they are carried out without the use of adequate detection
aids, such as equipment that can scan entire containers for radiation.
Efforts to target cargo for screening are hampered by the quality of
'.nformation regarding which cargo poses the greatest risk.
New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The
1 of 17 3/27/03 12:56 PM
GAO Report to the Committee on Science,

House of Representatives
August 2000
FAA COMPUTER
SECURITY
Concerns Remain Due
to Personnel and
Other Continuing
Weaknesses
GAO
GAO/AIMD-00-252
Report Abstract http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A01709&rptno=GAO-01-1065
Frames ! No Frames Site Mao In the News Search Home
Report Abstract
Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access Security

Improvements GAO-01-1069R August 31, 2001
Earlier this year, in response to concerns about the use of stolen or counterfeit law
enforcement badges or credentials to gain access to secure government buildings
and airports, GAO conducted an undercover operation during which GAO special
agents gained entry into many federal sites and two commercial airports in the
Washington, D.C., area and in Orlando, Florida. GAO surveyed these federal
facilities and airports, along with 23 other major federal agencies, about any security
improvements that they may have taken as a result of GAO's investigation. All 43
agencies and airports queried responded to GAO's survey, and many said that they
had either started or completed a security assessment of existing security policies
and procedures. GAO has not verified whether the reported specific security
enhancements have actually been implemented.
Subject Terms
National preparedness
Airport security
Airports
Criminals
Facility security
Identification cards
Internet
Terrorism
Emergency preparedness
lofl 3/25/03 1:53 PM

Report Abstract http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A01944&rptno=GAO-01-l 16;
Frames I No Frames Site Map In the News Search Home
Report Abstract
Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at

the Nation's Airports GAO-01-1162T September 20, 2001
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall
security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and
myriad programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system.
Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the
weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the
horrendous events on September 11, 2001, it is clear that serious weaknesses exist
in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far more devastating
than previously imagined. As reported last year, GAO's review of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic control (ATC) computer
systems showed that FAA had not followed some critical aspects of its own security
requirements. Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and facilities
were secure, that the systems themselves were protected, and that the contractors
who access these systems had undergone background checks. Controls for limiting
access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not always worked as intended.
GAO's special agents used fictitious law enforcement badges and credentials to
gain access to secure areas, bypass security checkpoints at two airports, and walk
unescorted to aircraft departure gates. Tests of screeners revealed significant
weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect threat objects located on
passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage. Screening operations in Belgium,
Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-countries whose
systems GAO has examined-differ from this country's in some significant ways.
Their screening operations require more extensive qualifications and training for
screeners, include higher pay and better benefits, and often include different
screening techniques, such as "pat-downs" of some passengers.
Subject Terms
Airports
Computer security
Facility security
Law enforcement personnel
Safety standards
Terrorism
Transportation safety
Air traffic control systems
Airport security
FAA Air Traffic Control System
lofl 3/25/03 1:52 PM

Report Abstract http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A01970&rptno=GAO-01-l 16!
Frames I No Frames Site Map in the News Search Home
Report Abstract
Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning

Screening Responsibilities GAO-01-1165T September 21, 2001
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of the nation's overall
security, physical infrastructure, and economic foundation. Billions of dollars and a
myriad of programs and policies have been devoted to achieving such a system.
Although it is not fully known at this time what actually occurred or what all the
weaknesses in the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the
horrendous terrorist acts of Semptember 11, 2001, it is clear that serious
weaknesses exist in the nation's aviation security system and that their impact can
be far more devastating than previously imagined. There are security concerns with
(1) airport access controls, (2) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, and (3)
alternatives to current screening practices, including practices in selected other
countries. Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including aircraft, have not
always worked as intended. In May of 2000, special agents used counterfeit law
enforcement badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports,
bypassing security checkpoints and walking unescorted to aircraft departure gates.
In June 2000, testing of screeners showed that significant, long-standing
weaknesses-measured by the screeners' abilities to detect threat objects located
on passengers or contained in their carry-on luggage-continue to exist. More recent
results show that as tests more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to
penetrate a checkpoint-screeners' performance declines significantly. Weaknesses
in screening and controlling access to secure are as have left questions concerning
alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, respondents identified five
important criteria: improving screening performance, establishing accountability,
ensuring cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and
minimizing legal and liability issues.
Subject Terms
Airport security
Airports
Facility security
Internal controls
Safety standards
Terrorism
Aircraft
FAA Civil Aviation Security Program
Accountability * integrity * Reliability
lofl 3/25/03 1:52 PM

Report Abstract http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A02036&rptno=GAO-01-l IT.
Frames i No Frames Site Map tn the News Search Home
Report Abstract
Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening

Security Operations GAO-01-1171T September 25, 2001
A safe and secure civil aviation system is critical to the nation's overall security,
physical infrastructure, and economy. Billions of dollars and countless programs and
policies have gone into developing such a system. Although many of the specific
factors contributing to the terrible events of September 11 are still unclear, it is
apparent that our aviation security system is plagued by serious weaknesses that
can have devastating consequences. Last year, as part of an undercover
investigation, GAO special agents used fake law enforcement badges and
credentials to gain access to secure areas at two airports. They were also issued
tickets and boarding passes, and could have carried weapons, explosives, or other
dangerous items onto the aircraft. GAO tests of airport screeners also found major
shortcomings in their ability to detect dangerous items hidden on passengers or in
carry-on luggage. These weaknesses have raised questions about the need for
alternative approaches. In assessing alternatives, five outcomes should be
considered: improving screener performance, establishing accountability, ensuring
cooperation among stakeholders, moving people efficiently, and minimizing legal
and liability issues.
Subject Terms
Airport security
Airports
Facility security
Law enforcement personnel
Terrorism
FAA Civil Aviation Security Program
lofl 3/25/03 1:52 PM

Report Abstract http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?recflag=&accno=A0244Q&rptno=B-288126
Frames I No Frames Site Map in the News Search Home
Report Abstract
Consortium Argenbright Security-Katrantzos Security B-288126.2 September 26,

2001
A firm protested a Department of State contract for guard services at a U.S.

embassy, contending that its proposal was improperly rejected as non-compliant
because it was priced in euros. GAO held that solicitation providing for the
submission of offers paid in local currency cannot reasonably be interpreted as
prohibiting the submission of offers priced in euros where the euro has been
adopted as a country's national currency. Accordingly, the protest was sustained,
and GAO recommended that the Department of State: (1) make determination as to
whether it would be in the agency's best interest to proceed with discussions with
the protester, given that such discussions might result in the protester's offer
becoming the lowest-priced, technically acceptable one; (2) if the contracting officer
does decide to proceed with such discussions, and as a result, the protester's offer
is determined to be the lowest-priced, technically acceptable offer, and the protester
is otherwise determined to be responsible, the agency should terminate the award
to the awardee and make award to the protester; and (3) reimburse the protester for
its costs of filing and pursuing the protest, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
Subject Terms
Service contracts
Federal procurement
Joint ventures
Bid evaluation protests
lofl 3/25/03 1:52 PM

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First Open Hearing

Mar 31-Apr 1 2003

9:30 a.m. EDT

Statement oi' (Irraid I,. Dillingham,

For Release on Delivery

Terrorist Acts Illustrate

Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham

United States General Accounting Office

Subject: National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing Challenges

GAO-02-1048R National Preparedness Challenges

OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

Date: September 20, 2001

Summary: In testimony before a joint House-Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee

lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

Date: September 21, 2001

Summary: In testimony before a House Transportation and Infrastructure Aviation Subcommittee

lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

Date: September 25, 2001

Files: H PDF file

lofl 3/21/03 12:06 PM

OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

Item: Status of Airline Security After September 1 1 , 2001

Date: November 14, 2001

Files: PDF file

lofl 3/21/03 12:11PM

| OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

FAA's Oversight of Airline Operations and Maintenance Practices

Air Transportation Oversight System

FAA's Oversight of Airline Maintenance Practices

FAA's Oversight of Repair Stations

OIG Home Privacy and Disclaimer

Office of Inspector General

Item: Status of Airline Security After September 1 1 , 2001

Date: November 14, 2001

Files: PDF file

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^ N Before the Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency

INTrGAOHEGRATION OF FEDERAL, STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR EFFORTS

Statement of Randall A. Yim

Managing Director, National Preparedness

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Highlights of GAO-03-263, a report to Congressional Requesters:

GAO Did This Study:

About one-third of terrorist attacks worldwide target transportation

What GAO Found:

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Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and

United States General Accounting Office:

Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials, New Initiatives, and

Statement of JayEtta Z . Hecker

Highlights of GAO-03-297T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on

Why GAO Did This Study:

After the attacks of September llth, 2001, concerns intensified over

What GAO Found:

U.S. ports have programs in place to detect illegal fissile material

New initiatives are under way to supplement these programs. The

GAO Report to the Committee on Science,

Frames ! No Frames Site Mao In the News Search Home

Responses of Federal Agencies and Airports We Surveyed About Access Security

Accountability * Integrity * Reliability