3. Aurora Go vs. Elmer Subanun Feb. 9, 2011 | GR No.

168240 When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality. Facts: In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against defendants, Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency. The respondents claimed that the spouses occupied the ground floor portion of their house under a one-year lease contract and had used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment Agency. Aurora on the contrary denied all of it and demanded actual damages as she claimed that she works in Hong Kong on a no-work-no-pay basis and the suit would result in spending airfare and lost earnings. After the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved on October 28, 2002 that her testimony be taken by deposition upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure as to when she could come home to the Philippines considering that her work schedule as a court interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She averred that arrangements have already been made with the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her deposition. Over the objection of the respondents, the RTC granted Aurora's motion on November 21, 2002. However, Aurora's deposition was taken only on January 28, 2004 after her follow-up letter dated November 7, 2003 to the Philippine consulate. Before this deposition was taken, the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Order already deemed the defendants to have waived their right to present their evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution since more than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC granted Aurora's motion to have her testimony be taken by deposition. Again, only Aurora moved for reconsideration and prayed that the December 1, 2003 Order be recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed the delay of her deposition-taking to the consulate's fault, as she was passed from one officer to another or no officer was available. On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. The trial court disregarded her two-page transcript of deposition when it received the same on March 5, 2004. Aurora's former counsel of record, Atty. Ycong, belatedly discovered about this adverse judgment when he received from respondents' counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of Entry of Judgment and Writ of Execution on March 16, 2004. It turned out that although he had already previously informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the January 26, 2004 Decision to his former office address. He raised this in his opposition to the motion filed by the respondents.

Finding this point meritorious, the court denied respondents' motion, ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet attained finality as the 15-day period to appeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed. Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration on March 31, 2004, the last day to file her appeal. The court in its April 27, 2004 Order denied said motion. Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his client a day left to file her appeal. Explaining that his client is busy campaigning for elections; and that they have yet to discuss the pros and cons of appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an extension of 15 days to file Aurora's notice of appeal. Issue: WON the amended procedural rules shall retroactively apply. Ruling: Aurora had almost lost her statutory privilege to appeal, but in view of our ruling on Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 37 we shall grant Aurora's petition. ADT In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. We said: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. "[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure." Neypes, which we rendered in September 2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases wherein the original period to appeal had already lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Aurora's situation is no exception, and thus she is entitled to benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules.

The denial of Aurora's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's January 26, 2004 decision was received by her former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004. 6. Rodolfo Canlas, et al. v. Iluminada Tabil Sept. 25, 2009 | GR No. 184285 Rule 40, Sec 8 CANNOT apply to a case where the MTC has original jurisdiction and where the case was already decided on its merits. FACTS: Iluminada Tubil was the owner of a residential lot in Guagua, Pampanga. Rudy, Victoria and Felicidad Canlas erected a house on the aforementioned lot and occupied it as their residential house upon mere tolerance by the owner. Tubil now wanted to use the land fruitfully so demands were made to vacate the lot. Canlas refused so a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil before the MTC. Canlas filed a motion to dismiss (MtD) on the grounds that the MTC was without jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the parties were not the real parties-in-interest. MtD was denied. Canlas filed an answer stating that they were in open, continuous, and exclusive possession of the land; that Tubils title over the land issued by a Free Patent was dubious; that the action was actually accion publiciana which is beyond MTCs jurisdiction. MTC dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer on the grounds that Tubil failed to show that there was mere tolerance. RTC affirmed. Respondent files a petition for review with the CA which reversed the MTCs decision and ordered the RTC to decide on the merits of the case. Canlas now files a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari contending that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the subject matter, thus, it cannot validly decide on the merits pursuant to Rule 40, Section 8, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court (RoC). ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 40, Section 8 is applicable in this case. HELD: NO. Rule 40, Sec 8, par 2 states that If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction BUT shall decide the case without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and additional evidence

The SC held that the case was of unlawful detainer to which the MTC has original jurisdiction over the subject matter, not accion publiciana where the RTC has original jurisdiction. Having ruled that the MTC acquired jurisdiction, it properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for failure of the respondent to prove mere tolerance by sufficient evidence. Rule 40, Section 8 of the RoC has no application in this case. *Decision of the MTC is reinstated.

RULE 41 1. Judith Yu v. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad Feb. 9, 2011 | GR No. 170979 Facts: An information for estafa against the petitioner (Judith Yu) was filed with the RTC which convicted the petitioner as charged. Fourteen days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was convicted. The respondent judge denied the petitioner's motion for new trial for lack of merit. The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging she had a fresh period of 15 days from the receipt of the denial of her motion for new trial, within which to file a notice of appeal. The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fore being belatedly filed and a Motion for execution of the decision. Issue: Does the fresh period rule apply to appeals in criminal cases? Ruling: Yes, to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration, litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from the receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution.

3. Magdalena Acosta vs. Hon. Judge Plan Jan. 30, 1989 | GR No. L-44466 Facts: Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela. Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to submit a record on appeal, they waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to CA (as provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court). On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal, hence this petition. Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant although it did not have to be printed. Issue: Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is required for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant Held: NO. Under B.P. Blg. 129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an appeal. This law was given retroactive effect. As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'