CO KIM CHAM v EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH FACTS : The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of the proceedings

in a civil case which were initiated during the Japanese military occupation on the ground that the proclamation issued by General MacArthur that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the court of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. During the Japanese occupation, no substantial change was effected in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced. ISSUES : 1. Whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts during a de facto government are good and valid. 2. Whether it was the intention of the Gen McArthur to annul and void thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation. 3. Whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands. HELD : 1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and

confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts in fine, from the law of nations. . . . The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de factogovernment, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio. 2. NO. The phrase processes of any other government is broad and may refer not only to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase processes of any other government in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. 3. YES. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War states that in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. And Taylor in this connection says: From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institution so

far as military necessity will permit. Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon removal of the external force, and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.

Underhill v. Hernandez 168 U.S. 250 (1897)

On a Writ of Certiorari to the United State Cir!"it Co"rt of #$$eal for the Se!ond Cir!"it. %n the earl& $art of 1892 a revol"tion 'a initiated in (enez"ela) a*ain t the ad+ini tration thereof) 'hi!h the revol"tioni t !lai+ed had !ea ed to ,e the le*iti+ate *overn+ent. -he $rin!i$al $artie to thi !onfli!t 'ere tho e 'ho re!o*nized .ala!io a their head) and tho e 'ho follo'ed the leader hi$ of Cre $o. /en. Hernandez ,elon*ed to the antiad+ini tration $art&) and !o++anded it for!e in the vi!init& of Ci"dad 0olivar. On the 8th of #"*" t) 1892) an en*a*e+ent too1 $la!e ,et'een the ari+e of the t'o $artie at 0"ena (i ta) o+e even +ile fro+ 0olivar) in 'hi!h the troo$ "nder Hernandez $revailed2 and) on the 13th of #"*" t) Hernandez entered 0olivar) and a "+ed !o++and of the !it&. #ll of the lo!al offi!ial had in the +eanti+e left) and the va!ant $o ition 'ere filled ,& /en.

Hernandez) 'ho fro+ that date) and d"rin* the $eriod of the tran a!tion !o+$lained of) 'a the !ivil and +ilitar& !hief of the !it& and di tri!t. %n O!to,er the $art& in revolt had a!hieved "!!e *enerall&) ta1in* $o e ion of the !a$ital of (enez"ela) O!to,er 6th2 and on O!to,er 23) 1892) the 4Cre $o *overn+ent)4 o !alled) 'a for+all& re!o*nized a the le*iti+ate *overn+ent of (enez"ela ,& the United State . /eor*e 5. Underhill 'a a !itizen of the United State ) 'ho had !on tr"!ted a 'ater'or1 & te+ for the !it& of 0olivar) "nder a !ontra!t 'ith the *overn+ent) and 'a en*a*ed in "$$l&in* the $la!e 'ith 'ater2 and he al o !arried on a +a!hine& re$air ," ine . So+e ti+e after the entr& of /en. Hernandez) Underhill a$$lied to hi+) a the offi!er in !o++and) for a $a $ort to leave the !it&. Hernandez ref" ed thi re6"e t) and re6"e t +ade ,& other in Underhill4 ,ehalf) "ntil O!to,er 18th) 'hen a $a $ort 'a *iven) and Underhill left the !o"ntr&. -hi a!tion 'a ,ro"*ht to re!over da+a*e for the detention !a" ed ,& rea on of the ref" al to *rant the $a $ort) for the alle*ed !onfine+ent of Underhill to hi o'n ho" e) and for !ertain alle*ed a a"lt and affront ,& the oldier of Hernandez4 ar+&. -he !a" e 'a tried in the !ir!"it !o"rt of the United State for the 7a tern di tri!t of 8e' 9or1) and on the !on!l" ion of $laintiff4 !a e the !ir!"it !o"rt r"led that "$on the fa!t $laintiff 'a not entitled to re!over) and dire!ted a verdi!t for defendant) on the *ro"nd that 4,e!a" e the a!t of defendant 'ere tho e of a +ilitar& !o++ander) re$re entin* a de fa!to *overn+ent in the $ro e!"tion of a 'ar) he 'a not !ivill& re $on i,le therefor.4 :"d*+ent havin* ,een rendered for defendant) the !a e 'a ta1en to the !ir!"it !o"rt of a$$eal ) and ,& that !o"rt affir+ed) "$on the *ro"nd 4that the a!t of the defendant 'ere the a!t of the *overn+ent of (enez"ela) and a "!h are not $ro$erl& the ",;e!t of ad;"di!ation in the !o"rt of another *overn+ent.4 26 U. S. #$$. 573. -here"$on the !a" e 'a ,ro"*ht to thi !o"rt on !ertiorari.

<r. Chief :" ti!e 5U==7>) after tatin* the fa!t in the fore*oin* lan*"a*e) delivered the o$inion of the !o"rt. 7ver& overei*n tate i ,o"nd to re $e!t the inde$enden!e of ever& other overei*n tate) and the !o"rt of one !o"ntr& 'ill not it in ;"d*+ent on the a!t of the *overn+ent of another) done 'ithin it o'n territor&. >edre of *rievan!e ,& rea on of "!h a!t +" t ,e o,tained thro"*h the +ean o$en to ,e availed of ,& overei*n $o'er a ,et'een the+ elve . 8or !an the $rin!i$le ,e !onfined to la'f"l or re!o*nized *overn+ent ) or to !a e 'here redre !an +anife tl& ,e had thro"*h $",li! !hannel . -he i++"nit& of individ"al fro+ "it ,ro"*ht in forei*n tri,"nal for a!t done 'ithin their o'n tate ) in the e?er!i e of *overn+ental a"thorit&) 'hether a !ivil offi!er or a +ilitar& !o++ander ) +" t ne!e aril& e?tend to the a*ent of *overn+ent r"lin* ,& $ara+o"nt for!e a +atter of fa!t. Where a !ivil 'ar $revail (that i ) 'here the $eo$le of a !o"ntr& are divided into t'o ho tile $artie ) 'ho ta1e "$ ar+ and o$$o e one another ,& +ilitar& for!e)) *enerall& $ea1in*) forei*n nation do not a "+e to ;"d*e of the +erit of the 6"arrel. %f the $art& ee1in* to di lod*e the e?i tin* *overn+ent "!!eed ) and the inde$enden!e of the *overn+ent it ha et "$ i re!o*nized) then the a!t of "!h *overn+ent) fro+ the !o++en!e+ent of it e?i ten!e) are re*arded a tho e of an inde$endent nation. %f the $oliti!al revolt fail of "!!e ) till) if a!t"al 'ar ha ,een 'a*ed) a!t of le*iti+ate 'arfare !annot ,e +ade the ,a i of individ"al lia,ilit&. U. S. v. >i!e) @ Wheat. 2@62 5le+in* v. .a*e) 9 Ho'. 6032 -horin*ton v. S+ith) 8 Wall. 12 Willia+ v. 0r"ff&) 96 U. S. 1762 5ord v. S"r*et) 97 U. S. 59@2 Ao' v. :ohn on) 100 U. S. 1582 and other !a e . >evol"tion or in "rre!tion +a& in!onvenien!e other nation ) ,"t ,& a!!o++odation to the fa!t the a$$li!ation of ettled r"le i readil& rea!hed. #nd) 'here the fa!t of the e?i ten!e of 'ar i in i "e in the in tan!e of !o+$laint of a!t !o++itted 'ithin forei*n territor&) it i not an a, ol"te $rere6"i ite that that fa!t ho"ld ,e +ade o"t ,& an

a!1no'led*+ent of ,elli*eren!&) a other offi!ial re!o*nition of it e?i ten!e +a& ,e "ffi!ient $roof thereof. -he -hree 5riend ) 166 U. S. 1. %n thi !a e the ar!hive of the tate de$art+ent ho' that !ivil 'ar 'a fla*rant in (enez"ela fro+ the $rin* of 1892) that the revol"tion 'a "!!e f"l) and that the revol"tionar& *overn+ent 'a re!o*nized ,& the United State a the *overn+ent of the !o"ntr&2 it ,ein*) to " e the lan*"a*e of the e!retar& of tate in a !o++"ni!ation to o"r +ini ter to (enez"ela) 4a!!e$ted ,& the $eo$le) in the $o e ion of the $o'er of the nation) and f"ll& e ta,li hed.4 -hat the e 'ere fa!t of 'hi!h the !o"rt i ,o"nd to ta1e ;"di!ial noti!e) and for infor+ation a to 'hi!h it +a& !on "lt the de$art+ent of tate) there !an ,e no do",t. :one v. U. S.) 137 U. S. 2022 <i*hell v. S"ltan of :ahore B189@C 1 D. 0. 1@9. %t i idle to ar*"e that the $ro!eedin* of tho e 'ho th" tri"+$hed ho"ld ,e treated a the a!t of ,aditti) or +ere +o, . We entertain no do",t) "$on the eviden!e) that Hernandez 'a !arr&in* on +ilitar& o$eration in "$$ort of the revol"tionar& $art&. %t +a& ,e that adherent of that ide of the !ontrover & in the $arti!"lar lo!alit& 'here Hernandez 'a the leader of the +ove+ent entertained a $referen!e for hi+ a the f"t"re e?e!"tive head of the nation) ,"t that i ,e ide the 6"e tion. -he a!t !o+$lained of 'ere the a!t of a +ilitar& !o++ander re$re entin* the a"thorit& of the revol"tionar& $art& a a *overn+ent) 'hi!h after'ard "!!eeded) and 'a re!o*nized ,& the United State . We thin1 the !ir!"it !o"rt of a$$eal 'a ;" tified in !on!l"din* 4that the a!t of the defendant 'ere the a!t of the *overn+ent of (enez"ela) and a "!h are not $ro$erl& the ",;e!t of ad;"di!ation in the !o"rt of another *overn+ent.4 -he de!i ion !ited on $laintiff4 ,ehalf are not in $oint. Ca e re $e!tin* arre t ,& +ilitar& a"thorit& in the a, en!e of the $revalen!e of 'ar) or the validit& of !ontra!t ,et'een individ"al entered into in aid of in "rre!tion) or the ri*ht or revol"tionar& ,odie to ve? the !o++er!e of the 'orld on it !o++on hi*h'a& 'itho"t in!"rrin* the $enaltie deno"n!ed on $ira!&) and the li1e) do not involve the 6"e tion $re ented here.

We a*ree 'ith the !ir!"it !o"rt of a$$eal that 4the eviden!e "$on the trial indi!ated that the $"r$o e of the defendant in hi treat+ent of the $laintiff 'a to !oer!e the $laintiff to o$erate hi 'ater'or1 and hi re$air 'or1 for the ,enefit of the !o++"nit& and the revol"tionar& for!e )4 and that 4it 'a not "ffi!ient to have 'arranted a findin* ,& the ;"r& that the defendant 'a a!t"ated ,& +ali!e or an& $er onal or $rivate +otive)4 and 'e !on!"r in it di $o ition of the r"lin* ,elo'. -he de!ree of the !ir!"it !o"rt i affir+ed.

Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878)

Ford v. Surget 97 U.S. 594 Syllabus 1. The court reaffirms the doctrine in Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176, that an enactment of the Confederate States, enforced as a law of one of the states composing that confederation, is a statute of such state within the meaning of the act regulating the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over the judgments and decrees of the state courts. . !., a resident of !dams Count", #ississippi, whose cotton was there $urnt $" %. in #a", 1&6 , $rought an action for its value against the latter, who set up as a defense that that state, whereof he was at that date a resident, was then in su$jection to and under the control of the 'Confederate States(' that an act of their congress, approved #arch 6, 1&6 , declared that it was the dut" of all militar" commanders in their service to destro" all cotton whenever, in their judgment, the same should $e a$out to fall into the hands of the United States( that in o$edience to that act, the commander of their forces in #ississippi issued an order, directed to his su$ordinate officers in that state, to $urn all cotton along the #ississippi )iver li*el" to fall into the hands of the forces of the United States( that the provost marshal of that count" was charged with e+ecuting within it that order( that !.,s cotton was li*el" to fall into the hands of the United States( that the provost marshal ordered and re-uired %. to $urn it( and that %. did $urn it in o$edience to the said act and the orders of that commander and the provost marshal. Held l. that the said act, as a measure of legislation, can have no force in an"

court recogni.ing the Constitution of the United Staten as the supreme law of the land( . that it did not assume to confer upon /age 97 U. S. 090 such commanders an" greater authorit" than the", $" the laws and usages of war, were entitled to e+ercise( 1. that the orders, as an act of war, e+empted a soldier of the Confederate arm" who e+ecuted them from lia$ilit" to the owner of the cotton who, at the time of its destruction, was a voluntar" resident within the lines of the insurrection( 2. that the plea should, upon demurrer, $e deemed as sufficientl" averring the e+istence of such relations $etween %. and the Confederate militar" authorities as entitled him to ma*e the same defense as if he had $een such soldier. 3ord filed his complaint against Surget in the Circuit Court of !dams Count", #ississippi, on the d of 4cto$er, 1&66, alleging that he, 'at his plantation in said count", on the fifth da" of #a", in the "ear 1&6 , was possessed, as of his own personal propert", of two hundred $ales of cotton, averaging in weight four hundred pounds per $ale, and of the value of 5666 per $ale( and that he $eing so possessed, Surget, at the place aforesaid, and upon the da" and "ear aforesaid, did willfull" and utterl", and against the consent and will of the plaintiff, destro" of fire the said two hundred $ales of cotton,' to the plaintiff,s damage in the sum of 51 6,666. The defendant pleaded not guilt", and also filed numerous special pleas. The defense, although presented $" the special pleas in different forms, is in su$stance em$raced $" the following allegations, namel"7 That at and $efore the time the alleged trespasses were committed, the people of #ississippi, and of 8irginia, 9orth Carolina, South Carolina, 3lorida, :eorgia, !la$ama, ;ouisiana, !r*ansas, and Te+as, had confederated together for revolt against, and within their territorial limits had entirel" su$verted, the government of the United States, and in place thereof, and within and for their territor" and people, had created a new and separate government, called the Confederate States of !merica, having e+ecutive, legislative, and judicial departments( that on the 6th of #arch, 1&6 , and from that date until the time when the alleged trespasses were committed, a war had $een, and was then, waged and prosecuted $" and $etween the United States and the

Confederate States, and against each other, as $elligerent powers and nations( that the Confederate States, for the prosecution of the war and the maintenance /age 97 U. S. 096 of its powers, then and $efore had maintained in its service, in the State of #ississippi, an arm" of which :eneral %eauregard was commander where$" the territor", propert", and inha$itants of that state were held in su$jection to and under the control of the Confederate States( that on the 6th of #arch, 1&6 , and $" an act on that da" approved and promulgated $" the Confederate Congress, it was declared to $e the dut" of all militar" commanders in the service of the Confederate state to destro" all cotton, to$acco, and other propert" that might $e useful to the forces of the United States whenever in their judgment the same should $e a$out to fall into their hands( that afterwards, on the d of #a", 1&6 , :eneral %eauregard, commanding the Confederate forces, in o$edience to that act, made and issued a general ordered, directed to officers under his command in the State of #ississippi and in the service of the Confederate States to $urn all cotton along the #ississippi )iver li*el" to fall into the hands of the forces of the United States( that $efore and at the date last mentioned, and afterwards until the time the supposed trespasses were committed, !le+ander <. 3arrar was acting as provost marshal of the Count" of !dams, charged with the dut", among others, of e+ecuting, within that count" the orders of militar" commanders in the State of #ississippi in the service of the Confederate States, and in pursuance thereof was commanded $" the Confederate militar" authorities to $urn all the cotton along the $an* of that river li*el" to fall into the hands of the forces of the United States( that the cotton in the complaint mentioned was near the $an* of the #ississippi within that count", and was, when $urned, li*el" to fall into the hands of the federal forces( that the defendant was then ordered and re-uired $" said 3arrar, acting as provost marshal under the orders aforesaid, to $urn certain cotton, including the cotton in controvers"( and that afterwards the defendant, in o$edience to the act of the Confederate Congress and the orders of said militar" commanders and provost marshal, did $urn 3ord,s cotton, which is the supposed trespass complained of. To each of the special pleas the plaintiff in error demurred, assigning numerous causes of demurrer. The demurrers were /age 97 U. S. 097

overruled and replications filed. The cause, $eing at issue, was tried $" a jur". 8erdict for the defendant. =udgment having $een rendered thereon, the plaintiff removed the cause to the supreme court of the state. Upon the affirmance of the judgment, he sued out this writ of error. /age 97 U. S. 66

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ANICETO ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. Buenaventura B. Martinez for petitioner. Office of the Solicitor General Taada for respondent. FERIA, J.: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and for the release of the petitioner on the ground that the latter is unlawfully imprisoned and restrained of his liberty by the respondent Director of Prison in the provincial jail at Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Petitioner was convicted by the ourt !irst Instance of Ilocos Sur " riminal case #o. $%& of the crime of illegal discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. 'pon appeal, the ourt of (ppeals of #orthern )u*on at +aguio modified said sentence " (, -... #o. /01&and sentence the petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of from four months four months and twenty,one days of arresto mayor to three years, nine months and three days ofprison correccional. The sentence as modified became final on September 2$, 2033, and 4une $%, 2035, petitioner commenced serving his sentence. Petitioner now 6uestions the validity of the decision of the ourt of (ppeals of #orthern )u*on, on the sole ground that said court was only a creation of the so,called .epublic of the Philippines during the 4apanese military occupation of the Islands7 that the ourt of (ppeals was not authori*ed by ommonwealth (ct #o. % to hold sessions in +aguio, and that only the two 4ustices constituted the majority which promulgated the decision in 6uestion. The petitioner does not 6uestion the validity of said decision on the strength of the Proclamation of -eneral Douglas 8c(rthur of 9ctober $%, 2033, which according to our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. aldez Tan Keh and !izon, -... #o. ),5 "p. 22%, ante&, does not refer to judicial processes.

In the said case of Co Kim Cham vs. aldez Tan Keh and !izon, this ourt ruled that the so,called .epublic of the Philippines and the Philippine :;ecutive ommission established in the Philippines during the 4apanese regime were governments de facto organi*ed by the belligerent occupant by the judicial acts thereof were good and valid and remained good and valid after the restoration of the ommonwealth -overnment, e;cept those a political comple;ion. In that the same case this ourt held that the ourt of (ppeals which was continued throughout the 4apanese occupation, was the same ourt of (ppeals e;isted prior to the 4apanese occupation and was lately abolished by :;ecutive 9rder #o. %/. The division of the ourt of (ppeals into several District ourt of (ppeals, and the reduction of the number of 4ustices sitting in each division, the regime of the so,called .epublic effected no substantial change in its nature and jurisdiction. :ven assuming that the ourt of (ppeals of #orthern )u*on was a new court created by the belligerent occupant or the de facto governments established by him, the judgments of such court, li<e those of the court which were continued during the 4apanese occupation, were good and valid and remain good and valid, and therefore enforceable now after the liberation or occupation of the Philippines, provided that such judgments do not have a political comple;ion, as this court held in its decision in the abovementioned case of Co Kim Cham vs. aldez Tan Keh and !izon supra, in accordance with the authorities therein cited. 9bviously, the sentence which petitioner is now serving has no political comple;ion. =e was charged with and convicted of an offense punishable under the municipal law of the ommonwealth, the .evised Penal ode. Therefore, the sentence of the ourt of !irst Instance of Ilocos Sur, as modified by the ourt of (ppeals of #orthern )u*on, is valid and enforceable. ( punitive or penal sentence is said to of a political comple;ion when it penali*es either a new act not defined in the municipal laws, or acts already penali*ed by the latter as a crime against the legitimate government, but ta<en out of the territorial law and penali*ed as a new offenses committed against belligerent occupant, incident to a state of a war and necessary for the control of the occupied territory and the protection of the army of the occupier. They are acts penali*ed for public rather than private reasons, acts which tend, directly or indirectly, to aid or favor the enemy and are directed against the welfare, safety and security, of the belligerent occupant. (s e;ample, the crimes against national security , such as treason, espionage, etc., and against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, etc., were crimes against the ommonwealth or 'nited States -overnment under the .evised Penal ode, which were made crimes against the belligerent occupant. In view of the foregoing, the petitioner for the writ of habeas corpus is denied. Moran" C.#." Ozaeta" $aras" #aranilla" $ablo and Ben%zon" ##." concur.