VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA, petitioners, vs. TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

- This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition to prohibit the issuing of a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the sheriff from implementing an alias writ of execution. The facts are as follows: - Ledesma was the registered owner of a lot in Tandang Sora, QC. The parcel of land was adjacent to certain portions of registered in the name of Piedad Estates and other portions to Herminigilda Pedro. - On October 29, 1964, Herminigilda sold her lot to Lising who then registered both lots and Lot 707-C in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots - Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. Other portions were registered in the name of the heirs of Pedro, heirs of Lising, and other third persons. - In 1969, Ledesma filed a complaint Pedro and Lising for allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for three decades. - On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered them: (a) to remove all construction, including barbed wires and fences, illegally constructed by defendants on plaintiffs property at defendants expense; (b) to replace the removed concrete monuments removed by defendants, at their own expense; As a result, in February 1998, the Deputy Sheriff directed petitioners (Orquiola spouses) to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying and issued a writ of demolition However, despite the service of the said writ to all the defendants and the present occupants of the subject property, they failed to comply therewith Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the demolition Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced

against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It held that as buyers and successors-in-interest of Lising, petitioners were considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached by the execution order Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: (1) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and (2) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith. HELD On the first issue, petitioners claim that the alias writ of execution cannot be enforced against them. Where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system1, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system. Coming now to the second issue, were petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value? A buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property. He is a buyer for value if he pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. The sale to petitioners was made before Ledesma claimed the lot. Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, considering the circumstances of this case, we conclude that petitioners acquired the land subject of this dispute in good faith and for value.

Torrens title is generally conclusive evidence of ownership of the land referred to therein, and a strong presumption exists that a Torrens title was regularly issued and valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any informacion possessoria, or other title existing prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the Torrens title. Moreover, persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens certificate of title are not required to go beyond what appears on its face.

The final question now is: could we consider petitioners builders in good faith? On this score, we find that petitioners are indeed builders in good faith. A builder in good faith is one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. As earlier discussed, petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-12918, that they had notice of private respondents adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case No. Q-12918 cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case No. Q-12918. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. In our view, the spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola have valid and meritorious cause to resist the demolition of their house on their own titled lot, which is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO

FACTS Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and (b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence. ISSUE Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid

HELD The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents. This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extradite in an extradition2 proceeding. On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997. The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz FACTS Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge. On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him. Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to
2

Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by respondent judge. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee. HELD: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail. Accordingly, although the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process guaranteed by the Constitution. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Philippines is a party. Ratio: The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired. Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should

Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."

diminish a potential extraditees rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met. In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

TIME, INC vs. HILL

FACTS Hill (Plaintiff), his wife, and five children were held hostage in their suburban Philadelphia home by three escaped convicts. During the ordeal, the family members were treated with dignity by the hostage-takers. The family members were held hostage for 19 hours. The three criminals were apprehended after leaving the Hills' home, and the incident received significant media attention. Plaintiff and his family were released without any harm but the story made the front pages of the newspapers. Mrs. Hill did not appreciate the media focus, and the family relocated to Connecticut in order to seek out a lifestyle out of the limelight. Time, Inc. (Defendant) published an article that told of a new Broadway thriller, The Desperate Hours. The article said Plaintiff and his family rose in heroism in the time of crisis. The article included pictures of scenes from the play that was to be reenacted in Plaintiffs Philadelphia home. (additional info)345 Plaintiff sued under Sections 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law; Defendants publication of the issues gave the impression that the play was true when in fact it did not accurately recount Plaintiffs actual experience and Defendant knew the article was false and untrue. Defendant answered that the
3

article was a subject of a legitimate news article. The trial judge denied Defendants motion to dismiss and the jury awarded Plaintiff $50,000 in actual damages and $25,000 in punitive damages. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. ISSUE: WON a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees? HELD Yes. Reversed and remanded. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of their exposure is an essential incident of life in a society, which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. A broadly defined freedom of the press assures the maintenance of our political system. Fear of litigation will inevitably create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized. However, constitutional guarantees cannot tolerate sanctions against calculated falsehood without significant impairment of their essential function. The evidence in this case reasonably would support a jury finding of either innocent or merely negligent misstatement by Defendant, or a finding that Defendant portrayed the play as a re-enactment of the Hill familys experience reckless of the truth or with actual knowledge that the portrayal was false. Justice Brennan wrote about the balance between freedom of speech and exposure to public view: The guarantees for speech and press are not the preserve of political expression or comment upon public affairs, essential as those are to healthy government. One need only pick up any newspaper or magazine to comprehend the vast range of published matter which exposes persons to public view, both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and press. The majority opinion held that states cannot judge in favor of plaintiffs "to redress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth". This decision had the impact of elaborating on the "actual malice" standard of the Court's prior holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, to also include cases involving false light

Joseph Hayes wrote a novel published in 1953 called The Desperate Hours, which was influenced by the Hill family's ordeal. The novel by Hayes went on to become a bestseller.
4

In 1954, the Broadway theatre production of the play The Desperate Hours debuted, which depicted a hostage incident similar to that experienced by the Hill family. However, in The Desperate Hours, the scenario was changed from the Hill's actual experiences, to a fictional portrayal of a family victimized by threats of sexual abuse and other violent acts. The setting for the play was Indianapolis, Indiana.
5

Life magazine published an article on the debut of The Desperate Hours on Broadway, and included pictures of the actors in the prior residence of the Hills in the Whitemarsh suburb of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. In the article, The Desperate Hours was characterized as a "reenactment" of the ordeal experienced by the Hill family. The Life magazine piece wrote that the photographed actors from the play were pictured in "the actual house where the Hills were besieged".] Mrs. Hill experienced a mental breakdown after the piece was published, and James Hill stated he was unable to comprehend why the magazine did not fact check the article through communication with the family.

HUDGEN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FACTS Butler Shoe Co. warehouse workers went on strike and decided to picket the nine retail locations in Atlanta. One of those stores was located within the North DeKalb Shopping Center, owned by the Petitioner, Hudgens (Petitioner). When striking members of respondent union picketed in front of their employer's leased store located in petitioner's shopping center, the shopping center's general manager threatened them with arrest for criminal trespass if they did not depart, and they left. The union then filed unfair labor practice charges against petitioner, alleging that the threat constituted interference with rights protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), concluding that the NLRA had been violated, issued a cease and desist order against petitioner, and the Court of Appeals enforced the order. Petitioner and respondent union contend that the respective rights and liabilities of the parties are to be decided under the criteria of the NLRA alone, whereas the NLRB contends that such rights and liabilities must be measured under a First Amendment6 standard. Hudgens argued that the Bill of Rights only applies to governmental actions, and this was private property (aka the State Action Doctrine). NLRB looked to Amalgamated Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (391 U.S. 308 (1968)) and argued that that when a private entity is open to the public, or performing a governmental function, they are bound by the Public Function Exception. ISSUE: WON a private shopping mall prohibit picketing of its tenants by members of the public HELD A private shopping mall is not the functional equivalent of a town and, therefore, not a state actor subject to the requirements of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution The majority overrules the holding of Logan Valley and reasserts the holding of Lloyd. A mall may look like and function as a small town would, yet it does not have all of the attributes of a town. So, it is not restricted by the

prohibition on content-based speech review that a state actor would be under in the same circumstances. Under the present state of the law, the constitutional guarantee of free expression has no part to play in a case such as this, and the pickets here did not have a First Amendment right to enter the shopping center for the purpose of advertising their strike against their employer. ( Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551. Pp. 512-521.) The rights and liabilities of the parties are dependent exclusively upon the NLRA, under which it is the NLRB's task, subject to judicial review, to resolve conflicts between 7 rights and private property rights and to seek accommodation of such rights "with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other," NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112. Hence, the case is remanded so that the NLRB may reconsider the case under the NLRA's statutory criteria alone.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.