Editorial

An incident occurred after an operator removed the cover of a 100-gallon reactor after the reaction was completed. He placed a spot ventilator at the opening of the reactor just prior to taking a sample and transferred the material into another vessel and recharged the reactor in preparation of a new batch. During this time, the operator was exposed to phosphorus oxychloride fumes. Some 12 hours later this exposure resulted in a severe irritation of his lungs. The cause was found to be unreacted phosphorus oxychloride present in the area. The main lesson learned from this is that exhaust vents must be sited so that fumes cannot return to their point of origin or to any work area. In another incident, an operator was exposed to extremely irritating vapours and hospitalized for two days when a reaction erupted and vented vapour found its way back to the plant. An investigation revealed that the vapours were escaping from a tank vent located about 600 mm above a broken window pane. This vent in conjunction with a number of others was located below the level of the roof. Negative building pressure and the proximity of the vent to the broken window pane resulted in the vapours coming back into the building. The cause of the eruption was found to be due to an operators failure to charge a solvent to the batch during the prior shift. This resulted in insufcient volume in the tank to get proper mixing. The subsequent transfer, ltering and addition of a water wash provided mixing and a reaction resulted. The heat given off in the absence of adequate solvent medium promoted further uncontrolled reaction and subsequent vapour release. Although the failure to replace broken windows is a clear example of poor housekeeping, this incident

emphasizes the need for vents to be located and extended if necessary above the roof. These two incidents show that local exhaust ventilation systems, although giving an enhanced working environment in some cases, may introduce safety hazards into a plant and give rise to completely unacceptable risks to the operator, especially where particularly toxic or explosive mixtures are being handled. Under some circumstances, it may be acceptable to require employees to wear masks, goggles, gloves, lab coats or other appropriate forms of PPE. However, if a full air-suit with respirator would be routinely required to provide adequate protection during normal operations, then local exhaust ventilation is clearly not a viable option! In such cases, materials will need to be handled within isolated systems such as a glove box isolator, and with transfer devices or coupling devices required in more extreme cases. These issues are discussed in greater detail in a new guide being published by IChemE. Design Guide to Containment Systems covers the range of containment systems available for use and the issues that have to be considered for anyone selecting a particular system for a specic duty. The guide deals with equipment ranging from simple local exhaust ventilation systems to enclosures that restrict exposures to well below a microgram per cubic metre averaged over a working day, describing systems suitable for materials of low to high toxicity, different scales of operation and different transfer steps. The book can be ordered from IChemE book sales (tel: +44 1788 578214, e-mail: booksales@icheme.org.uk).

Tracey Donaldson, IChemE

LOSS PREVENTION BULLETIN 166