School of Engineering and Mathematical Sciences

Greeces Difficulties in Delimiting an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) due to Her Neighbour Countries

by Antigoni-Maria Vrochidou

A Dissertation Submitted In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree

MSc In Maritime Operations and Management

Supervisor: Capt. Simon Culshaw

London 4 September 2013

Project Title: Greeces Difficulties in Delimiting an Exclusive Economic Zone due to Her Neighbour Countries Student: Antigoni-Maria Vrochidou Supervisor: Capt. Simon Culshaw Submission date: 4 September 2013

Abstract
This research study investigates the difficulties Greece is facing in delimiting her Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). More specifically, it analyses the regulations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) regarding the EEZ and its delimitation, it thoroughly examines Greeces relationships with her neighbour countries, with which she has maritime borders, and it probes three relevant maritime boundaries delimitation cases. EEZ is one of the maritime zones, which was first introduced by UNCLOS 1982. States that have ratified UNCLOS 1982 have to delimit their maritime boundaries according to it, while the other states have to act according to customary International Law. Greece has ratified UNCLOS 1982 and wishes to delimit her EEZ according to its provisions. Unfortunately, Turkey claims that if Greece decides to delimit her EEZ, it will be considered as a hostile gesture. Additionally, she does not recognise to the Greek Kastellorizo island its right to have an EEZ. Furthermore, Turkey tries to influence the rest of Greeces neighbour countries in order not to sign any agreement with her. Greece has maritime boundaries with Albania, Italy, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey. Apart from Turkey, Greece does not have great disputes with the rest of her neighbour countries. According to UNCLOS 1982, when two states cannot settle on a maritime boundary delimitation agreement, they should appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and follow its decree. Turkey does not want to go to the
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ICJ because she does not approve of ICJs jurisdiction and prefers to enforce her positions. However, the cases of Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands (1992), Romania v Ukraine (2009) and Nicaragua v Colombia (2012) have proved that each case is unique, as it has different characteristics and no one can forecast ICJs decree. Thus, Greece should stop being afraid of Turkeys protests and appeal to the ICJ for her EEZ delimitation. Either way, a solution has to be found so that the rich in hydrocarbons seabed of the Aegean and Ionian Sea can be exploited.

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Acknowledgements
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Captain Simon Culshaw for his helpful recommendations and enthusiasm during the process of writing my dissertation. Working with a supervisor who was as interested as me in this topic was an additional motivation to further explore the present subject. I would also like to acknowledge Professor George Samiotis, who enriched me with his knowledge about the Law of the Sea during my Bachelors Degree. His way of teaching made this module rather intriguing, as well as its comprehension easier. Furthermore, I would like to give my thanks to Vasileios Grigorakos for the endless hours we spent on studying and relaxing, Vasileios Galanis for his constant moral support and kindness, Emmanouil Ntentidakis for his continual amusement and our special common habits and, last but not least, Nikolaos Papanikolaou for his willingness to always help me and for caring for me so much. I could not have asked for better roommates than them. Additionally, I would like to give credits to my fellow classmates, especially Olga Symvoulaki and Kyriaki Skiniti, for making this year so amazing. Moreover, having my friends Katerina Alivizatou, Natasha Antoniou and Martha Rovithi here in London was an additional advantage that made me feel like home. Most importantly, I want to thank my parents, Anna and Vasileios, to whom I dedicate this project. Throughout my whole life, they have been supporting me, believing in me and inspiring me to aim higher. The love, values and ethics that they raised me with made me the person I am today and I could not have done it without them. Mum and Dad, I love you more than anyone else and I have always been looking up to you both.

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Abbreviations
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone EU European Union ICJ International Court of Justice MP Member of Parliament UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea USA United States of America USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Table of Contents
Abstract .................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements.................................................................................................. iv Abbreviations ............................................................................................................ v Table of Figures ..................................................................................................... viii 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 1 2. Literature Review ................................................................................................. 3 2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 3 2.2. Law of the Sea Codification ........................................................................... 3 2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) ................................................................... 6 2.3.1. The legal status of the EEZ ..................................................................... 6 2.3.2. The rights and duties of the coastal state in the EEZ .............................. 7 2.3.3. The rights and duties of the other states in the EEZ ................................ 7 2.3.4. The rights of islands and rocks to delimit an EEZ .................................... 7 2.3.5. Delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent coasts 8 2.3.6. The regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas ...................................... 9 2.4. Delimitation of a Greek EEZ .......................................................................... 9 2.4.1. Current situation of Greece regarding her maritime zones ...................... 9 2.4.2. Delimitation with Albania ........................................................................10 2.4.3. Delimitation with Italy .............................................................................11 2.4.4. Delimitation with Libya ...........................................................................13 2.4.5. Delimitation with Egypt ...........................................................................15 2.4.6. Delimitation with Cyprus.........................................................................16 2.4.7. Delimitation with Turkey .........................................................................19 3. Research Methodology .......................................................................................27 3.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................27 3.2. Literature Resources ....................................................................................27 3.3. Research Approach......................................................................................28 vi

4. Relevant Cases ..................................................................................................29 4.1. Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands (1992) .....................................................29 4.2. Romania v Ukraine (2009) ............................................................................32 4.3. Nicaragua v Colombia (2012) .......................................................................34 5. Conclusion Recommendations ........................................................................36 Reference List ........................................................................................................41 Appendices .............................................................................................................47

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Table of Figures
Figure 2.1: Maritime Zones.....................................................................................5 Figure 2.2: Extended Continental Shelf Constraint Lines......................................6 Figure 2.3: Greece Italy: Continental Shelf Boundary........................................12 Figure 2.4: The Construction of Baselines............................................................14 Figure 2.5: Map of Cyprus.....................................................................................18 Figure 2.6: Cyprus Hydrocarbon Exploration Blocks.............................................18 Figure 2.7: Cypriot vision of Eastern Meditteranean EEZs....................................19 Figure 2.8: Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea..............................................................21 Figure 2.9: Unofficial Turkish claims for her EEZ...................................................24 Figure 2.10: EEZ of Eastern Medittterenan countries............................................25 Figure 2.11: Turkish EEZ, according to International Law.....................................25 Figure 2.12: Greek EEZ, according to International Law.......................................26 Figure 4.1: Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands Maritime Zone...............................31 Figure 4.2: Romanian and Ukrainian Single Maritime Boundary...........................33 Figure 4.3: Nicaraguan and Colombian Single Maritime Boundary.......................35

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1. Introduction
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is a maritime zone which can extend up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal states baseline. It provides sovereign rig hts and jurisdiction to the coastal state as well as freedom of navigation and overflght by aircraft to the third states. The emphasis for the creation of the EEZ was given by the states which did not have continental shelf from a geological point of view; there was a big deviation of the seabed in a small distance from their coasts. After the Convention in Geneva in 1958 for the delimitation of the continental shelf zone, these states were in unfavourable position, since the outer limit of the continental shelf was the 200 nautical miles isobath. Consequently, their continental shelf was very limited. They tried to assure the natural resources of the sea that overlie the seabed. Besides, technology in our days allows intensive exploitation of the natural sources of the sea. The placing of foreign fishing fleets just outside the territorial waters of a coastal state is a common phenomenon. More importantly, the consequences for the spawns of this territory are disastrous, as they can be obliterated for a long period of time; from five to ten years. As a result, the fishing areas, even in the territorial waters, are limited. During the sixties decade, some states of the Latin America claimed for expansion of their territorial waters to 200 nautical miles, in order to protect the living natural sources of the sea. Additionally, the developing states considered it necessary to safeguard the economic exploitation of the natural sources close to their coasts. Latino Americans referred to Patrimonial Sea and Africans, especially Kenyans, to economic zone. The developing states suggested the coastal states could give to other states preferential rights for the fishing outside their territorial waters. On the other hand, many developed countries were opposite to the expansion of territorial waters to 200 nautical miles as the area of High Seas would be much smaller. Accordingly, their fishing rights would be weaker. Finally, according to the UNCLOS 1982, the outer limit of the continental shelf was set at 200 nautical miles, starting from the baseline, and a new zone, the EEZ, was established in which the coastal state had sovereign rights and jurisdiction, but not as many as in territorial waters.

Nowadays, plenty of states have delimited an EEZ extending to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. The EEZ is included in UNCLOS 1982 and, according to ICJ, is considered as part of the customary International Law. The EEZ enactment is the most important innovation of the UNCLOS 1982. First of all, its universal establishment of 200 nautical miles would cover around 36% of the oceans. Thus, these territories would go under national jurisdiction, from an economic point of view, and would be excluded from the international territory of the High Seas. Furthermore, the territory which falls within 200 nautical miles contains almost 95% of the worldwide fish stocks and 87% of the worldwide known submarine oil deposits (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). Hence, its legal status is of high significance. Greece has ratified UNCLOS 1982 and, as every other coastal state, has the right to delimit an EEZ. However, she has not delimited it yet, due to disputes with her neighbour countries. The aim of this project is to recommend possible solutions regarding Greeces difficulties in delimiting her EEZ. In order for this aim to be endorsed, firstly, the regulations of the Law of the Sea regarding the delimitation of an EEZ will be analysed. Secondly, a deeper investigation of Greeces relationships with each of her neighbour countries will be provided. Greece has maritime borders with Albania, Italy, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey. Additionally, a number of relevant cases to Greeces will be studied, in order to gain a deep understanding on how the provisions of the Law of the Sea are implemented in practice, its limitations and its special circumstances.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) concept will be thoroughly examined, as well as Greeces case, regarding the delimitation of a Greek EEZ. Starting with a brief outline of the development of the Law of the Sea, followed up by EEZs legal status and carrying on with the rights and duties of the coastal and other states in it, this project will provide a deep understanding of the EEZ topic. Moreover, the analysis of the right of islands to delimit an EEZ, the case of delimitation of an EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent coasts and the regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are essential before moving on to Greeces case. As far as the Greek EEZ is concerned, a detailed description of the relationship between Greece and each of her neighbour countries will contribute to the reasons why Greece has not yet delimited an EEZ.

2.2. Law of the Sea Codification

The first successful attempt to codify the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva in 1958 by the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). Four International Conventions were adopted by the 86 States participating, referring to the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the High Seas, the Continental Shelf and the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, respectively. Nevertheless, the breadth of the territorial sea and the fishery limits were not specified. Consequently, the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) took place in Geneva in 1960 but, unluckily, failed to establish consensus on both topics and ended with no result. The third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III or UNCLOS 1982) held its first session in 1973 and its last on April 30th, 1982, when the text was finally adopted by 130 countries out of the 134 that were present. There were 17 abstentions. Starting on December 10th, 1982 and ending on December 10th, 1984, UNCLOS III was opened for signature at Montego Bay in Jamaica and by the end of this period, 159 states had signed it. On the 16th November 1994, the final Convention was entered into force (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). 3

The UNCLOS 1982, among its other provisions, introduced the concept of an EEZ and set limits for the breadth of the maritime zones, starting from the coasts baseline. According to UNCLOS 1982, a normal baseline follows the low-water line along the coast. However, for coasts which have indentations, UNCLOS 1982, provides the method of straight baselines (also known as closing lines). A straight line is drawn across the indentation and is considered as the baseline. More specifically, in the case of a bay, UNCLOS 1982, states that if the distance b etween the low-water marks of the nature entrance points of a bay does not exceed 24 nautical miles, a closing line may be drawn between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed there by shall be considered as internal waters (UNCLOS, 1982, p.29). Starting from the coastline, there is a series of maritime zones, each one of which is governed by a different regime of UNCLOS 1982: a) Internal waters, which are the waters within the baseline. All the waters to the landward of this line are internal waters. The coastal state has full sovereign rights over them and foreign vessels are not given the right of innocent passage. b) Territorial Sea, which can extend up to 12 nautical miles, measured from the baseline of the states coast. The coastal state has fully sovereign rights over this area but foreign vessels are given the right of innocent passage. According to UNCLOS 1982, innocent passage is defined by passing through territorial sea waters in a manner which is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 31). c) Contiguous Zone, which cannot exceed 24 nautical miles from the baseline. Consequently, if a state has a Territorial Sea of 12 nautical miles, its contiguous zone can extend up to 12 nautical miles. The coastal state does not have sovereign rights but does have the right to enforce law regarding pollution and immigration. d) Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which can extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline. The coastal states, as well as other states, have rights and duties over this area, which will be fully analysed at the next chapter of this dissertation. e) High Seas, which is by definition all parts of the sea that are not included in any maritime zone of a state. No states have rights over those waters but all states, 4

whether coastal or land-locked, have the freedom of high seas, as long as they act according to the conditions of UNCLOS 1982. f) Continental Shelf, which is defined as the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond a states territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline in case the outer edge of the continental margin is less than this distance (UNCLOS, 1982, pp. 53). The continental margin consists of the shelf, slope and rise, without including the deep oceanic floor with its oceanic ridges. However, the continental margin may exceed the 200 nautical miles. In such cases, the outer limit of the continental shelf can extend up to 350 nautical miles from the baseline or up to 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-metre isobath. As per UNCLOS 1982, isobath is a line connecting the depth of 2,500 metres (UNCLOS 1982, p. 53). The coastal state has sovereign rights over the natural resources of its continental shelf. No other state can explore this area, unless the coastal state approves so (UNCLOS, 1982).
Figure 2.1: Maritime Zones

Source: The law of the sea by R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, 1999

Figure 2.2: Extended Continental Shelf Constraint Lines

Source: Extended Continental Shelf Project, 2011

2.3. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 2.3.1. The legal status of the EEZ
During the earlier stages of UNCLOS 1982, the legal status of the EEZ was a topic that concerned the participating states and needed to be determined. Some states suggested that the EEZ should have a residual high seas character, meaning that any activity that was not part of the clearly defined coastal states rights should be subject to the high seas legal status. However, the majority of the states voted against it (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). According to UNCLOS 1982, the EEZ is subject to a specific legal status, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal state and the rights and freedoms of other states are governed (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 43). Thus, the regime of the EEZ is totally different than the one of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone and the high seas and has a unique legal character, also known as sui generis legal character. This regime provides not only the coastal state, but also the other states with rights and duties, which are specified by the UNCLOS 1982 (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). 6

2.3.2. The rights and duties of the coastal state in the EEZ
The rights and duties of the coastal state can be divided into two categories: a) Sovereign rights with regards to research, exploitation, management and conservation of all natural resources existing in the zone, as well as for the purpose of economic exploration of the area, such as to produce energy from water or winds. b) Jurisdiction regarding the creation and utilisation of artificial islands and structures, the protection and conservation of the marine environment and marine scientific investigation. Additionally, the coastal state has to respect the rights and duties of the other states (UNCLOS, 1982).

2.3.3. The rights and duties of the other states in the EEZ
In the EEZ, all coastal and land-locked states have the freedom of navigation, overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 44). Meanwhile, they must respect the coastal states rights and duties and act in compliance with the coastal states adopted regulations. As far as the fishery is concerned, in case the coastal state does not exploit the entire appropriate catch in the EEZ, then the surplus will be accessed to other states, for which UNCLOS 1982 provides preferential rights. Those states are landlocked states of the same area with the coastal state, geographically disadvantaged states and states that used to exploit the area, before an EEZ was delimited (UNCLOS, 1982).

2.3.4. The rights of islands and rocks to delimit an EEZ

According to UNCLOS 1982, rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own, shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf (UNCLOS 1982, p.66). Apart from that case, every island has the right to have maritime zones, such as territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ and continental shelf, as every other land area does. Island is defined as a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide (UNCLOS 1982, p. 66). 7

2.3.5. Delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent coasts
The delimitation of the EEZ between states with either opposite or adjacent coasts, which cannot delimit an EEZ of 200 nautical miles each, has to be judged by an agreement on the basis of international law, in order to achieve an equitable solution (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 52). While the states concerned await for their agreement to be ratified, they must make every effort to establish a provisional arrangement of a practical nature and not to put in danger or hinder the reaching of the final agreement. While the UNCLOS 1982 negotiations concerning the delimitation of EEZ were taking place, the participating states were separated into two sides. The one side supported the principle of equidistance/median line, while the other supported the principle of equity, as the primary principle of delimitation. The aforementioned provision was the result of those negotiations, which lacks of clarification in respect to the term equitable solution. There is no reference to either the

equidistance/median line or equity principle (Churchill & Lowe, 1999). However, in the majority of ICJ cases, judges prefer to use the principle of equidistance/median line, when it comes to the delimitation of an EEZ, and use a different principle, such as the principle of equity, only if equidistance does not generate equitable results for both of the states involved (Dundua, 2006-2007). The principle of equidistance/median line was first introduced by the UNCLOS I, regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. As far as the states with opposites coasts are concerned, the boundary of the continental shelf must be the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines of each state except for cases where a different boundary line exists due to special circumstances (UNCLOS, 1958, p. 3). Regarding the states with adjacent coasts, the boundary of the continental shelf must be delimited by application of the principle of equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines of each state except for cases where a different boundary line exists due to special circumstances (UNCLOS 1958, pp.3-4). The same boundary is used for the delimitation of the EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.

As for the special circumstances, the principle of equity is mostly used by the ICJ. This principle has to do with the idea of unicum, which means that due to different geographical features of each delimitation case, it is impossible to define fixed principles applicable for all boundary delimitations between states. In other words, every boundary is unique. The term equity for the Judges is based on the idea of justice, hence, special circumstances are cases in which the one state has geographical feature advantage over the other (Dundua, 2006-2007).

2.3.6. The regime of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas

UNCLOS 1982 defines enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal states (UNCLOS, 1982, p. 67). In order for the states that border such a sea to delimit an EEZ, they must liaise with each other so as to reach an agreement.

2.4. Delimitation of a Greek EEZ 2.4.1. Current situation of Greece regarding her maritime zones
Greece ratified UNCLOS 1982 and the Agreement of 1994, regarding the implementation of Part XI of this Convention, by Act No. 2321/1995 (United Nations, 1995). Additionally, in 1936, Greece had set the breadth of her territorial sea at 6 nautical miles, starting from the coastline, by Law 230/1936. The amendment by Presidential Decree to Law 187/1973, gave Greece the right to extend her territorial sea up to 12 nautical miles at any future point. As per customary International Law, the extension of territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles is a sovereign and unilateral right of every coastal state which cannot be questioned by other states. Thus, most of the coastal states have already done so but Greece is not one of them. In 1995, when the UNCLOS 1982 was ratified, Greece expressed her willingness to use the right of extension of her territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. On the 8 th of June 1995, the Turkish National Assembly published a resolution stating that if Greece decides to extend her territorial sea beyond 6 nautical miles, it will be a

cause for war (widely known as casus belli) (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). An EEZ can only exist after a proclamation the country itself and Greece has not yet delimited one. She borders Albania, Italy, Libya, Egypt, Cyprus and Turkey. Hence, in order to delimit an EEZ, Greece must sign an agreement with each of the aforementioned states respectively. In case the states cannot reach an agreement themselves, then the appropriate court, for example ICJ, will decide (Stylianidis, 2011). This chapter will examine the relationship between Greece and each of her border countries.

2.4.2. Delimitation with Albania

In April 2009 in Tirana, an agreement between Greece and Albania was signed by the former Greek Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis, and his counterpart, Sali Berisha, regarding the delimitation of their countries boundaries in the Ionian Sea (BalkanInsight, 2012). It was then that Edi Rama, the Albanian governments Socialist opposition leader, claimed that Albania gave away 225 square kilometres to Greece and that the opposition should have been informed and involved during the negotiations (International Boundaries Research Unit, 2010). Six parties made a plea to the Constitutional Court to stop the agreement from being approved. Edi Ramas protest was part of his attempt to hinder Berishas government (Hellas Frappe, 2012). Finally, on the 26th of July 2010, the Albanian Constitutional Court cancelled the agreement, arguing that there were legal flaws in respect to the UNCLOS and the Constitution. The Albanian Prime Minister stated that Albania will soon start again negotiations with Greece, even though the Constitutional Courts decision was accepted by the government (International Boundaries Research Unit, 2010). On the 11th of November 2012, the Norwegian Nordic Explorer, part of PetroleumGeo-Services Company, started to explore areas in the north Ionian Sea for potential existence of oil and natural gas (Capital.gr, 2013). A representative of Albanias Foreign Ministry announced the news on Top Channel Albanian channel. The representative stated that Ankara will determine whether or not Albania has to 10

renegotiate the agreement with Greece, depending on the explorations results (Hellas Frappe, 2012). On the 1st of April 2013, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change verified the existence of hydrocarbons in the Ionian Sea and in the waters south to Crete island (Greek Reporter, 2013). No further negotiations have taken place between Greece and Albania. However, in the beginning of January 2013, Albania announced that she will actively respond in case Greece decides to present to the UN unilateral maps regarding her maritime borders with her neighbour countries. Nevertheless, she did not specify the nature of this response. The Albanian newspaper Gazeta Shqiptare reports official statements of the Foreign Ministry that express Tirana government position. As reported, the government will thoroughly examine the issue and decide on their move as soon as the initiative enters into force, according to Albanias best interest. The only case that the Albanian government will analyse the steps that she will take is if Greece proceeds with a unilateral declaration at the UN.

2.4.3. Delimitation with Italy

On the 24th of May 1977, Greece and Italy signed the agreement regarding the delimitation of their continental shelves in the Ionian Sea. The states agreed to use the principle of median line for the establishment of the separating line between their continental shelves and the agreement entered into force on the 12th of November 1980 (The Geographer, 1982). As far as the EEZs are concerned, no interaction between the two states has been done yet. According to Kariotis (2007), an agreement regarding the delimitation of the EEZs could be easily reached, since their continental shelves have already been delimited. Kariotis (2007) suggests that the boundaries of the EEZs could be identical to those of the continental shelves (Kariotis, 2007).

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Figure 2.3: Greece Italy: Continental Shelf Boundary

Source: The Geographer, 1982

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2.4.4. Delimitation with Libya

Greece started to negotiate with Libya, regarding the delimitation of their EEZs, in 2008 (Kalarritis, 2010). The last round of negotiations was in August 2010 and since then no further approaches have taken place from either country, regarding the EEZ topic. The three rounds of negotiations that occurred during that period showed that both states had to compromise on some matters in order to reach an agreement (TO BHMA English, 2012). In 1973, Libya proclaimed the Gulf of Sidra (Sirte) as internal waters, despite the fact that the closing lines width is 296 nautical miles. This claim caused a lot of states to protest against it and also armed incidents in 1981 and 1986 between Libya and USA (Boczek, 2005). As mentioned earlier, according to UNCLOS 1982, a closing line is drawn between the natural entrance points of a bay only if the distance of those points is not more than 24 nautical miles and, therefore, the enclosed waters are considered to be internal waters (UNCLOS, 1982, p.29). Libya has not yet ratified UNCLOS 1982 (TO BHMA English, 2012). However, she must act according to the provisions of customary International Law. The Conference on the Sustainable Development of Fisheries in the Mediterranean was held in 2003 in Venice. The Commission stated that the baseline that Libya has claimed of is questionable in respect to the fundamental principles of customary International Law (Borg, 2005). Additionally, Libya questions the right of some islands to delimit an EEZ (TO BHMA English, 2012). More specifically, Libya does not recognise Gavdos islands right to delimit an EEZ, even though it is an island which can and does sustain human life (Liyeros, 2010). On the 28th of March 2013, the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that Greece will soon start renegotiating with Libya and that she is determined to discuss every topic of concern (Editorial Staff, 2013).

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Figure 2.4: The Construction of Baselines

Source: The law of the sea by R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, 1999

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2.4.5. Delimitation with Egypt

Like Greece, Egypt ratified the UNCLOS 1982 on the 26th of August 1983 (United Nations - Office of Legal Affairs, 2013). Egypt has already signed her agreement with Cyprus regarding the delimitation of their EEZs on the 17th of February 2003 using the principle of median line (Mazis & Sgouros, 2010). Their agreement entered into force on the 7th of March 2004 (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 2011). As per Kariotis (2011), Greece approached Egypt regarding the EEZ delimitation topic in 2009. Egypt agreed to start the negotiations on the 20th of June 2009 in Cairo. Meanwhile, she informed Greece that she was planning to start discussions with Turkey too, on the 22nd of June 2009, regarding the maritime zones boundaries. Kariotis (2011) continues explaining that the only case in which Egypt would border Turkey is if Egypt does not approve of Greek Kastellorizo islands right to delimit an EEZ. Hence, according to Kariotis (2011), Greece should have not agreed on that conference. On the contrary, she should have claimed that Egypt transgressed UNCLOS by embracing Turkeys view in respect to Katellorizo island. While the negotiations between Greece and Egypt proceeded, Egypt insisted on her opinion as far as the Kastellorizo island is concerned. Thus, as per Kariotis (2011), this fact causes problems to Greece. More specifically, in case Greece decided to delimit her EEZ with Egypt excluding Kastelorizo islands rights, then her EEZ would not border Cyprus (Kariotis, 2011). Greece has not yet signed an agreement with Egypt, as the negotiations have been limited. However, during October 2012, the Greek President, Karolos Papoulias, visited the new Egyptian President, Mohammed Morsi. According to Akritas (2012), Greek Presidents visit shows that Greece is worried that the new Egyptian President will lead Egypt to form an alliance with Turkey and, therefore, Greeces and Cyprus sovereign rights in the Eastern Mediterranean will be subverted. As per Akritas (2012), Turkey puts pressure on Egypt in order for her to adopt Turkeys views regarding the maritime zone borders and overlook Greeces and Cyprus sovereignty in order for the Eastern Mediterranean to become a Turkish-Egyptian sea.

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However, President Karolos Papoulias clearly expressed Greeces willingness to delimit an EEZ with Egypt to President Mohammed Morsi. The Greek President focused on the geopolitical and geoeconomical significance of gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean and stated that an agreement between the two states will be of great advantage to both (Akritas, 2012).

2.4.6. Delimitation with Cyprus

As stated earlier, Cyprus has delimited her EEZ with Egypt in 2003. Moreover, she delimited her maritime borders with Lebanon on the 17th of January 2007. Both agreements were according to UNCLOS 1982 provisions, since all three states have ratified UNCLOS 1982 (Kariotis, 2011). Cyprus ratified the UNCLOS 1982 on the 12th of December 1988 and Lebanon on the 5th of January 2005 (United Nations, 2013). The method used in both agreements was the principle of median line (Kariotis, 2011). On the 15th of February 2007, Cyprus started issuing permits for gas and oil exploration in her EEZ. In January 2009, a US-Israel energy company, which has exploration rights over an adjacent block of Cyprus EEZ, announced the existence of gas close to the coast of Haifa. The geological indications and the small distance between Cyprus and Israel indicated the existence of hydrocarbons within the whole sea area in between Cyprus and Israel. The exploration was taking place in the South, Southeast and Southwest areas of Cyprus (Mazis & Sgouros, 2010). Finally, in December 2010 in Nicosia, Cyprus delimited her EEZ with Israel, using the principle of median line. According to Kariotis (2011), Turkey objected when Cyprus signed all three aforementioned agreements, claiming that the agreements did not take into consideration the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus rights and jurisdiction over the maritime territory around Cyprus island. However, the EU and United States have both approved Cyprus EEZ (Kariotis, 2011). Furthermore, no other country than Turkey recognises Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2013). This state is also known as pseudostate as it is legally invalid (The International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus, 2011). Additionally, the Greek Cypriot government has recently stated that any kind of fuel research is Cyprus sovereign right. Furthermore, it mentioned that hydrocarbon 16

finds could potentially act as an inducement to peace; in which case both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would be allowed to be a part of the finds economic advantages (Todays Zaman, 2013). In March 2013, The Shura Council, which Egypts upper house of parliament, approved a draft law submitted by MP Khaled Abdel Qader Ouda, member of the Muslim Brotherhood. The draft law invalidated Cyprus EEZ delimitation agreement with Egypt. Khaled Abdel Qader Ouda claimed that Egypt was absent when the agreement was signed in 2003 and, therefore, it should be cancelled. He continued stating that a new agreement could be signed for the re-delimitation of EEZ borders in the presence of Turkey as a third party. The Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, commented on the event saying that Egypt has never doubted their submitted agreement to the UN (Todays Zaman, 2013). In July 2012, the Turkish President approved the agreement between Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus regarding the maritime borders of Cyprus and Turkeys continental shelves. As per Greece Defence, disputes between Greece, Cyprus and Israel on the one side, and Turkey and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the other, have been going on over the control of the exploration area in the Eastern Mediterranean. The area is considered to have big amounts of crude oil and gas, therefore, the aforementioned agreement is of high importance (Greece Defence, 2013). As far as an agreement between Cyprus and Greece is concerned, nothing has been delimited yet. According to Kariotis (2011), in 2004, Cyprus approached Greece as to start delineating their EEZs borders; yet Greece refused in the fear of a Turkish protest (Kariotis, 2011).

17

Figure 2.5: Map of Cyprus

Source: Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2013

Figure 2.6: Cyprus Hydrocarbons Exploration Blocks

Source: Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, 2013

18

Figure 2.7: Cypriot vision of Eastern Mediterranean EEZs

Source: Republic of Cyprus, 2013

2.4.7. Delimitation with Turkey

2.4.7.1. Disputes regarding the breadth of the territorial waters in the Aegean Sea
As stated before, Greece expressed her willingness to extend her territorial waters to 12 nautical miles and Turkey objected. According to Turkey, this move would be a cause for war (casus belli) (Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). More specifically, Turkey claims that the extension of Greeces territorial waters to 12 nautical miles would have most inequitable implications and constitute an abuse of right (Republic of Turkey- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). Turkey bases her claims on a number of reasons. Firstly, the Aegean Sea would become a Greek Sea and, therefore, Turkeys rights will be eliminated in her territorial waters. Secondly, Turkeys economic, military and experimental benefits would be imperilled. Thirdly, Turkeys Aegean coast would be encircled by Greeces territorial waters and, as a result, Turkey would lose her access to high seas. Lastly, Greece would have benefit in future possible delimitations of other maritime zones over Turkey (Republic of Turkey- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 19

What needs to be mentioned is that Greece intends to expand her territorial sea to 12 nautical miles where the distance between the Greek islands coasts and the opposite Turkish coastline is larger than, or equal to, 24 nautical miles. In any other case, the principle of median line will be implemented.

2.4.7.2. Disputes regarding the delimitation of continental shelf borders

In November 1973, the Turkish government gave permission to the Turkish national petroleum company to start exploiting the area west of Greek islands, which was part of the Greek continental shelf. Ever since, Turkeys attempts to transgress Greeces sovereignty over the continental shelf have caused frictions between the two states; even the possibility of war was risen (1974,1976,1987). Almost three years later, in August 1976, Greece appealed first to the UN Security Council and later to the ICJ in Hague. Turkey doubted the ICJs jurisdiction and refused to attend the trial. The ICJ could not reach a decision due to lack of competence, nevertheless, stated that there was a legal dispute over the Aegean Seas continental shelf. Finally, in November 1976, Greece and Turkey signed the Berne process-verbal, a description of their arguments regarding the continental shelf issue, which they were going to submit to the ICJ. However, Turkeys continuous vacillations and intransigent stance ended the agreement in 1981. In March 2002, the two parties started to renegotiate via confidential contacts in order to see if a common ground could be found between them. These negotiations are still going on. Greeces position is according to UNCLOS 1982 and international law and is a prerequisite for Turkeys accession course. Nevertheless, since Turkey does not recognise ICJs jurisdiction, a special agreement referring the dispute to arbitrators is needed (Hellenic Public Ministry of Foreign Afairs, 2013).

2.4.7.3. Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea

Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS 1982 (Kariotis, 2011). Nevertheless, she proclaimed her EEZ in the Black Sea on the 17th of December1986. The agreements between Turkey and her neighbour countries had to be according to Turkish Legislation and the equitable principles, as per Article 1 of the Decree by the Council of Ministers. Additionally, previous maritime zone delimitations in the Black Sea would not be affected (United Nations, 2013). 20

In 1987, Turkey delimited her EEZ with Georgia, Russian Federation and Ukraine. Turkey and the former USSR countries decided to use their continental shelf boundaries, which they had delimited in 1978, as the EEZ boundaries too. (Department of Defence USA, 2005). The continental shelf boundaries were delimited according to the principle of equidistance. Furthermore, no reference to enclosed or semi-enclosed seas or provisions for special circumstances were made. Nevertheless, the Black Sea is a semi-enclosed sea, as the Aegean Sea is too. Later, Turkey delimited her EEZ boundaries with Romania and Bulgaria. During her negotiations with Bulgaria, Turkey claimed that there was no need for special circumstances application in the Black Sea. Turkey supported her opinion by saying that the principle of equidistance was the most appropriate one to be used in order to delimit equitable boundaries. Bulgaria, on the other hand, did not believe the same. However, their agreement was similar to the one with the USSR (Kariotis, 2011).

Figure 2.8: Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea

Source: Sea Around Us Project, 1999

21

2.4.7.4. Disputes regarding the delimitation of EEZ borders

According to Turkeys claims, a number of Greek habited islands should only have the right of territorial sea zone and not of continental shelf or EEZ. Those islands are Crete, Kastellorizo and three of the Dodecanese islands, Rhodes, Karpathos and Kassos. Turkey supports her position by referring to the case of the Ukrainian Serpent Island, which is entitled to have only territorial waters (Yayci, 2012). This case will be further analysed in the next chapter of the dissertation. Turkey has accepted Greek authority of Kastellorizo and its territorial sea of 6 nautical miles. A further extension of its territorial sea or EEZ delimitation would be seen as a cause for war by the Turkish people. According to Pipes (2012), by emasculating Kastellorizo, Turkeys EEZ in the Mediterranean would be much bigger. More specifically, if Greece were to claim her EEZ, Kastellorizos EEZ would border with Cypriot EEZ. This fact is of high significance, since many hydrocarbon explorations are currently taking place in this area. More importantly, the transfer of Cypriot or Israeli natural gas to Western Europe via pipeline would not need Turkish authorisation, since Greek and Cypriot EEZ would border. Additionally, on the 4th of November 2012, Turkey stated that she would not allow Israeli natural gas transfers via Turkish territory. Hence, Kastellorizo can be considered as a flashpoint. As per Pipes (2012), Turkey has violated Kastellorizos rights several times. Firstly, in September 2012, Turkish government gave permission to a Norwegian ship to explore the area south of Kastellorizo for hydrocarbons, which area is included in Kastellorizos continental shelf. Secondly, Turkish war crafts armed with munitions trained in the area between Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Lastly, in 2011, Turkish military aircrafts overflew Kastellorizo four times without permission. In general, Turkey has shown her enmity towards Cyprus, for she denies Cyrpus EEZ. Thus, doing the same vis--vis Kastellorizo builds on an established policy (Pipes, 2012). She conquered the North part of Cyprus in 1974 by force and she looks for nearby island region. USA and Russia responded to Turkeys behaviour in the Mediterranean and supported Cyprus right to explore her resources. Cypriot President, Dimitris Christofias, gave notice to Ankara that in case she insists having a gunboat 22

diplomacy, there will be bad results. Additionally, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Danny Ayalon, informed Greece that they will meet any challenge given regarding the drills and improved security of the Cypriot drilling areas (Pipes, 2012). Furthermore, according to the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yiannis Valinakis, the contract signed between Italy and Turkey in 1932 is still valid, since no other contract has been signed afterwards. This contract explains in detail the points of the continuous line, which defines Southern Samos and Kastellorizo, since the Dodecanese islands then belonged to Italy. He continues stating that Rhodes has a specific EEZ, which is evident from the maps drawn at that time as well as from the German and English maps after 1947 and the signing of the Paris peace Treaties (Balezdrova, 2011). In October 2012, the general director of a Greek tank organisation, Thanos Dokos, stated that Greece might have to delimit her EEZ due to domestic pressure. More specifically, Greece wants to delimit her EEZ in order to take advantage of the natural resources in her zones and overcome her massive economic crisis. Additionally, Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitrios Avramopoulos, stated that since 2002, the Turkish diplomats have been holding meetings with the Greek diplomats in order to find an equitable solution. According to Avramopoulos, Greece has clearly expressed her views regarding the EEZ topic to Turkey and that Greece is legally and politically prepared (Anadolu Agency, 2012). Meanwhile, during a meeting of Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davoutoglu, and Greek Foreign Minister, Dimitris Avramopoulos, in Athens, Davoutoglu clearly stated Turkeys opposition in regards to a Greek EEZ. Davoutoglu insisted that no further attempts for EEZ should be done by Greece before the two states settle on their territorial waters and continental shelves issues (Hellenic Antidote, 2012). Nevertheless, in February 2013, EU expressed their support for Greece regarding the delimitation of EEZ. Member of European Parliament, Niki Tzavella, added that the existing hydrocarbons in Greek areas might be national; however, the states borders are European (Ekathimerini.com, 2013). In March 2013, Greek Foreign Minister, Avramopoulos, and Turkish Foreign Minister, Davoutoglu, gave separately interviews to the Greek newspaper Kathimerini, after their meeting. Avramopoulos expressed his willingness to find common grounds with Turkey in respect to the delimitation of the continental 23

shelves. He continued saying that Greeces framework is the countrys sovereign rights according to International Law and that nobody should doubt our determination to defend this. International Law is our gospel (Kathimerini, 2013). Davoutoglu admitted that the two states have different points of view but those differences should not constitute obstacles in their negotiations. He added that Aegean Sea is a special case because it has numerous Greek islands and meanwhile consists part of the wider Mediterranean. Thus, bilateral dialogue seems the best way to solve any disputes over it. Furthermore, he explained that Turkey cannot agree to remain landlocked due to certain measures, when she has the longest coastline in the Mediterranean. However, he ensured that an equitable solution can surely be found (Kathimerini, 2013).

Figure 2.9: Unofficial Turkish claims for her EEZ

Source: Republic of Cyprus, 2013

24

Figure 2.10: EEZs of Eastern Mediterranean countries

Source: Mazis & Sgouros, 2010 Figure 2.11: Turkish EEZ, according to International Law

Source: Kariotis, 2009

25

Figure 2.12: Greek EEZ, according to International Law

Source: Kariotis, 2009

26

3. Research Methodology
3.1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the methods by which the author collected the information needed in order to build a background for this dissertations topic. Moreover, the type of research approach chosen by the author will be explained. Additionally, throughout this chapter, the validity and reliability of the references used will be evaluated. In respect to the subject of this study, EEZ is a very important maritime zone, as it provides sovereign rights and jurisdiction to a coastal state. Every state that wishes to delimit her EEZ must sign an agreement with each one of the countries her EEZ borders with. Undoubtedly, EEZ delimitation can cause disputes between the parties involved. Greece still faces many difficulties in delimiting her EEZ. In order to gain a deeper understanding of Greeces case, a detailed analysis of her relationship with the neighbour countries is provided at the first part of this dissertation. Later on, a number of EEZ delimitation cases, relevant to Greeces case, are explicated. In this way, the reader can understand the complexity surrounding the EEZ delimitation topic.

3.2. Literature Resources

The sources of information used for the completion of this project were of secondary literature. The nature of the topic did not request primary data, since it is a theoretical one. Additionally, Greeces delimitation of EEZ is still in the limelight. Thus, the quantity of secondary data, such as articles, reports from newspapers and reliable websites was numerous and continuously updated. As far as the historical background of the UNCLOS 1982 is concerned, a recommended book regarding the Law of the Sea was used, written by R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe. Additionally, the aforementioned book, along with the actual Law of the Sea text available online, formed the sources needed for the explanation of the EEZ concept and its regulations. Moreover, a number of reliable websites, articles and newspaper reports were used in order for the author to provide a complete depiction of Greeces current relations 27

with her neighbour countries. Some of the websites used were the official Greek, Turkish and Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs websites. The articles used were written by Dr. Georgios-Alexandros Sgouros, Dr. Theodore Kariotis and Prof. Ioannis Mazis, whose reputation is widely known. Finally, the newspaper reports used were from the Greek newspapers To Bima and Kathimerini. The main sources used for the description of relevant EEZ delimitation cases were the official ICJ website and the official UN website, as they provided each cases important details.

3.3. Research Approach

The research approach used by the author is the inductive one. As per Saunders et al., (2009) the inductive approach is when a thorough conclusion stems from the analysis of the data which have been collected (Saunders et al., 2009). Taking into account the subject of the project, the inductive approach was the most suitable. No recommendations or conclusions could be made without first analysing the UNCLOS 1982 regulations and the current relationship between Greece and her neighbour countries. Additionally, the analysis of relevant cases provided the author with a deeper understanding of the subject, since the theory was applied in practice.

28

4. Relevant Cases
4.1. Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands (1992)
Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands are located close to the Canadian coast, south of Newfoundland island and east of Cape Breton island. Even though they are close to Canada, they belong to France, whereas Newfoundland and Cape Breton are Canadian islands. On the 30th of March 1989, France and Canada started their negotiations via arbitrators. The Court of Arbitrators was entitled to delimit the maritime areas around Saint Pierre and Miquelon appertaining to France and Canada respectively, according to International Laws principles applicable to this case. Canada claimed that the principle of equity should be used. Thus, she suggested that each of the islands should be entitled to have a 12 nautical miles zone and in the territories in which their coasts are opposite to Newfoundlands coast, the principle of median line should be applied. On the other hand, France stated that the Court should respect the equal sovereignty of both States, as well as the equal ability of states and islands to delimit every maritime zone. Hence, she claimed a 200 nautical miles zone for the islands, according to the principle of equidistance and the special circumstances rule. The Court did not agree with either of the states arguments. On the contrary, the Court highlighted that France claimed of states equality but did not give any seaward projection to the segments of the southern coast of Newfoundland, which are close to Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands. Similarly, Canada claimed the principle of equity but did not want any cut-offs of her southern and western coastal projections and, therefore, entitled Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands only with territorial sea zone. On the 10th of June, the Court reached its final decision, emphasising on the importance of the geographical features of the territory. The ratio between the length of the coasts of Newfoundland and Saint Pierre and Miquelon was 1.53 to 1 and the Court considered them as adjacent coasts. The Court divided the examined area in two sectors. The first sector was the western sector, in which the Court entitled Saint Pierre and Miquelon to have a 29

territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and an additional one of 12 nautical miles for their EEZ. The second sector was the southern east one, in which the Court granted Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands with a zone of 10.5 nautical miles breadth and 200 nautical miles length to the south. In the eastern area, due to the adjacency with Newfoundland island, Saint Pierre and Miquelon were entitled to have a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. Additionally, at the points where the distance with Newfoundland was less than 24 nautical miles, and, therefore, the two islands could not have territorial waters of 12 nautical miles each; the delimitation was according to the principle of median line. Even though the length of the EEZ is 200 nautical miles to the south, this zone does not reach high seas. Thus, the French zone is totally enclosed in the Canadian waters (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, 2006).

30

Figure 4.1: Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands Maritime Zone (in dark grey)

Source: Arsana, 2009

31

4.2. Romania v Ukraine (2009)

On the 16th of September 2004, Romania appealed to the ICJ against Ukraine regarding the delimitation of their maritime boundaries in the Black Sea. The two states had already agreed on the delimitation of their continental shelf and EEZ as a single maritime boundary. However, their disputes led Romania to appeal to the ICJ. The main cause of their disagreement was Serpent (Snake) island and the maritime zones that it was entitled to delimit. Serpent island is a Ukrainian island, located in the north western territory of the Black Sea. In 2008, the two states submitted their arguments to the ICJ. Ukraine claimed as special circumstances the inequality in the length of the two states coastlines, the existence of Serpent island and the hitherto fishery and exploitation states policy, which she considered to have been unfair. Moreover, Ukraine invoked that Serpent island was entitled to delimit an EEZ. On the other hand, Romania entitled Serpent island to have territorial sea of 12 nautical miles. She justified her argument stating that the nature of the Black Sea is considered as special circumstances, as it had been considered for the delimitations which have been agreed in the area so far. On the 3rd of February 2009, the ICJ made its decree. The line drawn was according to the principle of equidistance. However, the Serpent island was entitled to have only a 12 nautical miles territorial sea (ICJ, 2009). The Courts justification on this fact was that Serpent island had a considerable distance with its mainland. Hence, according to ICJ, it could not be treated as a segment of the coast of Ukraine (Oude Elferink, 2009). The ICJ determined that the drawn line provided a fair result in the delimitation of the maritime zones of the two states (ICJ, 2009).

32

Figure 4.2: Romanian and Ukrainian Single Maritime Boundary

Source: The Hague Justice Portal, 2009

33

4.3. Nicaragua v Colombia (2012)

On the 6th of December 2001, Nicaragua appealed to the ICJ against Colombia regarding their sovereignty disputes over some islands in the western Caribbean and their maritime boundaries. Colombia, who has not ratified UNCLOS 1982, doubted the ICJs jurisdiction. However, ICJ stated that according to American Treaty on Pacific Settlement of 1948, it had jurisdiction to decree both of the states disputes. The procedures continued and on the 13th of December 2007, the ICJ approved of Colombias sovereignty over the islands of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina, which are located opposite to Nicaraguas coast. The ICJs decision was based on a Treaty signed in 1928, which was still valid. Additionally, ICJ examined the factor of conduct during the post-colonial period. The Court did so in order to decide which one of the two states had used her territorial jurisdiction over the conflicted area in a more effective way, regarding the islands benefit. ICJs conclusion was that Colombia, in comparison with Nicaragua, had shown excellent conduct. Therefore, the former decree of the ICJ was confirmed and the Court unanimously approved of Colombias sovereignty. As far as the delimitation between the Colombian islands and Nicaraguan EEZ and continental shelf is concerned, Colombia suggested that a single maritime boundary must be drawn. The boundary line should delimit both the EEZ and continental shelf and be based on the principle of the median line between Colombian and Nicaraguan islands. Nicaragua, on the other hand, wanted to delimit the continental shelf boundary between the coasts of the two countries mainland. This way, the islands of San Andres, Providencia and Santa Catalina would be enclosed in Nicaraguan EEZ and would be entitled to delimit a 12 nautical mile territorial sea. Furthermore, as per Nicaragua claims, the other Colombian islets would each have a 3 nautical mile territorial sea. Finally, on the 19th of November 2012, the ICJ delimited a single maritime boundary based on the principle of equidistance. The Court decided to use Nicaraguas mainland coast, which has 531 kilometres length, for the delimitation of the single boundary. On the contrary, for Colombia, the Court used the western coasts of the Colombian islands, measuring 65 kilometres, excluding Quitasueno and Serranilla 34

islands. Additionally, the Court decided to draw an eastward median line by implementing a 3:1 weighting ratio between the Nicaraguan and Colombian islands. The Quitasueno and Serrana islands, which were located above the northern boundary of the median line, were entitled of a surrounding 12 nautical mile zone each. The IJCs concluded that its decision did not involve such an asymmetry as to originate an inequitable result (Bekker, 2013).

Figure 4.3: Nicaraguan and Colombian Single Maritime Boundary

Source: JoomlaShine.com, 2012

35

5. Conclusion Recommendations
During the past few years, the EEZ has been of great importance due to the countries intensification regarding the exploration of minerals, such as

hydrocarbons, located in their sovereignty areas. Furthermore, the development of technology allows states to exploit minerals situated in the deep seas with unreasonable cost. Therefore, conflicts between neighbour countries over the sovereignty of maritime areas are inevitable. Apart from Turkey, Greece does not face great difficulties in delimiting her maritime zones with the rest of her neighbour countries. Greece respects the International Law as well as the UNCLOS 1982. In case she cannot reach an agreement with her neighbour countries, she must appeal to the ICJ. As far as the delimitation of EEZ with Albania is concerned, there is no actual disagreement. Ankaras influence on Tirana led to the cancellation of the agreement of 2009 between Greece and Albania. Greece has to persuade Albania that it is for the benefit of both states to delimit their EEZs as soon as possible, in order to exploit the potential hydrocarbon minerals located in the Ionian Sea. Additionally, hundreds of thousands Albanians found shelter in Greece after the fall of the communist regime and the majority of them became permanent residents of the state, without any prospect of going back to Albania. However, they provide financial support to their relatives who stayed in Albania. Thus, having good relations with Greece is of high significance for Albania. Regarding the delimitation with Italy, with whom the continental shelf borders have already been delimited, it seems that there are no problems concerning the EEZ. The increased interest for the exploitation of the hydrocarbons in the Ionian Sea should motivate the two states to delimit their EEZ borders. Their EEZ agreement should be based on their continental shelf agreement. Besides, the relationship of the two states is excellent and they are both members of the EU. Moreover, when the hydrocarbons located in Cyprus EEZ are exploited, a pipeline will be constructed, which will transfer the natural gas from Cyprus, via Greece, to Italy and from Italy to the rest of Europe. All of this will happen under the condition that the Greek and Cypriot EEZ have been delimited according to UNCLOS 1982. Therefore, Greece and Italy must be ready for this collaboration, having their EEZs delimited. 36

Libya, under the influence of Turkey, does not want bilateral negotiations with Greece. She also claims that Gavdos island does not have the right of delimiting an EEZ, which is wrong, according to UNCLOS 1982. Greece can retreat as far as the Gulf of Sidra is concerned for Libyas favour. In exchange, Libya can accept the right of Gavdos to delimit an EEZ, since this is of high importance for Greece, as it is a similar case with the Kastellorizo one. Nevertheless, concerning the issue of the Gulf of Sidra, Italy and Malta are also involved. Therefore, they might express their objections to Libyas demands. In 2011, Egypts President Mubarak, was overthrown by President Morsi. The Muslim regime of President Morsi gave great attention to the Muslim religion, as Turkey does. Hence, Egypt wanted to satisfy Turkey and did not accept to delimit EEZ with Greece according to UNCLOS 1982. Instead she opened discussions with Turkey, even though Egypt has no maritime borders with her. Additionally, in March 2013, MP Khaled Abdel Qader Ouda, member of the Muslim Brotherhood, submitted to the Shura Council, Egypts upper house of parliament, a draft law invalidating Egypts agreement with Cyprus, regarding their EEZ delimitation. Khaled Abdel Qader Ouda justified this submission by saying that Egypt was not present when the agreement was signed by Cyprus and Israel in 2003. He also stated that in any future agreement Turkey must be present as a third party. The Shura Council approved this submission. However, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kasoulides, commented that the Egyptian government has never questioned their agreement, which had been submitted to the UN (Todays Zaman, 2013). Greece has always had great relationships with the Arab world. More specifically, Greece has special bonds with Egypt, since there is a big Greek community and the Patriarchate of Alexandria there. Egypts current situation is out of control. Morsis government was overthrown by public uprising and the authority has been taken by the army. The Muslim Brotherhood though organises great riots daily, hundreds of people have been killed and no one knows what the outcome will be. In case the Muslim Brotherhood, which consists of the fanatic Muslims, does not prevail, Greece hopes that Cairo will not follow Ankaras orders. This way, Greece could reach an agreement with Egypt regarding their maritime borders according to UNCLOS 1982. A great quantity of hydrocarbon minerals exist in the maritime area between Crete and Egypt, thus, it is for both Greeces and Egypts favour to delimit an EEZ as soon as possible. 37

As for Cyprus, she does not have any conflicts with Greece. In 2004, Cyprus called Greece to sign an agreement for their EEZ boundaries. However, Greece refused to do so, in the fear of Turkeys protests. The ideal scenario, indeed, would be if Greece signed an agreement with Turkey first. Nevertheless, Cyprus has recently started exploiting the hydrocarbons in her EEZ via Israeli companies. Hence, if Greece decided to delimit her EEZ, she would have Cyprus, Israels, and therefore USAs, support. This way, the natural gas exported from Cyprus and Israels EEZ could be transferred to the EU without the need to pass through a non European country. Turkeys strategy has always been to cause problems to Greece, doubting her sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. Since 1973, Turkey questions the Greek continental shelf and does not want the two parties to appeal to the ICJ. Additionally, Turkey claimed that if the Greek territorial sea is expanded to 12 nautical miles, it will be a cause for war. In respect to EEZ, Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS 1982 and refuses to let Greece delimit her EEZ. She insists that the Aegean Sea is a semi-enclosed one and, therefore, special circumstances must be applied (negotiation). Nevertheless, she has delimited her EEZ in the Black Sea using the principle of median line. The last President of UNCLOS, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, has very wisely commented that Although the Convention consists of series of compromises, they form an integral whole. This is why the Convention does not provide for reservations. It is therefore not possible for States to pick what they like and disregard what they do not like. In International Law, as in Domestic Law, rights and duties go hand in hand. It is therefore legally impermissible to claim rights under the Convention without being willing to assume the correlative duties (Kariotis, 2011). Turkey claims that Kastellorizo, Rhodes, Karpathos and Kassos islands do not have the right to delimit an EEZ. Her justification is the principle of equity and that those islands are located on Turkish continental shelf. The state with the longest coastline in the Mediterranean, she claims, cannot be landlocked only because of a small island. She has also delimited her EEZ with the pseudostate of Northern Cyprus, giving Cyprus a much smaller EEZ than the one she deserved according to the principle of median line. As stated before, the pseudostate of Northern Cyprus is not recognised by any other country in the world apart from Turkey. 38

Turkeys uncompromised behaviour is based on her military power and her strategic geographic position. She is the last frontier of the western world. USA and EU tolerate Turkeys provocative behaviour because they are afraid of the possibility that the fanatical Muslims will take over the governance. That is why they accepted Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974, the possession of 37% of the state and her proclamation of the pseudostate in the Northern Cyprus in 1983. Moreover, they tried to integrate Turkey in the EU, which is something Greece wants too. It is possible that if Turkey becomes a state-member of the EU, she would have to follow a specific policy with the rest of the EU countries, according to the International Law. Unfortunately, Turkey and EU states have huge cultural differences and such integration would be really difficult. Additionally, she has been influencing her neighbour Muslim countries (Albania, Libya and Egypt) according to her beliefs on the EEZ topic. As a result, the aforementioned states find excuses to refuse the delimitation of their EEZ with Greece. She also refuses to appeal to the ICJ regarding her EEZ delimitation with Greece, as she prefers to impose with threats her opinion. Greece should insist on trying to reach an agreement with Turkey regarding EEZ topic or, at least, persuade her to appeal to the ICJ. It is possible that the ICJ might not approve of all Greeces requests; however it is the best solution in this case. In relevant cases, such as St. Pierre and Miquelon islands, Romania v Ukraine and Nicaragua v Colombia, the ICJ neither used the principle of median line nor approved all the requests of the two sides. As it is easily observed, each case has its own characteristics, and, therefore, it is unique. Besides, UNCLOS 1982 has general principles for the EEZ delimitation and not specific rules. The current situation in Greece is unsatisfactory. Since she is in a bad economic situation, she cannot exploit the minerals on the seabed in her maritime zones. Only in the Ionian Sea, Greece has given the authority of exploitation to Norwegian companies. The Greek Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras, highlights the subject of EEZ to EU emphasising that there is no Greek EEZ but EU EEZ. It is of high importance that the Greek EEZ is delimited according to UNCLOS 1982. As stated earlier, the transfer of natural gas will not pass via a non European country and, therefore, EU will not depend on third states. It is not easy to forget what happened in 2011, when Russia stopped the transfer of natural gas to the Western Europe via 39

a pipeline which was crossing Ukraine. Russia blamed Ukraine that she was stealing gas. The residents of the European counties suffered from the lack of natural gas, since there was no heating for a few days. Thus, EU has to support Greece as far as the EEZ subject is concerned. Ultimately, when two countries cannot reach an agreement on any subject, they must appeal to the ICJ. The policy of the law of the most powerful has to stop, in order that chaos does not prevail in the world. At some point, Turkey has to understand and recognise that it is for her own good too to settle on an agreement with Greece, as she will be able to exploit the hydrocarbons of her own EEZ. Civilization imposes collusion and, in cases where it is not possible to reach an agreement, recourse at the ICJ and acceptance of the ICJs decrees.

Word Count: 10,216 40

Reference List
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26) Kathimerini (2013) Greece, Turley cant agree on a sea deal [Online]. Available: http://www.turkishnews.com/en/content/2013/03/11/greece-turkey-cant-agreeon-sea-deal/ [23 August 2013] 27) Liyeros, S. (2010) Ankara Gives Notice of 'PlayingHardball' in the Aegean [Online]. Available: http://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/664166_egy-egypt-middleeast-.html [20 August 2013] 28) Mazis, T. & Sgouros, G. (2010) Geopolitics of Energy in the Katelorizo Cyprus Middle East Comple: Based on Existing Geophysical and Geological Indications of Hydrocarbon Deposits, Regional Science Inquiry Journal, 2 (2), pp. 133-150 [Online]. Available: http://www.rsijournal.eu/ARTICLES/Journal_dece_2010/GEOPOLITICS%20OF %20ENERGY%20IN%20THE%20KASTELORIZO%20%20CYPRUS%20MIDDL E%20EAST%20COMPLEX%20BASED%20ON%20THE%20EXISTING.pdf [23 August 2013] 29) Oude Elferink, A. (2009) Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine): A Commentary [Online]. Available: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=10407 [24 August 2013] 30) Pipes, D. (2012) Kastellorizo Mediterranean Flashpoint? [Online]. Available: http://www.danielpipes.org/10630/kastelorizo [23 August 2013] 31) Republic of Turkey- Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) The Breadth of Territorial Waters [Online]. Available: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-breadth-of-territorialwaters.en.mfa [23 August 2013] 32) Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornill, A. (2009) Research for Business Students, p. 124 [Online]. Available: http://doha.ac.mu/ebooks/Research%20Methods/ResearchMethodsForBusiness Students_Saunders.pdf [24 August 2013] 33) Stylianidis, E. (2011) Exclusive Economic Zone: The Blue Line of the Greek Foreign Policy, 1. The United Nations New Maritime Law [Online]. Available: http://www.e-stylianidis.gr/articles/exclusive-economic-zone-blue-line-greekforeign-policy [20 August 2013] 34) The Geographer (1982) Limits in the Seas, No. 96 - Continental Shelf Boundary: Greece Italy [Online]. Available: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58576.pdf [20 August 2013]

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35) The International Coordinating Committee Justice for Cyprus (2006) Cypriot FM says pseudostate obstacle to Cyprus reunification [Online]. Available: http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=6056 [22 August 2013] 36) TO BHMA English (2012) Investment opportunities and gambles in postrevolution Libyan [Online]. Available: http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=490055 [20 August 2013] 37) Todays Zaman (2013) Report: Egypt vows to cancel Egypt-Greek Cyprus EEZ deal [Online]. Available: http://www.todayszaman.com/news-309156-reportegypt-vows-to-cancel-egypt-greek-cyprus-eez-deal.html [22 August 2013] 38) United Nations (2013) Chapter XXI Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [Online]. Available: http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~ 6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en#EndDec [22 August 2013] 39) United Nations (2013) Decree by the Council of Ministers, No. 86/11264, dated 17 December 1986 [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TUR_198 6_Decree.pdf [23 August 2013] 40) United Nations (1995) Law of the Sea Bulletin No.29, Greece: declaration made upon ratification, pp.6-7 [Online]. Available: https://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/LOSBulletins/bulletinpdf/bulleti nE29.pdf [20 August 2013] 41) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (1958) Convention on the Continental Shelf, pp. 3-4 [Online]. Available: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_contin ental_shelf.pdf [18 August 2013] 42) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), (1982) Law of the Sea, pp. 27- 29, 31, 33, 35, 43, 44, 46, 49- 54, 57, 66 - 67 [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf [18 August 2013] 43) United Nations - Office of Legal Affairs (2013) Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 09 August 2013 [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.ht m [20 August 2013]

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44) United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (2006) Digest of International Cases on the Law of the Sea [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/depts/los/doalos_publications/publicationstexts/digest_website _version.pdf [24 August 2013] 45) United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (2011) Maritime boundary delimitation agreements and other material [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/CYP.ht m [20 August 2013] 46) Yayci, C. (2012) Delimitation of the Maritime Jurisdictional Areas between Turkey and Libya in Eastern Mediterranean [Online]. Available: http://www.ingepo.ro/downloadmateriale/557/SuplimentBuletin125En050712.pdf [23 August 2013]

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Appendices
Figure 2.1: Maritime Zones

Source: Churchill, R.R. & Lowe, A.V. (1999) The law of the sea, 3rd ed, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 30 Figure 2.2: Extended Continental Shelf Constraint Lines

Source: U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Task Force (2011) Extended Continental Shelf Project, How is an ECS determined? [Online]. Available: http://continentalshelf.gov/about.html 47

Figure 2.3: Greece Italy: Continental Shelf Boundary

Source: The Geographer (1982) Limits in the Seas, No. 96 - Continental Shelf Boundary: Greece Italy, p. 7 [Online]. Available: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58576.pdf Scale: 1:14,000,000 Figure 2.4: The Construction of Baselines

Source: Churchill, R.R. & Lowe, A.V. (1999) The law of the sea, 3rd ed, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 36 48

Figure 2.5: Map of Cyprus

Source: Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State (2013) Cyprus: Country Specific Information [Online]. Available: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1098.html Scale: 1:2,500,000 Figure 2.6: Cyprus Hydrocarbons Exploration Blocks

Source: Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism (2013) 2nd Licensing Round Hydrocarbon Exploration [Online]. Available: http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/dmlhcarbon_en/dmlhcarbon_en?OpenDocume nt Scale: 1:6,000,000 49

Figure 2.7: Cypriot vision of eastern Mediterranean EEZs

Source: Republic of Cyprus (2013) Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts [Online]. Available: http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/eu-turkeycyprus/2013/03/22/can-gas-save-cyprus-the-long-term-cost-of-frozen-conflicts/ Scale: 1:12,500,000 Figure 2.8: Turkish EEZ in the Black Sea

Source: Sea Around Us Project (1999) EEZ Waters of Turkey (Black Sea) [Online]. Available: http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/794.aspx Scale: 1:25,000,000 50

Figure 2.9: Unofficial Turkish claims for her EEZ

Source: Republic of Cyprus (2013) Can Gas Save Cyprus? The Long-Term Cost of Frozen Conflicts [Online]. Available: http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/eu-turkeycyprus/2013/03/22/can-gas-save-cyprus-the-long-term-cost-of-frozen-conflicts/ Scale: 1:20,000,000 Figure 2.10: EEZs of Eastern Mediterranean countries

Source: Mazis, T. & Sgouros, G. (2010) Geopolitics of Energy in the Katelorizo Cyprus Middle East Comple: Based on Existing Geophysical and Geological Indications of Hydrocarbon Deposits, Regional Science Inquiry Journal, 2 (2), pp. 133-150 [Online]. Available: http://www.rsijournal.eu/ARTICLES/Journal_dece_2010/GEOPOLITICS%20OF%20 ENERGY%20IN%20THE%20KASTELORIZO%20%20CYPRUS%20MIDDLE%20E AST%20COMPLEX%20BASED%20ON%20THE%20EXISTING.pdf Scale: 1:25,000,000 51

Figure 2.11: Turkish EEZ, according to International Law

Source: Kariotis, T. (2009) EEZ solves the Aegean problems [Online]. Available: http://noiazomai.net/aoz_kariotis.html Scale: 1:60,000,000 Figure 2.12: Greek EEZ, according to International Law

Source: Kariotis, T. (2009) EEZ solves the Aegean problems [Online]. Available: http://noiazomai.net/aoz_kariotis.html Scale: 1:60,000,000 52

Figure 4.1: Saint Pierre and Miquelon islands maritime zone (in dark grey)

Source: Arsana, A. (2009) Extending the Baguette France plays Leap-Frog on behalf of St. Pierre et Miquelon [Online]. Available: http://www.zeitschrift.co.uk/indexv5n2.html Scale: 1:5,000,000 Figure 4.2: Romanian and Ukrainian single maritime boundary

Source: The Hague Justice Portal (2009) Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine): A Commentary [Online]. Available: http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=10407 Scale: 1:2,200,000 53

Figure 4.3: Nicaraguan and Colombian single maritime boundary

Source: JoomlaShine.com (2012) Colombianos muy confundidos por el fallo del Tribunal de la Haya [Online]. Available: http://anncol.eu/index.php/noticias/noticias2012/120-noticias-noviembre-2012/780-nov-19-ultima-hora-elite-colombiana-muyconfundida-por-el-fallo-del-tribunal-de-la-haya-colombia-nicaragua Scale: 1:5,000,000

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