F I E L D ART1 I-LERY SUPPORT FOR I I I CORPS ATTACK

18

26 DECEMBER 1 9 4 4

A t h e s i s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e F a c u l t y o f t h e U. S . fhrrn? Cornmanil and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e i n p a r t i a l f u l I i l l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r the degree MkSTEH OF M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

BY B.A., GREGORY V . MORTON The D e f i a n c e C o l l e g e ,

1968

F o r t Leavsnwor t h 1985

Kansas

Approved for

pub1 i c r e l e a s e , d i s t r i b u t i o n

i s unl i n i t e d

MASTER

OF

M I L I T A R Y ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name o f C a n d i d a t e : T i t l e of Thesis :

G r e g o r y U. M o r t o n F I E L D ARTILLERY SUPPORT FOR I 1 1 CORPS ATTACK 18 26 DECEMBER 1i''t.)

A p p r o v e d by:

T h e s i s Committee C h a i r m i n G r a d u a t e F a c t i l t;.

, Member,

Member, C o n s u l t i n g f-acui t y

A c c e p t e d t h i s 7 t h d a y o f J u n e 1985 by:

,
P h i l i p l J . Brookes, Ph.0.

D i r e c t o r , G r a d u a t e IDegrr!e Programs

The op i n i o n s a n d c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e of t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e p r e s e n t t!ie v i e w s o f t h e U.!;. Army Command a n d G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l ~ r g eo r any o t h e r gouerrlmental agency. ( R e f e r e n c e s t o t h i rr j t u d y should include t k f o r e a o i n a statement.)

F I E L D ARTILLtiliY SIJPPORT FOR 1 1 1 CORPS ATTACK 18 25 DECEllBEH 184.1 by Gregory U . M o r t o n , USA, 152 p a g e s . T h i s s t i i d y i s an h i s t o r i c a l a n a l y s i s o f t h e e m p l u y m r n t of t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y d u r i n g t h e I 1 1 C o i - p i a t t a c k t o r e 1 teve t h e American s o l d i e r s surrounded <it BASTOGNE. Tha d o c t r i n e a n d t r a i n i n g o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s i s examined. T h i s e x a m i n a t i o n i s IJ!ied t o e v a l u a t e t h e empl oymen t t e c h n i q u e s u s e d by I II Corpci artillery. The d e v e l o p m e n t a n d m a t u r a t i o n p r o c e s s c r f t h e I 1 1 C o r p s a r t i l l e r y i s t r a c e d f r o m i t s f i r s t comba,t e x p e r i e n c e a t M e t z t h r o u g h i t s e m p l o y m e n t d u r i n g the. T h i s slL,dr i n 1 t i a l stage:: o f t h e B a t t l e o f t h e B u l g e . d i s c u s s e s the pre-war t r a i n i n g , d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d , and development and u s e o f the F i e l d A r t i l l e r y GrouF. A c t i o n s t a k e n hy 1 1 1 C o r p s p r i o r t o a n d d u r i n g t h e a t t x k a r e a n a l y z e d i n r e v i e w t h e i r employment t e c h n i q u e s and compliance w i t h the d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d . Among t h e l e s s o n s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s s t u d y a r e : t h e a d h e r e n c e t o a s t a n d a r d s e t o f e m p l o y m e n t procedure:; and ~ ~ m ~ p l i a n wci e t h d o c t r i n e was e f f e c t i u e i n t h i s b a t t l e ; f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s s h o u l d be e m p l o y e d as b a t t a l i o n Fiize u n i t s ; c u r r e n t d a y f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m e n s h o u l d p r a c t i c e it11 the standard t . r c t i c a l missions; l o c a l procedures t h a t v i o l a t e d o c t r t l , l e s h e u l d be a v o i d e d ; f i e l d a r t i l l e r ? u n i t c s h o u l d t r a i n W I t h t h e maneuver u n i t s t h e y w i 1 1 s u p p o - t . The s t u d r c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d i z e d s e t D f e m p l o y m e n t p r o t : e d u r e s u s e d b y I 1 1 C o r p s , a n d a throumah u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d o c t r i n e , c r e a t e d t h e f l e x i b i l i t y n e c e s s a r y f o r !he e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r , , d u r i n g thiz. b a t t l e .

-i

i-

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS F i r s t and f o r e m o s t under t h i s h e a d i n g I must l i s t m y w i f e J a n e t and o u r two c h i l d r e n , J u l i e and Nancy. It is o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t I was a b l e t o c o m p l e t e t h i s study. They gave me t h e i r most p r e c i o u s g i f t - t i m e .
M y c o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n , LTC John H i x s o n was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g t o d e f i n e and n a r r o w t h i s t o p i c . He h a s n u r t u r e d and g u i d e d t h i s e f f o r t w i t h p a t i e n c e and understanding. LTC John M a r t i n p r o v i ded c r i t i c a l comments and s e r v e d a s an e x c e l l e n t s o u n d i n g b o a r d . COL C l a y t o n Freeark accepted the task o f s e r v i n g as a c o n s u l t i n g f a c u l t y member on v e r y s h o r t n o t i c e . H i s comments w e r e i n s t r u m e n t a l i n f o c u s i n g t h i s s t u d y and p r o v i d i n g most welcome I a m most a p p r e c i a t i v e o f t h e u n t i r i n g encouragement. e f f o r t s o f C a r o l Ramkey, a r e s e a r c h e r w i t h t h e Combined A r m s Research L i b r a r y . She was most h e l p f u l , and a t t h e r i s k o f o v e r l o a d i n g h e r a l r e a d y busy s c h e d u l e , I h i g h l y recommend h e r t o anyone c o n d u c t i n g r e s e a r c h a t F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h . Mr. Les M i l l e r , o f the M o r r i s Swett L i b r a r y , F o r t S i l l , Oklahoma, was k i n d enough t o l e n d me documents t h a t e n a b l e d t h i s s t u d y t o b e conducted. Without h i s help, t h i s p r o j e c t c o u l d n o t have been c o m p l e t e d .

F i n a l l y , I d e d i c a t e t h i s s t u d y t o t h e memory o f a c i t i z e d s o l d i e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y m a n , and p r o u d m e m b e r o f C B a t t e r y , 177th F i e l d A r t i l l e r y B a t t a l i o n my f a t h e r , John Ravaud M o r t o n .

-iv-

TABLE O F CONTENTS

T H E S I S APPROV;+L ABSTRACT

.-

- - -

----------

i i
iii

----------------------

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

--

iv
1

CHAPTER ONE

CHAPTER TWO

9
31

CHAPTER THREE

CHAPTER FOUR CHAPTER F I V E

51

72

PLATE ONE APPENDIX ONE

85

86
111

APPENDIX TWO

APPENDIX THREE APPENDIX FOUR

118 126

BIBLIOGRAPHY DISTRIBUTION L I S T -

132

- - - - - -

-----

138

-V-

CHAPTER ONE

At

t h e T h i r d Army A r t i l l e r y C o n f e r e n c e a t

BOD
Fatton

WIESSEE, GERPIGNY, 3 8 May 1945, O e n e r a l George

said..

S.

I t h i n k t h a t i n e v a l u a t i n g a r t i 1 l e r y , thr, p r o o f of t h e p u d d i n g i s i n t h e e a t i n g . W e won t h e w a r And i t was l a r g e l y won by t h e a r t i l l e r - ) , . I t h i n k i t i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t h a t YOU now r e c o r d o n p a p e r w h a t YOU d i d ( n o t w h a t you t h i n k you d i d ) , so t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y i n t h e n e x t w a r c a r s t a r t o f f where you s t o p p e d . ( 1 )
I t i s i n t h i s s p i r i t t h a t t h i s s t u d y h a s been
a t tempted.

The p u r p l i s e o f employment o f

t h l s s t u d y i s t o analyze the a s s e t s by t h e 1 1 1 D u r i n g t h i s t i m s ? t;~e

I : i e l d a r t i l l e r y (FA)

CurpE. d u r i n g I I J

26 December 1944.

1 1 1 C o r p s was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r c o n t r o l a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f 25
d i f f e r e n t f ielcl a r t i 1 l e r y b a t t a l ions. c o n t r o l and d i r e c t the f i r e s of h a s i s of t h i s thesis. The m e t h o d s tJ<rsd t o

t h e s e b a t t a l i o n s i s (:he

The t i m e f r a m e o f 18-26 December i ~ a s

s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e d u r i n g t h i s t i m e the

I 1 1 Corps
BELGIUM.

p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e a t t a c k t o r e l i e v e BASTOGNE, This attack

i s a good example o f j u d i c i o u s employment o i The o p e r a t i o n c o n t a i n s a l l t h e bag. Shoo

C

field artillery,
elements o f Commu n i c a t e

the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m i s s i o n

- Move,

an cj

.
-1-

T h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y Chapter w i l l participated i n the attack, research, conducted,

d i s c u s s who

t h e methodology used i n the

t h e a s s u m p t i o n s upon w h i c h t h e r e s e a r c h was definition of

terms,

and t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and

significance of the study.

The f o l l o w i n g FA u n i t s w e r e a s s i g n e d t o 1 1 1 Corps d u r i n g t h e p e r I o d c o v e r e d b y t h i s s t u d y and p a r t i c i p a t e d

i n t h e a t t a c k t o r e l i e v e BASTOGNE:

Hq and Hq B a t t e r y ,

I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y

2 8 8 t h FA O b s e r v a t i o n 6n

1 7 7 t h FA 6n (155mm

H)

253rd FA 6n (185mm H)

2 7 4 t h FA Bn (185mm

H)

7 7 6 t h FA Bn (155mm H)

193rd

Fa Group

6 9 6 t h Armored FA 6n (105mm H ) 1 7 9 t h FA 6n (155mm H)

-2-

9 4 9 t h FA Bn (155mm H)

2l13rd FA G r o u p

1 7 6 t h FA En (4.5''

0)

7 3 1 s t FA Bn (155mm 0 )

482nd FA Group

5 6 1 s t FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m G) 5 5 9 t h FA En (155mm G) 5 7 8 t h FA Bn ( 0 "

H)

4134th FA Qroup
5 1 2 t h FA Bn ( 1 8 5 m m H)

7 5 2 n d FA En (15Smm H)

4 h Armored D i v i s i o n A r t i
2 2 n d FA En (1B5mm 6 6 t h FA Bn ( 1 0 5 m m 9 4 t h FA En ( 1 0 5 m m

H)
H)

H)

26th I n f a n t r y Division A r t i l l e r y
I B l s t FA Bn ( 1 8 5 m m H)

182nd FA Bn ( 1 0 5 m m H) 1 8 8 t h FA En ( 1 5 5 m m H)

;!63rd FA En (185mm

H)

88th Infantry Division A r t i l l e r y 3 1 3 t h FA Pn (185mm H)

314th FA Bn (185mm H)
3 1 5 t h FA Bn (155mm H) 9 6 5 t h FA Bn (185mm H) ( 2 )

T h i s l i s t i n g does n o t r e f l e c t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat. The r e c o r d s o f some o f t h e s e u n i t s w e r e u s e d a s p r i m a r y s o u r c e s f o r t h e a n a l y s i s . o f employment t e c h n i q u e s , and p r o c e d u r e s . tactic..

A s o f 188881A Dcc 4 4 o n l y t w o o f t h e s e

b a t t a l i o n s ( t h e 6 9 6 t h a n d t h e 1 7 7 t h ) w e r e a s s i g n e d t o 111 Corps. Over t h e n e x t e i g h t day p e r i o d a l l o f t h e s e u n i t s

w e r e a t t a c h e d t o 1 1 1 C o r p s . Many o f t h e s e u n i t s moved great distances, i n some c a s e s m o r e t h a n 158 m i l e s . The

e m p l o y m e n t o f t h i s v a s t amount o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i s t h e focus of t h i s s t u d y .

H i s t o r i c a l r e s e a r c h m e t h o d o l o g y was u s e d f o r t h i s

study.

The p r i m a r y s o u r c e s w e r e A f t e r - A c t i on r e p o r t s , u n i t s t a n d i n g o p e r a t i n g procedures, and Secondary

u n i t journals,

o f f i c i a l documents, s t u d i e s and r e p o r t s .

s o u r c e s i n c l u d e d magazine a r t i c l e s , newspaper r e p o r t s o f the a c t i o n s , and p r o f e s s i o n a l j o u i - n a l s o f the p e r i o d .

Pub1 i s h e d botjks w e r e o n l y u s e d f o r an o v e r a l 1 r e v i e w o f t h e a c t i o n and were not p r i m a r y s o u r c e s f o r d e s c r i p t i o n s

of

the a c t i o n s .

-4-

T h i s stiidy does n o t a d d r e s s t h e e n t i r e s p e c ' t r m o f combat a c t i o r l ' : i t a k e n by t h e

I 1 1 Corps.

I t i s l i m i t ? d to

an a n a l y s i s o+ t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r , t h e e f f e c t oi t h a t e m p l o y m e n t on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

and

!t i s

s p e c i f i c a l l y I i m i t e d t o an a n a l y s i s o f t h e employmeitt of

25 FA b a t t a l i c i n s 1 i s t e d p r e v i o u s l y .

T h i s study ha5 beon o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d t h e hypotheEiis t h a t t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h o artillery d u r i n g t h i s butt),:. was e f f e c t u e due t o t h e s t a n d a r d l z a t i o n o f p r o c e d u r e s a n d emp 1 o m e n t t e c h n i q u e 6 a n d t h a t t h e s e t e c h n i q u e s h a v e appl i c a b i 1
ty

t o t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d .

This

s t a n d a r d i z t i o n a l l o w e d 2s d i f f e r e n t FA b a t t a l i o n s t o tie assembled i n significant

d,

v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d o f t i m e a n d h a v e <a The ceu@i.aI

i n f l u e n c e on a m a j o r b a t t l e .

assumptions f o i . t h i s s t u d y were:

(1)

The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y h a d an i m p a c t

011

the

outcome o f t h e a t t a c k .

( 2 ) The f i e l d a r t l l l e r r s u p p o r t was a
coordinated e f i o r t .

(3) The p r o c e d u r e s u s e d by t h e f i e l d
a r t i l l e r y c a n be r e l a t e d t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f 1944.

Several of

the terms used through-out

t h i s study <ire

d i f f e r e n t from the c o n n o t a t i o n s they c a r r y today.

When

t h e f o l l o w i n g t e r m s a r e used i n t h i s s t u d y t h e y w i l l have these d e f i n i t i o n s :

" D i r e c t Support Direct support a r t i l l e r y i s r e t a i n e d under t h e c o n t r o l of t h e a r t i l l e r y commander, b u t o p e r a t e s p r i m a r i l y w i t h and f o r t h e s u p p o r t e d u n i t. I f t h e maneuver o f t h e s u p p o r t e d u n i t makes i t n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e d i r e c t support a r t i l l e r y t o displace t o prouide proper support, that a r t i l l e r y displaces w i thaut o r d e r from- i t s h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s and r p o r t s t h a t i t i s d o i n g so.

General SuDaort General s u p p o r t a r t i l e r y i s r e t a i n e d under c o n t r o l of the h i g h e r a r t l l e r y commander f o r e m p l o y m e n t a n y w h e r e i n t h e s e c t o r o f o p e r a t i o n of t h e u n i t a s a whole. When an a r t i l l e r y u n i t i s a t t a c h e d Attachment t o a n y o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e h i g h e r commander re1 inquishes d i r e c t control of that a r t i l l e r y a n d i t becomes as much a p a r t o f t h e u n i t t o which i t i s attached as are the organic organizations of that unit. p e in f o r c i n g An a r t i l l e r y u n i t g i v e n t h e m i s s i o n of r e i n f o r c i n g the f i r e s of another u n i t e s t a b l i s h e s l i a i s o n w i t h t h a t u n i t and g i v e s t h e reinforced u n i t p r i o r i t y i n c a l l i n g for f i r e s . I t r e m a i n s under c o n t r o l o f t h e h i g h e r commander. " General S u D D o r t / R e i n f o r c i n q A c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e g e n e r a l s u p p o r t and r e i n f o r c i n g m i s s i o n s . The a r t i l l e r y i s m a i n t a i n e d u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e h i g h e r a r t i l l e r y commander. The u n i t assigned t h i s mission responds t o c a l l s for f i r e support from the r e i n f o r c e d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n f i r s t . The u n i t w i t h t h i s m i s s i o n i 0 p o s i t i o n e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d by t h e h i g h e r a r t i l e r r (3) commander. The r e m a i n d e r o f t h e t h e s i s i s o r g a n z e d i n t o f o u r Chapters. C h a p t e r Two d i s c u s s e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f 1944, the

f u n c t i o n i n g o f group h e a d q u a r t e r s , and the b e g l n n i n g s o f

-6-

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n a s r e f l e c t e d i n pre-war Three concern< the p r e - a t t a c k

of the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y ,

training.

3hapter

phase,

the r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n

t h e movement t o c o n t a c t arid Chapter Four t h e Corps

h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s among u n i t s .

a n a l y z e s t h e a t t a c k phase o f t h e b a t t l e , emp 1 o m e n t p r c l c c d u r e s , h i s t o r i cal

r e 1 a t i o n s h i p a amor'g

u n i t s a n d t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f a t t a c h e d a r t i l l e r y by e z c h d i v i s i o n involved. conc 1 u s i ons. C h a p t e r F i v e i s d e v o t e d t o summary a n d

T h i s s t u d y s h o u l d be of v a l u e t o in particular,

f i e l d artillerymen The again

a n d combat t h e o r i s t s i n g e n e r a l .

r a p i d i t y o f movement on t h e m o d e r n b a t t l e f i e l d w i l l pose p r o b l e m s : . i m i l a r Namely: t o t h o s e f a c e d by I 1 1 C o r p s .

How do we a s s e m b l e a n d e m p l o y t h e f i e l d a r t i

lery

support for a t~ta~.siue c o u n t e r o f f e n s i u e a g a i n s t an crrlemy who h a s h a d c o n s i d e r a b l e

S.UCCBSS

i n a surprise attack?

We

c o u l d w e l l be f a c e d w i t h e m p l o y i n g f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i i c i t , ! , who do n o t h a v e l o n g - t e r m s u p p o r t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h t h e a t t a c k i n g q r o u n d g a i n i n g arms.

" I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important that o p e r a t i o n s and methods o f c o r p s a r t i 1 1 e r ie s arit (4) r e c o r d e d and s t u d i e d . .

."

BY t r a c i n g t h e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t ;

in

a m a j o r b a t t l e t:his s t u d y makes a s m a l l b e g i n n i n g a{: (ohat BG L e n t z s u g g e s t s .

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

1.

George S .

P a t t o n , J r , as q u o t e d i n

XI1

Corps

A r t i l l e r y i n Combat
U S Army,

(Regensburg, Germany,

1945), p . i .

2.

US A r m y ,

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and TanK D e s t r o y e r Weekly

gummarr #21. 1 8 G B l A Dec

242488A Dec 44
1.

(APO 4 6 3 , 25 December 1Y44), p .

3.

W i l l i a m J. L e w i s , LTC, " R e i n f o r c i n g A r t i l l e r y " , M i l i t a r y Review 3 4 , January 1944, p . 5 6 .

X I 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y

4.

John M . L e n t r , BG,

i n Combat

(Regensburg, Germany, U S A r m y ,

1945), p . i .

-8-

CHAPTER TWO

T h i s Chapter d i s c u s s e s t h e d o c t r i n e o f

1944.

The

p u r p o s e o f t h i s d i s c u s s l o n i s t o e s t a b l i s h a b a s e .for comparison w i t h the a c t i o n o f l a t e r Chapters. the b a t t l e to follow

in

Presented f i r s t

i n t h i s C h a p t e r i s ;n
then the s p e c i f i c After

o u e r u i e w of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y d o c t r i n e , functions r e l a t e d t o non-divisional e s t a b l i s h i n g the d o c t r i n a l base, d o c t r i n e was a p p l i e d f o l l o w s . pre-deployment t r a i n i n g as w e l l

artillery.

an e x a m p l e o f how t h e

T h i s Chapter addres'ses a s combat e x p e r i e n c e s .

l h e r o l e o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y h a s a l w a y s b e e n one o f s u p p o r t t o I h e maneuuer a r m s . i n c e p t i o n a n d i n t o W o r l d War 1 1 T h i s was t r u e f r c m i t,;

" I t c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e a c t i o n of the entii-6, f o r c e by g i v i n g c l o s e a n d c o n t i n u o u s f i r e s u p p o r t tc:, i n f a n t r y ( c a u a l r y ) ( a r m o r e d ) u n i t s arid by g i v i n g d e p t h t o combat by c o u n t e r b a t t e r y f i r e , f i r e on h o s t i l e r e s e r v e s , f i r e t o r e s t r i c t movement5 i n r e a r a r e a s , a n d f i r e t o d i s r u p t command aqenc i e s " ( 1 >

I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e w r i t e r s of

d o c t r i n e of

the

1940's

r e c o g n i z e d the s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the T h e r i ? *la:,

maneuuer u n i t s .and t h e i r s u p p o r t i n g a r t i I 1 e r y .

n o a t t e m p t t o d e s c r i b e r o l e s or m i s s i o n s t h a t w o u l d i ? a c l one t o b e l i e v e t h a t a r t i l l e r y was i n t e n d e d f o r a c t i o n . The d o c t i m e n t e c o n c e r n i n g d o c t r i n e o f are careful

t o clescribe

indepeident

t h e per.is>d

the r o l e o f

t h e a r t i l l e r y ir,

support terms.

However,

t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n wa5 n o t intended
I t was r e c o g n i z e d

t o demean t h e a r t i l l c r y c a p a b i l i t i e s .

t h a t t h e a r t i l l e r y was a p o w e r f u l a n d d e v a s t a t i n g weapon sys tem.

The s y s t e m s o

t h e p e r od w e r e c l a s s i f i e d p r i m a r i l y Artillery

by t h e i r r a n g e , mob 1 i t y a n d f i r e p o w e r .

c l a s s i f i e d a s l i g h t w a s g e n e r a l l y o f 105mm a n d s m a l l e r . T h e s e s y s t e m s w e r e i n t e n d e d t o b e u s e d by t h e d i v i s i o n s i n c o n t a c t as t h e i r p r i m a r y d i r e c t s u p p o r t a s s e t s . Light

a r t i l l e r y was h i g h l y m o b i l e a n d c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a h i g h
r a t e of f i r e .

M e d i u m a r t i l l e r y i n c l u d e d b o t h t h e 4.5

inch

g u n a n d t h e 155 mm h o w i t z e r . lower r a t e of f i r e , power.

I t was l e s s m o b i l e , h a d a

but delivered greater destructive

H e a v y a r t i l l e r y o f t h e p e r i o d was t h e 155mm gun,

t h e 8 i n c h h o w i t z e r a n d l a t e r i n t h e w a r t h e 24Bmm c a n n o n . Once a g a i n , a s i n t h e c a s e o f t h e medium a r t i l l e r y ,

what

was s a c r i f i c e d i n m o b i l i t y a n d r a t e o f f i r e was made up by i n c r e a s e d e x p l o s i v e p o w e r o f t h e a m m u n i t i o n . The c h a r t b e l o w show t h e r a n g e and d e s t r u c t i v e power o f e a c h t y p e o f system.

WEAPON

CALIBER

RANGE

W E I GHT
33 l b s
95 l b s 95 l b s

H o w i t z e r (M2) H o w i t z e r (M1918) Howi t z e r ( M 1 )

1B 5mm
155mm

12,150 yds 12,400 ydc. 16,350

yds

155mm

-10-

Howi t z e r ( M 1 ) Gun Gun Gun

8"
155mm

1 8 , 5 1 8 yds
2 8 , 1 8 8 yds 2 8 , 5 8 8 yds

288 It,s

CM2)

95 lbr; 55 l b i .

4.5" (Mi
)

1 SJmm

25,715 yds

95 l b s .

D o c t r i n e d i d n o t a d d r e s s each type o f a r t i l l e r y system separa e l y . I i o w e u e r , e a c h t y p e o f weapon w a s be5.t

s u i t e d t o p a r i c u l a r r o l e s . For e x a m p l e , w h e n e v e r p c s s i b l e
i t was b e t t e r t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i l l e r y so t h a t t h e meillium o r heavy a r t i l e r y c o n c e n t r a t e d on t h e c o u n t e r b a t t e r r

mission.

T h i s l e f t the d i r e c t support a r t i l l e r y , a v a i l a b l e t o the The d i v i s i o i s o f

g e n e r a l l y t h e s m a l l e r c a l i b e r weapons, u n i t s i n d i r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy.

t h e t i m e d l d n o t h a v e a g r e a t d e a l o f medium o r h e i r v v a r t i l l e r y orgailic. G e n e r a l l y , e a c h d i v i s i o n h a d o r i l f one B e c a u s e t h e medium a n d

b a t t a l i o n of medium a r t i l l e r y .

heavy a r t i l l e r y were a s s l g n e d t o g r o u p s or t h e Corps artillery, t h e d o c t r l n e emphasized once a g a i n t h e I n t h i s case t h e

s u p p o r t i n g role o f t h e a r t i l l e r y .

s u p p o r t was p r o v i d e d by t h e medium a n d h e a v y b a t t a l i c i n s t o t h e i r f e l l o w artillerymen of the d i v i s i o n b a t t a l i o n s

t h r o u g h t h e u s e of s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s .

The m i s s i o n s of t h e a r t i l l e r y w e r e s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t than the ones o f today. d e f i n e d i n C h a p t e r One, They have a l r e a d y been

b u t t h e y b e a r r e p e a t i n g h e r e for.

-1 1 -

c1 a r t y ' s

saKe.

The m i s s i o n o f d i r e c t s u p p o r t w a s one

usua l y assigned t o a b a t t a l i o n organic t o a d i v i s i o n . Even t h o u g h t h e a r t i l l e r y w a s n o t o r g a n i c t o a r e g i m e n t

( o r t h e combat command o f an a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n ) h a b i t u a l

a s s o c i a t i o n s were f o r m e d between r e g i m e n t s i z e d u n i t s and

one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n .

I t w a s common t o f i n d t h e same

FA b a t t a l i o n s u p p o r t i n g t h e same m a n e u v e r u n i t t h r o u g h o u t
a campaign. D i r e c t s u p p o r t b a t t a l i o n s were maneuvered as

n e c e s s a r y by t h e i r commander t o p r o v i d e t h e b e s t s u p p o r t

for

the supported u n i t .

Even t h o u g h i t : i s p o a . s i b l e t o s e e

d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y u n i t s l i s t e d under a Corps a r t i l l e r y , t h i s i 0 n o t meant t o suggest c o n t r o l . The C o r p s a r t i l l e r y

did not control

However, used

the f i r e s of

the d i r e c t support u n i t s .

t h e f i r e o f t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y u n i t 5 c o u l d be

o n a n y t a r g e t when o r d e r e d by t h e C o r p s Commander...or when t h e C o r p s A r t i l l e r y Commander, t h r o u g h h i s k n o w l e d g e o f t h e f l o w o f b a t t l e , i s cognizant of the f a c t that c e r t a i n b a t t a l i o n s of d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y a r e n o t b e i n g e m o l o r e d . t h e i r f i r e s c a n a n d s h o u l d be u t i l i z e d by'him t o r e i n f o r c e the i r e on p o r t i o n s o f t h e f r o n t where r e i n f o r c e m c n s a r e i n d i c a t e d . This i 5 a m a t t e r f o r thorough u n d e r s t a n d i n g and mutual cooperation." (2)

'...

I n t h i s m a n n e r , t h e C o r p s A r t 1 1 e r y Commander e x e r t e d some
i n f l u e n c e over the u n i t s w i t h a di.rect support mission.

The m i s s i o n o f g e n e r a l s u p p o r t a l l o w e d t h e C o r p s A r t i l l e r y Commander t o e x e r t d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e . T h i s m i s s i o n was

a s s i g n e d t o t h e medium a n d h e a v y a r t i l l e r y .

I t was t h e

-1 2-

m e t h o d by wh i i:h

t h e C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y Commander c o u 1 d we i gh t
t h e zone o f a c t i o n .

any p a r t i c u l a r . p o r t i o n o f

W e i g h t c o u l d a l s o be a p p l i e d t h r o u g h t h e u s e o f r e i n f o r c i n g mission.

the

T h i s m i s s i o n wa5 u n i q u e becau5.e a

u n i t t h a t p e r f o r m e d t h i s r o l e a n s w e r e d c a l l s f o r f i r e 1:rom a n o t h e r FA u n i t , n o t f r o m a m a n e u v e r u n i t d i r e c t l y . . Tb~is

m i s s i o n was c o n s i d e r e d t o b e s e c o n d a r y t o t h e p r i m a r y mission of general support. support/reinforcing missions. The m i s s i o n o f g e n e r a l t h e two d i s t i n c t

was a b l e n d o f

The a r t i l l e r y commander c o u l d Keep a s t r i n g

on a b a t t a l i o n a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w e i g h t t h e m a i n a t t a c k :
by a s s i g n i n g t t l i s . m i s s i o n .

The manii.il

g o e s so f a r a s t o s a y t h a t t h e

reinforcing unit w i l l

. , a n s w e r a l l calls f o r f i r e f r o m t h e r e i n f o r c e d u n i t when a n s w e r i n g s u c h c a l l s w i l l not interiere w i t h i t s primary mission...(3)

Attachment of occasionally. i n d i v i d u a l FA b a t t a l i o n s o c c u r r e d Howeuer, m o r e o f t e n a d i v i s i o n w o u l d A t t a c h m e n t gave t h e
to

r e c e i v e the attachment o f a group.

d i v i s i o n f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l I t y f o r t h e g r o u p s employmc,nt, include f u l l unit. tactical and admin s t r a t i v e c o n t r o l o f t h e

When a t t a c h e d t o a d i v i s o n ,

the groups b a t t a l i o n s

c o u l d be u s e d t o p e r f o r m a n y o f

the standard missions.

-13-

The s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s o f d i r e c t s u p p o r t

(DS), g e n e r a l s u p p o r t (GS), r e i n f o r c i n g ( R ) and g e n e r a l

support/reinforcing

(GSR) f o r m e d t h e b a s i s f o r employment

o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y and d e t e r m i n e d how t h e a r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d f o r combat. missions,

I n a d d i t i o n t o the types o f

t h e 1944 d o c t r i n e was a1n.o s p e c i f i c on t h e f i r e d i r e c t i o n and c o o r d i n a t i o n

methods o f o b s e r v a t i o n , p r o c e d u r e s t o be used.

The most s p e c i f i c m ethod o f o b s e r v a t i o n d i s c u s s e d i n

t h e d o c t r i n e o f the p e r i o d i s t h a t conducted by f o r w a r d
observers. These o b s e r v e r s w e r e a l l o c a t e d on a b a s i s o f They u s u a l l y came f r o m t h e

one team p e r maneuver company. d i r e c t support b a t t a l i o n .

Another source o f f o r w a r d

o b s e r v e r a s s e t s was t h e F i e l d A r t i l l e r y O b s e r v a t i o n Battal ion. Normal l y each C o r p s was a s s i g n e d an T h i s b a t t a l i o n was c a p a b l e o f p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h use of

observation b a t t a l i o n .

l o c a t i n g enemy b a t t e r y p o s i t i o n s , sound and f l a s h r a n g i n g , collecting intelligence. sub-set

a d j u s t i n g a r t i l l e r y and T h i s l a s t f u n c t i o n was r e a l l y a C e r t a i n l y one o f t h e

of

i t s adJusting function.

c a p a b i l i t i e s o f anyone a d j u s t i n g a r t i l l e r y was t o s e e t h e b a t t l e f i e l d and t h e r e b y c o l l e c t intelligence.

All

forward

o b s e r v e r s s u p p o r t i n g a maneuver u n i t w e r e c o o r d i n a t e d b y a liaison officer. T h i s l i a i s o n o f f i c e r was u s u a l l y l o c a t e d

i n t h e maneuver b a t t a l i o n o p e r a t i o n c e n t e r .

H i s primary

-1 4-

r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t v was t o i n s u r e t h a t
did not f i r e c a n f r i e n d l y troops.

the f o r w a r d obserlrer*s He a c c o m p l i s h e d t l i i s - b y

m o n i t o r i n g c a l l s f o r f i r e and I n s u r i n g t h a t target!; r e q u e s t e d were i n f a c t enemy l o c a t i o n s . Liaison ofiicrrs,

as w e l l a s f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r s , w e r e a l s o r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
p r o v i d i n g a d v i c e on t h e employment o f a r t i l l e r y t o t h e i r s u p p o r t e d u n i t commanders.

(4)

The o v e r a l l o b s e r v a t i o n e f f o r t was e s s e n t i a l l y a t w o pronged approach. and the

O n t h e one h a n d t h e . f o r w a r d o b s c ? r J e r s

1 i a i s o i r o f f i c e r s were r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p r o v i d i n g

the close support f o r

t h e maneuver f o r c e s . i.e.

The l o n g e r

r a n g e o h s e r v a t ~ n na s s e t s ,

sound a n d f l a s h a n d a r
i d e n t i f y i n g and n e u t r a l z i n g the sound and f l a s t i

a s s e t s , were r r s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e enemy a r t i l l e r y .

(The use o f

s e c t i o n s i n t h c o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l I o n c o u l d w e l l s e r i e ?is t h e h a s i e o f art i n t e r e s t i n g study, the cub a i r c r a f t Regardless o f a s c @ u l d t h e role o f

i n f i e l d a r t i l l e r y observation.) target acquistion,

the method of

a l l t:arQets

were p r o c e s s e d i n t h e f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r (FDC)

F i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r s were o r g a n i c t o each t v p e c f f a r t i 1 l e r y b a t t a l ion. F i r e D i r e c t i o n i s t h e t a c t i c a l command 0.f one o r m o r e a r t i l l e r y u n i t s , f o r t h e p u r p o s e oi: b r i n g i n g t h e i r f i r e t o b e a r upon t h e p r o p e r t a r g e t s at t h e p r o p e r t i m e . ( 5 )

-15-

G r o u p s a n d C o r p s a l s o had f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r s .
P r i mar l y t h e s e w e r e u s e d t o m a s s t h e f i r e s o f s e v e r a l

b a t t a l o n s on one t a r g e t ,

a n d t o a t t a c k deep t a r g e t s . The

p r i m a r y means o f commun i c a t i on b e t w e e n f i r e d i r e c t i o n s c e n t e r s was w i r e . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e t i n c l u d e d t h e C o r p s a r t i 1 l e r y FDC, t h e FDCs a n y Group FDC i n t h e C o r p s z o n e , Radio and

of the d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r i e s .

c o m m u n i c a t i o n d u p l i c a t e d t h e w i r e a s much a s p o s s i b e . T h i s s y s t e m o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n was c r i t i c a l t o t h e a b 1 i tr The

of a l l

t h e a r t i l l e r y t o m a s s o n one t a r g e t .

c o n c l u s i o n s on t h i s t o p i c r e a c h e d b y t h e The G e n e r a l B o a r d

i nc 1 u d e d :
...the a b i l i t y t o mass q u i c k l y and a c c u r a t e l y t h e f i r e s of many f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s on a s i n g l e t a r g e t w a s q u i t e f r e q u e n t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e s u c c e s s o f an operation... t h e r e was n o s u b s t i t u t e f o r massed a r t i l l e r y fires... these f i r e s p l a y e d a major r o l e i n t h e advance of o u r t r o o p s and i n b r e a k i n g u p a n d d i s o r g a n i z i n g enemy counterattacks... these f i r e s were c a r e f u l l y c o n t r o l l e d and r e a d i l y s h i f t e d t o t h e d e s i r e d location... t h e s e f i r e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e , on s h o r t n o t i c e , during a l l h o u r s o f t h e day and n i g h t and i n a l l kinds. of w e a t h e r . ( 6 ) T h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s r e f l e c t n o t o n l y on t h e FDC d o c t r i n e b u t a l s o on t h e r a t h e r s t r i n g e n t r e q u i r e m e n t s p l a c e d o n u n i t s f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n of f i r e s .

The c o o r d i n a t i o n e f f o r t w a s p r e s c r i b e d f r o m m a n e u v e r battalion level a l l such t h i n g s as: t h e w a y through Corps. I t included

-1 6-

" S e n d i n g o f 1 i a i s o n detachm ents t o i n f a n t i - y b a t t a l jaras and assi gnm ent o f m i s s i o n s t o f o r w a i - d Agreement w i t h supported i n f a n t r y observer:<. commandevs as t o a r t i 1 1 e r y s u p p o r t and s i g n a l s f o r s h i f t i n g fires...(and) any p r e a r r a n g e d f i r a b s i n o r d e r t o f a c i 1 i t a t e d e s i g n a t i o n o f t a r g e t s I>Y i n f a n t r y commanders, 1 i a i s o n o f f i c e r s , and a i l and a r t i I l e r y o b s e r v e r s . " ( 7 ) The u n i t s , b o t h f i e l d a r t i l l e r y and maneuver, The v a l u e o f planned

numerous c o n c e n t r a t i o n s .

these pre-ar.r

armed

t a r g e t s was t h a t each b a t t a l i o n w i t h i n r a n g e c o u l d compute f i r i n g data. From t h i s d a t a i t was a s i m p l e m a t t e r t o

s h i f t t o t a r g e t s o f o p p o r t u n i t y nearby the concentratitsf) location. T h i s i s one o f t h e p r i m a r y r e a s o n s so much

a r t i 1 l a r y was a v a i l a b l e on such s h o r t n o t i c e . C o o r d i n a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s w e r e s p e c i f i c , b u t n o t so d e t a i l e d

as t o p r e c l u d e a l 1 f l e x i b i 1 i t y .
f i e l d artiller;.,

As w i t h other p o r t i

m E

of

d o c t r i n e t h e emphasis Wac. a l w a y s

o r 1

j o i n t e f f o r t t)t?tween t h e s u p p o r t i n g f i e l d a r t i 1 l e r y ,tnd the supported o r i i t a .

Since i t was n o t expected t h a t f i e l d a r t i l l e r r would c a r r y o u t i n d e p e n d e nt a c t i o n s , t h e u n i t s had t o be

o r g a n i z e d i n s i ~ c ha manner t h a t t h e y c o u l d p e r f o r m t t e i i supporting r o l e s f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n was b u i

t h e maneuver u n i t s .

This The

t around t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i I l e r y .

a r t i 1 1 e r y o r g a n i c t o a d i v i s i o n was t h e minimum n e c e s s a r y t o p r o v i d e t h e d i u i s on w i t h a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t when f a c i n g weak r e s i s t a n c e .

(8)

Whenever

t h e s i t u a t i on exceedl?d t h i s

-17-

weaK resistance state additional artillery w a s allocated from C o r p s assets. T h e divsional artillery habitually C o r p s artillery w a s

performed the direct support role.

normally formed into g r o u p s and then the group w a s attached to a Division o r i t was assigned one of the standard missions. a common mission. structure.

All the u n i t s of t h e group w o u l d have

The group was by n o m e a n s a permanent

s a chronological What follows i

listing of the group

assignments for one C o r p s artillery battalion over the course of its European Theater a s s i ~ n m e n t .This 1 isting i s included to giue some indication o f the fluid nature of an assignment to any particu a r group.

T h e 177th Field A r t l l e r r Battalion arrived on the continent on 21 July 1944. Getween its arrival and the

termination of hostilities i t was assigned or attached to the following C o r p s and Groups:

DATE

GROUP

CORPS

2 1 J U L 44
28 A U G 44

STH FA G P

xx

ATTCH'D
F A BN

943RD

xx
xx
111

3 SEP 44
5 NOV 44

264TH FA G P
Z B 4 T H FA GP

-18-

18 DEC 4 4
1 9 DEC 4 4 ATTCH'D 4TH

I11
111

ARMORED D I U

26 DEC 4 4
6 1 JAN 45

---193RD FA GP 183RD FA GP 183RD FA GP 203RD FA GP 416TH FA GP 5TH FA GP 220TH FA GP

I
111 111 UIII

22 JAN 45
1 2 FEB 45

12 MAR 45
6 2 APR 45

UIII

xx xx
THIRD ARMY

0 9 APR 4 5
22 JUN 45

#:9 )

A s i s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s c h a r t ,
u n i t t o move a i - o u n d q u i t e a b i t .

i t was n o t unusua.1 f o r a

This particular

b a t t a l i o n was a s s i g n e d t o 7 d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s i n 3 d i f f e r v n t Corp-i i n the p e r i o d o f a year. unusual, i n far:t, T h i s cascb i s n o t

i t + experience i l l u s t r a t e s the rril,? nat

the exception.

The same phenomena i s a l s o s e e n when the groups.

examining the records o f

Below

iy,

a chronological

l i s t i n g o f t h e b a t t e a li o n s

a s s i g n e d t o t h e 4 0 4 t h FA Group d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 18 Ciug 44 t h r o u g h 1 J a n 45.

1 isted,

(The f i r s t t i m e t h e b a t t a l i o n i s t h e weapon
i s n o t e d i n parentb8eses

the c a l i b e r of

f o l l o w i n g the iini t designation.)

DATE

BATTALIONS ASSIGNED

CORPS

-.I 9-

18 AUG 4 4

558TH F A (155mm H) 176TH F A ( 4 . 5 " G)

XI I
XI I

21 AUG 4 4

512TH F A (105mm H) 731ST F A (155mm H) P74TH F A 2 8 AUG 44 176TH F A 512TH F A 775TH F A ( 4 . 5 " 974TH F A
1 1 SEP 44

< 155mm

H)

XII

G)

176TH F A 775TH F A ( 4 . 5 " P74TH F A G)

XI I

25 SEP 4 4

176TH F A 512TH F A 775TH F A 974TH F A

XII

0 9 OCT 44

512TH F A 775TH F A 974TH F A

XII

10 DEC 44

51ZTH FA 752ND F A (155mm H)

111

20 DEC 44

512TH F A 752ND F A 949TH F A (155mm H)

111

01 JAN 45

273RD F A (155mm H) 512TH F A

XI I

-20

752ND FA

(10)

A s with the 177th Battalion, the 484th FA Group hzd many

and varied assignments in a very short period o f time?. their. case t h e y controlled P different battalions in 2 different Corps in a period of 4 months.

In

T h e twc, previous 1 tsts demonstrate the flexibility that the group headquarters gave the Corps in orgariizing the field artillery. Groups were originally desigrled much That is, i t w a s a

1 ike a current briyade headquarters.

tactical headquarters with no battalions organic 1:c i t . The primary function w a s to assign missions for tactical employment of attached battalions, exercise fire direction

an(l supervi se trei n ing of attached bateal ions.

" T h e flexibility of the n e w organtzation makes i t readi ly possible to form tasK forces without reorganltatlon of units or disruption of the old fixed regimental organization and at tt.e same time permits a masstng of m e a n s a s required by the situation." ( 1 2 )

'The original p an w a s for the groups to form in t h e United States, train and then deploy to a theater of operations as a n ent ty. However, due to training

difficulties, ! ; h pment schedules, and a myriad o f o t h e r difficulties, t h

5

seldom occurred.

Upon arrival in

England, another attempt w a s made to form groups and

d e p l o y them t o the European T h e a t e r as an e n t i t y . e f f o r t also failed.

This

Groups w e r e o f t e n assigned t o a

D i v i s i o n o r Corps w i t h no b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d , as was the case w i t h the 464th c i t e d e a r l i e r . "The i n i t i a l f u n c t i o n s o f the group headquarters a f t e r l a n d i n g c o n s i s t e d o f a s s i s t i n g the d i v i s i o n s , t o which t h e y w e r e a t t a c h e d , i n s u p e r v i s i o n and f i r e d i r e c t i o n o f the a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y . Some groups p e r f o r e d c o u n t e r - b a t t e r y f u n c t i ons f o r t h e d i v i s i o n , o t h e r s a c t e d as an a d d i t i o n a l d i u i s i o n a r t i l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r , and s t i l l o t h e r s Derformed a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s on the beach (13)

T h i s p ecemeal commitment t o combat f o r group headquar t e r s s e t the p a t t e r n f o r the r e s t o f the war. Groups as we 1 a5 n o n - d i v i s i o n a l a r t i l l e r y were s h i f t e d

from Corps t o C o r p s and i n some cases from A r m y t o A r m y throughout the remainder o f the c o n f l i c t .
f lexibi1 ity

This

ecame the ha1 Imark o f the n o n - d i v i s i o n a l

a r t i l l e r y un t s .

T h i s f e x i b i 1 i t y was n o t c r e a t e d by the War Department doc tr i ne however. "The v a r i o u s h i g h e r commanders developed t h e i r own d o c t r i n e s on the f u n c t i o n s and use o f the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y groups. Some commanders a t t e m p t e d t o r e t a i n groups and b a t t a l i o n s together w h i l e o t h e r s s h i f t e d b a t t a l i o n s c o n t i n u o u s l y from one group t o another w i t h o u t r e g a r d t o c o n t i n u i t y o f command. Regardless o f the v a r i o u s i n d i v i d u a l i d e a s on proper o r g a n i z a t i o n for combat, the f l e x i b i l i t y o f the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y group o r g a n i z a t i o n gaue

-22-

commanders t h e n e c e s s a r y weapon t o m e e t r a p t d moving m d h i g h l y m o b i l e w a r f a r e . " ( l 4 )

A s n o t e d above,

each Corps Commander d e v e l o p v d h i s

own idea!;

on how t h e group s h o u l d be employed.

"The I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y h a b i t u a l l y attached a l l non-divisional 1 ight b a t t a l i o n s l o d i v i s i o n s and, when t h e a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y perm1 t t e d , an a d d i t i o n a l 155mm h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n was a l s o a t t a c h e d t o an i n f a n t r y division. A group c o n s i s t i n g o f two 155 howl t z e i - b a t t a l i o n s , one 195 mm gun b a t t a l i o n and one 13 i n c h h o w i t z e r b a t t a l i o n r e i n f o r c e d the f i r e s o f each i n f a n t r y d l u i s i o n a r t i l l e r y . A group c o i i s i s t i n g o f one 4.5 i n c h gun b a t t a l i o n and one 155mm gun b a t t a l I o n ( s e l f - p r o p e l l e d ) 11 r e i n f o r c v a d t h e f i r e s o f an armored d i v i s i o n . 159 mm hcJWi t z e r b a t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d t o the A l l oth6.r l a t t e r q'oup when i t wa5 a v a i l a b l e . a r t i l l e r y was i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t . " ( 1 5 ) T h i s i s an a c r u r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n o f how the 1 1 1 Corp'i d e p l o y e d i a r t i l l e r y d u r l n g t h e a t t a c k commencing 22 December 1944.

Even though t h e g r o u p s were never i n t e n d e d t o have organic b a t t a l i o n s ,

I t was e x p e c t e d t h a t a group w o u l d

t r a i n w l t h c e r t a i n b a t t a l i o n s and t h e n d e p l o y t o combat w i t h these same b a t t a l i o n s . The d o c t r i n e w r i t e r s

0 . F

the

p e r i o d d i d n o t e n v i s i o n t h e v a s t amount o f s h i f t i n g among groups t h a t e v e n t u a l l y o c c u r r e d . However as the w a r

progressed t h i : j s h i f t I n g f r o m one group t o a n o t h e r became the norm.

T h e e a s e w i t h w h i c h t h e s e s h i f t s w e r e made w a s i n great p a r t a r e s u l t of the u n i f o r m i t y of the t r a i n i n g g i v e n t o each b a t t a i o n . The r e c o r d s o f t h e t e s t s

a d m i n i s t e r e d by t h e Army G r o u n d F o r c e s b o a r d r e f 1 ec t t h i s uniformity. E a c h b a t t a l i o n a n d g r o u p was p u t t h r o u g h a

s e r i e s o f r i g o r o u s e x a m i n a t i o n s b e f o r e b e i n g r a t e d as s a t i s f a c t o r y i.e. c o m b a t r e a d y . The 4 8 4 t h FA Group t e s t The 4 6 4 t h was

r e s u l t s s e r v e a s a t y p c a l example.

a d m i n i s t e r e d t h e t e s t s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 17-26 A p r i l a t Camp Hood, T e x a s . D u r ng t h e s e t e s t s t h e 7 7 2 n d a n d 773rd

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y B a t t a l i o n s w e r e a t t a c h e d t o t h e G r o u p . The Group h e a d q u a r t e r s w a s r a t e d " s a t i s f a c t o r y " a n d e a c h B a t t a l i o n was r a t e d " v e r y s a t i s f a c t o r y " . The t e s t s

i n c l u d e d t a c t i c a l employment a s w e l l a s t e c h n i c a l f i r e d i r e c t i o n procedures. Had i t n o t b e e n for t h e

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of t h i s t e s t i n g t h e s h i f t i n g of b a t t a l i o n s among g r o u p s w o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n accompl i s h e d w i t h s u c h apparent ease. T o g i v e t h e r e a d e r an a p p r e c l a t i o n f o r

d e t a i l o f t h e s e t e s t s , A p p e n d i x One c o n t a i n s t h e r e s u l t s o f t h e 4 8 4 t h FA G r o u p t e s t .

The e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e g r o u p s a n d t h e i r a t t a c h e d b a t t a ions i s a good e x a m p l e o f t h e a d a p t a b i l i t y o f

doc t r ne t o t h e n e e d s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f w a r .
that

The f a c t
is a

h i s p r o c e d u r e was f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r

testament t o i t s v a l i d i t y .

I n l a t e r Chapters i t w i l l

be

-24-

d e m o n s t r a t e d how t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f g r o u p employmer t w a s meaningful iri p r o v i d i n g t i m e l y and s u f f i c i e n t a r t i l l e i - - r

f i r e support.

The c c l n c l u d i n g p o r t i o n s o f t h i s C h a p t e r d e s c r b e a s m a l l p o r t i o n o f t h e a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k t o r e i eve

BASTUGNE c o n d u c t e d by t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ( A D ) .
4 t h AD was on- o f t h e d i v i s i o n s a t t a c h e d t o 111 C o r 3 s . T h i s a c t i o n dkbpicts d o c t r i n a l employment o f t h e f i e l d artillery.

The

The 4 t h AD was o n t h e l e f t f l a n k o f t h e 111 ICorp!:. and had the m i s s i o n of o p e n i n g a c o r r i d o r i n t o BASTOGNET.

The a r t i l l e r y w i t h t h e D i v i s i o n was o r g a n i z e d as f o l l o i d s :
(A d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n w i l l

bs

p r e s e n t e d i n Chapter.. F o u r )

Combat Command A

6 6 t h FA (105mm H) ( o r g a n i c ) : 2 7 4 t h FA (105mm H, attached

f r o m 111 C o r p s ) Combat C.ommand B

2 2 n d FA (105mm t i )

( o r g a n i :)

253rd FA (105mm

H, a t t a c : h , ? d

f r o m I 1 1 Corps.) Combat Command

9 4 t h FA (10Jmm H) ( o r g a n i t : ) , B t r y C, 1 7 7 t h FA (155mm I-I (16)

a t t a c h e d f r o m I 1 1 Corps)

-25-

402nd FA Group (attached to Div)

561st FA (155mm G)

559th FA (155mm G ) 578th FA (8" H) ( 1 7 ) .

This organization i s typi al for this period of t h e w r .

I t reflects that the light artillery ( t h e 105mm's)
was

attached to the division and that one group of medium and h e a y artillery w a s assigned a mission of general support

t0

he C o r p s with a further mission of reinforcing the Communications were established among

Di v sion Artillerr.

al 1 these f i r i n g units and the Division Artillery Headquarters and the Group Headquarters. (18) The forward observers assigned to the maneuver companies were from the organic artillery battalions and no additional observers were assigned by Corps.. <1P)

The general plan for employment w a s for artillery to

fire on all town5 before the infantry or tanKs entered.

This was an attempt to s u p p r e s s the expected anti-tank

defenses and to s u p p r e s s any infantry direct fire weapons. Artillery fire w a s delivered on towns by all available artillery, not just that in direct support to one of the Combat Commands.

The coordination for this w a s done at

Division Artillery headquarters, despite some communication problems caused by terrain and weather. (20)

The most dramatic example o f the coordinated effort w a s on

the town of ASSENOIS, BELGIUM.

-26-

The 3 7 t h TanK B a t t a l i o n ,

commanded b y LTC C.

W.

Abrams, was 2 t t a c h e d t o Combat Command R e s e r v e .

This

Combat Command h a d t h e m i s s i o n o f c o v e r i n g t h e l e f t f l a n k
of

the D i v i s i o n .

LTC Abrams m i s s i o n was t o c o v e r BELGIUM. However,

i n t:he

d i r e c t i o n o f 3IBRET,

by 1586 on t h e

2 6 t h o f December LTC Abrams a n d h i s 3 7 t h TanK B a t t a l i o n w e r e o n l y 4 K i l o m e t e r s f r o m t h e p e r i m e t e r o f BASTOGNE. Because SIBRET was r e p o r t e d t o b e h e a v i l y d e f e n d e d , LTC

Abrams d e c i d e d t o i g n o r e h i s o r i g i n a l m i s s i o n a n d a : t e m p t a breaKthrough t o ASSENOI S.

RASTOGNE.

The l a s t town i n h i s p d i t h was

L t Col Abrams r a d i o e d b a c k t o h i s S-3 ant1 said, t h i s i s it. A few m i n u t e s l a t e r Capt Cook, L n 0 f r o m t h e 9 4 t h FA Bn t o CCR, r e c e i v r c a r a d i o message back a t t h e CCR CP a t REMOIUIL.LE f r o m Abrams t e l l i n g h i m t o h a v e a l l a r t i l l e r y Cook p r e p a r e d t o f i r e o n ASSENOIS on c a l 1 . r a d i o e d d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y t o h a v e them make a r r a n g e m e n t s f o r t h e 22 a n d 253 t o p r e p a r e t o fire. T h e 94 w a s a l r e a d y r e g i s t e r e d on t h e t a r g e t a n d f i r i n g d a t a was t r a n s m i t t e d t o D i v Ai-ty. The a r t i l l e r y p l a n was f o r t h e t h r e e 1 i g h t Bns t o f i r e b a t t a l i o n 16 v o l l e y s w i t h t h e 155 B t r y t o f i r e o n t h e c e n t e r o f t h e t o w n . . . D u r i n g t h i s s h o r t b u t i n t e n s e s h o o t on ASSENOXS a p p r o x i m a t e l y 368 r o u n d s o f 1 8 5 a n d 68 r o u n d s O F 155 were . + i r e d (21)
What

t h i s d e p i ( : t s i s t h a t a m a n e u v e r commander, on t h e
t h e moment, was a b l e t o a r r a n g e f o r the f i r e o f 3 This

spur o f

FA b a t t a l i o n s 1:18Smm) a n d 1 a t t a c h e d 155mm B a t t e r y .

f i r e was d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h at: ASSENOIS. There

i s some d i s p u t e a s t o w h e t h e r

t h i s tooL:

38 or 45 m i n u t e s ,

but t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t

i s t h a t due t o

adherence t o t h e employment p r a c t i c e s p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e d o c t r i n e a s i g n i f i c a n t amount o f a r t i l l e r y was a u a i l a b l e i n a v e r y short p e r i o d o f t i m a . T h i s example d e m o n s t r a t e s

t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n between maneuver a n d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s a s w e l l a s among a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . of

I t a l s o shows t h e a b i l i t y

t h e a r t i l l e r y t o q u i c k l y mass f i r e on a s i n g l e t a r g e t .

I t d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e importance of a l i a i s o n o f f i c e r and
t h e s h a r i n g o f f i r e d i r e c t i o n d a t a among u n i t s .

The m o s t

i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n t h a t t h i s example

i l l u s t r a t e s i s t h e speed and accuracy w i t h w h i c h the a r t i l l e r y f i r e c o u l d be d e l i v e r e d . T h i s f i r e came f r o m a

number o f b a t t a l i o n s i n a number o f d i f f e r e n t l o c a t i o n s . I t i s a r e f l e c t i o n of period's

effort

the c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n of the

doctrine.

I t i s a t r i b u t e to the standardization

t h a t b e g a n w i t h t h e Army G r o u n d F o r c e s t e s t s b e f o r e

the war.

T h i s h a s b e e n j u s t one s h o r t , c o n c i s e e x a m p l e o f employment o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . The n e x t C h a p t e r

the

a d d r e s s e s how t h e c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f

the doctrine

assisted i n the pre-attacK

phase of

t h i s operation.

Chapter Four d i s c u s s e s t h e a t t a c k phase and Chapter F i v e

i s t h e summary a n d c o n c l u s i o n s o f

t h i s study.

-28-

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

US War D e p a r t m e n t ,

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Tactics!, 1944, p .

Employment

FM 6-28,

1.

US War D e p a r t m e n t ,

F i e l d Ar t i l l e r r T a c t i c s - g g

T&!,uues

o f D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y and

Hiaher: A r t i l l e r y E c h e l o n s 1944, p . 49.

FM 6 - 1 8 6 ,

ibid.,

p.

9.
pp. 18-28.

FM 6-28,
i bid.,
p.

30.
R e p o r t on S t u d y o f F i e l d

The G e n e r a l B o a r d ,
Artii!.erY

Cmerations

undated,

p.

186.

(7)
(8)

FM 6-28,
FEl 6 - 1 6 0 ,

p. p.

26.
2. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o x Q : 1P44

(9)

T h i r d Army,

O p e r a t i o n Summary A u a u s t

June

1 9 4 5
(18

1945, p.

all.

4 8 4 t h FA G r o u p ,

History o f Headauarters and

4 0 4 t h FA GroUDL

Headau+rters Battery.
-

19 9 44

lP44, p.

pp.

2-3.

(11)
(12)

FM 6 - 1 8 8 ,

5Y.
R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i c J d

The G e n e r a l B o a r d , A r t i l l e r y Groug

undated,

p . 3.

( 1 3)

ibid.,

pp.

7-8.

(14)

The G e n e r a l B o a r d ,

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Groug

- 29-

undated, p . 8.
(15)
(16)

The G e n e r a l B o a r d , Capt H a r o l d Diuision, p.

O~erations

pp.

163-164

V.

McCoy,

as c i t e d i n 4 t h Armored

R e l i e f o f Bastosne

, ,

undated,

1.
O p e r a t i o n Summary
p.

(17)

T h i r d Army, summary,

25 December

1.

(18)

C a p t H a r o l d U . M c C o y , as c i t e d i n 4 t h Armoped

Division,
p.1.
(13)

R e l i e f o f Bastosne

undated,

ibid., p.2. R e l i e f o f Bastopne

(ZB) 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ,
undated, p p .
(22)

1-11.

ibid.,

pp7-8.

-30-

CHAPTER THREE

T h i s Ch:ipter s e t s t h e scene f o r a r o u n d HASTOGNE,

t h e b a t t l e t h a t tcsoK December 1944.

BELGIUM, 22-26

To

a p p r e c i a t e thtr c o m p l e x i t i e a o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y empl~,yment i n t h i s battle,,

i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o b e g i n w i t h what

:he

u n i t s w e r e dc8ing p r i o r t o t h e b a t l e .

The d i s c u s s i o n h e r e a f t e r w i o v e r v i e w of

1 depict a b r i e f

t h e 5.i t u a t i u n b e t w e e n 10 a n d 18 December.

These p a r a m e t e r s h a v e b e e n c h o s e n b e c a u s e t h e y d e s c : r i b + r the i n i t i a l cilinbat e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e 111 Corps a r t i l l e r y .

Some o f

t h e 25 b a t t a l i o n s r e f e r e n c e d i n C h a p t e r One A i l 1

be p l a c e d i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e i r employment dees0:ribed.
of

T h i s Chapter w i l l

a d d r e s s on1

11

t h e s e b a t t a i i o n s b e c a u s e i t was n o t u n t i 1 t h e ac:t.Jal

attack that

X I [ Corps c o n t r o l l e d a l l the b a t t a l i o n s
lery w i l l be descr

The bed,

reorganization of the f i e l d a r t i

t h e h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s ( o r l a c K t h e r e o f ) w i 1 1 tre r e p o r t e d a n d f I n a l 1 y t h e movemen new z o n e s o f a ( - t i o n .

o f these u n i t s t c l . h e i r

A brief c o erview of

the

I 1 1 Corps b a t t l e e x p e r i e n c e s

w i 1 1 p l a c e them i n t h e p r o p e r p e r s p e c t i ve on t h e batt efielcl.

I C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s a r r i v e d on t h e
I t s f i r s t mission, while

c o n t n e n t on 15 September 1944.

a s s i g n e d t o N i n t h Army, was t o manage t h e r e c e p t i o n a n d processing of a l l t h e s o l d i e r s o f t h e 1 2 t h A r m y Group a s The C o r p s

t h e y a r r i v e d o v e r t h e b e a c h e s a t Normandy. performed t h i s mission u n t i l a s s i g n e d t o t h e T h i r d Army.

18 O c t o b e r , when i t w a s

The d o c t r i n e o f t h e p e r i o d Even

r e q u i r e d t h a t a r t i l l e r y n e v e r be K e p t i n r e s e r v e .

t h o u g h t h e Corps A r t i 1 l e r y d i d n o t h a v e a n y f i r i n g u n i t s attached, t h i s p o l i c y a p p l i ed. Therefore, t h e Corps

A r t i l l e r y H e a d q u a r t e r s was d e t a c h e d and a s s i g n e d t o t h e XX Corps A r t i l l e r y Headquarters. s e r v e d a s a back-up

Corps.

The 111 C o r p s a r t i l l e r y m e n

f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r f o r t h e XX

(1)

On 5 December,

111 C o r p s r e c e i v e d i t s f i r s t combat The m i s s i o n was,

m i s s i o n d i r e c t i v e f r o m T h i r d Army.

"(1) t o r e 1 i e v e XX C o r p s o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n the Metz (France) area! ( 2 ) t o r e l i e v e t h e 5 t h D i v i s i o n w i t h elements o f the 87th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n and c o n t a i n t h e r e m a i n i n g Metz f o r t s w i t h o u t d i r e c t l y a s s a u l t i n g any m a j o r f o r t i f i c a t i o n ; a n d (3) t o b e p r e p a r e d t o r e c e i v e a d d i t i o n a l t r o o p s a n d a d v a n c e on Army o r d e r (2)

."

T h e f o r t s a t MET2 h a d b e e n b y - p a s s e d by t h e T h i r d Army i n
i t s d r i v e t h r o u g h F r a n c e a n d w e r e b e i n g s e c u r e d by t h e 5 t h

Division.

The r e l i e f o f t h e 5 t h D i v i s i o n by t h e 8 7 t h Elements o f

D i v s i o n was n o t c o m p l e t e d u n t i l 8 December.

the 87th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a r r i v e d , r e l i e v e d the 5 t h D i v s i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f t h e a r e a p a s s e d t o 111 C o r p s .

-32-

Control o f t h e 1 1 1 C:orp.

t h e 111 C o r p s a r t i l l e r y d i d n o t p a s s t o I n s t e a d , the 244th F i e l d was

a t t h i s time.

A r t i l l e r r Battalion,

u s i n g c a p t u r e d German weapon.3,

a s s i g n e d t o ca:induct a p r o g r a m o f h a r a s s i n g f i r e . of

( T h e men

t h e 2 4 4 t h i 3 a t t a l i o n h a d n o t r e c e i v e d t h e i r howl t z e r s I n a m w e t h a t was t o become c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , o f

irlcleed o f

yet.)

the

111 C o r p s ,

t h e e n t i r e T h i r d Army,

t h e 8i'tl1

I n f a n t r y D i v i . : i o n was o n l y a s s i g n e d t o 111 C o r p s u n ' : i l 9 December. The 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n r e l i e v e d t h e

e l e m e n t s o f t h e 8 7 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d was o f f i c i a l l y a s s i g n e d t o t h e I 1 1 C o r p s on 12 December.

(3)

I n compliance w i t h the i n s t r u c t i o n s from T h i r a Army,

n o d i r e c t a s s a u l t s w e r e made o n t h e f o r t . The i n t e n t bias

t o s e a l o f f t h e r e m a i n i n g Germans a n d a w a i t a s u r r e n d e r
b r o u g h t a b o u t b y l a c k o f f o o d a n d ammuni t i o n , The p l a n

was s u c c e s s f u l a n d on 13 December t h e g a r r i s o n o f 5 1 1 o f f i c e r s a n d 1 . 1 1 5 men s u r r e n d e r e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y ,

:4)

What ef+cbct d i d t h i s h a v e on t h e e v e n t u a l o p e i - < t t i o n s c o n d u c t e d by 1 1 1 C o r p s n e a r BASTOGNE ? T h i s t y p e G.F

iX

f l e x i b i l i t y ancl c o n s t a n t s h i f t i n g o f r e s o u r c e s was h a l l m a r k o f the 1 1 1 Corps.

They were a s s i g n e d a r a t t e r

s i m p l e m i s s i o n o f s u r r o u n d i n g a f o r t and e n c o u r a g i n g t h ? defenders t o surrender. Even t h o u g h t h i s was a r e l z ~ t i u e l y

-33-

easy combat m i s s i o n ,

t h e Army commander saw f i t This

t o switch

the i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n performing the task.

e x p e r i e n c e c e r t a i n l y s t o o d 111 C o r p s i n good s t e a d f o r t h e p e r i o d t o come when d i v i s i o n s w o u l d be s w i t c h e d e v e n m o r e rapidly. The importance a l s o l i e s i n the f a c t t h a t for

t h e i r f i r s t combat m i s s i o n t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s was a s s i g n e d a

mission o f r e l a t i v e l y low r i s k .

T h i s g a v e them t h e

o p p o r t u n i t y t o g e t combat e x p e r i e n c e w i t h o u t a g r e a t d e a l

of exposure t o c a s u a l t i e s ,

The e x p e r i e n c e m u s t h a v e b e e n

i n v a l u a b l e f o r t h e commander a n d t h e s t a f f .

I t was a

c h a n c e t o e x e r c i s e t h e i r d u t i e s i n an a c t u a l combat setting, r a t h e r t h a n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d u t i e s t h e y had H e a d q u a r t e r s and Headquarters B a t t e r y ,

been p e r f o r m i n g .

I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n the r e d u c t i o n

o f t h e MET2 f o r t s . Nevertheless, t h e y t o o were g a i n i n g

v a l u a b l e e x p e r i e n c e u n d e r t h e t u t e l a g e o f XX C o r p s .

The XX C o r p s f o l l o w e d t h e same s t y l e o f i n d o c t r i n a t i o n t o combat f o r t h e I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y m e n .

A s n o t e d p r e v i o u s l y , Hq a n d Hq B t r y ,

111 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y
They d i d n o t

was a s s i g n e d t o t h e XX C o r p s on 16 O c t o b e r . arrive

i n t h e XX C o r p s z o n e o f a c t i o n u n t i l 29 O c t o b e r . i ndependent a c t i v i

The o f f i c i a1 r e c o r d s do n o t r e f 1 ec t

tr

o f t h e I 1 1 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y u n t i 1 16 December.

During the

25 O c t o b e r t o 16 December t i m e f r a m e t h e y o p e r a t e d u n d e r
t h e c o n t r o l o f XX C o r p s . Throughout t h i s p e r i o d the

-34-

number a n d t y p e o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s v a r i e d . This experience, l i k e t h a t of the parent headquarters a t i n the b a t t l e o f

METZ, w o u l d s e r v e t h e a r t i l l e r y w e l l
EASTOGNE.

E a r l y i n t h e i r combat e x p e r i e n c e t h e y w e r e a h i g h degree o f f l e x i b i l i t y .
1 : s )

f o r c e d t o pr,id:tice

AS

an examp e o f t h a t f l e x i b i l i t y ,

t r a c e d b c l # ) w .are the p e r i o d 16

t h e v a r i o u s o r g a n z a t i o n s f o r combat f o r December t h r ocigh

8 December 1 9 4 4 .

1 6 December

2 4 4 FA En (Enemy Weapons)

87 I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y

15 Decemher
183rd

FA Group
a s s i g n e d f r o m X I 1 Cor->s assigned from

6 9 6 t h FA Bn 1 7 5 t h FA Bn 1 7 7 t h FA Rn 2 8 2 n d FA En B Btry, i143r.d FA Bn

XI1 Cor:)s

assigned f r o m X I I Cori>s a s s i g n e d f r o m XX Corp.; a s s i g n e d f r o m XX Gorp!; a s s i g n e d f r o m XX C o r p r s

1 8 December.

General Support 7 7 5 t h FA En (155mm H) 2 4 4 t h FA En (Enemy Weapons)

183r.d FA Group

282nd FA Bn < 1 8 5 m m H)

D i r e c t Support, 6 t h Caval r y Group

177th FA Bn (155mm H)

General Support, R e i n f o r c e 282nd FA En

6 9 6 t h FA Bn (lB5mm

H)

A t t a c h e d 6 t h Armored Division (6)

What the above d a t a demonstrate i s the m a t u r a t i o n p r o c e s s o f the 111 Corps A r t i l l e r y . The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r

i B December i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e s i n c e 111 Corps

a r t i l l e r y d i d not r e v e r t

t o Corps c o n t r o l u n t i l 15

December.

( 7 ) XX Corps a s s i g n e d t h i s a r t i l l e r y t o 111

Corps and then a s s i g n e d 111 Corps a r t i l l e r y the m i s s i o n o f s u p p o r t i n g i t s own p a r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n .

By 15 December w e

can see a more d o c t r i n a l approach t o the employment o f the a r t i l l e r y assets.

111 Corps was a s s i g n e d a number o f

b a t t a l i o r 1 5 and i n the p e r i o d o f t h r e e days task o r g a n i z e d them i n a manner t h a t w o u l d s e t the p a t t e r n for the employment of the a r t i l l e r y w i t h i n t h i s C o r p s . that A 1 5 0 note

i n these same t h r e e days changes w e r e made i n the The task o r g a n i z a t i o n o f 18 December w a s

u n i t s assigned.

t y p i c a l o f the way 1 1 1 Corps employed i t s v a r i o u s

a r t i l l e r y battalions.

The 183rd Group had t w o medium

b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d and was a s s i g n e d a m i s s i o n o f general support f o r t h e C o r p s . The 282nd,

a 1B5mm b a t t a l i o n , was

assigned a m i s s i o n of d i r e c t s u p p o r t t o one o f the Corps

-36-

maneuver e l e m e n t s a n d g i v e n t h e 1 7 7 t h , a medium b a t t a l i o n , to reinforce its fires. The C o r p s a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n t h e 6SL6th.

r e c e i v e d t h e :armored f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n ,

BY t h e been i n comba the c o n t r o l o

8 t h o f December t h e I 1 I C o r p s A r t i 1 I e l - y h a d
58 days,

a l l b u t t h e l a s t t h r e e days under T h e i r p e r i o d of t u t e l i i g e was

t h e XX C o r p s .

m a r k e d by r a p i d a n d f r e q u e n t s h i f t s i n a t t a c h e d battalions. r h e r w e r e r e q u i r e d t o s u p p o r t b o t h armclred They g a i n e d v a l u a b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n A 6 we s h a l l see b y t h e i r they learned t h e i r l e s 5 o n . c &el I .

and i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s . t h e lessons o i combat.

p e r f o r m a n c e a t EASTOGNE, Prior

t o t h e EASTOGNE o p e r a t i o n t h e C o r p s u n d e r w e n t

it?

most r a d i c a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , support elements.

b o t h o f m a n e u v e r a n d colnbat

They h a d a chance t o p r a c t i c e t h e i r their

r e o r g a r i i z a t i on t e c h n i q u e s a f t e r compl e t i on o f

m i s s i or1 a t MET;.

After

the c a p i t u l a t i o n o f

t h e l a s t MET2 f o r t ,

111

C o r p s was l e f t w i t h n o comba n o t t o l a s t lortg.

m i s s i n.

T h i s r e s p i t e was,
its

On 16 December t h e Corps., now w i t b

a r t i l l e r y r r t t a l : h e d , was a s s i g n e d a new m i s s i o n a n d new combat f o r c e s lo c o n d u c t directed to assume command o f t h e 6 t h A r m o r e d D i u i s i o n , t h e 4 2 n d I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n , upon i t s a r r i v a l a t M e t i , a n d t e m p o r a r y command o f t h e that mission.

I 1 1 C o r p s Wac,

- 37-

6th C a v a l r y Group ( r e i n f o r c e d ) . I t further d i r e c t e d t h a t 1 1 1 Corps ( 1 ) c o n t i n u e i t s present m i s s i o n s i n M e t z ; ( 2 ) m a i n t a i n maximum p r e s s u r e a g a i n s t t h e enemy i n t h e a s s i g n e d z o n e ! (3) d r i v e t h e enemy E a s t o f t h e S a a r R i v e r w i t h i n t h e C o r p s z o n e on c o m p l e t i o n o f r e f i t t i n g t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d on Army o r d e r ; ( 4 ) s e i z e a n d s e c u r e a b r i d g e h e a d a c r o s s t h e Saar R i v e r i n t h e C o r p s z o n e on Army o r d e r ; a n d ( 5 ) a d v a n c e N o r t h e a s t a n d s e i z e N e u n k i r c h e n ( s i c ) on Army order (8)

."

The C o r p s t a s k o r g a n i z e d t h e a r t i 1 1 e r y a s shown p r e v i ousl Y u n d e r t h e 18 December l i s t i n g . n e v e r t o be c o m p l e t e d . T h i s m i s s i o n was + a t e d

On t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e 1 8 t h , w h i l e p l a n n i n g f o r t h e a t t a c k towards the Saar, t h e C o r p s was n o t i f i e d o f t h e A t 2260 h o u r s t h a t

German b r e a k t h r o u g h i n t h e A r d e n n e s .

evening t h e Corps C h i e f of S t a f f d i r e c t e d that t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s b e moved n o r t h t o s u p p o r t an e x p e c t e d m i s . s i o n

of

a t t a c k i n g t h e s o u t h e r n f l a n k o f t h e German s a l i e n t .

(9)

Once a g a i n t h e I 1 1 C o r p s h a d new maneuver e l e m e n t s assigned. The 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a n d t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d

D i v i s i o n w e r e a t t a c h e d on 19 December p e r v e r b a l o r d e r s o f t h e Commander, T h i r d Army. These e l e m e n t s j o i n e d t h e 2 6 t h Neither

I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n a l r e a d y a s s i g n e d t o t h e Corps.

t h e 4 t h n o r t h e 8 0 t h d i v i s i o n s w e r e e n g a g e d a t t h e t i m e of t h e i r attachment. T h e 2 6 t h was i n a s s e m b l y a r e a s a r o u n d The C o r p s h e a d q u a r t e r s moved t o

MET2 c o n d u c t i n g t r a i n i n g .

ARLON, BELGIUM on t h e 2 0 t h a n d p r e p a r e d f o r t h e a t t a c k .

-38-

The 8 0 t h a n d t h e 4 t h b e g a n t h e i r m a r c h e s t o t h e ARLON r e g i o n on o r d e r s o f t h e T h i r d Army. The 4 t h a n d t h e f ? @ t h the 2 l s t .

d i v i s i o n s c l o s e d on a s s e m b l y a r e a s n e a r ARLON on

The 2 6 t h D i u i i j i o n h a d c o m p l e t e d i t s moue by 2318 hoJr5. on the 28th. was s e t f o r By l a t e i n t h e e u e n i n g on 21 December t h ? z t a g e tile a t t a c k t h a t w o u l d take p l a c e e a r l y m the Three d i v i s i o n s were
swing.
AS

m o r n i n g o f 22 December. the p l a n n i n g t o r

i n p l . i c e and A l l of h a d ttle the the

t h e a t t a c k was i n f u l l

D i v i s i o n s h a d c o m p l e t e d l o n g r o a d marches, Corps Headquarters.

T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , o f t h e scene l o r t h e movements o f the f i e l d

maneuver e l e m e n t s c o m p l e t e ,

a r t i l l e r y u n i t s t h a t supported t h l s a t t a c k a r e desc:ribcd,

On 19 December 1 1 1 C o r p s r e c e i v e d P new f i e l d
a r t i I l r ? r y b a t t a l ions.

A l l o f t h e s e b a t t a l i o n s h a d bsen

a c t i v e l y engaged i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i u e zones o f a c t i o n . T h e y h a d b e e n ' w p p o r t i n g t h e XX C o r p s a n d i n some c:a';es the X I 1 Corps.

111 Corps o r g a n i z e d these f i e l d a r t i

IPI'.Y

u n i t s i n t h e t o l l o w i n g manner: "A f i e l d a r t l l l e r y g r o u p , w i t h t h r e e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s , was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ; a f i e l d a r t i l l e r y group w i t h t w o f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i u i s i o n ; and two f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s (armored) were a t t a c h e d t o the 4 t h Armored D i u i s i o n . The r e m a i n i n g g r o u p w i t h f o u r f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s , one o f w h i c h was an o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n , was r e t a i n e c by I 1 1 C o r p s A r t i l l e r y . ' ' ( 1 1 )

-39-

By a t t a c h i n g the b a t t a l i o n s and groups t o the d i u i s i o n s , the C o r p s p r o v i d e d the d i v i s i o n s w i t h the most f l e x i h i l i t y f o r the employment o f the FA.

The c h a r t b e l w d e p i c t s t h i s n a r r a t i v e account and

shows the u n i t s p r e v i o u s assignments.

Chapter Four w i l l

show how u n i t s a t t a c h e d t o the D i u s i o n s w e r e employed.

UNITS

MISSION

F R O M

4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n
253rd FA Bra (185mm H)

Attached Attached

X I 1 Corps

274th FA Bn (lB5mm H)

XX Corps

26th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n 193rd FA Grnup 179th FA Rn (155mm H) 696th FA Bn (185mm H) (This battalion

p r e v i o u s l y assigned

Attached Attached Attached

XX Corps
X I 1 Corps
6th Armd

D i v i s i on

t o 1 1 1 Corps) 949th FA Bn (155mm H) Attached

XX Corps

80th I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n 404th FA Group 512th FA Bn (189mm H ) Attached

A t t ac hed

X I 1 Corps
X I 1 Corps

-46-

7 5 2 n d FA Bn (155mm H)

Attached

X I I Corps

111 Corps A r t i l l e r y c o n t r o l 2 8 8 t h FA O b s e r v a t on Bn Attached Attached Attached TI1 i r d A r m y

2(33rd FA Group
1 7 6 t h FA Bn t 4 5 G ) 1 7 7 t h I-A En ( T h l s b a t a1 i o n previous x assigned t o I 1 1 Corps) 7 3 1 s t F A Bn (135mm H )
(12)
(

XX 3or ps XX :orps

155mm H )

Attached

What of

th

5.

l i 5 t d e m o n s t r a t e s i s the v a r i e d bacKground

t h e b a t t a l con5 a n d t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f

the f i e l d

artillery.

W t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e 6 9 6 t h a n d the I i i t h ,
rhi
5

a1 I of t h e s e Ls.sttal t o n s w e r e new t o t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s .
list

also show+. t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y
Once a g a i n , a s on 18 D e c r m l > e r ,

employment hy ? h e C o r p s .

o n l y t h r e e medlitm h a t t a l i o n 5 a n d one o b s e r v a t i o n b z t :a1 i o n

w e r e K e p t under

d i r e c t Corps c o n t r o l .

The r e s t o f

ttte

a r t i l l e r y was a t t a c h e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n s .

By a t t a c h i r g

t h e s e u n i t s t o t h e d i v i s i o n s t h e C o r p s Commander was a l l o w i n g h i s m i < n e u v e r commanders, a s much f l e x i b i l i t y a s he could. C h a p t e r Four w i l l show how t h e d i v i s i o n commanders

used t h i s a r t i 1 l e r y .

H i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s between f i e l d a r t i l l e r y and maneuver u n i t s h a d l i t t l e o r n o e f f e c t on w h i c h f i e l d

a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n was a s s i g n e d t o a p a r t i c u l a r FA g r o u p

or m a n e u v e r e l e m e n t .

T h i s w a s n o t the f i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n

w i t h w h i c h the Corps c o n d u c t e d t h e e v e n t u a l a t t a c k on t h e 22nd. assets. BY t h e n t h e y had r e c e i v e d e v e n m o r e a r t i l l e r y

A s w i l l be seen i n Chapter F o u r ,

the Corps

w e i g h t e d t h e d i v s i o n h a v i n g t h e must s u c c e s s w i t h t h i s additional a r t i l ery. B e f o r e a n y f i r m p l a n s c o u l d b e made

or t h e a t t a c k c o n d u c t e d , a l l o f t h e s e u n i t s h a d t o make s u b s t a n t i a l r o a d marches. The d i s c u s s i o n t h a t f o l l o w s

d e t a i l s some o f t h o s e moues.

Space d o e s n o t p e r m i t , n o r n e c e s s i t y d i c t a t e d i s c u s s i o n o f a l l o f t h e s e moves.:.

I h a v e s e l e c t e d some o f
i t y of

t h e more i n t e r e s t i n g s h i f t s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e abi the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y t o respond t o r a p i d l y changing situations. This discussion w i l l

a l s o show how t h e

a r t i l l e r y was a b l e t o q u i c k l y c h a n g e m i s s i o n s . noted e a r l i e r ,
all

A s was

o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s w e r e new According t o the

t o t h e C o r p s on 19 December e x c e p t t w o . Corps a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t ,

a l l o f t h e u n i t s h a d c l o s e d on A1 1 o f

t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a s s e m b l y a r e a s by 21 December.

t h e u n i t s w e r e a c t i v e l y e n g a g e d when n o t i f i e d o f t h e i r
s h i f t t o the 1 1 1 Corps.

(13)

-42-

The 2531.d A r m o r e d FA B a t t a l i o n was s u p p o r t i n g t h e 8 7 t h l n f a n t r r D i v i s i o n a n d was l o c a t e d n e a r t h e s o u t h e r n boundary o f

the

XI1 C o r p s .

I t was a b o u t 15 m i l e s s o u t h o f

SAARBRUCKEN, GERMANY (See P l a t e 1 ) .

I t s mission a t th?

t i m e o f n o t i f i c a t i o n t o moue was g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o X I 1
Corps w i i : h a . t u r t h e r m i s s i o n o f r e i n f o r c i n g the 80tti I n f a n t r y [)ivie:ion upon i t s c o m m i t t m e n t . Upon i t s i i r r i i a l
<rth

i n t h e a . s s e m b I r a r e a d e s i g n a t e d f o r Combat Command E : , Armored D i u i s ~ o n ,12 m i l e s N W o f ARLON,

i t was a s s i c n e c l

the m i s s i c i n o i r e i n 4 o r c i n g t h e f i r e s o f t h e 2 2 n d FA
Battalion. Diuieion. The 22nd w a s o r g a n i c t o t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d The 253rcl c o m p l e t e d a 156 m i l e r o a d m a r c h ,
m r l i

r e c e i u c ! d a new m i s s i o n a n d f o r m e d new r e l a t i o n s h i p ! ; division dlrec:tlr. I n i t s previous attachment to

th a

)(I1
1:hn?

C o r p s i t h a d b v e n o p e r a t i n g u n d e r t h e g u i d a n c e of 1 7 7 t h FA G r o u p . ( 1 4 )

T h e 1 7 9 t I 1 FA B a t t a l i o n was also a t t a c h e d t o t h v 1 7 7 t h FA Group a n d h a d a s i m i l a r m i s s i o n a s t h e 253r.cl. The 1 7 9 t k . was i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t o f X I 1 C o r p s w i t h k : r e i n f o r c i n g micjsion f o r commitment. t h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n upon

d

I t was l o c a t e d n e a r t h e 253rd arid a l s o h a d

156 m i l e r o a d m a r c h t o i t s new a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s (See

Plate 1).

Upon i t s a r r i v a l

I n t h e ARLON a r e a ,

the

b a t t a l i o n was a t t a c h e d t o t h e 1 9 3 r d FA Group a n d asssigned

-43-

the m ssion o f general support for

the 26th I n f a n t r y l o c a t i o n , and

D i v i s on.

T h i s was a change i n m i s s i o n ,

group attachment.

(15)

The l a s t e x a m p l e o f t h e c h a n g e i n m i s s i o n s , a n d m a n e u v e r a f f i l i a t i o n s i s t h e 4 6 4 t h FA G r o u p .

location This

group h a d t h e 5 1 2 t h and t h e 752nd b a t t a l ions a l r e a d y a s s i g n e d when o r d e r e d t o move t o t h e n o r t h .

I t retained

p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e s e b a t t a l ions when i t came u n d e r c o n t r o l

o f t h e 111 C o r p s . I t was t h e o n l y group a s s i g n e d t o 1 1 1

C o r p s t h a t K e p t t h e same b a t t a l i o n s a t t a c h e d . o r d e r e d t o march,

When

i t was i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o t h e X I 1

C o r p s a n d was l o c a t e d 12 m i l e s SW o f SAARBRUCKEN (See P l a t e 1). Upon a r r i v a l i n t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s zone i t w a s

(16)

attached to the 80th I n f a F t r y Division.

T h e s e t h r e e e x a m p l e s o f t h e t y p e s o f s h i f t s made i n the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y a s s e t s are i n c l u d e d t o g i v e the reader an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n . The 111 C o r p s , r e l a t i v e l y new t o c o m b a t , was r e s p o n s i b l e

f o r a s s i g n i n g m i s s i o n s a n d c o n t r o l l i n g n i n e new f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s i n a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d of time. b a t t a l i o n s h a d t o conduct arduous r o a d marches over d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n w i t h o u t the b e n e f i t o f reconnaissance. Each u n i t s h a r e d t h e r o a d m a r c h e x p e r i e n c e as w e l l a s c h a n g e s i n t h e i r m i s s i o n a n d s u p p o r t e d manuever e l e m e n t . The

-44-

Essentially,

t h e T h i r d Army formed a new C o r p s a n d s h i f t e d

i t 5 d i r e c t i o n o f a t t a c k 98 d e g r e e s . A s h a s b e e n r e l a t e d
above, t h i s :;liift i n d i r e c t i o n r e q u i r e d s u b s t a n t i n l moues the u n i t s assigned.

on t h e p a r t o i : v i r t u a l l y a l l

T h e s e moves w e r e made w i t h s u c h a p p a r e n t eas.e p r i m a r i l y due t o a well movement p r o c e d u r e . d e v e l o p e d a n d w i d e l y under!;l:ood t h e d o c u m e n t s r*eviewetJ f o r . t l e 111

None o f

t h i s s t u d y g o i n t o a n y d e t a i l on t h e s p e c i f i c s o f C o r p s move t o ARLON.

T h i s i s not r e a l l y surprising since

t h e C o r p s h a d m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s t o c o n c e n t r a t e on d u r i n g t h i s tiine than p u b l i s h i n g o r d e r s and annexes. can imagine

tklt?

One

f r a n t i c t e l e p h o n e a n d r a d i o messagr?s t t 8 a t The smooth

m u s t hibum?O C C l J l ' r e d d u r i n g t h i s moue n o r t h . shift vf

t h e s e f o r c e s f r o m SAARERUCKEN t o ARLON i s m . r e a The Cot-ps

r e f l e c t i o n on t h e T h i r d Army t h a n on I 1 1 C o r p s .

r e c e i v e , I)ut knew w h a t b a t t x i o n s t h e y w o u l d e v e n t u a I Y d i d n o t c o n t r o l o r p l a n t h e movernent o f t h e s e u n i t s .

l h c on1

mention of

the plannin

conducted f c l r

t h i s move i s br G e n e r a l P a t ton, Arms.

Commanding G e n e r a l

7h i r d

" I t I c. n o t e w o r t h y t h a t a1 1 t h e o p e r a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p l a n s f o r a t t a c k e x e c u t e d on 22nd Decemher, w e r e done by p e r s o n a l c o n f e r e n c e or Iby t e l e p h o n e , and t h a t t h e h i g h l y c o m p l i c a t e d road and s u p p l , ~ movements w e r e o n l y made p o s s i b l e by t h e o l d and v e r y e x p e r i e n c e d G e n e r a l S t a f f o f t h e 3 r d Ai-ms a n d t h e h i g h d i s c i p l i n e a n d

- 1s-

devotion to duty o f a l l (17)

the u n i t s inuolved." t o do

T h e Q e n e r a l S t a f f o f t h e T h i r d Army h a d a g r e a t d e a l w i t h t h e smooth s h i f t o f t h e s e f o r c e s . a p p a r e n t 1 y h a d a good p l a n a l s o . Corps A r t i The X I 1 C o r p s

T h e movement o f t h e X I 1

l e r y t o t h e i r new p o s i t i o n s n e a r ARLON was t h e

s u b j e c t o f an Army Ground F o r c e s R e p o r t p u b 1 i s h e d an 3 January

945.

A c o p y o f t h i s r e p o r t i s i n c l u d e d as The u n i t s t h a t w e r e d e t a c h e d

A p p e n d i x Two t o t h i s s t u d y .

f r o m t h e X I 1 C o r p s a n d a s s i g n e d t o t h e 1 1 1 C o r p s wou d

have f a 1 lowed s i m i l a r p r o c e d u r e s a s t h e y handed o v e r t h e i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s t o t h e r e m a i n i n g and incoming a r t i l e r y units.

T h i s Chapter h a s d e s c r i b e d t h e scene j u s t p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f t h e a t t a c k on 22 December. The manner i n

w h i c h I 1 1 Corps o p e r a t e d i n t h i s t i m e s e t t h e s t a g e fur t h e manner i n w h i c h t h e y w o u l d o p e r a t e f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e battle. The C o r p s h a d b e e n c o n s i s t e n t

i n the way i n which

i t o r g a n i z e d t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y f o r combat.

I t had

p r a c t i c e d r a p i d a n d f r e q u e n t s h i f t s i n m a n e u v e r u n i t s as well as f i e l d a r t i l l e r y assets. Finally, t h e Corps had T h i s test would

b e e n a s s i g n e d i t s f i r s t r e a l combat t e s t .

examine t h e i r s t r e n g t h s a n d d e t e r m i n e i f t h e i r p r o c e d u r e s a r e sound.

-46-

Chapter Four w i l l

d i s c u s s t h e a t t a c k phase and t h i s study; hut

Chapter F i v e wi 1 1 draw c o n c l u s i o n s . about at this point

i t i s p o s s l b l e t o p o i n t o u t some t e n t a t i v e

findings.

1. problem!;

I n <$I1

t h e documents r e v i e w e d f o r

t h i s rittidy

are never surfaced.

E i t h e r the u n i t s were a b l e t h e y wei-(8 j u s t

t o complete t h i s s h i f t w i t h o u t problems or
never included i n o f f i c i a l reports.

2.
combat,

Evein t h o u g h I 1 1 C o r p s was r e l a t i v e l y new t o i 1: h a d a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d r a p i d c h a n g e s i n

m i s s i o n s a n d a s . s i g n e d u n i t s b e f o r e i t e m b a r k e d on t h i s

project.

Under t h e XX C o r p s i t h a d e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h t h e

way t o o r g a n i z e t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r r f o r combat a n d h>w t o control it. They were c o m f o r t a b l e w i t h the o p e r a t i n )

p r oc e d i i r I? s the:., d e v e 1 o p e d .

3.

'The f a c t

t h a t a l l o f these f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s

h a d u n d e v g o n e 5 t a n d a r d i z e d t r a i n i n g was a s i g n i f i c a n ' : benefit.

All

Linits

u n d e r s t o o d t h e i r a s s i g n e d m i s s i o r s and not a matter of

i t Wac. a m a t t e r of c o m p l e t i n g them, invent i ng procedures.

4.

The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat d e s i g n e d by t h e 1 1 1

C o r p s r e f l e c t s t h e t y p i c a l p r o c e d u r e s t h a t t h i s C o r p s urjed

-47-

throughout

the remainder o f the war.

I t a t t a c h e d the

armored a r t i l l e r y t o t h e armor d i v i s i o n and r e i n f o r c e d t h e f i r e s o f the i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s w i t h 155mm a s s e t s .

Now

on t o t h e a c t u a l a t t a c k i t s e l f !

-48-

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

I f 1 Cor.(os,

A f t e r A c t i o n Report. p. 1.

Dec 4 4

31

Decenher 1944,
ihid.,
11. 2.
1:'.

i tiid.,
T1.ii.d

3.
F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o y 2 y

Army,

O p e r a t i o n s Summary
T h i r d AI.ITIY,

20 November 1 9 4 4 , p . 2.

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d Tank D e s t r o y e r

O o e r a t i o n s Summary T h i r d Army,

,
,

1 1 December 1 9 4 4 ,

p.

1.

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y a n d TanK Drstro.fx.elL 1 1 December 1 9 4 4 , p . 1. Information p . 2. Dec 4 4

i and

O D e r a t i o n s Summary

18 December 1 9 4 4 , p .
T h i r d ArLmy, ;;urnmarl;.: 11; CorFl!,,

Daily Artillerr
15 December 1 9 4 4 ,

A f t e r A c t i o n Report. 1944, 5-7. p p . 4.

31

[)ecembrr ibid.,
ibid.,
ibid,
pp.

p . 8.
p.
7.

T h i r d Army, Summary

D a i l y A r t i l l e r y Information 20 December 1 9 4 4 , p.

2.
Dec 4 4

1 1 1 Corps-,

A f t e r A c t i o n ReDort.

31

December 1 9 4 4 , p . Summers, f?uhert R.,

9.
et.

al

.,

Armor a t B a s t o q i e
p.

May 1 9 4 ' ? , A p p e n d i x UI, No. 4,

liv.

-49-

(15)

4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , Dec 44

A f t e r A c t i o n ReDort

u n d a t e d , no page numbers A f t e r A c t i o n R e D o r t , D e c 44

(16)

111 C o r p s ,

31

December 1 9 4 4 , p . 9 .

(17)

T h i r d Grmy,

N o t e s on B a s t o a n e O p e r a t i o n

J a n u a r y 16, 1 9 4 5 , p . 4 .

CHAPTER FOUR

T h i s Ch'apter ar t i 1 ler..y u n i t s of December. 1 9 4 4 .

d e s c r i b e s t h e a c t i o n s by t h e f i e d

1 1 1 C o r p s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 22

26

T h e s e d a t e s c o n s t i t u t e t h e p e r i o d wlien I 1 1

C o r p s c o n d u c t e d t h e a t t a c K t o r e l i e v e BASTOGNE. o f December i5, a n a r b i t r a r y d a t e . b e c a u s e on t h a t d a y e l e m e n t s o f

lh6- 26th

I t h a s been c h o w n

t h e 4 t h Armored D i v l s i c m

made c o r l t a c t w i t h t h e b e l e a g u e r e d d e f e n d e r s o f BASTtIGNi!.

111 C o r p s c o n t i n u e d t h e a t t a c k l o n g a f t e r t h e 2 6 t h ,
however. of Thi!i s t u d y e n d s on t h e 2 6 t h b e c a u s e t h i s p e r i o d

time w e l l

d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e employment o f t h e f i e l d

ar t i 1 1ery

T h i s Chapter b e g i n s w i t h a d e x r i p t i o n o f F i e l d
Order
# 1 pub1 I s h e d by

I 1 1 C o r p s on 21 December 1944.
i n i t i a l organization for

l'h

I S

F i e l d Order e s t a b l i s h e d the combat f o r a l l

t h e e l e m e n t s o f 111 C o r p s .

No a t t e m p t h a s
the
COJlCl

been made t o d e s c r i b e a l l

t h e combat a c t i o n s o f

divisions during this battle. c o n s t i t u t e t h e focus. o f

Such a d e s c r i p t i o n

a d e t a i l e d study. This Chapt?r the d i v i s i o n s as they p i r t a i n The

w i l l d e s c r i b e t h e a c t i o n s of

t o t h e einployrnt!nt o f t h e i r f i e l d a r t i l l e r y a s s e t s .
ouervitrw o f
tti5.b

employment o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y t)e,ains

w i t h a d c p i c t i c m of

1 1 1 C o r p s as a w h o l e a n d c o n c l u d r s
the

w i t h t h e d e s c r f p t i o n of

FA employment

by t h e t t r r J r e

di v i s i ons.

1 1 1 C o r p s h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a Command P o s t a t ARLON by
t h e e v e n i n g o f 20 December. T h e y knew w h a t f i e l d i n the

a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s t h e y w o u l d r e c e i v e and were process of c r e a t i n g t h e i r f i r s t F i e l d Order. Order

This Field The

i s appended t o t h i s s t u d y a s Appendix Three.

f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n h a s been e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h a t F i e l d Order.

The m i s s i o n o f t h e C o r p s was t o a d v a n c e N o r t h i n Zone i n d i r e c t i o n o f S T . U I T H a t H-Hour t o d e s t r o y any

enemy e n c o u n t e r e d .

T h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n was on t h e

r i g h t f l a n K and i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e a t t a c k and d e s t r o y

m i s s i o n , was t o p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t f l a n k a n d m a i n t a i n
c o n t a c t w i t h t h e X I 1 Corps. i n the center of The 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ,

t h e C o r p s z o n e , was t o a t t a c k a n d d e s t r o y

t h e enemy a n d m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d on t h e i r l e f t a n d t h e 8 0 t h I n f a n t r y on t h e i r r i g h t . The 4 t h

A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n was on t h e C o r p s l e f t f l a n k a n d h a d t h e a d d i t i o n a l m i s s i o n o f p r o t e c t i n g t h e Corps f l a n k and g a i n i n g c o n t a c t w i t h elements o f the U I I I Corps. C o r p s A r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d a s f o l l o w s : The

"d.

Field Artillery: 2 0 3 r d FA Gp: attached: 1 7 6 t h FA Bn ( 4 . 5 " Gun) 1 7 7 t h FA Bn t155mm How)

(1)

-52-

mission:

731st FA Bn (155mm Guri) General s u p p o r t , r e i n f o r c e

f i r e s 4 t h Armd D i u w i t h one b a t t a l i o n 155mm g u n s

(Z!:

1 9 3 r d FA Gp: attached:

mission:
( Z : , , 4 8 4 t h FA G p : attached:

1 7 9 t h FA Bn (155mm How) 6 9 6 t h FA Bn (185mm How) 9 4 9 t h FA Bn (155mm How) a t t a c h e d t o 26 I n f D i v .

mission:

5 1 2 t h F A Bn (16Smm How) 7 5 2 n d FA Bn ( 155mm Hc~lri) a t t a c h e d t o 86 I n f D i u .

( 4 ) 2 S 3 r d Armd FA Bn a t t a c h e d 4 Armd D i ' J

(5) 2 7 4 t h Armd FA Bn a t t a c h e d 4 Armd D i v

(C-)

2 8 8 t h FA Obsn Bn s u p p o r t o f C o r p s " t h i s i s a typical

( : )

A s was r i o t e d i n C h a p t e r T h r e e ,

f itmld

a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat by I 1 1 C o r p s .

T h i s wa?, n o t a l l o f I 1 1 Corps.

the f i e l d a r t i

1 er-y emp 1 eyed by

L i t e r a l l y j u s t hours before

he a t t a c k : , n o t h e r

FA Group was h t t a c h e d .

" P r i o r t o t h e a t t a c k , t h e Commanding G e n e r a l , V I I I C o r p s o f f e r e d Commanding G e n e r a l I 1 1 C a r p . t h e u s e o f some o f h i s a r t i l l e r y , w h i c h he c o u l d n o t then employ. Consequently, t h e 482ncl F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Group w i t h one o b b e r v a t i o n a n d .Four f i r i n g b a t t a l i o n s , was a t t a c h e d t o I 1 1 Corps. O f t h i s g r o u p , one f i t r i d a r t i l l e r : . b a t t a l i o n was i n t u r n a t t a c h e d t o the 4 t h Armored D i u i s i o n , and t h e remainder p l a c e d i n g e n e r a l s u p p o r t o f Corps. A l l o f these b a t t a l i o n s had seen h a r d f l g h t i n g and had s u i f e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 25 p e r c e n t l o s s e s i n b o t h e q u i p m e n t arid p e r s o n n e l . Many o f t h e p e r s o n n e l los,ses, h o w e v e r , h a d been c o m p e n s a t e d f o r by t t e a c q u i s i t i o n o f a number o f o t h e r a r t i l l e r y m e n who h a d t:secome s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e i r u n i t s d u r i r g

-53-

t h e i n i t i a l German A d v a n c e . "

(2)

W i t h t h e a d d i t i o n o f t h i s G r o u p and i t s a t t a c h e d battalions, t h e Corps now h a d a l l the a r t i l l e r y i t would The c m l y c h a n g e

e m p l o y d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k on BASTOGNE.

made t o t h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat was o n 2 4 December when t h e 1 7 7 t h FA En was d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e 283rd FA Group and a t t a c h e d t o t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n .

A n o t h e r l i s t i n g o f f i e l d a r t i l l e r y m i g h t seem repetitive,
but

i t h a s b e e n i n c l u d e d h e r e f o r u s e as a

r e a d y r e f e r e n c e f o r the r e s t of t h i s Chapter.

The f i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k
was :

General Support t o I 1 1 Corps: 2 8 8 t h FA Obsn Bn 2 8 3 r d FA Gp: 1 7 6 t h FA En ( 4 . 5

G)

7 3 1 s t FA Bn (155 G) 4 6 2 n d FA Gp: 5 5 9 t h FA En ( 1 5 5 m m G) 5 6 1 s t FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m G) 5 7 8 t h FA En ( 8 "

H)

4th Armored Division:

-54-

In In

I
E m
h h
A

.Y

E
h

I
E
10

I
E

10
v

m
E E

E E

.
m
v
Q)
d

I#

.
0 .I n .C

0 .c

..
> .-

..
"l

- m m
a .m
C
v v

ffi
4 Y

Y
Y

..
2
Y

2
U

U
L3

a
n
Q
ffi

U
IT IT

a
c

2
a
m
x
L
Y
d

rn
U .-

16
(JI
Y

U .C

43
C

In

P
N
C

m
* m
43

'CI N

..
01

2
IT

m
U

Y)

0.
Y)

h P 0.

0 I n

..

16
CG

U
L

+
C

U#
i

+ ,

c 1 6

m c n

3 1 4 t h FA Bn <185mm H) 3 1 5 t h FA 617 (155mm 9 8 5 t h FA 6n (185mm A t tached: 4 6 4 t h FA Gp: 5 1 2 t h FA 6n (16Smm H) 7 5 2 n d FA 6n (155mm H)

H)

H)

(3)

B e f o r e m o v i n g on t o how e a c h d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z e d t h e field artillery, some comments on t h e f i n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n Hi s t o r i c a l r e 1a t i o n s h i p s

by t h e Corps a r e a p p r o p r i a t e ,

among f i r i n g b a t t a l i o n s w e r e e s s e n t i a1 1 y i g n o r e d i n t h i s organization. O n l y t h e 4 8 4 t h FA Group w i t h i t s p r e v i o u s l y

a s s i g n e d u n i t s was a t t a c h e d a s a g r o u p t o a d i v i s i o n . Once a g a i n t h e Corps a l l o c a t e d t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e a r t i l l e r y t o the divisions. The C o r p s o n l y k e p t f i v e This organization r e f l e c t s t h a t was

b a t t a l i o n s i n general support.

t h e maximum o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o n t r o l feasible.

" D u r i n g t h e f i r s t p a r t o f t h e week, s e v e r a l c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p s were a t t a c h e d t o d i v i s i o n s , a n d b a t t a l i o n s w i t h i n g r o u p s , i n some cases, were i n t u r n f u r t h e r a t t a c h e d t o divisional a r t i l l e r y battalions. This d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n o f c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was n e c e s s i t a t e d by w i d e d i v i s i o n z o n e s o f a c t i o n , r a p i d movement w i t h i t s i n h e r e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s , a n d t h e combat-team t y p e o f a c t i o n t h a t was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a t t h i s t i m e . Toward t h e l a s t p a r t o f t h e week, t h e s i t u a t i o n h a d become somewhat s t a b i l i z e d a n d c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f t h e c o r p s a r t i l l e r y was e f f e c t e d . "

...

-56-

(4)
The a d v a n t a g e o f c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l was t h e p e r c e i c l e d a b i l i t y t o ma55 t h e Corps a r t i l l e r y q u i c K l y . a b i 1 i t y t o m a 5 . s was n o t l o s t , echelon lower. HowevGmr, the

i t was j u s t moved one

The d i v i s i o n s w h i c h h a d t h e a s s e t s l o mass

a r t i l l e r y f i r e s d i d so f r e q u e n t l y d u r i n g t h e a t t a c k . a b i l i t y t o ma45 f i r e s q u i c K l y was l a r g e l y a f u n c t i o r

'The
ot

how e a c h t l i v i 5 i o n o r g a n i z e d i t s a t t a c h e d a r t i l l e r y t o r combat. Eiach o f the d i v i s i o n s organized t h e i r attached

and o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t manner.

'The 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t h e

m i s s i o n o f a t t a c k i n g t o w a r d s BASTOGNE a n d p r o t e c t i n g t t I e
Corps l e f t f l a n k . n o t e d above.

I t h a d been a s s i g n e d t h e a r t i l l e r y

iis

The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat was:

O n 22 December:
Combat Command A S 6 t h FA B n ( 1 8 5 m m HB 2 7 4 t h Fi4 Bn (185mm

By 2 4 December:

6 6 t h FA En (185mm 14) 2 7 4 t h FA En (185mm H) 1 7 7 t h FA En ( 1 5 5 m m H)

H)

(-1

Combat Command B

22~d FA F 3 n (185rnm H)
2 S 3 r d Ff+ Bn (185mrn

22nd FA Eln (185mm li)

253rd FA En ( 1 8 5 m m

H)

H)

7 7 6 t h FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m H )

-57-

Combat Command R

9 4 t h FA Bn (1BSmm H)

C Btry,
DivArty 9 4 t h FA Bn (1B5mm H)

1 7 7 t h (155mm H)

-- - -- - -- ( 6 )

(5)
T h e r e a r e s e v e r a l u n u s u a l a r r a n g e m e n t s i n hoth t h e s e

1istings.

The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r 22 December i s u n u s u a l t h e 9 4 t h FA En i s shown i n t h e b o d y o f be " . . d i r e c t Diu".

i n that

the a t t a c k order t o

s u p p o r t f o r R e 5 Cmd a n d g e n e r a l s u p p o r t for I n the Troop l i s t i n g s e c t i o n of the order This is

(7)

it

i s shown u n d e r D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y c o n t r o l .

p r o b a b l y j u s t a c o n v e n i e n t m e t h o d t o show t h a t w h i l e R e s e r v e Command was h e l d i n r e s e r v e t h a t t h e b a t t a l i o n would f i r e general support missions for the d i v i s i o n . T h i s i s i n f a c t what t h e b a t t a l i o n d i d u n t i l t h e Reserve Command was c o m m i t t e d .

The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r t h e 2 4 t h r e f l e c t s c o m p l e t e decentralization. D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r r had no d i r e c t T h i s command r e l a t i o n s h i p The D i v i s i o n

c o n t r o l o v e r any f i r i n g u n i t s .

i s u n i q u e , b u t p r o v e d t o be e f f e c t i v e .

A r t i l l e r y headquarters continued t o serve as a c o o r d i n a t i n g headquarters. The a s s i g n m e n t o f d i r e c t

-58-

s u p p o r t m i s s i o n s t o t w o b a t t a l i o n s s u p p o r t i n g t h e smne organ i z i I t i o n '(ppears unworkabl e,

I t wasn' t

Each i:ombat

Command b r o k e i n t o a t t a c k e c h e l o n s a n d e a c h e c h e l c m t h e n

was a s s . g n e d

i(

f i e l d a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n f o r suppcw:.

For

e x a m p l e Combaf Command A o r g a n i z e d a l e f t c o l u m n c a l e d " A l a n i s " and

<<

r i g h t c o l u m n c a l l e d "Oden" a n d t h e 2''4tIi

FA

Bn a n d t h e 6 a f h FA En w e r e a s s i g n e d t o e a c h c o l u m n respectiuely. When t h e 1 7 7 t h FA Bn was a s s i g n e d , i :

i1.e

r e c e i u e d t h e i i ~ i s s i o no f g e n e r a l s u p p o r t t o t h e e n t cclmrnand,

A < . i m i l a r a r r a n g e m e n t a p p a r e n t l y was machi. i n

although i t i s not d e t a i l e d i n

Combat Command B,

after-action I-eports.

A s i s n o t e d i n t h e 24 D e c c m b t ~ r
t h e 1 7 7 t h was d e t a c h e d f r o m

o r g a n i z a t i o n , one b a t t e r y o f

i t s p a r e n t u n i t a n d a t t a c h e d t o Combat Command

R.

1 t was

u s e d hy Combat Command R i n a g e n e r a l s u p p o r t r o l e .

(8.4

T h i s o r q a n i z a t i o n f o r combat was c e r t a i n l y c r ( t a t ~ u c ,
but
i t d i d no+ v i o l a t e the o v e r a l l

concept f o r

the

employment of f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .

As noted i n tho A l l m o d

Force A r t i l l e r y I n f o r m a t i o n L e t t e r

...

" I n t h e d i v i s i o n , o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat s h o u l d p i - o v i d e a r t i l l e r y i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t and a r t i l l e r y i n general support. I n the corps, i 1 s h o u i d pl-nuide f o r r e i n f o r c i n g t h e f i r e s o f d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y and a r t i l l e r y t o execute coiin t e r b . i t t e r y , h a r a s s i n g a n d i n t e r d i c t i o n fires. I n g e n e r a l , t a c t i c a l c o n t r o l of a r t i Iler). battalions should be maintained a t t t e l e v e l o f t h e i n f a n t r y command i n whose s e c t o r t h e weapcrn i n v o l v e d c a n be e f f e c t i v e l y emp 1 o ye d " ( 9 )

-59-

The o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat c e r t a i n l y c o m p l i e d w t h t h e s e p r e c e p t s , e v e n t h o u g h i t may a p p e a r t o be u n u s u a surface appraisal. on a

The D i v i s on A r t 1 l e r y Commander was w e l l w i t h i n h i s r i g h t s t o o r g a n ze t h e a r t i l e r y a s he d i d . f r o m C o r p s h a d been a t t a c h e d t o h i s D i v i s i o n , The u n i t s Attachment

c a r r i e d p e r m i s s i o n t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i l l e r y a s h e saw

fit.

T h i s a r r a n g e m e n t o f a r t i l l e r y was c e r t a i n l y

e f f e c t i v e a s d e m o n s t r a t e d b y t h e s t o r y o f ASSENOIS i n C h a p t e r Two. The o t h e r t w o d i v i s i o n s t o o k a d i f f e r e n t The 8 8 t h approach t o

a p p r o a c h t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat. I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n used a more t r a d i t i o n a l

f i e l d a r t i l l e r y o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat.

The 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n t o a t t a c k n o r t h i n z o n e a n d d e s t r o y t h e enemy; m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h X I 1 Corps; flank; p r o t e c t t h e Corps r i g h t

and m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y I 1 1 C o r p s h a d a t t a c h e d t h e 4 8 4 t h FA to the

D i v i s i o n on t h e l e f t .

Group ( c o n s i s t i n g o f t h e 5 1 2 t h a n d 7 5 2 n d b a t t a l i o n s ) assist i n t h i s mission.

S i n c e t h e g r o u p was a t t a c h e d ,

d i v i s i o n was f r e e t o o r g a n i z e t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y i n a n y m a n n e r . The d i v i s i o n p l a n was t o a t t a c k w i t h t h e 3 1 8 t h a n d 319th I n f a n t r y Regiments a b r e a s t and t h e 317th i n r e s e r v e .

-68-

The f i e l d a r t i l l e r y w a s o r g a n i z e d a s b e l o w :

UNIT 3 1 7 t h I n f Rgmt

FA UNIT/MI SSI O N
(None

Division

Reserue)

318th

Iiit

Rgmt

3 1 4 t h FA Bn (185mm t i ) DY 7 5 2 n d FA En ( 1 5 5 m m t i ) R, 314th

5 1 2 t h FA En (1Er5mm ti)

GS t o D i u , R 3 1 4 t l i

3191:h I n f

Rgmt

9 6 5 t h FA

En

(185mm \I)

DC.

3 1 5 t h FA Bn ( 1 5 5 m m )-I)

R, Y E r 5 t I i
3 1 3 t h FA Bn (IBS,, +I> GS t o D i v ,

R 5'05th

(10)

4 0 4 t h FA Gp

GS,

88th I n f Div ( 1 1 )

T h i s i s a m o r e d o c t r i n a l approach t o o r g a n i z i n g f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . 'The D i v i s i o n b a l a n c e d i t s a r t i l l e r y a l l c ~ c a t i o n e q u a l l y among t h e t w o a t t a c K i n g i n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t s . The

d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y , w h i l e n o t s u p e r u i s i n g any f i r i n g u n i t directly, k e p t c o n t r o l o f t h e 3 1 3 t h a n d t h e 5 1 2 t h ijly

a s s i g n i n g them t h e GSR m i s s i o n .

-61

T h i s f l e x i b i l i t y p a i d o f f on 23 December when t h e 3 1 7 t h I n f a n t r y Regiment passed t h r o u g h t h e 3 1 8 t h and t h e 318th r e v e r t e d t o d i v i s i o n reserve. The new o r g a n i z a t i o n

f o r combat became:

UNIT 3 1 7 t h I n f Rgmt

FA UNIT/MISSION 3 1 3 t h FA En ( 1 0 5 m m H) 5 1 2 t h FA En (165mm H)

DS

R,

313th

3 1 8 t h I n f Rgmt

3 1 4 t h FA En (1B5mm H) DS

752nd FA En (155mm H)

R,

314th

3 1 9 t h I n f Rgmt

9 6 5 t h FA En (165mm H) DS 3 1 5 t h FA En (155mm H)

R, 9 6 5 t h

4 0 4 t h FA Gp

GS,

8Bth I n f D i v (11)

The 3 1 8 t h became r e s e r v e i n name only.

I t continued t o

h a v e a m i s s i o n o f c o n t a i n i n g h o s t i l e f o r c e s i n ETTELERUCK. W h i l e t h e 3 r d B a t t a l i o n c o n t a i n e d t h e enemy, t h e 1 s t and

2nd w e r e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e D i v i s i o n a n d a t t a c h e d t o t h e
4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n .

-62-

The 1 / 3 1 8 t h
A a n d 2/31E:th

I n f a n t r y was a t t a c h e d t o Combat Command

I n f a n t r y was a t t a c h e d t o Combat Command B.

blei t h e r t h e W t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n r e c o r d s n o r thoso? o f

t h e 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n r e f l e c t t h a t the 3 1 8 t h b r o i i g h t
a n y a r t i l l e r y w i t h them d u r i n g t h i s t i m e . This ic, tl\e

c e r t a i n i r i n K e e p i n g w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e a s none o f a r t i 1 e v r tmat t a l rathe (12)

ons were a t t a c h e d t o the r e g i m e n t , b u t

p l a c e d i n s u p p o r t t h r o u g h DS,

o r GSR m i s s , i o n s . .

This division, demonstrated

(A

1 ilte the 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n ,

the

f l e x i b l e a p p r o a c h t o t h e employment c ) f

.field artillety.

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o n o t e t h a t a'lihoiigh
tbio

t h e 4841h GPGu p was a t t a c h e d t o t h e d i v i s i o n w i t h b a t t a l icms,

uni ts.
i t

did not supervise the f i r i n g of

the!;

In

fact

the u n i t s were n o t even s u p p o r t i n g l h e On 26 December t h e The 4041h ?:A

same marieuver e l e m e n t b y 23 December.

8 0 t h Dic.i<;ion was r e a s s i g n e d t o X I 1 C o r p s .

Group was t r a n s f e r r e d a l o n g w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n .

(13)

The
have

d i s c u s s i o n s o i t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d a n d t h e 8 0 t h Infantr.,. d e s c r i b e d t h e flartl! divisior,

u n i t s o f 111 C o r p s ; now t o t h e c e n l : e r

the 26th I n f a n t r y .

Tb8e 2 6 t l

I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n h a d t h e m i s s i o n oG

attaclcir.~ n o r t h i n Zone t o d e f e a t enemy r e s i s t a n c e a n d t o m a i n t a i r . c o n t d . c t w i t h t h e 4 t h A r m o r e d on t h e i r l e f t a n d

-63-

t h e 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y on t h e i r r i g h t .

A c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r G-3 t h e i r p l a n was t o

p e r i o d i c r e p o r t f r o m 21 December 1 9 4 4 ,

a t t a c K w i t h t h e 3 2 8 t h I n f a n t r y r e g i m e n t on the l e f t and t h e 1 8 4 t h I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t on t h e r i g h t . The 1 8 1 s t The f i e l d

I n f a n t r y R e g i m e n t was h e l d i n d i v i s i o n r e s e r u e . a r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d a s b e l o w .

UNIT 328th I n f Rymt

FA UNIT/MISSION

263rd FA En (105mm H) US
l 8 l s t FA

Bn (185mm H)
R,
263rd

1 7 9 t h FA Bn (155mm H)

263rd

1E4th I n f Rgmt

1 8 2 n d FA Bn (1E5mm H) DS 1 8 8 t h FA En (155mm H)

R,

182nd

6 9 6 t h FA Bn (185mm H)

R,

1E2nd

Diu A r t y

9 4 9 t h FA En (155mm H)

GS t o D i u

1 9 3 r d FA Group This, I i K e the 80th I n f a n t r y ,

A l t e r n a t e D i v A r t y FDC ( 1 4 )

i s a doctrinal organization

-64-

.for c o m t m t .

I..ike t h e 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s on,

the 1 3 1 G ~ o u p

a s s i g n e d t o t h i s d i v i s i o n was s p l i t u p .

was n o t e d i II

p o s t war d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t c o n t r o l o f m o r e t h a n one r e i n f o r c i n g b a t t a l i o n was d i f f i c u l t . t h a n one b a t t a l i o n

(15)

H a v i n g mclre

i n a r e i n f o r c i n g r o l e would c e r t i i n l r a b i l i t y t o c o n t r o l JII1
the
w . 3 ~ a

tax the reinfcqrced b a t t a l ion's f i r e s simultaneously. problem,

I f control during t h i s battle

i t w a s n o t so n o t e d .

The d o c u m e n t s r e v i e w e d t o r

t h i s s t u d y do n o t d i s c u s s t h e r o l e o f an a l t e r n a t e F D C . I t may w e l l h a v e b e e n t h a t t h e 193rd FA G r o u p s e r v e c a ? a c o n t r o l 1 i n g agency t o r the r e i n f o r c i n g b a t t a l ions.

The o n l y o t h e r n o t e w o r t h y d i f f e r e n c e when coiilparc;d t o the 88th Infantry, battalion

i i l

i s t h a t t h i s d i v i s i o n k e p t one

(is

t o the D i v i s i o n .

A s was d i s c u s s e d i n
the D i v i s i o n

C h a p t e r One,

t h i s i s one m e t h o d t h a t

A r t i l l e r y Commander c o u l d u s e t o m a i n t a i n f i r i n g u n i t s under h i s d i r e c t c o n t r o l . The 2 6 t h D i v i s i o n d i d n o t

r e o r g a n i ze tun t i 1 a f t e r 26 December,

so t h i s o r g a n i r a t i c:sn
The o n l y

+ o r combat toas t h e o n l y one u s e d i n t h i s s t u d y . o t h e r commentE. a b o u t reports of

t h e a r t i 1 l e r y i n t h e 6-3 p e r i o d i c

t h i s d i v i s i o n a r e o b s e r v a t i o n s such as:

"normihl s u p p o r t by f i e l d a r t i l l e r y u n i s " , a n d " n o r m a l missions i n support o f Infantry".

(16)

A s ha!;

heen n o t e d i n t h e d i s c u s s o n s a b o v e ,

t?arh

-65-

d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z e d i t s o r g a n i c and a t t a c h e d a r t i l l e r y differently. d o c t r i n e of T h i s i s e n t i r e l y consistent w i t h the the period. The m i s s i o n o f a t t a c h m e n t a l l o w e d

t h e commander

t o o r g a n i z e t h e a r t i 1 1 e r y he r e c e i v e d Chapter F i v e

t h r o u g h a t t a c h m e n t i n a n y manner he d e s i r e d . will

d i s c u s s t h e s i m i l a r i t i e s and d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e i r

methods.

B e f o r e m o v i n g on t o C h a p t e r F i v e a n d t h e summary a n d c o n c l u s i o n s of t h i s s t u d y , artillery's some f a c t s b e a r i n g on t h e

i m p a c t on t h i s b a t t l e a r e p r e s e n t e d .

D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d 22-26

December t h e a r t i l l e r y u n i t s r o u n d s o f ammunition of

w i t h t h e c o r p s f i r e d o v e r 55,000
all t y p e s and c a l i b e r s ,

This total represents pounds (2,194 s h o r t tons) o f

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4,387,746 ammunition. combat.

T r u l y i m p r e s s i v e t o t a l s f o r f i v e days of

Ammunition never p r e s e n t e d a s i g n i f i c a n t problem.

ammunition s u p p l y d i f f i c u l t i e s c a u s e d momen t a r 7 ammun i t i o n shor tagez. d u r i n g t h e week (18-24 D e c ) , b u t d i d n o t a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e x p e n d i t u r e s were t h e operations....Ammunition moderate wi t h I 1 1 Corps and X I 1 Corps c o n t r i b u t i n g most t o t h e t o t a l . For s e v e r a l d a y s a m m u n i t i o n r e s u p p l y was e x t r e m e l y difficult. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s were obliged to travel long distances i n order t o r e a c h ASPS a n d d e p o t s . T h i s c o n d i t i o n was aggravated by the necessity of supplying three c o r p s f r o m one ASP. However, w i t h i n a f e w d a y s new a d v a n c e d r a i l h e a d ASPS w e r e o p e n e d w h i c h d i d

". . .

-66-

much t o a l l e v i a t e t h e s i t u a t i o n .

(17)

' l h i 5 hourever via5 n o t t h e p e a k o f ammun i t i on expencli : u r t ?

for

the e n t i r e b a t t l e of

the Ardennes.

D u r i n g t h e week o f
'I.

1-7 J a n u a r y , 1 1 1 C o r p s

f ii-ipd

t h a n 125,666 r o u n d s o f l65mm h i 1 e e x p e n d i t u r e o f a1 1 c a l i ber.5 amniuni t i m . W During the period e x c e e d e d 432,866 r o u n d s . 298666 December 630608 J a n u a r y a t o t a l o f S,:i80 t o n s o f a r t i l l e r y a m m u n i t i o n was f i r e d i r i t h e p o c k p t s o u t h e a s t o f BASTOGNE i n I 1 1 C o r p s area." (18)

. . more

The s u p p l y o f a m m u n i t i o n i s b e y o n d t h e f o c u s o f study. S u f f i c e i t t o say h e r e t h a t

01'1

thi!;
110

i t a p p a r e n t l y hi,d

adverse a f f e c t

t h i s p o r t i o n of

the o v e r a l l batt'l6..

L i t e r a l l y ,111

the a f t e r action r e p o r t s reviewed l o r the f i e l d artiller.)..

the

t h i s s t u d y w e r e complimentary of
w o u l d r e q u i r e another chapter

It

t o j u s t quote a l l

e n t r i e s that r e f e r to the effectiveness of a n d so w o n ' t be a t t e m p t e d .

the a r t i l l e r y ,

S u f f i c e i t t o mention here the

q u o t e f r o m C h a p t e r One d e t a i l i n g t h e bombardment o+

f4SSENOIS a n d thi!;
r-epor t

quote f r o m t h e 111 Corps a f t e r act i o n

"Dur i n q t h e 18 d a y s o f t h e a s s a u l t 1 1 1 C o r p ' j l o s s e s a m o u n t e d t o a t o t a l o f 3,338 k i l l e d , wounded a n d m i s s i n g , o f whom o n l y 383 were k i l l e d . On t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e l e d g e r , , t h e enem,' l o s t 4,736 c a p t u r e d , an e s t i m a t e d 4,851 k i l l e d , a n d a n e s t i m a t e d 28,357 wounded, o r a r a t i o o f 11 t o 1 i n o u r f a v o r . The h i g h enemy l o s s e s w e r e i n g r e a t p a r t a d i r e c t r e s u l t of a r t i 1 l e r y f i r e . The l a r g e s u r p r i s e

-67-

concen t r a t i ons o f a r t i 1 I e r y f i r e caused a t r e m e n d o u s number o f enemy c a s u a l t i e s a n d i n a t l e a s t t w o a c t i o n s w e r e c r e d i t e d w i t h b r e a k i n g up l a r g e s c a l e a t t a c k s . " (19) One o f t h e r e a s o n s t h e a r t i l l e r y was a b l e t o c o n c e n t r a t e

so q u i c k l y w a s a p r o c e d u r e c a l l e d " S e r e n a d e " .

This

p r o c e d u r e i s n o t d e t a i l e d i n any o f t h e documents r e v i e w e d
for

t h i s s t u d y f r o m t h e Combined Arms R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y o f Therefore, i t i s i n c l u d e d a s Appendix

F o r t Leavenworth. Four t o t h i s s t u d y .

P e r h a p s t h e b e s t c o n c l u s i o n f o r t h i s C h a p t e r comes f r o m t h e I 1 1 Corps a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t . "The move o f t h e C o r p s t o A r l o n a n d t h e e x e c u t i o n o f t h e a t t a c k w e r e b o r n of need and conceived i n urgency. The suddenness a n d u n e x p e c t e d s t r e n g t h o f t h e enemy a s s a u l t , h i s r a p i d i n i t i a l successes and t h e e a r l y American reverses l e f t no time f o r lengthy planning, l o n g thought-out o r d e r s , or e x t e n s i v e reconnaissance. On t h e c o n t r a r y , t i m e was t h e a l l - i m p o r t a n t f a c t o r . . . T h i s was r e c o g n i z e d f u l l y , and t h e d e t a i l e d n i c e t i e s w h i c h n o r m a l l y w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d e s s e n t i a1 i n p l a n n i n g s u c h an o p e r a t i o n were s a c r i f i c e d i n p a r t t o g a i n Only s u r p r i s e and a s w i f t l y mounted a t t a c k . t h i r t y - s i x hours elapsed d u r i n g the time the C o r p s H e a d q u a r t e r s f i r s t r e c e i v e d i t s movement i n s t r u c t I o n s , moved t o L u x e m b o u r g a n d t h e n t o Arlon. I n t h r e e days, t h r e e d i v i s i o n s h a d r e c e i v e d o r d e r s , p l a n n e d and c o o r d i n a t e d t h e i r movements, a n d moved f r o m s i x t y t o e i g h t y m i l e s t o new a n d u n f a m i l i a r a s s e m b l y a r e a s . . . I t meant t h a t t h e a t t a c k m u s t be l a u n c h e d w i t h a m i n i m u m k n o w l e d g e o f t h e f r i e n d l y a n d enemy s i t u a t i o n . E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t , i t m e a n t t h a t a C o r p s whose c o m p o n e n t s h a d n e v e r b e f o r e o p e r a t e d a s one u n i t must b e q u i c k l y w e l d e d i n t o a s m o o t h l y f u n c t i on i n g t earn. " < 26 ) The p r i d e t h a t t h e a u t h o r c s ) o f t h i s passage

-68-

+ e l t i s res.dily apparent. conclusions,

Chapter F i v e w i l l

draw

trom the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y viewpoint,

a b o u t t h e s o u r ' c e ~o f

this pride.

-69-

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

111 Corps,

A f t e r A c t i o n Report.
9.

Dec 4 4

31

December 1 9 4 4 , p .
ibid.,

p.

11. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and T a n k

T h i r d A rm y ,

D e s t r o y e r O D e r a t i o n s Summary December 1 9 4 4 , T h i r d A rm y , p.

25

1.

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y and T a n k

D e s t r o y e r O D e r a t i o n s Summary
January 1 9 4 5 ,
p.

7.
et.

Summers, R o b e r t R.,

al.,

Armor a t Bastoane p.
1 iii.

May 1 9 4 9 , A p p e n d i x UI, No. 4 ,

ibid., ibid.,

A p p e n d x UI, No. 9 , p . A p p e n d x UI, No. 4 , p.

lxv. liv. lxv.

ibid.,

A p p e n d x UI, No. 9 , p .

A l l i e d Force Headquarters, I n f o r m a t i o n L e t t e r (US)

(18)

Field Artillerr

#6

May 44, After

p . 4.

88th Infantry Division f i r t i l l e r r , A c t i o n Report

, December

44,

p.4.

(11)

4 8 4 t h FA Group,

H i s t o r y of H e a d a u a r t e r s

and H e a d a u a r t e r s B a t t e r y . 4 0 4 t h FA
GrouD,

1944

June 1945,

p.

6.

(12) 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n ,

After Action 44, p.

6.

ReD0t-t Dec 4 4 (13)

ibid.,

, Dec

p.

7.

-70-

(14) 26th I n f j n t i - y D i v i s i o n , Repor t

G-3 P e r i o d i c
Dec 44

, 21 1268-221288

22 Dec 44,

c o n t a i n e d i n 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , A f t e r - A c t i o n R e D o r t Dec 4 4 n o page n u m b e r s .

(15) S l a c k , J. E.,

undated,

N o t e s a n d Obs e r v a t i o n s

on A r t i l l e r y O D e r a t i o n s
(16) 2 6 t h

undated,

pp. 2-3.

Inf-nti-r Division,

0 -3 P e r i o d i c
Dec 4 4

R e p o r t . 211288-221288

22 Dec 44,

c o n t a i n e d i n 4 t h Armored D i v i s i o n , A . f t e r A c t i o n R e D o r t Dec 4 4 n o paqe n u m b e r s . (17) T h i r d Army, F i e l d A r t i l l e r r a n d Tank DestroyAZ: Summary

undated,

&em!.i n n s
(18)
ibid., p.

8 January 1945, p p . i - t ! .

8.

(15)

I 1 1 Ccrpr:.,

P f t e r A c f i n n Reclor.t,

Dec 4 9

31

December 1944, p .
(28)
ibid.,

21.

p . 28.

-71

CHAPTER F I V E

A s s t a t e d i n C h a p t e r One,

the purpose of t h i s

s t u d y was t o a n a l y z e t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y by I 1 1 C o r p s d u r i n g t h e b a t t l e t o r e l i e v e BASTOGNE. Th i s C h a p t e r w i 1 1 summar i z e , draw

c o n c l u s i o n s a n d recommend a r e a s f o r f u r t h e r s t u d y .

T h i s Chapter

i s organized around the f i n a l

t h e employment o f t h e f i e l d

c o n c l u s i o n of the s t u d y ;

a r t i 1 1 e r y d u r i n g t h i s b a t t 1 e was c h a r a c t e r i z e d by adherence t o a s e t o f s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o c e d u r e s and doctrine. initial T h i s s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e

t r a i n i n g r e c e i v e d by t h e b a t t a l i o n s t h r o u g h T h i s conclusion

t h e f i n a l employment i n a b a t t l e .

does n o t i m p l y t h a t e v e r y h i n g was a l w a y s done i n

p r e c i s e l y t h e same manner

Rather,

this in

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n c r e a t e d the f l e x i b i I i t y apparent this battle.

The f i n d i n g s p r e s e n t e d h e r e g e n e r a l l y
0.C

trace the o u t l i n e

the p r e v i o u s Chapters.

A s d e m o n s t r a t e d i n C h a p t e r One,

t h e r e was a

d e f i n i t e l a c k o f long term s u p p o r t i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s in this battle. together The maneuver u n i t s h a d w o r k e d b u t the v a s t m a j o r i t y of the

i n the past,

f i e l d a r t i l l e r y s u p p o r t was a d d e d l i t e r a l l y a t t h e

-72-

l a s t minute.

N o t o n l y h a d m o s t o f t h e FA b a t t a 1 i c i n . i tht?y

n o t w o r k e d w i t h t h e s u p p o r t e d maneuver e l e m e n t s ,

a l s o had n c t worked w i t h each o t h e r b e f o r e t h i s

toattle. effect This. l a c k of a long term r e l a t i o n s h i p had on t h e o u t c o m e o f the b a t t l e , however. the
110

A s 111

Corps s t a t e d i n t h e i r A f t e r - A c t i o n c h a l l e n g e was t o w e l d a l l

report,

the v a r i o u s u n i t s i n t o an time.

e f f e c t i v e team i n a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d o f The s i m i l a r i t y o f

(1)

the t r a i n i n g r e c e i v e d and the the period c e r t a i n l y t h i s team.

adherence t o the d o c t r i n e of

c o n t r i b u t e d t o the q u i c k c r e a t i o n of

The t r a i n i n g r e c e i v e d i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , tieform? d e p l o y m e n t effect t o the t h e a t e r , had a demonstrable

on t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .

The common t e s t i n g allowed a l 1

procedures,

w i t h t h e common s t a n d a r d s ,

t h e FA b a t t . s I i u n s . t o h a v e a s i m i l a r r e f e r e n c e p o i n t . ' T h i s r e f e r e n c e p o i n t w a s one o f d o c t r i n a l l h e FA u n i t . ; bacKground. their

h.sd a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s when a s s i g n e d s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l missions. 1Jhei-1 t h e y w e r e a s s i g n e d a m i s s i o n o f

f m example,

Reinforcing,

they understood t h e i r T h i s common

r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s and d u t i e s .

under!jtanding c e r t a i n l y enhanced t h e i r a b i l i t y t o qu i cK1 y t r a r i s . t e r f r o m one command t o a n o t h e r . The!je

t r a n s f e r s w e r e made w i t h o n l y t h e s m a l l e s t o f

-7 3-

adjustment necessary i n t h e i r procedures.

These t r a n s f e r s a r e a p p a r e n t i n t h e s h i f t i n g o f t h e FA b a t t a l i o n s f r o m X I 1 a n d XX C o r p s t o I 1 1 C o r p s and i t s a t t a c h e d d i v i s i o n s . Chapter Three, As was d e m o n s t r a t e d i n

t h e FA b a t t a l i o n s w e r e c o m p l e t e l y time. This

r e o r g a n i z e d i n a two day p e r i o d o f

r e o r g a n i z a t i o n w o u l d n o t have been p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t t h e common a p p l i c a t i o n o f the doctrine.

Application of constricting.

t h e d o c t r i n e was n o t

In f a c t standardization allowed the

f l e x i b i l i t y t h a t was d e m o n s t r a t e d t h r o u g h o u t I 1 1 Corps d u r i n g t h i s b a t t l e . t h r o u g h o u t t h e Army, T h i s f l e x i b i l i t y extended

as r e p o r t e d i n t h e Army G r o u n d
t h e war.
(2)

F o r c e s r e p o r t s a t t h e end of report depicts, preferences f o r

As t h a t

e a c h C o r p s d e v e l o p e d t h e i r own t h e employment o f their i n d i v i d u a l FA

b a t t a l i o n s and groups.

These p r e f e r e n c e s howeuer, the p e r i o d . the

d i d not v i o l a t e t h e d o c t r i n e o f

No

m a t t e r how t h e a r t i l l e r y was o r g a n i z e d ,

organ z a t i o n always complied w i t h the d o c t r i n e

Compliance w i t h d o c t r i n a l apparent

p r e c e p t s was a so The

i n the f i r e d i r e c t i o n procedures.

i m p o s i t i o n of

t h e SERENADE p r o c e d u r e f r o m t h e T h i r d

-74-

A r m y Conimandei-. may a p p e a r o n t h e s u r f a c e t o be

constraining.

However,

i t was n o t .

T h i s procedure when u s e d

d e m o n s t r a t e s how a common p r a c t i c e , t h r o u g h o u t a r ominand,

c a n e n h a n c e c o o p e r a t i o n amon g D i s p e r s e d i n space ype ti S n a q u ic:k

0.:

w i d e l y disperF:.ed u n i t s .

weapon r j y s t e n i a n d t y p e o f combat m i s s i o n . procedure a l l r i w e d the massing of a r t i l l e r y and e f f i c i e n t manner,

t o any l e v e l
<Jf

I t was a l s o r e a d i l y a d a p t a t l l v
One c a n see t h e s e p r o c e d u r i ! ~ A l t h o u g h not

combat.

u s e d i n t h e hcmbardment o f ASSENOIS.

r , p e c i f i ( : a l I y mentioned a s the method t h a t L r C Abraim used, t h e SEREiNADE p r o c e s s i s r e a d i 1 y a p p a r e n t

EiERENfiDt. i c . a l l o t h e r e x a m p l e o f

a common p r o c e d u r e t h e FA.

t h a t enhanced the f l e x i b i l i t y of

Th e c I i v , s i o n s u n d e r I 1 1 C o r p s s u p e r v i s i o n a 1 5 1 ~
cjsmonsti.ate.d + l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e way t h e y o r g a n i z e d the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y . The 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n u s e d

complete ds*c(?iltral i z a t i o n of c o n t r o l . i n Chapter Four,

As described

t h i s D i v i s i o n a s s i g n e d 2 FA

b a t t a l i o n s i n d i r e c t sup a r t t o e a c h Combat Commarid. T h i s appears to b e a v i o a t i o n of d o c t r i n e . Normally

o n l y one FA b i a t t a l i o n i s a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n o f dire(:t support

However

t h e manner t h a t

the 4 t h

A r m o r e d u s e d t h e i r C o m b a t Commands makes t h i 5 o r g a n i z a t i o n n o t only w o r l t a b l e , b u t more r e s p o n s i o e

- 75--

t o t h e n e e d s o f t h e g r o u n d commander. Command w a s s p l i t i n t o two columns.

Each Combat The commander o f

e a c h c o l u m n h a d one FA b a t t a l i o n i n d i r e c t s u p p o r t . The 4 t h A r m o r e d D i v i s i o n ' s move t o BASTOGNE was a s e r i e s o f movements t o c o n t a c t . i n t h i s manner, BY o r g a n i z i n g t h e FA

t h e D i v i s i o n Commander h a d p r o v i d e d

t h e most r e s p o n s i v e f i r e s u p p o r t t o each o f h i s combat e l e m e n t s . f r o m the This organization did not detract The bombardment

FA'S

a b i l i t y t o mass f i r e s .

o f ASSENOIS p r o v e s t h i s c o n c l u s i o n .

The 8 8 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n t o o k a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h t o t h e u s e o f t h e i r FA s u p p o r t .
I n t h i s case,

the use o f

t h e GSR m i s s i o n a l l o w e d t h e t h e FA,

D i v sion t o m a i n t a i n c o n t r o l of a p o r t i o n of whi

e s t i l l a l l o w i n g t h e commander i n c o n t a c t w i t h The

t h e enemy i m m e d i a t e l y a v a i l a b l e f i r e s u p p o r t . u s e o f t h e GSR m i s s i o n p r o b l e m s when a l l were

also e a s e d t h e t r a n s i t i o n
the D i v i s i o n

three Regiments o f

i n c o n t a c t a t t h e same t i m e .

The t w o b a t t a l i o n s

t h a t h a d b e e n a s s i g n e d t h e GSR m i s s i o n assumed a d i r e c t s u p p o r t and a r e i n f o r c i n g m i s s i o n f o r t h e

t h i r d Regiment.

S i n c e t h e y h a d been o p e r a t i n g under

the d i r e c t i o n of D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y ,

i t i s v a l i d to
the a c t i o n and

assume t h e y w e r e b e i n g k e p t a b r e a s t o f i n f a c t h a d p a r t i c i p a t e d i n combat.

When t h e y made

-76-

t h e s h i i t t o t h e i r new m i s s i o n s t h e y w e r e aware o f the t a c t i c a l ! . i t u a t i o n and were a b l e t o p r o v i d e The c o n t i n u i t y o f the

continuous f i r e support.

? . u p p o r t wou1cl h a v e been less e f f e c t i v e i f

they had

n o t been a s s i q n e d t h e g e n e r a l s u p p o r t m i s s i o n a n d i n s t e a d h a c t w e n o n l y r e i n f o r c i n g one o t h e r u n i t .

The 2 6 t h I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n k e p t one FA b a t t a l i o n i n C:S a n d a s s i g n e d DS a n d R m i s s i o n s t o t t l e other battaliuns. They d i d n o t undergo a this battle,

so

reorganizatiot-1 d u r i n g the time of

i': irl

is difficult

l o evaluate

t h e i r methods. t h e war,

However,

r e p o r t s produi e d a t t h e end of

i t was n o t i ? ( l
Wilt-

t h a t u s i n g t w o b a t t a l i o n s t o r e i n f o r c e one o t h e r
a d i f f i c u l t p~ o c e s s .

The o f f i c i a l r e c o r d s of t h e t h a t t h i s dual r e i n f o r c i n g schenie

2 6 t h do n o t r e f l e c t

p r e s e n t e d p r a l . ~ I e r n sd u r i n g t h i s b a t t l e .

The corrlrnm t h r e a d among t h e d i u i s i o n a l method:, o f emplcuyment may n o t b e a p p a r e n t . that they a l l that they kept The t h r e a d i s

used s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s and t h e i r F A b a t t a l i o n s i n t a c t a s combat

iunits.

The one e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s was t h e detachmen!: 17'7th F A Bn (155mm H) i n the 4th

of B a t t e r y C,

Armored D i v i s i o n .

This aberration i s explained

however by t h e ainmun i t i o n p r o c e d u r e s i n t h e 4 t h

Armored.

The D i v i s i o n w a s o f t e n a s s i g n e d a 155mm
So o f t e n

Howitzer battalion.

in fact,

that they

c a r r i e d 155mm a m m u n i t i o n w i t h t h e D i v i s i o n a l battalions. The 9 4 t h FA En (1051~1m H) was a s s i g n e d Upon t h e i r d e p l o y m e n t t o t h e

this responsibility. ARLUN r e g i o n ,

t h e 9 4 t h was c a r r y i n g t h i s ammuni t i a n t h e y d i d n o t have time t o 77th

When c o m m i t t e d t o b a t t l e , re-distribute all

t h e 155mm a m m u n i t i o n t o t h e

a n d e n d e d up t a k i n g some o f r o a d t o ASSENOIS. easier

i t w i t h them a l o n g t h e
the b a t t l e , i t was

I n the midst o f

t o s e n d C B a t t e r y t o s h o o t t h i s ammuni t on

t h a n i t was t o t r a n s p o r t t h e a m m u n i t i o n t o o t h e r b a t t e r i e s of the 177th.

3)

The d e t a c h m e n t o f C

B a t t e r y , when v i e w e d i n

h i s l i g h t , does n o t appear

so u n u s u a l .

Rather,

i t d e p i c t s a n o t h e r example o f

t h e f l e x i b i l i t y o f t h e FA a n d t h e u s e o f e x p e d i e n t
measures t o r e s p o n d t o b a t t l e f i e l d c o n d i t i o n s .

The FA e m p l o y m e n t by e a c h D i v i s i o n i s m a r k e d a l s o by t h e i r u s e o f s t a n d a r d t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n s o f DS, R , control

GS,

a n d GSR.

These m i s s i o n s a l l o w e d a span o f

t h a t ranged f r o m absolute complete i n t h e 4 t h Armored t o p a r t i a l The 2 6 t h

decentralization centralization Divisions's

i n the 26th Division.

organization i s only p a r t i a l l y in

c e n t r a l i z e d b e c a u s e o n l y one b a t t a l i o n was k e p t

-78-

t h e GS role.

C e n t r a l i z a t i o n was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e i n The s i t u a t i o n w a s so f l u i d a n d r a p i t l l : f

this battle.

c:hangi nO t h a t t h e p o l i c y o f d e c e n t r a l i z a t i on was c e r t a i n l y t h e a p p r o p r i a t e one t o i m p l e m e n t .

p o l i c y d i d not

This

a + f e c t t h e a b i l i t y t o mass f i r e s . t h e b a t t a l ion!.

Even t h o u g h n o t u n d e r c e n t r a l c o n t r o l

w e r e s t i 1 1 a b l e t o m a s s t h e i r f i r e when a p p r o p r i a t e
and i n " a t l e a s t t w o a c t i o n s were c r e d i t e d w i t h b r e a k i n g up l a r g e s c a l e a t t a c k s " .

(4)

As n o t e d e a r l i e r ,

the standardization o f

p r o c e d u r e s ' s t a r t e d w i t h t h e t r a i n i n g of each u n i t .

I t i s a l s o i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t 111 Corps had a

t i c e t h e i r p r o c e d u r e s i n a 1 ow r i sk c h a n c e t o pr%ac

envirorment before t h i s b a t t l e . Three,

A s n o t e d i n Chapti?r

t h e Cor1)s A r t i 1 1 e r y s e r v e d f o r 5 0 days under.

c>+ XX C o r p s A r t i l l e r y .

t h e guidixncc

D u r i n g t h i s timi?

I 1 1 Corp:;

p r a c : ? i c e d t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f FA a s s e t s .

yi t o s e e t h e r a p i d c h a n g e s t h a : T h e y h a d an o p v ~ o r t u rt~

tooK p l a c e i n t h e number a n d t y p e s o f u n i t s a s s i g n e d The e x p e r . i e n c e under. XX C o r p s , and t h e i r

c o m p a r a t i v e l y l o w r i s k combat e x p o s u r e a t METZ, served wet 1

to demonstrate

the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f

the

c u r r e n t F,'A d o c t r i n e .

What does. t h i s s t u d y h a v e t o s a y t o t h e f i e l d

-75

a r t i l l e r y m e n o f today ?

The q u e s t i o n i s b e s t

a n s w e r e d by a n a l y z i n g some o f t h e i m p o r t a n t l e s s o n s d e m o n s t r a t e d by t h i s b a t t l e :

LESSON ONE:

The m o s t i m p o r t a n t f i n d i n g o f

this

s t u d y i s t h a t t h e adherence t o a s e t of s t a n d a r d i z e d p r o c e d u r e s a n d d o c t r i n e was e f f e c t i v e i n t h i s b a t t l e . T h i s s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n was n o t c o n s t r a i n i n g . contrary, On t h e

i t c r e a t e d condi t i o n s t h a t enhanced t h e Battalions

s u p p o r t p r o v i d e d by t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y .

and g r o u p s were a b l e t o p r o v i d e t i m e l y and e f f e c t i v e s u p p o r t because t h e y o p e r a t e d under a s e t o f r u l e s and p r o c e d u r e s t h a t were w i d e l y adhered to. The

s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n c r e a t e d f 1 ex b i l i t y n o t r g i d i t y .

LESSON TWO:

F i e l d A r t 1 l e r y b a t t a l ons s h o u l d Current

b e e m p l o y e d a s B a t t a l i o n s ze u n i t s .

a r t i 1 1 erymen shou 1 d r e s i s t t h e t e m p t a t i o n t o b r e a k up t h e b a s i c b a t t a l i o n f o r m a t on. The f l e x i b i l i t y o f

the d o c t r i n e i s s u f f i c i e n t t o respond t o v i r t u a l 1 y any t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . T h i s i s n o t an a r g u m e n t

a g a i n s t t h e d i s p e r s i o n a l l o w e d by m o d e r n
c ommu n c a t i o n s .

Dispersion i s a requirement of the However, the t a c t i c a l control of but concentrated today

modern b a t t l e f i e l d .

the un t s should n o t be dispersed, a t the b a t t a l i o n l e v e l .

I f t h e FA u n i t s o f

-80-

c o n c e n t r a t e cm t h e c o n s i s t e n t a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i r procedures, they w i l l

be a b l e to respond t o v i r t u s . 1 y

any b a t t l e f i e l d r e q u i r e m e n t .

LE:SSON IHREE:
well

The FA u n i t s o f

today w o u l d be

a d v i s e d t o p r a c t i c e a number o f s t a n d a r d The t e n d e n c y t o c h a r a c t e r i z e a All

t a c t i c a l missions.

u n i t by a s i n g l e t a c t i c a l m i s s i o n i s d a n g e r o u s . u n i t s m u s t be a b l e t o p e r f o r m a n y o f

the missions.

The a r t i 1 I e r y n i e n o f t h i s b a t t l e d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e a b i l i t y t o r a p i d l y s h i f t f r o m one d i v i s i o n t o a n o t h e r as w e l l a s 'changing t h e i r m i s s i o n . This a b i l i t y the f i e l d

s h o u l d n o t be 1 o s . t .

The f l e x i b i l i t y o f

a r t i 1 I e r y c a n h e t r a c e d t o t h e a r t i 1 erymen o f W o r l d War. 1 1 .
curreii t

This f l e x i b i l i "Redl c q s "

Y m u s t be ma n t a i n e d by

.
Local p r o c e d u r e s and arrangement 5

I-ESSUN IWIUR:

t h a t v i o l a t e i j t ) c t r i n e must be avoided.

The s t a n d a r d

o p e r a t I n g p r o i : + d u r e s u s e d by I I I C o r p s a r t i 1 I e r y u n i t s were w i d e l y u n d e r s t o o d a n d p r a c t ced. common pi-ocvdui.es e n h a n c e d t h e e a s e w i f r o m cine d i ~ ~ i s it m o a n o t h e r w e r e made The

h which s h i i : t i

L.E!;SObI

FIVE:

The F i e l d A r t i l l e r y m u s t t r a i n The FA

w i t h t h e marleuver u n i t s t h a t t h e y s u p p o r t .

must p r a c t i c e t h e r a p i d s h i f t s i n m i s s i o n and s u p p o r t e d u n i t t h a t was a p p a r e n t in this battle.

T r a i n i n g w i t h t h e s u p p o r t e d maneuver u n i t s w i l l c r e a t e a b e t t e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the c a p a b i l i t i e s of

t h e FA a n d an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e m y r i a d o f t a s k s
t h e FA c a n p e r f o r m .

The r e s e a r c h accompl i s h e d f o r t h i s s t u d y suggests t w o areas for f u r t h e r e x p l o r a t i o n . The

development o f o b s e r v a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s d u r i n g World War I 1 c o u l d be e x p l o r e d . w e r e u s e d i n W o r l d War 1 1 . Several d i f f e r e n t methods F i x e d as w e l l a s m o b i l e

systems w e r e t r i e d .

A comparison o f these two

especially as i t t o d a y s army.

methods c o u l d p r o v e i n t e r e s t i n g ,

concerns the a e r i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s o f There

i s a p o s s i b i 1 i t y of a reveal ing study of

ammunition s u p p l y procedures. Chapter Four,

A s was n o t e d i n

the expenditures during the b a t t l e f o r The movement a n d

the Ardennes were tremendous.

management o f t h i s a m m u n i t i o n c o u l d h a v e a p p l i c a b i l i t y t o c u r r e n t procedures.

A n o t h e r a r e a t h a t c u r r e n t " r e d 1 egs" need t o consider i s t h e span of c o n t r o l . Todays Corps

A r t i l l e r y S e c t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y s m a l l e r than the Corps A r t i l l e r y B a t t e r y o f t h e Corps Headquarters of

-82-

W o r l d War I I .

The p r o b l e m s o f c o n t r o l 1 i n g 25 T h e r e c o u l d be a

I > a t t a l i o n s arv s i g n i f i c a n t . v a l u a b l e stud;

conducted concerning the abi 1 i t y of the

t o d a y s C:orps G r t i I 1 e r y S e c t i on t o augment I)ivisioris firepower, a s i n World War 11.

RCi L e n t 2

X I 1 C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y commander,

sa i d

i t i s p a l - t i c ~ i l a r l y i m p o r t a n t t h a t o p e r a t i o n s and irie thodn. 0.f c o t p s a r t i 1 1 e r i e s a r e r e c o r d e d a n d studied.

(5) T h i s s t u d y h a s made an a t t e m p t t o
t h e o p e r a t i o n s and methods o f

r e c o r d ?mine 01 C:orps.

111

Fielcl A r t i

l e r y u n i t s today s h o u l d h e e d t h e he

e x p e r i e r i c e s c ~ t t h e r b r o t h e r s f r o m World War 1 1 . d e v e l opnient coupled w i t h will

CI.I
d,

a s e t of s t a n d a r d i z e d procedures,
cummi t m e n t

t o employment d o c t r i n e ,

c r e a t e the

f l e x i b i l i t y so n e c e s s a r y on a moderri

battlefield.

-:33-

CHAPTER F I V E ENDNOTES

1 1 1 CORPS,

A f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t , Dec 44

31 December 1944, p . 2 1 .
The G e n e r a l Board, R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i e l d

A r t i l l e r y Group

undated,

p.

3.

4th Armored D i v i s i o n ,
Dec 44

A f t e r A c t i o n Report

u n d a t e d , no page numbers A f t e r Action Report.

1 1 1 Corps,

D e c 44

31 December 1944, p . 2 1 .
John M . L e n t z , BG Combat

X I 1 CorD6 A r t i l l e r y in
Germany, U S A r m y ,

(Regensburg,

1945), p . i

-84-

PLATE ONE

ao'

1.10'

sO*lo'-

40'40'

-85-

APPENDIX ONE

APPENDIX ONE

I t i s important to understand t h a t the

standardization o f t r a i n i n g f o r f i e l d a r t i l l r y u n i t s played a big part
i n e n a b l i n g them t o s h i f t f r o m

Group t o G r o u p w i t h r e l a t i v e e a s e . underwent a s e r i e s of

Each b a t t a l i o n

t e s t s c o n d u c t e d by Army G r o u n d

Forces p r i o r t o deployment t o the European t h e a t e r .

These t e s t s n o t o n l y measured t h e u n i t c a p a b i 1 i t y t o conduct f i e l d a r t i l l e r y f i r e , aga n s t a c o n s i s t e n t s t a n d a r d . b u t a l s o m e a s u r e d them

O f the f i e l d

a r t l l e r y u n i t s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a t t a c k c o n d u c t e d by
111 Corps,

t h e 4 6 4 t h FA g r o u p

i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of The

t h e t e s t i n g p r o c e s s and t h e t e s t i n g r e s u l t s . following

i s an e x t r a c t f r o m t h e t e s t r e s u l t s f o r
The G r o u p u n d e r w e n t t h e t e s t d u r i n g 1944, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 4 m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e i r

t h i s Group. 17-28 A p r i l

a r r i v a l on t h e c o n t i n e n t . t h a t t h e G r o u p took

I t i s interesting t o note

t h i s t e s t w i t h t h e 772nd and

773rd FA B a t t a l i o n s a n d n e v e r a g a i n h a d t h e s e
battalions attached. T h i s a p p e n d i x has b e e n i n c l u d e d
for

t o give the reader a f l a v o r

the types of e v e n t s

t h a t w e r e t e s t a d a n d t h e comments made by t h e inspectors.

The f o l l o w i n g h a s b e e n e x t r a c t e d f r o m :

-86-

US A r m y . .

X X I I I Corps A r t i l l e r y .

" R e p o r t s AGF FA 81)

T e s t s C : c m d u c t e d by X Corps, X X I I I C o r p s
farti I l e r y ,

1 J a n u a r y 1943

31 O c t o b e r 1944."

Volume 1 , Georgia,

TAB 404th, APO 103, F o r t M c P h e r s o n ,

it. N o v e m b e r 1944

H e a d q u a r t e r 9 XXI I I C o r p s A r t i 1 1e r y Camp H Q W ~ QT , exas

26 Apr'i 1 1944

R e p o r t o f AGF FA Bn T e s t s

Ref:

L e t t e r ! , f $ W , f i l e 353/52 (Tng D i u Subject:

(19 Oc

42.1

GNGCT, d a t e d :?'? A u g u s t 1943,

" R e v i s i o n of

A r m y Ground F o i , c e F i e l d A r t i I l e r y and TanK D e s t r o w r Tests".

Un i t :
Place: Date:

4 0 4 t h FA Group
Carrip H o w i e ,

Texas

17 - 28 A p r i l

1944

T e s t I - Adjustments of F i r e : Grade Speed 7.800 O c c u p a t i o n and o r g a n i z a t i o n o f psrl 10.540 P r e c i s i o n adjustments 14.102 Brac Ke t a d j u s tmen t s 37.147 Observed f i r e c h a r t a n d bn c o n c e n t r a t i o n s

Weight

12

15

38

15

4 * 455
Grade f o r T e s t I 74.044

Test I 1

Transfers of Fire: 10

S e l e c t i o n and l o c a t i o n o f base p o i n t 10.00 Vertical 4.000 Determination of K 9.925 Laying b a t t a l i o n o f d i r e c t i o n 10 . O O Accuracy o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n s 16.545 contra1

10

10

30

-88-

Sp e e cI

15

15.00

A i r a d j us tmen t
15.00

10

C:I & p r e p a r a t i o n f o r n i g h t a d j u s t m e n t
'?. ----

1 8 -

700

W a d e f o r Test $34.726

11

Test

111

-. Lho,bserued

Fires: 15

Su r v e :v 12.75rj N i g h t occupation of p o s i t i o n

15

12 . 3 7 : s
P i - e p a r a t i on 0 . f f i r e
1 h . 58Cl E f f e c i of fire

28

30

2N. 638
N i g h t h i q h bur%*.;ta d j u s t m e n t 9.750 O p e r a t i on o f
F:[C

10

10

--

9 . 750
I

Grade f o r . 'Test

111

81.755

-85

Grade f o r T e s t I x 5 . 0 378.228

Grade f o r T e s t I 1 x 2 . 5
21 1.806 Grade f o r T e s t 1 1 1 x 2 . 5 204.387

Total
786.407

D i v by 10
78.641

Form 4 6

A r t i l l e r y section

(NOTE:

The a v e r a g e grade f o r a Group d u r i n g t h i s

time was 7 8 . 7 )

-90-

HEADQUARTERS X X I I I CORPS ARTILLERY

Camp Bow i e
24 A p r i 1

Texas,

1944

Comments #or 772d F. A.

Test

772d F. A.

Battal ion

SLe&
Phase 3 Nac. 21 m i n u t e s 46 s e c o n d s o u e r t i m e b e c a u a e o f !:lowness
far

o f FDC a n d s l o w n e s s o f a d j u s t m e n t

t h e Zd c o n c e n t r a t i o n . Speed
f0l'

occupation of p o s i t i o n excellent;

f i r s t r o u n d f i i . c d 24 m i n u t e s a f t e r p r o b l e m t i m e

star t ecl.

&cuuatiion

and , D r a a n i z a t i o n of P o s i t i o n

"A" B a t t e r y

Occ.upat i o n o f p o s t i o n e x c e l e n t ; personnel fulf

i

all

1 l e d t h e i r d u t e s i n a qu e t a n d

e f f i c i en t m a n n e r .

'I

8" Ba t t e r y
I l c c ~ ~ pi a on t o f p o s i t i o n v e r y good, however

some con.Fusi on ;.esul t e d d u r i n g i n i t i al

1 d y i n g because

n~ o t maKe h i s commands h e a r d by a l l executiue c o i i l ~

sections.
No. 2 piece fired 4

mils in error in

de f 1 ec t i on dur i n g r e g i st r a t i on

Bore w a s not c h e c k e d for foreign material after r o u n d s f i r e d .

"C" Battery
I n occupation of position, prime m o v e r s
cut a c r o s s ground indiscriminately m a k i n g fresh tracks into position. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s w a s unsatisfactory. Wire

net w a s not fully established, necessitating use of r a d i o throughout. Deflated BA 46 r a d i o b a t t e r i e s

m a d e i t necessary to establish a r e l a y r a d i o station be tween OP and bat tery wh i ch c a u s e d consi derabl e delay in conduct of fire. S e r v i c e of piece very good.

Precision R e a i s t r a t i o n s Initial d a t a and conduct o f f i r e for all three r e g i s t r a t i o n s very good.

8,

Small T r e g i s t r a t i o n s of

I#

battery very slow because of poor r a d i o

commun i cat i on.

Bracket ad.iustmen t s Battery F o r w a r d Observer

Officer firing made

-92-

an e x c e l l e n t a d j u s t m e n t w i t h t i m e f i r e

i n 4 minutes 3

seconds..

I-leioht of

b u r s t 18 y a r d s .

B a t t a l i o n Forward Observer

I n i t i a l data was

v e r y good b u t o f f i c e r f i r i n g w a s t e d s e v e r a l rounds d u r i n g a d j u s t m e n t by m a k i n g p o o r s e n s i n g s . Time f o r

t h i s prcbleln w a s ? m i n u t e s i n excess of a l l o w e d t i m e b e c a u s e oi: ( w a s t e d r o u n d s d u r i n g a d j u s t m e n t a n d s l o w n e s s o f FDC. Small 7 B r a c k e t

mils
111

I n i t i a l d a t a i n e r r o r 155 Officer

d i r e c t i o n a n d 268 y a r d s i n r a n g e .

f i r i n g made c h a n g e s p r o m p t 1 y b u t p r o b l e m e x c e e d e d

t i m e a l l o w e d I)/ 7 m i n u t e s a n d 5 8 s e c o n d s due t o p o o r r a d i o c:ornmurli(:.*tion o f

"C" B a t t e r y .

Commands h a d to t o the

be r e l a y e d t h r o u g h an i n t e r m e d i a t e s e t

battery

.
T
E3racket

Large

I n i t i a l data i n error

126

m i l s i n d i i - e c t i o n and 2BB y a r d s i n range.

Officer

f i r i n g t h i 5 problem attempted t o a d j u s t height o f b u r s t by c h a n g i n g t i m e s e t t i n g i n s t e a d o f c h a n g i n g site, c a u s i n g 4 s a l v o s t o b e wamted d u r i n g Lack o f p r o c e d u r e and i n c o r r e c t " S " t h i s problem t o exceed time

adjustment.

f a c t o r cause,j l i m e f o r

a l l o w e d b y 1 5 i n i n u t e s a n d 26 s e c o n d s .

O h s e r v e d F i r e 1:hart

and B a t t a l i o n C o n c e n t r a t i o n 5

( 1 t ) s e r v ~ dF i r e c h a r t c o n s t r u c t e d f r o m a d j u s t e d

-Y3

d a t a o f c e n t e r b a t t e r y w i t h one t y p e p r o p e l l i n g charge and the f l a n k b a t t e r i e s wi t h another t y p e charge. I n t h e b a t t a l i o n c o n c e n t r a t i o n s when t h e

center b a t t e r y a d j u s t e d the non-adjust i n g b a t t e r i e s f i r e d a b o u t 266 y a r d s o v e r ; when one o f t h e f l a n k b a t t e r i e s a d j u s t e d t h e o t h e r f l a n k b a t t e r y massed correctly, short

b u t t h e c e n t e r b a t t e r y w a s a b o u t 266 y a r d s

.
I n i t a1 p l o t o f o b s e r u e r ' s s e n s ng f o r f i r s t o b s e r v e r sensed 966 o v e r " ,

c o n c e n t r a t i o n w a s 266 y a r d s s h o r t ; " B a s e p o i n t 886 r g h t , right, 1166 o v e r "

HCU p l o t t e d " 8 6 0
this causing

S h i f t f o r "A" b a t t e r y for

p l o t was measured f r o m B a t t e r y " B " base l i n e ,

19 m i l s e r r o r i n i n i t i a l d a t a f o r " A " b a t t e r y .
caught and c o r r e c t e d b e f o r e f i r i n g .
of adjustment u n t i l

Error

Time c o m p l e t i o n

last battery to f i r e this due t o

c o n c e n t r a t i o n was 16 m i n u t e s 5 6 s e c o n d s ,

e x c e s s i v e e r r o r s by FDC p e r s o n n e l a n d 5-3 c h e c k i n g and c o r r e c t i n g d a t a . T o o many p e o p l e i n FDC; a t one t i m e t h e r e w e r e 28, many who h a d n o b u s i n e s s t h e r e . Battal ion phone t o

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o f f i c e r u s e d one c o m p u t e r ' s

s e n d a message w h i l e a m i s s i o n was b e i n g f i r e d . G e n e r a l o p e r a t i o n s o f FDC e x t r e m e l y s l o w .

-94-

HEADQUARTERS X X I I I CORPS A R T I L L E R Y

C:amp B o w i e ,

Texas,

25 A p r i l

1944
Comments f o r 7 7 3 d

F. A .

Test I

773d F. A .

Battalion

Speed
Phase 3 w a s 6 m i n u t e s 38 s e c o n d s o v e r t i m e due

t o s l o w n e s s i n o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.
Speed f o r o c c u p a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n e x c e l l e n t ; f i r s t r o u n d f i l * c d 25 m i n u t e s a f t e r p r o b l e m t i m e s t a r t6.d.

0 c . c u D a t i o n i.ntl O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n

" A " 6a.t 1 , e r y

Gun s e c t i o n e p e r f o r m e d s e r v i c e o f p i r c e

i n a v e r y thorr.iugh a n d e f f i c l e n t m a n n e r . T h e r e w a s a 1 ack o f s t r i c t c a m o u f l a g e discipline; p r i m e m o v e r s made f r e s h t r a c k s t h r o u g h

p o s i t i o n and p e r s o n n e l were f r e q u e n t l y and u n n e c e s s a r i l y i n open.

"8" B a t t e r y
S e r v i c e o f p i e c e and o c c u p a t i o n o f

p o s i t i o n was g e n e r a l l y e x c e l l e n t ;

cannoneers o p e r a t e d

s m o o t h l y and e f f i c i e n t l y and c o n t i n u e d t o improve p o s i t i o n through o u t t h e t e s t . assistant executive. T h e command "Do n o t L o a d " was r e c e i v e d
f r o m FDC on one m i s s i o n ;

Maximum u s e made o f

a f t e r 5B s e c o n d s e l a p s e d

" Q u a d r a n t 118" was r e c e i v e d a n d a l l p i e c e s l o a d e d o n t h i s command. On a n o t h e r p r o b l e m , e x e c u t i v e f i r e d No 1

p i e c e when t h e command r e c e i v e d f r o m FDC was " A t m y Command"

.
Battery

"C"

No e f f o r t made t o b o r e s i g h t p i e c e s .
After i n i t i a l l a y i n g the executive put

one a i m i n g s t a k e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 18 f e e t f r o m h i s a i m i n g c i r c l e a n d commanded e a c h g u n t o u s e t h a t s t a K e f o r an a i m i n g p o i n t . A i m i n g s t a k e s were n o t

p u t o u t u n t i l a f t e r base p o i n t r e g i s t r a t i o n .

No e f f o r t w a s made by c h i e f s o f s e c t i o n s
t o c a m o u f l a g e u n t i l r e m i n d e d t o d o so by a s s i s t a n t

executive.

D u r i n g l u l l s i n f i r i n g n o a t t e m p t made t o c a n n o n e e r s were s i t t i n g i n shade i n Personnel trenches

improve p o s i t i o n ;

r e a r o f p i e c e s when n o t f i r i n g .

a n d a m m u n i t i o n p i t s w e r e n o t dug.

-?6-

F r ' e c i s i on ------

Fte c

~s i t ra t

i on 2

I n i t i a l data for a x i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n very poor; i n e r r o r 77 m i l s i n d i r e c t i o n a n d 1888 y a r d s i n range. I n i t i a l data for t h e Small T and B a t t a l i o n

Forward Observer r e g i s t e r i n g t h e Large T b a t t e r y e x c e l 1 en t , B a t t a l i o n Forward Observer r e q u e s t e d " F i r e for. E f f e c t " w i t h o u t h a v i n g e s t a b l i e h e d a 108 y a r d r a n g e bracket i n t h e base p o i n t r e g i s t r a t i o n .

----_Bracket
problem,

R s i s j . r a t i on

B a t t e r y F o r w a r d O b s e r v e r f i r e d a v e r y good b u t t i m e w a s S m i n u t e % o v e r a l l o w e d t i m e due

t o s l o w n e s s iil o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.

B a t t a ' l i o o F o r w a r d O b s e r v e r made a v e r y g o o d adjustment, l o o s i n g ( s i c ) no time i n maKing s e n s i n q s

b u t t h e p r o h l i m e x c e e d e d t i m e a l l o w e d by 6 m i n u t e s b s c a u s e o f ri1c:swness i n FDC. FDC r e q u i r e d S m i n u t e ! ;

t o p l o t nobserot?rs i n i t i a l s e n s i n g a n d f i r e t h e f i r s i t salvo. Initis.

error

d a t a f o r Small T b r a c k e t a d j u s t m e n t i n
5,

18U m i

i n d i r e c t i o n a n d 588 y a r d s i n r a n g e . i n t h i s problem very slow; time 5

C o n d u c t c?f f r t .

m i n u t e s 50 sectmds o v e r a l l o w e d time. I n i t i a l ,data L a r g e T B r a c K e t a d j u s t m e n t in

-9; -

e r r o r 86 m i l s i n d i r e c t i o n a n d 686 y a r d s i n r a n g e . Officer f i r i n g r e q u i r e d 4 m i n u t e s 46 s e c o n d s t o

compute i n i t i a l d a t a a n d 3 m i n u t e s 26 s e c o n d s o v e r allowed time to f i r e problem.

Observed F i r e C h a r t and B a t t a l i o n C o n c e n t r a t i o n s
E r r o r made by HCO i n i n i t i a l p l o t o f f i r s t

c o n c e n t r a t i o n ; B a t t e r y F o r w a r d Observer sensed " C o n c e n t r a t i o n 738 i s 668 L e f t , p l o t t e d " 2 6 8 L e f t , 488 O v e r " . O p e r a t i o n o f FDC s l o w ;

time completion

488 O v e r " ; was

a d j u s t m e n t by a d j u s t i n g b a t t e r y on f i r s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n u n t i l l a s t b a t t e r y f i r e d 7 m i n u t e s 18 seconds, s e c o n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n 6 m i n u t e s 36 s e c o n d s . a l l B a t t e r i e s " was u s e d i n s t e a d o f

'Corrections

determining d a t a f r o m r e p l o t o f adjustment for non-adjusting batteries. T h i s r e s u l t e d i n an e r r o r

o f 4 m i l s i n d e f l e c t i o n and 5 6 a n d 75 y a r d s i n r a n g e i n t h e e f f e c t o f t h e n o n - a d j u s t i n g b a t t e r i e s on t h e
f i r s t c o n c e n t r a t i o n a n d 1 8 6 a n d 156 y a r d s i n r a n g e on

t h e second c o n c e n t r a t i o n ,
HCO a n d VCO made n u m e r o u s e r r o r s c a u s i n g

e x c e s s i v e c h e c k i n g by t h e S-3 a n d s l o w i n g down t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e FDC.

-?8-

HEADQUARTERS

XXIII

CORPS ARTILLERY

Camp B o w i e , T e x a s ,

24 Api- i 1 1 9 4 4
Cnmments f o r 772d F. A. Test I 1

772d F

. A.

Battalion

Selection
tr.ansier

arid L o c a t i o n o f Rase P o i n t i n location; target. location suitable for

No e r r o r
to a! 1

Vertical

Cor,tr.!?l targets f r o m 3 to 7 yards too

Altitude<. o f high.

-------_. D e t e r m i n a t i o n of K and K r S e t t i n q
No e r r o r :

i n r e g i s t r a t i o n n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o#

correct ions,

Layina -

B a t t a l i o n on Base P o i n t

ICorrect method u s e d and n o e r r ~ r s made.

E f--f .e

c t l v e n e s s O F-- F i r e on F o u r C o n c e n t r a t i o n s fzounds w e r e a l l g r a z e b u r s t s on T a r g e

14.

cat-eful check

1311

d a t a #or t h i s t a r g e t r e v e a s no

e r r o r t h a t w o u l d cause a l l g r a z e b u r s t s .
H e i g h t o f b u r s t s f o r T a r g e t 19 wa5 39 y a r d s .
VCO made a p l u s 2 m i l s e r r o r

i n determination of s i t e

t o this target. F i r s t f i r i n g o f T a r g e t 7 gave 2 g r a z e b u r s t s and 1 a i r b u r s t . H e i g h t of a l r b u r s t was 24 y a r d s .

R e f i r e of

t h i s t a r g e t w i t h an i n c r e a s e o f 3 m i l s s i t e

( a m o u n t i n g t o 15 y a r d s i n c r e a s e i n h e i g h t ) gave 1 g r a z e and 2 a i r b u r s t s w i t h h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 48 yards. Only 3 buns p e r b a t t e r y w e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r

test.

Speed T e s t completed i n 7 m i n u t e s l e s s than a l l o w e d

time.

A i r Adjustment A i r a d j u s t m e n t was v e r y
o p e r a t i o n o f FDC.
SlOW

due t o s l o w n e s s o f

P r e p a r a t i o n f o r N i a h t A d j u s t m e n t and C.I. No e r r o r s made.

Ge n e r a 1 Comme n t s

O c c u p a t i o n and O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n

-100-

"cb"

Battery U n n e c e s s a r y t a l K i n g i n a1 1 s e c t i 011s

d u r i n g f i r e misstonr;;

No 1 c a n n o n e e r 2d s e c t i o n

t a l k e d c o n t ihiiousl Y d u r i n g missions. L i t t l e e f f o r t made t o d i g i n o r 'tc) organize position. Battery recorder l a i d the b a t t e r y i n an e x c e l l e n t m a n n e r ; was c h e c k e d by e x e c u t i v e .

"tc" B a t t e r y
D i s c i p l i n e o f c a n n o n e e r s was excel l e n t tliri,ughout test. C h i e f s of sections

e x e r c I s e d command o f s e c t i o n s , k e e p i n g men b u s y i m p r o v i n g p o s i t i o n a n d c a r i n g f o r m a t e r i e l when n o t

f I r i nq..
I ,

[I

.a

Battery Battery functioned rapidly,

s l r i o o t h l y ancl c l i i i e t l r d u r i n g o c c u p a t i o n of and f i r i n g .

position

Personnel k e p t busy improving p o s i t i o n S e r v i c e o f p i e c e v e r y good.

when n o t f i r i n r l .

-101-

HEADPUARTEPS

XXIII CORPS ARTILLERY

Camp Bowie, T e x a s ,

24 Apr i 1 1944
Comments f o r 773d F. A. 773d F. A. Test

I1

Battalion

S e l e c t i o n and L o c a t i o n o f Base P o i n t

No e r r o r i n l o c a t i o n ; l o c a t i o n s u i t a b l e f o r
t r a n s f e r s t o a1 1 t a r g e t s .

ical Control
VCO d i d n o t r i d g e and s t r e a m l i n e c h a r t w h i l e a t

OP

.
K and K r S e t t i n q
No e r r o r I n r e g i s t r a t i o n n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f

Determination of

c o r r e c t i o n s , however,

r e g i s t r a t i o n was c o m p l e t e d

i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r o c c u p a t i o n o f p o s i t i o n and about an h o u r b e f o r e b a t t a l i o n was r e a d y t o f i r e concen t r a t i ons

L a r i n a B a t t a l i o n on Base P o i n t

No e r r o r s made: c o r r e c t methods used.

-102-

^ -

E f f e c t i v e n e s s o f F i r e on F o u r C o n c e n t r a t i o n s

No 3 p i t a c e B a t t e r y "C" f i r e d 134 m i l s i n e r r o r
i n d e f 1 e c t i or1 on 2d c o n c e n t r a t i o n .
Arl errcmr
i n p l o t t i n g t h e base l i n e e x t e n s i o n

for

"A"

B a t t e r y on t h e

HCO c h a r t c a u s e d s h i f t t o

t a r g e t 1 t o t - e t o o s m a l l w i t h n o e f f o r t on t a r g e t . A l t i t u d e o f T a r g e t 19 was 23 y a r d s t o o h i g h i i r d
1 m i l error
i n computation o f s i t e f o r

t h i s target

c:aused h e i g 9 t o f b u r s t s t o b e 74 y a r d s .
A1 1 r o u r l d s f i r e d o n T a r g e t 1 4 w e r e g r a z e . A

careful error

check f o f d a t a f o r t h i s t a r g e t r e v e a l s no
I~)C,U I

that

d cause g r a z e bursts.

Speed Elattal ioii completed t e s t w i t h a l l o w e d time.

A i r Ad.i u ! ; tme n 1 . Air. FDC acljur..tment was s l o w b e c a u s e o f s l o w n e s s o f

.
for N i q h t A d j u s t m e n t and

-_ PreDaration

C.I.

E r r o r s o f m i n u s S y a r d s p e r 1000 a n d 3 m i l s i n d e f l e c t i o n w e r e made i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o+ c o r r e c t i o n : : . f v o m C.I. adjustment.

G e n e r a l Comm.?ntc. -

-183-

OccuDat i on a n d O r o a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i o n
"A"

Bat t e r r B a t t e r y d i d n o t c a r r y out c o m p l e t e

o r g a n i z a t i o n of p o s i t i o n ; d i g g i n g i n a n d c a m o u f l a g e not continued throughout occupation of position. S e r v i c e of p i e c e e x c e l l e n t .

I'

E" B a t t erY o c c u p a i on accomp i s h e d w i t h

minimum o f t i m e and c o n f u s i o n . Men w e r e k e p t b u s y i m p r o v i n g p o s i t i o n and c a r i n g f o r m a t e r i e l . The r e c o r d e r k e p t h i s r e c o r d s n e a t a n d a c c u r a t e ; he c h e c k e d g u n n e r s d e f 1 ec t i o n s throughout t e s t .

'I

C 'I Ba t t e r Y
Occupation of p o s i t i o n r a p i d and

order Y .

Men i m p r o v e d p o s i t i o n a n d c a r e d f o r mater e l during o c c u p a t i o n .

No 3 p i e c e f i r e d 134 m i l s i n e r r o r
i n d e f l e c t i o n on s e c o n d c o n c e n t r a t i o n . BDL 67, No 3 p i e c e s h i f t e d BDR 67. Command was

HEADQUARTERS X X I I I CORPS ART1 LLERY

Camp H o w i e , T e x a s ,

i!4 Apt- i 1

1944 Comments f o r 4 8 4 t h

F. A . Group l e s t 1 1 1

Group H e a d q u a r t e r s
I _ .

G e n e r a l Commeri t s

thout confusion throughout t e s t . En1 i s t e d men

Group htFrAdquarters o p e r a t e d e f f i c i e n t l y , s m o o t h l y and

W I

Maximum u s e made o f en1 i s t e d men. prr.formetl t h e i i

d u t i e s i n an e x c e l l e n t m a n n e r .

T , w g e t s w e r e r e s t i t u t e d by en1 i s t e d men w i t h a v e r a g e
er.ror

of

122 yards i n X a n d 6 y a r d s i n Y.

Officers

made c h e c k s on r e s t i t u t i o n .
post wrre all complete.

I n s t a l l a t i o n s a t commanc:

772d F. A.
5 U l - W

Battalion

I n s t r u m e n t used i n t a r g e t a r e a suruey measured vertical angle.; from 1 t o 2 m i l s too high. This

c a u s e d c*ri*orc> o f targets.

f r o m 3 t o 6 y a r d s i n a1 t i t u d e s o f

An t ? r r c f r (jf m i n u s 15.8 y a r d s i n c o m p u t a t i o n of Ia.;t l e y i n c o n n e c t i o n s u r v e y was made.

-1 85-

O c c u P a t i on,

Camouf 1 aqe a n d O r a a n i z a t i o n o f P o s i t i on

A l l b a t t e r i e s h a d t o o many f l a s h l i g h t s a l t h o u g h t h e l i g h t s were hooded. T h i s e x c e s s i u e use o f

f l a s h 1 i g h t s c a u s e d some c o n f u s i o n among g u n n e r s

d u r i n g l a y i n g of

the pieces. Two

S e c u r i t y was g e n e r a l l y i n s u f f i c i e n t . umpires toured a l l areas a f t e r dark without encountering guards or s e n t i n e l s . c o u n t e r s i g n w e r e n o t used. Headauarters Battery

Password and

One man i n n e x t t o l a s t v e h i c l e s m o k i n g d u r i n g b l a c k o u t march.

"A"

Batt e r r

E x e c u t i ve s m o k i n g dur i n g i n s p e c t i o n o f s e c t i o n s a f t e r dark. Aiming posts of 1st section too close; near

p o s t 25 y a r d s a n d f a r one 50 y a r d s f r o m p i e c e . N o t enough p r e p a r a t i o n done b e f o r e o c c u p a t i o n ;

No 1 p i e c e c o u l d n o t b e p l a c e i n t h e p o s i t i o n
s e 1 ec t e d .

I ,

0 ,I B a t t e r y

En1 i s t e d men s l e e p i n g i n o p e n a f t e r d a y 1 i g h t .

-166-

." C "

Battery

0i.gan i ::<At i o n o f p o s i t i o n a n d camouf 1 age e x c e 1 1 eri t a.1 t h o u g h en 1 i s t e d men w e r e s l eep I n g i n crpt?n a f t e r d a y 1 i gbli

-_f'reoarat

i o n ot F i r e

Acsistant

S-3 r e s t 1 t u t e d t a r g e t s u s i n g t r a c i r r l l
R e s t i t u t i o n was n o t c h e c k e d by u 5 e o f

paper method.

a n o t h e r m r t , ? u d b u t was c h e c k e d by S-3 u s i n g same t r a c i n g paper and ( s i c ) method.

-_____-__ Effeci. of Firir

(:oiicerltr..ation

No 1 h a d 1 g r a z e a n d 2 a i r

b u r s t s ; i i u e r a q t ' h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 19 y a r d s . C : o r l c e n t r i t t i o n No 21 h a d 1 g r a z e a n d 2 a i r bursts; a u e r a g l r h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 37 y a r d s .

4 c a r e f u l check of a l l d a t a r e v e a l s n o e r r o r
t h a t w o u l d cauje the v a r i a t i o n s i n these c n n c e n t r a t i o n s . Range a n d d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t f o r a l l concentrations. O n l y 3 guns p e r b a t t e r y w e r e a v a i l a b l e f o r
tesi:.

i n h e i g h t s ol: b u r s t s

four

Ni (ah t tI I 913

Burst Adjustment

Sep.hrale w i r e 1 i n e s t o e a c h o b s e r v e r e n a b l e d

prompt r e p o r t i n g o f

instruments readings.

S-3 e x e r c i s e d e x c e l l e n t a n d c o m p l e t e c o n t r o l i n
f i r i n g h i g h burst a d j u s t m e n t .

Oaeration of F i r e D i r e c t i o n Center FDC e x c e l l e n t l y o r g a n i z e d . computed officers. HCO a n d UCO made s e v e r a l m i s t a k e s i n p l o t t i n g and r e a d i n g a n g l e s and r a n g e s c a u g h t a n d c o r r e c t e d by S-3 En1 i s t e d men

UE a n d s o l v e d m e t r o m e s s a g e s

c h e c K e d by

a l l of which w e r e

or a s s i s t a n t

S-3.

One c o m p u t e r u s e d command.

"OK,

l e a d 'em u p " .

T h i s , c a u s e d some d e l a y i n s t a r t i n g t h e h i g h b u r s t adjustment.

773d F. A . B a t t a l i o n
Survey Adequate and p r a c t i c a l s u r v e y p l a n ; prompt i n i t i a t i o n of survey, b u t completion slow.

F r o m 1436 t o 1630 s u r v e y p a r t i e s d o i n g C o m p u t a t i o n s w e r e v i s i b l e t o enemy o b s e r v a t i o n .

Occupat i on.

Camouf 1 aae a n d OrQan i z a t i on o f P o s i t i o n

A1 1 b a t t e r i e s made e x c e l 1 en t o c c u p a t i o n s o f

-108-

p o s i t i o n s w i t h a minimum o f n o i s e a n d 1 i g h t s . batterie5 well

c am0u.f I age.

A1 1

d u g i n ; e x c e l l e n t u s e made o f e x i s t i n g

Road l e a d i n g i n t o s o u t h e a s t o f B a t t e r y " A " p o s i t i o n wa!j i u n g u a r d e d a t 2256. A t 2255 p e r s o n n e l a t

m a c h i n e gun p o s t s o u t h o f B a t t e r y " A " p o s i t i o n d i d n o t Know cotin t e r s i g n .

Preparation of F i r e Dwta i o r . c o n c e n t r a t i o n 316 h a d t h e f o l l o w i n g

errors;

I. m i l

i n metro deflection correction, deflection shift,

5 mils

i n m e a w r e d ba:e

5 mils in

d e f l e c t i o n cau-:ed by e r r o r Total deilectic8n e r r o r o f

i n r e s t i t u t i o n of target.
1 1 m i l s i n same d i r e c t i o n .

T h i s e r r o r was l a r g e e n o u g h t o c a u s e loss o+ a1 I

e , f f e ct on t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n .
T h e d e f l e c t i o n c o r r e c t i o n c h a n g e as c o m p u t e d

f r o m h i g h h u r s t a d j u s t m e n t was u s e d i n s t e a d o f adjusted deflection correction c o n c e n t r a t i o n 385. i n data for

M e a s u r e d s h i f t BDL 26, a d j u s t e d

d e f l e c t i o n c n r r r c t i o n L e f t 14, d a t a t h a t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n f i r e d BDL 48; d a t a f i r e d BDL 31. B a t t e r y "B"

No 1 p i e c e

' t h a t f i r e d t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n f i r e d 28

m i l s i n error" iii d e f l e c t i o n to l e f t .

An e r r o r a l s o this

wa!;

made i n computing t h e q u a d r a n t e l e v a t i o n f o r
( :

colic en t r a t i or1

.IUS

i rig e f f ec t a p p r o x i ma t e 1 y 175 y a r d s

-109.-

over.

E l e v a t i o n f o r measured map r a n g e 136, s i t e

p l u s 5, e l e v a t i o n c o r r e c t i o n f r o m h i g h b u r s t a d j u s t m e n t p l u s 2, d a t a t h a t s h o u l d have been f i r e d quadrant

143; d a t a f i r e d ,

q u a d r a n t 14?.

Altitude of

t h i s t a r g e t w a s 9 y a r d s t o o l o w c a u s i n g 1 g r a z e and 3 a i r h u r s t s 7 yards high.

Effect of Fire C o n c e n t r a t i o n 311 had 1 g r a z e and 3 a i r b u r s t s w i t h average h e i g h t o f a i r b u r s t s 23 y a r d s .

c a r e f u l check o f a l l d a t a f o r t h i s c o n c e n t r a t i o n r e v e a l s no e r r o r t h a t w o u l d cause t h i s v a r i a t i o n .

N i a h t Hiah B u r s t R e a i s t r a t i o n Thorough p r e p a r a t i o n s made for h i g h b u r s t a d j u s t m e n t ; o r i e n t a t i o n and c a l i b r a t i o n o f i n s t r u m e n t s v e r y good;

v e r y good!

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and p r o c e d u r e

adequate and a c c u r a t e s e n s i n g .

b e r a t i o n o f F i r e D i r e c t i o n Center O r g a n i z a t i o n o f FDC v e r y good; o n l y necessary

t a l k i n g p e r m i t t e d ; o n l y necessary personnel p e r m i t t e d i n FDC.

-110-

APPENDIX TWO

APPENDIX TWO

The f a c t

t h a t T h i r d Army was a b l e t o make a

rmwe frcini SAWBRUCKEN t o ARLON i n s u c h a s m o o t h f a s h i o n has b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f a g r e a t d e a l ~ i t u d y . T h i s f e a t h a s s e r v e d as an e x a m p l e o f magnificent thesis;

ITII

of

1 i t a r r planning.

The purp0E.e o f Rather,

this

i s n o t t o a n a l y z e t h i s moue.

t o stucy

how f i e l d a r t 1 l l e r y u n i t s w e r e e m p l o y e d b e f o r e a n d a.fter t h i s rnovi?. T h i s a p p e n d i x has been i n c l u d e d t o

g i v e t h e reicder. a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e c o m p l e x i t i e , :

o i r e 1 t e v i n q ctirnbat u n i t s i n c o n t a c t a n d r e p l a c i n g
them
WI

tli 0 t h t : I . s .

lhe f c ~ l l < ~ w i n ha g s b e e n e x t r a c t e d f r o m Army

G r o u n d F o r c e s k e p o r t #C-569, Th i c. document
i s on f i l e

d a t e d 3 J a n u a r y 1945.

i n t h e Combined Arms

R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y u n d e r t h e number N6739.

HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER

OF OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES ARMY

!JAn DEPARTMENT OBSERVERS BOARD

APO 887

-1 11.-

3 J a n u a r y 1945

SUBJECT:

AGF R e p o r t No.

SB9

Movement o f X I 1 C or ps

A r t i1l e r y

SUBMITTED BY:

Colonel

JAMES W.

CLYBURN, F i e l d

A r t i 1 1 e r y Observer.

1.

When t h e Germans made t h e i r r e c e n t t h e X I 1 Cor ps A r t i l l e r y was h a s t i l y

counter-offensive

moved n o r t h and p l a c e d i n p o s i t i o n t o s u p p o r t a c o u n t e r a t t ac k ,

2.

The f o l l o w i n g b r i e f o u t l i n e o f

t h i s move of the X I 1

was o b t a n e d f r o m M a j o r E . W. Cor p s A r
i1 1ery:

B a r t l e y , S-4

a. obscure;

BY 211880,

t h e t a c t i c a l p i c t u r e was

a b o u t a l l we knew was t h a t w e w o u l d move

n o r t h t o w a r d s Luxembourg, XU Cor ps w o u l d t a k e o v e r o u r zone, we w o u l d l e a v e 3 heavy b a t t a l i o n s and b r i g a d e h e a d q u a r t e r s , move o u r own h e a d q u a r t e r s , 3 groups, 2 observation battalions, 3 1 ight battalions,

4 medical b a t t a l ions,

2 heavy gun b a t t a l i o n s ;

send a

155 gun (SP) b a t t e r y and an 8" gun b a t t e r y back t o

t h e i r b a t t a l i o n s i n another corps. We w o u l d g i v e XX

- 1 12-

C o r p s one 1 i g h t t r u c k b a t t a l i o n a n d r e c e i v e f r o m thsm
ir

18:;

SP b a t t , , l i o n .

b.

The f o l l o w i n g p l a n was a d o p t e d ,

a d j a c e n t c o r p s a r t i l l e r y commanders a n d u n i t s n o t i f i e c l b y 21 2388.

(1)
s e t up i n t h e f i r s t

An i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r w o u l d tie

town s o u t h o f c i t y o f Luxembourc..

E:ach b a t t a l i o n a n d g r o u p h e a d q u a r t e r s w o u l d s e n d an advance p a r t y o f 7 v e h i c l e s p e r gun o r h o w i t z e r battalion,

:3 p e r o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n , 5 p e r g r o u p
to r e p o r t t o the
instruction. i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r on B a t t a l i o n s a n d group!;

headquarter!$,

22 December f o r
wt!re

alei*ted

+,Jr

movement o n o r d e r a f t e r 2 2 2 4 8 0 .

Advance pard: ie!s> w e r e t o moue u n d e r g r o u p c o n t r o l .

(2)

XU C o r p s a g r e e d t o s e n d i n mi!

g r o u p a n d 4 b a i t a l i o n s on 22 December.

(3)

One l i g h t b a t t a l i o n w o u l d s e n t l

art a d v a n c e p a r t y t o XX C o r p s a n d XX C o r p s w o u l d h a v e t h e SP b a t t a l i o n s e n d an a d v a n c e p a r t y t o t h e
i r i f u r m a t i on c e n t e r

.
(4) A l l maps, charts,

-1 .I3-

communication l i n e s ,

etc..,

t h a t w o u l d be o f v a l u e

w o u l d be t u r n e d o v e r t o XU C o r p s A r t i l l e r y .

(5)

C o r p s a r t i 1 l e r y commander w i t h

c o r p s commander w o u l d l e a v e e a r l y o n 22 December t o establish information center.

( 6 ) C o r p s CP a d v a n c e e c h e l o n w o u l d
f o l l o w a t 221200.

( 7 ) No maps o f new a r e a w e r e
a v a i l a b l e e x c e p t a f e w r o a d maps t o L u x e m b o u r g a n d a f e w l/l00,00Bs o f the area.

(8)

X I 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y was t o

l e a v e a s e c t i o n o f h e a d q u a r t e r s t o a s s i s t XU C o r p s a n d t o d i r e c t movement o f o u r u n i t s o u t o f t h e a r e a . T h i s s e c t i o n c o n s i s t e d o f E x e c u t i v e , A s s i s t a n t S-4, A s s i s t a n t S-3, a n d a f e w e n l i s t e d men.

( 9 ) A new h e a v y m a i n t e n a n c e
o r d n a n c e company f o r m XU C o r p s r e p o r t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e c o r p s a r t i l l e r y o n 22 December. O r d n a n c e company

was t o f o r m l a r g e m a i n t e n a n c e c o n t a c t p a r t i e s a n d move w i t h e a c h g r o u p .

-114-

( 1 6 ) Corps a r t i l l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n
c e n t e r s w e r e to c o o r d i n a t e movement i n d i v i s i o n a r e i i s ;and g e t u n i t s t o I P S . corps area for
us.

Army s e l e c t e d t h e r o u t e s fronb

c.

B a t t a l i o n s were o r d e r e d t o d i s p l a c s -

o v e r .;everal
hour

d i f f e r e n t r o u t e s o n t h e 23d w i t h one Each O b s Q r V a t i O n

time

i n t e r v a l between u n i t s .

b a t t a l i o n l e f t one l e t t e r b a t t e r y i n o p e r a t i o n f o r X J C o r p s ( i n t i 1 re1 i e v e d . o f f i c e r a t leia.;t

report
tg3

Each u n i t was t o s e n d an

2 h o u r s ahead o f t h e m a i n body t o

t h e t:orps i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r .

d.

I n the

interim,

a CP was s e l e c t e d , advance

p l a n s made f o r p . i r t i e s Cjiuen
.

o r g a n i z a t i o n for combat,
t ~

much

i n f o r m a t i o n as p o s s i b l e and U n i t s were instructed to

areas t o +elect p o s i t i o n s .

send guicies back t o t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c e n t e r t o meet t h e i r units,. Cine o f f i c e r o f c o r p s a r t i l l e r y information

h e a d q u a r t e r s was l e f t on d u t y a t t h e center.

I?.

B a t t a l i o n s moved a s p l a n n e d on t h e

23d a n d by e u e n i n g o f t h e 23d, a l l b a t t a l i o n s h a d
c l o s e d i n t h e <3r.ea a n d t h e m a j o r i t y o f f i r s i n g the nigh': o f t h e 23d. them w o r e

The move w a s a l i t t l e

-1 1 5 . -

ouer 1B6 m i l e s and r e q u i r e d on t h e aver age o f 12 h o u r s f o r c o m p l e t i o n , by a b a t t a l i o n .

f.

The f o l l o w i n g a r t i l l e r y u n i t s w e r e

found i n the area:

1 Group w i t h a m e d i c a l and a 1 5 5 gun (SP)

battalion

2 B a t t a l i o n s of 2 8 t h D i v i s i o n , one l i g h t and one t h a t were a t t a c h e d t o c o r p s a r t i l l e r y

medical

4th Division

3 l i g h t b a t t a l i o n s and 1 m e d i c a l

(2

o f t h e l i g h t b a t t a i o n s w e r e SP) l B t h Armored D i u s i o n A r t i l l e r y w i t h 2 o r g a n i c

b a t t a l i o n s and one b a t t a l i o n f r o m 9 t h Armored D i u i s i o n , what was l e f t o f b a t t a l i o n h e a d q u a r t e r s and one l e t t e r b a t t e r y o f ( 2 8 5 ) o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n .

-A

5 t h D i v i s i o n &nd d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y moved i n on t h e

23d. new m e d i c a l b a t t a l i o n a r r i v e d on 23d f r o m t h e LIK.

9.

The l e t t e r b a t t e r i e s o f

the

o b s e r v a t i o n b a t t a l i o n s t h a t w e r e l e f t i n the o l d area d i s p l a c e d on t h e 2 4 t h .

h.

The moue can be summed up b y s t a t i n g

1 ight battalions f i r e d

t h a t on t h e 2 4 t h ,

n excess o f

1 B B B r o u n d s p e r b a t t a l i o n , med urn and hea i e s i n exces s o f 666 r o u n d s p e r b a t t a i o n and on t h e 2 S t h ,

-1 16-

they a l I a t e 1:urker.

3..

T h e s u i c e s s o f t h i s movement i s a t t r i b u t e i j
p a r t to t h e d i s p l a c e m e n t p l a n c o n t a i n e d i n A r t i l l e r y Standing Operating Procedur(,.

i n great

.the X I 1 Carp.

/s/ James W .

Clyburn

JAMES W .

CLYBURN

C o l o n e l , FA

W D O b s e r v e r s Eloal-d.

-1 1 7 -

APPENDIX THREE

APPENDIX THREE

T h i s F i e l d Order h a s been i n c l u d e d t o g i v e t h e r e a d e r an a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r t h e s i m p 1 i c i t y a n d conciseness o f t h i s document. I t d i r e c t e d what was

one o f t h e m a j o r b a t t l e s o f World War

11.

The

o p e r a t i o n o v e r l a y h a s been i n c l u d e d i n t h i s s t u d y a s P l a t e #X. t h i s copy. The i n t e l l i g e n c e annex i s deleted from

Note t h a t the f i e l d a r t i l l e r y attached to the 8Bth and t h e 2 6 t h D i u i s i o n s i n p a r a g r a p h s 3 a and b d o e s n o t m a t c h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat l i s t e d i n 3d. P a r a g r a p h 3d i s t h e c o r r e c t o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r

combat a s d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h a f t e r a c t i o n r e p o r t s o f t h e D i v i s i o n s c o n c e r n e d a n d 6-3 p u b l i s h e d by I 1 1 C o r p s . per iodi c r e p o r t s

T h i s i s an e x a c t c o p y o f contained i n

t h e F i e l d Order as

111 C o r p s A f t e r A c t i o n R e p o r t

Dec 4 4

Dec 44.

T h i s document

i s i n t h e Combined Arms

R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y u n d e r t h e f i l e number N-12029.

-118-

1'0

1
C!XS
13,

MAPS:

4416

4436,

Scale 1/166,608.

Sheets:

PIARCHE:

AF!l..ON 17, TRIER T - 1 , NIEUNKIRCHEN Ul.

I.

a.
b.

Annex 2 ( I n t e l l i g e n c e ) .

UIII C o r p s c o n t i n u e s t o d e l a y enemy advanc:e

A I X TAG s u p p o r t s a t t a c k o f 1 1 1 C o r p s .

t o W ancl S.

D e t a i l s on XI1 C o r p s l a t e r .

i! ,
S'T.

I 1 1 C . w p s advances N

i n Zone

i n d i r e c t i o n of

U I T H (UP 855882) a t H H o u r ,

D Day; d e s t r o y s a n y

enemy e n c o u n t s r e d ( o v e r l a y ) .

3.

if..

86 I i i f D i v :
Attached:
633 AAA A W Bn ( M b l )

7 6 2 Tk En
6 1 0 TD Bn

(SP)

4 0 4 FA Gp (312, 943 FA B n s )
3 Plat,

1 6 F i e l d Hosp

(1)

cidvance i n z o n e t h r o u g h e l e m e n t s o f

UlII a n d X I 1 CcNrps (4 I n f D i v , 1 6 A r m d D i v , 9 Armd

Diu,

a n d 28 I n t D i v ) .

A t t a c k a n d d e s t r o y enemy.

(2) P r o t e c t C o r p s r i g h t ( e a s t ) f l a n K a n d
m a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h X I 1 Corps.

(3) , H a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 26 I n f D i v on

-119-

l e f t (west).

b. 26 I n f D i v : Attached: 398 AAA A W Bn (SP) 8 1 8 TD Bn ( S P )

735 T k Bn

1 9 3 FA Gp (179, 7 5 2 FA E n s !
696 Armd FA E n )

2 P l a t , 59 F i e l d Hosp (1)
enemy. A d ance i n zone. A t t a c k and d e s t r o y

(2)

Ma n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 88 I n f D i v on

r i g h t ( e a s t ) a n d 4 Armd D i v on l e f t ( w e s t ) .

c.

4 Armd D i v :
Attached: 4 8 9 AAA A W En (SP) 7 0 4 TD En (SP)
253 Armd FA 8 n

2 7 4 Armd FA Bn 4 4 4 OM T r k Co 3864 QM T r k C o

1 Plat,

16 F i e l d Hosp

995 E n g r T r e a d w a y E r Co

(1)

A d v a n c e on l e f t o f 26 I n f D i v ;

attack

a n d d e s t r o y a n y enemy e n c o u n t e r e d .

-126-

(Z!)

M a i n t a i n c o n t a c t w i t h 26 I n f D i v on
I

right (east)

(5)
(4) element:.

P r o t e c t Corps l e f t ( w e s t ) . C o n t a c t , when g a i n e d , w i t h

UIII

Corp.5

wi 1 1 be maintained.

d. F i e l d A r t i l l e r y :
(1)

Z B 3 FA Gp:
A t t a c h a d s 176 F A Bn ( 4 . 5 " Gun)

177 FA Bn

15Smm Haw)

731 F A Bn (155mm Gun)

General support

r e i n f o r c e f ir e 5 4 Armd

I ) i v w i t h o n e b a t t a l i o n 155mm G u n s .

(2)

r Y 3 FA Gp: r.)ttached:

696 A r m d FA Bn (185mm How)

17'7 F A Bn
( (

55mm How) 55mm How)

949 F A Bn

C i t t a c h e d t o 26 I n f D i u .

(3)

4 8 4 t h F A Qp: Attached:

512 F A 6n (10Smm How)

752 F A Bn
155mm How)

A t t a c h e d t o 80 I n f D i u .

(4)

:?I53 A r m d

FA B n a t t a c h e d t o 4 A r m d

Div.,

-121

(5)

2 7 4 Armd FA 8 n a t t a c h e d t o 4 Armd D i v

( 6 ) 288 FA Ohsn Bn s u p p o r t o f C o r p s .

e.

3 2 AAA Gp: Attached: Protect:

(1)

4 6 8 AAA A W Bn (SP)

Corps A r t i l l e r y

( 2 ) B r i d g e s and Corps
i n s t a l 1 a t i ons.

f . Tank D e s t r o y e r :
Hq 8 TD Gp a t t a c h e d I 1 1 C r o p s A r t y .

9. A i r S u p p o r t :
F i g h t e r bombers of t h e X I X TAC w i 1 1

support a t t a c k of 111 Corps w i t h c l o s e support m i s s i o n s a n d armed r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o v e r t a c t i c a l a r e a . Squadrons w i l l c o n t a c t Corps and D i v i s i o n A i r Support Party for targets. weather p e r m i t s . T i m e o v e r t a r g e t a r e a a s soon a s

h. Engineers:
(1)

1 1 3 7 E n g r C Gp: Attached: 1 8 3 E n g r C Bn

-1 22-

1 8 8 E n g r C Bn 1 4 5 E n g r C Bn 249 Engr C

Bn
<-)

778 E n g r Dp Trlc CO
632 E n g r LE

Co

(-)

72 E n g r L Pon C o
513 E n g r

L Pon

Co

998 E n g r T r d w r B r Go
3:a)
ch)

Support a t t a c k . Be p r e p a r e d t o a t t a c h one

battalioil to

ii

d i v i s i o n on C o r p s o r d e r .
t.c)

D i r e c t Support;

(1)
L Pon Co a t c h c l j o f 86 D i u
I

1 4 5 E n g r C En ( o n e p l a t E i l : 3

(2)

2 4 9 E n g r C 5 n ( 5 1 3 L Pon C c l

less o n e p l a t i r t c h d ) o f 26 D i u .

188 E n g r C Bn o f 4 A r m d Div.

(2)

Attachments:

'?(?SE n g r T r d w y B r Co a t t a c h e d 4 Armd
Div

:3)

(ieneral Support:
1 .'8 E n g r C Bn.

A t t a c h e d : One P l a t ,

770 E n g r Dp Trlc Ccl.

-1 23-

One P l a t , 632 E n g r LE C o .

i . Corps R e s e r v e :

(1)

26 I n f D i v :

One I n f En t o h e c o m m i t t e d

on C o r p s o r d e r o n l y .

(2)

80 I n f D i v :

One I n f Bn t o h e c o m m i t t e d

on C o r p s o r d e r o n l y .

X.

(1)

B r i d g e s w i l l h e b l o w n on D i v o r d e r

only.

A u t h o r i t y t o blow b r i d g e s may be delegated t o

s u h o r d i n a t e un i ts.

(2)

S t r i c t measures t o i n s u r e ai'r

security

w i l l be e n f o r c e d .

(3)

Each u n i t commander w i l l

taKe s p e c i a l

measures f o r a l l - a r o u n d being surprised.

security to insure against

(4) No g a s o l i n e , weapons, u e h i c l e s , o r
ammunition w i l l
be permitted t o f a l l

i n t o enemy h a n d s

without being destroyed.

(5)

R e p o r t i n g l i n e s ( o v e r l a y ) w i l l h e used

f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n and a s r e f e r e n c e s i n r e p o r t s t o t h i s headquarters.

(6)

Air

i d e n t i f i c a t i o n panels w i l l

be

d i s p l a y e d on a l l v e h i c l e s .

4.

Adm U No. 2,

20 Dec 4 4 .

-124-

5.

a . See l e t t e r o f S i g n a l
Dec 4 4 . C:Ps: N o c h a n g e .

Instructions,

Hq 111

C o r p s , ;:B

tr. ( 1 )

L o c a t i o n s o f new CFs

t o be r e p o r t e d w h e n o c c u p i e d .

(2)

AXES ( s i c )

O F SIG COM :

I 1 1 Corps -

ARLON

ESCHDORF

- WILT2

HAMIUILLE.

26. D i u :
ESCHDORF

EISCHEN

GROSBAUS

IJ1L.TZ

HAMIUILLE. DOMMELANGE

80 D i u :
BISSEN

KEISFELT

BOIJRSCHEID

- WILWERWITZ - CLERF

W E I SWAMPACH

.
4 Armd D i u :
To b e r e p o r t e d .

c.

Radio Silence u n t i l contact gained.

MILLIKIN M a j Gen

OFF1 CI AL :

/s/ MEWSHAW
MEWSHAW
G-cJ

-12:-

APPENDIX FOUR

APPENDIX FOUR

"SERENADE" w a s a p r o c e d u r e d i r e c t e d by T h i r d Army.

I 1 1 Corps p r o b a b l y adapted these p r o c e d u r e s t o

The r e c o r d s d o n o t d i s c u s s t h e i r

t h e i r designs.

standard o p e r a t i n g procedures, b u t the concept would h a v e been t h e same a s p r e s e n t e d i n t h i s A p p e n d i x . X I I C o r p s A r t i 1 1 e r y (who " b r o k e - i n " I I I C o r p s A r t i l l e r y ) adopted t h i s procedure e s s e n t i a l l y verbatim. T h i s p r o c e d u r e i s one o f t h e r e a s o n s why

t h e f i e l d a r t i l l e r y was a b l e t o mass on a s i n g l e t a r g e t so q u i c k l y . More i m p o r t a n t l y , this

i l l u s t r a t e s how s t a n d a r d i z e d p r a c t i c e s f a c i l i t a t e d r e s p o n s e t o r e q u e s t s 1 i k e t h a t o f LTC Abrams d e s c r i b e d i n C h a p t e r One.

T h i s A p p e n d i x h a s been i n c l u d e d because I c o u l d n o t f i n d t h i s p r o c e d u r e d e s c r i b e d i n any of the

l i t e r a t u r e r e v i e w e d i n t h e Combined Arms R e s e a r c h L i b r a r y a t F o r t Leavenworth.

The s o u r c e for t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n i s The G e n e r a l Board REPORT ON STUDY O F F I E L D ARTILLERY GUNNERY F i l e 353.4/1.

S t u d y Number 64, t h i s study.

See b i b l i o g r a p h y o f

- 1 26-

THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY

22 A p r i I

1944

OPERAT I C I N S MEPIURANDUM)

:
NUMBER
1)

SERENADE

1.

T?e p u r p o s e o f

the procedure out1 ined i s tct

herein, which w i l l

be d e s i g n a t e d a s SERENADE,

e x p e d i t e t h e in.assing o f a l l a v a i l a b l e f i r e s w i t h i n a
corps sector

i n e x t r e m e e m e r g e n c y when l a c k o f

time

p r e c l u d e s pi-e.ar-rangement o f f i r e .

The f o l l o w i n g
0.F

SERENAIIE p r o c e d u r e w i 1 1 h e f o l l o w e d by a1 1 u n i t s . t h i s Corninanc~. a. originate with

ia

N o r m a l 1 y a r e q u e s t f o r SERENADE w i 1 1 f o r w a r d o b s e r v e r who t r a n s m i t s t o

the bat:tal ion i ' i r e d i r e c t i o n center the f o l l o w i n g : EXAMPLE

(1)

I'he c o d e word SERENADE, which i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h r e e (3) u o l l e y s a r e t o be f i r e d .

SERENADE

(2)

l'oordinates o f the center t h e a r e a t o be couered.

5301794

(3)

N a t u r e of t a r g e t .

46 t a n k s

b.

The b a t t a l i o n f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r

will

t r a n s m i t t h e r e q u e s t by t e l e p h o n e t o t h e

division a r t i l l e r y f i r e direction center.

I f the

d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y commander (or c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p commander) or h i s a u t h o r i z e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e d e c i d e s t h a t t h e t a r g e t w a r r e n t s ( s i c ) c a l l i n g for f i r e s i n a d d i t i o n t o those o f h i s d i v i s i o n a l group) a r t i l l e r y , he t r a n s m i t s o v e r t h e c o r p s

(or

a r t i l l e r y r a d i o net t o the corps a r t i l l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r h i s r e q u e s t f o r SERENADE. He

includes the d e s i r e d time a t which the concentration

i s to f a l l .

N o r m a l l y Corps and D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y

Commanders s h o u l d r e a l i z e t h a t an a1 l o w a n c e o f t e n t o t w e l v e m i n u t e s m u s t be made t o i n s u r e t h a t a l l battalions w i l l be r e a d y , a n d more t i m e w i l l be

r e q u i r e d i f checks are necessary.

T i m e m u s t be

s y n c h r o n i z e d p e r i o d i c a l l y and each b a t t a l i o n f i r i n g w i l l make i t s own a l l o w a n c e s f o r t i m e o f f l i g h t so t h a t a l l p r o j e c t i l e s a r r i v e simultaneously i n the

target area.
of

I f s u r p r i s e f i r e i s n o t d e s i r e d because

the e x i g e n c i e s of the s i t u a t i o n ,

t h e w o r d s "When

r e a d y " w i l l b e u s e d a n d f i r i n g commenced a s s o o n as possible. E x a m p l e of d i v i s i o n (or c o r p s g r o u p )

a r t i l l e r y r e q u e s t f o r SERENADE: SERENADE

J3B 1794

-1 28-

46 t a n k s
1 4 3 5 ( o r "when r e a d y " )

c.
profitable,

I f the t a r g e t

i s deemed s u f f i c i e n t l ) ,

the c o r p s a r t i l l e r y f i r e d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r

a s s i g n s t h e m i s s i o n t o a l l h e a d q u a r t e r s whose f i r e capabi 1 i t i e s p e r m i t , a n d who a r e n o t e n g a g e d on a (Note: A l l c o r p s and

more i m p o r t a n t m i s s i o n .

d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y u n i t s w i l l h a v e been a l e r t e d upon h e a r i n g t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n f o r SERENADE o v e r a r t i l l e r y radio net ) the corps

d.

F i r ng procedure:
(

Each b a t t a l i o n ,

firing with and

i t s normal s h e a f ,

c e n t e r e d on t h e c o o r d i n a t e s given, f i r e s t h r e e (3)

v o l l e y s a t c e n t e r range.

( 2 ) T a r g e t s of m o r e t h a t 466 yard!;
i n w i d t h or depth are covered
by i n c l u d i n g an a d d l t i o n a l

sel:

of for

c o o r d i n a t e s i n t h e reques't SERENADE. When m o r e t h a n

one s e t o f c o o r d i n a t e s a r e g i v e n the method o f a t t a c k

w i l l be announced.

-1 2P-

e.

I f the forward observer decides that

i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o c o n t i n u e t h e f i r i n g on t h e t a r g e t , h e r e p o r t s "REPEAT SERENADE". The b a t t a l i o n f i r e

d i r e c t i o n c e n t e r w i l l r e l a y t h e r e q u e s t by t e l e p h o n e t o t h e d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y (or c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p ) f i r e d i r e c t i o n center.
I f the d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y

commander ( o r c o r p s a r t i l l e r y g r o u p commander) o r h i s authorized representative decides the request i s warranted, he w i l l transmit over the corps a r t i l l e r y Each b a t t a l i o n

r a d i o n e t "REPEAT SERENADE".

p r e v i o u s l y assigned the mission w i l l repeat the f i r i n g w i thaut d e l a y or f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n u n l e s s d i r e c t e d o t h e r w i s e by i t s h i g h e r a r t i l l e r y headquarters.

f.

E x t r e m e c a r e m u s t be e x e r c i s e d t o l o c a t i o n on a n y r e q u e s t f o r

insure the accuracy of SERENADE.

T h i s i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f commanders T h e y w i l l be

o f a l l e c h e l o n s hand1 i n g such r e q u e s t s .
responsible that

the coordinates given are accurate

a n d t h a t f r i e n d l y t r o o p s a r e n o t e n d a n g e r e d by t h e shoot. I n addition, they are responsible t h a t the and t h a t the t a r g e t

If

requests are j u s t i f i a b l e ,

w a r r e n t s (sic.) s u c h an e x p e n d i t u r e o f a m m u n i t i o n . there

i s any q u e s t i o n a s t o t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e i s necessary the

t a r g e t and a d j u s t m e n t of f i r e

m i s s i o n t h e n becomes one n o t o f SERENADE b u t o f

-136-

a d j u s t m e n t and a r e q u e s t f o r a d d i t i o n a l f i r e s and reinforcement.

By

commmand o f L i e u t e n a n t G e n e r a l PATTOI'I

/S/

R. W. R. W.

Hartman

HARTMAN
G.

L t Col, A .

D.

A s s t , A d j Gen.

BOOKS

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A l l o f t h e b e l o w l i s t e d r e p o r t s a r e u n d a t e d , .nrld g i v e n o i n d i c a t i o n o f pub1 i c a t i o n l o c a t i o n s . I n c l u c e c l w i t h e a c h t i t l e i s t h e f i l e number c o n t a i n e d i n t h e r e p o r t a n d t h e s t u d y number. A l l r e p o r t s c o n t a i n t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n cln t h e t i t l e page " T h e G e n e r a l B o a r d was e s t a b ) i s h e ' d by Genere1 O r d e r s 128, H e a d q u a r t e r s E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r af O p e r a t i o n s , US Army, d a t e d 17 June 1945, a s amended by G e n e r a l O r d e r s 182, d a t e d 7 Augi1s.t 1945 a n d G e n e r a l O r d e r s 3 1 2 d a t e d 26 November 1 9 4 5 , H e a d q u a r t e r s U n i t e d S t a t e s F o r c e s , European Theater, t o prepare a f a c t u a l a n a l y s i s o f the s t r a t e g y , t a c t i c s , a n d admi n i s t r a t i on emp 1 o y e d

by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r c e s i n t h e E u r o p e a n T h e a t e r .I'

" R e p o r t on t h e S t u d y o f F i e l d A r t i l l e r y O p e r a t i o n s . . " F i l e number 3 7 0 / 4 , S t u d y number 61. " R e p o r t on S t u d y of F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Communications." F i l e number 311/1, S t u d y number 63. "Ammunition S u p p l y and O p e r a t i o n s , European C a m p a i g n . " F i l e number 471/2, S t u d y number 10B. " R e p o r t on A m m u n i t i o n S u p p l y f o r F i e l d A r t i l l e r y . " F i l e number 471/1, S t u d y number 58. " L i a i s o n A i r c r a f t w i t h Ground F o r c e U n i t s . " F i l e number 452.1/2, S t u d y number 2 0 . " R e p o r t on S t u d y o f F i e l d A r t i l l e r y G u n n e r y . " F i l e number 3 5 3 . 4 / 1 , S t u d y number 6 4 . " R e p o r t on S t u d y o f t h e F i e l d A r t i l l e r y G r o u p . " F i l e number 328.2/62, S t u d y number 65.

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES MG " I n f a n t r y D i v i s i o n i n E u r o p e . " B l a k e l e y , H. W . . , F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Journal 36 (May 1 9 4 6 ) : 262268. Burns, J o h n T . COL " T h e E m p l o y m e n t o f Corps. A r t i l l e r y . " F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Journal 3 3 ( M a r c h 943): 2 1 6 .

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."

Mi 1 itary

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. I -

S o m e r u i l l e , Duncan S. LTC " C o r p s a n d N o n - D i u i s i o n a l R r t i I " e r - ~ . ~ . "F i e l d A r t i l l e r y J o u r n a l 34 ( S c p tc!ml)+r. 1 9 4 4 ) : 622-624.

-,

37-

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION L I S T

1.

Combined A r m s Research L i b r a r y U . S. A r m y Command and Gener al S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , Kansas 66627 Defense T e c h n i c a l I n f o r m a t i o n C e n t e r Cameron S t a t i o n A l e x a n d r i a, U i r g i n i a 22314 LTC John H i xson Combat S t u d i e s I n s t i t u t e F o r t Leavenwor t h , Kansas

2.

3.

66827

4.

LTC John M a r t i n D e p a rtme n t, J o i n t and Combined O p e r a t i o n 6 U. S. A r m y Command And General S t a f f C o l l e g e F o r t Leavenwor t h 66627

5.

COL Clayton Freeark c/o U i r e c t o r , Graduate Degree Programs U. S. A r m y Command And General S t a f t : C o l l e g e F o r t L e a v e n w o r t h , Kansas 66627
Commander I 1 1 Corps A r t i l l e r y Fort Si 1 1 Okl ahoma

6.

73563

7.

Commander U C o rp s A r t i l l e r y Germany Comman de r

8.

UII C o rp s A r t i l l e r y
Germany

9.

Comm an dan t U . S. A r m y F i e l d A r t i l l e r y C e n t e r and School F o r t S i l l , Oklahoma 73561

1 8 . Commander I X Corps A r t i l l e r y F o r t L e w i s , W a s hi ngton

11. M o r r i s S w e t t T e c h n i c a l L i b r a r y c / o M r . Les M i l l e r F o r t S i l l , Oklahoma 73563

- 1 38-

12. Plrs John I ? . M o r t o n 729 S h e l h m S t r e e t Ravenna., i!h i o 44266

1 3 , The D e f i a n c e C o l l e g e c / o M r R . Buchman N o r t h C1 i r - I t o n S t r e e t D e f i a n c e , Oh I o 43512 14. Mrs. W i l l i a m B e r n i e r 984 Broad S t r e e t Warrensaur 8 , Missouri 15. L-r Dan C o t t o n e 852 P u r l - i I I R d . A p t 12 F o r t S i I , Oklahoma 73563 1 6 . Mr Robfnr t M o r t o n 7211 E a s t tl..iin S t r e e t K e n t , O h i o 44240

1 7 . M r . David Newton 1 H i dgeu i E.UJ T e r r a c e 12518 C o r n w a l 1 , New York

18. COL Plac D. S a n d e r s 5609 Heminq A v e . Sprinyfielci, U i r g i n i a
19.

22151

LTC B r i a , ? W a r r e n 121 R i v e r Road G a r d i n e r , 1I.aine 0 4 3 4 5