Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Study for Acme Widget Plant, Boomtown, USA
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 Results
An arc-flash hazard mitigation study was completed for the Acme Widget Plant in Boomtown, USA using the ETAP Electrical Engineering Software Program by Operation Technology, Inc. These are the key findings of this electrical engineering study: ! Using the methodology prescribed by [1], only three (3) equipment buses within the plant were computed with an arc flash hazard incident energy level greater than 40cal/cm2. These locations will be referred to as hotspots within this report. It was not possible to reduce the incident energy at any of these three (3) locations: Square-D Main 2000A Switchboard, Square-D I-Line Panelboard, and GE Series A Panelboard; therefore, energized work at these locations is strictly prohibited until further notice. Twenty (20) overcurrent protective devices were reported with short circuit current interrupting ratings less than the computed bus available fault current. This situation is a serious safety concern for electrical maintenance personnel and should be addressed immediately. In general, the majority of the buses at the plant exhibited a computed arc flash hazard risk Category 0 (zero).

1.2

Recommendations

After reviewing the results of the Arc-Flash Hazard Analysis, the following actions are recommended:
Immediate

a. There are currently three (3) incident energy hotspots in the plant where mitigation was not possible. Since mitigation was not possible, any energized work at these locations is strictly prohibited until further notice. Note: Strong consideration should be given to install main overcurrent protection devices at the Main Square-D 2000A Switchboard, Square-D ILine Panelboard, and the GE Series A Panelboard. Properly selection and adjustment of these devices can significantly reduce the existing high incident energy levels presently computed at these locations.

Immediate

b. Replace the twenty (20) overcurrent protective devices found with inadequate short circuit interrupting ratings. An alternative solution would be to add current limiting reactors, but this would need to be further evaluated to analyze the impact on bus arc flash incident energy calculations and load flow voltage through out the plant. c. Install the arc flash hazard study warning labels on applicable equipment throughout the plant, IAW [2]. Whenever changes are made to the power system, subsequent studies may be required to validate existing settings of devices. P-1

Immediat e

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

Intermediate

Preventiv e

d. Install new 60A circuit breaker feeding Sump Pump at MCC E301 to replace existing 50A device in order to reduce IE from Category 3 to Category 0; change existing #3 Pallet Machine Siemens ED4 125A circuit breaker with Siemens Type FD6-A 100A and replace upstream Square-D 100A breaker with Siemens FD6-A 175 for improved selective coordination. e. Continue to perform routine preventive maintenance on all circuit breakers and electrical equipment as recommended by [3] at regular service intervals. f. Always insist that all electrical contractors and other outside construction personnel servicing, maintaining, and/or making adjustments to energized power system equipment are equipped with properly rated PPE based upon the results of this arc flash study prior to start of work.

Preventiv e

2. INTRODUCTION
2.1
! !

Objectives
To investigate existing arc flash hazard incident energy (IE) levels at the Acme Widget Plant. To improve the coordination and selectivity between upstream and downstream overcurrent protective devices at the plant, if possible, without compromising equipment protection boundaries and selective coordination between upstream and downstream overcurrent protection devices.. To report all overcurrent protective devices with inadequate short circuit current interrupting ratings based upon the computed available fault current.

The primary goals of this study were as follows:

2.2

Methodology

Field data provided for the electrical power system at the Acme Widget Plant was used to construct a digital computer model for detailed electrical engineering analysis with the ETAP software program. Some examples of the typical field data required to perform this analysis include: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Motor Nameplate Conductor Sizes and Lengths Transformer Nameplate Utility Thevenin Impedance Breaker Ratings, Settings, and OEM Fuse Ratings and OEM Equipment Bus Short Circuit Rating

The ETAP computer model of the electrical one-line diagram of the Acme Widget depicting the 4.16 kV and 0.48 kV secondary distribution systems is shown in Fig. 1. The analysis includes a Base scenario based upon existing plant conditions and a Revision 1 scenario based upon modified device settings and ratings to provide the lowest possible arc flash incident energy levels while achieving the best selective P-2

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

coordination between upstream and downstream overcurrent protective devices without compromising existing equipment protection boundaries. An arc-flash hazard analysis is an electrical engineering study to determine the risk of personnel injury as a result of exposure to incident energy released during an electric arc-flash event [3]. Computed incident energy levels are largely dependent upon the computed available fault current and device clearing times, which are produced by short circuit current and protective device coordination studies. Based upon the results of the arc flash hazard study, the rating of personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, flame retardant shirts and pants, eye protection, etccan be properly selected for adequate personnel protection as required by [1]. Two separate scenarios were created in this study in order to compare the existing conditions and settings with modified or recommended settings to provide the lowest possible incident energy levels at plant equipment buses. Please refer to the following report sections for more detailed discussions: ! Section 3: Short Circuit Study, this section includes the methodology used in calculating the available fault currents, utility source impedance information, assumed modes of operation and the available fault currents at each bus location.

Fig. 1. ETAP Electrical One-Line Diagram Computer Model of Acme Widget Plant

Section 4: Protective Device Coordination Study, this section includes a list of locations where coordination discrepancies exist, possible solutions and the time current characteristic curves (TCC) for the plant protective devices, including the recommended device trip settings, plotted graphically on log-log scale paper. Section 5: Arc Flash Hazard Analysis, this section includes a list of arc-flash problem areas, possible solutions and a detailed AFHA report of the Acme Widget Plant.

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Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

! !

Section 6: Input Data, this section includes a list of assumptions, existing and recommended settings of the protective devices and One-line drawings. Section 7: References, this section includes a list of references used in this report and Acknowledgements.

3. SHORT CIRCUIT STUDY

3.1 Discussion
Short circuit current Studies are performed to determine the magnitude of currents flowing throughout the power systems at various time intervals after a fault or abnormal condition occurs [4], [6]. These currents must be calculated in order to adequately specify electrical equipment bus withstand ratings and overcurrent protective device interrupting duties. Computer modeling using the ETAP Electrical Engineering software program by OTI was done by expressing the per unit impedances of all relevant electrical power system components (i.e., Transformers, motors, cables, etc) on a common 100 MVA base and using symmetrical components theory to derive available fault current values at each specific bus. According to the ETAP study results, there are currently twenty (20) overcurrent protective devices at the Acme Widget Plant with inadequate short circuit current withstand and/or interrupting ratings. In the event of a short circuit current event at any of these locations, the electrical equipment and devices will be subjected to a violent, catastrophic failure and permanent damage. Plant maintenance personnel working near these locations at the time of a bus fault may also suffer serious bodily injury. Note that an arc flash hazard analysis is dependent upon the three-phase bolted fault current computed at each bus for the determination of the arcing fault current, incident energy, and flash protection boundary.

3.2

Utility Source Impedance Information

Once an accurate one-line diagram drawing of the power system is provided, the next crucial and often time consuming step of a short circuit current study is usually obtaining the Utility Thevenin Impedance Data. In this case, Tasmanian Devil Power Co. provided the Utility Thevenin impedance expressed in percent (%) on a100 MVA base, and it is as follows for both services:
Positive sequence: Zero sequence: 4.43% +j77.0% 3.87%+j73.4%

3.3

ANSI/IEEE Fault Current Report

ETAP provides two short current calculation methods based on either ANSI/IEEE or IEC (European) Industry Standards. The following summarizes the ANSI/IEEE short-circuit current method based upon [8], [9], [10], [11]:

3.3.1 ! Cycle Network

This network impedance is used to compute the momentary short circuit current and protective device duties at ! cycle after the fault occurs. This fault current is used to validate the following: Device Type Duty P-4

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

! ! ! ! !

HV CB LV CB Fuse SWGR/MCC Relay

Closing & Latching Rating Interrupting Rating Interrupting Rating Bus Bracing Rating Instantaneous Trip Settings

The ! Cycle Network is also preferred to as the subtransient impedance network, primarily because all of the AC rotating machines are represented by their subtransient reactance (Xd), as indicated below: Machine Type ! ! ! Turbo-Generator Utility Induction Machines: o >1000 Hp @1800 Rpm or Less o >250 Hp @ 3600 Rpm o All Other "50 Hp o <50 Hp Short Circuit Impedance XD X XD XD 1.2 XD 1.67 XD

3.3.2 1! - 4 Cycle Network

This network impedance is used to calculate the interrupting short circuit current and protective device duties 1! - 4 cycles after the fault occurs. This fault current, also referred to symmetrical fault current, is used to validate the following: Device Type ! ! ! ! ! HV CB LV CB Fuse SWGR/MCC Relay Duty Interrupting Rating N/A N/A N/A N/A

The 1! - 4 Cycle Network is also referred to the transient impedance network. The type of rotating machines and their representation in this network are as follows: Machine Type ! ! ! Turbo-Generator Utility Induction Machines: o >1000 Hp @1800 Rpm or Less o >250 Hp @ 3600 Rpm o All Other "50 Hp o <50 Hp P-5 Short Circuit Impedance XD X 1.5 XD 1.5 XD 3.0 XD Infinity (#)

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

3.3.3 30 Cycle Network

This network impedance is used to calculate the steady-state short circuit current and protective device duties 30 cycles after the fault occurs. This fault current is used to validate the following: Device Type ! ! ! ! ! HV CB LV CB Fuse SWGR/MCC Relay Duty N/A N/A N/A N/A Overcurrent Settings

The type of rotating machines and their representation in the 30-cycle network are as follows: Machine Type ! ! ! Turbo-Generator Utility Induction Motors Short Circuit Impedance XD X Infinity (#)

3.3.4 Short Circuit Summary Report

The summary report listing the results of the Acme Widget Plant fault Current Study is provided in Appendix A.

4. PROTECTIVE DEVICE COORDINATION STUDY

4.1 Discussion
The main objectives of the protective device coordination study are to prevent injury to personnel, to minimize damage to system components, and to limit the extent and duration of service interruption whenever equipment failure, human error, or adverse natural events occur on any portion of the electrical power system [4]. The term selective coordination simply implies that devices are carefully selected or adjusted to trip or operate in a certain desired sequence during fault conditions, preferably beginning with the device closest to the fault followed by the upstream protector(s). Using this methodology, extensive plant outages and safety hazards to personnel and equipment can be avoided by localizing faults to the closest protective device [2]. Based on stated objectives, the settings of molded case circuit breakers (MCCB) and static trip units (STU) were carefully analyzed and adjusted - wherever device adjustments were permissible - in order to obtain selectivity between upstream and downstream overcurrent protective devices without compromising equipment protective boundaries, transformer inrush, and motor starting criteria.

4.2

Coordination Discrepancies

Coordination discrepancies are best shown graphically by TCCs which overlap creating an incorrect device tripping sequence. The undesired operation of circuit breakers and can be modified simply by adjusting trip settings to greater than the computed fault P-6

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

current levels (And vice-versa). This operation is preferred to as blocking and is represented mathematically by the following expressions: |IF| > |Ip| |IF| < |Ip| Where: IF = Fault Current IP = Pick-Up Current This functional dependence between IF and IP is illustrated graphically in Fig. 2[7]. In this study, very few opportunities for adjustments were possible due to the installation of mostly MCCBs with fixed settings and fuses; however, one coordination discrepancy of note was found between MCC feeder breaker at the Square-D 2000A Switchboard and the downstream main circuit breaker installed at MCC E301. According to the existing settings, the upstream device will trip before the downstream device in the event of a fault at the MCC bus which is an example of an improper device tripping sequence. This discrepancy can be corrected by making proper adjustments to the long time and instantaneous settings of the upstream device and is graphically illustrated in Appendix B. : Trip : Do Not Trip (Block) (1) (2)

Figure 2. Graphical representation of trip and blocking regions of an over protective device in the complex plane. Device pickup current |IP| on this diagram shows operation or blocking and operating time. Time T2 is earlier than T1 [7].

Trip Curves and Settings

Time-current characteristic tripping curves (TCCs) of all applicable fuses, and circuit breakers found in this study are provided in Appendix B. The curves are plotted on log-log scale and shown for a Base Case, which represents existing plant device settings, and a Revision 1 Case with revised settings required to attain selective coordination and reduced arc flash hazard incident energy levels (Where possible). Also shown are transformer inrush/damage curves, motor starting profile curves, cable and P-7

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

conductor thermal curves, and a miniature section of the one-line diagram where the devices are taken from. These curves and points are plotted to provide a visual, graphical representation of the existing equipment protection boundaries for proper coordination and application of overcurrent protective devices.

5. ARC FLASH HAZARD ANALYSIS

5.1 Discussion
The ultimate goal of an arc-flash hazard analysis (AFHA) is to compute incident energy levels and flash protection boundary distances at all relevant equipment buses in order to increase awareness of plant personnel and others performing energized work around these areas and to provide adequately rated personal protective equipment (PPE), as prescribed by [5]. Incident energy (IE) level magnitudes, measured in cal/cm2 or joules/cm2, are dependent upon the available 3-phase fault current computed at equipment buses, and perhaps to an even greater degree, the actual total fault current clearing time of the upstream overcurrent protective device(s). Note that according to [1], arc flash hazard calculations pertain to three-phase electrical power systems only. Single-phase power systems and equipment encountered at the plant are not included in the arc flash calculations in this study! Wherever possible, the primary objective is to reduce or mitigate incident energy levels by adjusting device trip settings to operative at or below the computed arcing fault current, which is proportional to the 3-phase fault current. Personal protective clothing and equipment (PPE) hazard/risk categories 0-4 are specified in [5] with the intent of limiting skin burn injuries to survivable. PPE category 4 is the highest of the hazard/risk categories recognized by [5] and requires a minimum arc thermal performance exposure value (ATPV) of 40 cal/cm2 to limit the heat transfer through the material or fabric to a second degree curable burn based upon the Stoll curve. Incident energy levels computed above 40 cal/cm2 are preferred to as hotspots within this report and energized work at these locations If mitigation techniques are ineffective should be strictly prohibited.

5.2

Arc Flash Results

Originally, three (3) hotspots (I.E. > 40 cal/cm2) were reported by ETAP in the Acme Widget Plant. After performing the overcurrent protective device coordination study, it was not possible to reduce the IE at any of these locations. Therefore, energized electrical work should be strictly prohibited at these locations. A complete list of arc flash results based upon existing plant conditions and recommended changes are given in Appendix C. An observation which universally applies to these three (3) buses is that all are connected to the secondary of step-down transformers. It is a well documented physical phenomenon that upstream overcurrent protection devices on the primary side of stepdown transformers respond relatively slow to secondary bus faults which results in longer clearing times and significantly higher incident energy levels. The fact that there are no overcurrent protection devices installed at these three (3) locations where the tap conductor terminates from the transformer secondary terminals offers little solace in providing a means to manage the high IE levels. P-8

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

In addition, it has been well documented that a lack of timely electrical preventive maintenance and testing of power circuit breakers could result over time in slower operating/tripping times leading to higher incident energy levels [12]. Therefore, routine preventive maintenance testing of all plant protective relays and power circuit breakers with solid-state trip devices is highly encouraged and recommended. Although higher available fault current levels can affect bus incident energy levels, the results of this study demonstrated that long device clearing times can have an even greater impact.

6. INPUT DATA
6.1 Assumptions
In instances where credible data was not supplied or available, valid engineering assumptions for the ETAP computer model were made based upon the specific application and professional engineering experience and judgment. The following are known assumptions for this study: ! ! ! ! ! 1500 kVA for isolation transformer supplying Mycom Compressor and 1000 kVA for Frick Compressor with typical ANSI/IEEE X/R ratio and %Z 1.0 Hp rating for Glycol Pump supplied from MCC E301 5.0 Hp combined Hp rating for Mezzanine Exhaust Fans 0.75 Hp rating for Saw Fan Exhaust & 15 Hp for Cooling Tower Fan %Z=3.0 (nominal kVA Base) Main 13.8 kV-480/277 V, 500 kVA transformer Tasmanian Devil Power Engineers Handbook

6.2

Study Data

A complete listing all electrical power system and component data entered into the ETAP computer model for this study is provided in Appendix D.

7. REFERENCES
7.1. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the Acme Widget Plant Plant, in particularly Mr. B. Bunny, for his patience and logistical assistance throughout this project.

7.2. Bibliography
1. IEEE Standard 1584, IEEE Guide For Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, 2002. 2. NFPA Standard 70, National Electrical Code, 2005. 3. International Electrical Testing Association (NETA), Maintenance Testing Specifications For Electrical Power Distribution Equipment And Systems, 2005. 4. IEEE Standard 242 (Buff Book), IEEE Recommended Practice for Protection and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems, 1986. 5. NFPA Standard 70E, Standard For Electrical Safety Requirements For Employee Workplaces, 2004. P-9

Arc Flash Mitigation & Device Coordination Analyses Acme Widget Plant

Boomtown, USA

6. IEEE Standard 399 (Brown Book), IEEE Recommended Practice for Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Analysis, 1990. 7. Stevenson, William D, Jr., Elements of Power System Analysis, McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1982. 8. ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.04, Standard Rating Structure for AC High Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis, 1999. 9. ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.010, Standard Application Guide for AC High Voltage Circuit Breakers Rated on a Symmetrical Current Basis, 1999. 10. ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.13, Standard for Low-Voltage AC Circuit Breakers Used in Enclosures, 1990. 11. ANSI/IEEE Standard C37.20.1, Standard for Metal Enclosed Low-Voltage Power Circuit Breaker Switchgear, 2002. 12. Neitzel, Dennis K., Protective Devices Maintenance as It Applies To the Arc/Flash Hazard, 2004.

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