MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event:
Type of event: Intervie~"" ...II~FBIWashington Field Office Language

Supervisor)
Date: August 6, 2003
Special Access Issues: None
/~,/9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
Prepared by: Michael Jacobson,

Team Number: 6
Location: FBI Washington Field Office
Participants - Non-Commission: fB'! Assistant General Counsel Sean O'Neill
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Participants - Commission: Lance Cole and Mike Jacobson

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://Bad{ground

I lb~gan working at the JBI straight out of high school. She went to
college while working at the FBI, .and graduated from the University of Maryland. She is
now working on a MAlPhD in the psychology of terrorism. When she first joined the
FBI, she worked in the mail rOQ.tTI.and/she then transferred to the security office. She
went to New Agents class, but/did not/become an agent, and came back to WFO as an
intelligence analyst instead. She was/an Intelligence Research Specialist on an
International Terrorist squad: from 1~96 until approximately a month ago. At that time,
she was assigned to the ne~ly created Intelligence Squad, and became an Intelligence
Operations Specialist. I ,/ ~tated that all of the analysts at WFO have now been
assigned to this squad, and that all of the analysts are now considered "Intelligence
Operations Specialists:~?'

Working on the JOlnt InteUigence Task Force & Analytic and Intelligence Reforms

I Ihas a pending project on the overall understanding of al-Qa'ida,

by
analyzing the Infonnation on the al-Qa'ida subjects ofWFO. She used to do primary
case support, working at the direction of the agents on her squad. Generally, leads would
come in that supervisors needed covered, and some of these leads would be assigned to
her. Her current squad is DT -4, and is a "Joint Intelligence Task Force." She was
. originally on IT -3, which was also called NS-14, and CT -4 in the past. Her "old" squad
was responsible for Barnas, PIJ, and Hizbollah, and al-Qa'ida. Although they were
responsible for al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11, it has become more of a focus. They were the
only squad at WFO with any responsibility for al-Qa'ida prior to 9/11. After 9/11, they
became the PENTTBOM squad, which still included Hamas, Hizbollah, etc.
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As far as career development. they are supposed to be hiring GS-I3 analytic

supervisors. The field office will Iose analysts if they don't get on the bandwagon in
terms of promotional opportunities. Currently, the opportunities at the field office are
a....
limited; analysts can only be promoted to GS-12. They are planning to bring in Reports
Officers and Intelligence Analysis, who will.be eligible for promotion to a GS-13. She
has heard that all of this hiring i$ on hold, but ...she doesn't know why. She might consider
going to HQ at some point. I ! /' lImowS--..yerylittle and has heard very little about
the Office of Intelligence. / "

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ACC~~S to databases and int~~Ugenceproducts

As far as access t~ da~bases and tecbnolog;;1 !Said that WFO has

ICON, RAID, Intelink, and analysts' notebook. She's not accessing any databases with
shared information. She has! an Intelink password, but has never used it. She doesn't
know about other analysts' lise of Intelink. She's not working on Intelligence
Information Reports; another analyst is working on those. She uses ACS, and says that
this is always the first: place you look for information. She doesn't know what other
analysts are doing. Reports Officers may be assigned to her squad, but she has been told
that is on hold. ; ,

I Jdoes not really see intelligence products. She also does not have a lot
of interaction with the HQ analysts. She doesn't know whether CIA or NSA analysts will
be assigned to her squad/ and she does not have daily contact with the NSA or CIA
people at WFO. She didnote that a lot is changing though. She has never tasked others
for analytic products, 3.Qid hasn't really initiated analytic products. Until now, it's
primarily just been case' support.

Knowledge of other squads' cases

It's difficult to/know what other squads are working on. People don't typically go
around comparing cases, There is more willingness now (after 9/11) to go help other
squads, but the only formal mechanism for sharing information is through the supervisor.
The intelligence squad (her squad) is trying to get people to understand that they need to
share this information. She doesn't know what plan is in place to try and make this work,
however.

HO centralization

I ,has not heard much about HQ centralization efforts. She doesn't think
that HQ is going to become the office of origin on al-Qa'ida cases. Investigations are
still field office drive, but a lot is directed from HQ. As to whether or not this is a
change, she said that it could just be more obvious now. Since 9/11, everyone has had
more of a focus.

John Walker Lindh investigation

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~_~_ ....fc~ent supkrvisor i~1 I The squad used to be the

criminal intelligence squad, where all of the criminal analysts were assigned. .Her squad
is responsible for intelligence relating to FeI, IT, DT, and criminal matters. The analysts
are all still focusing on the same matters that they have in the past. The current
arrangement has been confusi",ng, because a lot of people are reporting to her one
supervisor.

Her assignments have typically come through the supervisor and are based on the
needs of the squad. She is still awaiting approval for her al-Qa'ida overview project. She
worked on the John Walker/Lindh case (discussed in greater detail below). She is trying
to keep it 50-50, in terms of long-term strategic assignments versus case support. So far,
though it's been more likej90% case support, and 10% "other." She is not sure whether
what she is doing is representative of other analysts. She's not sure what they are
working on. She is regularly called to help staff the command post at WFO, and is
usually one of the first ones called when there is a crisis.

The plan for her new squad is to have half the analysts do case support, and have
half do strategic analysis. She's not aware that anyone is doing strategic analysis at this
point. Once again, she/emphasized that she will be doing the al-Qa'ida overview in the
future. ./

In terms of the' "big picture" at WFO, the new squad will help put the focus on
, intelligence and will eentralize the intelligence efforts onto one squad. The hope is that
they will use analysts more for intelligence analysis than the cover leads. There have
some changes; she doesn't think that prior to 9/11 she would have been involved in the
Lindh case. Prior td 9/11 they were just covering leads, and at least now they are
becoming more involved incase support.

I I~ticipates that the strategic analysts at WFO will have similar roles to
those of the strategic analysts at HQ. There will be much more communication between
these field and HQ analysts, though she's not exactly sure as to what the HQ analysts will
be doing. A lot of responsibility for making this work 'will fall to her supervisor. The
supervisor will be responsible for about 45-50 people (30 analysts and 15 agents). The
agents on the squad will focus on liaison and on reviewing what information WFO has in
its possession.

Her squad will be involved in asset validation. They will be looking through asset
information, and through files for their assessments. She anticipates some push back
when she wants access to the source information, but thinks she will be backed up by
higher level people in the office, so she will get access to what she needs. Normally,
source information just goes to the case file. She is hoping that the analysts and
intelligence personnel will begin to drive the investigations, but is not sure how soon that
will happen. There hasn't been much of a reaction to this point by case agents about this
concept, but it's just the beginning. She doesn't think that the agents will be happy about
this.