Running Head: Human Flourishing

Should human flourishing be the definition of good? Taylor J. Hawkins ortland State !ni"ersity

Human Flourishing Res#onse to $uestion %ne

Should human flourishing be the definition of good? Is the flourishing of the human species (or conscious creatures) truly the best or most desirable moral good? What would Harris say? Do you agree or disagree? Why? &hen #osed with the 'uestion( Should human flourishing be the definition of good( ) am sus#e*t that the *orre*t answer is no. Howe"er( ) do grant that it is #ossible for human flourishing to be +a, definition of good. - sim#le .ustifi*ation for my re.e*tion of human flourishing as +the, definition of good would be that( #erha#s ) define a matter of taste( whi*h is not ne*essarily e'ui"alent to human flourishing( to be good. For e/am#le( ) might define masturbation as good( by whi*h ) mean #leasurable 0at least to myself1( while it is arguably not e'ui"alent to human flourishing( although definition and #ers#e*ti"e are of im#ortan*e here2 it would seem to me that an indi"idual masturbating is not an e/am#le of human flourishing. 3o"ing #ast sensual indulgen*es( we might *onsider whether the flourishing of *ons*ious *reatures is the most desirable moral good. Harris 045651 suggests that morality should regard ma/imi7ing the wellbeing of *ons*ious *reatures 0#.661. )n fa*t( he so boldly *laims that this is the only thing we *an reasonably "alue. -t this #oint ) find myself in need of defining se"eral keywords to ensure a more a##ro#riate inter#retation of his meaning. )nterestingly enough( Harris 045661 defines *ons*iousness as unadorned sentien*e. Harris 045651 defines good to be that whi*h su##orts wellbeing 0#.641. -t this #oint Harris seems to be suggesting that a moral good is that( whi*h #romotes the wellbeing of unadorned sentient *reatures. &ith this definition of a moral good( our *onsideration be*omes +whether the flourishing of unadorned sentient *reatures is the most desirable thing that #romotes the wellbeing of unadorned sentient *reatures., This seems to be nonsensi*al( as ) seem to be *onsidering whether the result of a moral good is the most desirable

Human Flourishing

moral good. ) think it is safe to say that the result of a moral good is not the most desirable moral good( as the result of a moral good is not itself a moral good. That is to say( the out*ome of an a*tion is not itself the a*tion. 8ue to the *onsideration be*oming nonsensi*al when ado#ting the definitions #ro"ided by Harris( we might *onsider why we would a**e#t his definitions to begin with or whether we are asking the right 'uestion. ) would argue that the reason we a**e#t his definitions is to understand his arguments( as his arguments may be*ome meaningless if his "o*abulary is redefined. )f we re.e*t his definitions and use definitions #ro"ided by another sour*e( we may #erha#s arri"e at a more rational result in regards to our *onsideration( although it may no longer be rele"ant to the arguments #resented by Harris. Howe"er( #erha#s what we ha"e been meaning to *onsider is the idea of ma/imi7ing the wellbeing of sentient *reatures. -**ording to his definitions #re"iously mentioned( Harris *laims the only thing we should and *an reasonably "alue is the ma/imi7ation of the wellbeing of sentient *reatures. )t is interesting to note that Harris states sentient *reatures and not sim#ly humans. To endea"or to *om#rehend the "astness of this #otential "alue( we might *onsider what *reatures *lassify as sentient. 8un*an 045591 suggests that o"er the #ast twenty fi"e years( animal welfare s*ien*e has de"elo#ed methods to indire*tly determine what animals are feeling( whi*h allows for the a**e#tan*e that at the "ery least( *ommonly farmed animals are sentient. S:mme 0455;1 defines the *a#a*ity of feeling as sentien*e( whi*h is the basis for e/#erien*e of stress and #ain. S:mme *on*ludes that most in"ertebrates are #robably unable to feel #ain( although more resear*h is needed. Howe"er( while the un*ertainty remains( it is suggested that *on*ern be gi"en to more ad"an*ed in"ertebrates( su*h as <e#halo#ods. )f this is what Harris means by sentient *reatures( then not only should we be interested in

Human Flourishing ma/imi7ing the wellbeing of humans( but also the wellbeing of a "astly e/#ansi"e array of animal s#e*ies. Sin*e the "alue #ro#osed by Harris is not dis*riminate between any two s#e*ies( it would seem that this means we should be seeking to ma/imi7e the wellbeing of all the thus deemed sentient s#e*ies e'ually. The #ro*ess of ena*ting this "alue is not only seemingly im#ra*ti*al( but ) would argue that it may 'uite #ossibly be im#ossible and #erha#s "oid of meaning due to its utter e/#ansi"eness. Howe"er( Harris 045651 seems to *on*ede this( as he a**e#ts that it would be ethi*al for

humanity to be sa*rifi*ed for the unimaginably "ast ha##iness of some hy#otheti*al su#er>beings 0#.44?1. )t would seem to then follow from this logi* that it would be ethi*al for animal s#e*ies( whi*h are deemed inferior to humanity( be sa*rifi*ed for our ha##iness. 8e#ending on how inferiority is defined( we may then find an ordering for the "alue #ro#osed by Harris( in whi*h humanity is *urrently first on the list for ma/imi7ation of wellbeing. This #ro#osal seems rather reasonable to me( as a human( at this #oint in time( as ) do deri"e signifi*ant #leasure from the flesh of some sentient animals. Howe"er( ) *an still *are about the wellbeing of the animals sa*rifi*ed for my en.oyment( albeit to a lesser degree than my own( while they were still ali"e. )t may also be of some im#ortan*e to note that some might *onsider this to be s#e*iesism. Therefore( while ) might find this #ro#osal reasonable( it is not ne*essarily the most desirable "alue #ro#osal( although ) myself do not ha"e an alternati"e to #resent at this #oint in time. &hile ) do not find human flourishing to be the most suitable definition of good in all *ases( ) *on*ede that it may be one of many useful definitions of good( de#ending u#on its intention. )n the realm of Harris 045651 it would seem to be a ne*essary definition. Howe"er( it may not always be the best definition.

Human Flourishing Referen*es 8un*an( ). J. 045591. The *hanging *on*e#t of animal sentien*e. pplied nimal !eha"iour Science( #$$061( 66>6A. Harris( S. 045651. %he moral landscape& How science can determine human "alues. Bew Cork( BC: Simon D S*huster( )n*. Harris( S. 045661. The 3ystery of <ons*iousness. Retrie"ed from http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-mystery-of-consciousness S:mme( E. S. 0455;1. Sentien*e and #ain in in"ertebrates. 'eport to (orwegian Scientific )ommittee for *ood Safety+ (orwegian ,ni"ersity of -ife Sciences.