1 Colbern C. Stuart III Email: Cole.Stuart@Lexevia.com 2 4891 Pacific Highway Ste.

102 San Diego, CA 92110 3 Telephone: 858-504-0171 Facsimile: 619-231-9143 4 In Pro Se 5 Dean Browning Webb (pro hac vice pending) Email: ricoman1968@aol.com 6 Law Offices of Dean Browning Webb 515 E 39th St. 7 Vancouver, WA 98663-2240 Telephone: 503-629-2176 8 Attorney for Plaintiffs California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC, and 9 Lexevia, PC 10 11 12 13 CALIFORNIA COALITION FOR 14 FAMILIES AND CHILDREN, et al., 15 16 v. Plaintiffs, Case No. 13-cv-1944-CAB (BLM) Judge: Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo PLAINITFFS OPPOSITION TO THE SUPERIOR COURTS MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

17 SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, et al., Date: December 19, 2013 18 Time: 3:30 p.m. Defendants Courtroom:4C 19 ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 20 SUBJECT TO COURT APPROVAL 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -iComplaint Filed: August 20, 2013

PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1

3 II. DISCUSSION .......................................................................................................... 1 4 A. Authority ............................................................................................................... 1 5 B. The Rule 11 Motion is a Cut-N-Paste Version of Superior Court Defendants 6 Motion to Dismiss, Failing to Address Relevant Analysis......................................... 2 7 C. By Posing the Rule 11 Motion on the Same Grounds as the Motion to Dismiss, 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -iPLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

The Superior Court Doubles Down on the Merits of the Motion to Dismiss ......... 3 D. The Complaint Satisfies all Three Certifications ................................................. 4 1. Evidentiary Foundation of Plaintiffs Claims (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) ................. 4 2. Claims Are Presented to Remedy Injury and Effect Reform--Not to Harass, Delay, Increase Costs, or Other Improper Purpose (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1)) ............. 5 3. The Complaint Seeks No Change, but Enforcement of Federal Law (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) ................................................................................................ 7 E. The Superior Court Lacks Standing to Assert Claims of Other Co-Defendants . 8 F. Counts Relevant to the Superior Court: ............................................................... 8 1. Distilling Relevant Counts ................................................................................ 8 2. Analysis of Remaining Counts by Each Ground of Attack ............................ 10 III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 21

1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935) ............................. 17 3 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416, (1997) ...... 14 4 City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399 (1989).......................................... 14 5 Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987) ...........................................2, 3, 4 6 Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 523 (9th Cir.1997) ....................................... 14 7 Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................ 14 8 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 (1996) ........................... 17 9 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999) 16 10 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)................... 14 11 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, (1986) ......................................... 14 12 Tadros v. State Bar of Cal., United State Supreme Court, Case No. 12-1438 (cert. 13 den. 571 U.S. __, (October 7, 2013) ........................................................................ 15 14 Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.1996) ...................................................... 14 15 Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 98485 (9th Cir.2002) ........ 14 16 Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir.2008) ............... 14 17 18 OTHER AUTHORITIES 19 Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 146 FRD 401, 20 590 (1993) .................................................................................................................. 2 21 Sandra Equivocal Child Abuse (2013) ........................................................................ 15 22 The Quest for Justice in California (2013) .................................................................. 16 23 Whores of the Court (1997) ......................................................................................... 15 24 25 RULES 26 Fed.R.C.P. 11 .................................................................................................1 et passim 27 General Order 550 ........................................................................................................ 11 28 -iPLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 U.S. Const., amend. VII ............................................................................................... 17 3 U.S. Const., amend. XIV ............................................................................................. 17 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -iiPLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

Plaintiff opposes Defendant Superior Court, County of San Diegos1 Motion For

2 Sanctions (Rule 11 Motion) as follows: 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 A. Authority Defendants assert Rule 11 violations of three certifications relating to the I. INTRODUCTION The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is off-target. The Motion is brought on virtually identical grounds as the judicial Co-Defendants Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Dkt#16) (MTD); a pleading-stage attack. The Rule 11 Motion simply parrots the MTDbarely addressing the relevant issues in a Rule 11 motion violations of the certifications required under Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1), (2), and (3). In parroting the MTD, which is brought by all eleven judicial defendants, the Rule 11 Motion asserts arguments which are not relevant to the sole moving party in this MotionThe Superior Court. This disconnect between the MTD and the Rule 11 movants creates an irascible confusion of arguments, evidence, and claims. Should the Court venture to follow the untangling of the morass attempted hereinbelow, it may conclude that the Rule 11 Motion is even less meritorious than the MTD brought on precisely the same grounds. Such unfaithful hard ball litigation conduct is itself unfaithful, sanctionable behavior. If at all, sanctionable litigation behavior thus far has occurred solely among judicial defendants. See, Plaintiffs Mtn. Rule 11 Sanctions (Dkt#39). II. DISCUSSION

23 Complaint, that: 24 25
1

it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause

The Superior Court for San Diego County insists that it is erroneously sued in that name; Plaintiff insists the name is correct. Because the official title of the Court is 26 a key element relied on by one Court of Appeals decision in relieving the Los Angeles Superior Court of liability on Eleventh Amendment grounds, this 27 controversy is legally significant. For simplicity of reference and without conceding the issue of official title, this defendant shall be referred to herein as The Superior 28 Court. -1PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation (FRCP 11(b)(1)); 2 the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing

3 law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing 4 law or for establishing new law (FRCP 11(b)(2)); and 5 the factual allegations have evidentiary support or, if specifically so

6 identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for 7 further investigation or discovery (FRCP 11(b)(3)). 8 The Superior Courts Motion for Sanctions (Dkt#23-1) (Rule 11 Motion) 2:5-7. 9 Seeking Rule 11 sanctions concurrent with a motion in order to leverage the

10 motion is prohibitedindeed itself sanctionablelitigation conduct. Gaiardo v. 11 Ethyl Corp., 835 F2d 479 (3rd Cir. 1987). Sanctions are inappropriate where there 12 exists legitimate controversy. Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of 13 Civil Procedure 146 FRD 401, 590 (1993). Simply adding a request for sanctions 14 without addressing the Rule 11 certification issues is itself sanctionable conduct: 15 The use of Rule 11 ... has become part of the so-called hardball litigation 16 techniques espoused by some firms and their clients. Those practitioners are 17 cautioned that they invite retribution from courts which are far from enchanted with 18 such abusive conduct. Gaiardo, supra at 485. 19 20 21 B. The Rule 11 Motion is a Cut-N-Paste Version of Superior Court Defendants Motion to Dismiss, Failing to Address Relevant Analysis The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion undertakes no substantial analysis of the

22 three Rule 11 certification violations it asserts(1) improper purpose, (2) frivolous 23 arguments under existing or extensions of law, or (3) lack of evidentiary support. 24 Rule 11 Motion 2:5-7. The Rule 11 Motion is little more than a parroting of the 25 arguments in the judicial defendants Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Dkt# 16) 26 (MTD). The MTD is a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion directed attacking preliminary 27 pleading stage matters. As properly drawn (which the MTD is unfortunately not), it 28 cannot address controverted evidentiary matters. As such, ground 3, above -2PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 evidentiary supportmay not be raised in either the MTD or Rule 11 Motion. All 2 such arguments in the Rule 11 Motion may therefore be immediately disposed of. 3 The remaining attacks of (1) harassment purpose and (2) frivolity suffer similar

4 disabilities. The Rule 11 Motion parrots pro haec verba the pleading arguments of 5 the MTD, then welds a one-liner bald claim that those pleading arguments also 6 establish a basis for Rule 11 sanctions. Compare MTD Dkt#16-1 Rule 11 Motion 7 Dkt#23-1. In simply welding a Rule 11 one liner to each of the Rule 12 attacks, 8 Defendants commit exactly the hard ball leverage tactic admonished by Gaiardo as 9 independently sanctionable. See details per Rule 11 Ground hereinbelow. 10 Similarly regarding the frivolity grounds of Rule 11(b)(2), merely attacking or

11 even prevailing on the merits of the underlying claim is not sufficient proof of 12 frivolity. Where an issue is debatable, even if the moving party ultimately 13 prevails on the issue, Rule 11 sanctions are inappropriate. More must be shown to 14 prevail on a sanctions Motion, yet The Superior Courts cut-n-paste tactic provides 15 no more reasoning for frivolity than the grounds it asserts in an attempt to prevail 16 on the merits. Welding the term is frivolous to the analysis does not cure this 17 defect. As such, the entire Rule 11 Motion directed to Rule 11(b)(2) is infirm as 18 directed to a standard of proof for the Motion to Dismiss (failure to state a claim as a 19 matter of law) rather than Rule 11s frivolity. 20 21 22 23 C. By Posing the Rule 11 Motion on the Same Grounds as the Motion to Dismiss, The Superior Court Doubles Down on the Merits of the Motion to Dismiss Because The Superior Court has brought its Rule 11 attack on the very same

24 grounds on which it brings the MTD, it effectively doubles down on the Motion to 25 Dismiss. In this case, Plaintiff has opposed the MTD with a Motion to Strike 26 (Dkt#19) and Opposition (Dkt#21) asserting the MTD is meritless and attempting 27 improper procedure. Where a moving party brings a Rule 11 motion on the same 28 grounds as an affirmative motion, yet fails on the underlying affirmative motion, it -3PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 cannot be heard to claim that its Rule 11 Motion was filed in good faithlosing the 2 underlying motion is at least prima facia evidence that a concurrently-filed Rule 11 3 Motion on the same grounds is impermissible hard ball attempt to leverage a 4 debatable (or in this case meritless) motion. Gaiardo, supra. Thus, should the 5 Court deny the MTD, counter-sanctions to the Rule 11 Motion for impermissibly 6 bringing the Rule 11 on debatable (indeed meritless) grounds are warranted. By 7 aggressively posing a quick-trigger Rule 11 Motion on top of a meritless Motion to 8 Dismiss, Defendants have stacked their chips quite high. 9 10 D. The Complaint Satisfies All Three Certifications Though Defendant fails to articulate discernable argument toward the relevant

11 Rule 11 certification issues, Plaintiff offers the following should the Court wish to 12 visit these issues. 13 1. Evidentiary Foundation of Plaintiffs Claims (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(3) 14 Plaintiff STUART has conducted extensive investigation and research into

15 each of the factual and legal allegations of the Complaint over a period of many 16 years. The allegations of the Complaint are not created by a lawyer interpreting a 17 clients experiencetherefore giving rise to the typical Rule 11 duty to investigate 18 factual foundations of the clients claims. Here, the pro se Plaintiff is the client and 19 witness. Almost all of the facts in the Complaint are given on personal and 20 professional knowledge and experience. This experience includes seventeen years 21 practicing law in the States of California, Nevada, and Arizona since 1995, 96, and 22 97, respectively, and federal districts therein. Plaintiffs experience includes 23 litigation, trial, mediation, and arbitration of dozens of matters for a variety of clients, 24 including federal civil rights, commercial fraud, legal malpractice, and similar state25 court matters. Though Plaintiff is not a divorce lawyer, he is familiar with California 26 state practice and procedure generally applicable in all California Superior Courts 27 through seventeen years of litigation experience. 28 Through his personal experience with his own dissolution litigation and in -4PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 assisting dozens of similarly-situated parents enduring modern family court 2 malfeasance, fraud, and abuse, he has become an informed observer of family court 3 practices at several levels. He founded Plaintiff California Coalition for Families and 4 Children to address those common concerns and provide a vehicle for domestic 5 dispute industry reform, education, and engagement toward those ends. Stuart Decl. 6 This experience, activism, scholarship, research, and personal observation is 7 described at 71-75, 77-99, 100-101, 110, 113-123. 8 This case is unusual in that few facts in this case will be in legitimate dispute

9 Plaintiff accuses widely-known, and increasingly widely despised, practices of public 10 institutions and private industry cohorts. Except perhaps for an answer to the 11 question why has such illegal conduct been tolerated for so long? few legitimate 12 factual issues will arise. 13 2. Claims Are Presented to Remedy Injury and Effect Reform--Not to Harass, Delay, 14 15 Increase Costs, or Other Improper Purpose (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1)) The claims of the Complaint are presented not to harass, cause unnecessary

16 delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation but to remedy independent 17 injury caused during the course of Plaintiffs reform efforts, and to cure the systemic 18 affliction which Defendants have proven incapable or unwilling to cure for 19 themselves. CCFC and the parent community it supports have undertaken extensive 20 efforts prefacing the filing of this lawsuit to effect reform by other meansbut such 21 efforts have been unsuccessful, and at times met with violent resistance by present 22 Defendants and their cohorts. See, Compl. 124-136; August 20, 2013 Press 23 Release, Stuart Decl. Ex. A. The injury precipitating the STUART ASSAULT and 24 this lawsuit was orchestrated by Defendants precisely to frustrate Plaintiffs efforts 25 while engaged in such reform. Litigation is not a preferred choice, but as with many 26 civil rights struggles in our nations historyfederal courts are a uniquely 27 appropriate and often the last recourse to defending the interests of an afflicted 28 minority. Given Defendants tactics of abusing color of law police power to silence -5PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 Plaintiffs efforts, remedy for injuries thereby caused are appropriate and uniquely 2 available in this forum. 3 The Superior Court claims that the inclusion of home addresses of certain

4 Defendants in the Complaint had no ostensible purpose other than harassment. 5 Rule 11 Motion 7:12-14. This is a misstatement of fact and law. Averment of where 6 an individual defendant "resides" or "may be found is an entirely ordinary and 7 required means to establish jurisdiction and venue within a federal district. 28 U.S.C. 8 1391(b). In compliance with this requirement, the Complaint avers the residence 9 address of Defendants Schall, Trentacosta, and Wohlfeil as they were readily 10 available from phone books, online records, online skip-trace searches, or other 11 public resources. No private records were disclosed. The practice of averring 12 residence or location of individual defendants to establish jurisdiction and venue is 13 not prohibited by any rule, order, or lawit is required by such. Plaintiffs 14 compliance with law and unremarkable practice in doing so in this action is 15 permissible, entirely ordinary, and has obvious appropriate purpose other than 16 harassment. 17 The Superior Court also incorrectly alleges that Plaintiffs refused to take any

18 steps to correct their violation. This assertion is a stunning and demonstrable 19 falsehood. The Courts files reflect that as a courtesy to defendants bellicose 20 demands that Plaintiff remove all addresses from the Internet and Court files, 21 Plaintiffs promptly undertook steps to redact home addresses from the Complaint, 22 removed the unreacted Complaint from its publically-accessible web servers, 23 coordinated the removal of the same from third party servers, and re-filed a redacted 24 version of the Complaint with this Court. Redacted Complaint, Dkt#8; Plaintiffs Ex 25 Parte Motion for Temporary Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4. 26 The remaining allegations of harassment motive in the Rule 11 Motion (Rule 11

27 at 7:17-8:10) do not support The Superior Courts claim that the Complaint was filed 28 to harass. The number of times the Complaint had been viewed on the Internet, that -6PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 the Complaint also included home addresses of other Defendants which have not 2 objected and are not represented by The Superior Court or its counsel, and this 3 Courts courteous, yet not required, sealing of the original and redacted Complaints 4 to which no plaintiff objectsare not consistent with an intent to harassthey are 5 the ordinary and expected behavior of civil rights plaintiffs publicizing their efforts to 6 a nationwide community of similarly-situated domestic dispute industry professionals 7 and victim-litigants closely watching this case as an augur of the future of reform. 8 Further, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants post-filing take-down demands 9 coerced by threats of San Diego County Sheriffs Department Detectives acting 10 without warrant or probable causeto remove the Complaint from public locations 11 are legally indefensible, and themselves constitute further illegal deprivation of 12 Plaintiffs rights of free speech and access to courts which will be redressed in due 13 course. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs claim that such take down activity was illegal 14 and indeed reprehensible state censorship, Plaintiff undertook substantial efforts to 15 accommodate Defendants less-than-courteous demands. See Ex Parte Motion for 16 Emergency Harassment Restraining Order, Dkt#4. 17 Defendant has not shown a motive of intent to harass sufficient to establish a

18 violation of certification under Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(1), and as such its Motion may be 19 Denied. 20 3. The Complaint Seeks No Change, but Enforcement of Law (Fed.R.C.P. 11(b)(2)) 21 The Complaint certainly asserts that a change in family law as practiced is in

22 immediate orderbut only to conform that practice with existing and longstanding 23 principles of state and federal lawscommercial, health and welfare, and 24 constitutional standards which are flagrantly disregarded by institutionalized 25 Domestic Dispute Industry public and private interests. To the extent that State laws 26 and practice are inconsistent with federal law, the Complaint properly and in good 27 faith prays for declaratory and prospective relief to conform or invalidate those 28 inconsistent laws and practices. Should Plaintiffs seeking enforcement of the -7PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 fundamental liberties of some of our most vulnerable citizens be viewed as 2 harassment or bad faith by present defendants, the proper judgment day for that 3 proposition may and should await the presence of a trier of fact rather than be quelled 4 by improper use of Rule 11 hardball. See, e.g., Plaintiff, and millions of parents and 5 children nationwide, eagerly await that day. 6 The Superior Courts specific arguments regarding the merits of specific

7 Counts of the Complaint (Rule 11 Motion III.A.1-11) are addressed below. 8 9 10 E. The Superior Court Lacks Standing to Assert Claims of Other CoDefendants The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is brought only by the Superior Court,

11 yet the motion asserts objections as if all eleven judicial defendants and Mr. RODDY 12 are joined. Because judicial Defendants are represented by common counsel and 13 maintain substantial common interests, a joint Motion to Dismiss simplified pleading. 14 However, by carving out only The Superior Court to assert the present Rule 11 15 Motion, The Superior Court creates a disconnect between the two motions. 16 This disconnectapparently unanticipated by The Superior Courtcauses

17 substantial structural infirmities. For that reason alone, the Court may save itself and 18 all parties unnecessary frustration in parsing issues relevant to The Superior Court by 19 discarding the entire Rule 11 Motion at this point as incomprehensible. 20 Should the Court desire to endure an unwinding of The Superior Court from

21 the irrelevant Co-Defendant grounds for the motion, further analysis is attempted as 22 follows: 23 24 F. Counts Relevant to the Superior Court: An attempt will be made to distill the Counts relevant to the Superior Court,

25 and analysis will proceed thereon. 26 1. Distilling Relevant Counts 27 The Superior Court is a named Defendant only in Counts 3, 6, 12-15, 18, and 21,

28 RICO Claims for Relief 2-10, and Prospective Relief Count 2. By contrast, the Rule -8PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 11 Motion attacks all Counts. It is necessary therefore to first dispose of any Rule 11 2 arguments or grounds related to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 7-11, 16, 17, 19, and 20, RICO 3 Claim for Relief 1 and Prospective Relief Count 1. 4 The remaining relevant Counts for purposes of the Rule 11 Motion are as Count 6municipal liability; Counts 12-15 (1985(2), (3)(a), (b), (c)obstruction of justice based on the facts of the STUART ASSAULT/CHILLING; Count 18 CULPABLE breach of duty relating to municipal liability in Count 6), (supervision of DOYNE, INC.); Count 3CULPABLE breach of dutya blanket allegation adding a level of intentCULPABILE (defined in detail in the complaint) to each of the other underlying Counts. CULPABLE intent establishes a foundation for additional claims, remedies, and grounds for reliefsuch as a substantive due process violation for the underling conduct, extreme and outrageous conduct enhanced and punitive damages, criminal liability for federal civil rights and predicate crimes under Title 18, United States Code. Pled as a single blanket count applicable to other Counts, it provides notice of an intent to pursue both ordinary or unreasonable intent necessary for one version of a claim (i.e., negligence, deliberate indifference, without probable cause) from an enhanced version of the claim (intentional interference, emotional distress, inducement to breach, etc.). Like intent generally, CULPABLE intent need not be pled with particularity, and does not impact the underlying facts of the underlying Count, and may thus be pled generally, and efficiently, in a single Count; Count 21False Advertising; RICO Claim for Relief 2Honest Services Fraud; RICO Claim for Relief 3, 4-10Witness Tampering and Retaliation; -9PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

5 follows: 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

1 2 3 4

Prospective relief count 2Declaratory Judgment; Superior Court is also alleged to be an operative in Rico Enterprises 1, 2, 3, and 4.

5 2. Analysis of Remaining Counts by Each Ground of Attack 6 Stripping non-moving Defendants and irrelevant Counts from the 11 Grounds

7 asserted for the Rule 11 Motion impacts each Rule 11 Ground to a different degree 8 some fatally, others not at all. A suggested distilled analysiswhich is The Superior 9 Courts burden herefollows (quotations are lifted directly from Rule 11 Motion 2:810 26): 11 12 13 14 Ground 1: CCFC and Lexevia's attempt to proceed in propria persona in violation of the laws of the states in which they were organized and the Local Civil Rules: This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.A.1

15 (Dkt#16-1), and is opposed in Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt#19) II.B.5, 16 incorporated herein by reference. In short, CCFC and Lexevia are represented by Mr. 17 Webb, who is not yet admitted pro hac vice in this District. STUART is proceeding 18 to retain local counsel for both entities in compliance with Local Rule 83.3(c)(4) to 19 sponsor Mr. Webb. STUART appears pro se. (Declaration of Colbern Stuart in 20 support hereof). Defendants cite no authority supporting the claim that a party in 21 process of obtaining local counsel to sponsor a pro hac vice admission as grounds for 22 dismissal, and as such the same is an impermissible hard ball tactical use of Rule 23 11 sanctions. 24 25 26 Ground 2: Lexevia's pursuit of claims without the capacity to do so as a suspended corporation This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.A.2, and is

27 opposed in Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt#19) at II.B.5, incorporated by 28 reference. In short, Defendants confound capacity and standing under state and -10PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 federal law. Lexevia is presently suspended for failure to file a Statement of 2 Information with the Secretary of State. The Statement of Information has been filed 3 curing the suspension. Stuart expects revival to good standing to occur within 90 4 days (Declaration of Colbern Stuart in support hereof, Ex. B). Because capacity 5 does not impact standing, Lexevias lack of capacity does not deprive it of standing. 6 As The Superior Courts argument grossly confounds the issues of capacity and 7 standing under both state and federal law, its Rule 11 Motion double down on the 8 same issue is an impermissible hard ball litigation tactic. 9 10 11 Ground 3: Plaintiffs' inclusion of the residential addresses of defendant judicial officers in the Complaint The Superior Count has no standing to bring this claim as it is only relevant to

12 certain non-moving individual Defendants whose addresses were identified in the 13 Complaint. The argument is also refuted by Plaintiffs Ex Parte Motion for 14 Harassment Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt#4) incorporated herein by reference. 15 Should the Court wish to entertain this Ground even absent The Superior Courts

16 standing, Plaintiff submits that this Courts General Order 550 does not apply to this 17 civil case despite its close affinity to a criminal action. General Order 550 provides: 18 19 20 h. Privacy Unless otherwise ordered by the court, parties must refrain from including, or

21 must partially redact where inclusion is necessary, the following personal identifiers 22 from all pleadings and documents filed with the court, including exhibits thereto: 23 24 5. Home address. In criminal cases, if a home address must be included only the

25 city and state should be listed. 26 27 Though Racketeering and the predicate crimes on which it is based are chargeable

28 federal felonies, and Plaintiffs have asserted 34 indictable federal offenses in the -11PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 Complaint against certain Defendants, this action is not a criminal case (General 2 Order 550) in any ordinary sense of that term. Though Plaintiff may and does seek 3 punitive damages, and statutorily trebled enhanced damages, costs, and fees, it 4 cannot seek criminal sanctions. 5 6 Ground 4: Plaintiffs' filing of a frivolous, 1,300-page complaint: This attack is identical to the Bucket of Mud attack in Superior Court

7 Defendants MTD IV.B and is opposed in Plaintiffs Opposition II.B, C, and 8 Motion to Strike (Dkt#19), II.E.2 incorporated herein by reference. In short, the 9 Complaint is admittedly complex, as it must be to plead to the extraordinary relief of 10 federal intervention in what is averred to be widespread institutionalized legal 11 consumer fraud involving Domestic Dispute Industry courts, attorneys, psychologists, 12 social workers, and bureaucrats nationwide. To the extent the Complaint is not a 13 model of clarity, Plaintiff apologizes to the Court and counsel should they take 14 exception to the Complaints form of pleading. The Compliant is draftedas 15 appropriateto give notice and with the expectation that substantial discovery will 16 be appropriate in fleshing out the notice provided in the Complaint. Defendants 17 insistence for more detail while simultaneously complaining of the Complaints 18 length and inclusion of supporting exhibits itself suggests unfaithful litigation 19 harassment and delay. If such is deemed appropriate, Plaintiff has proffered a present 20 ability, though no desire, to expand on the Complaint at length in an amended 21 pleading. 22 23 Ground 5: The Superior Courts Claim to Eleventh Amendment Immunity This attack is identical to the Superior Court Defendants MTD IV.C.

24 Plaintiff provides analysis in the Opposition to the Motion To Dismiss II.A.2.C as 25 well as in the Opposition to the Commission Defendants Motion to Dismiss on 26 Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, filed concurrently with this Opposition. 27 The legal analysis of both is germane hereto, and incorporated herein by reference. 28 In short, the Superior Court may not aspire to State level sovereign immunity -12PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 on the present record. No Defendant in this action is named as the State of California 2 or an employee or agent thereof, Plaintiff disputes that any beneath State-level 3 Defendant is entitled to be elevated to State level status, and certainly no Defendant 4 has or may make such a showing of fact at this, the Rule 12(b)(6) stage. As such, the 5 Eleventh Amendment immunity attack fails as to all Defendants on the present 6 record, and the hard ball tactic of seeking to double down with Rule 11 sanctions 7 is itself sanctionable. 8 9 10 Ground 6: Plaintiffs' filing of claims against judicial officers and Mr. Roddy in the face of judicial and quasi-judicial immunity: The Superior Court has no standing to assert claims of judicial officers and Mr.

11 Roddy to quasi-judicial immunity. The Superior Courts cut-n-paste attack on this 12 Ground is an inexcusable miss. The argument is also refuted at MTD Oppo. 13 II.A.2.b, incorporated herein by reference. This misfire can be nothing other than 14 wildly misguided hard ball tactics subject to sanctions. 15 Ground 7: Plaintiffs' presentation of civil rights claims relating to the so-called

16 Stuart Assault at the family law seminar that ostensibly lack evidentiary and legal 17 support and are barred by the statute of limitations: 18 This Rule 11 attack is substantially corrupted by the standing disconnect

19 between The Superior Court and its judicial Co-Defendants. The Superior Court is 20 not named in each of the Civil Rights claims attacked in this Groundonly Count 6 21 (municipal liability), Counts 12-15 (1985(2), (3)(a), (b), (c) (obstruction of 22 justice/CHILLING), Count 18 (relating to supervision and municipal liability in 23 Count 6), and Count 3 (culpable breach of dutya Count adding an allegation of 24 CULPABLE intent (defined in detail in the complaint) to each of Counts above). 25 Because the Rule 11 Motion focusses primarily on Defendants and Counts other than 26 those relevant to The Superior Court, this section of the Rule 11 Motion is 27 irretrievably corrupted. An analysis of what can be distilled relating only to The 28 Superior Court is attempted as follows: -13PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

The basis for The Superior Courts liability for all relevant Counts is the

2 independent acts or failures to act by a municipalitydescribed in the caselaw as 3 policy, custom, or habitactivity with an intent to deprive or acting/failing to act 4 in deliberate indifference to deprivationsetting in motion events causing 5 deprivation. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 416, 6 (1997) (Souter, J, concurring). Municipal liability arises from the line of cases 7 beginning with Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 8 (1978) and continuing through City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 399 9 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, (1986); Trevino v. Gates, 10 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.1996); Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n, 541 F.3d 11 950, 964 (9th Cir.2008); Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984 12 85 (9th Cir.2002); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2003); Henry v. Cnty. 13 of Shasta, 132 F.3d 512, 523 (9th Cir.1997); Hunter v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 14 1225, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). 15 The foundation of The Superior Courts municipal and oversight liability is set

16 forth in the averments beginning with Compl. 9, 10, and those describing its 17 operations of policy and custom for oversight of other operations, including the 18 private commercial psychology enterprise (the Domestic Dispute Industry Forensic 19 Investigator Criminal Enterprise, or DDI-FICE; Compl. 284 et passim) and the 20 in-house Family Law Facilitators Offices (the Domestic Dispute Industry 21 Intervention Advocate Criminal Enterprise or DDI-IACE; Compl.281 et 22 passim): 23 24 25 26 27 28 9. Defendant Superior Court San Diego County (SCSDC) is municipal entity chartered under and doing business in the County of San Diego. In conjunction with the County, SCSDC operates facilities and judicial services at nine San Diego County courthouses; creates and implements judicial policies, customs, and practices administered by judicial officers, administrators, and staff; and provides professional legal services and advice to the citizens of San -14PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Diego County, including services related to the practice of family law divorce and paternity, custody and visitation, child support, domestic violence, restraining orders, self-help services, frequently asked questions, form selection and advice, and public information regarding court fees, rules, locations, calendars, and proceedings.

10. SCSDC is part of a network of county courts governed by a 27member Judicial Council led by Ms. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court. The Judicial Council is the policy-making body of the California Courts and is responsible for ensuring the consistent, independent, impartial and accessible administration of justice. The Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) is the support staff of the Judicial Council.

These allegations also relate to The Superior Courts operation of the private

16 commercial psychology enterprise (DDI-FICE) and in-house domestic dispute 17 advocacy programs (DDI-IACE) described at Complaint 281-285. The Schemes 18 and Artifices to Defraud utilized by the DDI-FICE are disclosed at Compl.308-335. 19 Dr. Hagens publication Whores of the Court, Compl. Ex. 37, Equivocal Child Abuse, 20 Ex. 38, and the Petition for Certiorari in Tadros v. State Bar of Cal., United States 21 Supreme Court, Case No. 12-1438 (cert. den. 571 U.S. __, October 7, 2013); Compl. 22 Ex. 2, are also relevant to these allegations, and incorporated herein by reference. 23 As distilled, Ground 7 remains to attack only allegations of (i) conspiracy

24 (Rule 11 MTN 11:12-20), (ii) class-based discrimination (Rule 11 MTN 11:20-22), 25 (iii) Definition of 1985(1) office, trust, position of confidence under the U.S. (Rule 11 26 MTN 13:22-23), and (iv) statute of limitations (Rule 11 MTN 14:1-11) involving The 27 Superior Court municipal and oversight operations described above. Remaining Co28 Defendants did not join the Motion and thus those lines of argument in the Rule 11 -15PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 Motion may be ignored, and their assertion considered impermissible hard ball and 2 unfaithful litigation conduct. 3 (i) Conspiracy: (Rule 11 MTN 11:12-20): Conspiracy allegations are

4 analyzed in MTD Opposition Section II.E.1, and M&C Sections III.C.2(f), III.C.3, 5 incorporated herein by reference. A conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime. 6 Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 1999). 7 The conspiracy allegations of the Complaint need no creative mind to understand. A 8 simple walk through defendants own downstairs administrative operationsthe 9 Family Law Facilitator Offices (DDI-IACE) which counsels and facilitates illegal 10 DVILS ORDERS, paperwork, and enforcement (Compl. Ex. 1 and Exs. A, B 11 thereto); an illegal psychology enterprise (DDI-FICE) populated by fraudulent 12 forensic psychologists; to the legal communities which they participate inthe San 13 Diego County Bar Association and its Family Law Subsection (Compl. 4, 275, 14 Ex. 2) and the Family Law Community it serves (Compl. 71-73, 275-280, 320); 15 to the federally-funded quasi-public technical support and leadership corporations 16 it collaborates with on family law policy and operations levelsthe San Diego 17 Family Justice Center and National Family Justice Center Alliance (Compl. 262, 18 318, RICO Enterprises 2, 3, 4; Compl. Ex. 1); and to its leadership operations of Co19 Defendants Judicial Council and Administrative Office of the Courts (Compl. 10, 20 13-16; Quest for Justice, infra.). An insightful public account of the history, 21 evolution, and independent control and operation of these entities is recently available 22 from former California Supreme Court Chief Justice and Chairperson of Defendants 23 AOC and Judicial Counsel Ronald M. George, entitled Chief: The Quest for Justice in 24 California (2013).2 Chief Justice George explicitly details how these defendants have 25 established themselves to be free from the micromanagement of legislators, who 26 dont understand how to administer justice. Id. at 453-454. For theater fans, A 27 Supportive details describing the operation of these entities in collaboration with 28 their enterprise co-defendants is located at pp. 303-318, 380-81, Chapter 14, pp. 448459, 622-624, 660-665, 752-785. -16PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
2

1 feature-length documentary entitled DivorceCorp (www.divorcecorp.com) to be 2 released nationwide on January 10, 2014 graphically describes the Domestic Dispute 3 Industry Criminal Enterprise detailed in the Complaint. The Divorce Industry, it 4 seems, is enjoying a new day in the sun.3 5 Defendants no doubt will assert that the accused operations, though highly

6 coordinated, are not illegal. Plaintiff will be prepared to present that case to a trier of 7 fact at the appropriate time. For purposes of the Complaint, however, the above 8 allegations of coordinated action to accomplish an allegedly illegal purpose satisfy 9 any relevant pleading standard for pleading conspiracy. 10 (ii) Class-based Discrimination (Rule 11 MTN 11:20-22): Class-based

11 discrimination is analyzed in MTD Opposition section II.E.2, incorporated herein. In 12 short, the Complaint describes four EQUAL PROTECTION CLASSES which are 13 defined by existing precedent, state law, and de facto practice and effect. Compl. 14 193-200 and references therein. 15 (iii) 1985(1), (2) office, trust, position of confidence under the U.S. (Rule 11

16 MTN 13:22-23): STUARTs status under the United States is averred at Compl. 17 102-106 and analyzed in MTD Opposition section II.D, incorporated herein. In 18 short, Plaintiff has alleged facts describing his practice as an officer of six federal 19 Districts, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, law practice in Commerce 20 and Trade, Intellectual Property, and Health and Welfare litigation under federal law, 21 civil rights activism, published Constitutional and federal law scholarship, and related 22 engagementsincluding those that found this actionsufficient to give Defendants 23 notice of a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1985(1) and (2). Defendants will no doubt 24 "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient 26 policeman." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67, (1976); L. Tarango Trucking v. Cnty. 27 of Contra Costa, 202 F.R.D. 614, 620 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Fair Political Practices Com. v. Suitt, 90 Cal. App. 3d 125, 132, 153 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); 28 Original publication: L. Brandeis, Other People's Money at 62 (National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933) -1725
PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM
3

1 contest that assertion, yet their doing so at the Rule 12 stage is inappropriate, and 2 certainly insubstantial basis as a double down hardball litigation tactic under Rule 3 11. See, e.g., U.S. Const., amend VII, XIV; Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 4 295 U.S. 654, 656 (1935); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 371 5 (1996). 6 (iv) Statute of Limitations (Rule 11 MTN 14:1-11): Statute of Limitations

7 issues for civil rights allegations are fully analyzed in Opposition section II.G, 8 incorporated herein. Plaintiff has requested leave to amend to aver facts addressing 9 this attack. 10 11 12 13 Ground 8: Plaintiffs' pursuit of civil rights claims concerning Stuart's dissolution proceeding that are also untimely and barred by the RookerFeldman doctrine: The Superior Court has standing only with respect to Count 18; CULPABLE

14 Breach of Duty causing deprivations of rights under the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 14th 15 Amendments to the United States Constitution relating to the supervision of 16 Defendants DOYNE, INC. Compl. 216-252. The bankruptcy of the Rooker17 Feldman doctrine is explained at Opposition II.H and incorporated herein. Because 18 liability of The Superior Court follows a Monell analysis, it is not premised on any 19 judicial act. Rooker-Feldman is therefore further unavailable to this Defendant. 20 Statute of limitations attacks are discussed above. This section represents an 21 impermissible double down hardball litigation tactic. 22 23 24 25 Ground 9: Plaintiffs' frivolous assertion of a false advertising claim, given the Superior Court Defendants do not advertise or sell services and are not commercial competitors of anyone: The Superior Courts amenity to suit as a State under the Lanham Act, direct

26 misrepresentations to legal consumers, and collaboration with Co-Defendants in the 27 same are addressed at MTD Opposition II.I, incorporated herein. This section 28 represents an impermissible double down hardball litigation tactic. -18PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 2 3

Ground 10: the filing of Plaintiffs' factually and legally unsupportable RICO claims: Analysis of the RICO counts is set forth in detail in the MTD Oppo. II.J and the

4 M&C sections cited therein, incorporated herein by reference. This Ground is wildly 5 off-base, evidencing impermissible hard ball litigation tactics. 6 7 8 Ground 11: Plaintiffs' Pursuit Of Claims For Prospective Relief Without Standing: Analysis of the Article III Standing issue is set forth at the MTD Oppo. II.K

9 and detailed in the M&C sections referenced therein, incorporated herein by 10 reference. Plaintiff has averred sufficient standing to satisfy relevant pleading 11 standards. 12 In the event the Court wishes to consider The Superior Courts assertions

13 absent standing of Defendants not present in the Rule 11 Motion, Plaintiff 14 incorporates by reference the additional analysis relevant to those Defendants as set 15 forth in the sections of the MTD Oppo., Mtn. to Strike, and M&C sections referenced 16 therein. 17 18 G. An Award of Sanctions In This Case Would be An Affront to Justice Any award of sanctions must evaluate a sanctioned partys ability to pay.

19 Christian v. Mattel, Inc. (9th Cir. 2002) 286 F3d 1118, 1125, fn. 4. Rule 11 sanctions 20 should not be used to chill creative advocacy, or legitimate causes asserted in good 21 faith. See, e.g., Chase v. Auerbach, 1994 WL 590588, *2 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 26, 1994) 22 (rejecting the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a litigant for advancing a novel legal 23 theory in attempting to move an action to federal court to consolidate case with another 24 pending case); Committee Notes on Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 25 146 FRD 401, 587 (1993) (explaining that replacing the 1983 version of the rules 26 standard of good faith with the 1993 term nonfrivilous was not intended to raise 27 the bar on creative advocacy brought in good faith which might be chilled by a 28 higher standard). -19PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

Though Plaintiffs vigorously deny that sanctions against Plaintiff are

2 appropriate and assert precisely the opposite request for relief, any sanction award 3 against plaintiffs in this case would be unjust. Plaintiffs are a public benefit 4 corporation and their members and advocates which, in the course of attempts to 5 facilitate the reform of voracious criminal enterprises, have fallen victims to the 6 illegal tactics of those very enterprises. Stuart Decl. . It would be difficult to 7 exaggerate the devastating impact of Defendants illegal activities on the resources 8 available to Plaintiffs to continue their reform efforts, including this litigation. CCFC 9 is not a commercial operationit has no revenue other than donations and the 10 generous goodwill of many dedicated volunteers. It is a community of victims of 11 these very defendants heinous acts of fraud and abuse, who have formed to recover 12 their losses, but more importantly to prevent that same harm from befalling others 13 unaware of the maze of horrors that awaits them once they step behind Defendants 14 doors. Stuart Decl. X. 15 The Complaint details Plaintiffs efforts in seeking attention and assistance to

16 remedy and reform an industry few deny to be a notorious dystopia, yet almost none 17 have the knowledge, concern, or courage required to attend. Government agencies, 18 politicians, and the commercial and pro bono legal community have universally 19 respond yes, its a mess, but we dont know how to fix it. Present Defendants have 20 responded with offers to absorb even more resources in wastefully returning to the 21 lawless maze of family court, or more often responded not at all. Stuart Decl. 22 As the intended benefactors of that dystopiaparents and childrenwhove

23 instead of benefiting from that system have fallen victim to it, we have valuable input 24 of what is wrong and how to fix it. Yet Plaintiffs wealth of experience, knowledge, 25 and suggestions is not equaled by a wealth of material resources to implement them. 26 Like most family court litigants, CCFC members left family courts with little more 27 than harrowing nightmares and a very bitter taste in their mouths which, though 28 highly motivating, are accompanied by a debilitating fear of further legal reprisal or -20PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 financial victimization by the very defendants present here. By anticompetitive 2 meansincluding the violent means deployed against Plaintiffs detailed in the 3 ComplaintDefendants have effectively monopolized or blockaded all venues for 4 effecting reform through state-level machinerycourts, judges, lawyers, bureaucrats, 5 and psychologists collaborate to police a poisonous toll-based maze they themselves 6 built which outrageously extracts wealth from unsuspecting families by artifice, trick, 7 and deceit. Stuart Decl. 8 That wealth and power, initially earned by the honest hands and brows of

9 parents working to provide for their children, has by trick and device been converted 10 into the hands of some of San Diegos strongest law firms, hired to defend the 11 schemes that pay their billsand today returns to a new scene to use impermissible 12 hardball Rule 11 litigation tactics pick those pockets yet again, by means of new 13 rules in a new courthouse. Plaintiff prays for a new awakening to a new, healthier 14 day for plaintiffs and defendants alike. If we desire respect for the law, then we 15 must first make the law respectable. L. Brandeis, Other People's Money (National 16 Home Library Foundation ed. 1933). 17 Any award of sanctions against Plaintiffs in this case would only further the

18 perpetration of what will be proven to be a shameful and fraudulent abuse of 19 knowledge of public processes and institutions, public police power, and tainted 20 wealth by those operating under a public license, oath, and duty to protect those in 21 their care. Sanctions would be an affront not only to a meager pocketbook, but to the 22 courage, dignity, and public spirit of parents and children nationwide, who having no 23 recourse to defenders such as those they face, have barely the means to defend 24 themselves. A sanction against these Plaintiffs in this action would be a sanction 25 against equal justice itself. 26 27 28 III. CONCLUSION The Superior Courts Rule 11 Motion is almost entirely unwarranted by existing law, structurally incomprehensible, and wildly off-target. It impermissibly seeks -21PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

1 relief for Co-Defendants not present in the Motion, argues their case but not its own, 2 pleads to the wrong legal standards and only summarily acknowledges the correct 3 ones, and is infected with the same meritless arguments of the MTD and 4 inadmissible, impertinent, and scandalous evidence that work is based upon. The 5 Rule 11 Motion is itself an inappropriate litigation hard ball double down tactic by 6 those intimately familiar with such schemes and tools of prevailing in high-stakes 7 litigation games, making sanctions against The Superior Court for its unfaithful 8 litigation conduct in the present Motion appropriate. The Superior Court has chosen 9 the stakes of the table it sits at. It should not be permitted to walk away from the 10 accounting. 11 12 13 14 DATED: December 5, 2013 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -22PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM

Respectfully Submitted:

By: /s/

Colbern C. Stuart, III

Colbern C. Stuart, III, President, California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC in Pro Se

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned hereby certifies that all counsel of record who are deemed to have consented to electronic service are being served with a copy of this document via the court's CM-ECF system per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b )(2)(E). Any other counsel of record will be served by facsimile transmission and/or first class mail this 5th day of December, 2013. By: /s/ Colbern C. Stuart, III Colbern C. Stuart, III, President, California Coalition for Families and Children, PBC in Pro Se

-1PLTFS OPPO TO SUP CT RULE 11 MTN 13-CV-1944 CAB BLM