Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos.

140576-99 December 13, 2004

JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division), ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the ASSOCIATION OF GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents. DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999, denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. The Antecedents The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in December 1973 and started its actual operations in 1976. Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to establish a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340.1 Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional appropriations and compulsory contributions from members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.2 AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as "The Special Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002." It is administered by the Chief of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and Management Group.3 Its funds are in the nature of public funds.4 On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a "Complaint-Affidavit"5 with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial to the government had been entertained into between certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr., then President of the AFP-RSBS,6 together with twenty-seven (27) other persons7 for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the government millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes.8 On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12) Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133.9 All were similarly worded, except for the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the offense, and the property involved. Representative of the said Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the inculpatory portion of which reads: That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their official duties, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring together and confederating with NILO FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally execute and/or cause the execution of a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real property located at General Santos City, by making it appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes relative to the sale of the subject lot in the amount of only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively, when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and other taxes should have been P524,475.00 andP157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-changing and causing undue injury to the government through evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less. CONTRARY TO LAW.10 On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents, defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145.11 Save with respect to the names of the other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies, and the property involved in each case, the Informations were, likewise, similarly worded, representative of which is that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The accusatory portion reads: That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high-ranking public official being then the President, and WILFREDO

PABALAN, a low-ranking public officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking advantage of their official positions and committing the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring and confederating with each other and with accused NILO FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN, both private individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with malicious intent, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify a public document by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of Sale for a 999-sq. m. property particularly identified as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and stating therein a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, thereby perverting the truth. CONTRARY TO LAW.12 On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction.13 He, likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Proceedings14 on February 16, 1999, because of the pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special Prosecutor opposed the said motions.15 Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice of Appearance"16 as private prosecutors in all the aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)17 on March 9, 1999. The notice of appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof. In a Resolution18 dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty.20 On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen.21 He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "an offended party may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged."22 He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members-contributors, they "have been disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and residual interest at the AFP-RSBS" through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.23 Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal cases involved. He posited that AGFOI was neither a member nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering that it was funded partly by the national government and individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI never contributed a single centavo to the funds of the AFP-RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI, as an organization, has a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual members who compose it.24 Hence, it is of no moment if some members of AGFOI are or have been members and beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS. Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a "Motion for Reinvestigation"25 with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning therein his unresolved motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the resolution of the reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads: WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from today within which to elevate its evidence and to do whatever is appropriate on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court within the said period as to its findings and recommendations together with the action thereon of the Ombudsman. As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this authority from the Court for the prosecution to evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate action as regards accused Ramiscals subject motion shall also include the case regarding all the accused. SO ORDERED.26 In the meantime, in a Resolution27 dated June 9, 1999, the Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioners opposition and denied his plea for the denial of the appearance of the law firm.28 In justifying its resolution, the Sandiganbayan declared as follows: Considering that the offended parties are members of the AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and their right may be affected by the action of the Court resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there appears a strong legal presumption that their appearance should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.29 The petitioner moved for a reconsideration30 of the Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was opposed31 by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution32 denying the same on October 22, 1999.

The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9, 1999 and October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court, and raised the following issues: I WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY. II WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.33 In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan. The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was improper since the assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. He also argues that the petition is premature because the reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been completed. On the merits of the petition, he posits that the AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases. He further alleged that the appearance of the private prosecutor was subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence, his recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was proper. The Ruling of the Court

The Assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are Interlocutory in Nature

The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals34 as follows: A "final" judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which, among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes "final" or, to use the established and more distinctive term, "final and executory."35 Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory," e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in this case.36 The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal.37 Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only.38 In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI, represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who were, likewise, investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is the offended party whose rights may be affected by the prosecution of the criminal and civil aspects of the cases and the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private prosecutor is subject to the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases on their merits, more specifically, the guilt or innocence of the petitioner or the civil liabilities attendant to the commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the Ombudsman would maintain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases, and, thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would sustain the finding of probable cause against the petitioner and issue warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to proceed to trial, receive the evidence of the parties and render judgment on the basis thereof. The petitioner would then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial, and, if convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for certiorari,

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the said resolutions and decision. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure ought

not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest of justice, the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil action on certiorari.39 As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,40 a petition which should have been brought under Rule 65 and not under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible rule. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.41

Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the petitioner made the following averments: that the graft court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the offended party despite the plain language of the Informations and the nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court blatantly violated basic procedural rules, thereby eschewing the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. He, likewise, averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow the entry of a party, through a private prosecutor, which has no right to the civil liabilities of the accused arising from the crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil liabilities at all based on the nature of said crimes. The petitioner also faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition thereto, in gross violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as one under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v. Court of Appeals:42 The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.43 Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits, other parties, like the private respondents herein, may, likewise, enter their appearance as offended parties and participate in criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.

The Appearance of the Law Firm Albano & Associates

The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra: Atty. Antonio Albano Practicing Lawyer Albano-Irao Law Offices Dear Atty. Albano: We represent a number of Retired Generals and other Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have been disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful investments and residual interest at the Retirement Separation Benefit System, AFP because of alleged plunder of the Systems Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification of Public Documents. We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as private prosecutor of our case. Thank you very much. (Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET) (Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)44 As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it was Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so, for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank officers claiming to have residual interests in or to be investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover, there is no showing in the records that the Board of Directors of the AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in the above cases. Neither is there any resolution on record issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law firm is the counsel of Aparri and Navarro only.

The AGFOI and/or Commodore Aparri and/or Brig. Gen. Navarro Are Not the Offended Parties in the Informations filed Before the Sandiganbayan

The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to criminal liabilities in favor of any private party. He asserts that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government because based on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as vendee, it was deprived of capital gains and the documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any allegation that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage caused by the said falsifications. The petitioner further argues that absent any civil liability arising from the crimes charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be considered the offended party entitled to participate in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads: SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member, beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if it were so, it would not sustain a direct and material damage by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to intervene would open the floodgates to any person similarly situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the cases. In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS, whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases. The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the latter has a right to intervene, considering that such intervention would enable the members of AGFOI to assert their rights to information and access to the official records, documents, and papers, a right granted by no less than paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed with public character because the government provided for its initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers. We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule 110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 5, Rule 11045 of the Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted46 and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil action remains under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor.47 The prosecution of offenses is a public function.48 Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.49 With the implied institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused.50 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused: ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes: 1. Restitution; 2. Reparation of the damage caused; 3. Indemnification for consequential damages. Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.51 The offended party may be the State or any of its instrumentalities, including local governments or government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public funds or property under Article 21752 of the Revised Penal Code, frauds under Article 21353 of the Revised Penal Code, and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D. No. 705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019,54 any party, including the government, may be the offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the government is to be represented by the public prosecutor for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may also be a private individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act or omission of the accused,55 or that corporate entity which is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of. Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party.56

Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the constitutional right of such members to have access to the records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries. As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offended party is the government, which was allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the actual and correct purchase price of the property stated therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions, nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said cases. We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that in the felony of falsification of public document, the existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public character of a document and the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed. The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a third person.57 However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue injury to the government, the offenders thereby commit two crimes (a) falsification of public document defined in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government as the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the government, and the petitioner and his co-accused pocketed the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be considered the offended party entitled to intervene in the above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate Counsel.58 In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to intervene in said cases. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-44723 August 31, 1987 STA. ROSA MINING COMPANY, petitioner vs. ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL AUGUSTO ZABALA, in his capacity as OFFICER-IN-CHARGE of the Provincial Fiscal's OFFICE of Camarines Norte, and GIL ALAPAN et. al., respondents.

BIDIN, J.: Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated. The facts of the case are not disputed. On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated October 14, 1974. On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14, 1974. On November 6, 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial Fiscal by telegram to "Please elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and defer all proceedings pending review." The letter-request for review was opposed by petitioner in a letter to the Secretary of Justice dated November 23, 1974 alleging, among other things, that an information for Attempted Theft had already been filed against private respondents for which reason the request for review has become a moot question as the Provincial Fiscal has lost jurisdiction to dismiss the charge for attempted theft. On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975. A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the court's ruling but in an Order dated February 13, 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied. Trial of the case was reset to April 23, 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus. In this action, petitioner prays for the issuance of the writ of mandamus "commanding respondent fiscal or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the Court of First instance of Camarines Norte" (Petition, Rollo, p. 27). There is no question that the institution of a criminal action is addresses to the sound discretion of the investigating fiscal. He may or he may not file the information according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, 63 Phil. 846) and when he decides not to file the information, in the exercise of his discretion, he may not be compelled to do so (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748). However, after the case had already been filed in court, "fiscals are not clothed with power, without the consent of

the court, to dismiss or nolle prosequi criminal actions actually instituted and pending further proceedings. The power to dismiss criminal actions is vested solely in the court" (U.S. vs. Barredo, 32 Phil. 444, 450; Gonzales vs. Court of First Instance, supra). However, the matter of instituting an information should be distinguished from a motion by the fiscal for the dismissal of a case already filed in court. The judge may properly deny the motion where, judging from the record of the preliminary investigation, there appears to be sufficient evidence to sustain the prosecution. This is, as it should be, because the case is already in court and, therefore, within its discretion and control (Abela vs. Golez, 131 SCRA 12). This ruling is just being consistent with the principle first laid down in U.S. vs. Valencia (1 Phil. 642) where it was held that "after the complaint has been presented, and certainly after the trial has been commenced, the court and not the fiscal has full control of it. The complaint cannot be withdrawn by the fiscal without the consent of the court." It is discretionary on the court where the case is pending to grant the motion to dismiss or deny the same (Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Bataan vs. Dollete, 103 Phil. 914). In the case at bar, the court below denied the fiscal's motion to dismiss on the ground that there was a prima facie case against private respondents. The question presented for determination now is-after a case has been filed in court, can a fiscal be compelled to prosecute the same, after his motion to dismiss it has been denied? This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings wig be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556). Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. Very recently, this Court in Mario Fl. Crespo vs. Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul (G.R. No. 53373, promulgated June 30, 1987) ruled: The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation. In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court. WHEREFORE, petition is hereby Granted. Public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated. SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla and Cortes, JJ., concur. Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976 JORGE P. TAN, JR., CESAR TAN, LIBRADO SODE TEOFANIS BONJOC, OSMUNDO TOLENTINO and MARIANO BARTIDO, petitioners, vs. JUDGE PEDRO GALLARDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 13th Judicial District, Tacloban City, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ANTONIO, J.: In this Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition, petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in Criminal Cases Nos. CCCXIII50-L-S'72 and CCC-XIII-51-L-S'72, 1 to wit: (a) Order of July 21, 1975, denying petitioners' motion for respondent Judge to disqualify or to inhibit himself from hearing and acting upon their Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; (b) Order of July 23, 1975, denying petitioners' Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsidertion and Supplemental Motion for New Trial; and (c) Order of July 25, 1975, ordering the transfer of the accused (petitioners herein) from Camp Bumpus PC headquarters, Tacloban city, to the Nationial Penitentiary, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, Rizal. It is likewise sought, by way of prohibition, to compel respondent Judge to desist from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases. The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice ... . Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge "appeared to have been heedless of the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment" and, therefore, it was the submission of said official "that the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision and with instruction to receive additional evidence proferred by the accused with the right of the prosecution to present rebuttal evidence as inay be warranted" and, therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge, after the parties shall have adduced such additional evidence as they may wish to make, under such terms and conditions as this Honorable Court may deem fit to impose. 2 On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal. The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. The issue before Us is whether or not the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings. There are important reasons which support the view that in the present proceedings, the private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General. There is no question that since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. As stressed in Suarez v. Platon, et al., 3 the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of. an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigorindeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." Thus, it was stressed in People v. Esquivel, et al., 4 that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to

the accused, and to the state." It is for the purpose of realizing the afore-mentioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer. The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. 'This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. 5 Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party. 6 The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. 7 And in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official. " 8 As explained in Herrero v. Diaz, supra, the "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." (Emphasis supplied) Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. 9 The right which the procedural law reserves to the injured party is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal action and not of demanding punishment of the accused. 10As explained in People v. Orais: 11 ... the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because, as promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of first Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petiton of the promotor fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order overruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promotor fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. Consequently, where from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. 12 There is no question that the Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Thus, Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION 1. Function and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. ... The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (a) Represent the Governemnt in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. xxx xxx xxx (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. xxx xxx xxx It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

Moreover, the position taken by the Solicitor General in recommending the remand of the case to the trial court is not without any plausible justification. Thus, in support of his contention that the rendition of the decision and the resolution on the subsequent motions by the respondent Judge were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice, the Solicitor General stated: In alleging bias and manifest partiality on the part of respondent judge, petitioners assert that: (a) Respondent judge kept improper contact with and was illegally influenced by the Larrazabals in connection with the decision of the two cases against petitioners herein; (b) In the latter part of 1973, with the trial of the Tan cases still in progress, respondent judge received, through one of his court stenographers, two bottles of whisky from Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, brother and uncle of the deceased victims Feliciano and Francisco Larrazabal; (c) On one occasion, Mayor Larrazabal had a short talk with respondent judge, after which the latter received from one of the private prosecutors a bottle of wine wrapped in a newspaper which was "thick" and "bulky" and which allegedly contained "something else inside"; (d) Respondent judge prepared the decision in the Tan cases based on the memorandum of the prosecution which was literally copied in said decision although with some corrections; and (e) After an alleged meeting with Mayor Inaki Larrazabal, respondent judge amended his already prepared decision in the two criminal cases involved herein by changing the penalty of double life sentence for the double murder charge against the petitioners to the death penalty. The foregoing alleged irregularities are mainly supported by an affidavit executed on June 26, 1975 by Gerardo A. Makinano Jr., court stenographer of the Circuit Criminal Court, Tacloban City (Annex "E", Petition). The truth of the charges made in such affidavit are denied by respondent judge (in his answer to the instant petition dated October 11, 1975), who in turn claims that it was petitioners who tried to bribe him into acquitting them in the aforesaid criminal cases, after they were illegally furnished a copy of the draft of his decision of conviction by the same court stenographer Gerardo A. Makinano Jr. (please see Answer of respondent judge, pp. 12-13). Unlike in the cases of Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 191 (1973), and Castillo vs. Juan, 62 SCRA 124 (1974) relied upon mainly by herein petitioners, the facts alleged as constituting the grounds for disqualifying the respondent judge in the instant petition are disputed. Apart from the sworn statements submitted before this Court in support or in denial of the alleged bribery of respondent judge, we have been informed of evidence obtained by the National Bureau of Investigation when it cannot appropriate for us at this time, however, and we are unable to do so, to submit to this Court definite conclusions on the charges and counter-charges. An exhaustive inquiry and open hearing should perhaps precede the making of categorical conclusions. But we are persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolutions on the motions for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice (SeeMartinez Gironella, 65 SCRA 245 [July 22, 1975]). Considering the circumstances of the instant case, the seriousness of the charges and counter-charges and the nature of the evidence on hand to support them, we feel that respondent Judge appeared to have been heedless to the oft-reiterated admonition addressed to trial judges to avoid even the impression of the guilt or innocence of the accused being dependent on prejudice or prejudgment (Fernando, J., Concurring opinion, Martinez Gironella, supra, at 252). ... It is undisputed that the sole purpose of courts of justice is to enforce the laws uniformly and impartially without regard to persons or their circumstances or the opinions of men. A judge, according to Justice Castro, now Chief Justice of this Court, should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty, of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. 13 Thus, it has always been stressed that judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial. For "impartiality is not a technical conception, It is a state of mind" 14 and, consequently, the "appearance of impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality. 15 It must be obvious, therefore, that while judges should possess proficiency in law in order that they can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that they should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before them should have confidence in their impartiality. It appears, however, that respondent Judge is no longer in the judicial service, hence, the question as to whether or not he should be disqualified from further proceeding with the aforementioned criminal cases has already become moot. WHEREFORE, this Court grants the petition and hereby demands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. No Special pronouncement as to costs.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and concepcion Jr. JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. Nos. 135554-56 June 21, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO DELA CRUZ y CARIZZA, accused-appellant. KAPUNAN, J.: Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision dated August 13, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6, in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R, 15164-R and 15368-R finding accused-appellant Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness. On August 29, 1997, two informations for rape were filed against accused-appellant in the RTC of Baguio City. The informations alleged: Criminal Case No. 15163-R That sometime in the month of September, 1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.1 Criminal Case No. 15164-R That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16 years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW.2 On December 11, 1997, another information was filed against accused-appellant charging him with violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act). The information stated: That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being. CONTRARY TO LAW.3 This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15368-R. Upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the consolidation of the three cases. When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges. Thereafter, a joint trial of the cases ensued. The prosecution presented as its witnesses complainant Jeannie Ann dela Cruz; Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-Cordillera Administrative Region (NBI-CAR); Mrs. Jean dela Cruz, mother of complainant and spouse of accused-appellant; and SPO2 Melchor Ong of the Baguio City Police. The prosecution established that accused-appellant married Jean dela Cruz in civil rites on 14 April 1977 and again in Catholic rites on 27 December 1978. They begot four children, namely: Jeanie Ann (the private complainant), Divine Grace, Daniel Jay and Gerard Nio.4 Accused-appellant, a teacher, worked at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. He transferred to the Don Bosco Elementary School in Baguio City sometime in 1986 and taught there until the following year. In 1987, he worked at the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City until his dismissal therefrom in 1993. Accused-appellant again taught at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1993 until his arrest in August 1997.5 While working there, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac on weekdays and went home every 15 days or every payday. They would go home to Baguio City, where the rest of their family stayed, on Friday evening and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.6

Jeannie Ann dela Cruz ("Jeannie Ann") testified that she was born to accused-appellant and Jean Aqui-dela Cruz on April 18, 1979 in Tarlac, Tarlac. Not long after her birth, her family transferred to the house of her maternal grandmother in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City. Her family lived in an extension of her grandmothers house which had a basement, a second floor and an attic. The second floor had four rooms and a stairs leading to the attic, which served as a stockroom. Jeannie Anns parents and her two brothers, Daniel and Nio, stayed in the basement while she and her sister, Divine stayed in the second floor.7 Jeannie Ann revealed that accused-appellant started molesting her when she was seven years old. While he helped do her homework at night, accusedappellant would on occasion make her hold his penis and masturbate him. There were also instances when he would put his penis inside her mouth and withdraw the same when a white liquid came out.8 Accused-appellant warned Jeannie Ann not to tell her mother what he was doing to her and told her that it was a normal thing between father and daughter. He further warned Jeannie Ann that her mother might kill them should she learn about the things that they did. Jeannie Ann believed accused-appellant and did not tell anyone about the sexual acts he performed on her. As she was growing up, accused-appellant continued to engage in the aforementioned sexual activities with her, and continuously threatened to hurt her, her siblings or her mother if she did not give in to his desires. Jeannie Ann still refrained from complaining because she was convinced by the accused-appellant that the sexual activities which he performed on her were proper.9 She recounted before the trial court three particular occasions when accused-appellant molested her. Jeannie Ann said that sometime in September 1990, she was sexually abused by accused-appellant in their house in No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City. She was only 11 years old then. According to Jeannie Ann, their family had moved to said house when her grandmothers house in Sumulong St. was destroyed in the July 16, 1990 earthquake that hit Baguio City.10 They occupied the basement of the house in Leonard Wood Road. The basement had two bedrooms, a comfort room and a living room. Nobody stayed in the second floor thereof but during the day they stayed in the main house.11 Sometime that month, Jeannie Ann, her three year-old brother Nio and accused-appellant were left in the house while her mother and her sister Divine went to market. She was in the living room with Nio when her father undressed her. Her father removed his pants and she was made to lie down on a cushion. Her father played with her genitalia and rubbed his penis against her private part until a white liquid came out of his penis. Jeannie Ann said that after said incident, she felt pain in her vagina whenever she would urinate (mahapdi). She did not resist because she thought that what her father was doing to her was a normal act.12 Jeannie Ann narrated that accused-appellant again abused her one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old. She was watching television with her siblings in the living room. At that time, their mother was attending a meeting in church. Accused-appellant called her three times but she refused to respond to his call as she was watching television. Exasperated, accused-appellant pulled her inside one of the bedrooms and asked her to lie down on the bed saying, "This is only for a while." Accused-appellant then undressed her, removed his pants and underwear, inserted his finger inside her vagina, mashed her breasts and licked her vagina. Accused-appellant proceeded to rub his penis against her vagina and thereafter inserted his penis therein and kept it there until his semen started to come out. Accused-appellant placed his penis on Jeannie Anns stomach where he made his semen flow. While all this was happening, Jeannie Ann could only cry, as she was afraid of accused-appellant, because he threatened her that he would kill her or her mother and siblings.13 The third incident recounted by Jeannie Ann occurred in their house in No. 2 Sumulong Street, Baguio City on August 2, 1997. She was then 18 years old. When she came home at around 10:30 in the morning after her classes at Saint Louis University, she saw accused-appellant at the door. He told her to proceed to the attic shortly. She ignored him and went directly to her room and started cleaning the same. While she was cleaning the outer portion of her room, she saw accused-appellant go up the attic. While he was there, he repeatedly called her and asked her to go there. When Jeannie Ann remembered that her mother had earlier instructed her to clean the attic, she went up when she was done cleaning her room.14 Accused-appellant lay on the bed in the attic as Jeannie Ann swept the floor. When she was done, accused-appellant asked her to join him on the bed. He went near her and again asked her to sit on the bed when she refused to heed his call. Accused-appellant whispered to her that he was running out of time. He talked in whispers so that the other people in the house at that time would not be able to hear what he said. Sensing that accused-appellant would again molest her, Jeannie Ann became nervous and started to cry. He told her to stop crying and to relax, as what he was about to do would only take a while. Accused-appellant then lifted Jeannie Anns t-shirt and brassier, mashed her breasts with his left hand and inserted his right hand inside her pants. Jeannie Ann resisted, but accused-appellant proceeded to insert a finger of his right hand inside her vagina. While he performed the aforementioned acts on his daughter, accused-appellant told her, "I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only one who will do this to you."15 Accused-appellant only stopped what he was doing when he heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann. He immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved away from her. Accused-appellant instructed Jeannie Ann not to go down and to keep quiet about the incident. When accused-appellant noticed that Aileen had left because Jeannie Ann did not respond to her, accused-appellant embraced Jeannie Ann and said: "Please cooperate with me and trust me. I have given you my life. Promise that I will be the only one who will touch you." Accused-appellant began touching her again. He inserted his fingers inside her vagina. As he touched her, he said, "Please cooperate with me and trust me. This is for your own good and for the good of our family. If you will not follow me, you might regret it. I want you to have a bright future. And after you finish, I can already die and you will no longer have any problem."16 Although Aileen, Divine, Nio and Rogel, another boarder in their house were also there at the time of the incident, Jeannie Ann did not have the courage to call for help because she was very much afraid of accused-appellant, and she saw anger in his eyes.17 When accused-appellant was done with her, Jeannie Ann insisted on going down. She cried as she returned to her room to fix herself. Thereafter, she went out of the house to deal with what had just happened to her. While walking outside toward the bridge, she saw a white L-300 van belonging to the police. She flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2 Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what accused-appellant had just done to her. The policemen accompanied her back to their house where they met accused-appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who had raped her. Accused-appellant voluntarily went with the policemen to the Baguio City Police Station.18 When they arrived at the Baguio City Police Station, Jeannie Ann narrated her experience to the police officer stationed at the Womens Desk. In her statement, Jeannie Ann described what accused-appellant did to her on August 2, 1997.19 Jeannie Ann also denied accused-appellants claim that she had sexual relations with her boyfriend Charles, and that she accused her father of rape to get back at him for causing her breakup with Charles.20

Dr. Ronald R. Bandonill, the NBI-CAR medico-legal officer who conducted a physical examination of Jeannie Ann on August 8, 1997, testified that he found two old healed lacerations at 5 o'clock and 7 o'clock positions on Jeannie Anns hymen. He said that the lacerations could have been inflicted more than three months prior to the date of the examination and considering the proximity of their location, could have been inflicted at the same time. A hard rigid instrument like an erect male organ, a rigid wood or a finger could have caused these lacerations. Dr. Bandonill also opined that the positions of the lacerations did not rule out the possibility that the victim had sexual intercourse less than three months prior to his examination of her, since intercourse would not create further lacerations when done in the same position. He likewise noted that the vaginal walls were lax and the vaginal rugosities were slightly flattened and smoothed. The victim's hymenal orifice admitted a tube 2.4 cm. in diameter with ease. Dr. Bandonill said it was possible that penetration happened several times. He further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a diameter of more than an inch, could cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition of vaginal walls.21 Jean dela Cruz ("Mrs. dela Cruz"), Jeannie Anns mother and wife of accused-appellant, testified that she learned that accused-appellant had sexually abused their daughter Jeannie Ann on August 2, 1997 when she arrived at home after her marketing chores. She was told by her daughter Divine that accused-appellant was picked up by the police. Mrs. dela Cruz followed accused-appellant to the police station and found Jeanie Ann crying while the latter was reporting what had happened to her at the Women's Desk. Upon seeing her daughter, Mrs. dela Cruz hugged her and they cried together.22 Mrs. dela Cruz further stated that she was shocked upon hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that accused-appellant had been performing oral sex on their daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter was seven years old, as it was the first time that she learned about it. In her anger, she rushed to the other room where the accused-appellant was being questioned and slapped him, kicked him and scratched his face. She said accused-appellant denied all the accusations against him. When accused-appellant was already incarcerated, Mrs. dela Cruz received several letters23 from him asking for forgiveness from her and from Jeannie Ann.24 She also informed the trial court that after accused-appellants incarceration, she went to Tarlac to get her husband's things since he usually stayed there on weekdays while he taught at Don Bosco.25 She discovered several love letters by a certain Emily addressed to accused-appellant,26 Emilys photograph27 and accused-appellants draft love letters to Emily, dated March 21, 1995,28 September 4, 1995,29 and March 7, 1996.30 Mrs. dela Cruz also found a letter from a certain Maureen telling accused-appellant that he had a chance of winning her heart,31and a photograph of Maureen.32 She said that the tenor of the letters indicated that accused-appellant was having relations with other women.33 Mrs. dela Cruz also denied accused-appellants claims that she had a paramour and that she helped Jeannie Ann file the complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to get back at him for being unfaithful to her.34 SPO2 Melchor Ong, the police officer assigned to the Baguio City Mobile Group, also testified that on August 2, 1997, between 11:30 a.m. and 12:00 noon, while he and his companion inside an L-300 van of the Baguio City police were passing along Sumulong St., Baguio City, they saw Jeannie Ann walking towards them. The latter stopped them and tearfully reported to them that her father had just sexually molested her. They accompanied Jeannie Ann to her house and there the latter pointed to accused-appellant as the person who mashed her breasts and inserted his finger inside her vagina. SPO2 Ong and his companion approached accused-appellant, introduced themselves as policemen and invited him to the police station. He said that accused-appellant readily agreed to go with them to the police station.35 The defense presented as witnesses the accused-appellant, Camilo Estepa, Barangay Chairman of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute, and Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City. Accused-appellant testified that he was a teacher at the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac from 1978 to 1986. In 1987, he transferred to Don Bosco in Trancoville, Baguio City and worked there for a year. From 1988 to 1993, he taught also in Saint Louis School Center. In 1994, he went back to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac and had taught there until his incarceration in August 1997.36 On weekdays, he and his son Daniel stayed in Sto. Cristo, Tarlac, Tarlac and they would go home to their family in Baguio City every 15th and 30th of each month to give his salary to his wife. When these dates fell on a weekday, they would go home to Baguio City the following Friday and return to Tarlac on Sunday afternoon.37 He denied all the accusations hurled against him by his daughter Jeannie Ann.38 According to him, he tried to provide for the needs of his family, especially his wife whom he loved very much. He maintained that even when he was already in jail, he asked his mother and his sister to support his daughter's education. He admitted to having gone home to Baguio City in the evening of August 1, 1997, which he recalled was a Friday. That night, his wife asked him to clean the attic the following day as there was a dead rat therein.39 The following day, August 2, 1997, accused-appellant removed the decomposing body of the rat from the attic as requested by his wife. He called his daughter Jeannie Ann who was cleaning her room on the second floor of the house to come to the attic and help him. It took a while before Jeannie Ann heeded his call. When she finally went up, she merely swept one third of the floor area of the attic, away from where the dead rat was. When she was done sweeping the floor, accused-appellant asked her to come near him, as he wanted to apologize for having scolded her earlier and to remind her that she should not have ignored him when he commanded her to go up the attic, or to at least tell him that she could not obey his command immediately. While he was talking to her, they heard someone calling her name. Jeannie Ann told accused-appellant that that person was her classmate. She then went down while accused-appellant stayed on to fix the things in the attic. Not long afterwards, his daughter Divine informed him that they had some visitors downstairs. On his way down from the attic, he looked out of the window and saw Jeannie Ann walking beyond the bridge.40 Accused-appellant went down to meet the visitors who were looking for Rogel, one of their boarders. After leading these visitors to Rogel, two policemen arrived in their house with Jeannie Ann. Accused-appellant identified the policemen as SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo and SPO2 Melchor Ong. The former asked for accused-appellants name and thereafter invited him to the police station. He freely went with them, without asking the purpose of the invitation.41 At the station, SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accused-appellant. The interview was reduced to writing and he was asked to sign the same. He did not read the document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time. At first, accused-appellant refused to sign the document without the presence of his counsel. SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to sign the document may be interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part. Accused-appellant thereafter decided to sign the document.42

Accused-appellant admitted that he transferred to the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac, Tarlac because he was dismissed from the Saint Louis Center in Baguio City. He acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student named Freda Miguel filed a case43 against him because accused-appellant allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in the Science Laboratory Room of the school, and that he signed an amicable settlement of the complaint. However, he denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing thereof was not the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis Center.44 He also admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but insisted that they were only his friends, and that Emilys reference to him as her boyfriend in one of her letters45 was only a joke. Accused-appellant claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases against him because they had resentments against him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend Charles. His wife, on the other hand, wanted him out of her life because she had a paramour. According to him, his wife admitted to him that she had an illicit relationship with a man named Alfredo dela Cruz, a namesake of his brother. His wife had a second relationship with a person named Alfredo Aquino against whom he filed a case before the barangay.46 Camilo Estepa, Barangay Captain of Barangay Holy Ghost, Baguio City, told the trial court that sometime in 1993, accused-appellant filed a case for malicious mischief against a certain Alfredo or Federico Aquino, a boarder in the house of Mrs. Aqui, the mother of Mrs. dela Cruz. Accused-appellant alleged that Aquino was courting his wife. However, the case was settled amicably when Aquino agreed to leave the boarding house of Mrs. Aqui.47 Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac from 1994 to 1998, testified that he had known accused-appellant since 1994 and was not aware of any untoward incident involving the latter. He said that accused-appellant and his son Daniel would go home to his family in Baguio City every weekend and returned to Tarlac either on Sunday evening or Monday morning. He would come to school on time and attended the flag ceremony regularly. Fr. Veloso said that none of the lady teachers ever complained about accused-appellant.48 Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville, Baguio City, testified that accused-appellant was a very competent teacher in Science and had a very good relationship with the other teachers. He said he regretted that accused-appellant left his teaching job at the Don Bosco Elementary School after only one year.49 On August 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Rape (committed in September 1990) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under paragraph No. 3 of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (Statutory Rape) and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the offended party, Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. 2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of incest rape (committed in July 1995) as charged in the Information defined and penalized under Section 11 of Republic Act 7659 (Heinous Crime Law) which amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death to be implemented in accordance with law; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P50,000.00 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. 3. In Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court finds the accused Danilo dela Cruz y Carizza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Acts of Lasciviousness defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code instead of violation of RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences him, applying the indeterminate sentence law, to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) months and one (1) day of Arresto Mayor as Minimum to two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Maximum; to indemnify the offended party Jeannie Ann dela Cruz the sum of P5,000 as Moral Damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The accused Danilo dela Cruz being a detention prisoner is entitled to be credited 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Law. SO ORDERED.50 In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jeannie Ann and in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness. He alleges that Jeannie Anns testimony was fabricated and inconsistent.51 Accused-appellant points out that Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her harrowing experience. Notwithstanding the fact that he was often away from their home because he stayed in Tarlac where he worked on weekdays, and Jeannie Ann was with her mother in Baguio City, it took her eleven years to disclose the sexual abuses which accused-appellant allegedly committed against her.52Moreover, he claims that considering Jeannie Anns tender age at the time he allegedly raped her, she must have suffered great pain and should have complained about it to her mother or told the latter what accused-appellant had been doing to her. Accused-appellant argues that the delay in the reporting of the sexual acts he performed on his daughter is not normal and is indicative of the untruthfulness of complainan ts charges.53

The Court finds that the trial court did not err in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which defined the crime of Rape prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (the Anti-Rape Law of 1997), and which is the applicable law for the rape incidents of September 1990 and July 1995, states:

When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua. xxx In reviewing the cases at bar, the Court observed the following guidelines it had previously formulated for the review of rape cases: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is difficult to prove, and even more difficult for the accused to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense.54 In rape cases, the issue invariably boils down to the credibility of the victims testimony. The trial courts evaluation of the credibility of the victims statements is accorded great weight because it has the unique opportunity of hearing the witnesses testify and observing their deportment and manner of testifying. The trial court judge is indisputably in the best position to determine the truthfulness of the complainants testimony. Thus, unless it is shown that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that would otherwise affect the result of the case, its findings will not be disturbed on appeal.55 The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under oath that she has been raped meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.56 In the cases at bar, the trial court found Jeannie Anns testimony to be "natural, coherent and touching as she recounted her harrowing experience in the hands of her father,"57 as follows: xxx q Now, sometime in the month of July, 1995, Madame Witness, do you remember if there was anything unusual which took place again in your house at Sumulong St., Baguio City? a q There was, sir. What was that incident?

[a] On that night I was watching TV with my brothers and sisters. While I was watching TV my father was calling me but I did not heed his call because I said I was watching TV. So, three times he called me and I know that he was already angry. Then he went near me and pulled me into the other room. And in that other room, he did bad things that I cannot imagine. q Now, you said that you and your brothers and sisters were watching TV on that night of July, 1995. Where was your mother at that time? a She was not in the house at that time because she attended a meeting in our church.

COURT: (to witness) q That is why we already excluded the public. Dont let the Court speculate. Will you tell us straight. What did your father actually do which you said (sic) he did things which you cannot imagine? a When we were in the room he let me sit on the bed. And he asked me to lie down. And he said, "This is only for a while". And after that he put down my pants and my underwear. Then he undressed, lowered his pants and removed his brief. Then he started touching my vabina (sic).

COURT: Continue from there. Make it of record that at this point the witness is crying. PROS. CENTENO: q Now after your father had removed your pants and your underwear as you said, and he also removed his pants and his brief and started holding your vagina, what else happened? a He fingered my vagina and also mashed mybreasts (sic). And with his tongue he licked my vagina. After that he used his penis and rubbed it into my vagina. And he played with my vagina. q a q a q a q a q What did you do when your father was doing that to you? I was just crying, sir. Did you not fight back? No sir, because I was afraid of my father. Why are you afraid of your father? Because when I was still young, one time he told me that either I will be killed or our family will be killed. On what occasion was that when your father old (sic) you that it is either you or the family that will be killed? I cannot remember, sir. But that was when I was still young. Now, aside from rubbing his penis to your vagina, what else did your father do?

a When he was rubbing his penis against my vagina there was a white liquid that came out. And when that white liquid came out he placed his penis on my stomach where the white liquid was placed. COURT: (to witness) q a Will you tell us what you mean by his rubbing his penis to your vagina? What was being done actually? I felt that half of the head of his penis was inside my vagina. That is what I felt. (At this point the witness again broke into tears)

COURT: Continue. PROS. CENTENO: q a q a q a Now, when you felt that as you said half of the penis of your father was inside your vagina, what did you do? None, sir. Why did you not do anything? Because I didnt know what to do, sir. Did you not try to fight your father? No, sir, because I am really afraid of my father. Because when he gets mad at my mother, my brothers and sisters would be involved.

q Now, before July 1995, Madame Witness, particularly in September of 1990, several months after the earthquake of July 16, 1990, will you tell us where you were residing? a We were residing then at No. 37 Leonard Wood Road, sir.

q a

How old were you? I was 11 years old. xxx

q When you were staying at Leonard Wood Road, Baguio City, together with your father, your mother, your sister and your brothers in September of 1990, do you remember if there was any unusual incident which happened to you? a q Yes, sir. What was that incident?

a I was with my father and brother Nio at the sala. And at the sala he undressed me and did the same. He removed his pants. Then he took a cushion from the sala and asked me to lie down. And there he played with my vagina. Then he rubbed his penis against my vagina. Nio was still a baby at that time. q a q a Where was your mother at that time? My mother was not in the house at that time. What I know is that she went to the market. How about you sister Divine? She was with my mother, sir.

COURT: (to witness) q Again, in this incident will you describe actually to us the motions that took place with the rubbing of his penis into your vagina?

a It is like this, sir. For example this is my vagina (witness showing her left hand, palms up) and this is his penis (witness demonstrating with her right forefinger), he made a push and pull movement on my vagina. PROS. CENTENO: q a What did you feel while your father was doing that to you which you term as "rubbing his penis into your vagina"? I felt pain, sir.

PROS. CENTENO: May we put the word "mahapdi" which was the term used by the witness, in the record. (to witness) q a q a q a How long did your father rub his penis into your vagina? It was for quite a long time until a white liquid came out. Did you not fight back when your father did that to you? No, sir. Why did you not fight back? Because I thought that what he was doing to me was a normal act. xxx58 The trial court judge saw "from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the shame and the embarrassment as she broke down and cried several times in the course of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her father."59

Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of her private parts and endure the humiliation of a public trial where she would be forced to recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been raped. This is especially true in cases of incestuous rape, as in these cases where Jeannie Ann accused her own father of abusing her, since reverence and respect for ones parents and other elders is deeply ingrained in Filipino children.60 The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim where the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy over the victim. It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue because of the rapists threat on her life, or on the life of the other members of her family.61 In the cases at bar, Jeannie Ann repeatedly explained that accused-appellant threatened to hurt her, her mother or her siblings if she did not give in to his desires.62 Her fear of what accused-appellant would do to her, her mother and siblings if she revealed his evil deeds was what compelled her to suffer in silence for a long time. In People v. Nicolas,63 the Court stated: The pattern of instilling fear, utilized by the perpetrator in incestuous rape to intimidate his victim into submission, is evident in virtually all cases that have reached this Court. It is through this fear that the perpetrator hopes to create a climax of extreme psychological terror which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and force her to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of time. The relationship of the victim and the perpetrator magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim.64 On the other hand, the trial court found accused-appellant to be evasive in his narration of his story. All that he offered in his defense were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.65 Accused-appellant's assertion that his daughter made up the charges against him to get back at him for causing her breakup with her boyfriend Charles is likewise unbelievable. It is not likely that a complainant in a rape case would fabricate a story of defloration against her own father and put to shame not only herself but her whole family as well, unless it was the plain truth and her motive was purely to obtain justice.66 Neither does the Court believe accused-appellant's claim that his wife urged their daughter to file rape charges against him because she (his wife) wanted to get him out of the way of her extra-marital relationship. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject them to embarrassment and even stigma.67 No mother would have the courage to expose an ignominious act of her husband that could lead to a breakup of the family unless she was prompted by a desire to obtain justice for her daughter.68 The trial court committed no error in imposing upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the rape he committed in September 1990, since the offense was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law).69 However, the Court finds that the lower court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon him for the rape committed in July 1995. R.A. No. 7659, which was already in force at that time, requires that the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must concur for the death penalty to be imposable. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 provides: xxx The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances. 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. xxx The Court has previously explained that the circumstances of minority and relationship are considered as special qualifying circumstances because they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus warrant the imposition of the death penalty. These circumstances must be alleged in the information and established during trial for the court to be able to impose the death penalty.70 It was, therefore, incumbent upon the prosecution to satisfactorily prove both circumstances of minority and relationship. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the information and proven in the course of the trial. However, Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise alleged in the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was offered to establish her age was her bare testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to present her birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, other documentary evidence such as her baptismal certificate, school records which would have aided the court in verifying her claim that she was a minor when she was raped by accusedappellant in July 1995. In the absence of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the penalty imposable for the offense in Criminal Case No. 15164 -R is reclusion perpetua.71 The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), "either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness."72 It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The information does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused-appellant.73 Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions constituting the

offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:

Designation of the offense. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

The allegation in the information that accused-appellant "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her" is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts.74 The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the accused-appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.75 Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this Court regarding the defects of the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, the Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its ruling in Suy Sui vs. People,76 because the information is a patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of the basic principles of due process. Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as might be found in the appealed decision, whether these errors are assigned or not. It is likewise necessary to increase the award of damages by the trial court. The lower court in its decision ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the complainant in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) only in each of the cases, representing moral damages. It failed to award the prescribed amounts for civil indemnity, the award of which is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.77 This civil liability ex delicto is equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.78 It is not to be confused with moral damages, which is awarded upon a showing that the victim endured physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.79Under prevailing jurisprudence, when the penalty imposed on the accused is reclusion perpetua, the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) should be awarded as civil indemnity to the rape victim.80 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, an award of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for each count of rape is proper. In addition to civil indemnity, moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in rape cases without need of proof for it is assumed that the private complainant has sustained mental, physical and psychological suffering.81 The Court affirms the award by the trial court of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R, since said amounts are in accord with its current rulings.82 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal Cases Nos. 15163-R and 15164-R is hereby MODIFIED, as follows: 1. In Criminal Case No. 15163-R, the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand ordered to pay the victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; 2. In Criminal Case No. 15164-R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. 3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is declared null and void for being violative of the accused-appellant's constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr.*, Bellosillo, Puno*, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing**, Ynares-Santiago*, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. 128839 July 20, 1999 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-apellee, vs. GODOFREDO TEVES y LEMEN, accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: This case is before us on automatic review 1 of the decision 2 of 14 March 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in four (4) criminal cases, finding accused-appellant Godofredo Teves y Lemen (hereafter GODOFREDO) guilty of the crime of multiple rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages. On the basis of a sworn statement 3 executed by Cherry Rose Teves (hereafter CHERRY), daughter of GODOFREDO, a criminal complaint 4 for multiple rape committed "since the year 1993 up to the 1st, 8th and 3rd day of January 1995," was filed against GODOFREDO before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Kawit, Cavite. Although not clear from the record, GODOFREDO was somehow arrested and detained.1wphi1.nt Despite due notice, GODOFREDO did not file his counter-affidavit with the MTC. After due proceedings, the MTC found a prima facie case against GODOFREDO and thus forwarded the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite. 5 On 4 July 1995, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed four (4) separate informations for rape against GODOFREDO with the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 20, in Imus. The informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 3872-95, 6 3873-95, 7 3874-95 8 and 387595, 9 respectively. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 3872-95, denominated as one for multiple rape, reads as follows: That sometimes [sic] in the year 1993, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd designs, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have repeated carnal knowledge of Cherry Rose Q. Teves, against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 3873-95 reads as follows: That on or about the 1st day of January 1995, in the Municipality of Kawit, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, with lewd designs and taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of Cherry Rose Q. Teves, against her will and consent, thereby causing her damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. The accusatory portions of the informations in Criminal Case No. 3874-95 and Criminal Case No. 3875-95 are similarly worded as that in Criminal Case No. 3872-95, except as to the dates of the commission of the crimes, which were specified as 3 January 1995 and 8 January 1995, respectively. The four cases were consolidated and jointly tried. At his arraignment on 9 October 1995, GODOFREDO entered a plea of not guilty in each case. 10 At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the offended party, CHERRY, but dispensed with the testimonies of the social worker, Leonida Ramos, and of the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Owen Lebaquin, as the parties stipulated on the substance of their testimonies. On his part, GODOFREDO relied solely on his testimony, raising the defenses of denial and alibi. He further imputed ill motive on the part of CHEIRRY in having filed the case.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimony of CHERRY, having been "given spontaneously and in a straightforward manner" and which stood "unrebutted." On the other hand, the trial court considered GODOFREDO's claim of ill motive "hollow and totally unworthy of belief." The-trial court faithfully summarized the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, as follows: Taking the witness stand, the victim Cherry Rose Teves narrated how she was raped by her father on several occasions. She claimed that sometime in 1994 when she was only thirteen (13) years old and while washing dishes, her father touched her breast. A day before New Year of 1995, her father told her not to leave their house; that in a little while, her father laid her down, removed her panty and shorts, touched her breast and inserted his sex thing into her organ; that after a week, while she was taking a bath, her father asked her to hand him the dipper; that when she obeyed, he suddenly entered the bathroom and again sexually abused her; that she even noticed blood coming out of her organ. Continuing, she elucidated that on January 1, 1995, she was instructed by her father to clean the house and to take care of her younger brothers and sisters after sending her twelve (12) year old brother [on] an errand to buy cigarettes; after her brother left, she was molested by her father. The assault on her virtue was always followed by a threat for her not to report the incident to her mother or else she [would] be killed; that during all those times that she was abused by her father, her mother who [was] a laundry woman, was out of the house. When cross-examined, she declared that her father was then working as a carpenter and usually arrived home at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon or late in the evening. She, being the eldest among the six children in the family, was the one taking care of her little brothers and sisters because she already stopped schooling. Nobody knew of the abused [sic] heaped upon her by her father until she confided it to her friends who [resided] at Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite. After presenting the victim, the parties entered into stipulations to wit: 1. That Social Worker Leonida Ramos was the one who assisted and brought the complainant to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination resulting in the issuance of a medico-legal report; 2. That said Social Worker knew the complainant because the latter came to see her and so, she brought her to the Kawit Police Station where her statement was taken. In view of the above stipulations, the testimony of Social Worker Leonida Ramos was dispensed with. Likewise, the testimony of Dr. Owen Lebaquin, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, was dispensed with after the defense admitted the findings of the said physician as contained in Medico-Legal Report No. M-0092-95 (Exh. "B"). As stated in the Report of the Medico-Legal Officer which was completed on January 31, 1995, the subject is in non-virgin state physically without external signs of application of violence. Accused . . . claimed that he knew of no reason why he was charged [with] rape, except that he did not approve of [his] daughter coming home late from her friend at the DSWD. And because of this, he maltreated her. He added that he only comes home on weekends, being a construction worker at the Arcontica on a "pakyawan" basis; that there were occasions that he and his daughter were the only ones left at their house. 11 Applying Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, which imposes the death penalty in rape cases committed by a parent when the victim is under 18 years of age, the trial court then decreed: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Guilty of Multiple Rape. He is thus sentenced to death for the rape of his 13 year old daughter and to indemnify her of the sum of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages. SO ORDERED. In his Appellant's Brief, GODOFREDO's lone error is that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. GODOFREDO asserts that since his conviction rests on the uncorroborated testimony of the complainant, there must be a careful and painstaking scrutiny of the latter; it should not be easily accepted and believed with precipitate credulity. 12 GODOFREDO contends that CHERRY's testimony contained "uncertain and conflicting answers" and that the following circumstances warrant CHERRY's testimony was tainted with uncertainties and implausibilities as evidenced by inconsistencies and her failure to recall the number of times and the dates she was allegedly raped by her father, as well as of the details thereof; (2) CHERRY's testimony did not prove existence of force and intimidation; (3) the evidence for the prosecution was purely speculative and conjectural; and (4) the unreasonable delay of two years in the filing of the complaint. In the Brief for the Appellee, the People maintain that the alleged inconsistencies in CHERRY's testimony are not sufficient to cast serious doubt upon her credibility since victims of rape cannot be expected to remember every grisly detail of the fact of the commission of the offense and thereafter "keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience." 13 At any rate, the inconsistencies were only on minor matters which, instead of weakening CHERRY's credibility, all the more strengthened it as they eradicated the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 14 Moreover, the assessment of credibility of witnesses is best left to the trial court whose judgment thereon is entitled to the highest respect by appellate courts, it having had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. This, the People observe, is especially true in the instant case where CHERRY, a young and unschooled barrio lass, had no evil motive to charge her father with a grievous offense.

Anent the issue of force and intimidation, the People assert that it was of no moment that the prosecution failed to show its presence in the commission of the offense, since in a rape case committed by a father against his daughter, the moral ascendancy and influence of the latter over the former substitutes for the force and intimidation. 15 As to the delay in reporting the rape incident, the People contend it is settled that such delay neither diminishes complainant's credibility nor undermines the charges of rape where the delay can be attributed to death threats of the assailant upon the complainant. 16 Be that as it may, GODOFREDO's contention that the charges of rape were made known only two years thereafter was baseless, for as a matter of fact, it did not take two years before CHERRY finally broke her silence: the first rape incident happened sometime in 1994 before New Year's day of 1995, and that on 25 January 1995, a complaint charging GODOFREDO with rape was filed before the Municipal Trial Court of Kawit, Cavite. In reviewing rape cases we are guided by the following well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 17 Basic in every prosecution for rape is the determination of the credibility of the offended party's testimony, for the lone testimony of the victim, if credible, is sufficient to sustain the verdict of conviction. 18 On this note, when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question as it heard the witnesses themlselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial. 19 The exceptions to the rule are when such evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstance of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. 20 We sustain the trial court's ruling as to the credibility of CHERRY and find that GODOFREDO miserably failed to demonstrate the existence of any of the exceptions aforementioned. Our review of CHERRY's testimony has us fully convinced of her sincerities, candor and truthfulness as to the fact of rape, to the extent that the only issue to be resolved is the number of times she was raped. The following excerpt of CHERRY's testimony established with moral certainty GODOFREDO's guilt: Q Do you remember when your father raped you? A I cannot remember. Q How many times were you raped by your father? A Many times. Q Miss Witness, how old were you when you were first raped by your father? A 13 years old. Q That would be sometime in 1994? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q Can you tell the court what happened on the first occasion when you were raped by your father? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q What were you doing on that day when you were first raped by your father? A I was washing dishes. Q Do you remember what time was it [sic]? Was it morning, afternoon or evening? A I cannot recall. It happened quite some time. Q While you were washing dishes, what did your father do? A He touched my breast. Q After that what else did you do? A Nothing happened anymore. On that day before New Year, my father told me not to go out of the house. Q After your father told you not to go out of the house, what happened? A My father told me to lie on the floor. He laid me down. Q After he laid you down, what did he do? A He inserted his organ into my organ. Q Were you wearing a dress at that time? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q What were you wearing? A T-shirt and short pants. Q Before your father inserted his organ inside your organ, what if any, did he do with your short? A He removed my shorts. Q How about your pantie? A He also removed my pantie. Q After he removed-your shorts and pantie what else did he do? A He inserted his organ into my organ. He touched my breast. My mother was out of the house. Q You said that your father inserted his organ into your organ, what did you feel? A I felt pain. Q What did you do? A I just bore the pain. "Tiniis ko na lang ang sakit." Q After that, what else did your father do? A None. Q Did he leave the house? A He felt [sic] asleep. He was drunk then. Q You said awhile ago that you were raped several times by your father, after that first night when did your father rape you again, can you remember? A I cannot recall.

Q Could it be one week? A After a week. Q Can you tell the court how your father raped you on the second instance? A I was taking a bath. Q When you were taking a bath, what happened? A My father asked me to give him the "tabo". Q Where were you taking a bath at that time? A Inside our bathroom. Q Where is that bathroom located? A Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite. Q The first instance when you said your father raped you in what place were you then? A At Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite. Q You said that in the second instance your father asked you to hand him the the "tabo" [dipper], what did you do when your father asked you to hand the dipper? A I handed it to him. Q What did you do after that? A He suddenly entered in [sic] the bathroom. Q After entering the bathroom, what did he do? A He inserted his organ into my organ. I noticed blood came out of my organ. Q You said that you were raped several times by your father, when was the last time your father raped you? A January 23. Q What year? A January 23, 1995. Q Where were you on Jan. 23, 1995? A I was cleaning our house. Q While you were cleaning your house, what happened? A My mother came and then [the] raped [sic] [did] not pushed [sic] through. Q Madam witness in connection with this case, do you remember having executed an affidavit? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q If you were shown that document will you be able to identify it? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q I am showing to you this document below is a signature above the typewritten name Cherry Rose Teves, will you please tell us if that is the statement which you said you executed? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q Whose signature is this above the typewritten name Cherry Rose Teves? A Mine, mam [sic]. PROS. DE CASTRO For purposes of identification, we request that this document be marked as Exh. A and the signature of the witness as Exh. A-1. Q In this statement partiuclarly par. 5 the question was "Kailan ka ni rape ng iyong tatay?" Ans: "Sa Kawit, Cavite." Q Can you tell the court what happened on Jan. 1, 1995? A I went out of the house and then I went home. Q What happened after you went home on that day? A My father called me. Q What did you do after he called you? A He asked my brother to buy cigarette[s]. Q After that, what happened? A He asked me to clean our house and to take care my small brothers and sister. Q What did you do? A I cleaned our house. Q After that what happened? A I was again "raped" by my father and it happened many times. Q During all those times when you were being raped by our father, where was your mother? A She was not around. Q Where was she? A She went somewhere else. Only my small brothers and sisters were around. Q What was the occupation of your mother? A Laundrywoman. Q During those times when you were raped by your father, do you remember where your mother was? A She was washing clothes. Q Where? A In the aparment a little bit near our house. Q Why did you not tell your mother about what your father did to you the first time that you were raped? A I was afraid. Q Why were you afraid? A I did not tell my mother because father told me not to tell her. Q What else did your father tell you? A Not to tell the matter to my mother because if I will tell my mother he will kill me. Q Before you were raped by your father for the first time, did you love your father? A Yes, mam [sic]. Q How about now how do you fell [sic] towards your father? A I am mad at him. 21

Respecting the charge that CHERRY's testimony consisted mainly of uncertain, conflicting, vague and inconsistent answers to specific questions propounded upon her during the direct and cross-examination, suffice it to state that her failure to remember and elaborate on every detail of her unfortunate experience was inconsequential. What must be borne in mind was that she was merely fourteen (14) years old when she testified; moreover, GODOFREDO did not object to her testimony as to the time of the commission of the crime.22 It is settled that the precise time of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime. 23Likewise, GODOFREDO's harping on CHERRY's failure to recall the exact number of times she was raped is not persuasive. We cannot reasonably expect her to recount in detail her humiliating experience since the accused is of her own flesh and blood. The natural vacillation of a daughter to publicly denounce her father and to testify in an unfamiliar and unfriendly environment on such a delicate matter very well explain the minor lapses in her testimony. More than anything else, the alleged inconsistencies and discrepancies in CHERRY's testimony referred only to minor and trivial matters and were, undoubtedly, insufficient to dilute the truthfulness and destroy the probative value of her testimony. We find no iota of evidence showing that CHERRY's account was a result of deliberate falsehood. Settled is the rule that discrepancies and inconsistencies on minor matters do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole nor reflect on the witness' honesty. Such inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of the memory, even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. 24 Neither can GODOFREDO be allowed to make much of the fact that the prosecution was unable to establish forcible carnal knowledge of CHERRY. In a rape committed by a father against his daughter, the moral dominance and parental influence that essentially flows from the reverence and respect a child has toward their parents which are ingrained and observed in the minds of the Filipino children, substitute for force and intimidation, which produce reasonable fear in the child. 25 The delay in instituting the present criminal prosecution likewise does not engender doubt as to GODOFREDO's guilt, in light of the established fact that CHERRY kept silent about the incident because of GODOFREDO's death threat. CHERRY, a young barrio lass and with a simple and unsophisticated mind, cannot be expected to have the fortitude and courage of an adult, Mature and experienced woman who may disregard the threat and, with promptitude, condemn in the open the shameful scandal wrought upon her by her very own father. It is not uncommon that young girls usually conceal for some time the assault upon their virtue because of the threats on their lives. 26 Finally, there is absolutely no showing that CHERRY was actuated by a sinister motive to falsely charge and implicate her own father in a serious crime. 27 Briefly, if she did admit the ignominy she had undergone, allowed her private parts to be examined, exposed herself to the trouble and inconvenience of a public trial and endure the embarrassments and humiliation which a public revelation of what ought to be kept secret, she had nothing in mind except to obtain justice. 28 From the aforequoted testimony of CHERRY, it is clear to us that the rapes that were duly proved were those committed on: (a) New Year's day of 1995; (b) a week after said New Year's day; and (c) on 23 January 1995. That committed on New Year's day of 1995 is the subject of Criminal Case No. 3837-95, while that committed a week after New Year's day of 1995 is covered by the Information in Criminal Case No. 3875-95. There is no factual basis for the rapes charged in the information in Criminal Cases No. 3872-95, allegedly committed "sometime in the year 1993," and in the information in Criminal Case No. 3874-95, on 3 January 1995. GODOFREDO has not been charged for the rape committed on 23 January 1995.1wphi1.nt Concretely then, GODOFREDO might only be convicted of the crimes of rape charged in the informations in Criminal Case No. 3873-95 and in Criminal Case No. 3875-95. It was then error for the trial court to find him guilty of rape in the four (4) cases and, worse, impose upon him one penalty of death for multiple rape. In view of its findings, the court a quo should have imposed the death penalty in each of the four (4) cases. At this point, however, we are compelled to inquire into the propriety of the imposition of capital punishment. To repeat, the trial court so imposed the death penalty, reasoning that under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the same was warranted in rape cases committed by a parent when the victim was under 18 years of age. Initially, we note that the trial court found that R.A. No. 7659 "took effect in January 1994." However, in People v. Simon, of cases since, we categorically held that said statute took effect on 31 December 1993.
29

as reiterated in a multitude

Pursuant to Section 11 of the amendatory statute, the death penalty may be imposed in rape cases under the last paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, when the rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: The death penalty shall also be imposed of the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consaguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. 2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities. 3. When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the third degree of consaguinity. 4. When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old. 5. When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease. 6. When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation. (As amended by Sec. 11, Ra 7659.) These seven attendant circumstances, given that they alter the nature of the crime of rape and thus increase the degree of the penalty, are in the nature of qualifying circumstances. Plainly, these attendant circumstances added by R.A. No. 7659 are not mere aggravating circumstances, which merely increase the period of the penalty. So we held in People v. Ramos, 30 to the effect that a qualifying circumstance must be specifically pleaded in the information, thus: While Republic Act No. 7659 did not give a legal designation to the crime of rape attended by any of the seven new circumstances introduced in Article 335 on December 31, 1993, this Court has referred to such crime as qualified rape in a number of its decisions. However, with or without a name for this kind of rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender give a different character to the rape defined in the first part of Article 335. They raise the imposable penalty upon a person accused of rape from reclusion perpetua to the higher and supreme penalty of death. Such an effect conjointly puts relationship and minority of the offended party into the nature of a special qualifying circumstance. As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape. The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. 31 This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court. 32 Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information. Anent the Constitutional right afforded an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of an accusation against him, as implemented by the relevant provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, Section 9 of Rule 110 provides: Sec. 9. Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce a judgment. Pertinent to this case is the phrase of the current set of adjective rules: "a person of common understanding," which had its origins in this jurisdiction in the phrase: "a person of ordinary intelligence." 33 In this light, we hold that the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95 do not sufficiently allege the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim's age and the relationship between the culprit and the victim. The informations in these two cases provide, respectively: [A]nd taking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his own daughter who is only thirteen years old. . . [T]aking advantage of his superior strength over the person of his thirteen (13) year old daughter. . . What strikes us about the informations is that, as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength." 34 Be it in terms of syntax or composition, the wording of the informations is unable to sufficiently notify the accused, a person of common understanding or ordinary intelligence, of the gravity or nature of the crime he had been charged with, especially considering that generic aggravating circumstace of taking advantage of superior strength is not even an element of the attendant circumstances treated under number 1 of the last paragraph of Article 335. The aforequoted clauses in the informations can thus not be read nor understood as constituting a specific allegation of the special circumstances of relationship of father and daughter and that the daughter was less than 18 years of age at the time the crime of rape was committed. All told, to impose upon GODOFREDO the penalty of death under these circumstances would be to deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The penalty should thus only be for simple rape, in each of the two cases, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua under the second paragraph of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Finally, as regards the civil indemnity. The P50,000.00 compensatory damages awarded by the trial court shall represent indemnity in one case, but another P50,000.00 must be awarded in the second case. Moral damages of P50,000.00 in each case, must likewise be awarded, even in the absence of proof of mental and physical suffering of the victim, these being an inherent and necessary consequences of the crime of rape. 35 WHEREFORE, the appealed joint decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of IMUS, Cavite, is REVERSED insofar as Criminal Cases Nos. 3872-95 and 3874-95 are concerned and accused-appellant GODOFREDO TEVES y LEMEN is ACQUITED therein for lack of evidence, and MODIFIED as to Criminal Cases Nos. 3873-95 and 3875-95. As modified, said accused-appellant GODOFREDO TEVES y LEMEN is, in each of said cases, found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay complainant Cherry Rose Q. Teves indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED. Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Santiago, JJ.,

concur.

Panganiban, J., in the result.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 144034 May 28, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO MASCARIAS, accused-appellant. BELLOSILLO, J.: Found guilty of raping his nine (9)-year old daughter and sentenced to death by the court a quo as well as to indemnify his victim P75,000.00, accusedappellant Mario Mascarias now comes to us still insisting on his innocence. Private complainant Maries Mascarias testified that at the time of the rape she lived with her family of seven (7) in a tiny shack in Suarez, Iligan City. She claimed that it was in this one (1)-room hut where she was first molested by her father, accused-appellant Mario Mascarias. She narrated that when she was nine (9) her father placed his finger inside her vagina. Appalled by what her father did, she left home and sought shelter in the house of a neighbor. Her mother though fetched her and took her back home. Maries' first attempt to run away from home did not dissuade her father from further molesting her. Soon, he touched her again by placing his finger inside her vagina as he did before. Once more, Maries left home and stayed in the house of a classmate somewhere in the city market. A few days later her mother came for her and brought her home.1wphi1.nt The cycle of abuse would be repeated over the next two (2) years with Maries fleeing from home every time her father would sexually violate her. She finally left for good at the age of eleven (11), a few months after her father forced himself upon her. As narrated by Maries, sometime in July 1994 her mother Jesusa and her sister Iosa took her youngest sister Sigarettes to the hospital as the infant was gravely ill. Maries was left home with her father and younger siblings Perla and Chip. On the very same night after her mother and sister left, Maries was awakened by her father who ordered her to undress. She pleaded for mercy but her father refused to listen to her. She wept and even became numb as her father mounted her and placed his penis in between her thighs. His attempt to completely penetrate her however failed thus he retreated and went back to sleep. The following night was dreadful for Maries. She laid herself on the floor beside her siblings who were already asleep, and quickly covered herself with a blanket hoping that it would quell her father's lust. But late into the night her expectation failed her. Her blanket offered her no protection after all. Her father, armed with a knife, brandished it before her face as he ordered her to undress. Her determination to resist him soon weakened at the sight of the knife, thus she opted, albeit most unwillingly, to succumb to his sexual desire. Jesusa's arrival from the hospital afforded Maries some relief as she thought it would keep her father at bay and free her from his assault. She was wrong. Several months later, while Maries was taking care of Sigarettes, she accidentally injured the infant's back. This enraged accused-appellant who punished Maries by biting her hands in front of Jesusa and her siblings. Afterwards, he dragged her inside the house and bit her breast and licked her vagina. Fearing that her misfortune would repeat itself once more, Maries packed her few belongings and left home. To fend for herself she worked as a housekeeper for one of their neighbors. Later, she left their employ and stayed with another neighbor who took pity on her. After a few weeks she was accompanied by her benefactor to Pagadian City where she worked in another household. While working in Pagadian City she fell ill and was taken to the hospital where she was diagnosed with peptic ulcer. As her employer could not provide for her medical needs she was referred to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) which took her into custody. Following her discharge from the hospital the DSWD's Lingap Center became her new home. Her story of sexual abuse was recorded and her psychological well-being attended to by the center's social workers. Under the auspices of the center Maries successfully completed her elementary education in 1998. When she was in first year high school, her deep-seated resentment against her father continued to nag Maries. She confided to her counselor her desire to prosecute him for rape. Maries was asked to wait until the end of the schoolyear afterwhich she was taken back to Iligan City where she was medically examined preliminary to her filing a complaint for rape. After having herself examined, where healed hymenal lacerations at one o'clock and ten o'clock positions were noted,1 Maries filed a complaint for rape against her father, accused-appellant Mario Mascarias.2 Accordingly an Information for rape was filed against accused-appellant.3 The Information was amended with the supplementary allegation that private complainant Marie Mascarias was "his (accused-appellant's) daughter who is a minor."4 Shortly after, accused-appellant was apprehended. The defense of accused-appellant was sheer denial. He swore that no unusual incident transpired on that fateful night sometime in July 1994 and attributed the charge for rape to his daughter's avenging nature. According to him, Maries was a stubborn child whom he and his wife would often

chastise as part of their filial obligation. Maries though took it against them and ran away. He averred that the story of sexual abuse offered by Maries should not be taken as conclusive in view of the fact that he has another teenage daughter, Iosa, who has not charged him with rape.5 His wife Jesusa echoed his sentiments against Maries. According to Jesusa every time Maries was scolded the latter would secretly leave home and stay with one of their neighbors. As her husband was working, she was tasked with the twin duties of fetching her and admonishing her for her unruly behavior. This brought her endless grief and humiliation such that when Maries left home for Pagadian City she did not follow her anymore. She saw her daughter in Iligan City sometime in 1996 and with the assistance of a neighbor persuaded her to come home. But before leaving, Maries asked her permission to return to Pagadian City so that she could get her salary from her employer. Maries never returned. When Jesusa learned that Maries had filed a complaint for rape against her husband she immediately confronted her. But Maries was unflinching and even justified her actions.6 After trial, the court a quo sustained the prosecution and found accused-appellant Mario Mascarias guilty of raping his minor daughter Maries Mascarias. As Maries was only eleven (11) when she was raped, accused-appellant was sentenced to death and to indemnify private complainant P75,000.00.7 Upon automatic review, accused-appellant assails his conviction by insisting on his innocence. He reiterates his contention that Maries instituted this complaint for rape because she harbored deep resentment against his quick and heavy hand. Further, he avers that it strains credulity for him to have raped only Maries and not his other daughter Iosa. Such conduct, he argues, would be contrary to human nature and could only invite disbelief. Lastly, assuming arguendo that he indeed raped his daughter, the trial court erred in imposing upon him the penalty of death inasmuch as the Information failed to allege the exact age of Maries at the time of the rape.8 We find the motive imputed by accused-appellant against his daughter Maries highly outrageous. Indeed, mere disciplinary chastisement is not strong enough to make daughters in a Filipino family invent a charge that would not only bring shame and humiliation upon them and their families but also bring their fathers into the gallows of death.9 Even when blinded by hatred and consumed with revenge it requires a certain degree of psychological depravity for a young woman of tender years to concoct a story which would subject her to a lifetime of gossip and scandal among neighbors and friends.10 Maries' steadfast account of the rape both on direct and cross-examination is replete with details that coincide on material points. She was emphatic when she testified that her father failed to penetrate her on his first try but succeeded the following night. No more eloquent evidence of rape is necessary in light of that narration coming from the victim herself. Moreover, her testimony when taken together with that of the medico-legal officer and DSWD representative who guided her throughout those trying times paints a convincing picture of the whole sordid incident. Accused-appellant also harps on Iosa's muteness on the subject of sexual abuse. He seizes on his eldest daughter's silence and uses it to counter the prosecution's bid to portray him as a satyr masquerading as a father. To say the least, his argument is non sequitur and merely emphasizes the depth of his degeneracy. His conviction, therefore, must stand. The state policy on incestuous rape is clear and unmistakable - life is to be made forfeit under certain circumstances. Thus, under par. (1), Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code,11 the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. In the present case, although the age of Maries was satisfactorily established with the presentation of her baptismal certificate,12 accused-appellant argues against the imposition of the death penalty due to the failure of the Information to specifically alleged the exact age of Maries at the time of the commission of the rape.1wphi1.nt We find merit in accused-appellant's argument. The allegation in the Information that Maries was his minor daughter is as a matter of law insufficient to alert him as to the exact nature of the rape imputed to him. To do so would be to allege a conclusion of law to which the plea of not guilty joins no issue. Its effect is the same as alleging negligence without specifying the facts constituting such want of care or prudence. In the instant case, the exact age of the victim should have been asserted. Furthermore, the term minority is too technical to satisfy the pleading requirement that acts alleged as crime must be averred in a manner that a person of common understanding would understand the offense being charged. Certainly stating the words fifteen (15) years old, for example, in the information would signify something more familiar than the word minority could achieve. We accordingly modify the Decision of the court a quo. Conformably with existing jurisprudence, we award moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 without need of proof.13 Exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should also be imposed to deter other fathers with similar perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.14 Finally, on account of the failure of the Information to allege the age of Maries, this Court is constrained to reduce the penalty imposable upon accused-appellant for the ignoble act he had perpetrated from the supreme penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Mario Mascarias guilty of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death and to indemnify his minor daughter Maries Mascarias the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found GUILTY of simple, not qualified, rape and is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, AustriaMartinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October 2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The facts of the case are as follows. On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informations were signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba. On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged. On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution was signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano. On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date. Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus, bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration: CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2 Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3 As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4 In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a

particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling of this Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari. Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou7: The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him. The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify a judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.) Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor Antonio Sanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicide. One of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion of two other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez should have filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons. In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court, seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. The prosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine we established in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court, any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held: In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative. Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred to the Resolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of our Decision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12: In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and material evidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand.13 Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision, carefully cutting off the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jr. was directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceeded nonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case in Montesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution by the Provincial Prosecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was still ongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held that the judge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, the continuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads: Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department of Justice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, for it was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, the final resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No. 5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.14 As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine that the judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On the contrary, Montesa, Jr. states: The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.15 In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Informations is void. Petitioners counsel states in the Memorandum: 6.10. Furthermore, the ORDER dated October 2, 2006 of the Respondent Judge BAY consisting of 9 pages which was attached to the URGENT PETITION did not point out any iota of grave abuse of discretion committed by Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera in issuing his Resolution in favor of the sons of the Petitioners. Hence, the ORDER issued by RJBAY is NULL and VOID in view of the recent ruling of the Hon. Supreme Court in Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113216, September 5, 1997, 86 SCAD 695, 278 SCRA 657 which states that: "In the absence of a finding of grave abuse of discretion, the courts bare denial of a motion to withdraw information pursuant to the Secretarys resolution is void." (Underscoring ours). 6.11. It is therefore respectfully submitted that the Hon. Supreme Court disregard the argument of the OSG because of its falsity.16 This statement of petitioners counsel is utterly misleading. There is no such statement in our Decision in Ledesma.17 The excerpt from Ledesma, which appears to have a resemblance to the statement allegedly quoted from said case, provides: No Grave Abuse of Discretion in the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice In the light of recent holdings in Marcelo and Martinez; and considering that the issue of the correctness of the justice secretary's resolution has been amply threshed out in petitioner's letter, the information, the resolution of the secretary of justice, the motion to dismiss, and even the exhaustive discussion in the motion for reconsideration - all of which were submitted to the court - the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to withdraw the information, based solely on his bare and ambiguous reliance on Crespo. The trial court's order is inconsistent with our repetitive calls for an independent and competent assessment of the issue(s) presented in the motion to dismiss. The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary's recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely ruled to proceed with the trial without stating his reasons for disregarding the secretary's recommendation.18 (Emphasis supplied.) It very much appears that the counsel of petitioners is purposely misleading this Court, in violation of Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: Rule 10.02 A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repel or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved. Counsels use of block quotation and quotation marks signifies that he intends to make it appear that the passages are the exact words of the Court. Furthermore, putting the words "Underscoring ours" after the text implies that, except for the underscoring, the text is a faithful reproduction of the original. Accordingly, we are ordering Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. to show cause why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar. To clarify, we never stated in Ledesma that a judge is allowed to deny a Motion to Withdraw Information from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal. Neither did we rule therein that where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information is void. What we held therein is that a trial judge commits grave abuse of discretion if he denies a Motion to Withdraw Information without an independent and complete assessment of the issues presented in such Motion. Thus, the opening paragraph of Ledesma states: When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary's ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.19 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioners also try to capitalize on the fact that the dispositive portion of the assailed Order apparently states that there was no probable cause against petitioners: WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause against the herein accused for the crimes of rapes and acts of lasciviousness, the motion to withdraw informations is DENIED. Let the case be set for arraignment and pre-trial on October 24, 2006 at 8:30 oclock in the morning.20(Underscoring ours.) Thus, petitioners claim that since even the respondent judge himself found no probable cause against them, the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the Office of the City Prosecutor should be granted.21 Even a cursory reading of the assailed Order, however, clearly shows that the insertion of the word "no" in the above dispositive portion was a mere clerical error. The assailed Order states in full: After a careful study of the sworn statements of the complainants and the resolution dated March 3, 2006 of 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, the Court finds that there was probable cause against the herein accused. The actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness cannot be the basis of dismissal or withdrawal of the herein cases. Failure to shout or offer tenatious resistance did not make voluntary the complainants submission to the criminal acts of the accused (People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 214, 2002). The complainants affidavits indicate that the accused helped one another in committing the acts complained of. Considering that the attackers were not strangers but their trusted classmates who enticed them to go to the house where they were molested, the complainants cannot be expected to react forcefully or violently in protecting themselves from the unexpected turn of events. Considering also that both complainants were fifteen (15) years of age and considered children under our laws, the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004 becomes very relevant. The Supreme Court ruled as follows: Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar circumstances. The range of emotions shown by rape victim is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from rape victims (People v. Malones, G.R. Nos. 124388-90, March 11, 2004). The Court finds no need to discuss in detail the alleged actuations of the complainants after the alleged rapes and acts of lasciviousness. The alleged actuations are evidentiary in nature and should be evaluated after full blown trial on the merits. This is necessary to avoid a suspicion of prejudgment against the accused.22 As can be seen, the body of the assailed Order not only plainly stated that the court found probable cause against the petitioners, but likewise provided an adequate discussion of the reasons for such finding. Indeed, the general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail.23 In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.24 The trial court, when confronted with a Motion to Withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of probable cause, is not bound by the resolution of the prosecuting arm of the government, but is required to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion, a requirement satisfied by the respondent judge in the case at bar.25 Finally, if only to appease petitioners who came to this Court seeking a review of the finding of probable cause by the trial court, we nevertheless carefully reviewed the records of the case. After going through the same, we find that we are in agreement with the trial court that there is indeed probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. We decided to omit a detailed discussion of the merits of the case, as we are not unmindful of the undue influence that might result should this Court do so, even if such discussion is only intended to focus on the finding of probable cause. WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the resumption of the proceedings therein. The Regional Trial Court is directed to act on the case with dispatch. Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr. is ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for his disquieting conduct as herein discussed. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 164015 February 26, 2009

RAMON A. ALBERT, Petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This is a petition for certiorari1 of the Resolutions dated 10 February 20042 and 3 May 20043 of the Sandiganbayan. The 10 February 2004 Resolution granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit the Amended Information. The 3 May 2004 Resolution denied the Motion For Reconsider ation of petitioner Ramon A. Albert (petitioner). The Facts On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner and his co-accused, Favio D. Sayson and Arturo S. Asumbrado, before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019) or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged: The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows: That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government. CONTRARY TO LAW.4 On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his co-accused. On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the following grounds: (1) the accused (petitioner) was denied due process of law; (2) the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated; and (4) the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding the accused guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 is not supported by evidence.5 On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The prosecution did not object to the latter motion on the condition that petitioner would be "provisionally" arraigned.6 On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty." In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioners Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Ombudsman. In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of the pending motion for reconsideration of the order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003.

In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsmans denial of petitioners moti on for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, this exparte motion was withdrawn by the prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to 1 December 2003.7 On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended Information reads: The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer I of the Office of Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses RAMON A. ALBERT, FAVIO D. SAYSON, and ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO for (sic) violation of Section 3(e) R.A. 3019, as amended, committed as follows: That in (sic) or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A. ALBERT, a public officer, being then the President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation, occupying the said position with a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S. ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to the government and public interest, enter and make it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in the Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands which Tax Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew, the two pieces of real property covered by Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are agricultural land, and by reason of accuseds misrepresentation, the NHMFC released the amount of P4,535,400.00 which is higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural, thus causing undue injury to the government. CONTRARY TO LAW.8 Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment. The Ruling of the Sandiganbayan In its Resolution of 10 February 2004,9 the Sandiganbayan granted the prosecutions Motion to Admit Amended Information. At the outset, the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect of duty" which falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019 is different from "gross inexcusable negligence" under Section 3(e), and held thus: In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal causes undue injury compared to an information alleging gross inexcusable negligence where undue injury is a constitutive element. A change to this effect constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended. It may be considered however, that there are three modes by which the offense for Violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the following: 1. Through evident bad faith; 2. Through manifest partiality; 3. Through gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of the existence of any of these modes in connection with the prohibited acts under said section of the law should suffice to warrant conviction.10 However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even granting that the amendment of the information be formal or substantial, the prosecution could still effect the same in the event that the accused had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment. And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13 March 2001 was merely "provisional," then the prosecution may still amend the information either in form or in substance. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of 3 May 2004. Hence this petition. The Issues The issues raised in this petition are: 1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE AMENDED INFORMATION; AND 2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A SPEEDY TRIAL. The Ruling of the Court The petition has no merit.

On Whether the Sandiganbayan Should Admit the Amended Information

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution.-- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. xxx Petitioner contends that under the above section, only a formal amendment of the information may be made after a plea. The rule does not distinguish between a plea made during a "provisional" or a "permanent" arraignment. Since petitioner already entered a plea of "not guilty" during the 13 March 2001 arraignment, then the information may be amended only in form. An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him.11 The accused is formally informed of the charges against him, to which he enters a plea of guilty or not guilty. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily.12 The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court.13 However, in People v. Espinosa,14 this Court tangentially recognized such practice, provided that the alleged conditions attached thereto should be "unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened." Moreover, the conditions must be expressly stated in the Order disposing of the arraignment; otherwise, the arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.15 In the present case, the arraignment of petitioner is reflected in the Minutes of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 which merely states that the "[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling (sic) abroad."16 In the Resolution of 16 April 2001,17 the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment of petitioner and granted his Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel, setting forth the conditions attendant thereto which, however, were limited only to petitioners itinerary abroad; the setting up of additional bailbond; the required appearance before the clerk of court; and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines. Nothing on record is indicative of the provisional or conditional nature of the arraignment. Hence, following the doctrine laid down in Espinosa, the arraignment of petitioner should be deemed simple and unconditional. The rules mandate that after a plea is entered, only a formal amendment of the Information may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. Petitioner contends that replacing "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" is a substantial amendment of the Information which is prejudicial to his rights. He asserts that under the amended information, he has to present evidence that he did not act with "gross inexcusable negligence," evidence he was not required to present under the original information. To bolster his argument, petitioner refers to the 10 February 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan which ruled that the change "constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended."18lawphil.net We are not convinced. Petitioner is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 which provides as follows: SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. This crime has the following essential elements:19 1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence."20 In Uriarte v. People,21 this Court explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is

"manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another.22 "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.23 "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.24 "Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.25 The original information filed against petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross neglect of duty." The amended information, on the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with "evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence." Simply, the amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence." Given that these two phrases fall under different paragraphs of RA 3019specifically, "gross neglect of duty" is under Section 3(f) while "gross inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3(e) of the statutethe question remains whether or not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial to the rights of petitioner. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended.26 On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.27lavvphil In this case, the amendment entails the deletion of the phrase "gross neglect of duty" from the Information. Although this may be considered a substantial amendment, the same is allowable even after arraignment and plea being beneficial to the accused.28 As a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence" would be included in the Information as a modality in the commission of the offense. This Court believes that the same constitutes an amendment only in form. In Sistoza v. Desierto,29 the Information charged the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, but specified only "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as the modalities in the commission of the offense charged. "Gross inexcusable negligence" was not mentioned in the Information. Nonetheless, this Court held that the said section is committed by dolo or culpa, and although the Information may have alleged only one of the modalities of committing the offense, the other mode is deemed included in the accusation to allow proof thereof. 30 In so ruling, this Court applied by analogy the pronouncement in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan31 where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense. The Court held that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, we hold that the inclusion of "gross inexcusable negligence" in the Information, which merely alleges "manifest partiality" and "evident bad faith" as modalities in the commission of the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, is an amendment in form.

On Whether Petitioners Right to a Speedy Trial was Violated

Petitioner contends that the complaint-affidavit against him was filed on 15 June 1992, but it was resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, or after a period of almost seven (7) years. Four (4) years thereafter, the SPO, upon reinvestigation of the case, recommended that the case against petitioner be dismissed for lack of probable cause, but this recommendation was denied by the Ombudsman. A Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information was later filed by the prosecution and granted by the Sandiganbayan in the questioned Resolution of 10 February 2004. Thus, petitioner maintains that it took the Office of the Ombudsman twelve (12) years since the initial filing of the complaint-affidavit in 1992 to charge accused with the offense under the Amended Information, in violation of petitioners right to a speedy trial. Petitioners contentions are futile. The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Philippine Constitution which provides: "All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.32 A simple mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. We concede that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of everyday life.33 After reviewing the records of the case, we believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his co-accused and the filing of the original Information against petitioner was raised in petitioners Motion to Dismiss, and was duly addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution denying the said motion. It appears that the said delays were caused by the numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioners coaccused, and that no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan properly held that a reinvestigation of the case as to petitioner was in order. Although the reinvestigation inadvertently resulted to further delay in the proceedings, this process could not have been dispensed with as it was done for the protection of the rights of petitioner himself. It is well-settled that although the conduct of an investigation may hold back the progress of a case, it is necessary so that the accused's right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency.34 The succeeding events appear to be parts of a valid and regular course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays which can be considered vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Hence, petitioners contention of violation of his right to a speedy trial must fail. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions dated 10 February 2004 and 3 May 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25231. SO ORDERED.