ELISEO F. SORIANO vs CONSOLIZA LAGUARDIA G.R. NO.

164785 April 29, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, a television evangelist, hosted the Ang Dating Daan, a popular television ministry aired nationwide everyday from 10:00 p.m. to midnight over public television. The program carried a general patronage rating from the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). Ang Dating Daans rivalry with another religious television program, the Iglesia ni Cristos Ang Tamang Daan, is well known. The hosts of the two shows have regularly engaged in verbal sparring on air, hurling accusations and counter-accusations with respect to their opposing religious beliefs and practices. It appears that in his program Ang Tamang Daan, Michael M. Sandoval (Michael) of the Iglesia ni Cristo attacked petitioner Soriano for alleged inconsistencies in his Bible teachings. Michael compared spliced recordings of Sorianos statements, matched with subtitles of his utterances, to demonstrate those inconsistencies. On August 10, 2004, in an apparent reaction to what he perceived as a malicious attack against him by the rival television program, Soriano accused Michael of prostituting himself with his fabricated presentations. Michael and seven other ministers of the Iglesia ni Cristo lodged a complaint against petitioner Soriano before the MTRCB. Acting swiftly, the latter preventively suspended the airing of Sorianos Ang Dating Daan television program for 20 days, pursuant to its powers under Section 3(d) of Presidential Decree 1986 and its related rules. Petitioner Soriano challenged the validity of that preventive suspension before this Court in G.R. 164785. Meanwhile, after hearing the main case or on September 27, 2004, the MTRCB found Soriano guilty as charged and imposed on him a penalty of three months suspension from appearing on the Ang Dating Daan program. Soriano thus filed a second petition in G.R. 165636 to question that decision. The Court consolidated the two cases. On April 29, 2009 the Court rendered a decision, upholding MTRCBs power to impose preventive suspension and affirming its decision against petitioner Soriano with the modification of applying the three-month suspension to the program And DatingDaan, rather than to Soriano. ISSUE: Whether or not the order of suspension promulgated by MTRCB against the television program AND DATING DAAN is null and void for being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. RULING: No. Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated, expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed.

A perusal of the MTRCBs basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision. The issuance of a preventive suspension comes well within the scope of the MTRCBs authority and functions expressly set forth in PD 1986, more particularly under its Sec. 3(d), which empowers the MTRCB to supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel, permits for the x x x exhibition, and/or television broadcast of all motion pictures, television programs and publicity materials, to the end that no such pictures, programs and materials as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable in accordance with paragraph (c) hereof shall be x x x exhibited and/or broadcast by television. Surely, the power to issue preventive suspension forms part of the MTRCBs express regulatory and supervisory statutory mandate and its investigatory and disciplinary authority subsumed in or implied from such mandate. Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline illusory. Preventive suspension, it ought to be noted, is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person subject of the complaint. To reiterate, preventive suspension authority of the MTRCB springs from its powers conferred under PD 1986. The MTRCB did not, as petitioner insinuates, empower itself to impose preventive suspension through the medium of the IRR of PD 1986. It is true that the matter of imposing preventive suspension is embodied only in the IRR of PD 1986. But the mere absence of a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive suspension. The preventive suspension was actually done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCBs duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination of whether or not there has actually been a violation.

RODOLFO NAVARRO vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA G.R. No. 180050 February 10, 2010 FACTS: Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina aver that they are taxpayers and residents of theProvince of Surigao del Norte. They have served the Province of Surigao del Norte once as Vice- Governor and members of the Provincial Board, respectively. They claim to have previously filed a similar petition, which was dismissed on technical grounds. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area. The Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census, with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of 371,576. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers. On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes. On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized national and local elections held on May 14, 2007. On July 1,

2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office; hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence. Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government Code. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 complied with the Constitution and statutory requirements under Sec. 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. 2) Whether or not the Allegations of fraud and irregularities during the plebiscite cannot be resolved in a special civil action for certiorari.

RULING: 1) R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code. Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code. Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population of only 120,813, which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants 2) Allegations of fraud and irregularities in the conduct of a plebiscite are factual in nature. They cannot be the subject of this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which is a remedy designed only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners should have filed the proper action with the Commission on Elections. However, petitioners admittedly chose not to avail themselves of the correct remedy.

CITY ENGINEER OF BAGUIO vs ROLANDO BANIQUED G.R. No. 150270 November 26, 2008

FACTS: Generoso Bonifacio, acting as the attorney-in-fact of Purificacion de Joya, Milagros Villar, Minerva Baluyut and Israel de leon filed a complaint with the Office of the Mayor of baguio City seeking the demolition of a house built on a parcel of land located at Upper Quezon hill, Baguio City. Domogan, the then city mayor of Baguio City, issued Notice of Demolition No. 55, Series of 1999 against spouses Rolando and Fidela Baniqued. Aggrieved, Rolando Baniqued filed a complaint for prohibition with TRO/injunction. In his complaint, baniqued alleged that he was never given any copy of the complaint of Generoso Bonifacio. He also argued that Article 536 of the Civil Code should be applied, i.e., there should be a court action and a court order first before his house can be demolished and before he can be ousted from the lot. More, under Section 28 of Republic Act 7279, an adequate relocation should be provided first before demolition can be had. Too, by virtue of the National Building Code or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1096, the demolition of buildings or structures should only be resorted to in case they are dangerous or ruinous. Otherwise, the remedy is criminal prosecution under Section 213 of P.D. No. 1096. Lastly, the 1991 Local Government Code does not empower the mayor to order the demolition of anything unless the interested party was afforded prior hearing and unless the provisions of law pertaining to demolition are satisfied. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint of Baniqued on the ground of lack of cause of action because (1) there is nothing to be enjoined as there is no Demolition Order issued by the City Mayor and that the Demolition Team does not demolish on the basis of a mere Notice of Demolition; (2) he has no clear legal right to be protected as his structure is illegal, the same having been built on a land he does not own without the consent of the owner thereof and without securing the requisite building permit; (3) the Notice of Demolition was issued in accordance with law and in due performance of the duties and functions of defendants, who being public officers, are mandated by law to enforce all pertinent laws against illegal constructions; and that (4) *d+efendants do not exercise judicial and quasi judicial functions. Neither was the issuance of the assailed Notice of Demolition an exercise of a ministerial function. Nor is there any allegation in the complaint that defendants acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred and abused its discretion in ruling that the act of the City mayor in issuing a notice of demolition is a quasi-judicial function. RULING: The Mayor, although performing executive functions, also exercises quasijudicial function which may be corrected by prohibition. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town. It has also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or resolution thereon. In this manner, it exercises quasi-judicial

functions. This power is obviously a truism in the matter of issuing demolition notices and/or orders against squatters and illegal occupants through some of its agencies or authorized committees within its respective municipalities or cities. There is no gainsaying that a city mayor is an executive official nor is the matter of issuing demolition notices or orders not a ministerial one. But then, it cannot be denied as well that in determining whether or not a structure is illegal or it should be demolished, property rights are involved thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. In pursuit of these functions, the city mayor has to exercise quasi-judicial powers. Moreno, in his Philippine Law Dictionary, 3rd Edition, defines quasi-judicial function as applying to the action discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature (Midland Insurance Corp. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 458 [1986]). Significantly, the Notice of Demolition in issue was the result of the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the Office of the Mayor.

DISTELLERIA LIMTUACO & CO vs ADVERTISING BOARD OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 164242 November 28, 2008 FACTS: In January 2004, Destileria and Convoy Marketing Corporation (Convoy), through its advertising agency, SLG Advertising (SLG), a member of the 4As, applied with the AdBoard for a clearance of the airing of a radio advertisement entitled, Ginagabi(Nakatikim ka na ba ng Kinse Anyos). AdBoard issued a clearance for said advertisement. Not long after the ad started airing, AdBoard was swept with complaints from the public. This prompted AdBoard to ask SLG for a replacement but there was no response. With the continued complaints from the public, AdBoard, this time, asked SLG to withdraw its advertisement, to no avail. Thus, AdBoard decided to recall the clearance previously issued, effective immediately.[2] Said decision to recall was conveyed to SLG and AdBoard's membersorganizations.[3] Petitioners protested the AdBoard's decision, after which, they filed a Complaint which was later on amended, for Dissolution of Corporation, Damages and Application for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. On May 20, 2004, AdBoard issued ACRC Circular No. 2004-02, reminding its membersorganizations of Article VIII of the ACRC Manual of Procedures, which prohibits the airing of materials not duly screened by it. Petitioners then filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against AdBoard's officers. On July 16, 2004, petitioners filed the present petition for writ of prohibition and preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners argue that their right to advertise is a constitutionally protected right, as well as a property right. Petitioners believe that requiring a clearance from AdBoard before advertisements can be aired amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. They also argue that AdBoard's regulation is an exercise of police power which must be subject to constitutional proscriptions. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of prohibition is proper. RULING: No. First of all, the petition filed in this case is one for prohibition, i.e., to command AdBoard to desist from requiring petitioners to secure a clearance and imposing sanctions on any agency that will air, broadcast or publish petitioners' ads without such clearance. Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for petitioners to be entitled to such recourse, it must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its/his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function by which he has the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies, which are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial function is one which an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his/its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The acts sought to be prohibited in this case are not the acts of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.[9] What is at contest here is the power and authority of a private organization, composed of several members-organizations, which power and authority were vested to it by its own members. Obviously, prohibition will not lie in this case. The definition and purpose of a writ of prohibition excludes the use of the writ against any person or group of persons acting in a purely private capacity, and the writ will not be issued against private individuals or corporations so acting.

GOV. ORLANDO FUA vs THE COMMISIION ON AUDIT G.R. No. 175803 December 4, 2009 FACTS: On November 14, 2003, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Siquijor adopted Resolution No. 2003-247 segregating the sum of P8,600,000.00 as payment for the grant of extra Christmas bonus at P20,000.00 each to all its officials and employees. On the same date, corresponding Appropriation Ordinance No. 029 was passed. Thereafter, Resolution No. 2003-239 was adopted requesting President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo for an authority to the Provincial Government of Siquijor to grant such bonus. On even date, petitioner wrote a letter to the President reiterating said request. On said letter, the President then wrote a marginal note reading, NO OBJECTION. The provincial government, relying on the aforementioned resolutions and the Presidents marginal note, then proceeded to release the extra Christmas bonus to its officials and employees. However, a post-audit was conducted by Ms. Eufemia C. Jaugan, Audit Team Leader (ATL), Province of Siquijor. She questioned the legality of the payment of said bonuses, citing Section 4.1 of Budget Circular No. 2003-7 dated December 5, 2003, limiting the grant of Extra Christmas Bonus to P5,000.00, and Section 325 (a) of the Local Government Code imposing a 55% limitation on Personal Services expenditures. Such memorandum were then reviewed by Atty. Roy L. Ursal, Regional Cluster Director, Legal and Adjudication Sector, Commission on Audit Region VII. Atty. Ursal disallowed the payments and issued Notices of Disallowance. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and the same was denied by the Regional Cluster Director. Petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit-Legal and Adjudication Office (COA-LAO-Local), headed by respondent Director IV, Elizabeth S. Zosa. The COA-LAO-Local issued a Decision affirming the Regional Cluster Directors Notice of Disallowance. Hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the petition should not be given due course because of petitioners failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. RULING: The 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA states, thus: RULE VI APPEAL FROM DIRECTOR TO COMMISSION PROPER Section 1. Who May Appeal and Where to Appeal. The party aggrieved by a final order or decision of the Director may appeal to the Commission Proper. RULE XI JUDICIAL REVIEW Section 1. Petition for Certiorari. Any decision, order or resolution of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof in the manner provided by law, the Rules of Court and these Rules.

Clearly, by immediately filing the present petition for certiorari, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. The hornbook doctrine, reiterated in Joseph Peter Sison, et al. v. Rogelio Tablang, etc.,[7] is as follows: The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to the court without first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. xxxx x x x The non-observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its dismissal. In this case, the necessary consequence of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies is obvious: the disallowance as ruled by the LAO-C has now become final and executory.[8] In addition, Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides that the remedy of certiorari may only be availed of if there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It was absolutely necessary for petitioner to allege in the petition, and adduce evidence to prove, that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.[11] Thus, since petitioner could have appealed the Decision of the Director to the Commission Proper under the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, he is definitely not entitled to a writ of certiorari, because there was some other speedy and adequate remedy available to him. Petitioner having failed to pursue an appeal with the Commission Proper, the Decision issued by the COA-LAO-Local has become final and executory.

UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. vs LAGUNA LAKE DEVELEOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 191427 May 30, 2011 FACTS: Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA), respondent, found that Universal Robina Corp. failed to comply with government standards provided under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. After conducting hearings, the LLDA resolved that respondent is found to be discharging pollutive wastewater. Petitioner moved to reconsider however the LLDA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration and reiterated its order to pay the penalties. Petitioner challenged by certiorari the orders before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court went on to chide petitioners petition for certiorari as premature since the law provides for an appeal from decisions or orders of the LLDA to the DENR Secretary or the Office of the President, a remedy which should have first been exhausted before invoking judicial intervention. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was deprived of due process and lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy as grounds which exempted it from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. HELD: No. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed. Petitioner had thus available administrative remedy of appeal to the DENR Secretary. Its contrary arguments to show that an appeal to the DENR Secretary would be an exercise in futility as the latter merely adopts the LLDAs findings is at best, speculative and presumptuous. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS vs VELASCO ET.AL. G.R. No. 170463 February 2, 2011 FACTS: On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days.6 Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia. Respondent Mario I. Molina requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation of his step increment. On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion. Respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: Whether internal rules and regulations need not require publication with the Office of the National Administrative Register for their effectivity. RULING: Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Centers guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public, need not be filed with the UP Law Center. Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 FACTS: Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD) is a local water utility created under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 198, as amended. It is authorized to supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed TMPCs application. LTWD claimed that, un der Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its franchise is exclusive. Section 47 states that: Sec. 47. Exclusive Franchise. No franchise shall be granted to any other person or agency for domestic, industrial or commercial water service within the district or any portion thereof unless and except to the extent that the board of directors of said district consents thereto by resolution duly adopted, such resolution, however, shall be subject to review by the Administration. The NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. ISSUE: Whetehr or not the RTC erred in holding that Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, is valid. RULING: Yes. Sec. 47 of PD No. 198 is unconstitutional. What cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. This rule is basic and, to a reasonable mind, does not need explanation. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory. The President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises for the operation of a public utility that are exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly prohibit the creation of franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 8, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years.

Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied) Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. (Emphasis supplied) Plain words do not require explanation. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions are clear franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions expressly and clearly state that, "nor shall such franchise x x x be exclusive in character." There is no exception. When the law is clear, there is nothing for the courts to do but to apply it. The duty of the Court is to apply the law the way it is worded.

STERLING SELECTIONS CORPORATION VS. LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (LLDA) G.R. No. 171427 March 30 : 2011 FACTS: Petitioner is a company engaged in the fabrication of sterling silver jewelry. Its products are manufactured in the home of its principal stockholders, Asuncion Maria and Juan Luis Faustmann (Faustmanns), located in Barangay (Brgy.) Mariana, New Manila, Quezon City. Sometime in 1992, one of petitioner's neighbors in Brgy. Mariana filed a complaint with the Office of the Chairman of Brgy. Mariana against petitioner for "creating loud unceasing noise and emitting toxic fumes," coming from the manufacturing plant of the latter's predecessor, Unson, Faustmann and Company, Inc. During conciliation proceedings, petitioner's management undertook to relocate its operations within a month. The parties signed an Agreement to that effect. However, petitioner failed to abide by the undertaking and continued to manufacture its products in its Brgy. Mariana workshop. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 167, Pasig City. Contending that, as a cottage industry, its jewelry business is exempt from the requirement to secure a permit from the LLDA, petitioner asked the court to order the latter to issue a certificate of exemption in its favor. The RTC denied the petition, ruling that mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. ISSUE: Whether or not LLDA has the power to exercise its discretionary duty. RULING: Yes. LLDA was created by R.A. No. 4850 to carry out the development of the Laguna Lake region with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration, and pollution.[50] The LLDA was granted the power to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and projects proposed by the local government offices/agencies within their regions, by public corporations, and by private persons or enterprises, where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to those of the Authority for the development of the region, as well as to issue the necessary clearance for the approved plans, programs and/or projects. It is a doctrine of long-standing that factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if they are not overwhelming or preponderant.[69] Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of the government agency entrusted with regulation of activities coming under the special and technical training and knowledge of such agency. The exercise of administrative discretion is a policy decision and a matter that is best discharged by the government agency concerned and not by the courts. The Court recognizes the right of petitioner to engage in business and to profit from its industry. However, the exercise of the right must conform to the laws and regulations laid down by the competent authorities.

GANNAPAO v. CSC. G.R. No. 180141 May 31, 2011 FACTS: On December 22, 1995, respondents Ricardo Barien, Inocencio M. Navallo, Ligaya M. Gando, Lea Molleda, Fe R. Vetonio, Primo V. Babiano, Patiga J., Jose Taeza, G. Delos Santos, Losbaes, W., Ave Pediglorio and Cresencia Roque (Barien, et al.) who are stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division at Camp Crame, charging petitioner with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming. Barien, et al. are former drivers, conductors, mechanics and clerks of the defunct Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC). In April 1995, UWTC started operating MMTCs buses which it acquired under a conditional sale with right of repossession. At about the same time, petitioner was allegedly employed by Atty. Roy G. Gironella, the general manager appointed by the Board of Directors of UWTC, as his personal bodyguard with compensation coming from UWTC. In October 1995, Barien, et al. representing the majority stockholders of UWTC sued Atty. Gironella and five other members of the UWTC Board of Directors for gross mismanagement. Barien, et al. further alleged that upon orders of Atty. Gironella, the buses regularly driven by them and other stockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a task force composed of former drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons such as guns and knives, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus drivers and conductors, and took over the buses. Petitioner is not authorized to use his firearm or his authority as police officer to act as bodyguard of Atty. Gironella and to intimidate and coerce the drivers/stockholders and the bus passengers. Barien, et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner, the confiscation of his firearm and his termination after due hearing.

The complaint passed a pre-charge investigation with The Inspector General, Internal Affairs Office (TIG-IAO) of the PNP, and petitioner filed his Answer on January 12, 1996. Petitioner specifically denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that he was never employed by Atty. Gironella as bodyguard. Instead, it was his twin brother, Reynaldo Gannapao, who worked as messenger at UWTC. In an undated Memorandum, Chief Service Inspectorate Police Superintendent Atty. Joselito Azarcon Casugbo recommended the dismissal of the complaint, citing the affidavit of desistance allegedly executed by Avelino Pediglorio. Subsequently, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) Memorandum Circular No. 96010 dated July 31, 1996, was issued, and a summary hearing on the complaint was conducted by the Office of the Legal Service, PNP National Headquarters in accordance with the newly promulgated rules. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No. 09-97. On January 30, 1997, Atty. Eduardo Sierra of the Office of the Director General, PNP, issued a subpoena to petitioner requiring him to appear at the hearing of Adm. Case No. 09-97 before the Office of the Legal Service in Camp Crame. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata, citing the earlier dismissal of the complaint against him by Chief Service Inspectorate Casugbo. However, PNP Chief Recaredo A. Sarmiento II denied the motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was denied due process RULING: The petition must fail. Time and again, we have held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.[23] Petitioner here was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was given an opportunity to explain his side. He was not denied due process.

CASES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Submitted by: BERNESSHA GARGARITANO-CHAVEZ Submit to: ATTY.EDMUND GUILLEN