Multilateral Export Control Regimes

1. Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a multinational body concerned with reducing nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials applicable to nuclear weapon development and by improving safeguards and protection on existing materials. Established: 1975; also called the London Club Comprised of: 48 nuclear supplier states, including U.S., Russia, China, European Union countries and some others The Permanent Mission of Japan in Vienna serves as the NSG point of contact. Voluntary agreement for export controls; not bound by a treaty; no formal mechanism to enforce compliance (Because the regime is voluntary, NSG members may ultimately make a political calculation to proceed with a transfer that violates the guidelines. Russia transferred nuclear fuel to India in January 2001 even though majority of NSG members declared it contradictory to NSG) NSG decisions are made by consensus. Aim is to prevent nuclear exports for commercial and peaceful purposes from being used to make nuclear weapons Two parts guidelines that cover: i) Trigger List Goods - materials and technology designed specifically for nuclear use For e.g. fissile materials, nuclear reactors and equipment, reprocessing and enrichment equipment ii) dual-use goods -- non-nuclear items with legitimate civilian applications that can also be used to develop weapons. For e.g. Machine tools and lasers NSG members periodically review the Guidelines to add new items that pose proliferation risks or to eliminate goods that no longer require An annual plenary, which is chaired on a rotating basis among members, is held The IAEA is charged with verifying that non-nuclear-weapon states are not illicitly pursuing nuclear weapons. IAEA also safeguards to prevent nuclear material or technology from being stolen or misappropriated for weapons include inspections, remote monitoring, seals, and other measures. Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other NSG states are expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members.

Indias waiver On 6 September 2008, at an NSG meeting in Vienna, India was granted a waiver from the NSG guidelines that require comprehensive international safeguards as a condition of nuclear trade. The waiver came after three years of intense US diplomacy

In 2006, US Congress had amended US law to accommodate civilian nuclear trade with India Consensus was achieved after overcoming concerns expressed by a number of countries, but especially by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand The NSG agreed to several minor changes to the waiver text proposed by the United States. The most important was the incorporation of a reference to statement made by India's Minister of Foreign Affairs, highlighting India's moratorium on nuclear testing and its no-first-use policy. A number of countries stated that their understanding of the waiver was that they would not transfer ENR (enrichment and reprocessing technology) equipment to India and that all members of the NSG would take India's compliance with its commitments into account before agreeing to any nuclear transfers. This has diluted Indias waiver significantly Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009 o Already put 12 out of [the] 14 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Only two reactors are required to be notified by 2014 India has now signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, the U.S., Russia, Canada, Argentina, the U.K., Namibia, Mongolia, and Kazakhstan. Negotiations taking place with Japan on a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement

Indias Membership US, UK, France, Russia support Indian membership in the NSG In May 2012, Australia also publicly supported Indian membership in the NSG China & smaller European states such as Ireland, Netherlands & Switzerland have reservations - China stresses need for equal treatment in South Asia, an apparent reference to its ally Pakistan (also Israel?) - China has helped Pakistan in setting up & operating Pakistans Chashma I & II civil nuclear plants. Plans to build 2 more. (THE BASTARDS!) - Similarly, Russia had in the 90s helped Indias civil nuclear energy programme despite NSG objections (THE AWESOME GUYS! ) - Those for India joining the group say it is better if the country is inside than outside the NSG as it is already an advanced nuclear energy power and will in future become a significant exporter as well - Those countries which are sceptical argue the move could undermine the NPT, which is a cornerstone of global nuclear disarmament efforts. - If India joins, it will be NSGs only member outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) New Members Any state that conducts exports appearing on the Guidelines may apply for NSG membership. -

A potential member is evaluated on its proliferation record, adherence to international non-proliferation treaties and agreements, and national export controls. All existing members must approve an applicant for it to join the regime. Countries with nuclear programs who are outside the NSG: India, Pakistan, Israel & NK

June 2013: 23rd Plenary Meeting in Prague, Czech Republic Chaired by Czech Republic adopted 28 amendments to the NSG Control List Mexico and Serbia attended as NSG Participating Governments for the first time NSG noted the proliferation implications of the DPRKs nuclear program, the DPRKs 12 February nuclear test, and Irans nuclear program with grave concern considered implementing the 2008 Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India agreed to launch a new and revised NSG public website, and discussed NSG outreach efforts

June 2012: 22nd Plenary Meeting in Seattle Chaired by Netherlands Mexico and Serbia attended as observer states NSG noted concerns regarding the nuclear proliferation programs of Iran and the DPRK, approved a paper to outline outreach to non-party states, discussed the NSGs relationship with India, and reiterated the importance of keeping its lists updated in accordance with technological developments.

Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) Negotiated in 1968, the NPT granted non-nuclear-weapon states access to nuclear materials and technology for peaceful purposes as long as they committed not to develop nuclear weapons. Signed by 189-nations. Not signed by India, Israel & Pakistan all 3 atomic states To determine what specific equipment & materials & conditions under which to be shared NPT supplier states formed the Zanger Committee in 1971 States outside the NPT were reqd to institute IAEA safeguards before allowed imports These items were collectively referred as the Trigger List. NSG had accepted and incorporated the Zanger Committees Trigger List

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) P.S. Indias nuclear tests in 1974 were one of the main reasons for NSG to come into existence. Hehe, who says we dont exert enough influence in world polity

2. Missile Technology Control Regime

informal and voluntary association of countries which share the goals of nonproliferation of unmanned delivery systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (Nuclear, Chemical and Biological) seek to coordinate national export licensing efforts Category I and II items: i) Rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) ii) less-sensitive and dual-use missile related components Originally for stopping proliferation of nuclear-capable missiles to non NPT countries: able to travel at least 300 km with a 500-kilogram payload. Later agreed (in 1993) to also apply to missiles & related tech designed for chemical & biological weapons NOT a treaty; NO legally binding obligations originally established in 1987 by the G-7 Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US Now comprises of 34 countries all have equal standing in the regime Holds annual policy-level Plenary meeting; No formal secretariat; France serves as formal point of contact; Chairmanship rotates on an ad hoc basis China is NOT a member (Phew!); nor is India of course and Pakistan (Lol ) MTCR members spearheaded a voluntary November 2002 initiative, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (formerly known as the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation), calling on all countries to show greater restraint in their own development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and to reduce their existing missile arsenals if possible. The Hague Code of Conduct has 134 member states, including all MTCR members except Brazil. Brazil has expressed concerns about how the initiative might affect its space program.

How does MTCR achieve its objectives? Export Controls common export policy; applied to a common list of items Meetings Regularly exchange info about relevant missile non-proliferation issues Dialogue and Outreach to keep non-Partners informed about groups activities & provide assistance in non-proliferation efforts

INDIA and MTCR In 2008 India voluntarily committed to following the MTCR export control guidelines Since that time the United States has been working to secure India's membership in the regime

China (the bitch!) and MTCR key contributor to Pakistan's missile development provided sensitive technology to countries like North Korea and Iran

In 2004, China applied for MTCR membership, and, at the time, voluntarily pledged to follow the regime's export control guidelines (Hahahahaha..) its membership was rejected due to concerns that Chinese entities continued to provide sensitive technologies to countries developing ballistic missiles, such as North Korea China says it no longer sells complete missile systems and has tightened its export controls

3. Australia Group for Chemical and Biological Controls - Established in 1985, the Australia Group is a voluntary, informal, export-control arrangement - Comprises of: 40 countries as well as the European Commission - Yes, yes to coordinate their national export controls (boringggg) - to limit the supply of chemicals and biological agents-as well as related equipment, technologies, and knowledge - To who? - countries and non-state entities suspected of pursuing chemical or biological weapons (CBW) capabilities - All participants are members of the 1997 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - Yes, yes, it establishes "control lists," and its members are expected to deny export license requests for items on the lists - Each year meet in Paris to coordinate these export control policies, discuss revision of lists, share intelligence etc. - No charter or constitution, and each country uses its own discretion when implementing national export controls (LOL!! ); though of course the control lists are the baseline - Accepts new members only by consensus - New members should meet certain criteria, including proven compliance with the CWC and the BWC, established, effective national export control and enforcement mechanism for control lists items Control Lists Can be divided into 5 categories (unlike the 2 categories in the NSG and MTCR): Chemical weapons precursors-chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons. Dual-use chemical manufacturing facilities, equipment, and related technology-items that can be used either for civilian purposes or for chemical weapons production, such as reactors, storage tanks, pumps, and valves. Biological agents-disease-causing microorganisms, whether natural or genetically modified, such as smallpox, Marburg, foot-and-mouth disease, and anthrax.

Dual-use biological equipment-items that can be used for both peaceful research and biological weapons production, such as fermenters, containment facilities, freezedrying equipment, and aerosol testing chambers Toxins-poisonous substances either made by living organisms or produced synthetically that adversely affect humans, animals, or plants, such as botulinum toxin and ricin

Criticism criteria for membership are excessively strict Denying a country membership implicitly accuses that applicant of pursuing chemical or biological weapons at odds with the BWC provision for the "fullest possible technical exchange" for the advancement of peaceful scientific endeavours Countries in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), for instance, have repeatedly asserted that they already made legally binding commitments not to acquire CBW by signing the biological and chemical weapons conventions Participants of the Australia Group, however, maintain that the group complements CWC and the BWC and serves the same goals

4. Wassenaar Arrangement - Established in 1996, is a voluntary export control regime - 41members. Usual suspects: US, UK, France, Germany, Japan. Lots of European Countries. Australia, NZ, , South Korea, Japan, Mexico, Argentina. NO CHINA. - calls on states to make a series of voluntary information exchanges and notifications on their export activities related to weapons and items appearing on the arrangement's two control lists - aims to promote "greater responsibility" among its members in exports of weapons and dual-use goods and to prevent "destabilizing accumulations." - not targeted at any region or group of states, but rather at "states of concern" to members Control Lists i) Conventional Weapons: - eight broad weapon categories: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), largecaliber artillery, military aircraft/unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), military and attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems, and small arms and light weapons - Every six months, members exchange information on deliveries of conventional arms to non-Wassenaar members ii) Dual-use goods and Technologies: - Basic Items, Sensitive Items and Very Sensitive Items eg. Stealth technology and advanced radar systems

Problems/Criticisms No consensus among members on which countries are "states of concern" or what constitutes a "destabilizing" transfer And because Wassenaar operates by consensus, a single country can block any proposal In earlier years, a few members consistently refused to fully participate in voluntary information exchanges and notifications on dual-use goods Some major arms exporters, such as Belarus (who? ), China, and Israel are not members

Relevance for modern times (even after the days of cold war) Apart from the obvious points on world peace and arms race and hunger, blah blah.. Important to prevent non-state actors (terrorist groups and individuals) from acquiring conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies "responsible export policies" needed even for small arms and light weapons in the wake of civil wars in Africa and middle east

P.S./ Fun Info During Cold War days, there was a Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which was created to restrict exports to the former Soviet Union and Eastern bloc. Wassenaar arrangement is kind of successor to that though not aimed at any particular region or state.

Now. Perhaps the most important part: Indias stand on all the export control regimes Let us in please!!! Wants full membership of all the four export-control regimes Will apply for membership when the necessary preparations have been completed, and the ground has been prepared Engages with all the four groups via outreach meetings India has always demonstrated responsible non-proliferation and export control practices for all the pertinent control lists and is confident of fulfilling all requirements Has the ability to produce, manufacture or supply a vast majority of items controlled by these regimes Ability and considerable experience in enforcing a legal export control system NSG via its waiver has already recognised our impeccable non-proliferation record and the Safeguard Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 2009 o Already put 12 out of 14 nuclear reactors under IAEA safeguards. Only two reactors are required to be notified by 2014 Non-proliferation: As a responsible state, we continue policy of refraining from transfer of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technologies to states that did not possess them remain committed to a voluntary and unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosive testing commitment to complete, universal, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound manner

Reference: 1. The Hindu articles and news reports 2. Websites of these regimes Personal Info: Name Ashish Sheoran Email: sheoran.suneel@gmail.com Address: 737/10 Ram Gopal Colony; Sonepat Road; Rohtak 124001 Contact Number: 08468821004 Prize Preference: spectrum>Bipin >Economics>war (Dont need GSM Hindi, Thanks.)