Bace e |criam

Instauratie Ma

na. Prae}atie
Oe nobis isis silemus. Oe ie autem, quae agitui, etimus. ut homines
ea non inion em, sed us esse cogitent, ac io ceito habeant, non
Sectae nos alicuius, aut Placiti, sed utilitatis et amlitudinis humanae
mndamenta moliii. Oeinde ut suis commodis aequi . . . in commune
consul ant . . . et isi in aitem vcniant. Piaeteiea ut bene seient, neque
!nstauiationem nostiam ut quiddam inhnitum et ultia moitale hngant,
et animo conciiant, quum ieveia sit inhniti eiioiis hnis et teiminus
legitimus.
hismottowasaddcdinthcsccondcdition.
BaconoI'cruIam
hc Crcat!nstaurauon. IrcIacc
CIourownpcrsonwcwiIIsaynothing. Butasto thcsubjcctmattcrwithwhichwc
arcconccrncd,wcaskthatmcnthinkoIitnotas anopinionbutasawork, andconsid-
critcrcctcdnotIoranyscctoIours, orIorourgoodpIcasurc, butasthcIoundationoI
humanuuIityand dignity. !ach individuaI cquaIIy, thcn, mayrcccton it himscII. . .
Ior his own part . . . in thc common intcrcst. urthcr, cach maywcII hopc hom our
instaurauon thatitcIaimsnothing inhnitc, and nothing bcyond whatis mortaI, Iorin
truthitprcscribcsonIythc cndoIinhnitc crrors, andthisisaIcgitimatc cnd.
I
11
Giacious Loid, AIV
Jo luithei foi one's own ait the giowth of the sciences is to laboi in
youi !xcellency's own inteiest, foi the foimei is most inwaidly bound
u with the lattei, not only thiough the exalted ost as a iotectoi of
the sciences, but also thiough the moie intimate ielationshi of a lovei
and an enlightened connoisseui. n this account, ! avail myself of the
only means within my caacity to show my giatitude foi the giacious
tiust with which youi xcelIency honois me, as uough that could con- AV
tiibute something to this aim.
Ioi someone who enjoys the life of seculation the aioval of an
enlightened and cometent judge is, given his modest wishes, a owei-
lul encouiagement to toils whose utility is gieat, but distant, and hence
it is wholly misjudged by vulgai eyes.
Jo such a judge and to his giacious attention, ! now dedicate this
iece of wiiting, to his iotection ! commend all the iemaining business AV
of my liteiaiy vocation, and with deeest ieveience ! am,
Knigsbeig. the zth of Maich, : ;8:
^ inthc Iirstcdition.
Youi xcellency's humble,
most obedient seivant
mmanucIKnt
` :ertrautere |erbmmis,this !astwordwasaddcdlatcr,accordingtoKant'sIcttcrtoBicstcr
oI8)unc : ;8: .
S
<Giacious Loid,
s V
Jo mithei foi one's own ait the giowth of the sciences is to laboi in
youi xcellency's own inteiest, foi the foimei is most inwaidly bound
u with the lattei, not only thiough the exalted ost as a iotectoi of
the sciences, but also thiough the moie intimate ielationshi of a lovei
and an enlightened connoisseui. n this account, ! avail myself of the
only means within my caacity to show my giatitude foi the giacious
uust wiu which youi xceIIency honois me, as though that couId con-
tiibute something to this aim.
Jo the same giacious attention with which Youi xcellency has dig- s v
nihed the hist edition of this woiL, Idedicate also this second one, and
at the same time all the iemaining business of my liteiaiy vocation, and
with deeest ieveience ! am,
Knigsbeig, the z jid of AprI, : y8;>
^in ihe second edition.
Youi xcellency's humble,
most obedient seivant,
mucIKt
:ertrautere|erba/tni,ihis lasi word was addcd latcr, according to Kant's Icttcr to 8icstcr
of 8 |une ;;8:.
7
1H1L1
a,
Human reason has the eculiar fate in one secies of its cognitions that
it is burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are
given to it as roblems by the nature of reason itself, but which it also
cannot answer, since they transcend every caacity of human reason.
Reason falls into this erlexity through no fault of its own. !t begins
hom rinciles whose use is unavoidable in the course of exerience
and at the same time sumciently warranted by it. Vith these rinciles
it rises (as its nature also requires) ever higher, to more remote condi-
uons. 8ut since it becomes aware in this way that its business must al-
ways remain incomlete because the questions never cease, reason sees
itself necessitated to taLe remge in rinciles that overste all ossible
use in exerience, and yet seem so unsusicious that even ordinary
common sense agrees with them. 8ut it thereby falls into obscurity and
contradictions, from which it can indeed surmise that it must some-
where be roceeding on the ground of hidden errors, but it cannot dis-
cover them, for the rinciles on which it is roceeding, since they
surass the bounds of all exerience, no longer recognize any touch-
stone of exerience. Jhe battleheld of these endless controversies is
called mctaphysics.
Jhere was a time when metahysics was called the quccnof all the
sciences, and if the will be taLen for the deed, it deserved this title of
honor, on account of the reeminent imortance of its object. ow, in
accordance with the fashion of the age, the queen roves desised on all
sides, and the matron, outcast and forsaLen, mourns liLe Hecuba. Mee
maxima rerum, tet eneris natisue etens nunc trher exu/, ines vid,
Metamerheses.
!n the beginning, under the administration of the dogatists,her
rule was dcspouc.Yet because her legislation still retained traces of an-
cient barbarism, this rule gradually degenerated through internal wars
into comlete anarchy,and the sLetics, a Lind of nomads who abhor
all ermanent cultivation of the soil, shattered civil unity from time to
^ inthchrstcdition.KantvrotcancvprcIacc Ior thcsccondcdition, givcnbcIov.
` au}gegelen
` |een
"CrcatcstoIaIIbyracc and birth, Inovam
_
astout, povcrIcss" (Cvid,Metamerbeses
: j .o8-:o).

AVII
AVIII
A
_
IC!uCC <A
time. 8ut since theie weie foitunately only a few of them, they could
not ievent the dogmatists nom continually attemting to iebuild,
though nevei accoiding to a lan unanimously acceted among them-
selves. nce in iecent umes it even seemed as though an end would be
ut to all these contioveisies, and the lawlulness of all the cometing
claims would be comletely decided, thiough a ceitain physio!ogyof
the human undeistanding (by the famous LocLe), but it tuined out that
although the biith of the uioited queen was tiaced to the iabble of
common exeiience and hei ietensions would theiefoie have been
iightly iendeied susicious, neveitheless she still asseited hei claims,
because in fact this gcnca!ogywas attiibuted to hei falsely, thus meta-
ax hysics fell bacL into the same old woim-eaten dogmausm, and thus
into the same osition of contemt out of which the science was to have
been extiicated. ow aftei all aths (as we eisuade ouiselves) have
been tiied in vain, what iules is tedium and comlete indicrcnusm,
the mothei of chaos and night in the sciences, but at the same time also
the oiigin, oi at least the ielude, of theii inciient tiansfoimation and
enlightenment, when thiough ill-alied eoit they have become ob-
scuie, conlused, and useless.
Ioi it is ointless to aect indicrcncc with iesect to such in-
quiiies, to whose object human natuie cannot be indicrcnt. Moie-
ovei, howevei much they may thinL to male themselves uniecognizable
by exchanging the language of the schools foi a oulai style, these so-
called indicrcnusts, to the extent that they thinL anything at all, al-
ways unavoidably fall bacL into metahysical asseitions, which they yet
iofessed so much to desise. eveitheless tIis indieience, occuiiing
amid the louiishing of all sciences, and diiected iecisely at those sci-
ences whose iesults (if such aie to be had at all) we could least do with-
axt out, is a henomenon deseiving oui attention and ieection. Jhis is
evidently the eect not of the thoughtlessness of oui age, but of its
iiened povcrofjudgmcnt,` which will no longei be ut o with il-
* CW und u_un CnC hCuIs CCmQIunts uCut IhC suQCIHCIuIIty C! CuI u_Cs Wuj
C! Ihnkn_, und uCuI thC dCCuj C! WC!!-_ICundCd sCCnCC. ACI dC nCI sCC
thut thCsC sCCnCCs WhCsC _ICunds uIC WC!! !ud, suCh us muIhCmuICs, QhjsCs,
CIC., n thC !CusI dCsCIvC Ihs ChuI_C, IuIhCI, thCj munIun IhCI C!d ICQututCn
!CI WC!!-_ICundCdnCss, und n thC CusC C! nuIuIu! sCCnCC, CvCn suIQuss I. hs
sumC sQIt WCuId uIsC QICvC tsCII CCCtIvC n CIhCI sQCCCs C! CC_nIICn !
Cn!j CuIC hud HIsI CCn IukCn IC CCIICCt IhCI QInCQ!Cs. n IhC usCnCC C!
ths, ndHCICnCC, dCut, und !:nu!!j stICt CItCsm uIC IuIhCI QICC!s C! u WC!!-
_ICundCd Wuj C! thnkIn_. IuI u_C s IhC _CnunC u_C C! criucism, tC WhICh
Recbtmassigkeit
` Kenntnise
Prnciien
! 00
rC!uCC <A
lusoiy Lnowledge, and which demands that ieason should taLe on anew
the most dimcult of all its tasLs, namely, that of self-Lnowledge, and to
institute a couit of justice, by which ieason may secuie its iightml
claims while dismissing all its gioundless ietensions, and this not by
meie deciees but accoiding to its own eteinal and unchangeable laws, ax:
and this couit is none othei than the criuqucofpurcrcasonitself.
Yet by this ! do not undeistand a ciitique of booLs and systems, but a
ciitique of the faculty of icason in geneial, in iesect of all the cogni-
tions ahei which ieason might stiive indcpcndcndy ofa!! ccri-
cncc,and hence the decision about the ossibility oi imossibilip of a
metahysics in geneial, and the deteimination of its souices, as well as
its extent and boundaiies, all, howevei, hom iinciles.
!t is on this ath, the only one leh, that ! have set foith, and ! attei
myself that in following it ! have succeeded in iemoving all those eiiois
that have so fai ut ieason into dissension with itself in its nonexeii-
ential use. ! have not avoided ieason's questions by leading the inca-
acity of human ieason as an excuse, iathei ! have comletely secihed
these questions accoiding to iinciles, and ahei discoveiing the oint
wheie ieason has misundeistood itself, ! have iesolved them to iea-
son's mll satisfaction. Jo be suie, the answei to these questions has not ax::
tued out just as dogmatically enthusiastic lust foi Lnowledge might
have exected, foi the lattei could not be satished excet thiough mag-
ical oweis in which ! am not an exeit. Yet this was also not the intent
of oui ieason's natuial vocation, and the duty of hilosohy was to abol-
ish the semblance aiising fiom misinteiietation, even if many iized
and beloved delusions have to be destioyed in the iocess. !n this busi-
ness ! have maoe comiehensiveness my chief aim in view, and ! maLe
bold to say that theie cannot be a single metahysical ioblem that has
not been solved heie, oi at least to the solution of which the Ley has not
bcen iovided. !n fact uie ieason is such a eifect unity that if its iin-
cile' weie insumcient foi even a single one of the questions that aie set
CVCrjIhn_ musI sumI. RcIigion IhIOu_h Is hoIincss und IcgisIauon
IhIOu_h Is majcs COmmOn!j sCCk IO CxCmpI IhCmsC!VCs HOm I. DuI n Ihs
Wuj IhCj CxCIC u jusI suspCOn u_unsI IhCmsC!VCs, und CunnOI !uj C!um IO
IhuI un!C_nCd ICspCCI IhuI rCusOn _runIs On!j IO IhuI WhCh hus CCn u!C IO
WIhsIund Is HCC und pu!C CxumnuIOn.
Se/lsterkenntnis
` sie. o agrccvith "IacuIty oIrcason" (das |eun}e gtn) thcproounshouId havc
bccn ncutcr, pcrhapsKantvas takingthc antcccdcnttob "rcason"(die|eun}).
Princiien
Princiien
Princi
! 0!
|tClaCC<A
for it by its own nature, then this jrinciIej might as weII be discarded,
because then it also would not be u to answering any of the other ques-
tions with comIete reIiabiIity. /
Vhile ! am saying this ! believe ! erceive in the face of the reader
xv an indignation mixed with contemt at claims that are aarentIy so
retentious and immodest, and yet they are incomarably more mod-
erate than those of any author of the commonest rogram who retends
to rove the simle nature of the souIor the necessity of a hrst bcgn-
ning of thc vorId. Ior such an author ledges himself to extend
human cognition beyond all bounds of ossible exerience, of which !
humbly admit that this wholly surasses my caacity, instead ! have to
do merely with reason itself and its ure thinLing, to gain exhaustive ac-
quaintance with them ! need not seeL far beyond myself, because it is in
myself that ! encounter them, and common logic already also gives me
an examle of how the simle acts of reason may be lully and systemat-
icalIy enumerated, only here the question is raised how much ! may
hoe to settIe with these simIe acts if aII the materiaI and assistance of
exerience are taLen away from me.
So much for the compIctcncssin reaching cachof the ends, and for
the comprchcnsivcncssin reaching aII of them together, which ends
are not roosed arbitrarily, but are set u for us by the nature of cog-
nition itseIf, as the mattcrof our criucaI investigation.
X Iurthermore ccrtainty and cIarity, two things that concern the
formof the investigation, are to be viewed as essentiaI demands, which
may rightly be made on the author who ventures uon so sliery an
undertaLing.
A far as ccrtamtyis concerned, ! have myself ronounced the judg-
ment that in this Lind of inquiry it is in no way allowed to hoIdopin-
ions,and that anything that even looLs liLe an hyothesis is a forbidden
commodity, which should not be ut u for sale even at the lowest rice
but must be conhscated as soon as it is discovered. Ior every cognition
that is suosed to be certain urieri roclaims that it wants to be held
for absoluteIy necessary, and even more is this true of a determination
of all ure cognitions urieri, which is to be the standard and thus even
the examle of all aodictic (hilosohical) certainp. Vhether ! have
erformed what ! have just ledged in that resect remains wholly to
the judgment of ue reader, since it is aroriate for an author onIy to
resent the grounds, but not to judge about their eect on his judges.
8ut in order that he shouId not inadvertently be ue cause of weaLen-
x ing his own arguments, the author may be ermitted to note himself
those laces that, even uough they ertain only to the incidentaI end of
the worL, may be the occasion for some mistrust, in order that he may
in a timeIy manner counteract the inuence that even the reader's
I 0?
ICuCC <A
slightest reservation on this oint may have on his judgment over the
chief end.
! am acquainted with no investigations more imortant for getting to
the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding, and at the same
time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use, than
those ! have undertaLen in the second chater of the Jranscendental
Analytic, under the title Dcduction of thc Purc Conccpts ofthc
\ndcrstanding,they are also the investigations that have cost me the
most, but ! hoe i\ot unrewarded, eort. Jhis inquiiy, which goes
rather dee, has to sides. ne side refers to the objects of the ure un-
derstanding, and is suosed to demonstrate and maLe comrehensible
the objective validity of its concets urieri, thus it belongs essentially
to my ends. Jhe other side deals with the ure understanding itself,
conceing its ossibility and the owers of cognition on which it itself
rests, thus it considers it in a subjective relation, and although this ex- AX!!
osition is of great imortance in resect of my chief end, it does not
belong essentially to it, because the chief question always remains.
"Vhat and how much can understanding and reason cognize free of all
exerience: and not. "How is the facuItyofthinkingitself ossible:"
Since the latter question is something liLe the search for the cause of a
given effect, and is therefore something liLe a hyothesis (although, as
! will elsewhere taLe the oortunity to show, this is not in fact how
matters stand), it aears as if ! am taLing the liberty in this case of ex-
ressing an opinion,and that the reader might therefore be hee to hold
another opinion. !n view of this ! must remind the reader in advance
that even in case my subjective deduction does not roduce the com-
lete conviction that ! exect, the objective deduction that is my ri-
mary conce would come into its mll strength, on which what is said
at ages A] p:should even be sumcient by itself.
Iinally, as regards cIarity, the reader has a right to demand hrst dis-
cursivc (logical) cIarity, through conccpts, but then also intuitivc
(aesthetic) clarity, through intuitions, that is, through examles or
axiii
other illustrations in cencrete. ! have taLen sufhcient care for the former.
Jhat was essential to my undertaLing but was also the contingent cause
of the fact that ! could not satis the second demand, which is less strict
but still fair. !n the rogress of my labor ! have been almost constantly
undecided how to deal with this matter. xamles and illustrations al-
ways aeared necessaiy to me, and hence actually aeared in their
roer lace in my hrst dralt. 8ut then ! looLed at the size of my tasL
and the many objects with which ! would have to do, and ! became
aware that this alone, tieated in u diy, merely schoIasucmanner, would
Deut/icbkeit .
I0J
Preface <A>
sumce to hll an extensive woiL, uus ! found it inadvisable to swell it
luithei with examles and illusuations, which aie necessaiy only foi a
popu!araim, esecially since this woiL could nevei be made suitable foi
oulai use, and ieal exeits in this science do not have so much need
foi things to be made easy foi them, although this would always be
agieeable, heie it could also have biought with it something countei-
Axx ioductive. Jhe Abb Jeiiasson says that if the size of a booL is mea-
suied not by the numbei of ages but by the time needed to undeistand
it, then it can be said of many a booL thatitvou!dbcmuchshortcr
ifitvcrcnotsoshort. 8ut on the othei hand, if we diiect oui view
towaid the intelligibility of a whole of seculative cognition that is
wide-ianging and yet is connected in iincile, we could with equal
iight say that manyabookvou!dhavc bccnmuchc!carcrifithad
notbccnmadcquitcsoc!car.Ioi the aids to claiip hel in the parts
but ohen conmse in the vho!c,since the ieadei cannot quicLly enough
attain a suivey of the whole, and all theii biight colois aint ovei and
maLe uniecognizable the aiticulation oi stiuctuie of the system, which
yet matteis most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness.
1O
!t can, as it seems to me, be no small inducement foi the ieadei to
unite his eoit with that of the authoi, when he has the iosect of cai-
iying out, accoiding to the outline given above, a gieat and imoitant
iece of woiL, and that in a comIete and lasting way. ow meta-
ax hysics, accoiding to the concets we will give of i t heie, i s the only one
of all the sciences that may iomise that little but unified effoit, and
that indeed in a shoit time, will comlete it in such a way that nothing
iemains to osteiity excet to adat it in a didacucmannei to its in-
tentions, yet without being able to add to its content in the least. Ioi it
is nothing but the invcntoryof all we ossess thiough purcrcason,oi-
deied systematically. ^othing heie can escae us, because what ieason
biings foith entiiely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is biought to
light by ieason itself as soon as ieason's common iincile has been dis-
coveied. Jhe eifect unity of this Lind of cognition, and the fact that it
aiises solely out of uie concets without any inhuence that would ex-
tend oi inciease it fiom exeiience oi even parucu!arintuiuon,which
would lead to a deteiminate exeiience, maLe this unconditioned com-
leteness not only feasible but also necessaiy. 1ecum ha/ita, et neris uam
sit ti/i curta suehex. - Peisius.
Ax Such a system of uie (seculative) ieason ! hoe myself to delivei
Princi
` Kant'stcxtrcads '{b/en'' (arc missing). Vc IoIlovIrdmann, rcadingbeqen.
Princi
Jvcll in your on housc, and you vilI knov hov simplc your posscssions arc"
(Icrsius, Satiresq:Z,.
I 0+
Preface <
undei the titIe Mctaphysics of^aturc, which wiIl be not haIf so ex-
tensive but wiIl be incomaiabIy iichei in content than this ciitique,
which had hist to disIay the souices and conditions of its ossibility,
and needed to cleai and IeveI a giound that was comIeteIy oveigiown.
Heie ! exect fiom my ieadei the atience and imaitiality of a judgc,
but theie ! wiIl exect the cooeiative siiit and assistance of a fc!!ov
vorkcr,foi howevei comleteIy the princip!csof the system may be
exounded in the ciitique, the comiehensiveness of the system itself
iequiies aIso that no dcrivauvc concets should be IacLing, which,
howevei, cannot be estimated urieri in one Iea, but must be giaduaIly
sought out, liLewise, just as in the foimei the whole synthcsisof con-
cets has been exhausted, so in the Iattei it would be additionaIly de-
manded that the same thing shouId taLe Iace in iesect of theii
ana!ysis,which wouId be easy and moie enteitainment than Iaboi.
! have onIy a few moie things to iemaiL with iesect to the booL's
iinting. Since the beginning of the iinting was somewhat delayed, I
was able to see onIy about half the ioof sheets, in which ! have come axii
uon a few iinting eiiois, though none that conmse the sense excet
the one occuiiing at age A] ;p,fouith line hom the bottom, wheie
spccic shouId be iead in lace of skcpuca!. Jle Antinomy of Puie
Reason, hom age jA] (z
,
to age A] (6i , is aiianged in the mannei
of a table, so that eveiything beIonging to the thcsis always continues
on the left side and what beIongs to the anuthcsis on the iight side,
which ! did in oidei to maLe it easiei to comaie ioosition and
countei-ioosition with one anothei.
Princiien
!05
evii Ire/ace ts tbe secsn eitisn '
Vhethei oi not the tieatment of the cognitions belonging to the con-
cer of ieason uavels the secuie couise of a science is something which
can soon be judged by its success. !f aftei many ieliminaiies and iea-
iations aie made, a science gets stucL as soon as it aioaches its end,
oi if in oidei to ieach this end it must ohen go bacL and set out on a
new ath, oi liLewise if it ioves imossible foi the dieient co-woiL-
eis to achieve unanimity as to the way in which they should uisue
theii common aim, then we may be suie that such a study is meiely
gioing about, that it is still fai fiom having enteied uon the secuie
couise of a science, and it is alieady a seivce to ieason if we can ossi-
bIy hnd that ath foi it, even if we have to give u as lutile much of what
was included in the end ieviously foimed without delibeiation.
evi Jhat fiom the eailiest times !ogichas tiaveIed this secuie couise can
be seen hom the fact that since the time of Aiistotle it has not had to
go a single ste bacLwaids, unless we count the abolition of a few dis-
ensable subtIeties oi the moie distinct deteimination of its iesenta-
tion, which imiovements belong moie to the elegance than to the
secuiity of that science. Vhat is mithei iemaiLable about logic is that
untiI now it has also been unable to taLe a single ste foiwaid, and
theiefoie seems to all aeaiance to be hnished and comlete. Ioi if
some moders have thought to enlaige it by inteiolating psycho!ogi-
ca! chateis about oui diffeient cognitve oweis (about imagination,
wit), oi mctaphysica!chateis about the oiigin of cognition oi the dif-
feient Linds of certainty in accoidance with the diveisip of objects
(about idealism, sLeticism, etc.), oi anthropo!ogica! chateis about
oui iejudice (about theii causes and iemedies), then this ioceeds only
hom theii ignoiance of the eculiai natuie of this science. is not an
imiovement but a defoimation of the sciences when theii boundaiies
aie aIlowed to iun ovei into one anothei, the boundaiies oflogic, how-
evei, aie deteimined quite iecisely by the fact that logic is the science
e n that exhaustively iesents and stiictly ioves nothing but the foimaI
hisncvprcIacc,so cntitIcd,rcpIaccsthcprcIacc homthchrstcdiuon.
`
Kant's tcxt rcadseq/g"(rcsuItor cnsuc),vhich docsnotmakcscnsc hcrcbccausct
isanintransitivcvcrb,vc !oIIovCriIIoinrcading:eq/g.
Ojeue
I 0
Preface to the second edition <B>
iules of all thinLing (whethei this thinLing be emiiical oi u rieri,
whatevei oiigin oi object it may have, and whatevei contingent oi nat-
uial obstacles it may meet with in oui minds).
Ioi the advantage that has made it so successml logic has solely its
own limitation to thanL, since it is theieby justihed in abstiacting is
indeed obliged to absuact fiom all objects of cognition and all the
distinctions between them, and in logic, theiefoie, the undeistanding
has to do with nothing luithei than itself and its own foim. How much
moie dimcult, natuially, must it be foi ieason to entei uon the secuie
ath of a science if it does not have to do meiely with itself, but has to
deal with objects too, hence logic as a ioadeutic constitutes only the
outei couityaid, as it weie, to the sciences, and when it comes to infoi-
mation, a logic may indeed be iesuosed in judging about the lattei,
but its acquisition must be sought in the sciences ioeily and objec-
tively so called.
!nsofai as theie is to be ieason in these sciences, something in them
must be cognized urieri, and this cognition can ielate to its object in
eithei of two ways, eithei meiely dctcrminingthe object and its con-
cet (which must be given hom elsewheie), oi else also makingthe ob-
ject actua!.Jhe foimei is thcorcuca!, the Iattei practica!cognition of
ieason. !n both the purcait, the ait in which ieason deteimines its
object wholly urieri, must be exounded all by itself, howevei much
oi little it may contain, and that ait that comes fiom othei souices
must not be mixed u with it, foi it is bad economy to send blindly
whatevei comes in without being able latei, when the economy comes
to a standstill, to distinguish the ait of the ievenue that can covei the
exenses fiom the ait that must be cut.
Mathcmaucsand physicsaie the two theoietical cognitions of iea-
son that aie suosed to deteimine theii objccts`u rieri, the foimei
entiiely uiely, the latter at least in ait uiely but also following the
standaids of souices of cognition othei than ieason.
Mathcmatics has, fiom the eailiest times to which the histoiy of
human ieason ieaches, in that admiiable eole the GieeLs, tiaveled
the secuie ath of a science. Yet it must not be thought that it was as
easy foi it as foi logic in which ieason has to do only with itself to
hnd that ioyal ath, oi iathei itself to oen it u, iathei, ! believe that
mathematics was left gioing about foi a long time (chiely among the
gytians), and that its tiansfoimation is to be asciibed to a rcvo!u-
tion,biought about by the hay insiiation of a single man in an at-
Oject
` Olecte
Olecte
J
Oject
Olecte
I7
x
x
|tC!aCC
temt fiom which the ioad to be taLen onwaid could no longei be
missed, and the secuie couise of a science was enteied on and ie-
sciibed foi all time and to an inhnite extent. Jhe histoiy of this iev-
olution in the way of thinLing which was fai moie imoitant than
the discoveiy of the way aiound the famous Cae ' and of the luc|
one who biought it about, has not been ieseived foi us. 8ut the leg-
end handed down to us by Oiogenes Laeitius who names the
ieuted inventoi of the smallest elements of geometiical demonstia-
tions, even of those that, accoiding to common judgment, stand in no
need of ioof ioves that the memoiy of the alteiation wiought by
the discoveiy of this new ath in its eailiest footstes must have
seemed exceedingly imoitant to mathematicians, and was theieby
iendeied unfoigettable. A new light bioLe uon the hist eison who
demonstiated the isosceles tiiangle (whethei he was called "Jhales
oi had some othei name). '` Ioi he found that what he had to do was
8x not to tiace what he saw in this hguie, oi even tiace its meie con-
cet, and iead off, as it weie, fiom the ioeities of the hguie, but
iathei that he had to ioduce the lattei fiom what he himself thought
into the object and iesented (thiough construction) accoiding to H
rieri concets, and that in oidei to Lnow something secuiely H rieri
he had to asciibe to ue thing nothing excet what foIIowed nec-
essaiily fiom what he himself had ut into it in accoidance with its
concet.
!t tooL natuial science much longei to hnd the highway of science,
foi it is only about one and a half centuiies since the suggestion of the
ingenious Iiancis 8acon aitly occasioned this discoveiy and aitly mi-
thei stimulated it, since one was alieady on its tiacLs which discovery,
theiefoie, can )ust as much be exlained by a sudden ievolution in the
way of thinLing. Heie ! will considei natuial science only insofai as it
is giounded on cmpirica!iinciles.
Vhen Galileo' iolled balls of a weight chosen by himself down an
inclined lane, oi when Joiiicelli' made the aii beai a weight that he
had ieviously thought to be equal to that ol a Lnown column of watei,
oi when in a latei time Stahl' changed metals into calx and then
axiii changed the lattei bacL into metal by hist iemoving something and
Kant's tcxtrcads/eicbseiti"(cquiIatcraI),butonthcbasisoIhiscorrccuoninaIcttcrto
Schtz oI2)unc : ;8;(:o.q66),hc appcars tohavcmcant/eicbscbenk/i" (isosccIcs).
` Irtnrttcn
K/k. Kcmp Smith transIatcs this as "oxidcs," but that is anachronisuc, prior to thc
chcmicaI rcvoIution oIIricstIcy and !avoisicr, thc caIx vas conccivcd to bc vhat vas
IcItoIamctaIatcr itsphIogistonhad bccn drivcn o, onI Iatcr vasitdiscovcrcdthat
this proccss vasactuaIIyoncoIoxidation.
! 08
ro rhe second ediuon <B>
thCn uIIn_ IaCRa_an,`a _hI daWnCd Cn a thCsCWhC studj na-
tutC. hCjCCmptChCndCd IhaIICasCn has1ns1_hICn!jnIC WhaI1t1t-
sCICduCCs aCCCIdn_ICIsCWndCs_n,IhaIImusIIaRCIhCCadWIh
InCCs CIIs ud_mCnIs aCCCIdn_ICCCnsIanIaWs and CCmCna-
IuICICansWCI L QuCsICns, IaIhCI Ihan !CIHn_natuIC _udCIsmCVC-
mCnIs j RCCn_ ICasCn, as I WCIC, n Cadn_-sIIn_s, CI CIhCIWsC
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sCn sCCRs and ICQuICs. CasCn, n CIdCI IC C Iau_hI jnaIuIC, musI
aICaCh natuIC WIh Is pInCCs n CnC hand, aCCCIdn_ IC WhCh
aCnC IhC a_ICCmCnI amCn_ aCaIanCCs Can CCunI as aWs, and, nIhC
CIhCIhand, thC CxCImCnIsIhCu_hICuIn aCCCIdanCCWIhIhCsC In-
C!Cs'- jCIn CIdCI IC CnsIIuCICd jnaHIC nCI!RC a u!, WhChas
ICCICd IC hm WhaICVCI IhC ICaChCIWanIsIC saj, uI!RC an aCnICd
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husCVCnhjsCsCWCsIhCadVanIa_CCusICVCuICnnIsWajCIhnR-
n_IC IhC nsIaICnIhaIWhaIICasCnWCud nCI C aC IC RnCWCI- nxv
sCandhasICCaInICm naIuIC, IhasIC sCCRnIhCaIICI (IhCu_hnCI
mCICjasCIC IC I)n aCCCIdanCCWIhWhaIICasCnIsCuIsnIC na-
IuIC.hss hCWnaIuIasCCnCCWas HIsIICu_hIICIhCsCCuIC CCuIsC
Cta sCtCnCC aUCI_ICtn_aCutCrsCmanjCcntuICs.
Mctaphysics aWhCjsCaICd sCCuaIVC CC_nICn CICasCnIhaI
CCVaICs IsC CnIICj aCVC a nsIIuCICn ICm CxCICnCC, and IhaI
IhICu_h mCIC CCnCCIs (nCI, RC maIhCmaICs, IhICu_h IhC aCaICn
CCCnCCIs IC n\ICn), WhCIC ICasCn Ihus s suCsCd IC C Is CWn
up- has u IC nCW nCI CCn sC aVCICd j aIC as IC haVC CCn a!C
ICCnICIuCnIhCsCCuICCCuIsCCasCCnCC,CVCnIhCu_hIsCdCIIhan
a! CIhCI sCCnCCs, and WCud ICman CVCn a thC CIhCIs WCtC sWa!-
!CWCd u jan a!-CCnsumn_ aIaIsm. CIn IICasCn CCnInuCus!j
_CIs stuCR, CVCnWhCnICamsurieri ns_hI(asIICICnds)nICIhCsC
aWs CCnHImCd jIhC CCmmCnCsI CxCICnCC. n mCIahjsCs WC haVC
IC ICIIaCC CuIaIhCCunI!Css ImCs,CCausCWC Hnd IhaIIdCCs nCICad
WhCICWCWanIIC_C, andIssCaIICmICaChn_unanmIynIhC as-
BX
sCIICns CIs adhCICnIs IhaI I sIaIhCI a aIICHCd, and ndCCd CnC
thaI aCaIs IC C CspCCa!j dCICImnCd CI ICsI1n_ CnCs CWCIs n
mCCRCCmaI, CnIhsaIICHCdnCCCmaIanIhas CVCI_anCd IhC CasI
Here ! am not following exacrly the thread of the history of the experimental
Bx
method, whose nrst eginnings are aIso not preciseIy knon.
Princiien
` Prtncqien
Princiien
V
Preface
I C_ICund, nCI has anj CCn aC IC asC anj asIn_ CssCssCn Cn
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suCsICn,CCmCICnCIhn_. CnCCCIus CnCC WhCIhCIWCdCnCI
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sumCdIhaIIhC CnIIC CCCsIa hCsIICVCVCs aICund IhC CsCIVCI, IICd
IC sCC hCm_hI nCIhaVC _ICaICI suCCCss hC madC IhC CsCIvCI IC-
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WC ICICsCnIIhs CssIjIC mjsC. ACICCausC CannCIsICWIh
IhCsC nIuICns, IhCj aIC IC CCCmC CC_nICns, uI musI ICCI IhCm
as ICICsCnIaICns IC sCmCIhn_ as IhCI CCCI and dCICImnC Ihs C-
Olecte
` Ojecte
Oject
I I0
to the second edition <B>
CCIIhICu_hIhCm, CanassumC CIhCIIhaIthCCCnCCIs IhICu_hWhCh
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aCuIIhCmHrieri, CICsCassumCIhaIIhC CCCIs, CIWhaIsthCsamC
Ihn_, IhC exerience nWhCh aCnC IhCy Can C CC_nzCd (as _VCn C-
CCIS) CCn!CIms IC thCsC CCnCCIs, n WhCh CasC mmCdaICy sCC an
CasCIWay CuI C!IhC dHCuty, snCC CxCICnCC IsC!s a Rnd C!CC_-
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mysC!C!CIC any CCCI s _VCnIC mC, hCnCCHrieri, WhCh IuC s Cx-
ICssCd n CCnCCIs H rieri, IC WhCh a CCCIs C! CxCICnCC musI
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CCCIs nsC!aI as thCy aIC IhCu_hI mCICy thICu_h ICasCn, and nCCCs-
saIy aI thaI, uI IhaI (aI CasI as ICasCn IhnRs IhCm)CannCI C _VCn
n CxCICnCC aIa - thC aIICmI IC IhnR thCm (!CI IhCy musI C Caa-
CC!Cn_thCu_hI)W ICVdC a sCndd ICUChsICnC C!WhaIWC as-
sumC as IhC aICICd mCthCd C!CuIWayC!IhnRIn_, namCyIhaIWC Can
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hsCxCImCnIsuCCCCdsasWCasWCCCudWsh,andIICmsCsIC
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CCsIsC!WIhCCnCCIsHrieri ICWhChIhCCCIICsCndn_CCCIsa-
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ICnHrieri, andWhaIssImCIC, WC CanICVdCsaIs!aCICIyICC!s C!
thCaWsIhaIaICIhCHrieri _ICundC!naIuIC, asIhCsumICIaC!CCCIs
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C!ICCCCdn_. LuI!ICmIhs dCduCICn C!CuI!aCUtyC!CC_nzn_Hri-
* Jhis method, imitated from the method of those who study nature, thus con nxviii
sists in this. to seek the elements of pure reason in that vhich admits of
bcing conrmcd or rcmtcd through an cxpcrimcnt. ow the proposi-
tions of pure reason, especially when they venture beyond all boundaries of
possible experience, admit of no test by experiment with their objccts (as in
natural science). thus to experiment will be feasible only with conccpts and
principIcs that we assume H rieri by arranging the latter so that the same
objects can be considered from two dierent sides, on thc onc sidc as ob
jects of the senses and the understanding for experience, and on thc othcr nxix
sidc as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated reason striving
beyond the bounds of experience. If we now nnd that there is agreement with
the principle' of pure reason when things are considered from this twofold
standpoint, but that an unavoidable conllict of reason with itself arises with a
single standpoint, then the experiment decides for the correctness of that
distinction.
Oleue
` Princi
I ! I
Preface
eri n IhC HIsI aII CmCIahjsCs, IhCIC CmCI_Cs a VCIj sIIan_C ICsuI,
and CnC IhaI aCaIs VCIj dsadVanIa_CCus IC IhC WhCC uICsC WIIh
WhCh IhC sCCCnd aII CmCIahysCs CCnCCOs IsCl, namCly thaIWU
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CnCC, WhCh Is nCVCIIhCCss ICCsCj IhC mCsI CssCnIa CCCuaHCn C
sx Ihs sCICnCC. LuIhCICn!CsusIthC CxCImCnIICV:dn_a ChCCCn
IhC IIuIh CIhCICsuI CIhaIHIsI assCssmCnI CCuIIaICna CC_nICn
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CVCIjIhn_ IhaI s CCndICnCd, IhCICj dCmandn_ IhC sCICs C CCndI-
ICns as sCmCIhn_ CCmCICd. ^CW WC Hnd IhaI Cn IhC assumICn
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IhCmsCVCs,ICunCCndIIICnCdcannotbcthoughtatavithoutcon-
tradiction, uI IhaI Cn IhC CCnIIaIj, WC assumC IhaI CuI ICICsCnIa-
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IC us), uI IaIhCI n Ihn_s nsCaIas WC aIC nCIaCQuanICd WIh IhCm,
asIhIn_sInIhCmsCVCs: ICnIhsWCud shCWIhaIWhaIWCInIIIajas-
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nICnsurieri IhaIaIC CssIC, uICnjICmaIaCICasIandCnI.Lj
* Jhis experimenr of pure reason has much in common wirh whar rhe
chcmsts somerimes call rhe experimenr of rcduction, or more generally rhe
synthcuc proccdurc. Jhe analysis of mc mctaphysician separared pure H
rieri knowledge inro rwo very hererogeneous elemenrs, namely rhose of rhe
rhings as appearances and the rhings in themselves. Jhe diaIccuc once again
combines them, in unison with rhe necessary rarionaI idea of rhe uncondi-
uoncd, and fnds thar rhe unison will never come abour excepr through rhar
distincrion, which is rherefore rhe true one.
Gegenrele
` Sacbe
angetre{n
Sacben
Z
to the second edition <B>
suCh ICCCduICs sCCuuUVC ICusCn hus utCustmudCICCmCI suChun
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mCtuhjsICs, CCuusC, IC_uIdn_ IhC HIst Cnt, n 0 rieri CC_ntCn
nCIhn_Cun C usCICd tC thC CCCtsCxCCtWhutIhCthnRn_sujCCt
tuRCs Cut CtsC, undIC_uIdn_thC sCCCnd, uIC sCCuutVC ICusCns,
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* L the same way, ue central laws of the motion of the heavenly bodies estab- BXI
lished with certainty what Copernicus assumed at the beginning only as a hy-
pothesis, and at the same time they proved the invisible force (of ewtonian
attraction) that binds the universe, which would have remained forever
undiscovered if Copernicus had not ventured, in a manner contradictory to
the senses yet true, to seek for the observed movements not in the objects of
the heavens but in their observer. In this Preface I propose ue transforma
tion in our way of thinHng presented in criticism" merely as a hypothesis,
analogous to that other hypothesis, only in order L draw our notice to the
nrst attempts at such a transformation, which are always hypotheucal, even
though in the treatise itself it will be proved not hypothetically but rather
apodictically hom the constitution of our representations of space and time
and hom the elementary concepts of the understanding.
|egen
` Ojecte
u)galen
Ojecte
Irinciien
Irinci
' 0/tlau
indKritik, whch comd aso bc uans!atcd In thc /r!rquc, " rccrrgto thc Qrcscnt
book 35 3 hoc.
J
Preface
samC ImC CCnnVCsI_aICdnIs thoroughgoingICaICnICIhC CnIIC
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CnCjCd jnC CIhCI IaICna sCCnCC IhaI has IC dC WIh CCCIs(CI
!ogcdCasCnjWIh IhC CIm CIhnRn_n_CnCIa), WhCh s IhaI j
Ihs CIIQuC I has CCn ICu_hI CnIC IhC sCCuIC CCuIsC C a sCCnCC,
IhCn I Can mjCmIaCC IhC CnIIC HCd CCC_nICns CCn_n_ IC I
xiv and Ihus Can CCmpCIC Is WCIR and aj I dCWn CI pCsICIIjas apInC-
paHamCWCIRIhaICannCVCIC CnaI_Cd, snCCIhasIC dCsCCjWIh
pInCpCs'andIhCmIaICns CnIhCIusC,WhChaICdCICImnCdjIhC
pInCpCs IhCmsCVCs. 1CnCC as a mndamCnIa sCCnCC, mCIaphjsCs s
asC Cund IC aChCVCIhs CCmpCICnCss, and WC musI CaC IC saj C
I. ni/ actum reutans, si ui sueresset aenum.
LuIIW C asRCd. `haIsCIICIICasuIC sIIhaIWCnICnd IC CaVC
ICpCsICIIy, nIhC CImCamCIaphjsCsIhaIhas CCn puIHCdIhICu_h
CIHCsmuIIhCICjasCICu_hInIC a Chan_CCss sIaIC:'InaCuIsCIj
CVCIVCWCIhsWCIR, CnCm_hICCVCIhaICnCpCICCVCsIICCCnj
CncgauvcuIIy, ICaChn_ us nCVCIIC VCnIuICWIhspCCu!aIVCICasCn
CjCnd IhC CundaICs CCxpCICnCC, and n aCI IhaIs Is HIsIusCm-
nCss. LuI Ihs uIIj sCCn CCCmCs positivc WhCn WC CCCmC aWaIC
IhaI IhC pInCpCs WIh WhCh spCCuaIVC ICasCn VCnIuICs CjCnd Is
CundaICs dC nCI n aCI ICsuI n cxtcnding CuI usC CICasCn, uI
IaIhCI, CnCCCnsdCIs IhCmmCIC CCsCj, nCVIajICsuInnarrov-
ingI j IhICaICnn_ IC CxICnd IhC CundaICs C sCnsIj, IC WhCh
8X IhCsC pInCpCs ICaj CCn_, CjCnd CVCIjIhn_, and sCCVCn IC ds-
Cd_C IhCusCCpuIC(pIaCICa)ICasCn. 1CnCCaCIIQuCIhaImIs IhC
spCCuaIVCusC CICasCn s, IC C suIC, IC IhaI CxICnIncgauvc,uI C-
CausCIsmuIanCCusj ICmCVCs an CsIaCC IhaImIs CI CVCn IhICaI-
CnsICWpC CuIIhC pIaCICausCCICasCn, Ihs CIIQuCsasCn aCIC
posiuvc andVCIy mpCIIanI uIIy, as sCCn as WC haVC CCnVnCCd CuI-
sCVCs IhaI IhCIC s an asCuICjnCCCssaIj pIaCICa usC CpuIC ICasCn
(IhC mCIa usC), nWhChICasCn unaVCdaj CxICnds IsCCjCndIhC
CundaICs CsCnsj, WIhCuI nCCdn_anjasssIanCC DCm spCCua-
IVCICasCn, uInWhChImusIasC CmadC sCCuIC a_ansIanjCCun-
ICIaCICn ICm IhC aIICI, n CIdCI nCI IC a nIC CCnIIadCICn WIh
Olecte
` Hautmb/, Kant's mctaphorsccms to bc dravn hom vcaving(cI. 0lstub/, a Ioom or
hamc Iorvcaving).
Irinciien
"hinking nothing donc iI somcthing morc is to bcdonc."hc corrcct guotauon is.
Caesar in emniaraeces, ni/actum credens, cumquidsueresset agendum, instat atrex"
(Cacsar, hcadIong in cvcrything, bcIicving nothing donc vhiIc somcthing morc rc-
maincd tobcdonc,prcsscdIorvard hcrccIy) (!ucan, Dele//eci:i/i:: 6y).
lebarr/icbenZustand
+
to the second edition <B>
IsC!. C dCnj IhaI Ihs sCI\CC C! CIICsm" s C!anj positivc uIIj
WCud C as muCh as IC saj IhaI IhC CCC aIC C!nC CsIVC uIIjC-
CausC IhCI ChC!usnCss s IC uI a sIC IC IhC VCCnCC IhaI CICns
haVC IC !CaI HCm CIhCI CICns, sC IhaI CaCh Can CaIIjCn hs CWn a!-
!aIs n CaCC and sa!CIj.' n IhC anajICa aII C! IhC CIIguC I s
ICVCd IhaI saCC and ImC aIC Cnj !CIms C! sCnsC nIuICn, and
IhCIC!CIC CnjCCndICnsC!IhC CxsICnCCC!IhCIhn_sas aCaIanCCs,
!uIIhCIIhaIWChaVCnC CCnCCIs C!IhCundCIsIandn_andhCnCCnC C-
CmCnIs!CI IhC CC_nICn C!Ihn_s CxCCInsC!aI as an nIuICn Can C BXI
_VCn CCIICsCndn_ IC IhCsC CCnCCIs, CCnsCQuCnIj IhaI WC Can haVC
CC_nICn C!nC CCCI as a Ihn_nIsC!, uICnjnsC!aI as Is an C-
CCIC!sCnsC nIuICn, . C. as an aCaIanCC, !ICmWhCh !CCWs IhC
mIaICn C!a CVCn CssC sCCuaIVC CC_nICn C!ICasCn IC mCIC
CCCIs C!cxpcricncc.ACIIhCICsCIvaICn musIasCCWCnCICd, IhaI
CVCn !WC CannCI coguizc IhCsC samC CCCIs as Ihn_s n IhCmsCVCs,
WC aI CasI musI C aC IC think IhCm as Ihn_s n IhCmsCVCs. ` CI
CIhCIwsCIhCICWCu!d!C!!CWIhCasuIdICCsICnIhaIIhCICsana-
CaIanCCWIhCuIanjIhn_IhaIaCaIs. ^CW!WCWCIC IC assumCIhaI Bxxv
IhC dsInCICn CIWCCn Ihn_s as CjCCIs C! CxCICnCC and IhC VCIj
samC Ihn_s as Ihn_s n IhCmsCVCs, WhCh CuI CIIQuC has madC nCC-
CssaIj, WCIC nCI madC aI a, IhCn IhC InCC C!CausaIj, and hCnCC
IhCmCChansm C!naIuIC ndCICImnn_CausaIj, WCud CVad C!a
Ihn_s n _CnCIa as C!HCCnI CausCs. WCud nCI C aC IC saj C!CnC
andIhCsamCIhn_,C. _. ,IhChumansCu, IhaIIsWs!ICCandjCIIhaI
I s smuIanCCusj sujCCI IC naIuIa nCCCssIj, . C. , IhaI I s nCI !ICC,
WIhCuI !an_nIC an CVCus CCnIIadCICn, CCausC nCIhICCs-
ICns WCud haVC IaRCn IhC sCu injustthc samc mcaning,namCj
as a Ihn_n _CnCIa (as a Ihnn IsC!), and WIhCuI ICI CIIQuC,
* Jo cogzc an object, it is required that I be able to prove its possibility BxI
,whether by the testimony mexperience fom its actuality or H r:r through
reason). But I can UD whatever like, as long as I do not contradict myself,
i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought, even if I cannot give any as
surance whether or not there is a corresponding object somewhere within the
sum total of all possibilities. But in order to ascribe objective validity to such a
concept (real possibility, for the Frst sort of possibility was merely logical)
something more is required. Jhis more," however, need not be sought in the-
oretical sources of cognition, it may also lie in practical ones.
derKritik
` Oject
Bedeutung;mcaning" viII transIatcthisvord Ior thccmandcroIthisparagraph.
Sacbe
Olect
I I 5
Preface
CCud nCI haVC IaRCn I CIhCIWsC. LuI IhC CIIQuC has nCI CIICd n
ICaChn_ IhaI IhC CjCCI" shCud C IaRCn n a tvofo!d mcaning,
namCj as aCaIanCC CI as Ihn_ n IsC, 'Is dCduCICn CIhC uIC
CCnCCIs C IhC undCIsIandn_ s CCIICCI, and hCnCC IhC InCC C
CausaIy aCs Cnj IC Ihn_sIaRCn n IhC HIsI sCnsC, namCj nsCaI
as IhCj aIC CjCCIs C CxCICnCC, WhC Ihn_s n IhC sCCCnd mCann_
aICnCIsuCCIICI, IhCnusIIhC samCWsIhCu_hICn IhC aCaI-
BXII anCC (n VsC aCICns) as nCCCssaIj suCCI IC IhC aW CnaIuIC and
IC Ihs CxICnI not hcc, WhC jCI Cn IhC CIhCI hand I s IhCu_hI C
as CCn_n_ IC a Ihn_ n IsC as nCI sujCCI IC IhaI aW, and hCnCC
hcc,WIhCuIanjCCnIIadCICnhCICjCCCuIIn_.^CWaIhCu_h Can-
nCIcognzcmjsCu,CCnsdCICdICmIhCaIICIsdC,IhICu_hanjsCC-
uaIVC ICasCn (sI Css IhICu_h CmICa CsCIvaICn), and hCnCC
CannCI cognizc ICCdCm as a ICCIIy Canj Cn_ IC WhCh asCIC
CHCCIsnIhCWCId CsCnsC, CCausCIhCnWCudhaVCIC CC_nzC suCh
anCxsICnCC as dCICImnCd, andjCInCIas dCICImnCdn ImC (WhChs
mCssC, snCCCannCIsuCIImjCCnCCIWIhanjnIuHCn),nCV-
CIIhCCss, CandmICCdCmIC mjsC, . C. , IhC ICICsCnIaICn CIaI
CasI CCnIans nC CCnIIadCICn n IsC, sC Cn_ as CuI CIICa dsInC-
ICn ICVas CIwCCn IhC IwCWajs CICICsCnIn_ (sCnsC and nIC-
CCIua), aCn_ WIh IhC mIaICn C IhC uIC CCnCCIs CIhC undCI-
sIandn_ aIsn_ ICm I, and hCnCC IhaI CIhC InCCs HCWn_ ICm
IhCm. ^CW suCsC IhaImCIaIynCCCssaIjICsuCsCs ICCdCm (n
IhC sIICICsIsCnsC) as a ICCIIy CCuI W, CIn_ urieri as data CI
Ihs ICCdCm CCIIan CI_na IaCICa InCCs jn_ n CuI ICasCn,
WhCh WCud C asCuICj mCssC WIhCuI IhC ICsuCsICn C
8XX ICCdCm,jCIIhaIsCCuaIVCICasCnhadICVCdIhaIICCdCmCannCIC
IhCu_hIaIa, IhCn IhaI ICsuCsICn, namCj IhC mCIa CnC, WCud
nCCCssaIj haVC IC jCd IC IhC CIhCI CnC, WhCsC CCsIC CCnIans an
CVCusCCnIIadCICn, CCnsCQuCnIjhccdomandWIhImCIaIy(CI
IhC aIICI WCud CCnIan nC CCnIIadCICn ICCdCm WCIC nCI aICadj
ICsuCsCd)WCudhaVCIC_VCWajICIhCmcchansmofnaturc.LuI
IhCn, snCC CI mCIaIy nCCd nCIhn_mCIC Ihan IhaIICCdCm shCud
nCI CCnIIadCI IsC, IhaI I shCud aI CasI C IhnRaC IhaI I shCud
aCCnChndIanCCnIhCWajCIhCmcchanismofnaturcnIhC samC
aCICn (IaRCn n anCIhCIICaICn),WIhCuI ICn_nCCCssaIyCI mC IC
haVCanjmIIhCIns_hInICI. IhC dCCIInC CmCIaIyassCIIsIsaCC
andIhC dCCIInC CnaIuICIs CWn,WhCh,hCWCVCI,WCudnCIhaVCCC-
CuIICd CIICsm had nCIHIsIIau_hI us CCuIunaVCdaC _nCIanCC
n ICsCCI C IhC Ihn_s n IhCmsCVCs and mICd CVCIyIhn_ IhaI WC
CancognzcIhCCICI\CajICmCICaCaIanCCs.jusIIhCsamCsCIICCx-
CsICnCIhCCsI\VCuI\IjCCIICaInC\CsCuICICasCnCanC
Olect

ro rhe second edirion <B>
_VCn n ICsCCI IC IhC CCnCCIs CGodand CIhC simp!c naturc C
CuIsou!,WhCh, hCWCVCI, CI_C CIIhCsaRCCICVIj. hus CannCI
CVCn assumcGod, hccdomandimmorta!ityCI IhC saRC CIhC nCC- BX
CssaIjIaCICa usC Cmj ICasCnunCss smuIanCCusj dcprivc sCC-
uaIVCICasCnCIsICICnsCnIC CxIIaVa_anIns_hIs,CCausCn CIdCI
IC aIIan ICsuChns_hIs, sCCuaIVCICasCnWCudhaVCIChCIsCIC
InCCs IhaIn aCI ICaCh CnjIC CjCCIs CCssCCxCICnCC, and
WhCh,IhCjWCIC IC CaCdICWhaICannCICan CjCCICCxCI-
CnCC, IhCn IhCjWCud aWajs aCIuaj IIansCIm InIC an aCaIanCC,
and Ihus dCCaIC a pracuca!cxtcnsionCuIC ICasCn IC CmCss-
C. hus had IC dCnj knov!cdgc n CIdCI IC maRC ICCm CI faith,
and IhC dC_maIsm CmCIahjsCs, . C. , IhC ICudCCIhaIWIhCuI CII-
Csm ICasCn Can maRC IC_ICssn mCIahjsCs, s IhC IIuC sCuICC Ca
unCCCCnHCIn_ WIh mCIaj, WhCh unCCs aWajs VCIy dC_-
maIC.- hus CVCn I CannCI C a IhaI dHCuI IC CaVC IC CsICIIj
IhCC_aCjCasjsICmaICmCIahjsCs, CCnsIIuCICd aCCCIdn_ICIhC CI-
IQuC CuIC ICasCn, Ihs s sI a _U dCsCIVn_ CnC sma ICsCCI, IC
sCC Ihs, WC nCCd mCICj IC CCmaIC IhC CuIuIC CICasCn IhaIs sCI Cn
IhCCCuIsCCasCCuIC sCCnCCWIhICasCnsunCundCd_ICn_and IV-
CCusWandCIn_ aCuIWIhCuI CIIQuC, CIIC CCnsdCI hCW muCh CI- nx i
ICIjCun_ CCC hun_IjCIRnCWCd_C m_hI sCnd IhCI ImC Ihann
IhCusua dC_maIsm IhaI_VCs sC CaIjandsCmuCh CnCCuIa_CmCnIIC
IhCI CCmaCCnI Qun_ aCuI Ihn_s IhCj dC nCI undCIsIand, and
Ihn_s nIC WhCh nCIhCI IhCj nCI anjCnC CsC n IhC WCId W CVCI
haVC anj ns_hI, CI CVCn CnCCuIa_Cs IhCm IC aunCh Cn IhC nVCnICn
CnCW IhCu_hIs and CnCns, and Ihus IC nC_CCI IC CaIn IhC WC-
_ICundCdsCCnCCs, uIWC sCCIaCVCaWhCnWC IaRCaCCCunICIhC
WajCIICsmuIsanCndCI aIuIuICImCICCjCCICnsa_ansImCIa-
Iy and IC_Cn n a SocraucWaj, namCjj IhC CCaICsIICCCIhC
_nCIanCC C IhC CCnCnI. 1CI IhCIC has aWajs CCn sCmC mCIa-
hjsCsCICIhCIIC CmCIWIhnIhCWCId, andIhCICW aWajs CCn-
InuCIC CCnC, andWIh Ia daCCIC CuIC ICasCn, CCausC daCCIC
s naIuIa ICICasCn. CnCCIsIhC HIsI and mCsImCIIanICCCuaICn
ChCsChjICdCIVC daCCICCnCCandCIaCa dsadVanIa_CCus
nHuCnCC, jCCRn_ CHIhC sCuICC CIhC CIICIs.
`Ih Ihs mCIIanI aICIaICn n IhC HCd CIhC sCCnCCs, and WIh
IhC !oss C Is hIhCIIC ma_nCd CssCssCns IhaI sCCuaIVC ICasCn
musIsuCI, CVCIyIhn_jCIICmansnIhC samC adVanIa_CCussIaIC as I
Was CCICCCnCCInn_IhCunVCIsahumanCCnCCInandIhCuIIyIhaI nx ii
IhC WCId has sC aI dIaWn ICm IhC dCCIInCs C uIC ICasCn, and IhC
Css ICuChCs Cnj IhC monopo!yofthc schoo!sand n nC Waj IhC in-
tcrcst ofhuman bcings. asR IhC mCsI nHCxC dC_maIsI WhCIhCI
IhC ICCCIhC CCnInuaICn CCuI sCu aUC! dCaIh dIaWn ICm IhC
smCIy CsusIanCC, CIIhCICCCICCdCmCIhC W a_ansIun-
! ! 7
Preface
VCIsa mCChansm dIaWn ICmIhC suIC IhCu_h CWCICss dsInCICns
CIwCCnsu CCIVC and CjCCIVC IaCICa nCCCssIj, CIIhC ICCCIhC
CxsICnCC CLCddIaWnICmIhC CCnCCICa mCsIICa Cn_(CI ICm
IhC CCnIn_CnCjCWhaIs aICIaC and IhC nCCCssIjCa HIsImCVCI),
haVC CVCI,aI|CI CI_naIn_ n IhC sChCCs, CCn aC IC ICaCh IhC u-
CCIhaVCIhCCasInHuCnCCCVCIIsCCnVCICns: IhaIhasnCVCIha-
CnCd, and I Can nCVCI C CxCCICd IC haCn, CWn_ IC IhC
unsuIaIy C IhC CCmmCn human undCIsIandn_ CI suCh suIC
sCCuaICn, IaIhCI IhC CCnVCICn IhaI ICaChCs IhC uC, nsCaI
as I ICsIs Cn IaICna _ICunds, had IC C CCCICd j sCmCIhn_
CsC- namCj, as IC_aIds IhC HIsICnI, Cn IhaI ICmaIRaC ICdsCs-
ICn CCuInaIuIC,nCICCaC IC CVCIjhumanCn_, nCVCIIC C Caa-
C CCn_ saIsHCd jWhaI s ICmCIa(snCC IhC ICmCIas aWajs
nsuHCCnICIIhCICdsCsICnsCCuIWhCCVCCaICn)Cadn_IC IhC
hCC Ca IuIuIC C, n ICsCCI CIhC sCCCnd CnI, IhC mCIC CCaI Cx-
sx t:t CsICnCCuIduICs nCCsICnIC a Cams CIhCnCnaICnsCad-
n_ IC IhCCCnsCICusnCss CICCdCm, andHnaj, ICuChn_ CnIhCIhId
CnI, IhC sCndd CIdCI, CauIj, and ICVdCnCC shCWn CIIh CVCIj-
WhCIC n naIuIC Cadn_ IC IhC aIh n a WsC and _ICaI auIhCI C IhC
WCId- IhCn Ihs CssCssCn nCI Cnj ICmans undsIuICd, uI I CVCn
_ans n ICsCCIIhICu_hthCaCIIhaI nCW IhC sChCCs aIC nsIIuCICdIC
ICICnd IC nC h_hCI CI mCIC CCmIChCnsVC ns_hI Cn anj CnI
ICuChn_ IhC unVCIsa humanCCnCCIns Ihan IhCns_hIIhaIs aCCCss-
C IC IhC _ICaImuIHdC(WhC aIC aWajs mCsIWCIIhjCCuIICsCCI),
and IC mI IhCmsCVCs IC IhC CuIVaICn CIhCsC _ICunds C ICC
aCnC IhaI Can C _IasCd unVCIsaj and aIC suHCCnI HCm a mCIa
sIandCnI. hC aICIaICn Ihus CCnCCIns Cnj IhC aIIC_anI Cams C
IhCsChCCs,WhChWCud _adjCIIhCmsCVCs CIaRCn CIIhCsCC Cx-
CIIs and _uaIdans CsuChIIuIhs (as IhCjCanI_hIjCIaRCn nmanj
CIhCI aIIs CRnCWCd_C), shaIn_WIh IhC uC Cnj IhC usC CsuCh
IIuIhs,WhCRCCn_IhC RCjIC IhCmCIIhCmsCVCs(ue mecum nescit,
se/us vu/t scire vieri). "ACI CaIC s IaRCn CI a mCIC CQuIaC Cam Cn IhC
8xxxV aII C IhC sCCuaIVC hCsChCI. C ICmans IhC CxCusVC IIusICC C
a sCCnCC IhaI s usCIu IC IhC uC CVCn WIhCuI IhCI RnCWCd_C,
namCjIhCCIIQuC CICasCn,CI IhCaIICI CannCVCI CCCmC CuaI,
uI asC has nC nCCd CCn_ sC, CIusIas IIC as IhC CCC WanI IC
H IhCIhCadsWIhHnC-sunaI_umCnIs CIusCmIIuIhs, sC usI as I-
IC dC IhC CQuajsuIC CCCICns a_ansI IhCsC IIuIhs CVCI CnICI IhCI
mnds, Cn IhC CCnIIaIy, CCausC IhC sChCCnCVIajasnICCIh, as
dCCs CVCIyCnC WhC IasCs hmsCIC sCCuaICn, IhC CIIQuC CICasCn
"\hathcknovs nomorcthan!,hcaIoncvantstosccmtoknov. "`hccorrcctguota-
tionis Qucdmecumigerat, se/us:e/tscire :ideii" (Whatisunknovnto mc, that aIonc
hcvantstosccmtoknov)()oracc,Eist/es :. : .8y).
b
to the second edition <D>
s Cund CnCC and CIa IC ICVCnI, j a undamCnIa nVCsI_aICn C
IhC I_hIs CsCCuaIVC ICasCn, IhC sCanda IhaI sCCnCI CIaICI has IC
C nCHCCd CVCn amCn_ IhC CCC n IhC dsuICs n WhCh, n IhC a-
sCnCC C CIICsm, mCIahjsCans (and amCn_IhCsC n IhC Cnd CVCn
CCICs) nCVIaj nVCVC IhCmsCVCs, and n WhCh IhCj aUCIWaIds
CVCn as) IhCI CWn dCCIInCs. hICu_h CI|Csm aCnC Can WC sCVCI
IhC VCIy ICCI Cmatcria!ism, fata!ism, athcism, CDCCIhnRIn_ un-
bc!icf, Ccnthusiasm and supcrstition, WhCh Can CCCmC _CnCIaj
nuICus, and Hnaj asC Cidca!ism and skcpucism,WhCh aIC mCIC
dan_CICus IC IhC sChCCs and Can haIdjC IIansmIICd IC IhC uC.
_CVCInmCnIs Hnd I _CCd IC CCnCCIn IhCmsCVCs WIh IhC aHaIs C nx
sChCaIs, IhCn IWCud aCCCId CIICIWIh IhCIWsC sCCIudC CIh CI
IhC sCCnCCs and CIhumanIjIhCjaVCICd |hC ICCdCmCsuCh a CI-
IQuC, j WhCh aCnC IhC IICaImCnIs C ICasCn Can C uI Cn a HIm
CCIn_, nsICad CsuCIIn_IhC IdCuCus dCsCIsm CIhC sChCCs,
WhCh IasC a Cud CIy CuC dan_CI WhCnCVCI sCmCCnC ICaIs aaII
IhCI CCWCs, C WhCh IhC uC has nCVCI IaRCn anj nCHCC, and
hCnCC IhC Css CWhChICan asCnCVCICC.
IIIICsmsnCICCsCd ICIhCdogaucproccdurcCICasCnnIs
uIC CC_nICn as sCICnCC (CI sCCnCC musI aWajs C dC_maIIC, . C. , I
musI ICVC Is CCnCusCns sIICIj u rieri ICm sCCuIC InCCs)",
IaIhCI,Is CCsCd CnjIC dC_maIIsm, .C. , IC IhCICsumICnC_CI-
IIn_ Cn sCCj WIh uIC CC_nICn ICm (hCsChCa) CCnCCIs aC-
CCIdn_ IC InCCs, WhCh ICasCn has CCn usn_ CI a Cn_ IImC
WIhCuI HIsI nQuIn_ n WhaI Waj and j WhaI I_hI I has CIanCd
IhCm. C_maIsm s IhCICCIC IhC dC_maIC ICCCduIC CuIC ICasCn,
vithoutanantcccdcntcritiqucofitsovncapacity.JhisCCsIICn
IhCICCIC musInCICVCWCd as uIIn_n a _CCdWCId CI IhaI Cgua-
CCus shaCWnCss undCI IhC ICsumCd namC CCuaIIy, CI CVCn C
sRCICsm, WhCh _VCs shCII shI| IC a mCIahjsCs, IaIhCI, CIICsm nx i
s IhC ICaIaICIy aCIvIIy nCCCssaIy CI IhC adVanCCmCnI C mCIa-
hjsCs as a WC-_ICundCd sCCnCC, WhCh musI nCCCssaIj C dC_-
maIC, CaIICd CuI sjsICmaICaj n aCCCIdanCC WIh IhC sIICICsI IC-
QuICmCnI, hCnCC aCCCIdn_ IC sChCasIC I_CI (and nCI n a CuaI
Waj), CI Ihs ICQuICmCnI s CnC IhaI I maj nCI nC_CCI, snCC I un-
dCIIaRCsIC CaIIyCuIIs usnCssWhCjurieri andIhusIC IhC Iu saI-
saCICn CsCCuaIVC ICasCn. n sCmCdaj CaIIyn_ CuI IhC an IhaI
CIICsm ICsCICs, . C. , n IhC IuIuIC sjsICm C mCIahjsCs, WC W
haVC IC CCW IhC sIICI mCIhCd C IhC amCus `CU, IhC _ICaICsI
amCn_a dC_maIChCsChCIs, WhC _aVCusIhC !IsICxamC (an Cx-
Princiien
` Prnciien
' legen
! !
Preface
amC j WhCh hC CCamC IhC auIhCI Ca sII CWC-_ICundCdnCss
nLCImanjIhaIssInCICxIn_ushCd) CIhCWajnWhChIhCsCCuIC
CCuIsC Ca sCCnCCs IC CIaRCn, IhICu_hIhC IC_uaIasCCIIanmCnIC
IhC InCCs," IhC CCaI dCICImnaICn C CCnCCIs, IhC aIICmI aI
sIICInCss n IhC ICCs, and IhC ICVCnICn CaudaCCus Cas n nCI-
CnCCs, CI IhCsC ICasCns hC had IhC sRs CI mCVn_ a sCCnCC suCh as
mCIahjsCs nIC Ihs CCndICn, Cnj I had CCCuIICd IC hm IC IC-
aIC IhC HCdCIIja CIIQuC CIhC CI_an, namCjuIC ICasCnIsC.
BxX a aCRIhaIs IC C ChaI_Cd nCIsCmuCh IC hm as IC IhC dC_maICWaj
CIhnRn_ ICVaCnI n hs a_C, and CI Ihs IhC hCsChCIs Chs as
Ca ICVCus ImCs haVC nCIhn_ CI WhCh IC ICICaCh IhCmsCVCs.
hCsC WhC ICCCI hs Rnd CICaChn_ and smuIanCCusj IhC ICCC-
duIC CIhC CIIQuCCuIC ICasCnCanhaVCnCIhn_CsCnmndCxCCI
IC IhICW CUIhC CIICIs Cscicncc aIC_CIhCI, and IC IIansCIm WCIR
nIC aj, CCIIanIjnIC CnCn, and hCsChj nIC hCdCxy.
Conccrngthis sccond cdition, haVC WanICd, as s Cnj ICCI,
nCIIC CI_C IhC CCIIunIjIC ICmCVC asaIas Css!C IhCsC dHCu-
ICs and CsCuIICs ICm WhCh maj haVC sIun_ sCVCIa msundCI-
sIandn_s nICWhCh aCuIC mCn, CIhas nCIWIhCuIsCmCauICnmj
aII, haVC aCnnIhCIud_mCnICIhsCCR. haVC CundnCIhn_IC
aICI CIhCIn IhC ICCsICns IhCmsCVCs CInIhCI _ICunds CICC,
CInIhCCIm and CCmCICnCss CIhCCCRsan, IhssICCasCICd
aIIjIC IhC Cn_CICd CsCIuInjICWhCh suCCICd IhCm ICI IC
ajn_ I CCIC IhC uC, and aIIj IC IhC CCnsIHICn CIhC maIICI
IsC, namCj IC IhC naIuIC CauIC sCCuaIVC ICasCn,WhCh CCnIans
aIIujaIICuaICdsIIuCIuICCmCmCIsnWhChCaChIhn_san CI_an,
IhaI s, n WhCh CVCIjIhn_ s CI IhC saRC CCaCh mCmCI, and CaCh
BXIII ndVdua mCmCI s CI IhC saRC C a, sC IhaI CVCn IhC CasI IaIj,
WhCIhCI I CamsIaRC (anCIICI) CI aaCR, musInCVIajCIIajIsC
: - n Is usC. hCC Ihs sjsICm W hCnCCCIIh manIan IsCn Ihs un-
aICIaIj. IsnCIsC-CCnCCIIhaIusIHCsmjIIusInIhs, uIIaIhCI
mCICjIhCCVdCnCC dIaWnHCmIhC CxCImCnIshCWn_IhaIIhCICsuI
CCCICd s IhC samC WhCIhCIWC ICCCCd ICmIhC smaCsI CCmCnIs IC
IhCWhCC CuICICasCnCIICIuDICmIhCWhCC ICCVCIyaII(CIIhs
WhCC ICC s_VCnn IsCIhICu_h IhC HnanICnICn CuIC ICasCn n
IhC IaCICa), WhC IhC aIICmI IC aICI CVCn IhC smaCsI aII dICCIj
nIICduCCs CCnIIadCICns nCI mCICj nIC IhC sjsICm, uInIC unVCI-
sahumanICasCn.ACIn IhCprcscntationIhCIC s sImuCh IC dC, and
hCIC s WhCIC haVC aIICmICd IC maRC mICVCmCnIs n Ihs CdICn,
WhCh shCud ICmCVC HIsI, IhC msundCIsIandn_ C IhC PCsIhCIC,
ChC!j IhC CnC n IhC CCnCCI C ImC, sCCCnd, IhC CsCuIIy n IhC
CduCICn CIhC ICnCCIs CIhC 1ndCIsIandn_, nCxI IhC suCsCd
Irinciien
I ?0
\ second edition <B>
uCR C sUUCICnI CvIdCnCC n IhC ICCs CI IhC IInCICs C UtC
1ndCIsIundn_, und HnujIhCmsnICIICIuICnCIhCuIuC_smsud-
VunCCd u_unsI IuICnu sjChCC_y. j ICVsCns' 'CIIhC mCdC CIC-
sCnIuICn` CxICnd CnjICIhIsCnI(numCj, CnjIC IhCCnd CIhC HIsI
ChuICI CIhC IunsCCndCnIu uCCIC) und nC IuIIhCI, CCuUsC ImC
ax x
* Jhe only rhing I can really call a supplement, and that only in rhe way of proof, n2
is what I have said at n] z in rhe form of a new refutation of psychological
idca!ism, and a strict proof (the only possible one, I believe) of the objecrive
realiq of outer intuiuon. o marter how innocent idealism may be held to be
as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so inno
cent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason
rhat the existence of things outside us (from which we aFer all get rhe whole
matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed
merely on faith, and rhat if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be un-
abIe to answer him wirh a sausfactory proof. Because there are some obscuri
ries in the expressions of this proof between the rhird and sixth lines, I ask leave
to alter this passage as follows. But this pcrsisung cIcmcnt cannot bc an
intuiuon in mc. or aII thc dctcrmining grounds of my cxistcncc that can
bc cncountcrcd in mc arc rcprcscntauons, and as such thcy thcmscIvcs
nccd somcthing pcrsisting distinct 6om thcm, in rcIation to vhich thcir
changc, and thus my cxistcncc in thc timc in vhich thcy changc, can bc
dctcrmncd." Against rhis proof one will perhaps say. I am immediately con
scious to myself only of what is in me, i.e., of my rcprcscntauon of exteral
things, consequently it still remains undecided whether rhere is something
ourside me corresponding ro ir or nor. Yer I am conscious rhrough inner cx- nx
pcricncc of my cxistcncc m timc (and consequenrly also of its determinabil-
iry in time), and this is more than merely being conscious of my representarion,
yet it is identical with rhe cmpiricaI consciousncss of my cstcncc, which
is only determinable through a relation to something rhat, while being bound
up wirh my existence, is outsidc mc. Jhis consciousness of my existence in
rime is rhus bound up identically with rhe consciousness of a relarion to some-
rhing outside me, and so it is experience and not liction, sense and not imagi-
narion, that inseparably joins the outer with my inner sense, for outer sense is
already in itself a relation of inruition to somerhing actual outside me, and its
realip, as distinct fom imaginarion, resrs only on rhe facr rhar ir is inseparably
bound up with inner experience itself, as the condition of its possibiliry, which
happens here. If I could combine a determinarion of my existence through in-
tcIIcctuaI intuiuon simultaneously wirh the intcIIcctuaI consciousncss of
my existence, in the representarion am, which accompanies all my judgments
and actions of my understanding, rhen no consciousness of a relation ' to some-
thing outside me would necessarily belong to this. But now that intellecrual
consciousness does to be sure precede, but the inner intuiuon, in which alone
lrba/mit
` lrbImis
I 2 I
Prelace
8x Wus ICC shCII, und usCn ICsCCICIhC ICsICIhC CCR nC msundCI-
sIundn_ Cn IhC uII CCxCII und muIIu CxumnCIs hus CCmC mj
Bx Wuj, WhCm huVC nCI CCn uC IC numC WIh IhC IusC duC IC IhCm,
8x uIIhC uIICnICn! huVC ud IC IhCIICmndCIsWCCVdCnIIC IhCm
n IhC uICIuIC ussu_Cs. hs mICVCmCnI, hCWCVCI, s Cund u
WIh u smu Css CI IhC ICudCI, WhCh CCud nCI C _uuIdCd u_unsI
WIhCuI muRn_ IhC CCRICC VCumnCus. numCj, VuICus Ihn_s IhuI
uIC nCI CssCnIuj ICQuICd CI IhC CCmCICnCss CIhC WhCC hud IC
C CmIICd CI IICuICd n un uICVuICd ushCn, dCsIC IhC uCI IhuI
sCmC ICudCIs muj nCI RC dCn_WIhCuI IhCm, snCC IhCj CCud sI
C usCIu n unCIhCI ICsCCI, Cnj n Ihs Wuj CCud muRC ICCm CI
WhuI hCC s u mCIC CCmIChCnsC ICsCnIuICn, WhCh IundumCn-
Iuj uICIs usCuICj nCIhn_ n IC_uId IC IhC ICCsICns CI CVCn
IhCI _ICunds CICC, uIWhCh dCuIIs sCuIICmIhC ICVCus Cd-
ICn n IhC mCIhCd C ICsCnIuICn IhuI I CCud nCI C munu_Cd
IhICu_h nICICuICns. hs smu Css, WhCh n unj CusC Cun C
CCmCnsuICd Ct, IunjCnC RCs, j CCmuIIn_ IhC HIsI und sCCCnd
my exisrence can be derermined, is sensible, and is bound ro a condirion of-
rime, however, rhis dererminarion, and hence inner experience irself, depends
on somerhing permanenr, which is nor in me, and consequenrly musr be our-
B side me, and musr consider myself in relarion ro ir, rhus for an experience in
general ro be possible, rhe realiry of ourer sense is necessarily bound up wirh
rhar of inner sense, i.e., am jusr as cerrainly conscious rhar rhere are rhings
ourside me ro which my sensibiliry relares, as am conscious rhar myself exisr
derermined in rime. ow which given intuirions acrually correspond ro ourer
objecrs, which rherefore belong ro ourer scnsc, ro which rhey are ro be as-
cribed rarher rhan ro rhe imaginarion rhar musr be decided in each parricu-
lar case according ro rhe rules rhrough which experience in general ,even inner
experience) is ro be disringuished hom imaginauon, which procedure is
grounded always on rhe proposirion rhar rhere acrually is ourer experience. Jo
rhis rhe following remark can be added. Jhe represenrarion of somerhing pcr-
sisung in exisrence is nor rhe same as a pcrsisung rcprcscntation; for rhar
can be quire variable and changeable, as all our represenrarions are, even rhe
represenrarions of marrer, while sull being relared ro somerhing permanenr,
which musr rherefore be a rhing disrincr fom all my represenrarions and ex-
rernal, rhe exisrence of which is necessarily included in rhe dctcrmnauon of
my own exisrence, which wirh ir consrirures only a single experience, which
could nor rake place even as inner if ir were nor simulraneously ,in parr) ourer.
Jhe How`" of rhis can be no more explained rhan we can explain furrher how
we can rhink ar all of whar abides in rime, whose simulranei wirh whar
changes is whar roduces rhe concepr of alrerarion.
Re/atien
ZZ
to the second edition <B>
CdICns, s, as hCC,mCICIhan CCmCnsaICd CIj_ICaICI CCmIC-
hCnsIy. n VaICus uC WIIn_s (aIIj n IhC ICVCWs C sCmC
CCRs, aIIj n sCCa IICaIsCs) haVC CICCVCdWIh _IaIIudC and
CnjCjmCnI IhaI IhC sII C WC-_ICundCdnCss has nCI dCd CuI n
LCImanj, uIhas CnjCCn dICWnCd CuICI a shCIIImCjIhCash- Bx
CnaC nCsC Ca ICCdCmCIhCu_hIIhaIanCCsIsCn_CnCus, and
sCCIhaIIhCIhCInjaIhsCCIICsm,Cadn_IC asCCnCCCuIC ICa-
sCn IhaI s sChCasICaj I_CICus uI as suCh IhC Cnj asIn_ and
hCnCC IhC mCsI nCCCssaIj sCCnCC, has nCI hndCICd CCuIa_CCus and
CCaI mnds ICm masICIn_ IhCm. C IhCsC dCsCIVn_ mCn, WhC CCm-
nC WC-_ICundCdnCss Cns_hI sC CIIunaICjWIh IhC IaCnICIa
uCd ICsCnIaICn (sCmCIhn_ am CCnsCCus CnCIhaVn_ mjsC),
CaVC IIC CCmCIC mj IICaImCnI, WhCh s CIhas dCCCIVC hCIC and
IhCIC n Ihs aIICIIC_aId. CIn Ihs CasC IhC dan_CIs nCIIhaI W
C ICIuICd, uI IhaI W nCI C undCIsICCd. CI mj CWn aII, HCm
nCWCn CannCI CI mjsCCCCmCnVCVCd n CCnIICVCIsCs, aIhCu_h
sha aIICnd CaICmj IC a hnIs, WhCIhCI IhCj CCmC ICm ICnds CI
ICm CCnCnIs, sC IhaI maj uIzC IhCm, n aCCCIdanCC WIh Ihs
ICaCdCuIC, n IhC IuIuIC CxCCuICn CIhC sjsICm. bnCC duIn_IhCsC
aCIs haVC CCmC IC C IaIhCI adVanCCd n a_C (Ihs mCnIh W aI-
IanmjsxIy-CuIIhjCaI),musIICCCCdIu_ajWIhmjImC1am
IC CaIIy CuI mj an CICVdn_ IhC mCIahjsCs CIh CnaIuIC and
C mCIas, as CCnHImaICn CIhC CCIICCInCss CIhC CIIQuC CIh C
IhCCICICa and IaCICa ICasCn, and musI aWaI IhC umnaICn C
IhCsC CsCuIICs IhaI aIC haIdjIC C aVCdCd aI IhC C_nnn_ CIhs 8xV
WCIR, as WC as IhC dCCnsC CIhC WhCC, ICm IhCsC dCsCIVn_ mCn
WhC haVC madC I IhCI CWn.PnjhCsChCa IICaIsCmaj Hnd IsC
undCIICssuIC naIICuaIassa_Cs (CI ICannCIC asIujaImCICd
as a maIhCmaICa IICaIsC), WhC IhC WhCC sIIuCIuIC CIhC sjsICm,
CCnsdCICd as a unIy, ICCCCds WIhCuI IhC CasI dan_CI, WhCn a sjs-
ICm snCW, CWhaVC IhC adICInCss Cmnd"IC _an anCVCIVCW CI,
and CCausC annCVaICnsannCCnVCnCnCC ICIhCm, sI CWCIhaVC
IhC dCsIC IC dC sC. PsC, n anj CCC CWIIn_ aaICnI CCnIIadC-
ICns Can C CIICICd CuI ndVdua assa_Cs aIC ICIn CuI C IhCI
CCnICxIandCCmaICdWIh CaChCIhCI, CsCCajn aCCC CnCIma
dsCCuIsCIhaIn IhCCjCsCIhCsCWhC ICj Cn IhC ud_mCnICCIhCIs
CasI a dsadVanIa_CCus _hI Cn IhaI CCC CWIIn_ uI IhaI Can C
VCIj Casj ICsCVCd j sCmCCnC WhC has masICICd IhC dCa C IhC
WhCC. CanWhC, a IhCCIysICaj duIaC, IhCn n ImC IhC CHCCI
Geist
a/)eieRedertgebendenScbr;f
! 2J
Preface
CIaCICn and tCaCICn, whCh atHtsIsCCmCd IC IhtCaICn IwIh _tCaI
dan_Ct,wsCtVCCnjIC CshawajIstCu_hsCIs,andmCnCm-
atIaIj, ns_hI, and ItuC CuatIymaRCIIhCtUsnCssICdC Ihs,
IhCn n a shCtI ImC IhCjw tCduCC CVCn IhC tCQutCd CC_anCC.
Knis/er, in the menth e}ri/, :8.
I?+
Intructin'
'
i.
hC IdCa CIIansCCndCnIa QhICsCQhj.
xCICnCC s WIhCuI dCuI IhC HIsI ICduCI IhaI CuI undCIsIandn_
In_s CIIh asIWCIRs Cn IhC IaWmaICIa CsCnsC sCnsaICns.' Is
CI Ihs VCIj ICasCn IhC HIsI ICaChn_, and n Is IC_ICss I s sC nCx-
hausIC n nCW nsIIuCICn IhaI IhC Chan CC n a IuIuIC _CnCIa-
ICnsW nCVCIhaVC anjaCR CnCW nCImaICn IhaI Can C _aIhCICd
Cn Ihs ICIIan. ^CVCIIhCCss I s aI ICm IhC Cnj tCd IC WhCh CuI
undCIsIandn_ Can C ICsIICICd. IICsus, IC CsuIC,WhaIs, uInCVCI
IhaIImusInCCCssaIjCIhus andnCICIhCIWsC.'CI IhaIVCIjICasCn
I_VCs us nC IIuC unVCIsaj, and ICasCn, WhCh s sC dCsICus CIhs
ai
RInd CCC_nICns, s mCIC sImuaICd Ihan saIsHCd j I. ^CW suCh az
unVCIsaCC_nICns,WhChaIIhCsamCImChaVCIhC ChaIaCICICnnCI
nCCCssIj, musICCCaIand CCIIanCIIhCmsCVCs, ndCCndCnIjCCx-
CICnCC, hCnCC CnC Cas IhCm Hrier. CC_nICns.' WhCICas IhaIWhCh
s mCICj CIICWCd ICm CxCICnCC s, as Is uI, CC_nzCd CnjHes-
terieri, CI CmICaj
Vc hrstprcscntthcintroductionasitappcarcd inthchrstcdition, IoIIowcdbythcrc-
viscdvcrsion thatappcarcdinthc sccondcdition. ConsidcrabIc changcswcrc madc in
thc Iattcr, incIuding somc dcIctions, maor additions,and occasionaIaItcrationswithin
thcpassagcsthatwcrcrcpcatcd.VcwiIIuscnotcsandrcIcrcnccstothc marginaI pag-
ination toshowwhatchangcswcrcmadcIromthchrsttothcsccondcditions.hcIoI-
Iowing two paragraphs inthc hrst cditionwcrcrcpIaccdwith thc hrsttwo numbcrcd
scctions oIthcsccond.
` !nhiscopyoIthcIrstcdition,Kantmadcthc IoIIowingtwonotcs.
-
I . CnthcpossibiIityoIacritiquc oIpurcrcason.
2. Cnitsncccssity(notIromothcrscicnccs).
. Cnits division.
q. Cnitspurposc, thc scicnccoIaIIprincipIcs jPrinciien] oIpurcrcason. (Iracti-
caI)` [!!, p. : :).
hatrcasonhasits boundaricswith rcgardtoits HrieriprincipIcs Princiien] , con-
ccrningbothdcgrcc and scopc.
OivisionoImctaphysics into mctaphysics oInaturcandoImoraIs"(!!!,p. 1 Z).
' hcIoIIowingnotcis addcd inKant'scopyoIthc hrstcdition.
Vc cannotinIcr to anyncccssityHesterieriiIwc donotaIrcadyhavc a ruIcH rieri.
!.g., '!I many cascs arc idcnticaI, thcrc must bc somcthing that makcs this agrccmcnt
ncccssary' prcsupposcs thc Hrieriproposition thatcvcrythingcontingcnthas a causc
thatdctcrmincsitsconccptarieri."(!I\ p. : q)
! 2`
Inrroducrion <A
^CW WhaI s CsCCaj ICmaIRaC s IhaI CVCn amCn_ CuI CxCI-
CnCCs CC_nICns aIC mxCd n IhaI musI haVC IhCI CI_n H rieri and
IhaI CIhas sCIvC Cnj IC CsIash CCnnCCICn amCn_ CuI ICICsCn-
IaICns CIhC sCnsCs. CI CnCICmCVCs ICm CuI CxCICnCCs CVCIy-
Ihn_ IhaI CCn_s IC IhC sCnsCs, IhCIC sI ICman CCIIan CI_na
CCnCCIs and IhC ud_mCnIs _CnCIaICd ICm IhCm, WhCh musI haVC
aIsCn CnIICj H rieri, ndCCndCnIj C CxCICnCC, CCausC IhCj
maRC CnC aC IC saj mCIC aCuIIhC Cj CCIs IhaI aCaI IC IhC sCnsCs
Ihan mCIC CxCICnCC WCud ICaCh, CI aI CasI maRC CnC CCVC IhaI
CnC Can saj Ihs, and maRC assCIICns CCnIan IIuC unVCIsaIy and
sIICI nCCCssIy, IhC RCs C WhCh mCICj CmICa CC_nICn Can
nCVCI aCId.
e 6 LuI WhaI sajs sI! mCIC s Ihs, IhaI CCIIan CC_nICns CVCn aan-
z dCn IhC HCd Ca CssC CxCICnCCs, and sCCm IC Cxand IhC dC-
man C CuI ud_mCnIs CjCnd a Cunds C CxCICnCC IhICu_h
CCnCCIs IC WhCh nC CCIICsCndn_ CCCI aI a Can C _VCn n
CxCICnCC.
d ICCsCj n IhCsC aIICI CC_nICns, WhCh _C CjCnd IhCWCId
CIhC sCnsCs, WhCIC CxCICnCC Can _VC nCIhCI _udanCC nCI CCIICC-
tCn, C IhC nVCsI_atCns C CuI ICasCn IhaI WC hCd IC C aI mCIC
a )
ICCmnCnI n IhCI mCIIanCC and sumC n IhCI Hna am Ihan
CVCIjIhn_IhaIIhCundCIsIandn_CanCaInnIhC tCd CaCaIanCCs,
and Cn WhCh WC WCud IaIhCIVCntuIC CVCIjIhn_, CVCn aI IhC IsR C
CIIn_, Ihan _VCu suCh mCIIanInVCsI_aICns CCausC CanjsCII
CICsCIvaICn CIICm CCnICmI and ndCICnCC.
^CWImaj sCCm naIuIa IhaIas sCCn as CnChas aandCnCdIhC ICI-
Ian C CxCICnCC, CnC WCud nCI mmCdaICj CICCI an CdHCC WIh
CC_nICns IhaI CnC CssCssCs WIhCuI RnCWn_ WhCnCC, and Cn IhC
CICdI C InCCs WhCsC CI_n CnC dCCs nCI RnCW, WIhCuI haVn_
HIsI assuICd CnCsC CIs CundaICn IhICu_h CaICm nVCsI_aICns,
Uus IhaICnC WCudhaVC Cn_snCC IasCd IhC QuCsICn hCW IhC un-
dCIsIandn_ CCud CCmC IC a IhCsC CC_nICns H rieri and WhaI dC-
aq man,Vadty, andVauC IhCjm_hIhaVC.nd n aCI nCIhn_smCIC
naIuIa, CnC undCIsIands j Ihs WCId IhaI WhCh ICCIj and
s8 ICasCnaj Cu_hI IC haCn, uI CnC undCIsIands j I IhaI WhCh
usuajhaCns, IhCnCCnVCIsCjnCIhn_s mCIC naIuIa and CCmIC-
hCnsC Ihan IhaI Ihs nVCsI_aICn shCud Cn_haVC CCn nC_CCICd.
CICnCaII CIhCsC CC_nICns, IhC maIhCmaICa, hasCn_CCnIC-
aC, and IhCICj _VCs IsC IC a aVCIaC CxCCIaICn aCuI CIhCIs
as WC, aIhCu_h IhCsC maj C C an CnIICj dCICnI naIuIC. uI-
)crcthcsccondcditionaddstvoscntcnccscharactcrizingthctasksoIpurcrcason. Scc
s; bcIov.
I 28
nIrOduCIIOn <A
IhCImCIC,CnCsCjCndIhCCICCCCxCICnCC,IhCnCnCssuICnCI
IC C CCnIIadCICdIhICu_h CxCICnCC. hC ChaIm n Cxandn_CnCs
CC_nICns ssC_ICaIIhaICnC CanCsICCdn CnCs IC_ICss Cnjj
umn_ nIC a CCaI CCnIIadCICn. hs, hCWCVCI, CnC Can aVCd
CnC maRCs hs nVCnICns CaICmj, CVCn IhCu_h IhCj aIC nCI IhCICj
nVCnICns anj IhC Css. aIhCmaICs _VCs us a sCndd CxamC C
hCWaIWC Can_CWIhH rieri CC_nICn ndCCndCnIjCCxCICnCC.
^CW Is CCCuCd, IC C suIC,WIhCCCIs and CC_nICns Cnj sC aI
as IhCsC Can C CxhICd n nIuICn. hs CICumsIanCC, hCWCVCI, s
Casj CVCICCRCd, snCC IhC nIuICn n QuCsICn Can IsCC _VCn H
rieri, and Ihus CanhaIdjC dsIn_ushCdICm a mCIC uIC CCnCCI.
nCCuIa_Cd j suCh a ICCCIhC CWCI CICasCn, IhC dIVC CI Cx-
ansCn sCCsnC Cunds. hC _hI dCVC, n ICC I_hI CuIIn_ IhICu_h
IhC aI IhC ICssIanCC CWhCh ICCs, CCud _CIIhC dCa" IhaIICCud
dC CVCnCIICIn aICss saCC. 1RCWsC, aIC aandCnCdIhCWCIdC a g
IhC sCnsCsCCausC ICsCdsCmanjhndIanCCs CI IhC undCIsIandn_,
anddaICdIC _C CjCndICnIhCWn_sCIhC dCas, nIhCCmIysaCC
CuICundCIsIandn_. CddnCInCICCIhaIhCmadCnC hCadWajj
hs CCIIs, CIhChadnCICssIanCC,nC suCII, as IWCIC,jWhChhC
CCud sICn hmsC, andICWhCh hC CCud ajhsCWCIsn CIdCI
IC _CI hs undCIsIandn_ C IhC _ICund. I s, hCWCVCI, a CusICmaIj
aIC C human ICasCn n sCCuaICn IC Hnsh Is CdHCC as CaIj as
CssC and Cnj IhCn IC nVCsI_aIC WhCIhCI IhC _ICund has CCn
adCQuaICj ICaICd CI I. LuI aI IhaI CnI a sCIIs C CxCusCs W
C sCu_hI IC assuIC us CIs sIuIdnCss CI IC ICusC suCh a aIC and
dan_CICus CxamnaICn. \1aI RCCs us ICC C a WCIIj and sus-
CCn duIn_ IhC CCnsIIuCICn, hCWCVCI, and HaIICIs us WIh aaICnI
IhCICu_hnCss, s Ihs. P _ICaI aII, CIhas IhC _ICaICsI aII C IhC
usnCss CCuI ICasCn CCnssIs n anajsCs CIhC CCnCCIs IhaI WC a-
ICadjhaVC CCCCIs. hs aCIds us a muIIudC CCC_nICns IhaI,
IhCu_h IhCj aIC nCIhn_ mCIC Ihan umnaICns CI CaIHCaICns C
IhaI WhCh s aICadj IhCu_hI n CuI CCnCCIs (IhCu_h sI n a CCn-
usCd Waj), aIC, aICasIasaI asIhCI CIm sCCnCCInCd, IICasuICd as
IhCjWCICnCW ns_hIs, IhCu_h IhCjdCnCICxICnd IhC CCnCCIs IhaI
WC haVC n CIhCI maIICI CI CCnICnI uI Cnj sCI IhCm aaIIICm CaCh
CIhCI. ^CW snCC Ihs ICCCduIC dCCs jCd a ICa H rieri CC_nICn,
nio
WhChmaRCs sCCuICandusCu IC_ICss, ICasCn,WIhCuIIsCnCICn_
I, undCI IhCsC ICICnsCs suIICIICusj maRCs assCIICns CQuIC an-
CIhCI sCII, nWhChIadds sCmCIhn_CnIICjaCn IC _VCnCCnCCIs
H rieri, WIhCuI CnC RnCWn_hCW I Was aC IC dC Ihs and WIhCuI
Ihs QuCsICnCVCn Cn_ aCWCdIC CCmCICmnd. WIhCICCIC dCa
lrste//ung
V
Introduction <A
with the distinction beteen these two Linds ot cogniuon iight at Uc
outset.
Cn the dillerence between analytic and
synthetic judgments.
!n all judgments in which the ielation ol a subject to the iedicate is
mought (if I consider onIy afErmative judgments, since the alication
to negative ones is easy), this ielation is ossible in two dieient ways.
ithei the iedicate B belongs to the subj ect as something that is
(covertly) contained in this concet , oi B lies entiiely outside the
concet , though to be suie it stands in connection with it. !n the hist
case I call the judgment analytic, in the second synthetic. AnaIytic
y judgments (alhrmative ones) are thus those in which the connection ol
the redicate is thought thiough identity, but those in which this con-
nection is thought without identity are to be called synthetic judg-
a ments. ne could also call the lormer judgments ol clarihcation and
the lattei judgments ol amliEcation, since through the iedicate the
lormer do not add anything to the concet ol the subject, but only
breaL it u by means of analysis into its comonent concets, which
weie alieady thought in it (though conlusedly), while the latter, on the
contrary, add to the concet ol the subject a iedicate that was not
thought in it at all, and could not have been extracted from it through
any analysis, e. g. , il ! say. "All bodies aie extended, " then this is an an-
alytic judgment. Ior ! do not need to go outside the concet that !
combine with the woid "body" in order to hnd that extension is con-
nected with it, but rathei ! need only to analyze that concet, i. e. , be-
come conscious ol the manifoId that I always thinL in it, in ordei to
encountei this redicate theiein, it is therefoie an analytic judgment.
n the contiaiy, if ! say. "AIl bodies aie heavy, " then the iedicate is
something entirely difleient lrom that which ! thinL in the meie con-
cet ol a body in geneial. Jhe addition of such a iedicate thus yields
a synthetic judgment.
ow hom this it is clear. :) that through analytic judgments our
8 cognition is not amlifIed at all, but iather the concet, which ! alieady
Kant's copyolthcfirstcditionhasthcIoIIowingnorc:
Cn synthctic hypothcticaI and disunctivc udgmcnts as wcII as catcgoricaI ncgativc
judgmcnts."(!\ p. q)
` 1tlaarc_a- and1ractrcta
_
mtrctlc. Ahcsctcrmsarccmphasizcdinthcsccondbutnot
inthchrstcdition.
' Kant'scopyoIthchrsteditionhcrc adds. '!cxist'isananaIyticudgmcnt,'Abodycx-
ists'isasynthcconc." (!`,p. :q)
hcncxttwoparagraphsarcrcpIaccdwith asingIc oncinthc sccond cdition, thcscc-
ondoIwhichincorporatcs partoIthcprcscntonc, sccszbcIow.
J 0
DIrOducIIOD <A
haVC, s sCI CuI, and madC nIC_C IC mC, z) IhaI n sjnIhCIC jud_-
mCnIs musIhaVCn addICnIC IhC CCnCCI CIhC suCCIsCmCIhn_
CsC [`) CnWhCh IhC undCIsIandn_ dCCnds n CC_nzn_ a ICdCaIC
IhaI dCCs nCIC n IhaI CCnCCIas nCVCIIhCCss CCn_n_IC I."
n IhC CasC CCmrCa jud_mCnIs CIjud_mCnIs CCxCrCnCC IhCIC
snC dHCuIyhCrC. CIIhs`sIhC CCmCIC CxCICnCC CIhC CCCI
IhaI IhnRIhICu_h sCmC CCnCCI, WhCh CCnsIIuICs Cnj a aII C
Ihs CxCICnCC. CI aIhCu_h' dC nCI aI a nCudC IhC ICdCaIC C a z
WC_hI n IhC CCnCCI C a Cdj n _CnCra, IhC CCnCCI nCVCrIhCCss
dCs_naICs IhC CCmCIC CxCrCnCC IhICu_h a aIICI, IC WhCh Can
IhCICCIC add sI! CIhCIaIIs CIhCVCrysamC CxCICnCC as C!Cn_n_
IC IhC CImCr. Can HrsI CC_nzC IhC CCnCCI C Cdj anajICaj
IhrCu_hIhCmaIRs CCxICnsCn, CmCnCIraIy, CshaC, CIC.,WhCh
aIC a IhCu_hIn Ihs CCnCCI. LuInCW am)mj CC_nICn and, n
CCRn_aCRIC IhC CxCrCnCC rCmWhCh had CxIraCICd Ihs CCnCCI
CCdj, Hnd IhaI WC_hI s asC aWajs CCnnCCICd WIh IhC rCVCus
marRs. 1xCICnCC s IhCICCrC IhaI`IhaI Cs CuIsdC IhC CCnCCI
and CnWhCh IhC CssIy CIhC synIhCss CIhC rCdCaIC CWC_hI
B WIh IhC CCnCCI s _rCundCd.
LuIn synIhCICHrieri ud_mCnIs IhsmCansChCs CnIrCjaCR- zp
n_.` am IC _C CuIsdC IhC CCnCCI n CIdCr IC CC_nzC anCIhCIB a
as CCmnCd WIh I, WhaI s I Cn WhCh dCCnd und IhICu_h WhCh
IhC synIhCss CCCmCs CssC, snCC hCIC dC nCIhaVC IhC adVanIa_C
CCCRn_arCundCrInIhC HCd CCxCrCnCC:aRCIhCICCsICn.
VCryIhn_ IhaI haCns has Is CausC. n IhC CCnCCI CsCmCIhn_
IhaI haCns, IhnR,IC CsuIC, Can CxsICnCCWhChWas ICCCdCd j
a ImC, CIC., and rCm IhaI anayIC ud_mCnIs Can C draWn. LuI IhC
CCnCCI Ca CausC ndCaICs sCmCIhn_ dCICnI ICm IhC CCnCCI C
sCmCIhn_ IhaI haCns, and s nCI CCnIanCd n IhC aIICI ICrCsCnIa-
ICn aI a. CW IhCn dC CCmC IC saj sCmCIhn_QuIC dCICnI aCuI
IhaIWhCh haCns n _CnCIa, and IC CC_nzC IhC CCnCCI CCausC as
CCn_n_ICICVCn IhCu_hnCICCnIanCdnI:'`haIsIhC`hCrCCn
WhCh IhC undCIsIandn_ dCCnds WhCnICCVCs IsCIC dsCCVCIC-
jCndIhC CCnCCI C a rCdCaIC IhaI s CrC_n IC I and IhaI s jCI
Kant`s copy oIthc rst cdition adds hcrc. "AnaIytic |udgmcnts couId accordingIy bc
caIIcdmcrc|udgmcntsoIcIarication,synthcticudgmcnts,howcvcr,udgmcntsoIam-
pIiIcation."(!'II,p. : )
` In Kant's copyoIthc Irst cdition,this was changcd to. Lthc cascoIcmpiricaI|udg-
mcntsorudgmcntsoIcxpcricnccthcrcisnodihcuItyabouthowthcyarctobcprovcd
synthcticaIIy. " (!'III, p. :)
romhcrc thc rcmaindcr oIthcparagraphis incorporatcd into thcsccondcdition.
hcrcmaindcroIthisparagraphischangcdinthc sccondcdition, sccB:z.
' Kantcndsthis and thcncxtscntcnccwithpcriods,Iorwhichwchavc substitotcd qucs-
tionmarks.

Inrroducrion <A
CCnnCCICd WIh I: I CannCI C CxCICnCC, CI IhC InCC IhaI has
CCn adduCCd adds IhC aIICI ICICsCnIaICns IC IhC CImCI nCI Cnj
WIh _ICaICI _CnCIaIy Ihan CxCICnCC Can ICVdC, uI asC WIh IhC
CxICssCn CnCCCssIj, hCnCCCnIICjH rieri and HCmmCIC CCnCCIs.
~o ^CW IhC CnIIC Hna am CCuI sCCuaIVC H rieri CC_nICn ICsIs Cn
suCh sjnIhCIC, . C. , amaIVC, InCCs, CI IhC anayIC CnCs aIC, IC
C suIC, mCsI mCIIanI and nCCCssaIj, uI Cnj CI aIIann_ IhaI ds-
InCInCss CCCnCCIsIhaIsICQusIC CI asCCuICand CxICndCd sjnIhC-
ss as a ICajnCW CCnsIIuCICn."
'A CCIIan mjsICIy Ihus Cs hddCn hCIC,` IhC CuCdaICn CWhCh
aCnC Can maRC IC_ICss n IhC CundCss HCd CuIC CC_nICn CIhC
undCIsIandn_sCCuICandICaC.namCj, ICunCCVCIIhC gICundCIhC
CssIjCsjnIhCICHrieri ud_mCnIsWIh aICIaIC_CnCIaIy, IC
_an ns_hI nIC IhC CCndICns IhaI maC CVCIj Rnd CIhCm CssC,
and nCImCICjIC dCs_naICIhs CnIIC CC_nICn (WhCh CCmIsCs Is
CWn sCCCs) n a CuIsCIj CuInC, uI IC dCICImnC I CCmCICj and
adCQuaICj CI CVCIy usC n a sjsICm n aCCCIdanCC WIh Is ImaIj
sCuICCs, dVsCns, dCman, and CundaICs. bC muCh tCVsCnaj CI
IhC CCuaIICs CsjnIhCIC jud_mCnIs.
nzq '^CWICma CIhs UCICICsuIs IhC dCaCa sCCasCCnCC, WhCh
n : : CCud sCIvC CI IhC CIIQuC C uIC ICasCn. VCIj CC_nICn s CaCd
gurc, hCWCVCI, IhaIsnCImxCdWIhanjIhn_CIC_n IC I. LuIa CC_-
nICns CaCdasCuICjuIC, naIICuaI, nWhCh nCCxCICnCCCI
sCnsaICn aI a s mxCdn, andIhaIsIhusmjH rieri. ^CWICasCn s
IhC aCuIy IhaI ICVdCs IhC InCCs C CC_nICn H rieri. 1CnCC
uIC ICasCn s IhaIWhCh CCnIans IhC InCCs'CI CC_nZn_ sCmC-
Ihn_ asCuICj H rieri. CI_anCn CuIC ICasCn WCud C a sum
a: ICIaC IhCsC InCCs'naCCCIdanCCWIh WhCh a uICH rieri CC_-
If ir had occurred ro one of rhe ancienrs even ro raise rhis quesrion, rhis alone
would have oered powerful resisrance ro all rhe sysrems of pure reason down
ro our own rimes, and would have spared us so many vain arremprs rhar were
blindly underraken wirhour knowledge of whar was really ar issue.
nlau, changcdtoIroerl(acquisition) in thcsccondcdition.
` AhcIoIIowingparagraph,incIudingthcIoomotc,isomittcdinthc sccond cdition, and
rcpIaccdwith Scctions'and'I, sqthroughBz.
' AtthispointthccommontcxtoIthctwocditionsrcsumcs,inthcsccondcdition,how-
cvcr, thcrcishcrcinscrtcdthcscctionnumbcr'II and thccnsuinghcading. In addi-
tion,thcsccondandthirdscntcnccsoIthisparagrapharcomittcd,andthcrcarcminor
changcsin thcwordingoIthcopcningand Iourth scntcnccs. SccszqbcIow.
Irinciien
Irinciien
Irinciien
J
1nIrOduCIOn <A
nICnsCun C uCQuICd unduCIuujICu_hIuCuI. hC CxhuusIVC u-
CuICn CsuChun CI_unCnWCudCICuIC u sjsICm CuICICusCn. uI
snCCIhuIICQuICs uCI, undIssI un CCnQuCsICnWhCIhCIsuChun
umHCuICn C CuI CC_nICn s CssC uI u und n WhuI CusCs I
WCud C CssC, WC Cun IC_uId u sCCnCC CIhC mCIC CsImuICn C
uICICusCn, CIs sCuICCs und CunduICs, us IhC ICuCdCuIC IC IhC
sjsICm CuIC ICusCn. buCh u Ihn_ WCud nCI C u dCCIInC, uI musI
C CuCd Cnj u CIIQuC CuIC ICusCn, und Is uIIy WCud ICuj C
CnjnC_uIVC, sCIvn_nCI CI IhC umHCuICnuICnjCI IhC uIH-
CuICnCCuI ICusCn, und CI RCCn_IICC CCIICIs, jWhChu _ICuI
dCusuICudjWCn. Cu u CC_nICntransccndcnta!IhuIs CCCuCd
nCIsCmuChWIhCCCIs uIIuIhCIWIhCuIHrieri CCnCCIsCCCCIs
n _CnCIu."` AsjsICmCsuCh CCnCCIsWCud C CuCd IIunsCCndCnIu A1z
hCsChj. LuIIhssu_unICCmuChCIIhCC_nnn_. CIsnCCsuCh
u sCCnCCWCudhuVC ICCCnIunCCmCICjCIhunujIC usWC us sjn-
IhCIC H rieri CC_nICn, Is, us uI us CuI um s CCnCCDCd, ICC ICud
n scCC, snCCWC nCCd IC IuRC IhC unujss Cnjus uI us s ndsCns-
ujnCCCssuIyn CIdCI IC ICVdCns_hI nIC IhC InCCs CH rieri
sjnIhCss n IhCI CnIIC sCCC, WhCh s CuI Cnj CCnCCD. hs nVCsI- nz6
_uICn, WhCh WC Cun ICCIj Cu nCI dCCIInC uI Cnj IIunsCCndCn-
Iu CIIQuC, snCC I dCCs nCI um uI IhC umHCuICn CIhC CC_nICns
IhCmsCVCs uICnjuIIhCICCIICCICn, und s IC sujIhC ICuChsICnC
C IhC WCIIh CI WCIIhCssnCss C u CC_nICns H rieri, s IhuI WIh
WhCh WC uIC nCW CCnCCDCd. buCh u CIIQuC s uCCCIdn_j u ICuIu-
ICn, CssC, CI un CI_unCn, und, Ihs CunnCI C uCCCmshCd,
IhCn uICusICI uCunCn, nuCCCIdunCCWIhWhChIhC CCmCIC sjsICm
CIhC hCsChj CuIC CasCn, WhCIhCI Is IC CCnssI n IhC um-
HCuICn CIIhC mCIC mIuICnCIs CC_nICn, Cun n unjCusC uICusI
sCmC duj C CxhICd CIh unujICuj und synIhCICuj. CIIhuIIhs
shCud CCssC, ndCCd IhuIsuChu sjsICm shCud nCICICC _ICuIn
sCCC CI us IC hCC IC C uC CnIICj IC CCmCIC I, Cun C ussCssCd
n udVunCC ICm IhC uCI IhuI CuI CCCI s nCI IhC nuIuIC CIhn_s,
WhCh s nCxhuusIC, uI IhC undCIsIundn_, WhCh ud_Cs uCuI IhC :
nuIuIC CIhn_s, und IhsnIuD Cnjn IC_uId IC Is H rieri CC_nICn,
IhC suj CWhCh, snCC WC dC nCI nCCd IC sCuICh CI I CxICInuj,
CunnCI ICmun hddCn HCmus, und n u RChCCd s smu CnCu_h IC
C CCmCICj ICCCIdCd, Is WCIIh CI WCIIhCssnCss ussCssCd, und su-
CCICd IC u CCIICCI uIusu.'
Inthcsccondcdition,but. . . "rcpIaccdwith"butwithourmanncroIcognitionoIob-
cctsinsoIarasthis is to bcpossibIcaHoH."Sccsz bcIow.
` Begenzung
' woscntcnccs arc addcd hcrc inthcsccondcdition, scc s z ; bcIow.
J J
sz )
!nrroducuon <A
H.
V8On OIIun8CCndCnIu hO8Ohy
IunsCCndCnIu hCsChj s hCIC Cnj un dCu, ICI WhCh IhC CI-
IQuC CIuIC ICusCn s IC CuInC IhC CnIIC un architcctonica!!y, . C. ,
DCm InCCs,' WIh u m _uuIunICC ICI IhC CCmCICnCss und CCI-
IunIj CIu IhC CCmCnCnIs IhuI CCmIsC Ihs CdhCC. huI Ihs CI-
IQuC s nCI IsCIuICudj CuCd IIunsCCndCnIu hCsChjICsIs sCCj
Cn IhC IuCI IhuIn CIdCI IC C u CCmCICsjsICm IWCud usChuVCIC
CCnIun un CxhuusIVC unujss CIu CIhumun CC_nICn H rieri. ^CW
CuI CIIQuC musI, IC C suIC, ujCICIC us u CCmCIC CnumCIuHCn CI
u CIIhC unCCsIIu CCnCCIs' IhuI CCmIsC IhC uICCC_niCnn QuCs-
ICn.InjIICCIjICIIunsHCmIhCCxhuusIVCunujssCIIhCsCCCn-
CCIs IhCmsCVCs us WC us IICm IhC CCmCIC ICVCW CI u CI IhCsC
dCIVCd IICm IhCm, uIIj CCuusC Ihs unujss WCud nCI C uICsC-
A1q/B 2b m, snCC IdCCs nCI CCnIun IhC dHCuIj IhuI s CnCCunICICd InIhC
sjnIhCssCnuCCCunICIWhChIhCWhCCCIIQuCsuCIuujundCIIuRCn,
uIIj CCuusC IWCud C CCnIIuIj IC IhC unIjCIIhC un IC IuRC Cn
ICsCnsIyICI IhC CCmCICnCss CIsuCh un unujss und dCIVuICn,
IICm WhCh CnC CCud uIICI u C ICCVCd _VCn CnCs um. hs CCm-
CICnCss CIIhC unujss us WC us IhC dCIVuICn IICm IhC H rieri CCn-
CCIsWhChuIC IC CICVdCd nIhC mIuICWnCVCIIhCCss CCusjIC
CCmCICus Cn_ us IhCjuIC ICsCnIus CxhuusIVCInCCsCIsynIhC-
ss, und InCIhn_ suCRIn_nIhCmn IC_uIdIC Ihs CssCnIu um.
C IhC CIIQuC CIuIC ICusCnIhCIC uCCCIdn_jCCn_s CVCIyIhn_
IhuI CCnsIIuICs IIunsCCndCnIu hCsChj, und I s IhC CCmCIC dCu
C!IIunsCCndCnIu hCsChj, uIs nCIjCIIhs sCCnCC IsCI, snCC I
_CCs CnjsC IuI n IhC unujss us s ICQusIC ICI IhC CCmCIC CsImu-
ICnCIsjnIhCICH rieri CC_nICn.
hC ChCIIuI_CIn IhC dVsCn CIsuCh u sCCnCCs IhuIusCuICjnC
CCnCCIs musI CnICI nIC IIhuICCnIun unjIhn_ CmICu, CIIhuIIhC
Hrieri CC_nICn C CnIICj uIC. 1CnCC, uIhCu_h IhC suICmC In-
his numbcr andtitIc arc omittcdinthc sccond cdition, having bccn rcpIaccdbythc
numbcrandtitIcolScction` atBzq.
` hcwords"hcrconIyanidca"arcrcpIaccdinthcsccondcditionwith"thcidcaoIasci-
cncc",sccB zy bclow.
Irinciien
lcrc thc sccond cditton inscrrs mc scntcncc "It is thc systcm oI alI princtplcs
jIrinciien] oIpu:c rcason." InhiscopyoIthchrstcdition,Kanthadaddcdhcrc. or
without this thc Iormcr must aIso bcwithoutanytouchstonc, and thcrcIorc cntircIy
groundIcss." IX, p. : )
Stammlegri[e
! zweckmo)ig
' Irinciien
I
,4
Inuoducuon <A
CCs CmCIuIyund IhC IundumCnIu CCnCCIs CI uICH rier CC_n-
ICns, IhCj sI dC nCI CCn_ n IIunsCCndCnIu hCsChj, snCC IhC n
CCnCCIs C CusuIC und dsCusuIC, C dCsICs und nCnuICns, C nzp
ChCCC, CIC., WhCh uIC u CCmICu CI_n, musI IhCIC C ICsu-
CsCd. 1CnCC IIunsCCndCnIu hCsChj s u hCsChj" C uIC,
mCICj sCCuuIVC ICusCn. CI CVCIjIhn_ IuCICu, nsCuI us I CCn-
Iuns mCIVCs,' s ICuICd IC CCn_s, WhCh CCn_ umCn_ CmICu
sCuICCs CCC_nICn.
^CWCnCWunIsIC sCIu IhC dVsCn CIhs sCCnCC ICmIhC _Cn-
CIuVCWCnICusjsICmn_CnCIu,IhCnIhCCnCIhuIWCWnCWIC-
sCnImusICCnIun!1IsIuDoctrincof!cmcntsund sCCCnd uDoctrinc
ofMcthodCuIC ICusCn. uCh CIhCsC mun uIIs W huVC Is su-
dVsCn, IhC_ICundsCIWhChCunnCIjCI C CxCundCdhCIC. IhuI
sCCms nCCCssuIy CI un nIICduCICn CI u ICmnuIy s IhuI IhCIC uIC
IWC sICms Chumun CC_nICn, WhCh muj CIhus uIsC ICm u CCm-
mCn uI IC us unRnCWn ICCI, numCjscnsibi!ityund undcrstanding,
IhICu_h IhC HIsI CWhCh CCCIs uIC _VCn IC us, uI IhICu_h IhC sCC-
Cnd CWhCh IhCj uIC IhCu_hI. ^CW sCnsIyWCIC IC CCnIun H
rieri ICICsCnIuICns,WhChCCnsIIuICIhC CCndICns undCIWhCh C- ao
CCIs uIC _VCnICus, IWCud CCn_ICIIunsCCndCnIuhCsChj. hC
IIunsCCndCnIudCCIInC CIhC sCnsCsWhuVCICCCn_ICIhC HIsIuII n : 6
CIhC sCCnCC CCCmCnIs, snCC IhC CCndJtCns undCIWhCh uCnC IhC
CCCIs Chumun CC_nICn uIC _VCn ICCCdC IhCsC undCIWhCh IhCsC
CCCIs uIC IhCu_hI.
his scntcncc is rcviscd in thc sccond cdition to rcIIcctKant'sintcrvcningargumcnt,
bcginningwiththcGreundwerke)tbeMetabsicse)Mera/soI: y8, thatthcprincipIcoI
moraIityitnotits appIication is indccd cntircIyuricri. Scc B,SbcIov.
` h/tweisbeit
Bewegungsgr nde,rcpIaccdinthcsccondcditionwithTrel)ede (inccntivcs) inordcrto
IcavcroomIorthc idca that aIthough inccntivcs bascd on IccIings arc notadcquatc!or
moraIity, thcrc can bc othcr, morc purcIy rationaI motivcs Ior ii (scc Greundwetk,
q.qzy).
J J
s Intructin'
.
\n IhCUIICICnCC DCIVCCnuICanU CICa! CC_nIHCn.
hCIC s nC dCuIWhaICVCI IhaIa! CuI CC_nIICn C_nsWIh CxCI-
CnCC, CI hCW CsC shCud IhC CC_nIVC aCuIj C aWaRCnCd nIC CxCI-
CsC nCI IhICu_h CCCIs IhaI sImua!C CuI sCnsCs and n aII
IhCmsCVCs ICduCCICICsCnIaICns,naIIIn_IhCaCIVIjCCuIun-
dCIsIandn_nIC mCICnIC CCmaICIhCsC, IC CCnnCCICIsCaIaIC IhCm,
and Ihus IC WCIR u IhC IaW maICIa C sCnsC mICssCns nIC a
CC_nICn CCCCIs IhaI s CaCd CxCICnCCr As faras timcis con-
ccrcd, IhCn, nC CC_nICn nus ICCCdCs CxCICnCC, andWIhCxCI-
CnCC CVCIyCC_nICn C_ns.
LuI aIhCu_h a CuI CC_nICn CCmmCnCCs vth CxCICnCC, jCI I
dCCsnCICn IhaIaCCCunIaaIsChomCxCICnCC. CIICCudWC C
IhaICVCnCuICxCICnIaCC_nICnsa CCmCsICCIhaIWhChWC IC-
CCVC IhICu_h mICssCns and IhaI WhCh CuI CWn CC_nIVC aCuIy
(mCICj ICmICd j sCnsC mICssCns) ICVdCs CuI C IsC,
a z WhCh addICn WC CannCI dsIn_ush ICm IhaI undamCnIa maICIa
unI Cn_IaCICC has madC us aIICnIVC IC Iand sRCd nsCaIaIn_
ICuI.
I s IhCICCIC aI CasI a QuCsICn ICQuIn_ CCsCI nVCsI_aIICn, and
CnC nCI IC C dsmssCd aI HIsI _anCC, WhCIhCI IhCIC s anjsuCh CC_-
nIICn ndCCndCnI Ca CxCICnCC and CVCn Ca mICssCns CUC
sCnsCs. InC Cas suCh cogiuons u HoH, and dsIn_ushCs IhCm
ICm cmpirica! CnCs, WhCh haVC IhCI sCuICCs a esterieri, namCj n
CxCICnCC.
hC CImCI CxICssCn s nCVCIIhCCss nCI jCI suHCCnIj dCICIm-
naIC IC dCs_naICIhCWhCCsCnsCCIhCQuCsICnCCICus.CIIs Cus-
ICmaIjIC sajCmanjaCC_nIICndCIVCdUCmCxCICnUa!sCuICCsIhaI
WC aIC CaaC CICI aIIaRC n Ia rieri, CCausCWC dC nCI dCIVC I
`inthc sccond cdition.
` ScctionsIand!!(s6)rcpIaccthc!irsttwoparagraphsoIScctionIinthchrstcdition
(nz).
^ormaIIysctinromantypc,hcrccmphasizcd byKantbyucuscoIitaIics.
Ahatis, arieri."
I J
Inrroducrion <B>
mmCdaICj HCm CxCCnCC, uI aIhC HCm a _CnCa uC IhaI WC
haVCnCVCIhCCss IsCCCWCd HCm CxCCnCC. bCCnCsajsCsCmC-
CnC WhC undCmnCd IhC CundaICn Chs hCusC IhaI hC CCud haVC
RnCWn a rieri IhaI I WCud CCasC, . C. , hC nCCd nCI haVC WaICd C
IhC CxCCnCC CIaCIuajCCasn_.ACIhCCCudnCIhaVCRnCWnIhs
CnHCja rieri. 'CIhaICdCs aChCaVjandhCnCCaIhCsuCI
sIaRCnaWajmusIHsIhaVC CCCmC RnCWn IC hmIhCu_hCxCCnCC.
n IhC sCQuC IhCCCCWC W undCsIand ja rieri CC_nICns nCI
IhCsC IhaI CCCu ndCCndCnIj CIhs C IhaI CxCCnCC, uI aIhC
IhCsC IhaI CCCu a/se/ute[ ndCCndCnIj Ca CxCCnCC. ICsCd IC a
IhCm aC CmCa CC_nICns, C IhCsC IhaI aC CssC Cn a esteri
eri, . C. , IhCu_h CxCCnCC. mCn_a rieri CC_nICns, hCWCVC, IhCsC
aC CaCdpurcWIhWhChnCIhn_CmCas nICmxCd. hus, C. _. ,
IhC CCsICn VCry aICaICn hasIs CausC s ana rieri CCs-
ICn, CnjnCIuC, snCCaICaICnsa CCnCCIIhaICan C daWn Cnj
CmCxCCnCC.
1O
!!.
C aCnCssCssCn CCCrIan a rieri CC_nICns, and
CVCnIHCCCHHCn undCsIandn_snCVCIWIHCUIIhCH.
PIssuChCCs amaRjmCansCWhChWC CansCCuCjdsIn_ush a
uC CC_nICn Cm an CmCa CnC.`
'
xCCnCC ICaChCs us, IC C
suC,IhaIsCmCIhn_sCCnsIIuICdIhusand sC, uInCIIhaIICCudnCI
C CIhCIWsC. irst,IhCn, aCCsICns IhCu_hI aCn_WIhIs nc-
ccssity, I s an a rieri jud_mCnI, I s, mCCCVC, asC nCI dCVCd
HCm anj CCsICn CxCCI CnC IhaI n Iun s Vad as a nCCCssaIy
CCsICn, IhCn I s asCuICj a rieri. Sccond: xCCnCC nCVC
_VCs Is jud_mCnIs IuC C sICI uI Cnj assumCd and CCmaaIVC
univcrsa!ity(IhCu_h nduCICn), sC CCj I musI C sad. as a as
WC haVCjCICCCVCd, IhCC snC CxCCICn IC Ihs C IhaIuC.hus aq
a ud_mCnI sIhCu_hI n sICI unVCsaIy, . C. , n suCh a Waj IhaI nC
CxCCICn aIa s aCWCd IC CCssC,IhCnIsnCIdCVCd HCm Cx-
CCnCC, uIs aIhCVad asCuICja rieri. mCaunVC1saIys
IhCCCCCnjan aIaynCCasCnVadIyCmIhaIWhChhCdsn
mCsI CasCs IC IhaI WhCh hCds n a, as n, C._., IhC CCsICn
CdCs aChCaVy, WhCCas sICIunVCsaIyCCn_sIC ajud_mCnICs-
sCnIaj, IhsCnIs IC asCCasCuCC CCC_nICnC I, namCja aC-
uIyCa rieri CC_nICn. ^CCCssIyandsICI unVCsaIy aC IhCCCC
sCCuC ndCaICns'' Cana rieri CC_nICn, and asC CCn_IC_CIhC n-
Kennzeicben
! J 7
Inrroducrion <B>
scparably. But sincc in thcir usc it is somctimcs casicr to shov thc cm-
pirical limitation in judgmcnts than thc contingcncy in thcm, or is ohcn
morc plausiblc to shov thc unrcstrictcd univcrsality that vc ascribc to
a judgmcnt than its ncccssity, it is advisablc to cmploy scparatcly thcsc
two critcria, cach oI vhich is in itsclI inIalliblc.
12
^ov it is casy to shov that in human cognition thcrc actually arc
such ncccssary and in thc strictcst scnsc univcrsal, thus purc H rieri
judgmcnts. !I onc vants an cxamplc Irom thc scicnccs, onc nccd only
look at all thc propositions oI mathcmatics, iI onc vould havc onc
s
Irom thc commoncst usc oI thc undcrstanding, uc proposition that
cvcry altcration must havc a causc vill do, indccd in thc lattcr thc vcry
conccpt oI a causc so obviously contains thc conccpt oI a ncccssity oI
conncction vith an cIIcct and a strict univcrsality oI rulc that i t vould
bc cntircly lost iI onc sought, as Iumc did, to dcrivc it Irom a Ircqucnt
association oI that vhich happcns vith that vhich prcccdcs and a habit
(thus a mcrcly subjcctivc ncccssity) oI connccting rcprcscntations aris-
ing from that association. ' Ivcn vithout rcquiring such cxampIcs for
thc prooI oI thc rcality oI purc Hrieri principlcs in our cognition, onc
could cstablish thcir indispcnsability Ior thc possibility oI cxpcricncc
itsclI, thus cstablish it H rieri. !or vhcrc vould cxpcricncc itsclI gct
its ccrtainty iI all rulcs in accordancc vith vhich it procccds vcrc
thcmsclvcs in turn alvays cmpirical, thus contingcnt:, hcncc onc
could hardly allov thcsc to count as hrst principlcs. Yct hcrc vc can
contcnt oursclvcs vith having displaycd thc purc usc oI our cognitivc
Iaculty as a Iact togcthcr vith its indication. ^ot mcrcly in )udgmcnts,
hovcvcr, but cvcn in conccpts is an origin oI somc oI thcm rcvcalcd H
rieri. Cradually rcmovc Irom your cxpcricntial conccpt oI a body
cvcrything that is cmpirical in it thc color, thc hardncss or soItncss,
thc vcight, cvcn thc impcnctrability thcrc still rcmains thc spacc
that vas occupicd by thc body (vhich has nov cntircly disappcarcd),
a 6 and you cannot lcavc that out. !ikcvisc, iI you rcmovc Irom your cm-
pirical conccpt oI cvcry objcct, vhcthcr corporcal or incorporcal, all
thosc propcrtics oI vhich cxpcricncc tcachcs you, you could still not
takc Irom it that by mcans oI vhich you think oI it as a substancc or
as dcpcndcnton a substancc (cvcn though this conccpt contains morc
dctcrmination than that oI an objcct in gcncral). hus, convinccd by
thc ncccssity vith vhich this conccpt prcsscs itsclI on you, you must
conccdc that it has its scat in your Iaculty oI cognition H rieri.
ucstion marknotin originaI.
` Kennzeicben, i.c.,sign.
Clects
Cjects
I

b
Inrroducrion <B>
II
1hiIosophy needs a science that determines the possibiIity,
the principIes," and the donain oI aIl cognitions urieri.
But vhat says still more than aII the Ioregoing is this, that certain
cognitions even abandon the held oI all possible experiences, and seem z
to expand the domain oI our judgments beyond aIl bounds oI experi-
pnce through concepts to vhich no corresponding object at alI can be
given in experience.
And precisely in these latter cognitions, vhich go beyond the vorld
oI the senses, vhere experience can give neither guidance nor correc-
tion, Iie the investigations oI our reason that ve hold to be Iar more
preeminent in their importance and subIime in their hnal aim than s
)
everything that the understanding can Iearn in the heId oI appearances,
in vhich ve vouId rather venture everything, even at the risk oI erring,
than give up such important investigations because oI any sort oI reser-
vation or hom contempt and indiIIerence. Ahese unavoidabIe prob-
Iems oI pure reason itseII are God,hccdomand immorta!ity. But the
science vhose hnaI aim in aIl its preparations is directed properly onIy
to the solution oI these probIems is called mctaphysics, vhose proce-
dure is in the beginning dogmatic,i.e., it conhdently takes on the exe-
cution oI this task vithout an antecedent examination oI the capacity or
incapacity' oI reason Ior such a great undertaking.
^ov it may seem natural that as soon as one has abandoned the ter-
rain oI experience one vouId not immediately erect an edihce vith cog-
nitions that one possesses vithout knoving vhence, and on the credit
oI principIes vhose origin one does not knov, vithout having Iirst as-
sured oneseII oI its Ioundation through carelul investigations, thus that
one vould alI the morchave Iong since raised the question hov the un-
derstanding could come to all these cognitions u rieri and vhat do-
main, validity, and vaIue they might have. And in Iact nothing is more zq
naturaI, iI one understands by the vord natura! "that vhich properly
and reasonabIy ought to happen, but iI one understands by it that vhich e 8
usually happens, then conversely nothing is more naturaI and compre-
hisscctionnumbcrandtitIcaddcdinthcsccondcdition.hccnsuingparagraphcom-
mcnccsthcIrstparto!thcintroductioncommontobothcditions, cxtcndinghomhcrc
tos:q, thoughwith oncmaor intcrpoIationinthcncxtparagraph and anothcr changc
at s : :-:z.
` Princiien
' "than aIIthc Iorcgoing" addcd in thc sccond cdition.
AhcrcmaindcroIthis paragraphaddcdinthcsccondcdition.
des |ermegenseder |n:ermegens
:ie/mebr"addcdin thc sccondcdition.
' demhvrtnan rch"substitutcdIorunterdiesem hvrteinthcsccod cdioon.
I J
!ntroduction <B>
hensibIe than that this investigation shouId Iong have been negIected.
or one part oI these cognitions, the mathematicaI, has Iong been reIi-
abIe, and thereby gives rise to a IavorabIe expectation about others as
veII, aIthough these may be oI an entireIy diherent nanre. urther-
more, iI one is beyond the circIe oI experience, then one is sure oI not
being reluted' through experience. he charm in expanding one's cog-
nitions is so great that one can be stopped in one's progress onIy by
bumping into a cIear contradiction. Jhis, hovever, one can avoid iI one
makes his inventions careluIIy, even though they are not thereby inven-
tions any the Iess. Nathematics gives us a spIendid exampIe oI hov Iar
ve can go vith H rieri cognition independentIy oI experience. ^ov it
is occupied, to be sure, vith objects and cognitions onIy so Iar as these
can be exhibited in intuitions. Jhis circumstance, hoveve:, is easIy
overIooked, since the intuition in question can itseII be given H rieri,
and thus can hardIy be distinguished Irom a mere pure concept.
a Captivated' by such a prooI oI the pover oI reason, the drive Ior ex-
pansion sees no bounds. Jhe Iight dove, in Iree ight cutting through
the air the resistance oI vhich it IeeIs, couId get the idea that it couId
ag do even better in airIess space. Iikevise, !Iato abandoned the vorId oI
the senses because it set such narrov Iimits' Ior the understanding, and
dared to go beyond it on de vings oI the ideas, in the empty space oI
pure understanding. !e did not notice that he made no headvay by his
euorts, Ior he had no resistance, no support, as it vere, by vhich he
couId stiuen himseII, and to vhich he couId appIy his povers in order
to put his understanding into motion. !t is, hovever, a customary Iate
oI human reason in specuIation to hnish its edihce as earIy as possible
and onIy then to investigate vhether the ground has been adequateIy
prepared Ior it. But at that point aII sorts oI excuses viII be sought to as-
sure us oI its sturdiness or aIso, even better, to remse such a Iate and
dangerous examination. Vhat Ieeps us Iree oI aIl vorry and suspicion
during the construction, hovever, and atters us vith apparent thor-
oughness, is this. Agreat part, perhaps the greatest part, oI the business
oI our reason consists in HH[JtJ oI the concepts that ve aIready have oI
objects. Jhis aIIords us a muItitude oI cognitions that, aIthough they
are nothing more than iIIuminations or cIarihcations oI that vhich is aI-
a6
ready thought i n our concepts (though stiII i n a conlused vay), are, at
Ieast as Iar as their Iorm i s concerned, treasured as i I they vere nev in-
Ahcsccondcditionrcads/ange"instcadoI/angeZeit.
` Ahcsccondcdition rcadswider/egt" instcadoIwidersrecben."
' Ahcsccondcdiuonrcadseingenemmen"instcadoIau}gemuntert. "
lr:tehung
' hc sccond cdition rcads se enge Scbranken setzt" instcad oI se :ieq ltigt Hindmm t
/egt."
Ahcsccond
cditioninscrts ucwords aucb"and/ielergar.

Inrroduction <5>
sights, though they do not extend the conceps that ve have in either
matter or content, but onIy set them apart Irom each other. ^ov since s :o
this procedure does yieId a reaI H rieri cognition, vhich makes secure
and usemI progress, reason, vithout itseII noticing it, under these pre-
tenses surreptitiousIy makes assertions oI quite another sort, in vhich
reason adds something entireIy aIien to given concepts and indeed does
so Hrieri, vithout one knoving hov it vas able to do this and vithout
such a" question even being aIIoved to come to mind. ! viII thereIore
deaI vith the distinction betveen these tvo sorts oI cognition right at
the outset.
_.
fn the difference between analytic and
synthetic judgments. '`
!n aII judgments in vhich the reIation oI a subject to the predicate is
thought (iI I consider onIy aLrmative judgments, since the appIication
to negative ones is easy) this reIation is possibIe in tvo diuerent vays.
!ither the predicate B beIongs to the subject . as something that is
(covertIy) contained in this concept H; or B Iies entireIy outside the con
cept., though to be sure it stands in connection vith it. In the hrst case
I caII the judgment ana!yc, in the second sythcuc. AnaIytic judg- n ;
ments (amrmative ones) are thus those in vhich the connecuon oI the
predicate is thought through identity, but those in vhich this connec-
tion is thought vithout identity are to be caIIed synthetic judgments.
Cne couId aIso caII the Iormer judgmcntsofc!ari6cation,and the Iat- s
ter judgmcntsofamp!i6cation;since through the predicate the Ior-
mer do not add anything to the concept oI the subject, but onIy break
it up by means oI anaIysis into its component concepts, vhich vere aI-
ready thought in it (though conIusedIy), vhiIe the Iatter, on the con-
trary, add to the concept oI the subject a predicate that vas not thought
in it at aII, and couId not have been extracted Irom it through any anaIy-
sis. !.g., iI! say. AII bodies are extended," then this is an anaIytic judg-
ment. or ! do not need to go beyond' the concept that ! combine vith
the body' in order to hnd that extension is connected vith it, but rather
I need onIy to anaIyze that concept, i.e., become conscious oI the man-
iIoId that ! aIvays think in it, in order to encounter this predicate
therein, it is thereIore an anaIytic judgment. Cn the contrary, iI ! say:
!csccondcdiuonaddsthcwords undCUu

` hcsccondcditionrcpIaccsdiese"with eineso/cbe."
' Sccuonnumbcr1addcdinthcsccondcdition.
Ir/outerungs-"andIroeiterungsurtei/e. "
' hcsccondcdiuonrcadsuler"instcadoI
-
uJ.

hcsccondc`itionrcadsdemKer"instcadoIdemHrKQn"

!nuoducuon <B>
^I bodies are heavy, " then the predicate is something entireIy diuer-
ent Irom that vhich I think in the mere concept oI a body in generaI.
+he addition oI such a predicate thus yeIds a synthetic judgment.
)udgcntsofccricncc,assuch,arcasynthctic.!or it vouId
be absurd to ground an anaIytic judgment on experience, since I do not
need to go beyond my concept at aII in order to IormuIate the judg-
ment, and thereIore need no testimony Irom experience Ior that. +hat
a body is extended is a proposition that is estabIished H rieri, and is not
sr z
a judgment oI experience. !or beIore ! go to experience, ! aIready have
aII the conditions Ior my judgment in the concept, hom vhich I mereIy
drav out the predicate in accordance vith the principIe oI conrradic-
tion, and can thereby at the same time become conscious oI the neces-
sity oI the judgment, vhich experience couId never teach me. Cn the
ab
contrary, aIthough I "do not at aII incIude the predicate oI veight i n the
concept oI a body in generaI, the concept neverdeIess designates an ob-
ject oI experience through a part oI it, to vhich I can thereIore add stiII
other parts oI the same experience as beIonging vith the Iormer. I can
hrst cognize the concept oI body anaIyticaIIy through the marks oI ex-
tension, oI impenetrabiIity, oI shape, etc., vhich are aII thought in this
concept. But nov I ampIi[ my cognition and, Iooking back to the ex-
perience hom vhich I had extracted this concept oI body, I hnd that
veight is aIso aIvays connected vith the previous marks, and I there-
Iore add this syntheticaIIy as predicate to that concept. It is thus expe-
rience 'on vhich the possibiIity oI the synthesis oI the predicate oI
veight vith the concept oI body is grounded, since both concepts,
though de one is not contained in the other, nevertheIess beIong to-
gether, though onIy contingentIy, as parts oI a vhoIe, nameIy experi-
ence, vhich is itseII a synthetic combination oI intuitions.
zp 'But in synthetic H rioti |udgments this means oI heIp is entireIy
ni Iacking. ' II I am to go beyond the concept . in order to cognize an-
other B as combined vith it, vhat is it on vhich I depend and by means
oI vhich the synthesis becomes possibIe, since I here do not have the
advantage oI Iooking around Ior it in the heId oI experience? +ake the
proposition. !veryrhing that happens has its cause." In the concept oI
Ahc hrstpartoIthc IoIIowing paragraph rcpIaccs cwo paragraphs inchc lrst cdition,
sccAy-8 abovc.
` Ahctcxtcommon to thchrstcditionrcsumcshcrc.
Ahc sccond cdition has einen GegenstandderLqabrung" instcad oIthc lirst cdition`s
die:o//standigeLqabrung. "
AhcrcmaindcroIthisscntcncc is addcd inthc sccondcdition.
' `hc rcmaindcroIthisscntcnccismodihcdandcxpandcdin thcsccond cdition.
Ahc commontcxtrcsumcshcrc.
' uler"substicutcdinthc sccondcditionIor ausser"inchchrst.
I+?
nUOduCUCn <B>
something that happens, I think, to be sure, oI an existence that vas
preceded by a ume, etc., and hom that analytic |udgments can be
dravn. But the concept oI a cause Iies entireIy outside that concept,
and indicates something diuerent than the concept oI vhat happens in
general, and is thereIore" not contained in the Iatter representation at
alI. !ov then do ! come to say something quite diuerent about that
vhich happens in generaI, and to cognize the concept oI cause as be-
longing to it, indeed necessarily,' even though not contained in it?
Vhat is the unknovn =X here on vhich the understanding depends
vhen it believes itseII to discover beyond the concept oI . a predicate
that is Ioreign to it yet vhich it nevertheIess beIieves to be connected
vith it?'!t cannot be experience, Ior the principle that has been adduced
adds the latter representations to the Iormer not onIy vith greater gen-
eraJity than experience can provide, but also vith the expression oI ne-
cessity, hence entirely H rieri and Irom mere concepts. Iov the entire
hnaI aim oI our speculative H rieri cognition rests on such synthetic, n I o
i. e. , ampliative principIes, Ior the anaIytic ones are, to be sure, most im-
portant and necessary, but onIy Ior attaining that distinctness oI con- e iq
cepts vhich is requisite Ior a secure and extended synthesis as a reaIly
nev acquisition.
/_
Synthetic H rieri udgments are contained as principles'
in alI theoreticaI sciences oI reason.
Mathcmatica! j udgmcnts arc a!! synthctic.' his proposition
seems to have escaped the notice oI the anaIyst oI human reason until
nov, indeed to be diametricaIly opposed to aIl oI their conjectures, aI-
though it is incontrovertibIy certain and is very important in the sequeI.
or since one Iound that the inIerences oI the mathematicians aII pro-
ceed in accordance vith the principIe oI contradiction (vhich is re-
/iegtganzau}er enemBegri],und"addcdinthc sccondcdition.
` ista/se"inthcsccondcditioninstcad oIundist" in thcrst.
` undsegarnenendig" addcdinthc sccondcdition.
Kantcndsthis andthcncxtscntcnccwith pcriods,Iorwhichwc havcsubstitutcd qucs-
tion marks.
unlekannte=` addcd inthc sccondcdition.
Inthcsccond cdition,we/cbeserg/eicbweb/damit:erknu}zuseineracbtet"substitutcd
Ior dasg/eicbweb/damit:erknu}sei."
' Inthc sccondcdition, Irerl"rcpIaccsnlau."
AtthispointoncparagraphIromthchrstcditionisomittcd andrcpIaccdwiththcIoI-
lowingScctions'and',s :qthroughsz .
Princiien
Kant adapts thc IoIIowinghvc paragraphshom thcPre/egemena, z (q.z68).
I

!nuoducuon <B>
quired by the nature oI any apodictic certainty), one was persuaded that
the principIes couId aIso be cognized Irom the principIe oI contradic-
uon, in which, however, they" erred, Ior a synthetic proposition can oI
course be comprehended in accordance with the principIe oI contradic-
uon, but onIy insoIar as anoder syntheuc proposiLion is presupposed
hom which it can be deduced, never in itseII.
It must hrst be remarked that properIy mathematicaI proposiLions are
aIways H rieri udgments and are never empiricaI, bccause they carry
necessiLy with them, which cannot be derived hom experience. But iI
8 t
one does not want to concede this, weII then, I wiII restrict myroposi-
uon to purcmathcmaucs,the concept oI which aIready impIies that it
does not contain empiricaI but mereIy pure H rieri cognition.
o be sure, one might initiaIIy think that the proposiLion
-
;+" z

is a mereIy anaIytic proposition that IoIIows Irom the concept oI a sum
oI seven and hve in accordance with Lhe principIe oI conLradiction. Yet
iI one considers it more cIoseIy, one hnds that the concept oI the sum
oI ; and contains noLhing more than the uniIicaLion oI both numbers
in a singIe one, through which it is not at aII thought what this singIe
number is which comprehends the two oI them. he concept oI tweIve
is by no means aIready thought mereIy by my dinking oI dat unihca-
tion oI seven and hve, and no matter how Iong I anaIyze my concept oI
such a possibIe sum I wiII stiII not hnd reIve in it. Cne must go beyond
these concepts, seeking assistance in the inLuition that corresponds to
one oI the Lwo, one's hve hngers, say, or (as in Segner's arithmeLic)' hve
points, and one aIter another add the units oI the hve given in the inLu-
iLion to the concept oI seven. ' or I take hrst the number ;, and, as I
take the hngers oI my hand as an intuition Ior assistance with the con-
cept oI , to that image oI mine I now add the units that I have previ-
8 t ousIy taken together in order to consLitute the number one auer
anoLher to Lhe number ;, and thus see the number z arise. Jhat ;
shou!dbe added to I have, to be sure, thought in the concept oI a sum
" ; , but not that this sum is equaI to the number z . +he arith-
meticaI proposiLion is thereIore aIways synLhetic, one becomes aII the
more distinctIy aware oI that iI one takes somewhat Iarger numbers, Ior
it is then cIear that, Lwist and Lur our concepts as we wiII, without get-
ting heIp hom inLuition we couId never hnd the sum by means oI the
mere anaIysis oI our concepts.
Satz
` Kant switchcsnumbcrIrom man"tosie. "
' Ahis and thc IoIIowing scntcncc arc substitotcd hcrc Iorthc cIausc Man eroeiteta/se
wirk/icb seinen Begi1_durcb diesen Satz + ! 2 und tbutzu dem ersteren Begreinen
neuenbinzu,derinenemgarnicbtgedacbtwar"(CncthcrcIorcrcaIIyampIicshis con-
ccptthroughthisproposition; + ::"andaddsancwconccpttothcIormcr,which
was notthoughtinit)inthcPre/egemena(.:6).
I++
Inrroducrion <B>
]ust as littlc is any principIc oI purc gcoctry anaIytic. Jhat thc
straight Iinc bctvccn tvo points is thc shortcst is a synthctic proposi-
tion. !or my conccpt oI thcstraightcontains nothing oI quantity, but
onIy a quality. '

Jhc conccpt oI thc shortcst is thcrcIorc cntircly addi-
tionaI to it, and cannot bc cxtractcd out oI thc conccpt oI thc straight
linc by any analysis. !cIp must hcrc bc gottcn lrom intuition, by mcans
oI vhich alonc thc synthcsis is possibIc.
Jo bc surc, a Icv principIcs that thc gcomctcrs prcsupposc arc actu-
aIly anaIytic and rcst on thc principIc oI contiadiction, but thcy also
onIy scrvc, as idcnticaI propositions, Ior thc chain oI mcthod and not as
principlcs," c.g., a a, thc vholc is cquaI to itscII, or (a +/) H i. c. , thc at
;
vhoIc is grcatcr than its part. And yct cvcn thcsc, aIthough thcy arc
vaIid in accordancc vith mcrc conccpts, arc admittcd in mathcmatics
only bccausc thcy can bc cxhibitcd in intuitior. ''Vhat usualIy makcs
us bclicvc hcrc that thc prcdicatc oI such apodictic udgmcnts aIrcady
Iics in our conccpt, and that thc judgmcnt is thcrcIorc analytic, is
mcrcIy thc ambiguity oI thc cxprcssion. Vc shou!d,namcIy, add a ccr-
tain prcdicatc to a givcn conccpt in thought, and this ncccssity alrcady
attachcs to thc conccpts. But thc qucstion is not vhat vc shou!ddm
in addition to thc givcn conccpt, but vhat vc actua!!y dm in it,
though only obscurcIy, and thcrc it is maniIcst that thc prcdicatc ccr-
tainIy adhcrcs to thosc conccpts ncccssariIy, though not as thought in
thc conccpt itscII, ' but by mcans oI an intuition that must bc addcd to
thc conccpt.
z. ^atura!scicncc(Phsicu) containsvithinitsc!fsynthcucu H-
ori judgmcnts asprincip!cs.'I vilI adducc onIy a coupIc oI proposi-
tions as cxamplcs, such as thc proposition that in aIl aItcrations oI thc
corporcal vorld thc quantity oI mattcr rcmains unaltcrcd, or that in alI
communication oI motion cIIcct and countci-cIIcct must aIvays bc
cquaI. In both oI thcsc not only thc ncccssity, thus thcir a rieri origin,
but also that thcy arc synthctic propositions is cIcar. !or in thc conccpt ar 8
oI mattcr I do not think pcrsistcncc, but only its prcscncc in spacc
through thc hlIing oI spacc. Jhus I actuaIly go bcyond thc conccpt oI
mattcr in ordcr to add somcthing to it a rieri that I did not think init.
Jhc proposition is thus not anaIytic, but syrthctic, and ncvcrthclcss
thought H rieri, and Iikcvisc vith thc othcr propositions oI thc purc
part oI naturaI scicncc.
. nmctaphysics,cvcn iI onc rcgards it as a scicncc that has thus Iar
aucb"addcdto tcxtIromPre/egemena(q: :6).
` Princiien
a/s im Begre se/lst gedacbt" substimtcd hcrc Ior thc word unmitte/lar" in thc
Pre/egemena (q:z6).
Princiien
I+S
s :
!nrroducrion <B>
mereIy been sought but is nevertheIess indispensabIe because oI the na-
ture oI human reason, sythctc u riari coguons are supposed to
bc contancd,and it is not concered mereIy viu anaIyzing concepts
that ve make oI things a rieri and thereby cIari[ing them anaIyricaIIy,
but ve vant to ampIi[ our cognition a rieri, to this end ve must make
use oI such principIes that add something to the given concepts that vas
not contained in them, and through synthetic a rieri |udgments go so
Iar beyond that experience itseII cannot IoIIov us that Iar, e. g. , in the
proposition he vorId must have a hrst beginning," and others be-
sides, and thus metaphysics, at Ieast as Iar as tscndsconccrcd,con-
sists oI pureIy synthetic a rieri propositions.
2O
`.
he generaI problem oI purc reason. ` '
Cne has aIready gained a great deaI iI one can bring a muItitude oI in-
vestigations under the IormuIa oI 3 singIe probIem. !or one thereby not
onIy Iightens one's ovn task, by determining it preciseIy, but aIso the
judgment oI anyone eIse vho vants to examine vhether ve have satis-
hed our pIan or not. he reaI probIem oI pure reason is nov contained
in the question: Hovarcsynthctcjudgcntsu HaHpossb!ci
hat metaphysics has untiI nov remained in such a vaciIIating state
oI uncertainty and contradictions is to be ascribed soIeIy to the cause
that no one has previousIy thought oI this probIem and perhaps even oI
the distinction betveen ana!ytc and synthcucudgments. Cn the so-
Iution oI this probIem, or on a satisIactory prooI that the possibiIity that
it demands to have expIained does not in Iact exist at aII, metaphysics
nov stands or IaIIs. Oavid !ume, vho among aII phiIosophers came
cIosest to this probIem, stiII did not conceive oI it anyvhere near deter-
minateIy enough and in its universaIity, but rather stopped vith the syn-
thetic proposition oI the connection oI the eIIect vith its cause
s zo (Princiium :ausa/itatis), beIieving himseII to have brought out that such
an a rieri proposition is entireIy impossibIe, and according to his in-
Ierences everything that ve caII metaphysics vouId come dovn to a
mere deIusion oI an aIIeged insight oI reason into that vhich has in Iact
mereIy been borroved Irom experience and Irom habit has taken on the
appearance oI necessity, an assertion, destructive oI aII pure phiIosophy,
on vhich he vouId never have IaIIen iI he had had our probIem in its
generaIity beIore his eyes, since then he vouId have comprehended that
according to his argument there couId aIso be no pure mathematics,
since this certainIy contains synthetic a rieri propositions, an assertion
u}gale
I
q

!ntroduction <B>
hom which his sound understanding wouId sureIy have protected
him.

In the soIution oI the above probIem there is at the same time con-
tained the possibiIity oI the pure use oI reason in the grounding and ex-
ecution oI aII sciences that contain a theoreticaI a rieri cognition oI
ob|ects, i. e. , the answer to the questions.
Hovispurcmathcmaucspossib!ci
Hovispurcnatura!scicnccpossib!ci
About these sciences, since they are actuaIIy given, it can appropri-
ateIy be asIed hovthey are possibIe, Ior that they must be possibIe is
proved through their actuaIity. ` Iar as mctaphysics is concered,
however, its poor progress up to now, and the Iact that oI no meta- n::
physics thus Iar expounded can it even be said that, as Iar as its essentiaI
end is concered, it even reaIIy exists, Ieaves everyone with ground to
doubt its possibiIity.
!ut now this knd of cogniton is in a certain sense a\so to be re-
garded as given, and metaphysics is actuaI, iI not as a science yet as a
naturaI predisposition (metahsica natura/is). !or human reason, with-
out being moved by the mere vanity oI Inowing it aII, inexorabIy pushes
on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be answered
by any experientiaI use oI reason and oI principIes borrowed Irom such
a use, and thus a certain sort oI metaphysics has actuaIIy been present
in aII human beings as soon as reason has extended itseII to specuIation
in them, and it wiII aIso aIways remain there. ^nd now about this too
the question is. Hovismctaphysicsasanatura!prcdisposiuonpos- az z
sib!cii. e. , how do the questions that pure reason raises, and which it is
driven by its own need to answer as weII as it can, arise Irom the nature
oI universaI human reason
!ut since unavoidabIe contradictions have aIways been Iound in aII
previous attempts to answer these naturaI questions, e.g., whether the
worId has a beginning or exists Irom eternity, etc., one cannot Ieave it
up to the mere naturaI predisposition to metaphysics, i. e. , to the pure
IacuIty oI reason itseII, Irom which, to be sure, some sort oI metaphysics
(whatever it might be) aIways grows, but it must be possibIe to bring it
` Some may still doubt this last point in the case of pure natural science. Yet one az
need merely consider the various propositions that come forth at the outset of
proper ,empirical) physics, such as those of the persistence of the same quan-
tity of matter, of inertia, of the equality of effect and counter-eect, etc., and
one will quickly be convinced that they constitute a hsica ura (or ratiena/is),
which well deserves to be separately established, as a science of its own, in its
whole domain, whether narrow or wide.
Princiien
I+7
!nuoducuon <B>
to certainty regarding either the knovIedge or ignorance oI obects, i. e. ,
to come to a decision either about the objects oI its questions or about
the capacity and incapacity oI reason Ior judging something about
them, thus either reIiabIy to extend our pure reason or eIse to set de-
terminate and secure Iimits Ior it. +his Iast question, vhich lIovs hom
the generaI probIem above, vouId rightly be this. Hovismctaphysics
possib!c asscicncc?
+he critique oI reason dus hnaIIy Ieads necessariIy to science, the
dogmatic use oI it vithout critque, on the contrary, Ieads to groundIess
nz
asserLions, to vhich one can oppose equaIIy pIausibIe ones, thus to
skcpucism.
!urther, this science cannot be terribIy extensive, Ior it does not deaI
vith obects" oI reason, vhose muItiplicity, is inhnite, but mereIy vith
itseII, vith probIems that spring entireIy Irom its ovn vomb, and that
are not set beIore it by the nature oI things that are distinct Irom it but
through its ovn nature, so that, once it has become compIeteIy IamiIiar
vith its ovn capaci in regard U the obJects that may come belore it
in experience, then it must become easy to determine, compIeteIy and
secureIy, the domain and the bounds oI its attempted use beyond aII
bounds oI experience.
+hus one can and must regard as undone aII attempts made unLiI nov
to bring about a metaphysics dogmauca!!y,Ior vhat is anaIytic in one
or the other oI them, nameIy the mere anaIysis oI the concepts that in-
habit our reason Hrier, is not the end at aII, but onIy a preparauon Ior
metaphysics proper, nameIy extending its H rieri cognition syntheti-
caIIy, and it is useIess Ior this end, because it mereIy shovs vhat is con-
tained in these concepts, but not hov ve attain such concepts Hrieri in
order Lhereaher to be abIe to determine their vaIid use in regard to the
s :q ob ects oI aII cognition in generaI. It aIso requires onIy a IittIe seII-
deniaI in order to give up aII these cIaims, since the contradictions oI
reason, vhich cannot be denied and vhich are also unavoidabIe in dog-
matic procedure, have Iong snce destroycd the authority oI every prc-
vious metaphysics. Nore resoIution viII be necessary in order not to Ie
deterred by internaI dimcuIty and externaI resistance Irom using an-
other approach,' entirely opposed to the previous one, in order to pro-
mote the productive and IruitIuI grovth oI a science that is indis-
pensabIe Ior human reason, and Irom vhich one can chop dovn every
stem that has shot up vithout ever being abIe to eradicate its root.
legenund|n:eegen
` O[ecten
Manniga/tigkeit
lc;ogen
Beband/ung
! +8
!nuoducuon <B>
11.
+he idea and division oI a speciaI science
under rhe name oI a cririque oI pure reason.
^ov Irom aII oI this there resuIts the idea oI a speciaI science, vhich A::
can be caIIed the criuquc ofpurc rcason.' !or' reason is the IacuIry
that provides rhe principIes oI cognition H rieri. !ence pure reason is
that vhich contains the principIes' Ior cognizing something absoIuteIy
H rieri. organonoI pure reason vouId be a sum totaI oI aII those
principIes in accordance vith vhich aII pure H rieri cognitions can be s z
acquired and actuaIIy brought about. +he exhaustive appIication oI
such an organon vouId create a system oI pure reason. But since that
requires a Iot, and it is stiII an open question vhether such an ampIih-
cation oI our knovIedge is possibIe at aII and in vhat cases it vouId be
possibIe, ve can regard a science oI ue mere estimation oI pure reason,
oI its sources and boundaries, as the propacdcutic to the system oI
pure reason. Such a thing vouId not be a doctrinc,but must be caIIed
onIy a cnuquc oI pure reason, and its utiIity in regard to specuIation
vouId reaIIy be onIy negative, serving not Ior the ampIihcation but onIy
Ior the purihcation oI our reason, and Ior keeping it Iree oI errors, by
vhich a great deaI is aIready won. ! caII aII cognition transcendentaI that
is occupied not so much vith objects but rather vith our mode oI cog-
nition oI objects insoIar as this is to be possibIe H rieri.
'
` AsystcmoI A: z
such concepts vouId be caIIed transccndcntaIphi!osophy. But this is
again too much Ior the beginning. !or since such a science vouId have
to contain compIeteIy both the anaIytic as veII as the synthetic H rieri
cognition, it is, so Iar' as our aim is concerned, too broad in scope, since
ve need to take the anaIysis onIy as Iar as is indispensabIy necessary in
order to provide insight into the principIes oI H rieri synthesis in their
entire scope, vhich is our onIy concem. Jhis investigation, vhich ve e :6
hcsccuonnumbcr` andthc IoIIowingtitIc arcinscrtcdat this pointinthcsccond
cdition, IoIIowingwhich thc tcxtcommonto thc tvo cditions rcsumcs,withminoraI-
tcrations.
` dieKritikderreinen lmun[be;enkann"substitutcd in thc sccondcditionIor die
zurKrtik der reinen |eun}dienenkcnne. "Ahcncxt tvo scntcnccs in thc lrst cdiuon
arcomittcd,sccAI I abovc.
Denn"substitutcdin thc sccondcditionIor Nun."
Princiien
' Princiien
' Princiien
^ innsebungderSeku/atien"addcdin thc sccond cdition.
sende mitunsererLrkennmisa:enGegenstanden, se}diee 8 priorimghchsem wll
subsututcd in thc sccond cdiuon Ior sende mit umo Begrt 8 po 70N
Gegenstanden."
' seweit"substitutcdIorinse}"in thcsccondcdition.
V
Introdvction <B>
can propcrIy caII not doctrinc but onIy transccndcntaI critiquc, sincc it
docs not aim at thc ampIihcaLion oI cognitions thcmscIvcs but onIy at
Lhcir corrcction, and is to suppIy thc touchstonc oI Lhc vorth or vorth-
Icssncss oI aII cognitions H rieri, is that vith vhich vc arc nov con-
ccrncd. Such a critiquc is accordingIy a prcparation, iI possibIc, Ior an
organon, and, iI this cannot bc accompIishcd, dcn aL IcasL Ior a canon,
in accordancc vith vhich thc compIctc systcm oI thc phiIosophy oI
purc rcason, vhcthcr iL is to consist in Lhc ampIihcation or mcrc Iimi-
tation oI its cognition, can in any casc at Icast somc day bc cxhibitcd
bod anaIyticaIIy and synthcticaIIy. or that dis shouId bc possibIc, in-
dccd that such a systcm shouId not bc too grcat in scopc Ior us to hopc
to bc abIc cntircIy to compIctc it, can bc asscsscd in advancc Irom thc
IacL Lhat our objcct is noL thc naLurc oI Lhings, vhich is incxhaustibIc,
a but thc undcrstanding, vhich judgcs about thc naturc oI things, and Lhis
in turn onIy in rcgard to its Hrieri cognition, thc suppIy oI vhich, sincc
vc do noL nccd Lo scarch Ior iL cxLcrnalIy, cannoL rcmain hiddcn Irom
uS, aD ID a IkCIDOO IS SDa CDOu_D !O DC cODC!C tCcOtC, I!S
vorth or vorthIcssncss asscsscd, and subj cctcd to a corrcct appraisaI.
s z
;
'!vcn Icss can onc cxpcct hcrc a critiquc oI thc books and systcms oI
purc rcason, but rathcr that oI thc purc IacuIty oI rcason itscIL CnIy iI
dis is onc's ground docs onc havc a sccurc touchstonc Ior appraising
thc phiIosophicaI contcnt oI oId and ncv vorks in this spcciaIty, othcr-
visc thc unquaIihcd historian and judgc asscsscs thc groundIcss asscr-
tions oI othcrs drough his ovn, vhich arc cquaIIy groundIcss.
ransccndcntaI phiIosophy is hcrc dc idca oI a scicncc, Ior vhich
thc criLiquc oI purc rcason is to outIinc Lhc cntirc pIan architcctonicaIIy,
i. c. , Irom principIcs,' vith a mII guarantcc Ior thc compIctcncss and ccr-
tainp oI aII thc componcnts thaL comprisc dis cdihcc. It is Lhc systcm
oI aII principIcs' oI purc rcason. +hat this critiquc is not itscII aIrcady
caIIcd transccndcntaI phiIosophy rcsts soIcIy on thc Iact that in ordcr Lo
bc a compIctc systcm it vouId aIso havc to contain an cxhaustivc anaIy-
sis oI aII oI human cognition Hrieri. ^ov our critiquc must, to bc surc,
Iay bcIorc us a compIctc cnumcraLion oI aII oI thc anccstraI conccpts'
that comprisc thc purc cognirion in qucsLion. CnIy it propcrly rcIrains
hom Lhc cxhausLivc anaIysis oI dcsc conccpts thcmscIvcs as vcII as
Begrenzung
`hcncxtno scntcnccs arc addcd inthc sccod cdition.
hc titIc "U. 1vson oInansccndcnta pb!osopby" pcscntin thcIrstcdition is
omittcdinthcsccond.
DieIdeeeinerhissenscba}"substitutcd inthcsccondcditionforbiernureineIdee."
' Princiien
' Princiien
' his scntcncc inscrtcd in thc sccond cdition.
Stammlegri[e
I S0
Inrroducrion <B>
Irom the compIete review oI aII oI dose derived Irom them, partIy be-
cause this anaIysis wouId not be purposemI, since it does not contain
the dimcuIty encountered in the synthesis on account oI which the
whoIe critique is actuaIIy undertaken, partIy because it wouId be con-
trary to the unip oI the pIan to take on responsibiIity Ior the com-
pIeteness oI such an anaIysis and derivation, Irom which one couId yet
be reIieved given irs aim. his completeness oI the analysis as weIl as
the derivation Irom the H rieri concepts that are to be provided in the
mture wiII nevertheIess be easy to compIete as Iong as they are present
as exhaustive principIes" oI synthesis, and iI nothing is Iacking in them
in regard to this essentiaI aim.
+o the critique oI pure reason there accordingIy beIongs everyrhing
that constitutes transcendentaI phiIosophy, and it is the compIete idea
oI transcendentaI phiIosophy, but is not yet this science itseII, since it
goes onIy so Iar in the anaIysis as is requisite Ior the compIete estima-
tion oI synrhetic H rieri cogtion.
he chieI target in the division oI such a science is that absoIuteIy no
concept must enter into it that contains anything empiricaI, or that the
H rieri cognition be entireIy pure. !ence, aIthough the supreme prin-
cipIes oI moraIity and the lundamentaI concepts oI it are H rieri cogni-
tions, they stiII do not beIong in transcendentaI phiIosophy,' Ior, whiIe
they do not, to be sure, take the concepts oI pIeasure and dispIeasure,
oI desires and incIinations, etc., which are aII oI empiricaI origin, as the
ground oI their precepts, they stiII must necessariIy incIude them in the
composition oI ue system oI pure moraIity in the concept oI duty, as
the hindrance that must be overcome or the attraction that ought not
to be made into a motive. !ence transcendentaI phiIosophy is a phiIos-
ophy oI pure, mereIy specuIative reason. !or everything practicaI, in-
soIar as it contains incentives,' is reIated to IeeIings, which beIong
among empiricaI sources oI cognition.
^ow iI one wants to set up the division oI uis science Irom the gen-
eraI viewpoint oI a system in generaI, then what we wiII now present
must contain hrst a Doctnncof!cmcnts and second a Doctnncof
McthodoI pure reason. !ach of these main parts wiII have its subdivi-
sion, the grounds Ior which cannot yet be expounded. AII that seems
zweckmo}ig
` Princiien
' hcrcmaindcroIthisscntcnccinthcsccondcditionissubstitutcdIorthcIoIIowingin
thc Irst. "sinccthcconccptsoIpIcasurcanddispIcasurc,oIdcsircsand incIinations, oI
choicc,ctc.,whicharc aIIoIcmpiricaIorigin,mustthcrcbybcprcsupposcd. "
/tweibeit
Bewegungsgrunde in thc hrst cdition is rcpIaccd in thc sccond with Trielde to Icavc
roomIorthcidca thataIthoughinccntivcs bascdonIccIingsarcnotadcquatcIormoraI-
ity, thcrccanbcothcr,morcpurcIyrationaImotivcsIorit.
5
z :
n :p
Inrroducrion <B>
necessary lor an introduction or pteIiminaty is chac chere are cuo scems
ol human cognition, vhich may perhaps arise Irom a common but to us
unknovn root, nameIy sensibiIity and understanding, drough the hrst
ol vhich objects are given to us, but through the second oI vhich they
are thought. ^ov il sensibiIity vere co contain H rieri representations,
no vhich consutute the condition under vhich objects are given to us, it
viII beIong to transcendentaI phiIosophy. Jhe transcendentaI doctrine
n : 6 oI the senses viII have t o beIong to the hrst part oI the science oI eIe-
ments, since the condic|ons under which aIone che objeccs of !uman
cognition are given precede those under vhich those objects are
thought.
Bedingung"inmc sccond cditionrcpIaccs Bedinngen"n tbc nrst.
I 5?
1.
Transcenenta/ Dctrine ) I/ements

Tbe Trans.enenta/ D.trine ) I/ements
Iirst Iart
Tbe Trans.enenta/ .estbeti.' '
In vhatever vay and through vhatever means a cognition may reIate
to obects, that through vhich it reIates immediateIy to them, and at
vhich aII thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition."` his,
Iovever, takes pIace onIy insoIar as the obect is given to us, but this in
turn, is possibIe onIy iI it aIIects the mind in a certain vay. +he capac-
ity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the vay in vhich
ve are aIIected by obects is caIIed sensibiIity. Cbects are thereIore
given to us by means oI sensibiIity, and it aIone auords us intuitions,
but they are thought through the understanding, and Irom it arise
concepts. But aII thought, vhether straightavay (irecte) or through a
detour (inire:te), must uItimateIy be reIated to intuitions, thus, in our
case, to sensibiIiry, since there is no other vay in vhich obects can be
given to us.
he euect oI an obect on the capacity Ior representation, insoIar as e q
ve are aIIected by it, is scnsation.

+hat intuition vhich is reIated to the n zo

obect through sensation is caIIed cmpirica!.he undetermined obect
oI an empiricaI inruition is caIIed appcarancc. '
I caII dat in the appearance vhich corresponds to sensation its mattcr,
but that vhich aIIovs the maniIoId oI appearance to be inruited as or-
hc "ransccndcntaIAcsthctic"undcrwcntmaorchangcsbctwccnthctwo cditions oI
thc Critique, incIuding but not Iimitcd to thc scparation oI thc "NctaphysicaI" and
"ransccndcntal"cxpositionsoIspaccandtimcandthc addition oIthrccscctionsto thc
concIuding "CcncraI Kcmarks. "Vc thcrcIorc prcscntbothvcrsions in thcir cntircty,
using thc marginaI pagination and notcs to showwhcrc spcciIc changcs wcrc madc.
hc loIlowingvcrsion homthc hrstcdition aIso incIudcs thcnotcsKantmadc inhis
owncopyolthatcdition.
` hc IoIIowingnotc isinscrtcdinKant'scopy.
"intuition] isopposcdto thc conccpt, which is mcrcIy thc markoIintuition.
"hcunivcrsaI must bc givcn in thc particular. hrough that it has signiIcancc.
(!X, p. :, z. :: )
' Addcd i nKant's copy. "IIthc rcprcscntation i s not i nitscIIthc causc oI thc objcct
Olectt] ."(E X,p. zj: zt)
AddcdinKant'scopy. 'IntuitionisrcIatctothcob,cctOl,ect] ,scnsationmcrcIytothc
subcct."(EXII, p. : , : . z :)
I JS
Doctrine of Elements Part I <
dered in cerrain reIarions "1 caII Lhe fomoI appearance. Since rhar viLhin
vhich rhe sensauons can aIone be ordered and pIaced in a cerLain Iorm
cannor irseII be in Lurn sensarion, rhe marLer oI aII appearance is onIy
given Lo us H everieri, bur iLs Io musL aII Iie ready Ior iL in rhe mind H
rieri, and can rhereIore be considered separareIy hom aII sensarion.
1 caII aII represenrarions pure (in rhe rranscendenraI sense) in vhich
norhing is ro be encounrered rhar beIongs ro sensarion. AccordingIy rhe
pure Iorm oI sensibIe inLuirions in generaI is ro be encounrered in rhe
mind H rieri, vherein aII oI Lhe maniIoId oI appearances is inruired in
cerrain reIaLions. his pure Iorm oI sensibiIiLy irseII is aIso caIIed pure
a}
inruirion. So iI separare Irom rhe represenrarion oI a body rhar vhich
rhe undersranding rhinks abour ir, such as subsrance, Iorce, divisibiIiLy,
n z : eLc., as veII as rhaL vhich beIongs Lo sensaLion, such as impeneLrabiIiLy,
hardness, coIor, erc., somerhing hom rhis empiricaI inruirion is sLiII IeIr
Ior me, nameIy exrension and Iorm. +hese beIong ro rhe pure inruirion,
vhich occurs Hrieri, even virhour an acruaI objecr oI rhe senses or sen-
saLion, as a mere Iorm oI sensibiIiLy in Lhe mind.
I caII a science oI aII principIes' oI urieri sensibiIiry rhe transccn-
dcntal acsthcuc.*' here musr rhereIore be such a science, vhich
a}
6 consriLures rhe hrsr parr oI rhe rranscendenraI docrrine oI eIemenrs, in
conrrasr ro rhar vhich conrains rhe principIes oI pure rhinking, and is
named rranscendenraI Iogic.
nz : /n
}
* Jhe Germans are the only ones who now employ the word aesthetics" to
designate that which others call the critique of taste. Jhe ground for this is a
failed hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical
estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason,' and elevating its rules
to a science. But this effort is futile. !or the putative rules or criteria are
merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never
serve as H rieri rules according U which our judgment of taste must be di-
rected, rather the latter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness
uj6 of the former. !or this reason i t i s advisable again to desist from the use ofthis
term and to save it for that doctrine which is true science ,whereby one would
come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients, among whom the
division of cognition into oto0q:o sot voq:o was very well known).
|crbaItnissen.Kantuscsthc tcrm |crbaItnisthroughoutthc "ransccndcntaIAcsthctic"
to dcnotc thc rcIation among scvcraI things occupying dihcrcntpositionsin spacc or
timc, rcscrvingthcwordBeziebungtodcnotcthc rcIation bctwccnobccts andthccog-
nitivc subcct (in which scnsc itisuscdonIyfourtimcs, to bc notcd bcIow, in thc fnaI
scctionoIthc"ransccndcntaIAcsthctic").Sincc"rcIauon"oritspIuraIwiIIthusaImost
aIwaysbctransIatinglrbo/tnisoritspIuraI,IrthcrnotcsoIthcoccurrcnccoIthistcrm
inthc"ransccndcnta!Acsthctc"wIIbcomittcd.
` Princiien
Princiien
Iun}rinciien
I S
Secuon 1. On Space <A
In the transcendentaI aesthetic we wiII thereIore rst isoIate sensibiI- A2 2
ity by separating oh everything that the understanding thinks through
its concepts, so that nothing but empiricaI inuition remains. Second,
we wiII then detach Irom the Iatter everything that beIongs to sensation,
so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere Iorm oI ap-
pearances, which is the onIy thing that sensibiIity can make avaiIabIe H
rieri. In this investigation it wiII be Iound that there are two pure Iorms
oI sensibIe intuition as principIes oI H rieri cognition, nameIy space
and time, with the assessment oI which we wiII now be concemed.
he ranscendentaI ^esthetic s j ;
Iirst Section
fn space.
'^ By means oI outer sense (a property oI our mind) we represent to our-
seIves objects as outside us, and aII as in space. In space their Iorm,
magnitude, and reIation to one another is determined, or deter-
minabIe,' Inner sense, by means oI which the mind intuits itseII, or its
inner sta

, gives, to be sure, no intuition oI the souI itseII, as an ob-

ect," yet it is stiII a determinate Iorm, under which the intuition oI its A2
inner state is aIone possibIe, so that everything that beIongs to the
inner determinations is represented in reIations oI time. Jime can no
more be intuited externaIIy than space can be intuited as something in
us. ^ow what are space and time ^re they actuaI entities' ^re they
onIy determinations or reIations oI things, yet ones that wouId pertain
to them even iI they were not intuited, or are they reIations that onIy
attach to the Iorm oI intuition aIone, and thus to the subective consti- a8
tution oI our mind, without which these predicates couId not be as-
cribed to any thing at aII In order to instruct ourseIves about this, we
wiII consider space hrst.
:) Space is not an empiricaI concept that has been drawn hom outer
experiences. !or in order Ior certain sensations to be reIated to some-
thing outside me (i. e. , to something in another pIace in space Irom that
in which I hnd myseIl), thus in order Ior me to represent them as out-
side one another, thus not mereIy as diherent but as in diherent pIaces,
the representation oI space must aIready be their ground. Jhus the
representation oI space cannot be obtained Irom the reIations oI outer
Princiien
Olect
wirk/icbe 0sen
lezegen
1
CCDnC C!CmCnIs. 1at I. hC ransCCndCnIaCsIhCIC <
appearance through experience, bur rhis outer experience is itseII hrsr
possibIe onIy through rhis representarion.
az| z)'Space is a necessary representarion, Hrieri, which is the ground oI
aII ourer inruitions.

Cne can never represenr rhat uere is no space, aI-
though one can very weII rhink thar there are no objects to be encoun-
s p tered i n it. !t i s thereIore to be regarded as the condiuon oI rhe possi-
biIiry oI appearances, not as a determination dependent on rhem, and is
an Hreri represenration that necessariIy grounds outer appearances.'
j) Jhe apodicric certainty oI aII geometricaI principIes and rhe possi-
biIiry oI their Hrieri construcrion are grounded in this Hrieri necessiry.
!or iI rhis representation oI space were a concept acquired H esterieri,
which was drawn out oI generaI outer experience, rhe hrst principIes oI
mathematicaI determination wouId be norhing bur perceptions. +hey
wouId thereIore have aII rhe contingency oI perceprion, and it wouId not
even be necessary uat onIy one straight Iine Iie berween rwo poinrs, but
experience wouId mereIy aIways teach rhar. Vhat is borrowed hom ex-
perience aIways has onIy comparative universaIity, nameIy through in-
ducrion. Cne wouId thereIore onIy be abIe to say rhat as Iar as has been
observed to date, no space has been Iound that has more than three
dimensions.
d,1O
() Space is not a discursive or, as is said, generaI concept oI reIations
\
z
J
oI rhings in generaI, but a pure inruition. !or, hrst, one can onIy repre-
sent a singIe space, and iI one speaks oI many spaces, one undersrands
by rhar onIy parrs oI one and rhe same unique space. '

And uese parrs
cannot as it were precede the singIe aII-encompassing space as its com-
ponents (Irom which its composition wouId be possibIe), bur rather are
onIy rhought in it. !t is essentiaIIy singIe, the maniIoId in ir, thus aIso
hcIoIIowingnotcisaddcdatthcbottomoIthispagcinKant's copy.
: .] Spacc isnota conccpt, butanintuition.
z . - notancmpiricaIintuition,!orcvcrythingcmpiricaI onccan . . .
. ItisanHrieriintuition . . .
q. Spaccisthcsubjcctivc lorm . . . "(!XI!I, p. :6, z . zz)
` AddcdinKant'scopy.
Spacc is not a conccpt oIcxtcrnaI rcIations, as !cibniz supposcd, but thatwhich
grounds thcpossibiIityoIcxtcraI rcIations.
hcncccssioIthc rcIationoIourpropositions tosomcthingcxtcrnaI is a prooI
oIthc rcaI conncction'inwhich wc stand with cxtcrnaI things, against idcaIism." (!
XJp. : 6, z. zz)
' InscrtcdinKant'scopy.
Spaccisnotaconccptdcrivcdhomcxpcricncc, butagroundolpossibIcoutcrcx-
pcricncc.Imusthavc a conccpt olspacc il. . . "(!Xp. :6, z . z:)
!rooIoI thcidcaIityoI spaccIromthcsynthcticHrieriproposition.ol.andoI. sic]
his is no hypothcsis . . . jsic] "(!X,p. :6, z: zz)
hisparagraphi sdcIctcdi nthcsccondcdiuon,andrcpIaccdby, hcransccndcn-
taI!xpositionoIthc ConccptoISpacc" (sqc:).
|rlindung
I ` b
Secuon I. On Space <A>
thc gcncraI conccpt oI spaccs in gcncraI, rcsts mcrcIy on Iimitations.
!rom this it IoIIovs that in rcspcct to it an a rieri intuition (vhich is
not cmpiricaI) grounds aII conccpts oI thcm. Jhus aIso aII gcomctricaI
principIcs, c. g. , that in a triangIc tvo sidcs togcthcr arc aIvays grcatcr
than thc third, arc ncvcr dcrivcd Irom gcncraI conccpts oI Iinc and tri-
angIc, but rathcr arc dcrivcd Irom inruirion and indccd dcrivcd a rieri
vith apodictic ccrtainty.
) Spacc is rcprcscntcd as a givcn inhnitc magnitudc. AgcncraI con-
ccpt oI spacc (vhich is common to a Ioot as vcII as an cII) can dctcrminc
nothing in rcspcct to magnitudc. II thcrc vcrc not boundIcssncss in thc
progrcss oI intuition, no conccpt oI rcIations couId bring vith it a prin-
cipIc oI thcir inhnity."
.

ConcIusions Irom thc abovc conccprs.
a) Spacc rcprcscnts no propcrty at aII oI any things in thcmscIvcs nor
any rcIation oI thcm to cach othcr, i. c. , no dctcrmination oI thcm that
attachcs to obccts thcmscIvcs and that vouId rcmain cvcn iI onc vcrc
to abstract Irom aII subcctivc conditions oI intuition. !or ncithcr ab-
soIutc nor rcIativc dctcrminations can bc intuitcd prior to thc cxistcncc
oI thc things to vhich thcy pcrtain, thus bc intuitcd a rieri.
/) Spacc is nothing othcr than mcrcIy thc Iorm oI aII appcaranccs oI
outcr scnsc, i. c. , thc subcctivc condition oI scnsibiIiry, undcr vhich
aIonc outcr intuition is possibIc Ior us. ^ov sincc thc rcccptiity oI thc
subcct to bc aIIcctcd by obccts ncccssariIy prcccdcs aII intuitions oI
thcsc obccts, it can bc undcrstood hov thc Iorm oI aII appcaranccs can
bc givcn in thc mind prior to aII actuaI pcrccptions, thus a rieri, and
hov as a purc intuition, in vhich aII obccts must bc dctcrmincd, it can
contain principIcs oI thcir rcIations prior to aII cxpcricncc.
Vc can accordingIy spcak oI spacc, cxtcndcd bcings, and so on, onIy
hom thc human standpoint. II vc dcpart Irom thc subcctivc condition
undcr vhich aIonc vc can acquirc outcr inruition, namcIy that through
vhich vc may bc aIIcctcd by obccts, thcn thc rcprcscntation oI spacc
Princiium
` hisparagraphischangcdin thc sccond cdition, scc paragraphq, s qo bcIow.
Princiien
Inscrtcd in Kant's copy. "Spacc and timc carry with thcm in thcir rcprcscntation thc
conccptoIncccssity. ^owthis isnotthc ncccssityoIa conccpt. !orwccanprovc that
thcirnon-cxistcnccisnotcontradictory. ^cccssityaIsocannotIicinthc cmpiricaIintu-
ition. !or this can, to bc surc, carrywith itthc conccptoIcxistcncc, butnotolncccs-
sary cxistcncc. hus this ncccssity is not in thc obcct jOlect]" objcctivc at aII,
conscqucntIy it isonIya ncccssary condition oIthc subcct Ior aII pcrccptions oIthc
scnscs." p. :y, z. :z)
I S
e
+z 8
Doctrine of Elements. Part 1 . Jhe Jranscendenral Aesthetic <A
signihes nothing at aII. Jhis predicate is attributed to things onIy inso-
Iar as they appear to us, i. e. , are objects oI sensibiIity." ' Jhe constant
Iorm oI this receptivity, vhich ve caII sensibiIity, is a necessary condi-
tion oI aII the reIations vithin vhich objects can be intuited as outside
us, and, iI one abstracts Irom these objects, it is a pure intuition, vhich
bears the name oI space. Since ve cannot make the speciaI conditions oI
sensibiIity into conditions oI the possibiIity oI things, but onIy oI their
appearances, ve can veII say that space comprehends aII things that
may appear to us externaIIy, but not aII things in themseIves, vhether
they be intuited or not, or by vhatever subject they may be intuited.
!or ve cannot judge at aII vhether the intuitions oI other thinking be-
ings are bound to the same conditions that Iimit our intuition and that
are universaIIy vaIid Ior us. II ve add the Iimitation' oI a judgment to the
concept oI the subject, then the judgment is unconditionaIIy vaIid. Jhe
proposition ^Il things are next to one anoder in space" is vaIid onIy
under the Iimitation that these things be taken as objects oI our sensibIe
intuition. IIhere I add the condition to the concept and say. l things,
as outer intuitions, are next to one another in space," then this ruIe is
vaIid universaIIy and vithout Iimitation. Cur expositions accordingIy
teach the rcaIity(i.e., objective vaIidity) oI space in regard to everything
that can come beIore us externaIIy as an object, but at the same time the
idcaIityoI space in regard to things vhen they are considered in them-
seIves through reason, i. e. , vithout taking account oI the constitution oI
our sensibiIity. Ve thereIore assert the cmpiricaIrcaIityoI space (vith
respect to aIl possibIe outer experience), though to be sure at de same
time its transccndcntaI idcaIity, i.e. , that it is nothing as soon as ve
Ieave out the condition oI the possibiIity oI aII experience, and take it as
something that grounds the things in themseIves.
Inscrtcd in Kant`s copy. !crhaps aII crcatcd bcings arc bound to it, that wc do not
ow. hismuch onccanknow,thatitisamcrcIyscnsibIc Iorm.hcmostimportant
thing is that ityicds a dctcrminatc conccpt arieri, and throughinncrintuitionwc
wouId nothavcscnsations, thusno cmpiricaIrcprcscntationsandnoscicnccoIobccts
Olecte] arier. "(!XiII,p. ;, z . z)
IcrcKant's copyinscrts: "asNcndcIssohn couId soapodicticaIIy asscrt, sincc hcstiI
gavcspaccobcctivcrcaity. " (!X,p. : ;, z .qq)
Ataboutthispoint, this partiaIIy dcciphcrabIcnotc aIso appcars:
Ficld ospacc and onmc.
": . Both cannot cxtcndIurthcr than to obccts oIthc scnscs, thus not to Cod, z .
!vcnamongthcscthcyarcvaIid onIyoIthingsasobcctsoI. . . " (!XX,p. : ;, z . z)
IcrcKant`scopyinscrts"cvcr" (nurimmer)(!/, p. : 8, z j .qq).
InhiscopyKantcrosscsout"ornot,or" (!XII,p. : 8, z .qq).
Kant'scopychangcs"Iimitation"to"Iimiungcondition" (!XIII,p. : 8, z .q).
' InhiscopyKantchangcsthisproposiuonto"^IIthingsarcncxtU oncanothcrinspacc
orthcyarcsomcwhcrc"(!X p. t8, z .q).
^ InhiscopyIntinscrts"aIso"(changingolzwar"toaleraucb"(F X p. t8, z .q)
I 0
Secuon !. On Space <A
Besides space, hovever, there is no other subjecLive representaLion
reIated to something externaI that couId be caIIed H rieri objective.
"!ence this subjective condition oI aII outer appearances cannot be
compared vith any other. Jhe pIeasant taste oI a vine does not beIong
to the obj ecLive determinations oI the vine, thus oI an objecL even con-
sidered as an appearance, but rather to the particuIar constitution oI
sense in the subject that enjoys it. CoIors are not objective quaIities oI
the bodies to Lhe intuition oI vhich Lhey are attached, but are aIso onIy
modihcaLions oI Lhe sense oI sight, vhich is ahected by Iight in a cer-
tain vay. Space, on the contrary, as a condiLion oI outer objects, neces-
sariIy beIongs to their appearance or intuition. Jaste and coIors are by
no means necessary conditions under vhich aIone the objects can be nz
obj ects' oI the senses Ior us. Jhey are onIy combined vith Lhe appear-
ance as contingentIy added eIIects oI the particuIar organizaLion. !ence
they are not Hrieri representations, but are grounded on sensaLion, and
pIeasant taste is even grounded on IeeIing (oI pIeasure and dispIeasure)
as an ehecL oI Lhe sensaLion. Ad no one can have urieri Lhe represen-
tation either oI a coIor or oI any taste. but space concerns onIy the pure
Iorm oI intuition, thus it incIudes no sensation (nothing empiricaI) in it-
seII, and aII kinds and determinations oI space can and even must be
abIe to be represented H rieri iI concepts oI shapes as veII as reIaLions
are to arise. Jhrough space aIone is it possibIe Ior things to be outer ob-
j ects Ior us.
Jhe aim oI this remark is onIy to prevent one Irom thinking oI iIIus- aq
trating the asserted ideaIiLy oI space viLh compIeteIy inadequate exam-
pIes, since things Iike coIors, taste, etc., are correctIy considered not as
quaIiLies oI things but as mere aIteraLions oI our subject, vhich can even
be diIIerent in diherent peopIe. or in Lhis case that vhich is originaIIy
itseII onIy appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empiricaI sense as a
thing in itseII, vhich yet can appear diherent to every eye in regard to no
coIor. Jhe transcendentaI concept oI appearances in space, on Lhe con-
trary, is a criticaI reminder that absoIuteIy nothing that is intuited in
space is a thing in itseII, and that space is not a Iorm that is proper to
lezegene
i
hc rcmaindcroIthis paragraphis aItcrcd inthc sccond cdition. sccs, bcIow.
Olect
Ojecte
'Ojecte
'Inscrtcdinthc margin oIKant'scopy.
Iurc idcaIism conccrs thc cxistcncc oIthings outsidcus. CriticaI idcaIismIcavcs
that undccidcd, and asscrts onIy thatthc Iorm oIthcir intuition is mcrcly in us." (!
Xi, p. :8, z. z)
AIurthcrnotcadds."^idcaIism,homwhichthcpossibiIityoI anHriericognition
andoImathcmaticscanbccognizcd."(!XII, p. : , z . z)
I I
Docuine of EIements. Parr . Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <A>
anything in itseII, but rather that obects in themseIves are not knovn
to us at aII, and that vhat ve caII outer objects are nothing other than
mere representations oI our sensibiIity, vhose Iorm is space, but vhose
true correIate, i. e. , the thing in itseII, is not and cannot be cognized
through them, but is aIso never asked aher in experience.
he ranscendentaI ^esthetic
Second ScCtion
n tmc. '
: ) Jime is not an empiricaI concept that is somehov dravn Irom an ex-
perience. !or simuItaneity or succession vouId not themseIves come
into perception iI the representation oI time did not ground them Hri-
eri. CnIy under its presupposition can one represent that severaI things
exist at one and the same time (simuItaneousIy) or in diIIerent times
(successiveIy).
n I z) Jime is a necessary representation that grounds aII intuitions. In
regard to appearances in generaI one cannot remove time, though one
can very veII take the appearances avay Irom time. +ime is thereIore
given Hrieri. In it aIone is aII actuaIity oI appearances possibIe. +he Iat-
ter couId aII disappear, but time itseII, as the universaI condition oI their
possibiIity, cannot be removed.
s q; j) Jhis H rieri necessity aIso grounds the possibiIity oI apodictic
principIes oI the reIations oI time, or axioms oI time in generaI. It has
onIy one dimension. diuerent times are not simuItaneous, but succes-
sive (just as diuerent spaces are not successive, but simuItaneous).
Jhese principIes couId not be dravn Irom experience, Ior this vouId
yieId neither strict universaIity nor apodictic certainty. Ve vouId onIy
be abIe to say. Jhis is vhat common perception teaches, but not. +his
is hov matters must stand. Jhese principIes are vaIid as ruIes under
vhich experiences are possibIe at aII, and instruct us prior to them, not
through it."
() +ime is no discursive or, as one caIIs it, generaI concept, but a pure
n j z Iorm oI sensibIe intuition. OiIIerent times are onIy parts oI one and the
same time. ' Jhat representation, hovever, vhich can onIy be given
through a singIe object, is an intuition. !urther, the proposition that
diuerent times cannot be simuItaneous cannot be derived Irom a gen-
hc "I

isactuaIyprintcdatabovcthcccntcroIthc hrstIinc oIthis paragraphrathcr

than atits bcginning.
hc tcxt rcads "le/ebrenuns:erderse/len, undnicbtdurcb diese/le." !arIicr cditors sug-
gcstcd cmcndngthc Iastword to diese/len"but Ithc scntcncc is intcrprctcd to mcan
"instructs us prior to cxpcricnccs, not through common pcrccption," it can bc rca
withoutcmcndation.
I
Secuon !!. On uC <A
eial concept. Jhe pioposition is synthetic, and cannot aiise liom con-
cepts alone. !t is theieloie immediately contained in the intuition and
iepiesentation ol time.
,
) Jhe inhnitude ol time signihes nothing moie than that eveiy de-
teiminate magnitude ol time is only possible thiough limitations ol a a
(
8
single time giounding it. Jhe oiiginal iepiesentation, time, must theie-
loie be given as unlimited. 8ut wheie the paits themselves and eveiy
magnitude ol an object can be deteiminately iepiesented only thiough
limitation, theie the entiie iepiesentation cannot be given thiough
concepts (loi then the paitial iepiesentations piecede) but theii imme-
diate intuition must be the giound. '
Conclusions hom these concepts. r
|,
a) Jime is not something that would subsist loi itsell oi attach to things
as an objective deteimination, and thus iemain il one abstiacted liom
all subjective conditions ol the intuition ol them, loi in the hist case it
would be something that was actual yet without an actual object. lai
as the second case is conceined, howevei, time could not piecede the n j
}
obj ects as a deteimination oi oidei attaching to the things themselves
as theii condition and be cognized and intuited a rieri thiough syn-
thetic piopositions. 8ut the lattei, on the contiaiy, can veiy well occui
il time is nothing othei than the subjective condition undei which all
intuitions can taLe place in us. Ioi then this loim ol innei intuition can
be iepiesented piioi to the objects, thus a rieri.
: 8
/) Jime is nothing othei than the loim ol innei sense, i. e. , ol the in-
tuition ol oui sell and oui innei state. ' Ioi time cannot be a deteimi-
nation ol outei appeaiances, it belongs neithei to a shape oi a position, s o
etc., but on the contiaiy deteimines the ielation ol iepiesentations in
oui innei state. Ad just because this innei intuition yields no shape we
also attempt to iemedy this lacL thiough analogies, and iepiesent the
tempoial sequence thiough a line piogiessing to inhnity, in which the
manilold constitutes a seiies that is ol only one dimension, and inlei
liom the piopeities ol this line to all the piopeities ol time, with the
sole diheience that the paits ol the loimei aie simultaneous but those
ol the lattei always exist successively. Iiom this it is also appaient that
the iepiesentation ol time is itsell an intuition, since all its ielations can
be expiessed in an outei intuition.
c) Jime is the a rieri loimal condition ol all appeaiances in geneial. a
|
Space, as the puie loim ol all outei intuitions, is limited as an H rieri
condition meiely to outei intuitions. 8ut since, on the contiaiy, all iep-
iesentations, whethei oi not they have outei things as theii object, nev-
eitheless as deteiminations oI the mind themselves belong to the innei
state, while this innei state belongs undei the loimal condition of innei
IJ
Doctrine of Elemenrs. Part 1.Jhe Jranscendenral Aesrhetic <A
intuition, and thus ol time, so time is an H rieri condition ol all ap-
pearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition ol the inner
intuition (ol our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition ol outer
B appearances. Il ! can say H rieri: all outer appearances are in space and
determined H rieri according to the relations ol space, so hom the
principle ol inner sense ! can say entirely generally. all appearances in
general, i.e., all objects ol the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand
in relations ol time.
Il we abstract hom our way ol interally intuiting ourselves and by
means ol this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the
power ol representation, and thus taLe objects as they may be in them-
selves, then time is nothing. !t is only ol objective validity in regard to
appearances, because these are already things that we taLe as objcctsof
A
{
ourscnscs,but it is no longer objective il one abstracts lrom the sen-
sibility ol our intuition, thus lrom that Lind ol representation that is pe-
culiar to us, and speaLs ol thingsmgcncraI.Jime is therelore merely
a suhjective condition ol our (human) intuition (which is always sensi-
ble, i. e. , insolar as we are aected by objects), and in itsell, outside the
subject, is nothing. ^oneueless it is necessarily objective in regard to
all appearances, thus also in regard to all things that can come belore us
in experience. Ve cannot say all things are in time, because with the
nz concept ol things in general abstraction i s made lrom every Lind ol in-
tuition ol them, but this is the real condition under which time belongs
to the representation ol objects. ^ow il the condition is added to the
concept, and the principle says that all things as appearances (objects ol
sensible intuition) are in time, then the principle has its sound objective
correctness and Hrieri universality.
ur assertions accordingly teach the cmpiricaI rcaIity ol time, i. e. ,
objective validity in regard to all objects that may ever be given to our
senses. Ad since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be
given to us in experience that would not belong under the condition ol
time. 8ut, on the contrary, we dispute all claim ol time to absolute re-
ality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition
Aj6 or properq even wiuout regard to the lorm ol our sensible intuition.
Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can never be
given to us through the senses. In this therelore consists the transccn-
dcntaIidcaIityol time, according to which it is nothing at all il one ab-
stracts hom the subjective conditions ol sensible intuition, and cannot
be counted as either subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves
(without their relation to our intuition). Yet this ideality is to be com-
s
{
pared with the subreptions ol sensauon just as little as that ol space is,
because in that case one presupposes that the appearance itsell, in which
Princ:
I +
Secrion H. On Jime <A
these piedicates inheie, has objective ieality, which is heie entiiely ab-
sent except insofai as it is meiely empiiical, i. e. , the object itself is ie-
gaided meiely as appeaiance. conceining which the above iemaiL in
the pievious section is to be consulted.
!lucidation.
Against this theoiy, which concedes empiiical ieality to time but dis-
putes its absolute and tianscendental ieality, insightml men have so
unanimously pioposed one objection that I conclude that it must natu-
ially occui to eveiy ieadei who is not accustomed to these consideia-
tions.`` It goes thus. Alteiations aie ieal (this is pioved by the change of A
j
;
oui own iepiesentations, even if one would deny all outei appeaiances
togethei with theii alteiations). ^ow alteiations aie possible only in
time, theiefoie time is something ieal. Jheie is no dimculty in answei-
ing. I admit the entiie aigument. Jime is ceitainly something ieal,
namely the ieal foim of innei intuition. !t theiefoie has subjective ieal-
ity in iegaid to innei expeiience, i. e. , I ieally have the iepiesentation of
time and of my deteiminations in it. It is theiefoie to be iegaided ie- a,(
ally not as object but as the way of iepiesenting myself as object' 8ut
if I oi anothei being could intuit myself without this condition of sen-
sibility, then these veiy deteiminations, which we now iepiesent to oui-
selves as alteiations, would yield us a cognition in which the iepiesen-
tation of time and thus also of alteiation would not occui at all. Its
empiiical ieality theiefoie iemains as a condition of all oui expeiiences.
nly absolute ieality cannot be gianted to it accoiding to what has been
adduced above. It is nothing except the foim of oui innei intuition. *If
* ! can, ro be sure, say. my represenrarions succeed one anorher, bur rhar only
means rhar we are conscious of rhem as in a temporal sequence, i. e., accord-
ing ro rhe form of inner sense. Jime is nor on rhar accounr somerhing in ir-
self, nor any deretminarion objecrively adhering ro rhings.
his rcIcrs tonz8o/sqq in .
` Inscrtcdin Kant'scopy, bcIorcthcncxtscction. SpaccandumcarcnotmcrcIyIogicaI
Iorms oIourscnsibiIity, i.c.,thcydonotconsistinthcIactthatwcrcprcscntactuaIrc-
Iauons to ourscIvcs conIscdIy, Ior thcn how couIdwcdcrivchom thcm urierisyn-
thctic and nuc propositions:Vc do not intuit spacc, but inaconIuscd manncr, rathcr
itis thc Iorm oIour intuition. ScnsibiIityisnotconIsion oIrcprcscntations, butthc
subjccuvc conditionoIconsciousncss."(!XII, p. zo, z . z)
Kant's copyadds.Soi sspacc.hisprovcs thathcrc a rcaIity(conscqucntIyaIsoindi-
viduaIintuition)isgivcn,whichyctaIwaysgroundsthcrcaIityasathing. Spaccandtimc
donotbcIongto thc rcaIity oIthings, butonIytoourrcprcscntations."(!X,p.zo,
z :zq)
" Olect
Olectt
IS
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <A
one iemoves the special condition ol oui sensibility hom it, then the
concept ol time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects
nj8 themselves, iather merely to the subject that intuits them. ''
Jhe cause, howevei, on account ol which this objection is so unani-
mously made, and indeed by those who nevertheless Lnow ol nothing
8
JJ
convincing to object against the doctrine ol the ideality ol space, ' is
this. Jhey did not expect to be able to demonstrate the absolute ieality
ol space apodictically, since they were conhonted by idealism, accord-
ing to which the reality ol outer objects is not capable ol any stiict prool,
on the contiary, the ieality ol the object ol our inner sense (ol mysell
and my state) is immediately cleai through consciousness. Jhe loimei
could have been a mere illusion, but the lattei, accoiding to their opin-
ion, is undeniably something ieal. 8ut they did not considei that both,
without theii ieality as iepresentations being disputed, nevertheless be-
long only to appeaiance, which always has two sides, one where the ob-
j ect is considered in itsell (wiuout regard to the way in which it is to be
intuited, the constitution ol which howevei must lor that very ieason al-
ways remain problematic), the other where the loim ol the intuition ol
this object is consideied, which must not be sought in the object in it-
sell but in the subject to which it appeais, but which neveitheless ieally
and necessarily peitains to the representation ol this object.
Jime and space aie accoidingly two sources ol cognition, liom which
n dilleient synthetic cognitions can be diawn H rieri, ol which especially
pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions ol space and its relations
e 6 provides a splendid example.'

8oth taLen togethei aie, namely, the
puie loims ol all sensible intuition, and theieby maLe possible synthetic
H rieri piopositions. 8ut these H rieri souices ol cognition determine
theii own boundaiies by that very lact (that they aie meiely conditions
ol sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only so lai as they are
considered as appeaiances, but do not present things in themselves.
Jhose alone are the held ol their validity, beyond which no mrther ob-
j ective use ol them taLes place. Jhis reality ol space and time, mruer,
leaves the certainty ol expeiiential cognition untouched. loi we aie just
as certain ol that whethei these loims necessaiily adheie to the things _
in themselves or only to oui intuition ol these things. Jhose, however,
who assert the absolute reality ol space and time, whethei they assume
it to be subsisting oi only inheiing, must themselves come into conict
with the principles ol experience. Ior il they decide in lavoi ol the hist
(which is geneially the position ol the mathematical investigators ol na-
ture), `

then they must assume two eteal and inhnite sell-subsisting
non-entities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being any-
Ojeu
` Princiio
I
Secrion II. On Jime <A
thing real) only in order to comprehend everything real within them-
selves. Il they adopt the second position (as do some metaphysicians ol n qo
nature), and hold space and ume to be relations ol appearances (next to
or successive to one another) that are abstracted hom experience
though conlusedly represented in this abstraction, then they must dis- n;
pute the validity or at least the apodictic certainty ol Hrieri mathemat-
ical doctrines in regard to real things (e.g., in space), since this certainty
does not occur Hesterieri, and on this xiew the Hrieri concepts ol space
and time are only creatures ol the imagination, the origin ol which must
really be sought in experience, out ol whose abstracted relations imag-
ination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in
them, but that cannot occur without the resuicuons that nature has at-
tached to them. Jhe hrst succeed in opening the held ol appearances
lor mathematical assertions, however, they themselves become very
conmsed through precisely these conditions il the understanding would
go beyond this held. Jhe second succeed, to be sure, with respect to the
latter, in that the representations ol space and time do not stand in their
way il they would judge ol objects not as appearances but merely in re-
lation to the understanding, but they can neither oller any ground lor
the possibility ol H rieri mathematical cognitions (since they lacL a true
and objectiveIy vaIid Hrieri intuition), nor can they bring the proposi-
tions ol experience into necessary accord with those assertions. n our
nq:
theory ol the true constitution ol these two original lorms ol sensibility n
,
8
both dimculties are remedied.
Iinally, that the transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than
these two elements, namely space and time, is clear lrom the lact that
all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that ol motion, which
unites both elements, presuppose something empiricaI Ior this pre-
supposes the perception ol something movable. In space considered in
itseIl there is nothing movabIe, hence the movabIe must be something
that is lound in spacc omy through ccricncc, thus an empirical
datum. In the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the
concept ol alteration among its H rieri data, lor time itsell does not
alter, but only something that is within time. Ior this there is required
the perception ol some existence and the succession ol its determina-
tions, thus experience.
!nscrtcdinKant`s copy."Lcibniz'ssystcmoIspaccandtimcwastotransIormbothinto
intcIIcctuaI but conIscd conccpts. But Irom this thc possibiIi oIarieri cogniuon
cannotbcundcrstood,Iorinthatcascbothmustprcccdc. "(!X , p. zo, z. zq)
` !nscrtcdinKant'scopy."ConcIusion.AhatspaccandtimcoIcourschavcobccuvcrc-
aIity, butnotIor whatpcrtains to thingsoutsidcoIthcirrcIation Re/atienj to ourIac-
uIty oIcognition, butrathcr onIy in rcIauon to it, and thus to thc Iorm oIscnsibiIity,
hcnccsoIcIy as appcaranccs. "(! `, p. z :, z . zq)
I 7
Docttine of Elements. Parr I. Jhe Jtanscendenral Aestheric <A
a
5
p
Ceneial iemaiLs
on the tianscenoental aesthetic.
!t will hist be necessaiy to exlain as oistinctly as ossible oui oin-
Aqz ion in iegaio to the mnoamental consutution ol sensibIe cognition in
geneial, in oioei to iecluoe all misinteiietation ol it.
Ve have theieloie wanteo to say that all oui intuition is nothing but
the ieiesentation ol aeaiance, that the things that we intuit aie not
in themselves what we intuit them to be, noi aie theii ielations so con-
stituteo in themselves as they aeai to us, ano that il we iemove oui
own subject oi even only the subj ective constitution ol the senses in
geneial, then all the constitution, all ielations ol objects in sace ano
time, inoeeo sace ano time themselves woulo oisaeai, ano as a-
eaiances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. Vhat may be
the case with objects in themselves ano abstiacteo hom all this iece-
tiviq ol oui sensibility iemains entiiely unLnown to us. Ve aie ac-
quainteo wth nothing excet oui way ol eiceiving them, which is
eculiai to us, ano which theieloie ooes not necessaiily eitain to eveiy
being, though to be suie it eitains to eveiy human being. Ve aie con-
a 6o ceineo solely with this. Sace ano time aie its uie loims, sensation in
geneial its mattei. Ve can cognize only the loimei Hrieri, i. e. , iioi to
all actual eicetion, ano they aie theieloie calleo uie intuition, the
lattei, howevei, is that in oui cognition that is iesonsible loi it being
calleo H esterieri cognition, i. e. , emiiical intuition. Jhe loimei ao-
heies to oui sensibility absolutely necessaiily, whatevei soit ol sensa-
A
+J
tions we may have, the lattei can be veiy oiheient. ven il we coulo
biing this intuition ol ouis to the highest oegiee ol oistinctness we
woulo not theieby come any closei to the constitution ol objects in
themselves. Ioi in any case we woulo still comletely cognize only oui
own way ol intuiting, i. e. , oui sensibility, ano this always only unoei the
conoitions oiiginally oeenoing on the subject, sace ano time, what
the objects may be in themselves woulo still nevei be Lnown thiough
the most enlighteneo cognition ol theii aeaiance, which is alone
given to us.
Jhat oui entiie sensibility is nothing but the conmseo ieiesentation
ol things, which contains solely that which eitains to them in them-
selves but only unoei a hea ol maiLs ano aitial ieiesentations that
we can nevei consciously seaiate liom one anothei, is theieloie a lal-
sihcation ol the concet ol sensibility ano ol aeaiance that ienoeis
the entiie theory ol them useless ano emty. Jhe oiheience between an
a6: inoistinct ano a oistinct ieiesentation is meiely logical, ano ooes not
concein the content. Vithout ooubt the concet ol nghtthat is useo
Olecte
I 68
Section II. On Jime <A
by the healthy undeistanding contains the very same things that the
most subtle speculation can evolve out ol it, only in common and piac-
tical use one is not conscious ol these manilold iepiesentations in these
thoughts. Jhus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and
contains a meie appeaiance, loi iight cannot appeai at all, iathei its nqq
concept lies in the undeistanding and iepiesents a constitution (the
moial constitution) ol actions that peitains to them in themselves. Jhe
iepiesentation ol a bodyin intuition, on the contiary, contains nothing
at all that could peitain to an object in itsell, but meiely the appeaiance
ol something and the way in which we aie aected by it, and this ie-
ceptivity ol oui cognitive capacity is called sensibility and iemains
woilds apait liom the cognition ol the object in itsell even il one might
see thiough to the veiy bottom ol it (the appeaiance).
Jhe !eibnizian-Volman philosophy has theieloie diiected all inves-
tigations ol the natuie and oiigin ol oui cognitions to an entiiely unjust
point ol view in consideiing the distinction between sensibilip and the
intellectual as meiely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and
does not concein meiely the loim ol distincmess oi indistincuess, but its a6z
oiigin and content, so that thiough sensibility we do not cognize the
constitution ol things in themselves meiely indisunctly, but iathei not at
all, and, as soon as we taLe away oui subjective constimtion, the iepie-
sented object with the piopeities that sensible intuition attributes to it
is nowheie to be encounteied, noi can it be encounteied, loi it is just this
subjective consutution that deteimines its loim as appeaiance.`
Ve oidinaiily distinguish quite well between that which is essentially n(,
attached to the intuition ol appeaiances, and is valid loi eveiy human
sense in geneial, and that which peitains to them only contingently be-
cause it is not valid loi the ielation to sensibility in geneial but only loi
a paiticulai situation oi oiganization ol this oi that sense. And thus one
calls the hist cognition one that iepiesents the object in itsell, but the
second one only its appeaiance. Jhis distinction, howevei, is only em-
piiical. !l one stands by it (as commonly happens) and does not iegaid
that empiiical intuition as in tuin meie appeaiance (as ought to hap-
pen), so that theie is nothing to be encounteied in it that peitains to any
thing in itsell, then oui tianscendental distinction is lost, and we believe
ouiselves to cognize things in themselves, although we have nothing to
do with anything except appeaiances anywheie (in the woild ol sense), a6
even in the deepest ieseaich into its objects. Jhus, we would ceitainly
Olec
` Icrc iswhcrcKant switchcs nom |crbohnisto eziebungashistopicswitchcs homthc
rcIauon oIobcctsinspaccortimctocachothcrtothcrcIauon oIspaccandtimctous.
Vithonccxccption to bcnotcd,thcrcIorc, IorthcrcmaindcroIthcscction "rcIation"
uansIatcsBeziebung.
I6
;
Docrrine of Elemenrs. Parr I. Jhe Jranscendenral Aesrheric <A
call a iainbow a meie aeaiance in a sun-showei, but would call this
iain the thing in itselI, and this is coiiect, as long as we undeistand the
lattei concet in a meiely hysical sense, as that which in univeisal ex-
eiience and all diIIeient ositions ielative to the senses is always de-
teimined thus and not otheiwise in intuition. 8ut iI we considei this
n(6 emiiical object in geneial and, without tuing to its agieement with
eveiy human sense, asL whethei it (not the iaindios, since these, as a-
eaiances, aie alieady emiiical objects) ieiesents an object in itselI,
then the question oI the ielation oI the ieiesentation to the object is
tianscendental, and not only these dios aie meie aeaiances, but
even theii iound Ioim, indeed even the sace thiough which they Iall
aie nothing in themselves, but only meie modihcations oi Ioundations
oI oui sensible intuition; the tianscendental object, howevei, iemains
unLnown to us.
Jhe second imoitant concein oI oui tianscendental aesthetic is that
it not meiely eain some Iavoi as a lausible hyothesis, but that it be as
ceitain and indubitable as can evei be demanded oI a theoiy that is to
seive as an oiganon. In oidei to maLe this ceitainq mlly convincing we
e 6q will choose a case in which its validity can become obvious.
Jhus, iI it weie to be suosed that sace and time aie in themselves
objective and conditions oI the ossibility oI things in themselves, then
it would be shown, hist, that theie is a laige numbei oI H rieri aodic-
tic and synthetic ioositions about both, but esecially about sace,
which we will theieIoie heie investigate as oui iimaiy examle. Since
the ioositions oI geometiy aie cognized synthetically H rieri and
n
4
7
with aodictic ceitainty, I asL. Vhence do you taLe such ioositions,
and on what does oui undeistanding iely in attaining to such absolutely
necessaiy and univeisally valid tiuths: +heie is no othei way than
thiough concets oi thiough intuitions, both oI which, howevei, aie
given, as such, eithei H rieri oi H esterieri. Jhe lattei, namely emiii-
cal concets, togethei with that on which they aie giounded, emiiical
intuition, cannot yield any synthetic ioosition excet one that is also
meiely emiiical, i. e. , a ioosition oI exeiience, thus it can nevei
contain necessiq and absolute univeisality oI the soit that is neveithe-
less chaiacteiistic oI all ioositions oI geometiy. Conceining the hist
and only means Ioi attaining to such cognitions, howevei, namely
thiough meie concets oi H rieri intuitions, it is cleai that Iiom meie
concets no synthetic cognition but only meiely analytic cognition can
e 6 be attained. JaLe the ioosition that with two stiaight lines no sace
O[eue
Gndmen
O[eu
Ahc
qucstionmarkrcpIacsa pcriodinthc tcxt.
I70
Secuon II. On Jime <A>
at all can be enclosed, thus no hguie is possible, and tiy to deiive it liom
tle concept ol stiaight lines and the numbei two; oi taLe ue proposi-
tion tlat a hguie is possible witl tliee stiaiglt lines, and in tle same
way tiy to deiive it hom these concepts. All ol youi elloit is in vain, and
you see youisell loiced to taLe ieluge in intuition, as indeed geometiy
always does. You thus give youisell an object in intuition; but what Lind nq8
is tlis, is it a puie H rieri intuition oi an empiiical one: !l it weie the
lattei, then no univeisally valid, let alone apodictic pioposition could
evei come liom it. loi expeiience can nevei piovide anything ol this
soit. You must theieloie give youi object H rieri in intuition, and
giound youi syntleuc pioposition on this. !l tleie did not lie in you a
laculty loi intuiting H rieri, il this subjective condition iegaiding loim
weie not at tle same time the univeisal Hrieri condition undei wlicl
alone the objecr ol uis outei) intuition is itsell possible, il the object
(the tiiangle) weie something in itsell witlout ielation to youi subject.
tlen how could you say that what necessaiily lies in youi subjective con-
ditions loi constiucting a tiiangle must also necessaiily peitain to the
tiiangle in itsell: loi you could not add to youi concept (ol thiee lines)
sometling new (tle hguie) that must tleieby necessaiily be encoun- e 66
teied in the object, since tlis is given piioi to youi cognition and not
thiough it. !l, theieloie, space (and time as well) weie not a meie loim
ol youi intuition that contains H rieri conditions undei which alone
tlings could be outei objects loi you, wlich aie nothing in themselves
without these subjective conditions, then you could maLe out absolutely
nothing synthetic and Hrieri about outei objects.' !t is theieloie in-
dubitably ceitain, and not meiely possible oi even piobable, that space
and time, as tle necessaiy conditions ol aIl (outei and innei) expeiience, n(
aie meiely subjective conditions ol all oui intuition, in ielation to
wlich theieloie all obj ects aie meie appeaiances and not things given
loi themselves in uis way, about these appeaiances, mithei, mucl may
be said H rieri tlat conceins theii loim, but notling whatsoevei about
the things in themselves that may giound them.'
Cject
` ucstion mark addcd.
Clecte
lrbmtnis
' Kant addsthrccparagraphs and aconcusionIoIIowingthis pointinthcsccondcdition
(s66;).1hiscopyofucurstcdition,hchcrcinscrtcd ucfoIIowingnotc,which to
somccxtcntoutIincsthcadditionstobcmadc inthcsccond.
"CnthcncccssityoIspaccandtimcasHriericonditionsbcIongingtothccxistcncc
oIthings Cnthc cuortncvcrthclcsstorcmovcbothhomabcingthatisnoobcctoI
thc scnscs, Cod NcndcIssohn.
"Cn thcucoryofnaturc. howitis to bcsccn fromthatthat bodicsarcmcrcbe
nemena."(EX !!,p. : ;, z.
:
)
I I I
Tbe Transcenenta/ Dctrine } I/ements
Iirst Iart
Tbe Transcenenta/ .estbetic '
< : >
In whatevei way and thiough whatevei means a cognition may ielate to
objects, that thiough which it ielates immediately to them, and at which
all thought as a means is diiected as an end, is intuition.Jhis, howevei,
taLes place only insolai as the object is given to us, but this in tuin, <at
least loi us humans,> is possible only il it allects the mind in a ceitain
way. Jhe capacity (ieceptivity) to acquiie iepiesentations thiough the
way in which we aie allected by objects is called scnsibiIity. bjects aie
theieloie givcnto us by means ol sensibility, and it alone alloids us in-
tuiuons,but they aie thoughtthiough the undeistanding, and liom it
aiise conccpts. 8ut all thought, whethei stiaightaway (irecte) oi
thiough a detoui (inirecte), must, <by means ol ceitain maiLs,> ulti-
mately be ielated to intuitions, thus, in oui case, to sensibiliq, since
theie is no othei way in which objects can be given to us.
s
5

Jhe ehect ol an object on the capaciq loi iepiesentation, insolai as
azo we aie ahected by it, i s scnsauon.Jhat intuition which i s ielated to the
object thiough sensation is called cmpiricaI.Jhe undeteimined object
ol an empiiical intuition is called appcarancc.
I call that in the appeaiance which coiiesponds to sensation its mat-
tcr, but that which allows the manilold ol appeaiance to be oideied in
Vc hcrcprcscntthc rcviscdvcrsionoIthc ransccndcntaIAcsthctic" thatKantprc-
parcdIorthcsccondcditionoIthc Critique. Sinccinaddiuontothcmaorchangcsthat
hcmadc, aII oIwhich wiII bcnotcd, Kant aIsomadc numcrous minorchangcs thatit
wouIdbccumbcrsomctonotcindividuaIIy, wcwiII cncIoscaIIthc changcs Kantmadc
inBwithinangIcdbrackcts( . . . > , whcthcrornotthcyarcothcrwiscnotcd.!ditoriaI
notcsonpassagcsunchangcdnomAwiIInotbc rcpcatcd.
!n thc sccond cdition, Kant dividcd thc (ransccndcntaI Ooctrinc oI!Icmcnts" hom
thc bcginning oIthc AransccndcntaI Acsthcuc" through thc cnd oIthc "ransccn-
dcntaIOcductionoIthc!urcConccptsoIthc\ndcrstanding"intotwcnty-scvcnnum-
bcrcd scctions. In thc casc otsomc scctions, ncw titIcs wcrc aIso addcd tormatcriaI
othcrwisctaIcnovcrwithoutothcrchangc Iromthc hrstcdition.
' Inthc hrstcdiuonthis rcads"intuitcdasordcrcdinccrtainrcIations . . .
I 7?
Jhe Jranscendenral Aesderic <B>
certain ielations I call the fomol appeaiance. Since that within which
the sensations can alone be oroeieo ano placeo in a ceitain loim cannot
itsell be in tuin sensation, the mattei ol all appeaiance is only given to
us H esterieri, but its loim must all lie ieaoy loi it in the mino H rieri,
ano can theielore be consioereo separately hom all sensation.
I call all represeniations purc(in the tianscenoental sense) in which
nothing is to be encountereo that belongs to sensation. Accoioingly the
puie lorm ol sensible intuitions in geneial is to be encountereo in the
mino H rieri, wheiein all ol the manilolo ol appearances is intuiteo in
certain ielations. Jhis puie lorm ol sensibility itsell is also calleo purc
intuition. So il I separate lrom the iepiesentation ol a booy that which e j
,
the unoerstanoing thinLs about it, such as substance, lorce, oivisibility,
etc., as weI as that which beIongs to sensation, such as impenenabiIity,
haroness, coloi, etc., something lrom this empiiical intuition is still leh nz :
lor me, namely extension ano lorm. Jhese belong to the pure intuition,
which occurs Hrieri, even without an actuaI object ol the senses oi sen-
sation, as a meie loim ol sensibility in the mino.
I call a science ol all piinciples' ol H rieri sensibility the transcen-
dcntaIacsthcuc.* Jheie must theieloie be such a science, which con-
stitutes the hrst part ol the tianscenoental ooctiine ol elements, in nj6
opposition to that which contains the principles ol pure thinLing, ano
which is nameo tianscenoental Iogic.
* Jhe Germans are rhe only ones who now employ rhe word "aestheucs" ro des- n z i /a
igare rhar which orhers call rhe criuque of rasre. Jhe ground for rhis i s a failed
hope, held by ue excellenr analysr Baumgarren, of bringing ue criucal esrima-
uon of rhe beauriful under principles of reason, and elevaung its rules ro a sci
ence. Bur rhis efforr is mule. !or rhe purauve rules or crireria are merely empiri
cal as far as rheir <mosr prominenr> sources are concened, and can rherefore
never serve as <dererminare> Hrier rules according ro which our judgmenr of
rasre musr be direcred, rarher rhe larter consurures rhe genuine rouchsrone of rhe
correcess of the former. Ior this reason ir is advisable <eirher> again ro desisr e 6
nom rhe use of this rerm and preserve ir for rhar docuine which is rrue science
(whereby one would come closer ro rhe language and the sense of rhe ancienrs,
among whom de division of cogninon into ;0:o KOL vop:o was very well
Lown), <or else ro share rhe rerm wirh speculauve philosophy and rake aes-
theucs partly in a uanscendenral meaning, partly in a psychological meaning>.
` aIrcadynotcdatp. : 6,notc u with thccxccptionoIIour cascs initshnaIscction,
throughout thc ransccndcntaI Acsthctic" Kant charactcristicaIIy uscs thc tcrm
lrbaItnis, connotingarcIation among objccts, rathcrthanBeziebung,connotingarcIa-
tion bctvccn subjcctand objcct, dus, unIcss othcrwisc notcd, "rcIauon" or its pIuraI
uansIatcs lrbahnisorits dcrivativcs.
` Princiien
Princiien
lun}rinciien
>
Doctrine of Elements. Part ! Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <B>
nzz !n the transcendental aesthetic we will thereloie hist isoIatc sensi-
bility by sepaiating oh eveiything that the undeistanding thinLs
through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition iemains.
Second, we will then detach hom the lattei everyhing that belongs to
sensation, so that nothing iemains except pure intuition and the mere
lorm ol appeaiances, which is the only thing that sensibility can maLe
available uriori. !n this investigation it will be lound that theie are two
pure lorms ol sensible intuition as principles ' ol u rtort cognition,
namely space and time, with ue assessment ol which we will now be
concerned.
a
J
)
Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic
!irst Section
n space.
< :
Metaphysical exposition of this concept. >
8y means ol outer sense (a property ol oui mind) we represent to
ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. !n space theii shape,
magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable.
!nnei sense, by means ol which the mind intuits itsell, oi its innei state,
gives, to be suie, no intuition ol the soul itsell, as an object," yet it is
n z j still a deteiminate loim, under which the intuition ol its inner state is
alone possible, so that eveiything that belongs to the innei determina-
tions is represented in relations ol time. Jime can no more be intuited
exteally than space can be intuited as something in us. ^ow what are
space and time: Aie they actual entities: Are they only determinations
oi relauons ol things, yet ones that would pertain to them even il they
weie not intuited, oi are they ielations that only attach to the loim ol
e j 8 intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constimtion ol our mind,
without which these predicates could not be asciibed to any thing at all:
!n order to instiuct ourselves about this, we will <expound the concept
ol space> hrst. <I understand by cosition (caosttto) the distinct
(even il not complete) repiesentation ol that which belongs to a con-
cept, but the exposition is mctaphysicaIwhen it contains that which
exhibits the concept asgivcnH riori. >
:) Space is not an empiiical concept that has been drawn lrom outer
Princiien
O[ect
wirk/icbe us
In
thc hrstcdinon "rstconsidcrspacc."
I 7+
Secrion 1. On Space <B>
expeiiences. Ioi in oider lor certain sensations to be ielated to some-
thing outside me (i. e. , to someihing in anothei place in space liom ihat
in which I hnd myseI(, thus in order lor me to iepiesent them as out-
side <and next to> one anoiher, thus not meiely as dierent but as in
dieient places, the iepresentation ol space must alieady be iheii
ground. Jhus the iepresentaiion ol space cannot be obtained liom the
relaiions ol outer appeaiance through experience, but this outei expe-
iience is itsell hist possible only thiough this iepiesentation.
:) Space is a necessary iepiesentation, H rieri, ihat is the giound ol n:(
all outei intuitions. ne can never represent that theie is no space,
though one can very well thinL that there are no objects to be encoun-
tered in it. It is thereloie to be iegaided as the condition ol the possi- n j
9
biIity ol appeaiances, not as a deteimination dependent on them, and is
an H rieri iepiesentation that necessaiily giounds outei appeaiances.
<j) Space is not a discuisive oi, as is said, general concept ol iela-
tions ol things in geneial, but a puie intuition. Ioi, hist, one can onIy nz
iepresent a single space, and il one speaLs ol many spaces, one under-
stands by that only paits ol one and the same unique space. And ihese
parts cannot as it weie piecede the single all-encompassing space as its
components (liom which its composition would be possible), but iathei
aie only thought m it. It is essentiaIIy singIe, the maniloId in it, thus
also the geneial concept ol spaces in geneial, iests merely on limita-
tions. Irom ihis it lollows that in respect to it an H rieri intuition
(which is not empiiical) giounds all concepts ol it. Jhus also all geo-
meuical iinciles, e.g., ihat in a iiiangle iwo sides iogether are always
gieatei than the thiid, aie never deiived lrom geneial concepts ol line
and tiiangle, but raihei aie deiived liom intuition and indeed deiived H
rieri with apodictic ceitainp.
<() Space is iepiesented as an inhnite givcn magnitude. ^ow one
must, to be suie, thinL ol eveiy concept as a iepresentation that is con- a (o
tained in an inhnite set ol dierent possible repiesentations (as theii
common maiL), which thus contains these undcr itscIf, but no con-
cept, as such, can be thought as il it contained an inhnite set ol repie-
sentations wdin itscIf. ^eveitheless space is so ihought (lor all the
parts ol space, even to inhnity, are simultaneous). Jhereloie the origi-
nal iepiesentation ol space is an u Hariintuition, not a conccpt.>
lezegen
` Inthc hrst cdition thcrc IoIIowsa paragraph () (at nzqabovc) that isrcpIaccd by thc
"+ransccndcntaI!xposiuonoIthcConccptoISpacc"inthcsccond (scc BqoI bcIow),
thc IoIIowing paragraphs, () and (q), wcrc thus originaIIy numbcrcd (q) and (), thc
contcntoIthc originaI paragraph (), nowrcnumbc:cd (q),is aIsochangcd.
' In dc hrstcdition: "oIthcm," i.c.,thcIimitationsoIspacc.
^prcviousIymcntioncd,thccontcntoIthisparagraphischangcd(omthchrstcdition.
I 7S
Doctrine of Elements. Part 1. Jhe Jranscendental Aesrhetic <B>

; }
Jianscendental exposition ol the concept ol space.
! undeistand by a transccndcntaI cosiuonthe explanation ol a
concept as a piinciple liom which insight into the possibility ol othei
sythetic Hrieri cognitions can be gained. Ioi this aim it is iequiied :)
that such cognitions actually ow liom the given concept, and :) that
these cognitions aie only possible undei the piesupposition ol a given
way ol explaining this concept.
Geometiy is a science that deteimines the piopeities ol space syn-
thetically and yet H rieri. V'hat then must the iepiesentation ol space
be loi such a cognition ol it to be possible: !t must oiiginally be intu-
aq: ition, loi liom a meie concept no piopositions can be diawn that go be-
yond the concept, which, howevei, happens in geometiy (!ntioducuon
V). 8ut this intuition must be encounteied in us Hrieri, i. e. , piioi to all
peiception ol an object, thus it must be puie, not empiiical intuition.
Ioi geometiical piopositions aie all apodictic, i. e. , combined with con-
sciousness ol theii necessity, e.g., space has only thiee dimensions, but
such piopositions cannot be empiiical oi judgments ol expeiience, noi
inleiied liom them (!ntioduction !!).
^ow how can an outei intuition inhabit the mind that piecedes the
objects 'themselves, and in which the concept ol the lattei can be de-
teimined Hrierir bviously not otheiwise than insolai as it has its seat
meiely in the subject, as its loimal constitution loi being allected by ob-
jects and theieby acquiiing imcdiatcrcprcscntation,i. e. , intuition,
ol them, thus only as the loim ol outei scnscin geneial.
Jhus oui explanation alone maLes the possibi!ityol geometiy as a
synthetic H rieri cognition compiehensible. Any Lind ol explanation
that does not accomplish this, even il it appeais to have some similai-
ity with it, can most suiely be distinguished liom it by means ol this
chaiacteiistic.>'
nz6/sqz ConcIusions liom the above concepts.
a) Space iepiesents no piopeity at all ol any things in themselves noi
any ielation ol them to each othei, i. e. , no deteimination ol them that
attaches to objects themselves and that would iemain even il one weie
to abstiact liom all subjective conditions ol intuition. Ioi neithei ab-
solute noi ielative deteiminations can be intuited piioi to the existence
ol the things to which they peitain, thus be intuited Hrieri.
Princis
` Ojecten
Olecten
I 7
Secuon 1. On Space <B>
b) Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of
outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which
alone outer inmition is possible for us. ^ow since the receptivity of the
subject to be aected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of
these objects, it can be understood how the form of all appearances can
be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, thus H riori, and
how as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can
contain principles of their relations prior to all experience.
Ve can accordingly speaL of space, extended beings, and so on, only
from the human standpoint. !f we depart hom the subjective condition
under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through
which we may be ahected by objects, then the representation of space
signihes nothing at all. Jhis predicate is attributed to things only inso-
far as they appear to us, i. e. , are objects of sensibility. Jhe constant form
of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of
all the relations within which objects can be intuited as outside us, and,
if one abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition, which bears the
name of space. Since we cannot maLe the special conditions of sensibil-
ity into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appear-
ances, we can well say that space comprehends all things that may
appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves, whether they
be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may be intuited. Ior we
cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinLing beings are
bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are uni-
versally valid for us. !f we add the limitation of a judgment to the con-
cept of the subject, then the judgment is unconditionally valid. Jhe
proposition. "All things are next to one another in space," is valid under
the limitation that these things be taLen as objects of our sensible intu-
ition. !f here ! add the condition to the concept and say "All things, as
outer intuitions, are next to one another in space," then this rule is valid
universally and without limitation. ur expositions accordingly teach
the rca!ity(i.e., objective validity) of space in regard to everything that
can come before us externally as an object, but at the same time the idc-
aIity of space in regard to things when they are considered in them-
selves through reason, i. e. , without taLing account of the constitution of
our sensibility. Ve therefore assert the cmpiricaIrca!ityof space (with
respect to all possible outer experience), though to be sure its tran-
sccndcntaIidcaIity, i. e. , that it is nothing as soon as we leave aside the
condition of the possibility of all experience, and taLe it as something
that grounds the things in themselves.
8esides space, however, there is no other subjective representation
Princiien
I 77
Doctrine of Elements. Part I. Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <B>
related to something cxtcra! that could be called H riori objective.
<Ior one cannot derive synthetic H riori roositions hom any such
reresentation, as one can lrom intuition in sace (
}). Strictly seaL-
ing, therelore, ideality does not ertain to them, although they coincide
with the reresentation ol sace in belonging only to the subjective
constitution ol the Lind ol sense, e. g. , ol sight, hearing, and leeling,
through the sensations ol colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however,
since they are mereIy sensations and not intuitions, do not in them-
selves allow any object to be cognized, least ol all H riori. >
sq Jhe aim ol this remarL is only to revent one lrom thinLing ol illus-
trating the asserted ideality ol sace with comletely inadequate exam-
les, since things liLe colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as
qualities ol things but as mere alterations ol our subject, which can even
be dierent in dillerent eole. Ior in this case that which is originally
itsell only aearance, e. g. , a rose, counts in an emirical sense as a
n o thing in itseIl, which yet can aear dillerent to every eye in regard to
color. Jhe transcendental concet ol aearances in sace, on the con-
trary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in
sace is a thing in itsell, and that sace is not a lorm that is roer to
anything in itsell, but rather that objects in themselves are not Lnown
to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than
mere reresentations ol our sensibility, whose lorm is sace, but whose
true correlate, i. e. , the thing in itsell, is not and cannot be cognized
through them, but is aIso never asLed aner in exerience.
sqo +he +ranscendentaI ^esthetic
Second Section
Cn time.
< (
Metahysical exosition oI the concet oI time.>
Jime is <:) not an emirical concet that is somehow drawn lrom an
exerience. Ior simultaneity or succession would not themselves come
into ercetion il the reresentation ol time did not ground them Hri-
ori. nly under its resuosition can one reresent that several things
exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in dillerent times
(successively) .
n
}
1 2) Jime is a necessary reresentation that grounds all intuitions. !n
regard to aearances in general one cannot remove time, though one
lezegene
` Inthc hrst cdition,thcrcmaindcroIthisparagraph rcads diIIcrcntIy, scc n:8-abovc.
Clect
I 78

Section !!. On Jime <B>
can very well taLe the appearances away hom time. Jime is therelore
given Hrtort. !n it alone is all actuality ol appearances possible. Jhe lat-
ter could all disappear, but time itsell (as the universal condition ol their
possibility) cannot be removed.
) Jhis H rtort necessity also grounds the possibility ol apodictic eq;
principles ol relations ol time, or axioms ol time in general. !t has only
one dimension. dierent times are not simultaneous, but successive
(just as dillerent spaces are not successive, but simultaneous). Jhese
principles could not be drawn lrom experience, lor this would yeld nei-
ther strict universality nor apodictic certainty. Ve would only be able to
say. Jhis is what common perception teaches, but not. Jhis is how mat-
ters must stand. Jhese principles are valid as rules under which alone
experiences are possible at all, and instruct us prior to them, not
through it.
q) Jime is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure
lorm ol sensible intuition. Oillerent times are only parts ol one and the
same time. Jhat representation, however, which can only be given n :
through a single object, is an intuition. Iurther, the proposition that
dierent times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived lrom a gen-
eral concept. Jhe proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise hom con-
cepts alone. !t is therelore immediately contained in the intuition and
representation ol time.
,
) Jhe inhnitude ol time signihes nothing more than that every de-
terminate magnitude ol time is only possible through limitations ol a e q8
single time grounding it. Jhe original representation umcmust there-
lore be given as unlimited. 8ut where the parts themselves and every
magnitude ol an object can be determinately represented only through
limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through
concepts, ( lor they contain only partial representations) , but imme-
diate intuition must ground them.

; ,
Jranscenoental exposition oI the concept oI time.
! can appeal to ^o. where, in order to be briel, ! have placed that
which is properly transcendental under the heading ol the metaphysical
exposition. Here ! add lurther that the concept ol alteration and, with
hcsc parcnthcscsaddcdinB.
hctcxt rcads le/ebrenuns:erderse/len, undnicbtdurcb diese/le."!arIicrcditors sug-
gcstcd cmcnding thc Iastwordto diese/len",butiIthc scntcncc isintcrprctcd tomcan
"instructs us prior to cxpcricnccs, not through common pcrccption," it can bc rcad
withoutcmcndation.
' Inthc!irstcdition. Iorthcrcthc partiaIrcprcscntationsprcccdc."
B hasibneninstcadoIibrehcrc.
I 7
Docrrine of Elements. Part I. Jhe Jranscendental Aesrhetic <B>
it, the concept oI motion (as alteration oI place), is only possible
through and in the representation oI time that iI this representation
were not a rtcrt (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might
be, could maLe comprehensible the possibility oI an alteration, i. e. , oI a
combination oI contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., a thing's being
in a place and the not-being oI the very same thing in the same place)
one and the same object. nly in time can both contradictorily op-
e q
9
posed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely succcs-
sivc!y.ur concept oI time thereIore explains the possibility oI as much
synuetic a rtcrt cognition as is presented by the general iheory oI mo-
tion, which is no less huitIul. >`
< 6>
n j z Conclusions Irom these concepts.
a) Jime is noi someihing ihat would subsist Ior itselI or attach to things
as an objective determination, and thus remain iI one abstracted Irom
all subjective condiiions oI the intuition oI them, Ior in the hrst case it
would be something that was actual yet without an actual object. As Iar
n as the second case is concerned, however, time could not precede the
obj ects as a determination or order attaching to the things themselves
as their condition and be cognized and intuited a rtcrt through syn-
thetic propositions. 8ut the latter, on the contrary, can very well occur
iI time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all
intuitions can taLe place in us. !or then ihis Iorm oI inner intuiiion can
be represented prior to the obj ects, thus H rtcrt.
/) Jime is nothing other than the Iorm oI inner sense, i. e. , oI the in-
tuition oI our selI and our inner state. Ior time cannot be a determina-
e o tion oI outer appearances, it belongs neiuer to a shape or a position,
etc., but on the contrary determines the relation oI representations in
our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yieIds no shape we
also attempt to remedy this lacL through analogies, and represent the
temporaI sequence through a Iine progressing to inhnity, in which the
maniIold constitutes a series that is oI only one dimension, and inIer
hom the properties oI this Iine to alI the properties oI time, with the
sole diIIerence that the parts oI the Iormer are simultaneous but those
oI the latter always exist successively. Irom this it is also apparent that
the representation oI time is itselI an intuition, since all its relations can
be expressed in an outer intuition.
n jq c) Jime is the a rtcrt Iormal condition oI all appearances in general.
Space, as the pure Iorm oI all outer intuitions, is limited as an a rtcrt
Olecte
I 80
Secuon II. On Jime <B>
condition meiely to outei intuitions. 8ut since, on the contiaiy, all iep-
iesentations, whethei oi not they have outei things as theii object, nev-
eitheIess as deteiminations ol the mind themseIves beIong to the innei
state, while this innei state belongs undei the loimal condition ol innei
intuition, and thus ol time, so time is an a rtort condition ol all ap-
peaiance in geneiaI, and indeed the immediate condition ol the innei
intuition (ol oui souls), and theieby also the mediate condition ol outei
appeaiances. !l ! can say a rtort. all outei appeaiances aie in space and s
J
I
deteimined a rtort accoiding to the ielations ol space, so liom the
piinciple ol innei sense I can say entiiely geneially. all appeaiances in
geneial, i. e. , all objects ol the senses, aie in time, and necessaiily stand
in ieIations ol time.
Il we abstiact liom oui way ol inteally intuiting ouiselves and by
means ol this intuition also dealing with all outei intuitions in the
powei ol iepiesentation, and thus taLe objects as they may be in them-
selves, then time is nothing. It is only ol objective validity in iegaid to
appeaiances, because these aie alieady things that we taLe as objcctsof
ourscnscs,but it is no longei objective il one abstiacts liom the sen- A]
J
sibility ol oui intuition, thus liom that Lind o iepiesentation that is pe-
culiai to us, and speaLs ol thingsingcncraI.Jime is theieloie meiely
a subjective condition ol oui (human) intuition (which is always sensi-
ble, i. e. , insolai as we aie allected by objects), and in itsell, outside the
subject, is nothing. onetheless it is necessaiily objective in iegaid to
all appeaiances, thus also in iegaid to all things that can come beloie us
in expeiience. Ve cannot say all things aie in ume, because with ue
concept ol things in geneiaI abstiaction is made liom eveiy Lind ol in- s
J
z
tuition ol them, but this is the ieal condition undei which time belongs
to the iepiesentation ol objects. ow il the condition is added to the
concept, and the piinciple says that all things as appeaiances (objects ol
sensible intuition) aie in time, then the piinciple has its sound objective
coiiectness and a rtort univeisality.
ui asseitions accoidingly teach the cmpiricaI rca!ity ol time, i. e. ,
obj ective validip in iegaid to all objects that may evei be given to oui
senses. And since oui intuition is always sensible, no object can evei be
given to us in expeiience that would not belong undei the condition ol
time. 8ut, on the contiaiy, we dispute all claim ol time to absolute ie-
ality, namely wheie it would attach to things absolutely as a condition
oi piopeity even without iegaid to the loim ol oui sensible inmition. n j6
Such piopeities, which peitain to things in themselves, can nevei be
given to us thiough the senses. In this theieloie consists the transccn-
dcntaIidcaIityol time, accoiding to which it is nothing at all il one ab-
Itnc
I 8I
Docrrine of Elemenrs. Parr I. Jhe Jranscendenral Aesrheric <B>
stiacts liom the subjective conditions ol sensible intuition, and cannot
be counted as eithei subsisting oi inheiing in the objects in themselves
(without theii ielation to oui intuition). Yet this ideality is to be com-
n,j paied with the subieptions ol sensation just as little as that ol space is,
because in that case one piesupposes that the appeaiance itsell, in which
these piedicates inheie, has objective ieality, which is heie entiiely ab-
sent except insolai as it is meiely empiiical, i. e. , the object itsell is ie-
gaided meiely as appeaiance. conceining which the above iemaiL in
the pievious sections is to be consulted.
< 7>
!lucidation.
Against this theoiy, which concedes empiiical ieality to time but dis-
putes its absolute and tianscendental ieality, insightml men have so
unanimously pioposed one objection that ! conclude that it must natu-
ially occui to eveiy ieadei who is not accustomed to these consideia-
tions. !t goes thus. Alteiations aie ieal (this is pioved by the change ol
nj; oui own iepiesentations, even i l one would deny all outei appeaiances
togethei with theii alteiations). ^ow alteiations aie possible only in
time, theieloie time is something ieal. Jheie is no dimculty in answei-
ing. ! admit the entiie aigument. Jime is ceitainly something ieal,
namely the ieal loim ol innei intuition. !t theieloie has subjective ieal-
ity in iegaid to innei expeiience, i. e. , ! ieally have the iepiesentation ol
s ,( time and <my> deteiminations in it. !t is theieloie to be iegaided ie-
ally not as object' but as the way ol iepiesenting mysell as object. 8ut
il ! oi anothei being could intuit mysell without this condition ol sen-
sibility, then these veiy deteiminations, which we now iepiesent to oui-
selves as alteiations, would yield us a cognition in which the iepie-
sentation ol time and thus also ol alteiation would not occui at all. !ts
empiiical ieality theieloie iemains as a condition ol all oui expeiiences.
nly absolute ieality cannot be gianted to it accoiding to what has been
adduced above. !t is nothing except the loim ol oui innei intuition.* !l
* I can, ro be sure, say. my represenrarions succeed one anorher, bur rhar only
means rhar we are conscious of rhem as in a remporal sequence, i. e. , accord-
ing ro rhe fotm of inner sense. Jime is nor on rhar accounr somerhing in ir-
self, nor any dererminarion objecrively adhering ro rhings.
hisrcIcrsto^z8-o/sg I .
` I nthc rstcdition. "oImy. "
Cject
Clect
I 82
Section !!. On Jime <B>
one removes the special condition ol our sensibility hom it, then the
concept ol time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects nj 8
themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them.
Jhe cause, however, on account ol which this objection is so unani-
mously made, and indeed by those who nevertheless Lnow ol nothing
convincing to object against the doctrine ol the ideality ol space, ' is n
, ,
this. Jhey did not expect to be able to demonstrate the absolute reality
ol space apodictically, since they were conlronted by idealism, accord-
ing to which the reality ol outer objects is not capable ol any strict
prool. on the contrary, the reality ol the object ol our inner sense (ol
mysell and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness. Jhe
lormer could have been a mere illusion, but the latter, according to
their opinion, is undeniably something real. 8ut they did not consider
that both, without their reality as representations being disputed, nev-
ertheless belong only to appearance, which always has to sides, one
where the object is considered in itsell (without regard to the way in
which it is to be intuited, the constitution ol which however must lor
that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the lorm
ol the intuition ol this object is considered, which must not be sought
in the object in itsell but in the subject to which it appears, but which
nevertheless really and necessarily pertains to the representation ol this
object.
Jime and space are accordingly two sources ol cognition, lrom
which dillerent synthetic cognitions can be drawn a rtort, ol which es- n j
9
pecially pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions ol space and its
relations provides a splendid example. 8oth taLen together are, n
,
6
namely, the pure lorms ol all sensible intuition, and thereby maLe pos-
sible synthetic a rtort propositions. 8ut these a rtort sources ol cog-
nition determine their own boundaries by that very lact (that they are
merely conditions ol sensibility), namely that they apply to objects
only so lar as they are considered as appearances, but do not present
things in themselves. Jhose alone are the held ol their validity, beyond
which no mrther objective use ol them taLes place. Jhis reality ol
space and time, lurther, leaves the certainty ol experiential cognition
untouched. lor we are just as certain ol that whether these lorms nec-
essarily adhere to the things in themselves or only to our intuition ol
these things. Jhose, however, who assert the absolute reality ol space
and time, whether they assume it to be subsisting or only inhering,
must themselves come into conict with the principles' ol experience.
Clect
` Prnciien
I8J
Doctrine of E|ements. Part 1. Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <B>
Ior il they decide in lavor ol the hrst (which is generally the position
ol the mathematical investigators ol nature), then they must assume
two eternal and inhnite sell-subsisting non-entities (space and time),
which exist (yet without there being anything real) only in order to
comprehend everything real within themselves. !l they adopt the sec-
zqo ond position (as do some metaphysicians ol nature), and hold space
and time to be relations ol appearances (next to or successive to one
a, ;
another) that are abstracted lrom experience though conlusedly repre-
sented in this abstraction, then they must dispute the validity or at least
the apodictic certainty ol H rieri mathematical doctrines in regard to
real things (e.g., in space), since this certainty does not occur a esteri-
eri, and on this view the a rieri concepts ol space and time are only
creatures ol the imagination, the origin ol which must really be sought
in experience, out ol whose abstracted relations imagination has made
something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them but that
cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to
them.' Jhe first succeed in opening the field of appearances for math-
ematical assertions. However, they themselves become very conlused
through precisely these conditions il the understanding would go be-
yond this held. Jhe second succeed, to be sure, with respect to the lat-
ter, in that the representations ol space and time do not stand in their
way il they would judge ol objects not as appearances but merely in re-
lation to the understanding, but they can neither ouer any ground lor
the possibility ol a rieri mathematical cognitions (since they lacL a
true and objectively valid a rieri intuition), nor can they bring the
zqi propositions ol experience into necessary accord with those assertions.
a,
8 n our theory ol the true constitution ol these two original lorms ol
sensibility both dilhculties are remedied.
Iinally, that the transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than
these two elements, namely space and time, is clear hom the lact uat
all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that ol motion, which
unites both elements, presuppose something empirical. Ior this pre-
supposes the perception ol something movable. !n space considered in
itsell there is nothing movable, hence the movable must be something
that is lound in spacc omy through cxpcricncc, thus an empirical
datum. !n the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the
concept ol alteration among its a rieri data, lor time itsell does not
alter, but only something that is within time. Ior this there is required
the perception ol some existence and the succession ol its determina-
tions, thus experience.
AcoIoninuc !irstcditionis rcp!accd witha pcriod in mc sccond.
I 8+
Section !!. On Jime s
;
8> a ,
Ceneial iemaiLs
on the tianscenoental aesthetic
<.>' It will hist be necessaiy to explain as oistinctly as possible oui
opinion in iegaio to the lunoamental constitution ol sensible cognition n
(
z
in geneial, in oioei to piecluoe all misinteipietation ol it.
Ve have theieloie wanteo to say that all oui intuition is nothing but
the iepiesentation ol appeaiance, that the things that we intuit aie not
in themselves what we intuit them to be, noi aie theii ielations so con-
stituteo in themselves as they appeai to us, ano that il we iemove oui
own subject oi even only the subjective constitution ol the senses in
geneial, then all constitution, all ielations ol objects' in space ano time,
inoeeo space ano time themselves woulo oisappeai, ano as appeaiances
they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. \at may be the case
with objects in themselves ano abstiacteo hom all this ieceptivity ol oui
sensibility iemains entiiely unLnown to us. Ve aie acquainteo with
nothing except oui way ol peiceiving them, which is peculiai to us, ano
which theieloie ooes not necessaiily peitain to eveiy being, though to
be suie it peitains to every human being. Ve aie conceineo solely with
this. Space ano time aie its puie loims, sensation in geneial its mattei. a6o
Ve can cognize only the loimei a rieri, i. e. , piioi to all actual peicep-
tion, ano they aie theieloie calleo puie intuition, the lattei, howevei, is
that in oui cognition that is iesponsible loi it being calleo a esterieri
cognition, i. e. , empiiical intuition. Jhe loimei aoheies to oui sensibil-
ity absolutely necessaiily, whatevei soit ol sensations we may have, the
lattei can be veiy oieient. ven il we coulo biing this inmition ol ouis n
(j
to the highest oegiee ol oistinctness we woulo not theieby come any
closei to the constitution ol objects in themselves. Ioi in any case we
woulo still completely cognize only oui own way ol intuiting, i. e. , oui
sensibility, ano this always only unoei the conoitions oiiginally oepeno-
ing on the subject, space ano time, what the objects may be in them-
selves woulo still nevei be Lnown thiough the most enlighteneo
cognition ol theii appeaiance, which alone is given to us.
Jhat oui entiie sensibility is nothing but the conluseo iepiesentation
ol things, which contains solely that which peitains to them in them-
selves but only unoei a heap ol maiLs ano paitial iepiesentations that
we can nevei consciously sepaiate liom one anothei, is theieloie a lal-
sihcation ol the concept ol sensibility ano ol appeaiance that ienoeis
"l.`isaddcdinthcsccondcdiuonbccauscoIthcadditionoIthcIurthcrnumbcrcdpara-
graphs (IIthroughI)addcdats 66-;.
` Olecte
I 8S
Doctrine of Elements. Part !. Jhe Jranscendental Aesthetic <B>
the entiie theoiy ol them useless and empty. Jhe dilleience between an
6: indistinct and a distinct iepiesentation is meieIy Iog1caI, and does not
conce the content. Vithout doubt the concept ol Hght that is used
by the IeaImy understanding contains tIe very same tIings that ue
most subtle speculation can evolve out ol it, only in common and piac-
tical use one is not conscious ol these manilold iepiesentations in these
thoughts. Jhus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and
a]
contains a meie appeaiance, loi iight cannot appeai at all, iathei its
concept lies in the undeistanding and iepiesents a constitution (the
moial constitution) ol actions that peitains to them in themselves. Jhe
iepiesentation ol a bodyin intuition, on the contraiy, contains nothing
at all that could peitain to an object in itsell, but meiely the appeaiance
of someuing and tIe way in wIicI we aie auected by this ie-
ceptivity ol oui cognitive capacity is called sensibility and iemains
woiIds apait nom the cogition ol the object in itsell even il one might
see thiough to the veiy bottom ol it (the appeaiance).
Jhe Leibnizian-Volan philosophy has theieloie diiected all inves-
tigations ol the natuie and oiigin ol oui cognitions to an entiiely unjust
point ol view in consideiing the distinction between sensibility and the
intellectual as meiely logical, since it is obviously tianscendental, and
a6z does not concein meiely the loim ol distinctness oi indistinctness, but
its oiigin and content, so that thiougI sensibiIity we do not cognize the
constitution ol things in themselves meiely indistinctly, but iathei not
ac alI, ano, as soon as we taLe away oui subjective consumtion, the iep-
iesented obj ect with the piopeities that sensible intuition attiibutes to
it is nowheie to be encountered, noi can it be encounteied, loi it is just
this subjective constitution that deteimines its loim as appeaiance.
n
(
Ve oidinaiily distinguish quite well between that which is essentially
attached to the intuition ol appeaiances, and is valid loi eveiy human
sense in geneial, and that which peitains to them only contingently be-
cause it is not valid loi the ieIation ol sensibility in geneiaI but onIy loi
a paiticulai situation oi oiganization ol this oi that sense. And thus one
caIIs the nist cognition one that iepresents the object i tseIl, but the
second one only its appeaiance. Jhis distinction, howevei, is only em-
piiicaI. Il one stands by it as commonly happens) and does not iegaid
that empiiical intuition as in tuin meie appeaiance (as ought to hap-
pen), so that theie is nothing to be encounteied in it that peitains to
anything in itsell, then oui tianscendental distinction is lost, and we be-
Clect
^ notcd in thc hrst-cdition vcrsion abovc, hcrc Kant switchcs fom |crba/tni: to
Bez:ebugashis toicswitchcsnomthcrcIationolob|cctsinspaccor timc tocachothcr
to thc rcIationoIspacc andtmcto us. Vith onccxccption to bcnotcd,thcrcIorc,Ior
thc rcmaindcr oIthis scction (I) "rcIation" transIatcs lrba/mis. In thc ncw paragraphs
) th)ough addcdIcIow,howcvcr, Kantagainrcvcrtsto lrboIni:.
b
Section H. On Jime <B>
lieve ouiselves to cognize things in themselves, though we have noth-
ing to do with anything except appeaiances anywheie (in the woild ol
sense), even in the deepest ieseaich into its objects. Jhus, we would a 6
ceitainly call a iainbow a meie appeaiance in a sun-showei, but would
call this iain the thing in itsell, and this is coiiect, as long as we undei-
stand the lattei concept in a meiely physical sense, as that which in uni-
veisal expeiience and all diheient positions ielative to the senses is
always deteimined thus and not otheiwise in intuition. 8ut il we con-
sidei this empiiical object in geneial and, without tuining to its agiee-
ment with eveiy human sense, asL whethei it (not the iaindiops, since nq6
these, as appeaiances, aie alieady empiiical objects) iepiesents an ob-
ject in itsell, then the question ol the ielation ol the iepiesentation to
the object is tianscendental, and not only these diops aie meie appeai-
ances, but even theii iound loim, indeed even thc space thiough which
they lall aie nothing in themselves, but only meie modihcations oi
loundations ol oui sensible intuition, the tianscendental object, how-
evei, iemains unInown to us.
Jhe second impoitant concein ol oui tianscendental aesthetic is that
it not meiely eain some lavoi as a plausible hypothesis, but that it be as
ceitain and indubitable as can evei be demanded ol a theoiy that is to
seive as an oiganon. !n oidei to maLe this ceitainty mlly convincing we
will choose a case in which its validity can become obvious <and that a 6
(
can seive to maLe thai which has been adduced in even moie cleai>.
Jhus, il it weie to be supposed that space and time aie in themselves
objective and conditions ol the possibility ol things in themselves, then
it would be shown, hist, that theie is a laige numbei ol a rieri apodic-
tic and synthetic piopositions about both, but especially about space,
which we will theieloie heie investigate as oui piimaiy example. Since
the piopositions ol geometiy aie cognized synthetically a rieri and
with apodictic ceitainty, ! asL. Vhence do you taLe such piopositions, n
4
;
and on what does oui undeistanding iely in attaining to such absolutely
necessaiy and univeisally valid tiuths: Jheie is no othei way than
thiough concepts oi thiough intuitions, both ol which, howevei, aie
given, as such, eithei a rieri oi a esterieri. Jhe lattei, namely empiii-
cal concepts, togethei with that on which they aie giounded, empiiical
intuition, cannot yield any synthetic pioposition except one that is also
meiely empiiical, i. e. , a pioposition ol expeiience, thus it can nevei
contain necessity and absolute univeisality ol the soit that is neveithe-
less chaiacteiistic ol all piopositions ol geometiy. Conceining the hist
and only means loi attaining to such cognitions, howevei, namely
Ojece
` Gndmgen
Ojec
I 87
Doctrine of Elemenrs. Parr !. Jhe Jranscendenral Aesrheric <B>
thiough meie concepts oi a ]rtort intuitions, it is cleai that liom meie
concepts no synueuc cognition but only meiely analytic cognition can
B6 be attained. JaLe the pioposition that with two stiaight lines no space
at alI can be encIosed, thus no hguie is possible, and tiy to deiive it hom
the concept ol stiaight lines and the numbei two, oi taLe the pioposi-
tion that a hguie is possible with thiee stiaight lines, and in the same
way tiy to deiive it liom these concepts. All ol youi elloit is in vain, and
you see youisell loiced to taLe iemge in intuition, as indeed geometiy
n(8 always does. You thus give youisell an object in intuition; but what Lind
is this, is it a puie a ]rtort intuition oi an empiiical one: !l it weie the
Iattei, then no univeisaIly valid, Iet aIone apodictic pioposition couId
evei come liom it. loi expeiience can nevei piovide anything ol this
soit. You must theieloie give youi object a ]rtort in intuition, and
giound youi synthetic pioposition on this. !l theie did not lie in you a
laculty loi intuiting a ]rtort, il this subjective condition iegaiding loim
weie not at the same time the univeisal a ]rtort condition undei which
alone the object ol this (outei) intuition is itseIl possibIe, il the object
(the tiiangle) weie something in itseIl without ielation to youi subject.
then how could you say that what necessaiily lies in youi subjective con-
ditions loi constiucting a tiiangle must also necessaiily peitain to the
tiiangle in itseIf: loi you could not add to youi concept (ol thiee lines)
s66 something new (the hguie) that must theieby necessaiily be encoun-
teied in the object, since this is given piioi to youi cognition and not
thiough it. !l, theieloie, space (and time as well) weie not a meie loim
ol youi intuition that contains a ]rtort conditions undei which aIone
things could be outei objects loi you, which aie nothing in themselves
without these subjective conditions, then you could maLe out absolutely
nothing synthetic and a ]rtort about outei objects. ' !t is theieloie indu-
bitably ceitain and not meiely possible oi even piobable that space and
|,
time, as the necessaiy conditions ol aIl (outei and innei) expeiience, aie
meiely subjective conditions ol all oui intuition, in ielation to which
theieloie aIl objects aie meie appeaiances and not things given loi
themselves in this way, about these appeaiances, mithei, much may be
said a ]rtort that conceins theii loim but nothing whatsoevei about the
things in themselves that may giound them.
<!. Ioi conhimation ol this theoiy ol the ideality ol outei as well as
innei sense, thus ol aIl objects ol the senses, as meie appeaiances, this
comment is especially useIul. that eveiyhing in oui cognition that be-
longs to intuition (with the exception, theieloie, ol the leeling ol plea-
Olect
' Olecte
rom hcte to the end of the Transcendental Aesthec" added in the second ediuo.
Olecte
I 88
Secrion II. On Jime <B>
suie and disleasuie and the will, which aie not cognitions at all) con-
tains nothing but meie ielations, ol laces in one intuition (extension),
alteration ol laces (motion), and laws in accoidance with which this al- n6;
teiauon is deteimined (moving loices). 8ut what is iesent in the lace,
oi what it ioduces in the things themselves besides the alteiation ol
lace, is not given thiough these ielations. ^ow thiough meie ielations
no thing in itsell is cognized, it is theieloie iight to judge that since
nothing is given to us thiough outei sense excet meie ieiesentations
ol ielation, outei sense can also contain in its ieiesentation only the
ielation ol an object to the subject, and not that which is inteinal to the
object in itsell. !t is exactly the same in the case ol innei sense. !t is
not meiely that the ieiesentations ofoutcrscnscmaLe u the ioei
mateiial with which we occuy oui mind, but also the time in which we
lace these ieiesentations, which itsell iecedes the consciousness ol
them in exeiience and giounds the way in which we lace them in
mind as a loimal condition, alieady contains ielations ol succession, ol
simultaneiq, and ol that which is simultaneous with succession (ol that
which eisists). ^ow that which, as ieiesentation, can iecede any act
ol thinLing something is intuition and, il it contains nothing but iela-
tions, it is the loim ol intuition, which, since it does not ieiesent any-
thing excet insolai as something is osited in the mind, can be nothing
othei than the way in which the mind is allected by its own activity,
namely this ositing ol its ieiesentation, thus the way it is allected e 68
thiough itsell, i. e. , it is an innei sense as lai as iegaids its loim.
!veiything that is ieiesented thiough a sense is to that extent always
aeaiance, and an innei sense must theieloie eithei not be admitted at
all oi else the subject, which is the object ol this sense, can only be ie-
iesented by its means as aeaiance, not as it would judge ol itsell il its
intuition weie meie sell-activity, i. e. , intellectual. Any dimculq in this
deends meiely on the question how a subject can inteinally intuit it-
sell, yet this dimculty is common to eveiy theoiy. Consciousness ol it-
sell (aeicetion) is the simle ieiesentation ol the !, and il all ol the
manilold in the subject weie given sc!f-activc!y thiough that alone,
then the innei intuition would be intellectual. !n human beings this
consciousness iequiies innei eicetion ol the manilold that is an-
tecedently given in the subject, and the mannei in which this is given in
the mind without sontaneity must be called sensibility on account ol
this dilleience. !l the laculty loi becoming conscious ol onesell is to
seeL out (aiehend) that which lies in the mind, it must aect the lat-
crc Kant rcvcrts to thc usc oI lrbaImis Ior thc rcmaindcr oIthc "ransccndcntaI
Acsthctic," anditis thus thisvord thatis transIatcd by "rcIation"hcrcandIorthc rc-
maindcroIthc scctionunIcssothcrvisc notcd.
` Clecte
I 8
Doctrine of Elemenrs. Pa . Jhe Jranscendenra| Aesrhetic <B>
tei, and it can only pioduce an intuition ol itsell in such a way, whose
loim, howevei, which antecedently giounds it in the mind, deteimines
the way in which the manilold is togethei in the mind in the iepiesen-
s tation ol time, theie it then intuits itsell not as it would immediately
sell-actively iepiesent itsell, but in accoidance with the way in which it
is aected liom within, consequently as it appeais to itsell, not as it is.
III. If say. in space and time intuition iepiesents both outei objects
as well as the sell-intuition ol the mind as each allects oui senses, i. e. ,
as it appcars,that is not to say that these objects would be a meie iI!u-
sion.' Ioi in the appeaiance the objects, indeed even piopeities that
we attiibute to them, aie always iegaided as something ieally given,
only insolai as this piopeity depends only on the Lind ol intuition ol the
subject in the ielation ol the given object to it then this object as ap-
pcaranccis to be distinguished liom itseIl as object' in itsclf. Jhus I
do not say that bodies meiely sccm"to exist outside me oi that my soul
only sccms'to be given ilI assert that the quali ol space and time in
accoidance with which, as condition ol theii existence, I posit both ol
these lies in my Lind ol intuition and not in these objects' in them-
selves. It would be my own lault il I made that which I should count as
s

o appeaiance into meie illusion. * 8ut this does not happen accoiding to
s *Jhe predicares of appearance can be arrribured ro rhe objecr in irself, in rela-
s ;o rion ro our sense, e.g., rhe red color or fragrance ro the rose, bur the illusion
can never be arrribured ro rhe objecr as predicare, precisely because rhar would
be ro arrribure ro the objecr' for itscIf whar perrains ro ir only in relarion ro
the senses or in general to the subject, e.g., the two handles that were origi-
nally arrribured ro Saturn. \har is nor ro be encounrered in the objecr' in ir-
self at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation U ue subject and is
inseparable from the represenrarion of rhe objecr, is appearance, and rhus the
predicares of space and of time are righrly arrribured ro rhe objecrs of rhe
senses as such, and rhere is no iIlusion in rhis. On rhe conrr+ry, if I artribure
rhe redness ro rhe rose in itscIf, the handles ro Satarn or exrension ro all ourer
objecrs in thcmscIvcs, wirhour looking ro a dererminare relation of rhese ob-
jecrs ro the subjecr and limiring my judgmenr ro rhis, rhen illusion firsr arises.
Oltte
Scbein
Olecte
Bescbanbcito, hcrc and in thc rcmaindcroImisparagraph.
Re/atien
' O(ject
' scbeinen
scbeint
' Olecten
Olecte
` Olect
Olecte
I 0
Secrion II. On Jime <B>
oui piinciple ol the ideality ol all ol oui sensible intuitions, iathei, il
one asciibes objcctivc rca!i( to those loims ol iepiesentation then
one cannot avoid theieby tiansloiming eveiything into meie i!!usion.
Ioi il one iegaids space and time as piopeities that, as lai as theii pos-
sibility is conceined, must be encounteied in things in themselves, and
ieects on tle absuidities in which one then becomes entangled, be-
cause two infinite things that aie neithei substances noi anything ieally
inheiing in substances must neveitheless be something existing, indeed
the necessaiy condition ol the existence ol all things, which also iemain e ; :
even il all existing things aie iemoved, then one cannot well blame the
good 8eiLeley il he demotes bodies to meie illusion,'" indeed even oui
own existence, which would be made dependent in such a way on the
sell-subsisting ieality ol a non-entip such as time, would be tians-
loimed along with this into meie ilIusion, an absuidity ol which no one
has yet allowed himsell to be guilty.
! In natuial theology, wheie one conceives ol an object that is not
only not an object ol intuition loi us but cannot even be an object ol
sensible iniuiiion loi itsell, one is caielul to iemove the conditions ol
time and space liom all ol its intuition (loi all ol its cognition must be
intuition and not thinking, which is always piool ol limitations). 8ut
with what iight can one do this il one has antecedentIy made both ol
these into loims ol things in themselves, and indeed ones that, as a ri-
eri conditions ol the existence ol things, would iemain even il one ie-
moved the things themselves: loi as conditions ol all existence in
geneial they would also have to be conditions ol the existence ol God.
!l one will not maLe them into objective loims ol all things, then no al- a;z
teinative iemains but to maLe them into subjective loims ol oui Lind ol
outei as weIl as innei intuition, which is called sensible because it is not
origna!, i. e. , one thiough which the existence ol the object ol inm-
iuon is itsell given (and that, so lai as we can have insight, can only pei-
tain to the oiiginal being), iathei it is dependent on the existence ol the
ob|ect, thus it is possible only insolai as the iepiesentational capaciiy ol
the subject is aected thiough that.
It is also not necessaiy loi us to limit the Lind ol intuition in space


and time to ue sensibility ol human beings, it may weIl be that all hnite
thinLing beings must necessaiily agiee with human beings in this ie-
gaid (though we cannot decide uis), yet even given such univeisal va-
lidity this Lind ol intuition would not cease to be sensibility, loi the veiy
ieason that it is deiived (intuitus erivativus), not oiiginal (intuitius er
Princi
Clect:
Clects
uct\ot\cntuuon
I 9I
e ;j
Doctrine of Elements. Part 1. Jhe Jranscendenral Aesthetic <B>
inarius),' thus not intellecual ntuIO, which lor the ground alrcady
adduced seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that
is dependent as regards both its existence and its inmition (which de-
termines its existence in relation' to given objects), although the last re-
marL must be counted only as an illustration ol our aesthetic theory and
not as a ground ol its prool.
Conclusion ol ue Jranscendental Aesthetic.
Here we now have one ol the required pieces lor the solution ol the
general problem ol transcendental philosophy hov arc synthctic u
rioH proposiuons possib!ci namely pure a rieri intuitions, space
and time, in which, il we want to go beyond the given concept in an a
rieri judgment, we encounter that which is to be discovered a rieri and
synthetically connected with it, not in the concept but h the intuition
that corresponds to it, but on this ground such a judgment nevei ex-
tends beyond the objects ol the senses and can hold only lor objects ol
possible experience.>
originaIinruition
' Beziebung
Clecte
Cjecte
I ?
Tbe Transcenenta/ Dctrine ) I/ements
Secn Iart
Tbe Transcenenta/ Iic
!ntioouction
hc Ioea oI a JianscenoentaI Iogc
I.
Cn Iogic in geneiaI.
ui cognition aiises liom two lunoamental souices in the mino, the
hist ol which is the ieception ol iepiesentations (the ieceptivity ol im-
piessions), the secono the laculty loi cognizing an ohject hy means ol
these iepiesentations (spontaneity ol concepts), thiough the loimei an
ohject is givcnto us, thiough the lattei it is thoughtin ielation to that
iepiesentation (as a meie oeteimination ol the mino). !ntuition ano
concepts theieloie constitute the elements ol all oui cognition, so that
neithei concepts without intuition coiiesponoing to them in some way
noi intuition without concepts can yielo a cognition. 8oth aie eithei
puie oi empiiical. mpirica!, il sensation (which piesupposes the ac-
tual piesence ol the ohj ect) is containeo theiein, hut purcil no sensa-
tion is mixeo into the iepiesentation. ne can call the lattei the mattei
ol sensihle cognition. Jhus puie intuition contains meiely the loim n;
unoei which something i s inmiteo, ano puie concept only the loim ol n i
thinLing ol an ohject in geneial. nly puie intuitions oi concepts alone
aie possihle H rieri, empiiical ones only H esterieri.
!l we will call the rcccpuvityol oui mino to ieceive iepiesentations
insolai as it is aecteo in some way scnsibi!ity,then on the contiaiy the
laculty loi hiinging loith iepiesentations itsell, oi the spontancityol
cognition, is the undcrstanding. !t comes along with oui natuie that
intuiuoncan nevei he othei than scnsib!c, i. e. , that it contains only
the way in which we aie aecteo hy ohjects. Jhe laculty loi thinking
ol ohjects ol sensihle intuition, on the contiaiy, is the undcrstanding.
eithei ol these piopeities is to he pieleiieo to the othei. Vithout sen-
sihility no ohject woulo he given to us, ano without unoeistanoing none
woulo he thought. Jhoughts without content aie empty, intuitions
hc sccond cditionhasthc pIuraIvcrb kennen,thc lirsthadthcsinguIarkann.
IJ
Docrrine of Elemenrs. Pr. !I. Jranscendental Logic
without concepts aie bIind.

It is thus just as necessaiy to maLe the
mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as
it is to maLe its intuitions undeistandable (i. e. , to biing them undei
concepts). Iuithei, these two lacuIties oi capacities cannot exchange
theii mnctions. Jhe undeistanding is not capable ol intuiung anything,
and the senses aie not capable ol thinLing anything. nIy liom theii
e ;6 unihcation can cognition aiise. 8ut on this account one must not mix
az up theii ioles, iathei one has gieat cause to sepaiate them caiemlIy
hom each ouei and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science
ol the iules ol sensibility in geneial, i. e. , aesthetic, liom the science ol
the rules ol undeistanding in geneiaI, i. e., Iogic.
^ow logic in tuin can be undeitaLen with two dieient aims, eithei as
the logic ol the geneial oi ol the paiucuIai use ol the undeistanding. Jhe
loimei contains the absolutely necessary iuIes ol thinLing, without which
no use ol the mdeistanding taLes place, and it theieloie concers these
iules without iegaid to the dieience ol the objects to which it may be
diiected. ' Jhe logc ol the paiticuIai use ol ue undeistanding contains
the iules loi coiiectIy thinLing about a ceitain Lind ol objects. Jhe loi-
mei can be calIed eIementaiy logic, the lattei, howevei, the oiganon ol
this oi that science. !n the schools the Iattei is ohen stucL beloie the sci-
ences as theii piopaedeutic, though in ue couise ol human ieason uey
aie ceitainly the latest to be ieached, once the science is alieady long
compIete, and iequiies onIy the hnal touch loi its impiovement and pei-
lecuon. Ioi one must alieady Lnow the objects iathei well il one wiIl
e ;; ohei the iuIes loi how a science ol them is to be biought about.
ow geneiaI logic is eithei puie oi appIied logic. !n the loimei we
a abstiact hom aIl empiiical conditions undei which oui undeistanding
is exeicised, e. g. , liom the inuence ol the senses, liom the play ol
imaginauon, the laws ol memoiy, the powei ol habit, incIination, etc.,
hence also liom the souices ol piejudice, indeed in geneial liom all
causes liom which ceitain cognitions aiise oi may be supposed to aiise,
because these meiely concein the undeistanding undei ceitain ciicum-
stances ol its appIication, and expeiience is iequiied in oidei to Lnow
these. A gcncra!but purcIogic theieloie has to do with stiictly uri
eri piincipIes, and is a canon ofthc undcrstanding and ieason, but
only in iegaid to what is loimal in theii use, be the content what it may
(empiiicaI oi transcendental). A gcncra!!ogIc, howevei, is then calIed
app!icd il it is diiected to the iules ol the use ol the undeistanding
undei the subjective empiiical conditions that psychology teaches us. !t
theieloie has empiiicaI piincipIes, although it is to be suie geneial in-
Iinli/dung
Irinciien
Irinciien
I +
Introduction
solar as it conceins the use ol the undeistanding without regard to the
dierence ol objects. n this account it is also neithei a canon ol the
undeistanding in general nor an organon ol articular sciences, but e ;8
merely a cathaitic ol the common understanding.
!n geneial logic the pait that is to constitute the pure doctiine ol iea-
son must theieloie be entirely separated lrom that which constitutes
applied (though still geneial) logic. Jhe lormei alone is pioperly sci- a
,(
ence, although biiel and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation
ol a doctrine ol the elements ol the understanding iequires. !n this
therelore logicians must always have two iules in view.
i) As geneial logic it abstracts liom all contcnts ol the cognition ol
the undeistanding and ol the dillerence ol its objects, and has to do with
nothing but the mere loim ol thinLing.
z) pure logic it has no empiiical principles, thus it draws nothing
lrom psychology (as one has occasionally been persuaded), which theie-
loie has no inuence at all on the canon ol the undeistanding. !t is a
proven doctrine, and everyihing in it must be completely a riari.
Vhat ! call applied logic (in opposition to the common signihcation
ol this woid, accoiding to which it ought to contain certain exeicises to
which pure logic gives the rule) is thus a repiesentation ol the undei-
standing and the rules ol its necessary use in cancreta, namely under the
contingent conditions ol the subject, which can hinder oi piomote this n;
use, and which can all be given only empiiically. !t deals with attention,
its hindrance and consequences, the cause ol eiioi, the condition ol
doubt, ol ieseivation, ol conviction, etc. , and general and puie logic is
ielated to it as pure moiality, which contains merely the necessary moial a
, ,
laws ol a hee will in general, is related to the doctiine ol virtue piopei,
which assesses these laws under the hindrances ol the leelings, inclina-
tions, and passions to which human beings are moie oi less subject, and
which can never yield a true and pioven science, since it requiies empir-
ical and psychological piinciples' just as much as that applied logic does.
11.
Cn tianscendentaI logic.
General logic abstracts, as we have shown, lrom all content ol cogni-
tion, i. e. liom any relation ol it to the object, and consideis only the
Princiien
Princiien
Beziebung. Ahc contrast bctwccn this tcrm and thc IoIIowingusc oIlrbImis (p. : 6,
notca)showsthatKantcontinucstouscthcIo:mcrtoconnotca:cIationbctwccnsub-
cct and obcct and thc Iattcr among obccts, though in this casc obccts oIthought
rathcrthanscnsibility. !urthcr,unnotcdinstanccsolrcation" transatcBeziebung.
Clect
IS
Doctrine of Elements. Pt. !!. Jranscendental Logic
logical loim in the ielation ol cognitions to one anothei, i. e. , the loim
ol thinLing in geneial. 8ut now since theie aie puie as well as empiii-
cal intuitions (as the tianscendental aesthetic pioved), a distinction be-
a8o tween puie and empiiical thinLing ol objects could also well be lound.
!n this case theie would be a logic in which one did not abstiact hom
all content ol cognition, loi that logic that contained meiely the iules
ol the puie thinLing ol an object would exclude all those cognitions that
weie ol empiiical content. It would theieloie concein the oiigin ol oui
n ,
6 cognitions ol objects insolai as that cannot be asciibed to the objects,
while geneial logic, on the contiaiy, has nothing to do with this oiigin
ol cognition, but iathei consideis iepiesentations, whethei they aie
oiiginally given H rieri in ouiselves oi only empiiically, meiely in ie-
spect ol the laws accoiding to which the undeistanding biings them
into ielation to one anouei when it thinLs, and theieloie it deals only
with the loim ol the undeistanding, which can be given to the iepie-
sentations wheievei they may have oiiginated.
Ad heie I maLe a iemaiL the impoit ol which extends to all ol the
lolIowing consideiations, and that we must Leep weIl in view, nameIy
that not eveiy Hrieri cognition must be called tianscendental, but only
that by means ol which we cognize that and how ceitain iepiesentations
(intuitions oi concepts) aie applied entiiely Hrieri, oi aie possible (i. e. ,
a8: the possibility ol cognition oi its use H rieri). Hence neithei space noi
any geometiical deteimination ol it H rieri is a tianscendental iepie-
sentation, but only the cognition that these iepiesentations aie not ol
empiiical oiigin at all and the possibility that they can neveitheless be
ielated H rieri to objects ol expeiience can be called tianscendental.
!iLewise the use ol space about all objects in geneial would also be
tianscendental, but il it is iestiicted solely to obj ects ol the senses, then
n
7
it is called empiiical. Jhe dilleience between the tianscendental and
the empiiical theieloie belongs only to the ciitique ol cognitions and
does not concein theii ielation to theii object.
In the expectation, theieloie, that theie can peihaps be concepts that
may be ielated to objects H rieri, not as puie oi sensible intuitions but
iathei meiely as acts ol puie thinLing, that aie thus concepts but ol nei-
thei empiiical noi aesthetic oiigin, we piovisionally loimulate the idea
ol a science ol puie undeistanding and ol the puie cognition ol ieason,
by means ol which we thinL objects completely H rieri. Such a science,
which would deteimine the oiigin, the domain, and the objective valid-
ity ol such cognitions, would have to be calIed transccndcnta! !ogc,
since it has to do meiely with the laws ol the undeistanding and ieason,
lrbaImisse
|crba/tni:
' oIIowing!rdmann,rcadIngkonneninstcad oIkonne.
I
Inuoducuon
but solely insolai as they aie ielated to objects H]rieri and not, as in the e 8z
case ol geneial logic, to empiiical as well as puie cognitions ol ieason
without distinction.
!!!.
Cn the division ol general logic
into analytic and dialectic.
Jhe old and lamous question with which the logicians weie to be dii-
ven into a coei and biought to such a pass that they must eithei lall
into a miseiable ciicle oi else conless theii ignoiance, hence the van- n
,
8
ity ol theii entiie ait, is this. VhatismthiJhe nominal dehnition ol
tiuth, namely that it is the agieement ol cognition with its object, is
heie gianted and piesupposed, but one demands to Lnow what is the
geneial and ceitain ciiteiion ol the tiuth ol any cognition.
It is alieady a gieat and necessary piool ol cleveiness oi insight to
Lnow what one shouId ieasonabIy asL. Ioi il the question is absuid in
itsell and demands unnecessaiy answeis, then, besides the embaiiass-
ment ol the one who pioposes it, it also has the disadvantage ol mis-
leading the incautious listenei into absuid answeis, and piesenting the
iidiculous sight (as the ancients said) ol one peison milLing a billy-goat a 8
while the othei holds a sieve undeineath.
!l tiuth consists in the agieement ol a cognition with its object, then
this object must theieby be distinguished liom otheis, loi a cognition
is lalse il it does not agiee with the object to which it is ielated even il
it contains something that could well be valid ol othei objects. ^ow a
geneial ciiteiion ol tiuth would be that which was valid ol all cognitions
without any distinction among theii objects. 8ut it is cleai that since
with such a ciiteiion one abstiacts liom all content ol cognition (iela-
tion to its object), 'yet tiuth conceins piecisely this content, it would be n
completely impossible and absuid to asL loi a maiL ol the tiuth ol this
content ol cognition, and thus it is cleai that a sulhcient and yet at the
same time geneial sign ol tiuth cannot possibly be piovided. Since
above we have called the content ol a cognition its mattei, one must
theieloie say that no geneial sign ol the tiuth ol the mattei ol cogni-
tion can be demanded, because it is sell-contiadictory.
8ut conceining the meie loim ol cognition (setting aside all content),
it is equally cleai that a logic, so lai as it expounds the geneial and nec- e 8(
essaiy iules ol undeistanding, must piesent ciiteiia ol truth in these
veiy iules. Ioi that which contiadicts these is lalse, since the undei-
standing theieby contiadicts its geneial iules ol thinLing and thus con-
D thcsccondcdition,Dia/exi:, in thc hrst, Dia/e/e, i.c.rcasoninginacircIc.
` Clect
I 7
Docrrine of Flemenrs. Pr. II. Jranscendenral Iogic
tradicts itsell. 8ut these ciiteria concein only the lorm ol tiuth, i. e. , ol
thinLing in geneial, and aie to uat extent entiiely coirect but not sul-
hcient. Ioi although a cognition may be in complete accoid with logi-
cal loim, i. e. , not contradict itsell, yet it can still always contiadict the
object. Jhe merely logical ciiteiion ol tiuth, namely the agreement ol
a cognition with the geneial and loimal laws ol understanding and rea-
son, is theielore ceitainly the cenitie sine ua nen and thus the negative
aO condition ol all tiuth; mithei, howevei, logic cannot go, and the eiioi
that conceins not lorm but content cannot be discovered by any touch-
stone ol logic.`
General logic analyzes the entiie loimal business ol the understand-
ing and reason into its elements, and presents these as piinciples ol all
logical assessment' ol oui cognition. Jhis part ol logic can therelore be
called an analytic, and is on that veiy account at least the negative
touchstone ol tiuth, since one must belore all else examine and evalu-
ate by means ol these rules the loim ol all cognition beloie investigat-
e 8 ing its content in oidei to hnd out whethei with iegaid to the object it
contains positive tiuth. 8ut since the meie lorm ol cognition, howevei
well it may agree with logical laws, is lar lrom suncing to constitute the
mateiial (objective) tiuth ol the cognition, nobody can daie to judge ol
objects and to assert anything about them meiely with logic without
having diawn on antecedently weIl-lounded inloimation about them
liom outside ollogic, in oidei subsequently meiely to investigate its use
and connection in a coherent whole according to logical laws, or, bet-
tei, solely to examine them according to such laws. ^eveitheless there
is something so seductive in the possession ol an apparent art lor giving
all ol oui cognitions the lorm ol undeistanding, even though with ie-
n6:
gaid to theii content one may yet be veiy empty and pooi, that this gen-
eral logic, which is meiely a canon lor judging, has been used as il it
weie an organon loi de actual pioduction ol at least tLe semblance ol
objective assertions, and thus in lact it has thereby been misused. ow
general logic, as a putative organon, is called diaIcctic.
As dilleient as the signihcance ol the employment ol this designation
ol a science oi ait among the ancients may have been, one can still inler
e 86
hom their actuaI use ol it that among them it was nothing other than
the Iogic of iIIusion a sophistical art loi giving to its ignorance, in-
deed even to its intentional tiicLs, the aii ol truth, by imitating the
meuod ol thoioughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using
its topics lor the embellishment ol every empty pretension. ^ow one
can taLe it as a ceitain and uselul warning that geneial logic, consid-
Princiien
Beurtbei/ung
Beurtbei/ung
Vb
Inuoducuon
crcd as an organon, is always a logic oI illusion, i. e. , is dialectical. Ioi
since it teaches us nothing at all about the content oI cognition, but
only the Ioimal conditions oI agieement with the undeistanding, which
aie entiiely indiIIeient with iegaid to the objects, the ehionteiy oI
using it as a tool (oiganon) Ioi an expansion and extension oI its inIoi-
mation, oi at least the pietension oI so doing, comes down to nothing
but idle chattei, asseiting oi impeaching whatevei one wants with some n6z
plausibiliq.
Such instiuction by no means behts the dignity oI philosophy. Ioi
this ieason it would be bettei to taLe this designation oI dialectic" as a
critiquc of diaIccucaI iIIusion, which is counted as pait oI logic, and
in such a way we would heie have it be undeistood.
n 8;
Cn the division oI tianscendental logic into
the tianscendental analytic and dialectic.
!n a tianscendental logic we isolate the undeistanding (as we did above
with sensibility in the tianscendental aesthetic), and elevate Iiom oui
cognition meiely the pait oI oui thought that has its oiigin solely in the
undeistanding. Jhe use oI this puie cognition, howevei, depends on
this as its condition: that objects aie given to us in intuition, to which it
can be applied. Ioi without intuition all oI oui cognition would lacL ob-
jects, and theieIoie iemain completely empty. Jhe pait oI tianscen-
dental logic, theieIoie, that expounds the elements oI the puie
cognition oI the undeistanding and the piinciples without which no
object can be thought at all, is the tianscendental analytic, and at the
same time a logic oI tiuth. Ioi no cognition can contiadict it without at
the same time losing all content, i. e. , all ielation to any object, hence n6j
all tiuth. 8ut because it is veiy enticing and seductive to naLe use oI
these puie cognitions oI the undeistanding and piinciples by them-
selves, and even beyond all bounds oI expeiience, which howevei itselI
alone can give us the mattei (objects)' to which those puie concepts oI n 88
the undeistanding can be applied, the undeistanding Ialls into the dan-
gei oI maLing a mateiial use oI the meiely Ioimal piinciples' oI puie
undeistanding thiough empty sophistiies, and oI judging without dis-
tinction about objects that aie not given to us, which peihaps indeed
Kennmise
Cjecten
Irinciien
Cject
Clecte
' Irinciien
!
Doctrine of Elements. Pr. !!. Jranscendenral Iogic
could not be given to us in any way. Since it should piopeily be only a
canon loi the assessment ol empiiical use, it is misused il one lets it
count as the oiganon ol a geneial and uniestiicted use, and daies to
synthetically judge, asseit, and decide about objects in geneial with the
puie undeistanding alone. Jhe use ol the puie undeistanding would in
this case theieloie be dialectical. Jhe second pait ol the tianscendental
logic must theieloie be a ciitique ol this dialectical illusion, and is called
tianscendental dialectic, not as an ait ol dogmatically aiousing such il-
lusion (an unloitunately highly pievalent ait among the manilold woiLs
ol metaphysical juggleiy), but iathei as a ciitique ol the undeistanding
and ieason in iegaid to theii hypeiphysical use, in oidei to uncovei the
n 6q lalse illusion ol theii gioundless pietensions and to ieduce theii claims
to invention and amplihcation, putatively to be attained thiough tian-
scendental piinciples, to the meie assessment and evaluation ol the puie
undeistanding, guaiding it against sophistical tiicLs.
?00