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Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985 SOFIA J.

NEPOMUCENO, petitioner, vs. !E !ONORA"LE COUR OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOME#, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELI A JUGO, respondents.

GU IERRE#, JR., J.: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside that portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals (now intermediate Appellate Court) dated June 3, 198 , as amended !" the resolution dated Au#ust 1$, 198 , declarin# as null and void the devise in favor of the petitioner and the resolution dated %ecem!er 8, 198 den"in# petitioner&s motion for reconsideration. 'artin Ju#o died on Jul" 1(, 19)* in 'ala!on, +i,al. -e left a last .ill and Testament dul" si#ned !" him at the end of the .ill on pa#e three and on the left mar#in of pa#es 1, and * thereof in the presence of Celestina Ale/andro, '"rna C. Corte,, and 0eandro 0eano, who in turn, affi1ed their si#natures !elow the attestation clause and on the left mar#in of pa#es 1, and * of the .ill in the presence of the testator and of each other and the 2otar" 3u!lic. The .ill was ac4nowled#ed !efore the 2otar" 3u!lic +omeo 5scareal !" the testator and his three attestin# witnesses. 6n the said .ill, the testator named and appointed herein petitioner 7ofia J. 2epomuceno as his sole and onl" e1ecutor of his estate. 6t is clearl" stated in the .ill that the testator was le#all" married to a certain +ufina 8ome, !" whom he had two le#itimate children, 9scar and Carmelita, !ut since 19: , he had !een estran#ed from his lawfull" wedded wife and had !een livin# with petitioner as hus!and and wife. 6n fact, on %ecem!er :, 19: , the testator 'artin Ju#o and the petitioner herein, 7ofia J. 2epomuceno were married in ;ictoria, Tarlac !efore the Justice of the 3eace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namel", his le#al wife +ufina 8ome, and his children 9scar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner. The .ill reads in part< Art. 666. That 6 have the followin# le#al heirs, namel"< m" aforementioned le#al wife, +ufina 8ome,, and our son, 9scar, and dau#hter Carmelita, !oth surnamed Ju#o, whom 6 declare and admit to !e le#all" and properl" entitled to inherit from me= that while 6 have !een estran#ed from m" a!ove>named wife for so man" "ears, 6 cannot den" that 6 was le#all" married to her or that we have !een separated up to the present for reasons and /ustifications 4nown full" well !" them<

Art. 6;. That since 19: , 1 have !een livin#, as man and wife with one 7ofia J. 2epomuceno, whom 6 declare and avow to !e entitled to m" love and affection, for all the thin#s which she has done for me, now and in the past= that while 7ofia J. 2epomuceno has with m" full 4nowled#e and consent, did comport and represent m"self as her own hus!and, in truth and in fact, as well as in the e"es of the law, 6 could not !ind her to me in the hol" !onds of matrimon" !ecause of m" aforementioned previous marria#e= 9n Au#ust 1, 19)*, the petitioner filed a petition for the pro!ate of the last .ill and Testament of the deceased 'artin Ju#o in the Court of ?irst 6nstance of +i,al, @ranch AAA6;, Caloocan Cit" and as4ed for the issuance to her of letters testamentar". 9n 'a" 13, 19):, the le#al wife of the testator, +ufina 8ome, and her children filed an opposition alle#in# inter alia that the e1ecution of the .ill was procured !" undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner= that at the time of the e1ecution of the .ill, the testator was alread" ver" sic4 and that petitioner havin# admitted her livin# in concu!ina#e with the testator, she is wantin# in inte#rit" and thus, letters testamentar" should not !e issued to her. 9n Januar" (, 19)(, the lower court denied the pro!ate of the .ill on the #round that as the testator admitted in his .ill to coha!itin# with the petitioner from %ecem!er 19: until his death on Jul" 1(, 19)*, the .ill&s admission to pro!ate will !e an 6dle e1ercise !ecause on the face of the .ill, the invalidit" of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The petitioner appealed to the respondent>appellate court. 9n June , 198 , the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of ?irst 6nstance of +i,al den"in# the pro!ate of the will. The respondent court declared the .ill to !e valid e1cept that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant to Article )39 in relation with Article 1$ 8 of the Civil Code of the 3hilippines. The dispositive portion of the decision reads< .-5+5?9+5, the decision a quo is here!" set aside, the will in Buestion declared valid e1cept the devise in favor of the appellant which is declared null and void. The properties so devised are instead passed on in intestac" to the appellant in eBual shares, without pronouncement as to cost. 9n June 1:, 198 , oppositors +ufina 8ome, and her children filed a C'otion for Correction of Clerical 5rrorC pra"in# that the word CappellantC in the last sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision !e chan#ed to CappelleesC so as to read< CThe properties so devised are instead passed on intestac" to the appellees in eBual shares, without pronouncement as to costs.C The motion was #ranted !" the respondent court on Au#ust 1$, 198 . 9n Au#ust 3, 198 , the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. This was denied !" the respondent court in a resolution dated %ecem!er 8, 198 . The main issue raised !" the petitioner is whether or not the respondent court acted in e1cess of its /urisdiction when after declarin# the last .ill and Testament of the deceased 'artin Ju#o

validl" drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validit" of the testamentar" provision in favor of herein petitioner. The petitioner su!mits that the validit" of the testamentar" provision in her favor cannot !e passed upon and decided in the pro!ate proceedin#s !ut in some other proceedin#s !ecause the onl" purpose of the pro!ate of a .ill is to esta!lish conclusivel" as a#ainst ever"one that a .ill was e1ecuted with the formalities reBuired !" law and that the testator has the mental capacit" to e1ecute the same. The petitioner further contends that even if the provisions of para#raph 1 of Article )39 of the Civil Code of the 3hilippines were applica!le, the declaration of its nullit" could onl" !e made !" the proper court in a separate action !rou#ht !" the le#al wife for the specific purpose of o!tainin# a declaration of the nullit" of the testamentar" provision in the .ill in favor of the person with whom the testator was alle#edl" #uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e. The respondents on the other hand contend that the fact that the last .ill and Testament itself e1pressl" admits indu!ita!l" on its face the meretricious relationship !etween the testator and the petitioner and the fact that petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alle#ed i#norance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrar" evidence, merits the application of the doctrine enunciated in Nuguid v. Felix Nuguid, et al. (1) 7C+A **9) and Felix Balanay, Jr. v. Hon. Antonio Martinez, et al. (8.+. 2o. 0> 39 *), June ), 19):). +espondents also su!mit that the admission of the testator of the illicit relationship !etween him and the petitioner put in issue the le#alit" of the devise. .e a#ree with the respondents. The respondent court acted within its /urisdiction when after declarin# the .ill to !e validl" drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validit" of the .ill and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The #eneral rule is that in pro!ate proceedin#s, the court&s area of inBuir" is limited to an e1amination and resolution of the e1trinsic validit" of the .ill. The rule is e1pressed thus< 111 111 111 ... 6t is elementar" that a pro!ate decree finall" and definitivel" settles all Buestions concernin# capacit" of the testator and the proper e1ecution and witnessin# of his last .ill and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforcea!le or otherwise. Fernandez v. !imagi"a, 1 7C+A * 8) The petition !elow !ein# for the pro!ate of a .ill, the court&s area of inBuir" is limited to the e1trinsic validit" thereof. The testators testamentar" capacit" and the compliance with the formal reBuisites or solemnities prescri!ed !" law are the onl" Buestions presented for the resolution of the court. An" inBuir" into the intrinsi# validit" or efficac" of the provisions of the will or the le#alit" of an" devise or le#ac" is premature. 111 111 111

True or not, the alle#ed sale is no #round for the dismissal of the petition for pro!ate. 3ro!ate is one thin#= the validit" of the testamentar" provisions is another. The first decides the e1ecution of the document and the testamentar" capacit" of the testator= the second relates to descent and distri!ution ($umilang v. %amagosa, 1 7C+A 13(9) 111 111 111 To esta!lish conclusivel" as a#ainst ever"one, and once for all, the facts that a will was e1ecuted with the formalities reBuired !" law and that the testator was in a condition to ma4e a will, is the onl" purpose of the proceedin#s under the new code for the pro!ate of a will. (7ec. ( :). The /ud#ment in such proceedin#s determines and can determine nothin# more. 6n them the court has no power to pass upon the validit" of an" provisions made in the will. 6t can not decide, for e1ample, that a certain le#ac" is void and another one valid. ... (&astaneda v. Alemany, 3 3hil. * () The rule, however, is not infle1i!le and a!solute. 8iven e1ceptional circumstances, the pro!ate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the .ill. 6n Nuguid v. Nuguid (1) 7C+A **9) cited !" the trial court, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completel" preterited her survivin# forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it ma" appear e1trinsicall", would !e null and void. 7eparate or latter proceedin#s to determine the intrinsic validit" of the testamentar" provisions would !e superfluous. 5ven !efore esta!lishin# the formal validit" of the will, the Court in Balanay .Jr. v. Martinez ((* 7C+A *: ) passed upon the validit" of its intrinsic provisions. 6nvo4in# Cpractical considerationsC, we stated< The !asic issue is whether the pro!ate court erred in passin# upon the intrinsic validit" of the will, !efore rulin# on its allowance or formal validit", and in declarin# it void. .e are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of du!ious le#alit", and !ecause of the motion to withdraw the petition for pro!ate (which the lower court assumed to have !een filed with the petitioner&s authori,ation) the trial court acted correctl" in passin# upon the will&s intrinsic validit" even !efore its formal validit" had !een esta!lished. The pro!ate of a will mi#ht !ecome an 6dle ceremon" if on its face it appears to !e intrinsicall" void. .here practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validit" of the will !e passed upon, even !efore it is pro!ated, the court should meet the issue (2u#uid v. 2u#uid, (* 9.8. 1: ), 1) 7C+A **9. Compare with 7umilan# vs. +ama#osa 0> 313:, %ecem!er (, 19(), 1 7C+A 13(9= Cacho v. Ddan 0>1999(, April 3$, 19(:, 13 7C+A (93).

There appears to !e no more dispute at this time over the e1trinsic validit" of the .ill. @oth parties are a#reed that the .ill of 'artin Ju#o was e1ecuted with all the formalities reBuired !" law and that the testator had the mental capacit" to e1ecute his .ill. The petitioner states that she completel" a#rees with the respondent court when in resolvin# the Buestion of whether or not the pro!ate court correctl" denied the pro!ate of 'artin Ju#o&s last .ill and Testament, it ruled< This !ein# so, the will is declared validl" drawn. (3a#e *, %ecision, Anne1 A of 3etition.) 9n the other hand the respondents pra" for the affirmance of the Court of Appeals& decision in toto. The onl" issue, therefore, is the /urisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentar" provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void. .e sustain the respondent court&s /urisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra'( .e pause to reflect. 6f the case were to !e remanded for pro!ate of the will, nothin# will !e #ained. 9n the contrar", this liti#ation will !e protracted. And for au#ht that appears in the record, in the record, in the event of pro!ate or if the court re/ects the will, pro!a!ilit" e1ists that the case will come up once a#ain !efore us on the same issue of the intrinsic validit" or nullit" of the will. +esult, waste of time, effort, e1pense, plus added an1iet". These are the practical considerations that induce us to a !elief that we mi#ht as well meet head>on the issue of the validit" of the provisions of the will in Buestion. (7ection , +ule 1, +ules of Court. Case, et al. v. Ju#o, et al., )) 3hil. :1), : ). After all, there e1ists a /usticia!le controvers" cr"in# for solution. .e see no useful purpose that would !e served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simpl" !ecause, in the pro!ate of a will, the court does not ordinaril" loo4 into the intrinsic validit" of its provisions. Article )39 of the Civil Code provides< The followin# donations shall !e void< (1) Those made !etween persons who were #uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e at the time of the donation= ( ) Those made !etween persons found #uilt" of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof= (3) Those made to a pu!lic officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, !" reason of his office.

6n the case referred to in 2o. 1, the action for declaration of nullit" ma" !e !rou#ht !" the spouse of the donor or donee= and the #uilt of the donor and donee ma" !e proved !" preponderance of evidence in the same action. Article 1$ 8 of the Civil Code provides< The prohi!itions mentioned in Article )39, concernin# donations inter vivos shall appl" to testamentar" provisions. 6n Article 666 of the disputed .ill, e1ecuted on Au#ust 1:, 19(8, or almost si1 "ears !efore the testator&s death on Jul" 1(, 19)*, 'artin Ju#o stated that respondent +ufina 8ome, was his le#al wife from whom he had !een estran#ed Cfor so man" "ears.C -e also declared that respondents Carmelita Ju#o and 9scar Ju#o were his le#itimate children. 6n Article 6;, he stated that he had !een livin# as man and wife with the petitioner since 19: . Testator Ju#o declared that the petitioner was entitled to his love and affection. -e stated that 2epomuceno represented Ju#o as her own hus!and !ut Cin truth and in fact, as well as in the e"es of the law, 6 could not !ind her to me in the hol" !onds of matrimon" !ecause of m" aforementioned previous marria#e. There is no Buestion from the records a!out the fact of a prior e1istin# marria#e when 'artin Ju#o e1ecuted his .ill. There is also no dispute that the petitioner and 'r. Ju#o lived to#ether in an ostensi!le marital relationship for "ears until his death. 6t is also a fact that on %ecem!er , 19: , 'artin Ju#o and 7ofia J. 2epomuceno contracted a marria#e !efore the Justice of the 3eace of ;ictoria, Tarlac. The man was then :1 "ears old while the woman was *8. 2epomuceno now contends that she acted in #ood faith for "ears in the !elief that she was le#all" married to the testator. The records do not sustain a findin# of innocence or #ood faith. As ar#ued !" the private respondents< ?irst. The last will and testament itself e1pressl" admits indu!ita!l" on its face the meretricious relationship !etween the testator and petitioner, the devisee. 7econd. 3etitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alle#ed i#norance of the true civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrar" evidence. 6n short, the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validit" of the le#ac" #iven in the will to petitioner !" the deceased testator at the start of the proceedin#s. .hether or not petitioner 4new that testator 'artin Ju#o, the man he had lived with as man and wife, as alread" married, was an important and specific issue !rou#ht !" the parties !efore the trial court, and passed upon !" the Court of Appeals. 6nstead of limitin# herself to provin# the e1trinsic validit" of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her alle#ed #ood faith in marr"in#

the testator. (Testimon" of 3etitioner, T72 of Au#ust 1, 198 , pp. :(>:) and pp. ( >(*). 3rivate respondents, naturall", presented evidence that would refute the testimon" of petitioner on the point. 7e!astian Ju#o, "oun#er !rother of the deceased testator, testified at len#th on the meretricious relationship of his !rother and petitioner. (T72 of Au#ust 18,19):). Clearl", the #ood faith of petitioner was !" option of the parties made a decisive issue ri#ht at the inception of the case. Confronted !" the situation, the trial court had to ma4e a rulin# on the Buestion. .hen the court a quo held that the testator 'artin Ju#o and petitioner &were deemed #uilt" of adulter" or concu!ina#e&, it was a findin# that petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended to !e. 111 111 111 3. 6f a review of the evidence must !e made nonetheless, then private respondents respectfull" offer the followin# anal"sis< ?6+7T< The secrec" of the marria#e of petitioner with the deceased testator in a town in Tarlac where neither she nor the testator ever resided. 6f there was nothin# to hide from, wh" the concealment& E 9f course, it ma"!e ar#ued that the marria#e of the deceased with private respondent +ufina 8ome, was li4ewise done in secrec". @ut it should !e remem!ered that +ufina 8ome, was alread" in the famil" wa" at that time and it would seem that the parents of 'artin Ju#o were not in favor of the marria#e so much so that an action in court was !rou#ht concernin# the marria#e. (Testimon" of 7e!astian Ju#o, T72 of Au#ust 18, 19):, pp. 9>3$) 75C92%< 3etitioner was a sweetheart of the deceased testator when the" were still !oth sin#le. That would !e in 19 as 'artin Ju#o married respondent +ufina 8ome, on 2ovem!er 9, 19 3 (51h. 3). 3etitioner married the testator onl" on %ecem!er :, 19: . There was a space of a!out 3$ "ears in !etween. %urin# those 3$ "ears, could it !e !elieved that she did not even wonder wh" 'artin Ju#o did not marr" her nor contact her an"more after 2ovem!er, 19 3 > facts that should impel her to as4 her #room !efore she married him in secrec", especiall" so when she was alread" a!out :$ "ears old at the time of marria#e. T-6+%< The fact that petitioner !ro4e off from 'artin Ju#o in 19 3 is !" itself conclusive demonstration that she new that the man she had openl" lived for "ears as man and wife was a married man with alread" two children.

?9D+T-< -avin# admitted that she 4new the children of respondent +ufina 8ome,, is it possi!le that she would not have as4ed 'artin Ju#o whether or not the" were his ille#itimate or le#itimate children and !" whomE That is un>?ilipino. ?6?T-< -avin# often #one to 3asi# to the residence of the parents of the deceased testator, is it possi!le that she would not have 4nown that the mother of private respondent 9scar Ju#o and Carmelita Ju#o was respondent +ufina 8ome,, considerin# that the houses of the parents of 'artin Ju#o (where he had lived for man" "ears) and that of respondent +ufina 8ome, were /ust a few meters awa"E 7uch pretentions of petitioner 7ofia 2epomuceno are un!elieva!le. The" are, to sa" the least, inherentl" impro!a!le, for the" are a#ainst the e1perience in common life and the ordinar" instincts and promptin#s of human nature that a woman would not !other at all to as4 the man she was #oin# to marr" whether or not he was alread" married to another, 4nowin# that her #room had children. 6t would !e a stor" that would strain human credulit" to the limit if petitioner did not 4now that 'artin Ju#o was alread" a married man in view of the irrefuta!le fact that it was precisel" his marria#e to respondent +ufina 8ome, that led petitioner to !rea4 off with the deceased durin# their "oun#er "ears. 'oreover, the prohi!ition in Article )39 of the Civil Code is a#ainst the ma4in# of a donation !etween persons who are livin# in adulter" or concu!ina#e. 6t is the donation which !ecomes void. The #iver cannot #ive even assumin# that the recipient ma" receive. The ver" wordin#s of the .ill invalidate the le#ac" !ecause the testator admitted he was disposin# the properties to a person with whom he had !een livin# in concu!ina#e. .-5+5?9+5, the petition is %67'6775% for lac4 of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals, now 6ntermediate Appellate Court, is A??6+'5%. 2o costs. 79 9+%5+5%. )ee*an+ee &*airman', Melen#io,Herrera, -lana, %elova, !e la Fuente and -ata.o, JJ., #on#ur.

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