774

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 87: SLAVERY
775
the form of private possession by an individual
master or the subjugation of a whole people by
the conquering state. Nor do those, like Aris-
totle and Montesquieu, who regard some men
or some races as naturally servile, seem to offer
reasons for political slavery different from
those which they think justify economic ser-
vitude.
What does seem to affectthe issue concern-
ing the justice of slavery is the difference be-
tween the natural slave and the slave by force
or law./This is the difference between the man
who is born a slave (not merely born of slaves
and into slavery) and the man who, born with
a nature fit for freedom, is made a slave, either
because his parents before him were slaves, be-
cause he is sold into slavery, or because, for
one reason or another, he forfeits his birthright
to freedom.
If no men are by nature slaves, then the only
questions of justice concern the: conditions which
justify making slaves of free men. These may
remain the only questions even if there are
natural slaves, since it cannot be unjust to
treat as slaves those who are by nature slaves,
any more than it is unjust to treat animals as
brutes.
In both cases some consideration may be
given to how slaves or animals should be treated.
"The right treatment of slaves," Plato declares
in the Laws, "is to behave properly to theIn,
and to do to them, if possible, even more justice
than to those who are our equals."Justice also
requires, according to Plato, that if a slave or
an animal do any harm, the master shall pay for
the injury.
\VB HAVE ALREADY observed that, with regard
to natural slavery, the main issue is one of fact.
The fact in question concerns human equality
and inequality. Within that equality of all men
\vhich rests upon their common possession of
human nature, are some men by nature in-
ferior to others in their use of reason or their
capacity for leading the life of reason? Does
such inferiority prevent them from directing
their own lives or even their own work to the
ends \vhich are the natural fulfillment of man's
powers? And if so, do not such men profit from
being directed by their superiors, as well as
from serving them and, through serving them,
CHAPTER 87: SLAVERY
"'waster and slave, husband and wife, father
and children."
That the distinction bet\veen slave and free
man signifies economic rather than political
status for Aristotle, and for the ancients
ally, seems to be indicated by the fact that,
under certain types of oligarchical constitu-
tion, free men are excluded from citizenship
without thereby becoming slaves. But in all
ancient republics, democratic as "veIl as oli-
garchical, slaves for citizenship..
'Though the relation of master and slave IS
essentially economic rather than political, such
slavery has a political aspect in the sense that
some men have no function in the state except
to serve other men. Aristotle speaks of them as
necessary to the state, but not, as are citizens,
parts of it. "The necessary people," he says,
"are either slaves who minister to the wants of
individuals, or mechanics and laborers who are
the servants of the community."
The mark of economic slavery seems to be
tI:iekind of work a man does and the conditions
nuder which he labors, whereas political slavery
seems to. depend upon the. kind of life a man
leads and the conditions under which he lives
in society. The economic slave serves a master
his work. The political slave lives under a
rant. In Aristotle's view it is only the man
o is economically. free who has .anything to
e frolll being enslaved by a tyrant. "No free
fi, if he can escape from it, "vill endure such
vernment," he writes; but the barbarians,
ho "are by nature slaves," do not rebel
ainst tyranny. Where some men are by nature
e, there is also a natural distinction between
men and slaves, "but among barbarians,"
according to Aristotle, "no distinction is made
between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they area com..;
nitl' of slaves, male and female."
Whe difference between economic bondage-...
ich can include what Marx calls the,vage
ery of the proletariat,. as well as chattel
ery and other forms of serfdom---and the
litical condition of those enslaved by a tyrant
es not seem to affect the issue of justice.
hose, like f-Iobbes and Locke, who think that
e vanquished in war must pay for being al-
ed to live by submitting to slavery, do not
em concerned .whether the servitude takes
the condition of men under tyranny and under
benevolent despotism; the second, to the di
ference in the condition of men under abso-
lute and under constitutional government.
The other sense in which the word "slavery"
seems always to be used with the connotation
of evil is the sense in which Augustine speak
of man's slavery to lust as a consequence 0
original sin; or in which Spinoza writes 0
human bondage-the condition of men en-
slaved by the tyranny of .their passions
compared with human freedom under t m
rule of reason. This meaning of slavery. isd ",
cussed in other chapters, such as EMOTION a
LIBERTY.
The slavery which results. from thetyrann
of the passions is a disorder from which an
man may suffer; it stems from a weakness i
the human nature which is common to a
Similarly, the slavery of a whole people und
tyrannical rule is a perversion of governme
for all the members of the community, n
just for some. But whenever slavery is d
fended, it is justified only for S01ne men with'
a community, not for all; or if for a who
people, not for all mankind, but only
certain peoples under certain conditions. Wit
regard to slavery, the basic issue of justice .
therefore, whether some men should be sla
or all should be free, not whether all shou
be slaves or all free.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN the slavery of so
men within a community and the enslaveme
of a \vhole people appears to be related to t
distinction between economic and politi
enslavement. In the ancient meaning of t
word "economic," the economic slave is
slave of the household or family. "A comp
household," writes Aristotle, "consists of sl
and freemen." The elements of a family
M
... ORALISTS and political philosophers
who appear to be in substantial agree-
ment on the principles of justice differremark-
ably from one another on whether slavery is
just. The sharpness of this disagreement is
made all the more remarkable by the almost
unanimous condemnation of slavery-in two
senses of that term.
As appears in the chapter on TYRANNY, the
condition of those who live under tyrannical
rule is generally conceived as a kind of slavery,
involving not only the loss of political freedom
but also the suffering of other abuses or in-
juries. With the possible exception of Hobbes,
who says that tyranny is merely monarchy
"misliked," none of the great authors from
Plato and Aristotle to Rousseau, Hegel, and
Mill, writes of tyranny except as a perversion
ofgovernment-unjust, lawless, or illegitimate.
The evil of tyranny for them lies in the en-
slavement of men who deserve to be free, who
should govern themselves or at least should be
governed for their own good, not exploited by
a ruler who uses them for his own private
interests.
Some writers, like Montesquieu, who tend
to identify despotism and tyranny see little
difference between subjection and slavery, re-
garding both alike as degradations. Yet Mon-
tesquieu-and with him Aristotle-also thinks
that for certain races of mankind subj ection
or slavery may be justified. Mill later makes
the comparable point that for a people at a
certain stage of political development, sub-
jection may be necessary for a time in prepa-
ration for citizenship. The two basic distinc-
tions in political status which are here implied
-between slavery and subjection and betvveen
subjection and citizenship-are developed more
fully in the chapter on CITIZEN. The first of
these distinctions relates to the difference in
THE GREAT
CHAPTER 87: SLAVERY
776
participating in the greater good their betters
are able to achieve?
These are the questions of fact '\vhich Aris-
totle seems to ans\ver affirmatively as he de-
velops hi.s theory of natural slavery. If the facts
are granted, then no issue of justice arises, for
Aristotle can say that "the slave by nature and
the master by nature have in reality the same
interests." It is by the justice inherent in the
relation of master and slave when both are
naturally so related that Aristotle can criticize
the injustice of all conventionalforms ofslavery.
But the question of fact must be faced, as
Aristotle himself is aware.
"Is there anyone intended by nature to be a
slave," he asks, "and for \vhom such a condition
is expedient and right, or is all slavery a vio...
lation of nature?" Aristotle recognizes that
"others affirm the rule of a master. over slaves
to be contrary to nature and that the dis-
tinction between slave and free man exists by
law only, and not by nature, and being an in-
terference with nature is therefore unjust." He
himself questions the justice of making slaves
of captives. taken in war, for that may violate
the natures of men of high rank who have had
the misfortune to be captured or sold. But he
thinks that the same kind of difference\vhich
exists between male and female-the male being
by nature superior, the felnale inferior; the
one ruling, the other submitting to rule-can
be extended to all mankind.
"\JVhere there is such a difference," Aristotle
explains, "as that between soul and hody, or
between men and animals . .. the lo\ver sort
are by nature slaves, and it is better for them
as for all inferiors that they should be under
the rule of a master. For he who can be, and
therefore is, another's and he who participates
in a rational principle enough to apprehend,
but not to have, such a principle, is a slave by
nature; whereas the lower animals cannot even
apprehend a principle; they obey their instincts.
And indeed the use made of slaves and of tame
animals is not very different; for both with
their bodies minister to the needs of life . . . If
men differed from one another in the mere
forms of their bodies as nluch as the statues of
the gods do from n1en, all would acknowledge
that the inferior class should be slaves of the
superior. And if this is true of the body, how
much more just that a similar distinction shaul
exist in the soul ... It is clear, then, that Som.e
are by nature free, and others slaves, and that
for these latter slavery is both expedient and
right."
According to the theory .of natural slaver)"
it is as good for the slave to have a master as fo;
the master to have a slave. This reciprocity of
interest does not occur in legal or
slavery. In both types ofslavery, the slave is a
piece of property, a possession. \Vhether b)"
nature or by institution, a slave does not own
himself; he is another's man. "He nlay be caUe<l
another's man," A.ristotle says, "who, being a.
human being, is also a possession." Does this
mean that the slave belongs wholly to the
master, in all that he is and has? He woul<l
seem to belong to his master insofar as he is a.
possession; but not wholly-in all that he is an<l
has-insofar as he is a hun1an being. Aristotle
does not introduce such a qualification where
he says that "the slave is a part of the master,
a living but separated part of his bodily frame";
yet he adds: "where the relation of n1aster and
slave is natural they are friends and have a.
comon interest, but \vhere it rests merely On
law and force, the reverse is true."
Aristotle considers the difference between
the natural slave and other forms of personal
property, whether domestic animals, beasts or
burden, or the inanimate instruments used in
the household for productive purposes. go
slaves, he asks, have any excellence "beyond
and higher than merely instrumental and min-
isterial qualities" of the sort to be found in
tools and anilnals ? Do they have virtues, andir
so, then "in 'tvhat way ,vill they differ from
freemen?"
Aristotle answers by saying that "since theJ
are men and share in the rational principle, it
seems absurd to say that they have no virtue"
But since the rational principle in them is ,vea
and consists only in the ability to execute de"
cisions-not to make them or to know the e1il1.
for \vhich they are made-the slave "vill hav
capacity for only so rnuch virtue as he requir
enough virtue, for example, to "prevent 11
from failing in his duty through co,vardice
lack of self-control. "
It is precisely because of his lirruted com
tence and virtue that the slave needs,
profits by having, a master. Aristotle thinks
that he is better off than the artisan out of
bondage. "The slave shares in his master's
life; the artisan is less closely connected with
him, and only attains excellence in proportion
as he becomes asiavee The meaner sort of
lllechanic has a special and separate slavery,
and whereas the slave exists by nature, not so
the shoemaker or other artisan."
The "separate slavery" of the artisan makes
him more like an animal or an inanimate tool
the way he is used; for, according to Aristotle,
he is an instrument of production, while the
natural slave participates in his master's life by
being an instrument not of production, but of
action. The work the slave does enables the
master to live well-to achieve the happiness of
the political or contemplative life-and since
"life is action, not production ... the slave is a
minister of action." If the slave had in his own
nature the capacity for human happiness, he
would not be by nature a slave, nor be limited
to the good of serving another man's happiness.
"Slaves and brute animals cannot form a
state," Aristotle says, because "the state exists
for the sake, not of life, but the good life" and
slaves "have no share in happiness or in a life of
free choice.... No one assigns to a slave a
share in happiness," he says in another place,
"unless he assigns to him also a share in human
life." At best, that share could come only from
being a part of the master and contributing to
the n1aster's happiness. But though to this ex-
tent "the slave by nature and the master by
nature have in reality the same interests," the
rule under which the slave lives "is neverthe-
less exercised primarily with a view to the inter'"
est of the master."
DOCTRINE OF natural slavery is re'"
jeeted by those who affirm the fundan1ental
equality of all men in their common humanity
an<l who, in addition, insist that their inequality
as individuals in talent or capacity, should not
affect their status or detennine their treatnlent.
On these grounds, Roman Stoics and Christian
theologians seem to agree-and with them such
modern thinkers as Rousseau, Kant, Hegel, and
Mill-that all men are by nature born to be
free. Freedom, writes Kant, belongs "to every
man in virtue of his Hurnanity.There is, in-
777
deed, an innate Equality belonging to every
man which consists in his right to be independ-
ent of being bound to others ... in virtue of
which he ought to be his own master by Right."
That "all persons are deemed to have a right to
equality of treatment" SeelTIS to follow for Mill
from the principle that "one person's happiness,
supposed equal in degree (with the proper al-
iowance made for kind), is counted for exactly
as much as another's." The "equal claim of
everybody to happiness" involves "an equal
claim to all the means of happiness," among
them freedom.
But though theologians like Augustine and
Aquinas deny that slavery is instituted by
nature, they do not seem to regard it as con'"
trarv to natural law or to the will of God.
can be according to natural law in
two ways, Aquinas says: "First, because nature
inclines thereto.... Secondly, because nature
does not require the contrary." Just as we can
say, in the second sense, that nakedness is
natural for man, "because nature did not give
him clothes, but art invented them," so we can
say that all men are by nature free because
slavery was not instituted by nature, "but de-
vised by human reason for the benefit of human
life. "
The institution of slavery, whereby one man
belongs to another for his use, seems due to the
fallen nature of man, as one of the penal conse-
quences of original sin. If man had remained in
a state of innocence, onelnan would have ruled
another for the latter's good, but no man would
have been the master of slaves to be used for the
master's good. Since "it is a grievous matter to
anyone to yield to another what ought to be
one's own," it follows, says Aquinas, that "such
dominion necessarily implies a pain inflicted on
the subject." This painfulness ofslavery in turn
seerrlS to imply a contradiction to Aristotle's
view that slavery fits certain natures and is for
their benefit.
"By nature, as God first created us," writes
Augustine, "no one is the slave either of man or
of sin." Both sorts of slavery are "introduced
by sin and not by nature." Both are punish-
ments for sin, though one seems to Augustine
more grievous than the other. "It is a happier
thing," he says, "to be the slave of a man than
of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling .
THE GREAT IDEAS
CHAPTER 87:SLAVERY
778
lays \vastemen's hearts with the most ruthless
dominion. Moreover, when men are subjected
to one another in a peaceful order, the lowly
position does as much good to the servant as
the proud position does harm to the master."
Not sin, but climate, according to Montes-
quieu, is the cause of slavery and to some
tent its excuse. Though he thinks that "the
state of slavery is in its own nature bad .
neither useful to the master nor to the slave,"
Montesquieu, like I-lippocrates before him, re-
gards the .A.si(itics as reduced to servility by the
physical conditions of their life. "There reigns
in Asia," he writes, "a servile spirit which they
have never been able. to .shake off.' , Under
Asiatic despotism, where whole peoples live in
poIitical servitude, domestic slavery is more
tolerable than elsewhere. In those countries
'\vhere the excess of heat enervates the body
and renders men so slothful that nothing but
the fear of chastisement can oblige them to per-
fOfm any laborious duty, slavery is . more rec..
oncilable to reason."
Mantesquieu seems toaccept Aristotle's doc-
trine. with some qualifications. "Aristotle en-
deavors to prove that there are natural slaves,
but what he says is far from proving it. If there
be any such, I believe they are those of whom I
have been speaking." Slavery is both natural
and unnatural. "As all men are born equal,"
Montesquieu declares, "slavery must be ac-
counted unnatural, though in some countries it
be founded on natural reason Natural
slavery, then, is to be limited to some particular
parts of the world."But in arguing the right of
Europeans "to make slaves of the negroes," he
concludes with the equivocal remark that "it is
impossible fOf us to suppose these creatures to
be men, because, allowing them to be men, a
suspicion would follo\v that we ourselves are
not Christians."
Hegel's comment on the enslavement of
African negroes by Europeans runs somewhat
differently. "Bad as this may be," he writes,
"their lot in their own land is even worse,since
there a slavery quite as absolute exists." But
though Hegel thinks that the negroes are natu-
rally given to slavery, he regards "the 'natural
condition' itselfas one ofabsolute and thorough
injustice." To remove this injustice, however,
is not easy. "Man must be matured" for free-
dom, Hegel writes. "The gradual ......
slavery is therefore wiser and more
than its sudden removaL"
Mill also looks upon slavery as a
rise of certain peoples framsavagery to
life, and maintains that the transition
dom must be gradually effected. "A
properly so called," he says, "is a
not learnt to help himself. He is, no
step in advance ofa savage. I-Ie has not
lesson of political life still to acquire.
learnt to obey. But ,,,hat he obeys is
direct command. It is the characteristic
slaves to be incapable of conforming
duct to a rule, or a law.... They have
taught self-government, and this, in its
stage, means the capacity to act on
structions." Extenuations of the
ruling men as slaves, such as those nr."'\n...... C"L:>rI
Hegel and Mill, are rej ected by
The notion that some men are by
slaves, whether in Asia or in Europe,
Rousseau to be an illusion due to the
those who are made slaves by force
their natures debased to slavishness.
he says, ."took the effect for the cause.
can be more certain than that every
in slavery is born for slavery. Slaves lose
thing in their chains, even the desire
ing from them . . . If then there are
nature, it is because there have been
against nature. Force made the first
their cowardice perpetuated the .... ""lnri.'t-."......
It is sophistry, he thinks, for
"attribute to man a natural propensity
tude, because the slaves within their
tion are seen to bear the yoke with
they fail to reflect that it is \vith liberty
innocence and virtue; the value is known
to those who possess thenl, and the
them is forfei ted when they are forfeited
selves. "
THE ISSUE CONCERNING slavery as a
legal institution does not seem to be
by the views men take ofnatural
tode, who holds that only natural
justified, criticizes those who "affirm to
just and inexpedient in their own
they are not ashamed of nr':Jrt-1IC1MI0'
others; they demand just
e.writes, "but where other men are concerned
ey care nothing about it. Such behavior is
rational, unless the one party is, and other is
t, born to serve." This cannot be determined
conquest. Aristotle questions, therefore, the
nvention "by which whatever is taken in war
supposed to belong to the victors," or the
inciple that "because one man has the power
doing violence and is superior in brute
ength, another shall be his slave and subject."
'ose who "assume that slavery in accordance
ith the custom of war is justified by la,v," are
nfronted by Aristotle with the question:
if the cause of the war. be unjust ?"
and Locke appear to take an opposite
Men in a state of nature are free, though
can actually enjoy only as much freedom
have power to secure. Yet the natural
.. '''' in their powers does not establish a
right on the part of the stronger to en-
the weaker. Hobbes makes the right of
or what he calls "despoticaldomin-
" depend not merely upon victory in war,
tupon a covenant into which the vanquished
voluntarily, "when the vanquished, to
the present stroke of death, covenanteth
. that so long as his life, and the liberty of
s body, is allowed him, the victor shall have
e use thereof at his pleasure." Only. "after
ch covenant is made, the vanquished isa serv-
t, and not before ... It is not, therefore, the
ctory, that giveth the right of dominion over
e.vanquished, but his own covenant." That
obbes means chattel slave when he says "serv-
t." seems to be indicated by his remark that
he master of the servant is master also of all
hath, and may exact the use thereof; that is
say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants,
dof his children, as often as he shall think fit. "
ocke disagrees with Hobbes that one man
give another the. right to enslave him by
to become a slave in order to avoid
ath. "A man not having the power of his own
writes, "cannot by compact, or his own
enslave. himself to anyone.. No..
can give more power than he has himself;
that cannot take away his own life, ,can-
power over it." As among the
Jews, men can sell themselves into
mrlOr()r't7 service to requite a debt. But this
of drudgery, not slavery; "the per-
779
son sold was not under an absolute, arbitrary,
despotical power, for the master could not have
the power to kill him at any time, whom at a
certain time he was obliged to let go free out of
his service." No Jew, Aquinas concurs, "could
own a Jew as a slave absolutely, but only. ina
restricted sense, as a hireling for a. time. And in
this way the Law permitted that through stress
of poverty a man might sell his sonordaughter."
Absolute slavery, for Locke, "is nothing else
but the state of war continued between a law-
ful conqueror and a captive." It is lawful, he
thinks, to kill a violent aggressor, "for to that
hazard does he justly expose himself whoever
introduces a state of\var, and is aggressorinit.1'
But he who has forfeited his life necessarily for-
feits his freedom. Slaves, then, are those "who,
being captives taken in a just war, are by right
of nature subjected to theabsolutedominionand
arbitrary power of their masters." In contrast to
the limited servitude which a man can contract
for wages, absolute slavery "is the effect only of
forfei ture which the aggressor makes of his own
life when he puts himself into the state of war
with another."
Against Locke and Hobbes, as well as Aris-
totle, Rousseau denies that there is any justice
in slavery----by nature, by covenant or com-
pact, or by right of war. To think as Hobbes
appears to, that "the child of a slave comes into
the world as a slave," is, in Rousseau's opinion,
to say that "a man. shall come into the world
not a man." Holding that slavery is "contrary
to nature," Rousseau also holds that it "cannot
be authorized by any right or law." A man can-
not alienate his freedom by selling himself into
slavery, for "to renounce liberty is to renounce
being a man."
In Kant's language, "a contract by which the
one party renounces his whole freedom for the
advantage of the other, ceasing thereby to bea
person and consequently having no duty even
to observe a contract, is self-contradictory, and
is therefore of itself null and void. " Agreeing
that such a contract is a nullity, Hegel.holds
that the "slave has an absolute .right. to. free
himself," but he adds that "if a m.an is a slave,
his own will is responsible for his slavery....
Hence the wrong of slavery lies at the door not
simply of enslavers or conquerors, but of .the
slaves and the conquered themselves."
THE GREAT IDEAS CHAPTER 87: SLAVERY 780
As for Grotius and the others who "find in
\var another origin for the so-called right of
slavery"-on the ground that "the victor hav-
ing ... the right of killing the vanquished, the
latter can buy back his life at the price of his
liberty"- Rousseau thinks their argument begs
the question. "The right of conquest," he says,
"has no foundation other than the right of the
strongest. If \var does not give the conqueror
the right to massacre the conquered peoples,
the right to enslave them cannot be based upon
a right \V'hieh does not exist."
Since Rousseau denies that victory gives the
victors a right to kill those who have laid down
their arms, he regards it unfair to make the cap-
tive "buy at the price of his liberty his life, over
which the victor holds no right.... From
\vhatever aspect we regard the question," he
concludes, "the right of slavery is null and void,
not only as being illegitimate, but also because
it is absurd and meaningless. The words slave
and right contradict each other and are n1utual-
ly exclusive."
IN MODERN AS WELL AS ancient times, in the
European colonies in the New World if not in
Europe itself, slave labor characterizes a certain
type of economy and determines the mode of
production, especially in agriculture and min-
ing. The slave as chattel is bought and sold like
other property. He may be a source of profit to
his owner in exchange as well as in production.
The traffic in slaves depends upon an original
acquisition, either through the spoils of war or
by the activity of slave traders who hunt men
as if they were animals, to transport them in
chains and sell them into slavery.
In the ancient \vorld, individual slave owners
emancipated their slaves, even as, under modern
feudalism, a great 'landowner like Prince An-
drew in War and Peace freed his serfs. Aristotle
speaks of those in his own time who opposed the
institution of slavery; and the Roman Stoics
did a great deal to ameliorate the condition of
the slave and to protect him legally against
abuse. But there seems to have been no political
party or active political moven1ent among the
ancients corresponding to the abolitionists and
their struggle in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Even then, however, the abolitionists were
looked upon as a radical minority \vho had no
respect for the rights of property in their over-
zealous sentimentali ty about the rights of lllen. '
Those \vho were \villing to outlaw the AfricCln
slave trade as outrageous l<7ere less outraged by
the treatment of men as chattel, once they
were possessed.
11adison, for example, referring to the prohi-
bition affecting the importation of slaves into
the United States, which the Constitution post-
poned until 1808, thinks it "a great point
gained in favor of humanity, that a period of
twenty years may terminate forever,within
these States, a traffic which has so long and so
loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern pol-
icy." But inanother paper the writers of The
Federalist present their version of the Southern
argument defending the Constitution's appor-
tionment of representation, "determined by
adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for a term of'
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-
fifths of all other persons." They do not object
to the vie\v of the negro slave as two-fifths
property and three-fifths a person, confessing
then1selves reconciled to reasoning which,
though "it may appear a little strained in some
points," appeals to a principle they themselves
approve, namely, that "government is insti-
tuted no less for the protection ofproperty than
of persons."
"[here are even those, in the 18th century,
who defend the slave trade. Bos\vell reports an
argument set forth by Dr. Johnson in favor of
granting liberty to a negro, who claimed his
freedom before a Scottish Court of Session. The
sum of Dr. Johnson's argument, according to
Boswell, came to this: "No man is by nature
the property ofanother; the defendant is, there-
fore, by nature free. The rights of nature must
be in some way forfeited before they can be
justly taken away ... and if no proof of such
forfeiture can be given, we doubt not but the
justice of the court \viH declare hiin free." Ad-
mitting that Johnson may have been right i
the particular case at hand, Bos\vell protests his
general atti tude toward slavery and the slave
trade.
"To abolish a status," Boswell writes, '\vbie
in all ages God has sanctioned, and man h
continued, would not only be robbery to an in
numerable class of our fello\v-subjects; but i
"vou1d be extreme cruelty to the African sav-
ages, a portion of \vhorn it saves from massacre,
or intolerable bondage in their own country,
and introduces iuto a much happier state of
life, especially n ~ when their passage to the
'Vest Indies and their treatment there is hu-
manely regulated."
Issues of justice aside, economists like Smith
and !vfarx question the productivity of slave la-
bor. Improvements in machinery "are least of
all to be expected," writes Smith, when the
proprietors "employ slaves for their \vorkmen.
Ihe experience of all ages and nations, I be-
lieve, demonstrates that the work done by
slaves, though it appears to cost only their
maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A
person \vho can acquire no property, can have
no interest but to eat as much, and to labor as
little as possible." He explains the lack of me-
chanical progress in Greece and ROlne by the
:fact that "slaves ... are very seldom inventive;
and all the most important improvements in
machinery, or in the arrangement and distri-
bution of \vork, which facilitate and abridge
labor, have been the discoveries of free
" men.
Marx also judges "production by slave labor"
to be "a costly process ... The principle, uni-
versally applied in this method of production,"
is "to employ the rudest and heaviest imple-
ments and such as are difficult to damage owing
to their sheer clumsiness. In the slave-states,
bordering'on the Gulf of Mexico, down to the
date of the civil \var, ploughs constructed on
old Chinese models, \vhich turned up the soil
like a hog or a rnole, instead of making furrows,
were alone to be found."
But Marx does not limit his judglnent ofslav-
ery to criteria of efficiency, nor does he limit
his consideration of servitude to its more obvi-
ous forms of chattel slavery and feudal serfdom.
For him, all use of labor by those \vho o\vn the
instruments of production involves exploita-
tion; it differs only in the degree to which the
owner derives a surplus value from> the labor
po\ver he possesses, through property rights or
wage payments.
According to 1/farx, "the essential difference
between the various economic forms of society,
between, for instance, a society based on slave
labor and one based on \vage labor, lies only in
781
the mode in which this surplus-labor is in each
case extracted from the actual producer, the la-
borer." As all the value produced by a slave, in
excess of the cost of keeping him alive, profits
his owner, so during "the period of surplus-
labor, the usufruct of the labor-po\ver creates a
value for the capitalist that costs him no equiv-
alent ... In this sense it is that surplus-labor
can be called unpaid labor"-whether it is the
labor of chattel or wage slaves.
Because a laborer is forced to sell his labor-
po,ver in the open market in order to subsist,
Marx regards his so-called "freedom" as a pious
fiction. "The contract by which he sold to the
capitalist his labor-power proved in black and
white," Marx writes, "that he disposed of him-
self freely. The bargain concluded, it is discov-
ered that he was no 'free-agent,' that the time
for which he is free to sell his labor-po,ver is the
time for which he is forced to sell it."
Others take the vie\v that there is a funda-
mental moral difference between chattel slaves
and men who work for wages. Hobbes, for ex-
ample, thinks that bet\veen slaves who "are
bought and sold as beasts" and servants "to
whose service the masters have no further right
than is contained in the covenants made be-
t\vixt them," there is only this much in com-
mon-"that their labor is appointed them by
another." In slightly varying terms, Aquinas,
I..Jocke, and Kant make a similar distinction be-
tween the free servant, or paid worker, and the
slave. The point is summarized by Hegel as a
difference between alienating to someone else
"products of my particular physical and mental
skill," and alienating "the whole of my time, as
crystallized in my work." In the latter case, "I
would be making into another's property the
substance of my being."
Debating with Douglas, Lincoln insisted
that political freedom was the difference be-
t,veen the white slaves of the North and the
black slaves of the South. The legal right, won
by the proletariat, to organize and strike, seems
to be a difference which Marx himself recog-
nizes betvveen the wage earner and the bonded
slave. Until his chains are struck, the slave is
not in the position of the free workingman to
fight for political rights and privileges. Citizen-
ship is not ahvays extended to the laboring
classes, but it is never conferred upon slaves.
I. The nature of enslavement: the relation of master and slave
7. The analogy of tyranny and slavery in the relations bet\veen passions and reason or
\vill: human bondage
4. The forms of economic slavery
4a.Chattel slavery: slaves of the household and slaves of the state
4b. Serfdom or peonage
{c. Wage slavery: the exploitation of the laborer
783
Politics, BK I, CH 2 [I252824--bI2] 445b-d; CH
3--7 446d-449c; CH 13 454a-455a,c; BK III, CH 5
475a-b; CH 6 [I278b30-37] 476a-b;
CH 9 [128083-34] 477d-478a; BK IV; CH 4
[129187-10] 490b; BK VII,CH 10 [133825-34]
534d; CH IS [1334816-4] 539a-b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16
15d-16a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH' 19, 126a;
CH 29, 137c-d
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 46c-47a I Lycurgus-
Numa, 62a / Coriolanus, 185b-186a / Marcus
Cato, 278b-279a; 287b-d / Crassus, 439a-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XIV, 151d-152c
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK XIX, CH IS 521a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 21,
A I, REP 3 124b-125b; Q 81, A3, REP 2 430c-
431d; Q 92, A I, REP 2 488d-489d; Q96, A 4
512d-513c; PART I-II, Q 2, A4, REP 3 618a-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q98,
A6, REP 2 244c-245b; Q 104, A I, REP 3304a-
30Sa; A4, ANS 306d-307c; Q IQS, A4, ANS and
REP 1-4 318b-321a; PART II-II, Q 10, A 10,
REP 3 434c-435d;Q 183, AI 625a-626a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-532a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 110b-l11a; PART
IV, 261d-262a
25 MONTAIGNE: Essays, 219b-d; 344d-345d
REFERENCES
CHAPTER 87: SLAVERY
To lind the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page
numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in4 HOMER: Iliad, BK II [265-283] 12d, the
number 4 is the nUlnber of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the pas-
sage is in section d of page 12.
PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the
upper andlower halves of the page. For example, in53 JAMES: Psychology, 116a-119b, the passage
begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is
printed in t"vo columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-
hand side ofthe page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of
thepage. For example, in 7 PLATO: Symposium, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half
of the left-hand side of page !,63 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.
AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions ofa work (such as PART, BK, CH,
SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer-
tain cases; e.g., Iliad, BK II [265-283112d.
BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James
and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters orverses', the King
James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (D), follows; e.g., OLD TESTA-
MENT: Nehemiah, 7:45-(D) II Esdras, 7:46
SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially
relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit-
tently rather than continuously in. the work or passage cited.
For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explana.tion of
Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas, consult the Preface.
The nature of enslavement: the relation of
master and slave
LD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:25
POCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 33:24-31---(D) aT,
Ecclesiasticus, 33 :25-33
EW TESTAMENT: Ephesians, 6:5-9 / Colossians,
3:22-4:1 / I Timothy, 6:1-3 / Titus, 2:9-10 /
Philemon / I Peter, 2:18-25
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK I [421-444] 187c-d; BK
XIV 260a-265d; BK xv [351-492] 269c-271a;
BK XVIII [313-345] 287b-d; BK XXII [390-477]
309d-310d
5 AESCHYLUS: Agamemnon [1035-1046] 63a-b
5 SOPHOCLES: Ajax [1226-1263] 153c-154a /
Trachiniae [246-29] 172b-c
5 EURIPIDES: Helen [722-738] 305a; [1621-1641]
313b-d / Iphigenia at Aulis [303-316] 427b
5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [1-8] 629a
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 21b; BK IV, 124a-d;
BK VII, 223c-d
7 PLATO: Lysis, 16c-18a / Gorgias, 271c /
Theaetetus, 528c-d / Statesman, 597a-b /
Laws, BK VI, 709a-710a; BK XI, 772a-773a
ARISTOTLE: Metaphysics, BK I, CH 2 [982b25-
27] SOla
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH II [116183-
bIO] 413c-d; BK x, CH 6 [117786-10] 431c /
THE GREAT IDEAS
OUTLINE OF TOPICS
3. Slavery as a social institution: the conventionality of slavery
3a. The acquisition of slaves: conquest, purchase, indenture, forfeiture
3b. Laws regulating slavery: the rights and duties of master and slave
3C The emancipation or manumission of slaves: the rebellion of slaves
3d. Criticisms of the institution of slavery: the injustice of slavery; its transgression
of inalienable human righ ts
2. The theory of natural slavery and the natural slave
2a. Characteristics of the natural slave: individual and racial differences in rdation
to slavery
2b. The conception of the natural slave as the property or instrument of his master
2C. Slavery in relation to natural or to divine law
2d. Criticisms of the doctrine of natural slavery
5. The political aspect of economic slavery
5a. The disfranchisement of chattel slaves and serfs: their exclusion from the body
politic or political community
Sb. The political deprivations of the laboring classes or wage slaves: the struggie for
enfranchisement; the issue between oligarchy and democracy with respect
to suffrage
6. Political enslavement or subjection
6a. Slavery as the condition of men living under tyrannical government
6b. Subjection as the condition of men living under benevolent despotism or
paternalistic government
6c. The transition from subjection to citizenship: the conditions fitting men for
self-government
6d. The imperialistic subjection or enslavement of conquered peoples or colonial
dependencies
782
785
3a. The acquisition of slaves: conquest, pur-
chase, indenture, forfeiture
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 44:1-10 IExodus, 21:2-
6 esp 21 :5-6 I Leviticus, 25:39-55 I Deuteron...
omy, 15:12-17 esp 15:16-17 I I Kings, 9:22-
(D) III Kings, 9:22 I II Chronicles, 28:8-15-
(D) II Paralipon'lenon, 28:8-15 / Nehemiah,
5:I - I2-(D) II Esdras, 5:1- 12
4 HOMER: Odyssey, BK XIV [r09-120] 261b; BK
XV [380-492] 270a-271a
5 SOPHOCLES: Trachiniae [293-306] 172e-d
5 EURIPIDES: Trojan Women [r260-1333] 280d...
281a,e I Andromache [1-146] 315a-316e I
Hecuba [342-378] 355d-356a
5 ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [144-148] 630d; [507-
526] 635a-b
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 404a / Latus, BK XI,
772a-773a; 780b-c; 783b-e
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, ClI 6 448e-449b; CH
7 [
12
55
b
37-40] 44ge; CH 8 [I256b20-25] 450c;
BK VII, CH 14 [1333b38-1334a2] 538d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, ClI 19, 126a
14 PLUTARCH: Marcus Cato, 278b-279a; 287b-d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q105,
A 4, ANS and REP 1,4 318b-321a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-532a
23 I-IOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 110b-111a; PART
IV, 261d-262a
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 22-23
30a-b; CH VII, SECT 85 43e-d; CH XV, SECT
172-"-174 65b-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK X, 62d-63a;
BK XV, 109b-111a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 389d-390d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16e-d; 144b;
147a-b; 402b; 510d-511a; 620a-e; 628d;
880d [n 96]
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 45b; 551d-552e
42 KANT: Science of Right, 445c-446a; 447b;
454d-455a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I,
SECT 9 [260-266]13d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 42, 137b-c
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 363c-364c
to3a CHAPTER 87: SLAVERY
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357e-358b / Political 42 KANT: Science of Right, 421c-422d; 445e...
Economy, 368a I Social Contract, BK I, 389a 447e; 454d-455a
42 KANT: Science of Right, 401e-402a; 445e-446a 43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS,
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-9] 1a XIII, SECT I-XIV, SECT I 18e... d
43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d 43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 42, 137b-e; NUMBER
44 BOSWELL: Johnson, 363c-364a 54,170e-d
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick,3b 43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d / Representative Govern...
ment, 332e-d; 339d-340e; 428e; 430e-d /
Utilitarianism, 467a
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 363e-364c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 36
122b-e I Philosophy ofHistory, INTRO, 161a-e;
199b-e; PART II, 273e; PART IV, 364d
49 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315a
50 MARX: Capital, 113d-114a; 114d [En 3]; 145c-
146a; 361b [En I]; 364a-366a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882d
(J. Criticisms of the doctrine of natural slavery
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 3 [I253b20-23]
447a; CH 6448e-449b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 13 120b-e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 96, A
4512d-513e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q94,
A 5, REP 3 224d-22Sd
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 6S-67,531a...
532a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VI, SECT 54 36c;
CH XV, SECT 172 65b-e
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 109a;
110d-111e; BK XVII, 124b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 347a-d; 356b-357a;
357e-358b I Political Economy, 368a / Social
Contract, BK I, 388a-390d
42 KANT: Science ofRight, 401b-402a; 421e-422d;
445e-446a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-9] la
43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 363b-364c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 48
24b-e; par 57 26b-27a; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-c
I Philosophy ofHistory, INTRO, 161a-e; 199c
50 MARX: Capital, 25e-d
Slavery as a social institution: the conven-
tionality of slavery
7 PLATO: Laws, BK VI, 709a-710a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 3 [r2S3b2o-23]
447a; CH 6 448e-449b; BK VII, CH 10 [1330833-
34] 534d
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 46e-47a / Lycurgus...
Numa, 62a / Coriolanus, 185b-186a
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK XIII, 132a-e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q94,
A 5, REP 3 224d-225d; Q l0S, A 4, ANS and
REP 1,3 318b-321a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-532a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-e
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV 29d-30b; CH
VII, SECT 85 43e-d; CH XV, SECT 172 65b-e
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws,BKxv 109a...
11Sd; BK XVII, 122a-124d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 347a-d / Social Con...
tract, BK I, 387b,d-390d; BK III, 422e-d
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK I, 34b-e; BK III,
167a-c; BK IV, 23ge-240a; 253e-254a; 298e...
299a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16e-17b; 620a-c;
628d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 45b
2b. The conception of the natural slave as tit
property or instrument of his master
7 PLATO: Laws, BK VI, 709a-710a; BK XI, 772a
773a
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH II [1161830
bIOI 413e-d / Politics, BK I, CH 4 447b-
CH 5 [I254bI5-26] 448b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q96,
4 512d-513e; PART I-II, Q 20, A 6, REP
716b-d
42 KANT: Science ofRight, 445e-446a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170b-171b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO,
19ge
2c. Slavery in relation to natural
law
OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis, 9:25
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 33 :24-31 - CD)
Ecclesiasticus, 33 :25-33
NEW TESTAMENT: Ephesians, 6:5-9 / Colossia
3:22-4: I / I Ti1nothy, 6:1-3 / Philemon
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK XIX, CH 15 521a
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 92,
I, REP 2 488d-489d; Q 96, A 4 5l2d-513e
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q 9
A 5, REP 3 224d-225d; Q l0S, '-'1\ 4, ANS a
REP 1-4 318b-321a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 53
532a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-e
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK XII
321a-b esp [101-14] 321b
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH II, SECT 4 2
26a; CH IV 29d-30b; CH XV, SECT 172 651:>
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 10
llle
THE GREAT IDEAS 2 to
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH II [II6Ia30_bl
413e-d; BK X, CH 6 [II77
aI
--II ] 431c / Politic
BK CH 2 [I252a24-bI2] 445b-d; CH 5 [
12
5
I5-I255
a
3] 448b-e; CH 13 454a-455a,e; BR I
CH 9 [I280
a
30 -34] 477d-478a; BK IV, ell
[I29Ia7-IO] 490b; Bit VII, CH 7 [I327bI9-3
531d-532a;cH 10 [I33
oa2
S-34] 534d; Cll 15
[I334aI6-40] 539a-b
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par
15d-16a
14 PLUTARCH: Crassus, 439b-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, tIOe-
111h; BK XVII, 122a-b; 123a-b; 124c-d
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 347a-d I Social Con-
tract,BK I, 388b-c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 402b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170b-171b
43 MILL: Representative Government, 340a-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 198a-
199c
50 MARX: Capital, 95a-b [En I]
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace,
216e-d
(1. The nature of enslavement: the relation of mas-
ter and slave.)
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV 29d-30b; CH
VII, SECT 85 43e-d; CH xv, SECT 172-174
65b-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK xv, 109a;
111d-112a; 114a-e
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 388a-e;
389a-390d
39 SMITH: Wealth ofNations, BK IV, 298e-299a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16e-d
42 KANT: Science of Right, 404d; 421e-422d;
445e-446a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS,
XIII 18e
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170b..171b
43 MILL: Representative Government,339d-340c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 57
26b-27a; par 66, 29b; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-e /
Philosophy ofHistory, INTRO, 198a-19ge; PART
II,273e
48 MELVILLE: Moby Dick, 3b
50 MARX: Capital, 7ge-d esp 79d-80b [En 4];
95a-b [En I]; 128d-129a; 266e; 267e
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-213a;
BK VII, 277a--287a passim,esp 278c, 280b-
281d; BK X, 410c-421e; EPILOGUE I, 654a-655c
784
2. The theory of natural slavery and the natural
slave
7 PLATO: Laws, BK VI, 709a-710a
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 2 [1252a24-bI2]
445b-d; CH 3-6 446d-449b; CH 8 [I256b20-25]
450e; BK VII, CH 14 [1333b38-1334a2] 538d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 13 120b-e
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 15
521a-c
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I,Q 96, A
4512d-513e
20 AQUINAS: Sumn'la Theologica, PART I-II, Q94,
A 5, REP 3 224d-225d
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-532a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-e
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV 29d-30b; CH
VI, SECT 54 36c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 10gb...
111e; BK XVII, 122a-b
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 347a-d; 356b-357a /
Social Contract, BK I, 388a'-e
42 I(ANT: Science of Right, 401e-402a; 445a-c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170e-d
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 363e-364a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right; PART I, par 57
26b-27a; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-e I Philosophy
of History, INTRO, 198a-19ge
2a. Characteristics of the natural slave: indi-
vidual and racial differences in relation
to slavery
6 HERODOTUS: llistolY, BK IV, 124a-d
7 PLATO: Laws, B-K VI, 709a-710a
787
5. The. political aspect of economic slavery
5a. The disfranchisement of chattel slaves and
serfs: their exclusion from the body
politic or political community
6 THUCYDIDES :Peloponnesian War, BKI, 374a;
BK IV, 467b; BK VII, 545b;BK VIII, 573c
7 PLATO: Laws, BK VIII, 740d-741a
9 ARISTOTLE:POlz'tics, BK II, CH 5 [I264a20-23]
459b,-e; CH 7 [I267bI4-I9l 463b-e; CH 8
[I268
a
I6-33] 464a-b; BK III,CH 4 [1277a30_b6]
474b-e; CH 5 [I277b33-I278aI4] 475a-b; [I278a
31-34] 475e; CH 9 [I280
a
32-34] 477d-478a;
BK IV, CH 6 [I292b22-1293aIO] 492b-e; BK V,
CH 3 [I303
a6
- 8] 504b-e; BK VI, eH 4 [I319b3-
31] 523a-b;BK VII, CH 9 533a-d; CH 10 [I33oa
25-34] 534d / Athenz'an Constitution, CH 2-5
553a-555a
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q98,
A 6, REP 2 244e-245b
35 LOCKE: Cz'viIGovernment, CH VII, SECT 85
43e-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Sprt of Laws, BK XV, 114c-
I1Sh
38 ROUSSEAU: Socal Contract, BK III, 422e-d;
BK IV, 42ge-d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK III, 168d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16c; 17a-b; 144b
4c. Wage slavery: the exploitation ofthe laborer
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK I, 20b-21e;
27b-37b passim, esp 27b-28d
50 MARX: Capital, 82d-84a,e;88d-'89b; 104b-
lOSe; 111e-146e passim, esp112e,138b, 146a-e;
150a-e; 161b-163e;173b-180dpassim, esp
176a-178d; 192e-248e passim; 2.51c... 253b;
262a-275e esp 263e-d,,266b-c, 272e-275e;
282b-'286a esp283e-d, 285e-286a; 302d-368b
esp 307a-e, 316d-317e,318a-320a, 354b-355d,
364a-368b; 36ge-371e
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 420e-d;
422e-423a; 424d-425a; 426b-e
4b. Serfdom or peonage
38 MONTESQUIEU: SpititofLaws,BK XIII, 96d-
97b
39 SMITH: WealthofNations,BKIII; 165b-171e
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 144a-b; 628e-d
41 GIBBON: Decline, and Fall" 404e-d;452d-
453a,e
43 MILL: Representative Government,351d-352b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, pat 66,
29b / Philosophy ofHistory, PART IV, 346a-b;
352a
50 MARX: Capital, 34b;79d':80b [fn 4]; 113d-
lISe; 266b-e; 355d-364a passim
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 424d-
425a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v,211a,-213a; BK
VI, 235a; BK VII, 285b-d passim;BK:VIII,
308e; BK X, 410e-421e; EPILOGUE I, 654a-655e
The forms of economic slavery
. Chattel slavery: slaves ofthe household and
slaves of the state
LD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 1:8-14;21 :1-11 /
Leviticus, 25:39-55 / Deuteronomy, IS :12-18
5ARISTOPHANES: Plutus [507-526] 635a-b
7 PLATO: Lysis, 16e-18a / Laws, BK VI, 709a-
710a; BK VII, 722d
9 'ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, eH 446d-447c;
CHS [I256aI-3] 449d; BK II,CH7 [I267bIO-I9]
463b-e; BK VII, CH 8 [I328a35-38] 532e-d;
eH 10 [I33oa25-34] 534d / Rhetoric, BK I, CH
5 [I36IaI2-I4] 601c
14 PLUTARCH: A/arcus Cato, 278d-279a/ Crassus,
439a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I.,.-'II, Q 87,
A 8, ANS 191d-192d; Q 105, A 4, REP 1-4
318b-321a
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART IV, 261d-262a
8 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 111d-
112a; BK XVI, 116a
8 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 353e-d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 23ge-240a;
253e-254a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16d; 17b-e; 147a-b;
498b-500bpassim; 620a-b
42 KANT: Science of Right, 445e-446a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT
9 [260-266] 13d
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 42, 137b-e; NUMBER 54,
170b-171b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Rz'ght, PART I, par 66
29a-e
SO MARX: Capital, 95a-b [fn I]; 113e-114a; 128d-
129a; 266e; 267e
1 War and Peace, BK VII, 285b-d pas-
SIm
to 5a CHAPTER .. 87;SLA.. VERY
Economy, 368a / Social Contract, BK I, 388a-
e; 389a-390d
39SMITH: Wealth ofNations,BK I, 34b-c; BK III,
167a-e; BK IV, 298e-299a
40, GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 620b-c
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 45b-e
4ZKANT: Science of Right, 401b-402a; 421c-
422d; 445e-446a; 454d-455a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [7-9] 1a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS,
XIII 18c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 42 , 137b-c; NUMBER 54,
170d-171a
'43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d / Representative
ment, 339d-340a
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 363b-364c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 57
26b-27a;ADDITIONS, 36 122b-e / Philosophy
of History, INTRO, 161a-e; PART III, .310d-
311a; PART IV, 364d
9 DARWIN: Descent of Man, 315a
50 MARX: Capital, 25e-d; 113d-114a; 376c-377a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 216e-d
3c. The emancipation or manumission 0
slaves: the of slaves
OLDTESTAMENT: Exodus, 1--14; 21:2-4/ Leviticu
25:39-55 / Deuteronomy, 15:12- 15; 23:15-::-1
26:5-9 / II Chronicles, 28:8-15-(D) II Para-
lipome.non, 28 :8-15 J jeremiah, 34:8- 17-(.0)
jeremras, 34:8-17
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK II, 71b-c; BK III,
117a-e; 118a-119b; BK IV, 124a-d
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, III
435b; BK IV, 467a-b ... ,
7 PLATO: Republic, BK IX, 420a-b I Laws, BK XI,
772a-b
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 9 [I269a29-bI3)
465b-d; CH 10 [I272bI7-19] 469a; BK V, CH II
[I3I 5
a
32-391 518b; BK VII, CH 10 [I33
0a
33':"'34
534d
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK II, CH I, 139d; B
IV, CH I, 214e-d
15 TACITUS: Annals,
132a-c
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II,
105, A 4, ANS and REP I t3 318b-32Ia
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 280c
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit ofLaws, BK X, 62d-63a
BK XV, 112e-113a; 114e-115b
40 GIBBON: Declz'ne and Fall, 16d-17b; 144a-d
505e; 509a; 628e-d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall,
453a,c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS
XIII, SECT I-XIV, SECT I 18e-d
43 MILL: Representative Government,
340a-e; 351d-352b
44 BOSWELL: johnson, 364a-b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Hz'story, INTRO,
PART II, 273e; 277a
50 MARX: Capital, 145e-146a
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK V, 211a-21
216e-d; BK VI, 235a; BK X, 410c-421e; BK
640b-c
3d. Criticisms of the institution of slavery: t
injustice of slavery; its transgression
inalienable human rights
9 ARISTOTLE: Polz'tics, BK I, CH 3 [I253b20
447a; CH 6448e-449b
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 13 120b-
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus, 46e-47a I Lycur:
Numa, 62a / Coriolanus, 185b-186a IMa
Cato, 278d-27ge
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART I, 94b-d
35 LOCKE: Civl Government, CM II-IV 25d,
esp CH IV 29d-30b
38 MONTESQUIEtJ: Spirit ofLaws, BK X, 62d-
BK xv, lOga-liOd
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357e-358b /Poli
THE GREAT IDEAS
50 MARX: Capital, 364c-365b
51 TOLSTOY: War and Peace, BK v, 197c; 215a-d.
216e-d .. ,
786
(3. Slavery (/s a social institution: the conventional-
ity oj sla'lJery. 3a. The acquisition oj slaves:
conquest, purchase, indenture, jorfeiture.)
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART I, par 57
26b-27a / Philosophy of History, PART I,
216a-b; PART II, 276d-277a
50 MARX: Capital, 114d [fn 3]; 128d-129a; 36tb
[fn I]; 364a-366a esp 364e-365b; 376e-377a
54 FREUD: New Introductory Lectures, 882d
3b. Laws regulating slavery: the rights and
duties of master and slave
OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 21 :1-11,20-21,26-27,
32 / Leviticus, 19:20-22; 25:39-55 / Deuteron-
omy, 5:14; 15:12- 18 ; 23:15-16 / jeremiah, 34:
8-17-(D) jeremias, 34 :8-17
ApOCRYPHA: Ecclesiasticus, 4 :3; 33 :24-31 - (D)
aT, Ecclesiasticus, 4:35; 33 :25-33
NEW TESTAMENT: Ephesians, 6:5-9 / Colossians,
3:22..;.4:1 / I Timothy, 6:1-3/ Titus, 2:9-10 /
Philemon /1 Peter, 2 :18
5 ARISTOPHANES: Clouds [1-7] 488a / Frogs
[605-628] 571a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 21b; BK VII, 223e-d
7 PLATO: Gorgias, 271c / Theaetetus, 528e-d /
Laws, BK VI, 709a-710a; BK IX, 757e-d;BK XI,
772a-773a; 780b-e; 783b-c
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH 7 [1255b20-37]
449b-e; CH 13 [I260a3I-b81 454d-455a,e; BK
III, CH 4 [I277a3o_bI] 474b-c; BK VII,CH 10
[I.330a33-34] 534d
14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus-Numa, 62a / Coriolanus,
185b-186a / Marcus Cato, 287b-d / Crassus,
439a-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK II, 30b-e;BK XII, 121d-
122a; BK XIII, 133e; BK XIV, 151d-152e
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 81,
A 3, REP 2 430e-431d
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q
104, A 4, ANS 306d-307e; Q 105, A 4, ANS and
REP 1-4 318b-321a; PART II-II, Q 10, A 10,
REP 3 434e-435d;Q 189, AS, ANS 693b-694e
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-532a
29 CERVANTES: Don Quixote, PART II, 280e
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH IV, SECT 22-23
30a-b; CH VII, SECT 85 43e-d
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XV, 112a-
115b
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 253e-254a;
298e-299a
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 16d-17a; 620a.:c
42 KANT: Science of Right, 400b,d-402a; 421e-
422d
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE IV,
SECT 2 [529-535] 16b
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 42, 137b-e; NUMBER 54,
170b-171b
43 MILL: Liberty, 316b-d / Utilitarianism, 467a
46 HEGEL: Phz'losophy of Right, ADDITIONS, 99
133a / Philosophy of History, PART I, 216a-b;
PART II, 276d.:.277a
THE GREAT CHAPTER 87: SLi\VERY 788
(5. The political aspect of economic slavery.
5a. The disfranchisement of chattel slaves
and serfs: their exclusionfrom the bodypol-
itic or political comnzunity.)
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 82a-b; 404d; 45Zd
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT
2 [17-25] lIb
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170b-171b
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History,. PART II, 273c;
PART IV, 356d
Sb. The political deprivations of the laboring
classes or wage slaves: the struggle for
enfranchisement; the issue between
oligarchy and democracy with respect to
suffrage
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 405c-407a / Laws,
BK VIII, 740d-74la
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 7 [I267bIO-I9]
463b-c; CH 8 [I268
a
I6-33] 464a-b; CH II
[127.3a22..,...b7] 469d-470a; BK III, CH 4 [I277a30-
b
7
] 474b-c; CH 5 [I277b33-I278a251475a-c;
CH 9-12 477c-48lb passim; BK IV, CH II [I295b
2-I296b2] 495c-496c; BK V502a-5l9d esp Cli I
[I30Ia25'-39] 502b-c, [I30Ib26-I302a8] S03a-b,
CH 2 S03b-d, CH 3 [I302b34-I303aI4] 504b-c,
[1303
b
4-7] 505a, CH 4 [1304aI8-39] 505d-506a,
CH 6 [I305a36-b21] 507b-c, CH 7 [1306b22-
1307a281508c-509b, CH 8 [1308a3-14] 510a-b,
[1308b3I-1309a32] 5lla-c, CH 9 [1309
bI
4-
1310a13] 5lld-512b, CH 12 [I316a39-b24]
519c-d; BK VI, CH 7 [132Ia26-32] 525a /
Athenian Constitution, CH 2-5 553a-555a
14 PLUTARCH: Solon, 68d-71c I Poplicola, 79d-
80a / Poplicola-Solon, 87a / Tiberius Gracchus,
674c-681a,c / Caius .Gra.c.chus 681b,d-689a,c
18 AUGUSTINE: City ofGod, BK III, CH 17, 178d-
179a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK III, 412b-c
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, HK I, 27b-37b; BK
III, 168d-169a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 73b
42 KANT: Science of Right, 436d-437c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 54, 170b-17lb passim;
NUMBER 57, 178d
43 MILL: Representative Government, 345c-346a;
383d-384a; 392b-399d passim, esp 393c-395a;
419a-c
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART II, 273c;
PART IV, 356d; 364a-c
50 MARX: Capital, 137b-141b esp l38b, l40a-b;
283d-286a; 364a-368b esp 367c-368b
50 MARX-ENGELS: Communist Manifesto, 4l5b-c;
423b; 424d-425a; 428a; 428d; 429b-c
6. Political enslavement or subjection
6a. Slavery as the condition of men living under
tyrannical government
5 EURIPIDES: Suppliants [429-456] 262a-b
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK VII, 238b-c
7 PLATO: Republic, BK VIII, 4l3d-416a; BK IX,
420a / Laws, BK VI, 709d-710a
Letter, 80Sd
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK III, CH 14
29] 483b-c; BK IV, CH 10 [129SaI7-24] 495a-
BK V, CH II 516a-517it; B
VII, CH 7 [I327bIg-32] 531d-532a
10 HIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par I
15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 1b-c; 3a-b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 8r
3, REP 2 430c-431d; Q 96, A4 512d-513c '
20 AQUINAS: Sumnza Theologica, PART I-II, Q105,
A I, REP 5 307d-309d
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 1l0b-111a; 114d-
115a; 150c-151a
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, CH III,
28d-29a; Cli IV 29d-30b; CH VII,
45d-46a; CH XIV, SECT 163 63a-b
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK III, 12
13c; BK IV, 15a--c; BK V, 28c; BK VI, 33d-34
BK XII, 94d-95a; BK XIII, 99b-100e; BKX
10ga-b; 110d-111a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 356b-358b; 360a-b
361c-d / Social Contract, BK I, 388a-e; 389
390d
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 33a-34a,c; SIc
154b-c; 342a-b; 523d-524a; 592a
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 125a; 161c-162b
320d-321b
43 1\thLL: Representative Government, 342b... 344d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I,222a-
PART III, 28gb; 302a-d
6b. Subjection as the condition of men livin
under benevolent despotismor patern
istic government
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics, BK VIII, CH II [116I
B
IO-
413b-c / Politics,BK I, CH 2 [I252bl9-26] 44
CH 7 [I255bI6-20] 449b; BK III, CH 14 [128
29-34] 484a
14 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 2la-27c
15 TACITUS: Histories, BK IV, 271b
19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q81,
3, REP 2 430c-431d; Q 92, A I, REP 2 488
489d; Q 96, A 4 512d-513c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 110b-llla
30 BACON: Advancement of Learning, 27a-c
35 LOCKE: Civil Government, Cli VI, SECT
38a-b; SECT 74-76 41b-42b; Cli XIV, SECT I
63a
36 STERNE: Tristram Shandy, 216b
38 11oNTESQUIEU: Spirzt of Laws,
95a
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 357a-b
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 50a;
255c-d; 342a-b
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 81d-82a
42 KANT: Science ofRight, 439a-c
43 MILL: Liberty, 271d-272a; 273b-d / R
sentative Government, 340a-c; 342b-344d
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, ADDITIONS,
134d-135a / Philosophy of History, IN
172b-d
2 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK V,
127b-137c passim
c. The transition from subjection to citizen-
ship: the conditions fitting men for self-
government
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK III, 120b-C;BK v,
l67a-b; 171c-175b; BK VI, 187d; 193b;.c; BK
IX, 314a,c
9 ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK II, CH 12 470b-471d;
BK III, CH IS [I286
b
8-22] 484d-485a; BK IV,
ell 12 496d-497b; CH 13 [I297bI6-28] 498a;
13K V, CH 4 [1304BI8-38] 505d-506a; BK VI,
ell 4 522a-523b I Athenian Constitution, CH
2-13 553a-558c
oHIPPOCRATES: Airs, Waters, Places, par 16
15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
<4 PLUTARCH: Romulus, 22c
STACITUS: Annals, BK XI, 106a-107b
S LOCKE: Civil Government, CH VIII, SECT 100-
III 47c-51a; CH XIV, SECT 162-166 63a-64a
8 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK XIV,
107b-d; BK XV, 114c-115b; BK XVI, 118b-c;
BK XVII-XVIII, 122a-125c; BK XVIII, 126a-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality, 324a / Social Contract,
BK II, 402b-403a; BK III, 411a-c; 422c-423a
oGIBBON: Decline and Fall, 15b-c; 513b-c;
521a-523a,c; 624b-c
1 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 562c-565a esp
562c-d, 563d-564a
2 KANT: Scence of Right, 436d-437c
3 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 39, 125b; NUMBER 55,
l74c-d
3 MILL: Liberty, 267d-268b; 271d-272a / Repre-
sentative Government, 328d-331a; 339d-340c;
344a-d passim,; 350b-355b
6 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, INTRO, 161a-c;
199b-c; PART I, 222a-c;PART II, 271c-d;
273c; PART IV, 346a-c; 364d
. The imperialistic subjection or enslavement
of conquered peoples or colonial de-
pendencies
LD TESTAMENT: Exodus, 1:8-14; 5 I I Kings, 9:
20-23-(D) III Kings, 9:20--23 / II Chronicles,
8:7-8-(D) II Paralipomenon, 8:7-8
POCRYPHA: I Maccabees, I :41-64-(D) OT,
I Machabees, 1:43-67 / II Maccabees, 5:21-7:
42-(D) OT, II Machabees,s :21-7 :42
6 HERODOTUS: History, BK I, 4a-6c; 16b-20b;
30b-31a; 35c-36a; 37b-40b; 46a-48a;BK IV,
139a-159d; BK V-VI, 184a-191c; BK VII, 222b-c;
225d-226b
6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War, BK I, 358a;
367b-369a; 379b-c; 384d-385b; BK II, 403b-
404a; 406a-407b; BK III, 424d-434c; BKIV,
461c-463a; 468a-469b; BK V, 504c-508a,c; BK
VI, 529b-d; BK VII, 559b-d
ARISTOTLE: Politics, BK I, CH2 [1252bl-9]
445c-d; eH 6 448c-449b; CH 8 [1256b2o--;25]
450c; fiK III, CH 13 [I284B26-b2] 482b-c; BK
VII, CH 2 [I.324b23-41] 528d-529a; ell 14
[r333b38-1334a2] 538d
789
13 VIRGIL: Aeneid, BK VI [845-853] 233b-234a;
BK VIII 17I4-731]278a-b
15 TACITUS: Annals, BK I, 17c-d; BK IV, 76a;
82d-83a; BK XII, 117c-d; BK XIV, 149a-b I
Histories, BK IV, 286c-287a; 290a-d
18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK IV, CH 15 196c-
197a; BK v, Cli 12, 216d-218a;BK XIX, CH2I,
524c-d
23 MACHIAVELLI: Prince, CH III-v3c-8c; CH
VIII, 14a-c
23 HOBBES: Leviathan, PART II, 110b-1lla; CON-
CLUSION, 280b-28la
26 SHAKESPEARE: 1st Henry VI lR-32a,e /. 2nd
Henry VI 33a-68d / llenry V 532a-567a,c
32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [241-276] 344b-
34Sb
35 LOCKE: Civil Governnzent, CH XVI 65d-70c esp
SECT 176 66a-b
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART I, 24b-25a; PART IV,
182b-183a
38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws, BK x, 62b
63d; BKXI, 83c-84c; BK XIII, 96d-97a; BK XV,
109b-c
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 389d-390d
39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations, BK IV, 248b""d;
25lc-d; 253a-c; 288b-c
40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 14d-16b; 17d-18a;
33d-34a,c; 147a-b; 420b-d; 518b-519a passim;
550b-551b; 608b,d-609a; 620a; 632d
41 GIBBON: Decline and Fall, 51a-'53b passim;
420c; 443b-c
42 KANT: Science ofRight, 413d; 454a-455a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: 1a-3b
43 MILL: Representative Government, 427a-b;
436b-442d passim
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of Right, PART III, par 351
ll2a-b / Philosophy of History, PART III,
299a-e
50 MARX: Capital, 372c-374b; 379a-383d passim
7. The analogy of tyranny and slavery in the re-
lations between passions and reason or
will: human bondage
NEWTESTAMENT:]ohn, 8:31-36/ Romans, 6:16-
23; 7: 14-8:21 / Galatians, 4: 1-5:1 / Titus, 3:3 /
Hebrews, 2:14-15 / II Peter, 2:19
7 PLATO: Phaedrus, 120b-c / Gorgias, 275c-
276a / Republic, BK I, 296b-c; BK IV, 347d-
348d; BK IX, 416a-418c; 419b-421a; 425c-
427b / Theaetetus, 528c-529a / Seventh Letter,
806a; 814b
9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics,BK VII, CH 5 [I I48b32-
I149
aI
5] 399b-c / Politics, BK I, CHS [I254a33-
b
9
J448a
12 EPICTETUS: Discourses, BK I, CH 29, 137c-d;
BK IV, CHI 213a-223d; CH 4, 225a-b
12 AURELIUS: Meditations, BK VII, SECT 68
284c-d
17 PLOTINUS: Sixth Ennead, TR VIII, CH I, 343a-b
18 AUGUSTINE: Confessions, BK VI, par 25 42c-d/
City ofGod, BK IV, CH 3, 190c; BK XIV, CH II,
386b; CH IS, 389a-b; BK XIX, CH IS 521a-c;
BK XXI, CH 16 573b-574a
ADDITIONAL READINGS
HOBBES. Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Govern-
ment and Society, CH 8
-.-. The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic,
PART II, CH 3
HEGEL. The Phenomenology of Mind, IV (A)
DOSTOEVSKY. Poor Folk
SENECA. De Beneficiis (On Benefits),'BK III, CHI8-25
LA BOETIE. Anti-Dictator, the Discours de la servi-
tude volontaire
BODIN. The Six Bookes ofa Commonweale, BK I, CH 5
GROTIUS. The Rights of War and Peace, BK II, CH 5;
BK III, CH 7
VOLTAIRE. "Master," "Slaves," in A Philosophical
Dictionary
as parts of the body, he means no more than is
implied in speaking of the hand and eye as
parts of the body. ., 'The nature of mind and
soul is bodily," he writes. Just as flesh and bones
are composed of atomic particles, so the mind
is formed ofatoms "exceeding small and smooth
and round," and the soul is "made of very
tiny seeds linked together throughout veins,
flesh, .and sinews."
APART FROM THESE exceptions, the traditional
discussion of soul considers it as somehow con-
joined with body to constitute a whole of which
it is the immaterial principle or part. Even
those who, like Descartes, definethe soul as an
immaterial substance, capable of existing by
itself, do not actually ascribe to the human soul
complete independence of the human body.
Nor do the theologians who think of God as a
purely spiritual being and 'of angels as imma-
terial substances attribute soul to them.
Precisely because God and the angels do not
have bodies, neither do they have souls. Wheth-
er everything which has a body also has a soul
is another question.. It is variously answered;
but certainly those who, like Plato and Plo"
tinus, speak of a world-soul or a soul of the uni..
verse, confirm the point that soul is the co-
principle or complement of body. The same
point appears in theories of the celestial bodies
which conceive them as being alive and as
therefore having souls.
Unfolding to Socrates the story of the crea-
tion, Timaeus says: "Using the language of
probability, we may say that the world became
a living creature endowed with soul and intelli-
gence by the providence of God." To the
world, Timaeus explains, God "gave a body,
smooth and even, having a surface in every
direction equidistant from the center, a body
entire and perfect, and formed out of perfect
INTRODUCTION
Chapter 88: SOUL
791
the language of the poets as well as in the
discourse of the philosophers, body and soul
correlative terms. Each affects the meaning
he other. The words are used together in
yspeech. Men who are unaware of, or deny,
metaphysical and theological significance
having a soul, nevertheless use the word
1" with a sense of contrast to body, even
ly to refer to vague manifestations of spirit
elings and sympathies \vhich seem to be
n to the world of matter.
ith few exceptions, traditional theories of
soul involve its distinction from andrela'"
to the body. Berkeley represents one of
major exceptions. Denying the reality of
ter, he conceives the soul as existing in and
tself; souls or spirits differ from God as finite
infinite spiritual beings. The something
ich knows and perceives" and which x ~
ses divers operations,. as willing, imagining,
mbering," .Berkeley says, "is what 1 call
,. spirit, sou/, or myseif." Berkeley,. there-
,would not speak of himself or other men
aving souls, but rather as being souls.
heather major exception is exemplified by
retius. It is not that Lucretius denies soul
erkeley denies body. Nor does he deny that
adds something to body which differenti..
living organisms from inorganic things.. On
ontrary, he declares the mind to be ' 'a part
an no whit less .than hand and foot and
are parts of the whole living being." Dis-
from mind, soul is also .part of a living
g. "Mind and soul are held in union one
the other, and form of themselves a single
re," but whereas the mind is, as it were,
ord or head of the whole body, "the rest
esoul, spread abroad throughout the body,
and is moved at the will and inclination
mind."
ut when Lucretius refers to mind and soul
THE GREAT IDEAS
32 MILTON: Paradise Lost, BK VI [169-188) 20
BK x [144-156] 277b; BKXII [79-IIo1321a
36 SWIFT: Gulliver, PART IV 135a-184a
38 ROUSSEAU: Social Contract, BK I, 393c
42 KANT:]udgement, i86d-587a
46 HEGEL: Philosophy of History, PART I, 233
52 DOSTOEVSKY: Brothers Karamazov, BK
164b-d
54 FREUD: Ego and Id, 715d-716a I Newlnt
ductory Lectures, 838d-839b
I.
II.
Listed below are works not included in Great BotJkS ofthe Western World, but relevant to the
idea and topics with which this chapterdeals. These works are divided into two groups:
I. Works by authors represented in thiscollection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.
For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult
the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of The Great Ideas.
FRANKLIN. Essay on the African Slave Trade
CHANNING. Slavery
GOGOL. Dead Souls
WHEvVELL. The Elements of Morality, BK II
24
THOREAU. Civil Disobedience
COMTE. The Positive Philosophy, BK VI, CH 6
--a ~ y s t m of Positive Polity, VOL III, Socia
namzcs
NIEBOER. SlavelY as an Industrial System
VINOGRADOFF. The Growth ofthe Manor
HOBHOUSE. Morals in Evolution, PART I, eH"!
KOHLER. Philosophy of Law, CH 6 (12)
MARITAIN. Freedom in the Modern World
MANN. Joseph' and His Brothers
--a Young Joseph
-.-.-. Joseph in Egypt
BERDYAYEV. Slavery and Freedom
'(7. The analogy of tyranny andslavery in the rela-
tions between passions and reason or will:
humantbondage. )
20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I"':"II, Q 72,
A 2, REP 4 112b-113a
22 CHAUCER: Parson's Tale, par 65-67, 531a-b
27 SHAKESPEARE: Hamlet, ACT III, SC II [61-79]
49c-d
31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV, PREF, 422b
CROSS-REFERENCES
For: Other discussions relevant to the theory of natural slavery, see JUSTICE 6, 6c; LAW
LIBERTY Ia; WILL 7a.
Other discussions of the institution of slavery, see JUSTICE 6c; LABOR If, sa-sc,7c(I); PR.
RESS 3b; PUNISHMENT 4b(3}; STATEsa, sc; TYRANNY Ib; WEALTH 7b(I).
The discussion of slave rebellions and of the emancipation of slaves, see LIBERTY 6b; P
RESS 3b; REVOLUTION4a. .,
Other discussions ofthe forms ofeconomic slavery or servitudein relation todifferent sys
of production, see JUSTICE 8e( I); LABOR If, sa-sc; WEALTH 6a, 7b( I); and for thepoli
aspects of economic slavery or servitude, see CITIZEN 2C; CONSTITUTION 5a; DEMOC
4a(I)-4ar2); LABOR 7d,7f ;LIBERTY 2d; OLIGARCHY 4, sa. "
The differentiation of citizenship,subj:ection, and slavery as three conditions of men 1.1
political rule,see CITIZEN2b; LIBERTY If; TYRANNY sa-sb; and for factors involved i
change from subjection to citizenship, see DEMOCRACY4d; MONARCHY4e(2); TYRANN
Discussions of imperialism and of the government of colonial dependencies and conq1.1
peoples, see GOVERNMENT Sb; LIBERTY 6c;MONARCHYS-Sb; STATE lob; TYRANN
Other discussions of the slavery of men in bondage to their passions, see LIBERTY