Offshore Safety Case Trainingppt

One Day Offshore Safety Training
Pillai Sreejith
Sreejith
Offshore Training pack
Introduction
Offshore Safety Case Training
pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Sreejith Offshore Training pack
%hy this training(

Major accidents do happen around the orld! some of them recent! ha"e caused us to ask if they can happen to us # and they certainly can$ %e need to ensure they do not happen to us &y'
Re-emphasising our safety management system; Updating our existing Field safety Case; and Ensuring you all know about it!!
%hat
ill
e learn today(
The difference &et een occupational)personal and process safety* %hat is a major accident* %hat is and hat is in an offshore Safety +ase* %hat are the safety &arriers ) controls) systems) Safety +ritical Systems ,S+-. that pre"ent major accidents* The part e all must play in pre"enting major accidents* and Test our understanding of hat e ha"e learned through Piper /lpha accident.
Major /ccidents in Oil > Aas Bndustries

Piper /lpha 0122 # Major fire and e3plosion 045 people died +aused &y PT% failure! P6P fla s and layout issues 7om&ay 8igh 9::; # MS< collision 00 People died +aused &y riser damage from MS< impact Te3as +ity =efinery 9::; # petroleum distillate o"erflo ed causing e3plosion > flash fire 0? People died +aused &y maintenance > process start@up fla s
ith platform and major fire
=ecent Major /ccidents in your offshore 6ield(

Please include details of major accidents ,and near@misses. that occurred in your installation)s to tell the participants the need for them to &e cautious. Bnclude photographs if you ha"e.
Sreejith
Major Modifications
Cist do n the major modifications ,process ) marine. that occurred in your offshore installation)s in the past 0 year to tell them that the risk profile has changed'
# -3amples'

Sreejith
6lare system modifications /ddition of a hydrocar&on process eDuipment +hange in mooring system /ddition of gas compression facilities
%hat is a safety case(

Operators of offshore installations ant to &e sure that their operations are safe and do not e3pose their people or their &usiness to unaccepta&le le"els of risk* Plant modifications! "ariations on operating conditions and ne o nership mean that the risk picture is changing* and =egulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installation through safety cases.
Corporate HSE Management System Sho your 8S-MS through a flo chart or a diagram to e3plain ho periodic risk assessment)s are done to update safety case! as part of glo&al sustaina&ility reporting ) +S=.
Sreejith
Offshore Safety +ase Epdate project

Fey
steps in"ol"ed'
Offshore site "isit ,to assess the safety critical element ) &arrier performance.* =isk /ssessment ,using realistic field inputs such as &arrier performance to &e used in G=/ e"ent gates in freDuency analysis.* and Safety +ase update
0 day Training +ontents

Difference &et een Occupational )personal and Process > Marine Safety* %hat is a major accident(* Major Offshore accident case studies*
# Piper lpha # !umbai "igh Platform # #P $exas Refinery
Potential Major accidents for offshore comple3* Offshore Safety +ase* Safety 7arriers in the offshore comple3 ) installation* and Safety training assessment.
Sreejith
7reaks for the day

0:.H: am' Tea ) +offee 7reak 09.H: to 0.H: pm' Cunch &reak H.H: pm' Tea ) +offee 7reak
Sreejith
Key Message Once the safety systems )&arriers fail! there can &e major accidents$$$
%nly you &an operate and maintain safety systems without flaws'
Session 7reak
Sreejith
Occupational /Personal, Marine and Process Hazards
Cearning o&jecti"es
To understand major accidents* To understand the difference &et een occupational)personal! marine and process haIards* To understand the JS iss +heeseK accident causation model and J7o TieK &arrier concept* To learn the importance of &arriers in controlling major accidents and To appreciate the need to maintain the safety systems in order to control ) mitigate major accidents.
/re these terms too o&"ious and more of a commonsense issue(

Bf so! hy are e discussing this(
Discussion trigger' 7P Te3as findings &y Mr. 7aker panel.
Sreejith
Major /ccident
(U) "*E *C Regulations+,--. / / JMajor /ccidentK defined &y EF 8S- is'
# / fire! e3plosion or the release of a dangerous su&stance in"ol"ing death or serious personal injury to persons on the installation or engaged in an acti"ity or in connection ith it* # /n e"ent in"ol"ing major damage to the structure of the installation or plant affi3ed thereto or any loss in the sta&ility of the installation* # The collision of a helicopter ith the installation* # The failure of life support systems for di"ing operations in connection ith the installation* and # /ny other e"ent arising from a ork acti"ity in"ol"ing death or serious personal injury to fi"e or more persons on the installation or engaged in an acti"ity in connection ith it.
Sreejith
Major /ccidents
Examples
Deadliest accident so far' 0122 Piper /lpha ,045 fatalities.* 9nd deadliest' 012: /le3ander C. Fielland /ccommodation rig capsiIed during a storm ,09H fatalities.* Hrd deadliest' 0121 Seacrest drillship capsiIed during a typhoon ,10 fatalities .* and 1th Deadliest' 9::; Mum&ai 8igh Platform fire ,99 fatalities..
Potential Major /ccidents in your Offshore 6ield

-3amples #please &ustomi0e
# # # # # # # # # # #
Sreejith
7lo outs =iser > Pipeline releases Process 8ydrocar&on =eleases # Fire 1 Explosion Ship +ollision Dropped O&jects Transportation /ccidents 8elicopter crash Projectile)Missile impact Structural damage Turret 6ailure +argo Tank e3plosion
Occupational 8aIards
Personal or Occupational 8ealth and Safety 8aIards # +an gi"e rise to incidents or accidents that primarily affect one indi"idual orker for each occurrence
Personnel injury from'

# # # # # Slips! trips and falls* -lectrical shocks* /d"erse effects from high noise)heat)dust)fumes* Minor cuts ) &ruises* and Struck@&y o&jects.
Aenerally O8 are a"oided &y procedures

Sreejith
earing PP-s > follo ing
Occupational /ccidents
Mainly those accidents that can &e controlled &y the use of PP-s
Sreejith
Source courtesy' Bnternet
Process Safety > Marine 8aIards

Process and Marine Safety 8aIards # +an gi"e rise to major accidents that can ha"e catastrophic effects and can result in multiple injuries and fatalities! as ell as su&stantial economic! property and en"ironmental damage
-3amples of these are'

# # # # # # 6ires ) -3plosions 8elicopter crash Dropped o&jects damaging structure or 6PSO hull En@ignited gas releases Ship collisions =iser ) pipeline ruptures
Sreejith
Safety Performance O8 > PS8

Performance for occupational safety is measured through ,eg.. lost time injuries ,CTB.* and Performance for process safety is measured process safety eDuipment performance! hydrocar&on releases! fires! etc.
Process Safety /ccident
7P Te3as +ity =efinery 6ire and -3plosion ,0; killed! 02: injured.
Marine /ccident
Ship collision in Lapanese aters causing major damage ,Luly 95! 9::5.
Loss Iceberg
Sreejith
7o @tie 7arrier +oncept

E ents and Circumstances (!##IE#S Harm to people and damage to assets or en ironment
H ! " ! # $
Ma)or accident
C O % S E & ' E % C E S
Sreejith
Construction /Engineering acti ities Maintenance acti ities Offshore Training Operations actipack ities
7arriers for Potential Major /ccidents

THREATS CO NTRO L & PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIG ATIVE BARRIERS CO NSEQ ENCE
M!E Major Potential /ccidents

Pre&entati&e
E$ ergen#y res%onse Sa,e %e,u"e 'M uster rea ) M itigation Firewater Pum $s "ete#tion ESD system Firewater %in" main M anual W ater Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$m ent Delu"e System W ellhead Isolation Blowdown Valves ESD M anual Pull Stations HV ! M anual Foam Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$m ent Blowdown Valves ESD M anual Pull Stations Firewalls
B!o'o(t )S(rfa#e *!o'o(ts Riser Pi%e!ine Re!eases
Bnstrumentation ! i.e. T/88 ) C/CC ) C/88 ) P/CC ) P/88 =elief System ,PS< .
Pro#ess Hy,ro#ar*on Re!eases Shi% Co!!ision "ro%%e, O*-e#ts He!i#o%ter Crash
Esca$e %outes
Emer"ency &i"htin" Emer"ency Power '(PS ) Internal !om munications & larms E*ternal !om munications Helidec+ !rash E#ui$m ent M iscellaneous Sa,ety E#ui$m ent -EM PS! & &i,e ra,ts Helico$ter Facilities Direct to Sea E#ui$m ent
Inspections
Ma"igational /ids PT%
Contro! ESD Valves F&G System F&G Detectors
Pedestal +ranes
+MMS
Pro-e#ti!e .$issi!e I$%a#ts

Bnert Aas System
Maintenance
)
Str(#t(ra! En&iron$enta! e&ents Trans%ortation A##i,ents
Miscellaneous Temporary -Duipment
!udits
Gaseous System s
T(rret fai!(re
Ignition control
Cargo tan/ e0%!osions
Sreejith
Do you kno here these safety &arriers are in your installation)s(

6ire alls ,are they / or 8 or L type( %hat does these alpha&ets mean(* if there is / 4: fire all! is this accepta&le( %hy(. 7last alls ,are &last and fire alls same( 8o are their locations decided(. 6lame ) flash &ack arrestors -SD push &uttons
Safety 7arriers
-3planation@Example 2
Bgnition +ontrol
# 8aIardous /rea +lassification # Ese of -3 type eDuipment ,do you kno ho they are designed( %hy canKt they &e designed as "apour ) gas tight(. # 6lash &ack arrestors! spark arrestors # Static charge discharge control ,&onding! hen do you install &onding( %hy is this done(. # Cightning control ,ho do you control these haIards(. # Bnert gas system for cargo tanks # Ese of inert gas system to dilute hydrocar&on "apours at "ents
Sreejith
Safety 7arriers
-3planation@Example , %hat are the difference &et een Passi"e 6ire Protection ,P6P. > /cti"e 6ire Protection ,/6P.( -3amples of P6P(
# 6ire alls # Bn tumescent coatings ,-SD "al"es(. # 8eat shields on the escape routes(
-3amples of /6P(
# Deluge # 6M 9:: Aaseous 6ire 6ighting system # 6ire > Aas Detection system
6ire alls! 7last
alls! 8eat Shields

L ?;) 84:! :.H &ar 7last all
/ 4: 6ire all
7last all in place Sreejith
8eat Shield
Source courtesy' Bnternet sources Offshore Training pack
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Hydro Carbon #eleases

Per/ormance Indicators 0Leading 1 lagging2
Maintenance Check !te t Ca"i#$ati%n L%%& Check Si'("ati%n A()it MOC!ECR
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PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION
Pre ention barriers

HAC Static E"ect$ic A()it
IGNITION CONTROL
L%%& check *%$ BD A()it !In &ecti%n CFI %n Re"ie* Va"+e
BLOWDOWN & RELIEF SYSTEM

L%%& Check Detect%$ Ca"i#$ati%n A()it MOC!ECR
E*plosion / +ire S,iss C-eese Model

FIRE & GAS DETECTION EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
CFT %n ESDV L%%& Check A()it !In &ecti%n
CFT %n Fi$e P('& & Va"+e Te tin, %* *%a' c%ncent$ate MOC
Inte,$it- In &ecti%n %* PFP *i$e.a"" A()it MOC
Mitigation barriers
Fi$e D$i"" A()it
E.PLOSIO%
Discuss
6or major accident control! hich side of the &o tie should &e strong( Ceft ,pre"ention. or the right side ,mitigation. ( %hy(
Ma)or !ccident
Discussion trigger' +an a gas e3plosion &e effecti"ely mitigated pre"ented ith ater deluge(
Cearning
Major accidents* Potential major accidents at your offshore installation* Difference &et een personal ) occupational! marine and process accidents* S iss +heese > 7o Tie safety concepts* and Bmportance of safety &arriers in controlling major accidents.
Session 7reak
Sreejith
Ma)or !ccidents in your Offshore 6ield
Cearning O&jecti"es
To learn a&out the major accidents that occurred in your offshore comple3 to understand J%hat ent rong(N* and To think a&out the potential &arrier failures that might e3ist at offshore installations hich could lead to potential major accidents.
Offshore +omple3
Sho the field diagram
Sho the platforms ) 6PSOs and the interconnecting pipelines Bnclude the major additions ) modifications to highlight to the participants that the installation has changed o"er the years
Platform /ccident Details

Sho the accident > near@miss trends ,&ar chart. and discuss cause &reakdo n ,pie@chart. / graph that sho s no particular trend ,up ard or do n ard. could mean'
# The 8S- is not under control* # The 8S- performance ) accident data collection ) analysis is not proper* # Mo one kno s hat ill &e the future 8Sperformance is$
Major /ccidents
Bdentify major accidents! hi@potential incidents! near@misses* Discuss each of the major cases from the detail reports to e3plain' Causes # Conse3uen&es # Risk redu&tion re&ommendations # 4mplementation status # ny similar a&&idents o&&urred5 #
Bf there are any photos of these accidents! sho
them.
Sreejith
+auses
Examples
BnadeDuate planning ) organiIation* 6la s in PT% procedures* %ritten jo& procedure did not anticipate contri&uting factors* 6ailure to follo kno n jo& procedure ,s.* BnadeDuate training* Super"isor failure to identify unsafe condition* and 6ailure to communicate.
Sreejith
Cearning
Bf no concrete action is taken to rectify the cause of
the incident permanently! it might lead to an accident ne3t time round # 8istory has pro"en this* /ccidents could happen e"en ith safety &arriers in place* Personnel play an e3tremely important role in promoting safety # competency! e3perience and kno ledge is important* and %e need to ensure that the safety &arriers are maintained so as to control ) mitigate accidents.
Sreejith Offshore Training pack pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Session 7reak
Sreejith
Potential Ma)or !ccident E ents at 3our O//s-ore Comple*
In thi &$e entati%n3 the t-&ica" &%tentia" 'a0%$ acci)ent *%$ FPSO ! &"at*%$' a$e inc"()e)2 Thi .i"" $e4(i$e c( t%'i ati%n in "ine .ith the *ie") 5RA $e ("t 2
Sreejith
Offshore Training pack &i""ai/ $ee0ith1h%t'ai"2 c%'
Cearning O&jecti"es
To learn a&out the potential major accidents that can occur in offshore field and to understand the conseDuences* To &e a are of the major risk contri&utors at offshore installations* and To &e a are of the risk le"els for "arious personnel at your offshore field.
Sreejith
Potential Ma)or !ccidents 4

E0a$%!es
0. Surface 7lo out ?. Ship collisions
9. =iser ) Pipeline =eleases ;. Dropped O&jects
H. Process 8+ =eleases #6ires ) -3plosions 4. Transportation /ccidents

Sreejith Offshore Training pack S%($ce c%($te
-6 Inte$net
Potential Ma)or !ccidents 5 E0a$%!es

5. 8elicopter crash 0:. Turret 6ailure
2. Projectile ) Missile impact 00. +argo Tank -3plosion
1. Structural damage
Sreejith
Offshore Training pack S%($ce c%($te
-6 Inte$net
=isk Terminology
Bndi"idual =isk ,B=. Bndi"idual =isk Per /nnum is the freDuency ith hich an indi"idual may &e e3pected to sustain fatal harm due to e3posure to specific haIards in a year
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
/C/=P Triangle
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-6 Inte$net
%hat does risk mean(
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Manning distri&ution Transportation details 8eat > Material 7alance diagram P>BDs P6Ds Aeneral /rrangement ) Cayouts Design &asis and safety philosophies
-ssential data used in Guantitati"e =isk /ssessment ,G=/.
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Areas Sho the areas considered in the G=/ -3plain the manning distri&ution of "arious personnel categories in the areas Tell them the risks calculated is rather realistic since e ha"e considered more facts
Offshore Installation
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6ires and -3plosions

Pool 6ire Let fire <apour +loud -3plosion 6lash 6ire
Sreejith Offshore Training pack E7&"ain the ca( e an) c%n e4(ence %* each t-&e %* *i$e inc"()in, thei$ i'&ai$'ent &%tentia"
Bmpairment
Discuss impingement and impairment from pool and jet fires Pool fire impingement on steel structures'
# 0: minutes
Let fire impingement on steel structures'

# ; minutes
Sreejith
C%($te -6 CMPT 5RA Offshore Training pack G(i)e"ine
=isk assessment 6lo

H!"I$' Bdentify potential haIards Sectionalisation' =e"ie P6Ds! E6Ds > P>BDs to separate the process and utility system to "arious isolata&le sections.
+hart
Causal !nalysis' Bdentify haIardous e"ents associated ith accidents
+re7uency !nalysis and E ent 8ree !nalysis9 6reDuency of each accidental e"ent ,top e"ent. and &ranch pro&a&ilities are assigned to e"ent tree and outcome e"ent freDuency are estimated.
Conse7uence Modelling9 Esing the soft are. The physical effects and damages for each outcome e"ent are estimated
Impact !ssessment' /nalyse the fire and e3plosion impact to structures and eDuipment.
#is6 !ssessment 1ata!ity Esti$ation' Determine the risk to personnel from each outcome e"ent. Ris/ S($$ation an, Ris/ Ran/ing' Sum the risks to indi"idual from each outcome e"ents for hydrocar&on and non@hydrocar&on haIards and identify the dominant risk contri&utors. Ris/ Assess$ent' +ompare the risk le"els against Bndi"idual =isk /ccepta&ility +riteria to determine hether additional measures are necessary to reduce risks to /C/=P.
Sreejith
#is6 reducing measures' /pply enhanced or additional control measures and mitigation measures.
Potential Major /ccidents

Offshore 6ield
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M!E 4 Sur/ace (lo,out

+auses' 6ailure of choke "al"e 6ailure of OKMas tree ) D8S< ) S+SS< Presence of ignition sources
+onseDuences' Let 6ire Major asset damage Multiple fatalities ) injuries
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Sreejith
S%($ce c%($te -6 Inte$net
Subsea blow out

-6 Inte$net
6ire +ontours
Sho the jet! pool fire contours superimposed on the offshore installation layout dra ing to sho them the potential effects.
Sreejith
M!E : $ropped Ob)ects

+auses' 6ailure of lifting eDuipment ,o"erload ) damaged lifting eDuipment. 6ailure of crane eDuipment ,o"erload! etc.. Cifting ithout follo ing procedures ) controls +onseDuences' /sset damage ,hull! eDuipment! platform! etc.. Multiple fatalities ) injuries
Sreejith
Transportation /ccidents
"eli&opter+ boat+ personnel transfers
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Risks from transportation
/MO/ 6B-CD
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M!E ; 8ransportation !ccidents

+auses' Mechanical failure of &oats ) helicopter) flights -3traneous eather conditions Material defects of personal transfer &askets or associated lifting tackles
+onseDuences' /sset damage ,hull! eDuipment! platform! etc.. Multiple fatalities ) injuries
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Personnel (as6et 8rans/ers
Protection from side > "ertical impacts( Personnel falling from height due to giddiness! loss of grip! high ind! loss of &alance! etc.
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I the$e an %&ti%n8
M!E < Helicopter Cras+auses' 6ailure of helicopter ,engine failure ) e3treme eather. 6ailure of communication eDuipment 6ire ) e3plosion in 6PSO ) Platform Pilot error +onseDuences' 6ire Major asset ) helicopter damage Multiple fatalities ) injuries
The$e a$e ha$)"- an- kn%.n %cc($$ence %* He"ic%&te$ c$a hin, int% FPSO %$ &"at*%$'
Sreejith
M!E = Pro)ectiles / Missiles

+auses' 6ailure of eDuipment due to o"erpressure BnadeDuate design Missiles ) projectiles from gas tur&ines and 6PSO steam tur&ines
+onseDuences' /sset damage ,hull! eDuipment! etc.. Multiple fatalities ) injuries
Sreejith
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M!E > Structural E ents

+auses' Structural failures due to e3treme eather +orrosion BnadeDuate design +rane &oom collision
+onseDuences' /sset damage Multiple fatalities ) injuries
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M!E 4? 8urret +ailure
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M!E 44 Cargo 8an6 E*plosion
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Offshore Training pack FPSO
-3plain the Bndi"idual =isk ,B=. for the "arious personnel categories*
O"erall =isk for Offshore +omple3

ithin the /C/=P tolera&le region*
-3plain the PCC ,Potential Coss Of Cife. "alues for the comple3 and "arious personnel categories* Discuss if the B= "alue is
-3plain the major risk contri&utors for the offshore comple3* -3plain hat is &ase case B=! and /C/=P B= cases ,sensiti"ity cases.* and is it used to determine =ealistic
-3plain hat is traffic light system and ho =isk le"els(
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&i""ai/ $ee0ith1h%t'ai"2c Offshore Training pack %'
%hat is Traffic Cight system(

Traffic Cight system is used as an assessment tool &y EF 8S-! MOPS/! etc.
Sreejith
Traffic lights system and performance of safety systems

Traffic light system as used to assess the performance of safety systems* The performance of safety systems ere determined &ased on'
# +ritical maintenance test results* # /ccidents ) incidents* # Maintenance &acklogs* and # Offshore audit findings.
Sreejith
H%. .i"" the TL S- te' ( e) t% ca"c("ate Offshore Training pack i'&ai$'ent ! e+ent *$e4(encie in 5RA8
8ra//ic Lig-t Interpretation

Tolera&le
Partially degraded
!cce ptab le
Sa/ety Systems Per/ormance

%ot accepta
ble
Earlier risk IR 1 Risk after Safety System performance Assessment IR 3 Base case risk IR 2
Potential resi ual risk after impro!ements IR "
Sreejith
Cearning
Bndi"idual =isk for all offshore personnel are ithin the accepta&le limits* Enderstanding potential major accidents for offshore installations ,causes and conseDuences.* Enderstanding the major risk contri&utors at offshore field* and Enderstanding the personnel risk le"els for "arious categories.
Sreejith
Session 7reak
Sreejith
O//s-ore Sa/ety Cases
pilliai_sreejith@hotmail.com
Cearning o&jecti"es
To understand the o&jecti"e of Safety +ases* To understand JThe EF 8S- Offshore Bnstallations ,Safety +ase. =egulations 9::;K* To understand the typical S+ update triggers* and To kno the Typical Safety +ase contents.
Sreejith
Safety +ase@Definition
P/ do&umented body of e6iden&e that pro6ides a &on6in&ing and 6alid argument that a system is ade3uately safe for a gi6en appli&ation in a gi6en en6ironmentN
Safety +ase e3ists for Muclear! Offshore! /"iation! and =ail industries
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Safety +ase Origin

(post 2788 Piper lpha explosion/
PEF Offshore Operators! says +ullen! must adopt this ne philosophy on safety! producing a JSafety +aseQ. This includes continuous haIard assessment o"er the plantQs lifetime! fault tree analysis! hich looks at all the ays an error could de"elop! and takes account of ays that Qhuman factorsQ contri&ute to disastersN
Safety +ase -"olution Timeline
6orth ith' Bmmediate! at once Cord +ullen recommended that the ? ,6-/! -SS/! --=/!SBA/. &e carried out &y the offshore operators immediately &efore the 0119 safety case regulation as released. Sreejith Offshore Training pack
%hy Offshore Safety +ase(

Operators of offshore installations ant to &e sure that their operations are safe and do not e3pose their people or their &usiness to unaccepta&le le"els of risk* Plant modifications! "ariations on operating conditions and ne o nership mean that the risk picture is changing* and =egulators and other stakeholders ask you to justify the continuing operation of the installation through safety cases. =egulatory compliance is essential to your &usiness
Safety +ase
6irst S+ =egulations came into force in 0119* +ullen 6orth ith studies'
# / 6ire =isk /nalysis* # /n assessment of the risk of ingress of smoke or gas into the accommodation* # / re"ie of the a&ility of emergency systems to ithstand se"ere accident conditions* and # /n e"acuation! escape and rescue analysis.
The EF 8S- Offshore Bnstallations ,Safety +ase. =egulations 9::;

Fey changes introduced &y the 9::; =egulations include' @The reDuirement for duty holders to send an early design notification! instead of a design safety case! to 8S- hen esta&lishing a ne production installation* @Duty holders are reDuired to carry out a thorough and fundamental re"ie of their safety cases at least e"ery fi"e years! or as directed &y 8S-* @The present reDuirement to re@su&mit safety cases e"ery three years has &een remo"ed ,inspectors ill &e checking to see that safety cases are &eing kept up to date through inspection.* @Me duties reDuire licensees to ensure anyone they appoint as an operator is capa&le of fulfilling their legal responsi&ilities for safety* @+om&ined operations safety cases ha"e &een replaced &y notifications! hich do not need 8S- acceptance* and @The Offshore Bnstallations ,Safety =epresentati"es and Safety +ommittees. =egulations ha"e &een amended to e3tend consultation ith safety representati"es to re"ie ing and re"ising a safety case! as ell as preparing one.
Sreejith
Typical +ontents of Safety +ase

6acility description 8S- Management system 6ormal Safety /ssessment ,6S/. Summary Safety +ritical elements and Performance Standards /C/=P Demonstration 6itness to Operate
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Safety +ase Epdate Triggers

Examples
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Cearning
Origin and o&jecti"es of Safety +ase* Piper /lpha /ccident > Safety +ase* JThe EF 8S- Offshore Bnstallations ,Safety +ase. =egulations 9::;* Typical S+ contents* and Typical S+ update triggers.
Sreejith
Session 7reak
Sreejith
Sa/ety (arriers and t-eir #ole in Controlling Ma)or accidents
Cearning o&jecti"es
To understand the critical role of safety &arriers ) safety systems in controlling major accidents using 7o @Tie diagram* To understand safety &arriers on offshore installations* To appreciate the need to maintain the &arriers through maintenance system! inspections! etc.* and To identify and monitor performance of safety &arriers through lead and lag indicators.
7o
Tie Diagram
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
7arriers for Potential Major /ccidents

THREATS CONTROL & PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIGATIVE BARRIERS
M!E
Pre&entati&e
E$ergen#y re
B!o'o(t )S(rfa#e *!o'o(ts + Riser Pi%e!ine Re!eases

Mitigation
Sa,e %e, 'Muster
Bnstrumentation ! i.e. T/88 ) C/CC ) C/88 ) P/CC ) Inspections P/88 =elief System ,PS< .

ESD system Contro! ESD Valves "ete#tion
Esca$e %
Firewater Pum$s Firewater %in" main Manual Water Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$ment Delu"e System Wellhead Isolation Blowdown Valves ESD Manual Pull Stations HV ! Manual Foam Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$ment Blowdown Valves ESD Manual Pull Stations Firewalls Gaseous Systems
Emer"e &i"htin
Emer"e Power '(
Ma"igational /ids
PT%
F&G System F&G Detectors
Intern !ommunica & lar
E*tern !ommunica
Pedestal +ranes
!udits
+MMS
Tur ret failures Pro-e#ti!e .$issi!e I$%a#ts
Helidec+ ! E#ui$m
Bnert Aas System
Carg o t ank explos ions Str(#t(ra! En&iron$enta! e&ents
Miscellan Sa,et E#ui$m
Ignition control Miscellaneous )

Temporary -Duipment
Trans%ortation A##i,ents
-EMPS! ra,ts
Helico$ Faciliti
Sreejith
Direct to E#ui$m
EF 8S- FP H Bnspection =esults
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
%hat is
rong at present in oil > gas industry(
Enaccepta&le le"el of process safety related dangerous occurrences especially in relation to loss of containment incidents* Major haIard industry measured safety performance using CTBs$$ +ritical systems deteriorate o"er time ithout arning until they fail catastrophically* and /udits tend to &e too infreDuent and orkplace inspections focus on personal safety.
Process Sa/ety Management System

/n effecti"e process safety management system measures performance
2ey %erfor$an#e in,i#ators $(st in#!(,e a%%ro%riate in,i#ators of %ro#ess safety %erfor$an#e
-6 Inte$net
Key Per/ormance Indicators set to identi/y de/ects in sa/ety systems
!ccident 8ra)ectory
Lagging indicator
Lagging indicator
Leading indicator
Lagging indicator
Permit@to@,or6
Leading indicator
Inspection 1 Maintenance Lagging indicator

Leading indicator
Sta// Competence
System defects
Leading indicator Operational Procedures
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Hydro Carbon #eleases

Per/ormance Indicators 0Leading 1 lagging2
Maintenance Check !te t Ca"i#$ati%n L%%& Check Si'("ati%n A()it MOC!ECR
Sreejith
PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION
HAC Static E"ect$ic A()it
IGNITION CONTROL
L%%& check *%$ BD A()it !In &ecti%n CFI %n Re"ie* Va"+e
BLOWDOWN & RELIEF SYSTEM

L%%& Check Detect%$ Ca"i#$ati%n A()it MOC!ECR
P#OCESS H3$#OC!#(O% #ELE!SES/+I#ES/E.PLOSIO%S E*ample

FIRE & GAS DETECTION EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION PASSIVE FIRE PROTECTION
CFT %n ESDV L%%& Check A()it !In &ecti%n
Fi$e D$i"" A()it
CFT %n Fi$e P('& & Va"+e Te tin, %* *%a' c%ncent$ate MOC
Inte,$it- In &ecti%n %* PFP *i$e.a"" A()it MOC
E.PLOSIO%
Dual Performance /ssurance

$ual !ssurance @ leading and lagging indicators measuring per/ormance o/ eac- critical element o/ a Process Sa/ety Management System
Reactive Monitoring Lagging Indicator: Outcome Indicator
Critical Process Safety Risk Control System
Active Monitoring Leading Indicators: Process or Input Indicators
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Ho, e//ecti e are 3O'# sa/ety systemsA Traffic light system as used to assess the performance of safety systems* -ach of the safety systems ere assessed &ased on'
# +ritical Maintenance Test ,+MT. results* # /ccidents ) incidents* # Maintenance &acklogs* and # /udit findings.
8ra//ic Lig-t Interpretation

Tolera&le
Partially degraded
!cce ptab le
Sa/ety Systems Per/ormance

%ot accepta
ble
Offshore /udit 6indings

Examples
8 4: fire alls penetrated to pass pipes and electrical conduits 6ire ater deluge not pro"ided for critical hydrocar&on systems ) "al"e clusters 6lame Detectors o&structed ith pipe ork 8aIardous area +lassification compromised -3 eDuipment maintenance fla s
Sreejith
Safety 7arrier Performance

THREATS CONTROL & PREVENTATIVE BARRIERS MITIGATIVE BARRIERS
M!E
Pre&entati&e
E$ergen#y re
B!o'o(t )S(rfa#e *!o'o(ts + Riser Pi%e!ine Re!eases

Mitigation
Sa,e %e, 'Muster
Bnstrumentation ! i.e. T/88 ) C/CC ) C/88 ) P/CC ) Inspections P/88 =elief System ,PS< .

ESD system Contro! ESD Valves "ete#tion
Esca$e %
Firewater Pum$s Firewater %in" main Manual Water Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$ment Delu"e System Wellhead Isolation Blowdown Valves ESD Manual Pull Stations HV ! Manual Foam Fire Fi"htin" E#ui$ment Blowdown Valves ESD Manual Pull Stations Firewalls Gaseous Systems
Emer"e &i"htin
Emer"e Power '(
Ma"igational /ids
PT%
F&G System F&G Detectors
Intern !ommunica & lar
E*tern !ommunica
Pedestal +ranes
!udits
+MMS
Tur ret failures Pro-e#ti!e .$issi!e I$%a#ts
Helidec+ ! E#ui$m
Bnert Aas System
Carg o t ank explos ions Str(#t(ra! En&iron$enta! e&ents
Miscellan Sa,et E#ui$m
Ignition control Miscellaneous )

Temporary -Duipment
Trans%ortation A##i,ents
-EMPS! ra,ts
Helico$ Faciliti
Sreejith
Direct to E#ui$m
Process Sa/ety Management Major 8aIard /nalysis)Maintenance Coop
Maintenance Management
!re 8-e (arriers (eing Properly MaintainedA
Ma)or Hazard !nalysis
I$E%8I+3 (arriersB 0SCEs2
Per/ormance Indicators !re 8-ey SuitableA
Sreejith
-6 Inte$net
Cearning
+oncept of Safety &arriers in major accident control* and =ole of offshore personnel in ensuring integrity of safety &arriers &y monitoring performance indicators* and Performance of safety systems to control major haIards cannot &e monitored using CTBs hich calls for a shift in focus.
Sreejith
Key Message Once the safety systems fail! there can &e major accidents$$$
%nly you &an operate 1 maintain safety systems without flaws'

Offshore Safety Case Trainingppt

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One Day Offshore Safety Training

Offshore Training pack

%hy this training(

Major /ccidents in Oil > Aas Bndustries

ith platform and major fire

=ecent Major /ccidents in your offshore 6ield(

Offshore Training pack

%hat is a safety case(

Offshore Training pack

Offshore Safety +ase Epdate project

0 day Training +ontents

Offshore Training pack

7reaks for the day

Offshore Training pack

Offshore Training pack

Occupational /Personal, Marine and Process Hazards

/re these terms too o&"ious and more of a commonsense issue(

Discussion trigger' 7P Te3as findings &y Mr. 7aker panel.

Offshore Training pack

Offshore Training pack

Potential Major /ccidents in your Offshore 6ield

Personnel injury from'

Aenerally O8 are a"oided &y procedures

earing PP-s > follo ing

Offshore Training pack

Offshore Training pack

Source courtesy' Bnternet

Process Safety > Marine 8aIards

-3amples of these are'

Safety Performance O8 > PS8

Process Safety /ccident

Source courtesy' Bnternet

Offshore Training pack

7o @tie 7arrier +oncept

Source courtesy' Bnternet

7arriers for Potential Major /ccidents

M!E Major Potential /ccidents

B!o'o(t )S(rfa#e *!o'o(ts Riser Pi%e!ine Re!eases

Pro#ess Hy,ro#ar*on Re!eases Shi% Co!!ision "ro%%e, O*-e#ts He!i#o%ter Crash

Contro! ESD Valves F&G System F&G Detectors

Pro-e#ti!e .$issi!e I$%a#ts

Str(#t(ra! En&iron$enta! e&ents Trans%ortation A##i,ents

Miscellaneous Temporary -Duipment

Cargo tan/ e0%!osions

Offshore Training pack

Do you kno here these safety &arriers are in your installation)s(

Offshore Training pack

6ire alls! 7last

alls! 8eat Shields

7last all in place Sreejith

Source courtesy' Bnternet sources Offshore Training pack

Offshore Training pack

Source courtesy' Bnternet

Hydro Carbon #eleases

Pre ention barriers

BLOWDOWN & RELIEF SYSTEM

E*plosion / +ire S,iss C-eese Model

Offshore Training pack

CFT %n ESDV L%%& Check A()it !In &ecti%n

CFT %n Fi$e P('& & Va"+e Te tin, %* *%a' c%ncent$ate MOC

Inte,$it- In &ecti%n %* PFP *i$e.a"" A()it MOC

Fi$e D$i"" A()it

Pro#ess Hy,ro#aron Re!eases Shi% Co!!ision "ro%%e, O-e#ts He!i#o%ter Crash