G.R. NO. L-36731: GODINEZ V.

FONG PAK LUEN Facts: The plaintiffs filed a case to recover a parcel of land sold by their father Jose Godinez to defendant Fong Pak Luen. Said defendant executed a power of attorney in favour of his co-defendant Kwan Pun Ming, who conveyed and sold the above described parcel of land to co-defendant Trinidad S. Navata. The latter is aware of and with full knowledge that Fong Pak Luen is a Chinese citizen as well as Kwan Pun Ming, who under the law are prohibited and disqualified to acquire real property; that Fong Pak Luen has not acquired any title or interest in said parcel of land as purported contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez alone was contrary to law and considered non-existent. The defendant filed her answer that the complaint does not state a cause of action since it appears from the allegation that the property is registered in the name of Jose Godinez so that as his sole property he may dispose of the same; that the cause of action has been barred by the statute of limitations as the alleged document of sale executed by Jose Godinez on November 27, 1941, conveyed the property to defendant Fong Pak Luen as a result of which a title was issued to said defendant; that under Article 1144(1) of the Civil Code, an action based upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues; that the right of action accrued on November 27, 1941 but the complaint was filed only on September 30, 1966, beyond the 10-year period provided by law. The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint. A motion for reconsideration was filed by plaintiffs but was denied. Issue: Whether or not the sale was null and void ab initio since it violates applicable provisions of the Constitution and the Civil Code. Ruling:No Prescription may never be invoked to defend that which the Constitution prohibits. However, we see no necessity from the facts of this case to pass upon the nature of the contract of sale executed by Jose Godinez and Fong Pak Luen whether void ab initio, illegal per se, or merely prohibited. It is enough to stress that insofar as the vendee is concerned, prescription is unavailing. But neither can the vendor or his heirs rely on an argument based on imprescriptibility because the land sold in 1941 is now in the hands of a Filipino citizen against whom the constitutional prescription was never intended to apply. As earlier mentioned, Fong Pak Luen, the disqualified alien vendee later sold the same property to Navata, a Filipino citizen qualified to acquire real property. Navata, as a naturalized citizen, was constitutionally qualified to own the subject property. Santiago v. COMELEC FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others: 1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE: Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative? HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED. Avelino vs. Cuenco - A case digest Facts; Senator Cuenco was elected Senate President after the seat being declared vacant resulting to the other senators including the Senate President Avelino's walk-out. Issue; WON there's quorum, enough to conduct business and therefor legitimizing Senator Cuenco's election as Senate President.

Ruling; The Supreme Court held that twelve is a majority of 24 enough to conduct business taking into consideration the absence of Senator Confessor being out of the country and jurisdiction, and Senator Sotto who's in the hospital. G.R. No. L-11530: US vs Juan Pons Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914. HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case. G.R. No. L-6266: Rodriguez vs Gella Rodriguez et al seek to invalidate EO. 545 and 546 issued in 1952, the first appropriating the sum of P37,850,500 for urgent and essential public works, and the second setting aside the sum of P11,367,600 for relief in the provinces and cities visited by typhoons, floods, droughts, earthquakes, volcanic action and other calamities. These EOs were pursuant to CA 671. Note that prior to Araneta vs Dinglasan, Congress passed HB 727 intendi ng to revoke CA 671 but the same was vetoed by the President due to the Korean War and his perception that war is still subsisting as a fact. ISSUE: Whether or not the EOs are valid. HELD: As similarly decided in the Araneta case, the EOs issued in pursuant to CA 671 shall be rendered ineffective. The president did not invoke any actual emergencies or calamities emanating from the last world war for which CA 671 has been intended. Without such invocation, the veto of the president cannot be of merit for the emergency he feared cannot be attributed to the war contemplated in CA 671. Even if the president vetoed the repealing bill the intent of Congress must be given due weight. For it would be absurd to contend otherwise. For "while Congress might delegate its power by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-third vote. In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be the law." Act No. 671 may be likened to an ordinary contract of agency, whereby the consent of the

agent is necessary only in the sense that he cannot be compelled to accept the trust, in the same way that the principal cannot be forced to keep the relation in eternity or at the will of the agent. Neither can it be suggested that the agency created under the Act is coupled with interest On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Basco and four others (all lawyers) assailed the validity of the law creating PAGCOR on constitutional grounds among others particularly citing that the PAGCORs charter is against the constitutional provision on local autonomy. Basco et al contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local is violative of the local autonomy principle.

Basco vs PAGCOR ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCORs charter is violative of the principle of local autonomy. HELD: NO. Section 5, Article 10 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. A close reading of the above provision does not violate local autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide. Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress which has the power to create and abolish municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power. Further still, local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National Government over local governments.

Estrada v Desierto Facts: In the trial of former President Estrada for plunder, he claimed presidential immunity from suit, since he was not convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Issue: WON Estrada is immune from suit. Ruling: Negative. The impeachment trial of Estrada was aborted by events which led to his loss of the presidency. Senate had already declared the trial in functus officio. If impeachment proceedings have become moot because of the resignation of the president, he can already be sued. From the ruling: What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts wi thin his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of NA/BP sought to prohibit Alba, then Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 77. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of Sec 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment." Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution. G.R. No. 71977: Demetria vs Alba ISSUE: Whether or not Par 1, Sec 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.

HELD: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. Par 1 of Sec 44 of PD1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. HOWEVER, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GA Act may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from 1 dept to another here.

ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF NUEVA SEGOVIA VS PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ILOCOSNORTEDECEMBER 31 1927AVANCENA, C. J. FACTS: The Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, represented by the Bishop of NuevaSegovia, possesses and is the owner of a parcel of land in the Municipality of SanN i c o l a s , I l o c o s N o r t e , a l l f o u r s i d e s o f w h i c h f a c e o n t h e p u b l i c s t r e e t . O n t h e south side is a part of the churchyard, the convent and an adjacent lot used for vegetable garden, in which there is a stable and a well for the use of the convent.In the center is the r emainder of the churchyar d and the church. On the norths i d e i s a n o l d c e m e t e r y w i t h 2 o f i t s w a l l s s t i l l s t a n d i n g , a n d a p o r t i o n w h e r e formerly stood a tower, the base of whic h may still be seen. As required by the provincial board of ilocos norte, the plaintiff paid, under protest, the land tax onthe lot adjoining the convent and the lot which form erly was the cemetery withthe portion where the tower stood. Plaintiff filed this action for the recovery of thesum paid by it by way of land tax, alleging that the collection of this tax is illegal. ISSUE:Whether or not the said property is exempt from tax? HELD: YES. The exemption of favor of the convent in the payment of the land taxrefers to the home of the priest who presides over the church and who has to takecare of himself in order to discharge his duties. It ther efore must, in this sense, include not only the land actually occupied by the church, but also the a djacentground destined to the ordinary incidental uses of man. In regard to the lot whichformerly was the cemetery, while it is no longer used as such, neither is it used forc o m m e r c i a l p u r p o s e s a n d , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e v i d e n c e , i s n o w b e i n g u s e d a s a l o d g i n g h o u s e b y t h e p e o p l e w h o p a r t i c i p a t e i n r e l i g i o u s f e s t i v i t i e s , w h i c h constitutes an incidental use in religious functions, which also comes within the exemption. YMCA OF MANILA VS COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE JANUARY 19, 1916MORELAND, J. FACTS: T h e C i t y o f M a n i l a c o n t e n d i n g t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g a n d l o t s o f t h e Y M C A i s taxable, assessed it and levied a tax thereon. It was paid under protest and this a c t i o n b e g u n t o r e c o v e r i t o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y w a s e x e m p t f r o m taxation under the charter of the city of Manila. The decision was for the city andthe association appealed. YMCA con tends that it is a welfare, educational andc h a r i t a b l e n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e i t s r e n t a l i n c o m e f r o m l e a s i n g i t s f a c i l i t i e s t o s m a l l s h o p o w n e r s , r e s t a u r a n t s , a n d c a n t e e n o p e r a t o r s , a n d f r o m collecting parking fees is not subject to tax .ISSUE:Whether or not the rental income of YMCA may be a subject of taxation? HELD:NO. The Supreme Court ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keepsa lodging and boarding house and maintains a restaurant for its members, still,these do not constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the word, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, ansas such, it is entitled to b exempted from taxation.* There is o doubt about the correctness of the contention that an institutionmust devote itself exclusively to one or the other of the purposes mentioned inthe statute before it can be exempt from taxation ; but the statute does not say that it must be devoted exclusively to anyone of the purpose therein mentioned.It may be a combination of 2 or 3 or more of those purposes and still be entitled t o e x e m p t i o n . T h e Y M C A o f M a n i l a c a n n o t b e s a i d t o b e a n i n s t i t u t i o n u s e d exclusively for religious purposes, or an institution used exclusively for charitablepurposes, or an institution devoted exclusively for educational purposes; but webelieve it can be truthfully said that it is an institution used exclusiv ely for all 3purposes, and that, as such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation