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1 I is for Idea: Maimon, Kant, and Deleuzes ontology of difference Beth Lord b.lord@dundee.ac.uk Draft conference paper.

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In chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition, Deleuze says that the fundamental reformulation of Kants Critique, and the overcoming of the Kantian duality between concept and intuition, are accomplished by the post-Kantian philosopher Solomon Maimon.1 In order to understand Deleuzes complex relation to Kant, we must look at how Deleuze draws on Maimon. I will argue that Deleuzes transcendental empiricism, in attempting to overcome the failure of transcendental idealism to account for the genesis of beings, draws extensively on Maimon. However, Deleuze finds insufficient resources in Maimon to account for the generation of beings from difference. Curiously, it is in Kant that Deleuze finds these resources, and finds a source for an ontology of difference. Maimon was an outsider to Enlightenment circles, a self-taught philosopher without academic or social credentials. An eastern European Jew from an impoverished background, he read Spinoza, Hume, and Kant, and, against enormous odds, became a respected contributor to philosophical debates. His major work, the Versuch ber Transcendentalphilosophie, he sent to Kant in 1789, whereupon Kant declared that Maimon was his best and most profound critic. Maimons Versuch is a long and obscure criticism of Kants Critique of Pure Reason. Among other things, Maimon argues that given Kants strict separation of understanding from sensibility, the conceptual products of understanding cannot be directly applied to passively received intuitions. The understanding, trapped amongst its concepts, accesses only the object in general which it itself constructs, while the material that is given to

2 intuition is produced mysteriously. So on Kants account, there are two forces producing being one stemming from understanding, the other mysteriously emanating from nature that can find no way of meeting. Maimon concludes that a Kantian cannot account for real being. The only solution, on Maimons view, is to merge these two streams of production, such that the productivity of understanding is identical with the productivity of the given. In other words, given objects are not just received by the subject, but actively produced by it. Maimon is an idealist in a much stronger sense than Kant is. But Maimon also claims to be a transcendental philosopher in a stronger sense than Kant, because of his concern to go beyond conditions of possible experience to get at the conditions of the being of intuitions. Maimon finds these conditions in the human understanding, which he takes to be a finite mode of an infinite understanding. Briefly, Maimon accounts for the generation of objects of intuition by positing that the infinite understanding contains rules for the generation of qualities. These rules are differentials: the relations of difference that a specific qualitative tendency has to all the others. So the rule for producing this specific redness is its differential relation to every other quality. The finite understanding integrates, or generates, qualities from differentials, not as objects, but as intensities that exist as ideas of understanding. That is, ideas of understanding are spun out from differentials, as infinitely flowing intensities that cannot be experienced or conceptually thought. It is up to the imagination to delimit and fix these intensities, and to represent them in sensibility. In sensibility we have a partial view of the intensities of the idea, of which sensible intuitions are contractions. This is how sensible intuitions are generated from differentials. Maimon accuses Kant of ignoring the question of the generation of the sensible, and looking only at how sensible objects can be related to concepts that

3 are entirely external to them. Where Kant accounts only for what can be represented in the sensible, Maimon accounts for the being of the sensible.2 Deleuzes transcendental empiricism draws on Maimons genetic account of being. Like Maimon, Deleuze holds that if transcendental philosophy concerns itself with the conditions of possible experience, it remains on the level of conceptual representation and does not reach real being. Kant cuts his investigations off from the conditions of being, since those conditions are not objects of possible experience. In seeking the real being that gives rise to experience, Deleuze wants to recover a noumenon that does not have an external, transcendent relation to phenomena. He seeks the noumenon closest to the phenomenon which is internal to it and produces it immanently.3 This is not the indeterminate thought of an intelligible ground, but the being of the sensible which can only be sensed. The distinction between the sensible and that which can only be sensed is between the recognizable given, and something that can only be encountered, that by which the given is given.4 This transcendental condition is insensible in terms of representation, and unthinkable in terms of concepts, but it is internal to thought and must be thought. The question of the genesis of the given is closely related to the question of its determination. For Kant, determination takes place externally to the given, between the concepts of understanding and the object of intuition. External determination yields objects in general that differ in degree, the mass of possible experience. Deleuze, like Maimon, wants to find the internally-determining conditions that produce real experience (i.e. encounters that differ in kind). Deleuzes transcendental empiricism looks into the depth, interior, or being of experience. Transcendental empiricism is not concerned with the empirically real, but with the real immanent to the empirical; it is not concerned with the transcendentally ideal, but with what is

4 transcendental in the Idea. The real transcendental conditions of the given are in the Idea. Kant, too, locates the conditions of the given in ideas: the ideas of soul, cosmos and God are conditions that cannot be experienced, but force themselves upon our thought. But Kants ideas are legitimately conceived only as the conditions of our thinking of the genesis of being, insofar as they regulate conceptual thinking, not as its real conditions. Kants transcendental ideas are important but frustrating for Deleuze: they are undetermined problems concerning the genesis of being, but they are solved only in relation to representations and concepts. The constitutive power of the idea to determine and even generate being is distrusted and suppressed, leaving it only a regulative power to determine thinking. The model for an idea with genetic power, Deleuze finds in Maimon. Deleuze follows Maimon in arguing that the being of the sensible is in the Idea, and that intuition is produced from differentials. Chapter 4 of Difference and Repetition is, broadly, a Maimonian theory of onto-hetero-genesis,5 in which a basic distinction is posited between productivity from differences in kind in the Idea, and produced, sensible things that differ in degree. But these realms are not external to one another: virtual differential productivity is immanent to its actual product, and the sensible is the surface contraction of the flows and intensities of the idea. Deleuzes Idea is far more Maimonian than it is Kantian: it is an unfinished, unfixed process of actualizing and expressing the differential relations that constitute it. Deleuze draws on Maimon in his criticism of Kants account of determination. For Kant, the determinant concept is applied to the determinable given from the outside, such that the transcendental moment is one of conditioning rather than genesis. The question of the internal constructability of the given is suppressed in his

5 focus on the surface construction of the object of experience. For Kant, therefore, difference is spoken of only in terms of this surface: the object in general is a blanket identity that is the basis for mere empirical diversity. For Maimon, on the other hand, determination is between determinant and determinable elements in the idea. The relation is not one of conditioning the intuition with a concept, but of generating the object from within. Determination is conceived not in terms of a oneway conditioning from the outside, but as reciprocal determination within the idea.6 For Maimon, determination takes place within the idea, according to reciprocal determination rather than negative determination.7 For Maimon, a real object is determined by its differential positively generating its predicates. The predicates of a thing are new, and different in kind from others, because they are generated specifically with it. There is no sum-total of pre-existing possible predicates (greenness, blueness, etc) that a red thing is negatively determined to be. Instead, a red thing is reciprocally determined to be this instance of red: its differential determines its relation to all other qualities, and at the same time gains its own determination from its relation to all other qualities. This is what Deleuze, following Martial Gueroult, calls reciprocal determination as the reason for the emergence of qualities. When the differential is thought through all its relations of difference, both sides become determined: the differential becomes a determinate instance of redness, and all reality becomes more determined in its differential relations to that redness. This basic structure of the Idea Deleuze adapts from Maimon. Ideas appear [as ] a system of differential relations between reciprocally determined genetic elements.8 The Idea produces determinate objects from differences, because of an ideal synthesis of differentials that gives determination to intensities and to the whole of the virtual. But Deleuze finds Maimon lacking in an important respect. For

6 Maimon, the differential is a fixed relation between qualities. For Deleuze, the differential relation varies, so that what is integrated from it is not a fixed quality, but rather the qualitys continuous multiplicity. Maimons differential is a rule for producing a fixed quality of variable size, but the rule itself does not vary. In this, Deleuze suggests, Maimon makes the same mistake as Leibniz: he fixes the differential relation such that it corresponds to the discrete multiplicity of a selfidentical quality.9 Deleuze sees this as a kind of atomism in which the differential is a fixed essence that resembles the objects generated from it. For Deleuze, the differential is not a fixed formula that produces a number of shades of red, but pure and varying difference from which flows a continuity of reds that cannot be divided into identifiable elements. So, even Maimon retains the image of thought through which the production of reality is taken to rest on the resemblance of the actual to the possible. Maimon ultimately grounds differential production in the identity of rules and qualities. Surprisingly, Deleuze finds a more profound thinking of difference in Kant. He refers to a precise moment within Kantianism, a furtive and explosive moment which is not even continued by Kant, much less by post-Kantianism.10 The moment in question is one that makes the spontaneous self an other to itself in section 25 of the Transcendental Deduction (B).11 Kants thinking of the determination of the I is crucial for Deleuzes ontology of difference in the Idea. Briefly, the I think, in determining its own being, cannot determine its own thinking activity, which can only be represented to it as an other. A gap therefore opens within the self, between its being and its thinking, or between the I am and the I think. While my existence is already given with the I think that determines it, my existence cannot be immediately determined. For the mode in which I am to

7 determine my existence that is, the manifold to be combined by the I think is not immediately given. It must be intuited in time, which makes my indeterminate existence determinable. But the I think thereby determines something different from itself: it determines its existence as it is given in time. Thus I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; all that I can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination.12 The I think, in the act of determining its existence, prevents the determination of its own activity. The determination of my existence is a movement of self-differing. Determination is not here a matter of subsuming some given being in general under an external concept that would determine it as my being, but of producing my being by internally differentiating it from my thinking. This is a moment of Maimonian onto-hetero-genesis: the I think generates itself from its own differential relation to itself. The difference means there is no possibility of adequately thinking my spontaneity; it can only be represented insofar as receptivity experiences the spontaneity of my thought being exercised upon it, as if from outside it. The self cannot enact or be its own thinking activity. For this reason, Deleuze characterizes this moment with Rimbauds phrase I is an other.13 Here, Deleuze finds, Kant adopts transcendental empiricism and discovers the pure difference internal to the relation of determination. It amounts to the discovery of Difference no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such as what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being.14

8 Kants fractured I has three moments of determinable being, determinant thinking, and time as the form of determination. This is important for Deleuze for several reasons. It indicates the priority of time as a genetic condition for experience; it indicates that the self is generated from its own differential; and it grounds determination in an original difference of being and thinking. These factors make Kants fractured I the prototype of Deleuzes Idea, with the same problematic unity. The Idea performs like the I in that in determining its own being, its own activity must remain undetermined. As the Idea determines its actual solutions in the realm of the sensible, its virtual object, the problem, must be represented without being able to be directly determined.15 The problem becomes determined by analogy with the objects of experience it relates to. So the Idea is its differing from itself. It produces itself as the determinate solutions (singularities and events) that make its problematic being fundamentally undeterminable and thinkable only in terms of representation. As a result, problems can indeed be represented in terms of experience and concepts, but their true being cannot be thought in this way. The true, problematic being of the Idea is fundamentally undetermined and unrepresentable. It is the being of the sensible that can only be sensed; the unthinkable that must be thought. Kants passive self receives the activity of [its] own thought as an other, and Deleuzes actualized Idea receives the activity of the problem as an other; this powerful other must be sensed and must be thought.16 Kants fractured I is therefore closely bound up with the discovery of the problematic and the Idea. Structurally, the Idea repeats its relation of determination and the difference internal to being and thought. Ideas are exactly the thoughts of the fractured Cogito17 because they enact the activity of thinking determining its own being as the unfolding of time. Time is not simply the form of intuition, or the form of

9 actualized solutions, but the form of the determinability of being by thought. For Kant, it is the form internal to the I that continually produces the I as differing from itself. For Deleuze, time is internal to the Idea: its unfolding is the activity of the Idea determining itself and preserving its own indeterminacy. It is not that thinking determines being in time as a container. Rather, time is the difference internal to the fractured I and the Idea: thought determining being is the unfolding of time and the operation of difference. This indicates an original and irreducible relation that does not merely condition but generates experience: the relation of the difference of thinking and being that can be formulated thinking-time-being or determinantdeterminable-undetermined. Ideas contain [these] dismembered moments as an internal problematic objective unity.18 The thinking and being that we speak of here does not refer to a determinative judgment between a concept and an actual being, but to an ontological relation that forms the internal structure of Kants transcendental unity of apperception, and of Deleuzes virtual, pre-individual Idea. This is the original relation of the determination and genesis of the actual. It is the relation of being and thinking differentiated by time. Deleuze thinks that Kant is mistaken to locate this differential relation in a subject, for this difference and its generative power too easily become covered over. The fracture in the I is quickly filled by a new form of identity and an external difference between spontaneity and receptivity.19 Kant is too empirical in holding thinking and being in external opposition, whereas the post-Kantians are too dogmatic in filling the gap between them. But in this moment of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant discovers pure difference. For a brief moment we enter into that schizophrenia in principle which characterises the highest power of thought, and

10 opens Being directly onto difference, despite all the mediations, all the reconciliations, of the concept.20 The fractured, self-differing I is therefore the essence of Kants Copernican revolution and constitutes the discovery of the transcendental.21 Kant discovers the genetic conditions of real experience in the pure difference of being and thinking. Without the difference of being and thinking internal to the fractured I, experience and determination are inevitably founded in identity: the identity of a finite or infinite self for whom there is no being that cannot be thought. In this kind of system, actual experience will be nothing more than a copy of a possible reality determined in advance. This is ultimately the problem with Maimon. Where experience is grounded in the difference between being and thinking, however (in Kants fractured I, in Deleuzes Idea, or paradigmatically, in Spinozas substance), the sensible is determined as it is generated. Differentials produce experience as surprising and unforeseeable, the encounters that shock us into thinking.

Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), 173. Hereafter DR. 2 DR 56-7. 3 DR 222. 4 DR 139-40. 5 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis: Philosophy as Differential Ontology (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). 6 DR 173. 7 Martial Guroult, La philosophie transcendentale de Salomon Maimon (Paris: Librairie Flix Alcan, 1929), 54, 76. 8 DR 173-4. 9 DR 172. 10 DR 58. 11 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), B157-9. Hereafter CPR. 12 CPR B158n.. 13 Gilles Deleuze, Kants Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone, 1995) viii. 14 DR 86. 15 DR 169. 16 Gilles Deleuze, On Four Poetic Formulas that might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Grew (London: Verso, 1998), 30; DR 199-200.

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DR 169. DR 170. 19 DR 87. 20 DR 58. 21 DR 86.

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