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Harry Hillaker - Father Of The F-16

Harry Hillaker began his career wit h Convair in San Diego, Calif ornia, in 1941 as a Det ail Draf t sman. T he F-16 is a revolut ionary aircraf t . It represent s a major change in f ight er design. It s f ine blend of high t echnology and common sense requirement s emphasizes f light perf ormance-range, persist ence, and maneuverabilit y - right in t he heart of t he f light envelope where air combat t akes place. T he aircraf t 's "user-f riendly" cockpit and int egrat ed avionic syst em allow a single pilot t o f ight and win in aerial combat . T he design also emphasizes low cost in procurement , in operat ion and support , and in provisions f or growt h. T he F-16 int roduced many successf ul t echnologies. Fly-by-wire and relaxed st at ic st abilit y gave t he F-16 a quant um leap in air combat capabilit y over ot her f ight ers when it was int roduced and t his t echnology st ill makes t he aircraf t an unmat ched compet it or t oday. T he F-16 disproved t he adages t hat bigger was bet t er, t hat a lot of capabilit y had t o be expensive, and t hat sophist icat ed syst ems rarely worked. Harry Hillaker deserves much of t he credit f or t his revolut ionary approach t o f ight er design. You might say t hat t he F-16 began as a spare-t ime project f or t his vet eran designer. Back in t he mid1960s, Hillaker spent his of f hours designing t he plane of his dreams - a light weight , highperf ormance jet t hat could f ly circles around all ot her f ight ers. His spare-t ime project t urned int o an obsession. T he obsession became a realit y. Today it is a st andard - a plane by which ot hers are measured. T hough Hillaker ret ired in 1985, af t er f ort y-f our years of design work, he remains act ive as a consult ant t o t he US Air Force and indust ry. In 1990, he was induct ed int o t he prest igious US Nat ional Academy of Engineering f or his achievement s. He spent t wo t erms as chairman of t he Aerospace Vehicles Panel of t he Air Force's Scient if ic Advisory Board. Hillaker, who lives about t en minut es away f rom t he F-16 product ion line in Fort Wort h, is always pleased t o t alk about t he F-16 and his part in it s development .

In the late 1960s, you f ound yourself involved in what was called the "f ighter maf ia." Where did that name come f rom?
T hat was t he t it le given t o t he small group of people responsible f or t he concept ual design of t he light weight f ight er, what became t he F-16. T he group had t hree core members: John Boyd, Pierre Sprey, and me. We were given t he "maf ia" t it le by people in t he Air Force back in t he mid-60s. We were viewed as an underground group t hat was challenging t he est ablishment . We were a t hreat of sort s.

What made the f ighter maf ia threatening?

We want ed a change. While most of t he Air Force was int erest ed in going nort h, we want ed t o go sout h. More specif ically, t hey were concerned t hat we were t rying t o int roduce a new f ight er t hat would jeopardize t he F-15.

You see, t he F-15 was t he f irst air-superiorit y f ight er t hat t he Air Force had put under cont ract in t went y-f ive years. T hey were commit t ed t o t he F-15. T hey f elt st rongly t hat our airplane was just a hot dog airplane t hat was good only f or air shows on sunny Sundays at t he st at e f air. T his view was st rengt hened t o a degree by t heir experience wit h t he Lockheed F-104. T he F-104 was a really hot airplane t hat people loved t o f ly, but it didn't have much capabilit y and not much range. T he Air Force bought only 300 of t hem. We were t hreat ening f or anot her reason. We were perceived as being ant i-t echnology. Our slogan was "make it simple." T he slogan it self may have been an oversimplif icat ion. We didn't art iculat e ourselves well early on.

Does technology discourage simple approaches in aircraf t design?

T here have been debat es t hrough t he years about just how much t echnology should be incorporat ed in any design. T he real issue isn't t echnology versus no t echnology. It is how t o apply t echnology. For example, t he F-15 represent s a brut e-f orce approach t o t echnology. If you want higher speeds, add bigger engines. If you want longer range, make t he airplane bigger t o increase t he f uel capacit y. T he result is a big airplane. T he F-15 was viewed as highly sophist icat ed because it is so big and expensive. In my mind, t he F-15 wasn't as t echnically advanced as t he F-4. T he F-16 is much more of an applicat ion of high t echnology t han t he F-15. We used t he t echnology available t o drive t he given end, t hat is, or was, t o keep t hings as simple and small as we could. Our design was a f inesse approach. If we want ed t o f ly f ast er, we made t he drag lower by reducing size and adjust ing t he conf igurat ion it self . If we want ed great er range, we made t he plane more ef f icient , more compact .

What are the advantages of simple and small?

In general t erms, it t ranslat es int o lower weight , less drag, and t heref ore higher perf ormance. Also, a f undament al indicat or of an airplane's cost is it s weight . We were well aware t hat t he avionics f olks would be put t ing a bunch of gadget s in t he airplane, which would increase weight and decrease perf ormance. We st acked t he deck. We made t he airplane so dense t hat t here wasn't room f or all t hat st uf f . As it t urned out , our high-densit y design was one of t he t hings t hat looked as t hough it might hinder t he advancement of t he airplane. It was lat er graded on t he amount of unusable space. We had 4.8 cubic f eet . T he F-15 had almost t en t imes t hat . Anot her reason, besides weight , f avors small size. Smaller aircraf t have less drag. People always t alk in t erms of drag coef f icient s. But drag coef f icient s really don't t ell you t hat much. For example, t he drag coef f icient of an F-16 is about t he same as t hat of an F-4. However, t he F-16 has about one-t hird t he drag of an F-4 in level f light . At angle of at t ack, it is about one-f if t eent h. T he airplane's except ional maneuverabilit y is a consequence of t hat lower drag and a higher t hrust -t o-weight rat io.

How were these relationships used in the development of the lightweight f ighter?

My f irst dealings wit h John Boyd and Pierre Sprey did not involve any airplane designs per se. Our early work was purely and simply an analysis of t he relat ionships of wing loading and t hrust loading and f uel f ract ion (t he rat io of f uel capacit y t o t he weight of t he airplane). We want ed t o underst and t he relat ionship bet ween t hese variables. We knew t hat we want ed low wing loading and high t hrust loading. But we also knew t hat low wing loading means more weight and more drag. High t hrust loading means high f uel consumpt ion. Airplanes wit h high t hrust -t o-weight rat ios are normally equat ed wit h short range. T hat 's why we st art ed looking at f uel f ract ions. We want ed t o t ie all t hese t hings t oget her t o get a bet t er f eel f or t he boundaries involved.

Had anyone looked at the problem this way bef ore?

I would say t hat people had t hought about it , but no one had applied it syst emat ically t o get a complet e pict ure. We were t rying t o det ermine t he t rends. We didn't spend a lot of t ime looking f or exact values. It is one t hing t o agree t hat somet hing is bet t er. But how much bet t er is anot her quest ion. T he answer involves f inding a t rend and asking more quest ions. Is t he design being improved by t hese act ions? How f ast is it improving f or a given amount of change? T he person most responsible f or t his approach was John Boyd.

What were some of the conventions the f ighter maf ia challenged?

Range was associat ed wit h f uel capacit y. High speed was associat ed wit h bigger engines. Technology was associat ed wit h complexit y. Twin-engine designs were considered saf er. Size and cost were associat ed wit h capabilit y. T hese were t he reigning over-simplif icat ions of t he day.

Why were they accepted as truth?

People t end t o f ocus on one part of a given paramet er. You can, f or example, get a higher t hrust -t oweight rat io by increasing t he t hrust . You can also get a higher t hrust -t o-weight rat io by leaving t he t hrust alone and reducing t he weight , which is what we did on t he light weight f ight er. We had t o t ake t his approach because we had t o use a given engine, t he F100, which had been developed f or t he F-15. John Boyd had played a part in def ining t hat engine, and he f elt comf ort able wit h it . So t he engine was f ixed. T hat meant t hat t he t hrust was f ixed. If we want ed a high t hrust -t oweight rat io, we had no choice but t o reduce weight . T he range equat ion can be t reat ed like t he t hrust -t o-weight rat io. T he t ypical approach t o increase range is t o simply increase f uel capacit y. But increasing f uel capacit y increases volume, which means more weight and more drag. People t hink t hat big is bet t er. It 's not . Wit h t he light weight f ight er, we want ed t o achieve our ends t hrough dif f erent means. We increased range by reducing size.

Did those involved in the early days of the lightweight f ighter program take such a historical perspective?
Boyd and Sprey did t wo t hings in t his respect . Sprey collect ed all t he dat a he could get his hands on concerning f ight er aircraf t reliabilit y and ef f ect iveness. T hey also collect ed cost dat a. T hey were t he f irst people I know of who t ook Air Force cost dat a and plot t ed it against t ime.

T hey st art ed wit h t he P-51 Must ang. T he minimum increases in cost in jumping f rom one airplane t o anot her was a f act or of 1.9. T he increases were as high as 3.1 in same-year dollars. T he dat a showed t he increment involved in going t o jet engines, t o swept wings, t o supersonic, missiles, and big radars. It showed t he dif f erence bet ween t his airplane and t hat airplane and t he ef f ect of t hese dif f erences on cost . T he cost per pound of succeeding airplanes went up at t he same rat e as t he overall cost . T his is t rue even f or t he F-16. T hat is, if I plot a curve of cost per pound f or succeeding aircraf t , t he F-16 is right on t he curve. It s increment of cost per pound has gone up t he same as any ot her airplane. However, if I plot a curve of unit f lyaway cost , t he F-16 f alls of f t hat curve. It reversed t he upward t rend in unit f lyaway cost . It was t he only aircraf t t o do t his. So t he way we got t he cost down was by get t ing t he size down. T hat was anot her mot ivat ion f or reducing size.

How was this design approach dif f erent f rom the norm?
We usually rush int o f orm bef ore we really underst and what t he f unct ion is. T hat get s us in t rouble. T he light weight f ight er brought a new perspect ive t o maximum speed and accelerat ion. Everyone want ed airplanes t o go Mach 2 t o 2.5. No one asked why. I had t he opport unit y one t ime when we were working on t he supersonic t ransport t o t rack all t he supersonic f light t ime on t he B-58. We had over one hundred B-58s f lying, and t he most supersonic f light t ime on any one airplane was seven hours. Seven hours. T his was less t han f ive percent of t he t ot al f light t ime. T he ent ire f leet had a t ot al of only 200 hours supersonic. A lot of people equat e f lying t op speed wit h accelerat ion. Big engines, f or t hose set t ing t he requirement s, meant high speed and high accelerat ion. T his is not a t rue relat ionship. Wit h t he F-16, we addressed f unct ion f irst . We asked, what value is derived f rom a given capabilit y?

What was the riskiest portion of your lightweight f ighter design?

T he f ly-by-wire syst em. If t he f ly by wire didn't work, our relaxed st at ic st abilit y wasn't going t o work. And t hen t he airplane would have had higher drag and would have been less responsive, less maneuverable. We had a backup t hat not t oo many people know about . We designed t he f uselage so t hat if t he f ly by wire did not work, we could go back t o a st at ically st able design by moving t he wing back. We had bulkheads in t he f uselage t hat were designed t o carry t he load of bot h placement s of t he wing.

Were other companies looking at f ly-by-wire control systems?

McDonnell Douglas had cont ract s wit h t he Air Force and wit h t he Flight Dynamics Lab f or t est programs f or f ly-by-wire syst ems, relaxed st at ic st abilit y, and t he high-accelerat ion cockpit f or t he F-4. T he t echnology was available, but t hese companies didn't t ake advant age of it . Short ly af t er we won t he f ull-scale development cont ract f or t he F-16, I was invit ed t o give a t alk t o t he St . Louis chapt er of t he American Inst it ut e of Aeronaut ics and Ast ronaut ics. My init ial response was, You must be kidding. You want me t o go int o t he lion's den? McDonnell Douglas did all kinds of advert ising and everyt hing else t hat was ant i light weight f ight er. My immediat e reply was, t hanks but no t hanks.

About f if t een minut es lat er, I got a call f rom Dave Lewis [t hen-chairman of General Dynamics Corporat ion]. He said, Harry, I hear t hat you're giving a t alk on t he F-16 up here t o t hese McAir guys. T hat 's great . I want you t o give t hem hell, and I'm going t o be t here t o see you do it . I called t he AIAA guy back up and said I had second t hought s. A present at ion might be f un. I didn't really t hink t hat . But I'm inf luenced by polit ics, t oo. A couple of days bef ore t he meet ing, t he program chairman said t hat t he chapt er had sold more t icket s t o t hat meet ing t han t o any ot her past meet ing, even meet ings wit h ast ronaut speakers. He said t hey had over one hundred coming f rom McDonnell Douglas alone. You can imagine how I f elt . I gave t he t alk. Af t er about an hour of quest ions and answers, t he program chairman int errupt ed t o let t hose who want ed t o leave, leave. Two hours af t er t hat , t he hot el manager came in t he room and asked us t o leave because t hey had t o set up t he room f or a breakf ast t he next morning. At 2:30 in t he morning, about f if t een McAir guys and I closed t he bar. T hese were t he same people who worked on f ly by wire, relaxed st at ic st abilit y, and t he high-accelerat ion cockpit , all t he t est programs t he Air Force and it s Flight Dynamics Lab had conduct ed f or t he F-4, which McDonnell had t he cont ract f or. Now here's McDonnell building t he F-15, t he world's lat est -great est f ight er, which did not cont ain one of t hese t echnologies. I had 125 McDonnell guys who were more int erest ed in t he F-16 t han t hey were in t heir own F-15 because t hey saw t he f ruit s of t heir labors being incorporat ed in my airplane.

Why didn't they incorporate these technologies?

T he F-15 was very expensive. It had been t went y-f ive years since t he Air Force had had an airsuperiorit y f ight er. It had t aken more t han f ive years just t o get t he program approved. T hey couldn't af f ord t o t ake any risks.

How was it that you could take these risks?

T he cont ract f or t he light weight f ight er prot ot ype was f or a best ef f ort . We did not have t o deliver an airplane, legally. Once we spent our $3 million, we could have piled all t he part s on a f lat bed t railer and said t o Mr. Air Force, here's your airplane. We could f ly t he airplane when we were ready t o f ly it . We pushed f or a f lyable airplane because we were compet ing against Nort hrop. But my point is t hat we were not working against a dif f icult , but arbit rary schedule. And most schedules are arbit rary. Furt hermore, t here was no f ixed f ollow-on. T he airplane was simply a t echnology demonst rat or.

Why was Northrop unwilling to take the risks involved with the new technologies in their prototype f or a lightweight f ighter?
Nort hrop want ed an airplane t o replace t heir F-5. T hey were more int erest ed in sales t o f oreign market s and st ayed very rigid and conservat ive in t heir design because t hey want ed t o be able t o show t heir f oreign market s t he airplane at any point in it s design. We were int erest ed in what t he US Air Force want ed, and we st ayed f lexible in t he design t o respond t o t heir needs. We looked at a number of designs. We wait ed unt il t he very last t o choose t he best one. We could af f ord t o put t hese advanced t echnologies int o t he airplane. We were more apt t o accept t he risk.

A number of companies were caught of f guard by our winning t he light weight f ight er prot ot ype cont ract . T hey were out t here promot ing t heir ideas around t he Air Force. We weren't . We were deliberat ely quiet about what we were doing because we were handicapped wit h a bad reput at ion, t hough quit e undeserved, f rom t he F-111 days. We couldn't brag. Inst ead, we quiet ly did our homework and did it t horoughly. We were ready t o f ly t he light weight prot ot ype on 1 February 1974. We f ound out Nort hrop wasn't f lying unt il June or July. T hat really worried us. We f irst t hought t hat t hey had one-upped us. T heir design is a product ion design, we t hought , not a prot ot ype. In act ualit y, t hey were just behind. One of t he reasons t he Air Force event ually chose our design was t hat it was closer t o a f ull-scale development t han Nort hrop's.

Are you comf ortable with the title "Father of the F-16"?
I'm f lat t ered by it . As it s f at her, I had t he best part , providing t he sperm. Now t he gest at ion period and much of what happened lat er was somet hing else. Ot her people can t ake credit f or what happened t here. My int erest in airplanes is t he ext ernal shape. I'm not t hat int erest ed in what goes inside, except as how it af f ect s t he out side shape.

PART II Of The Harry Hillaker Interview In the f irst part of the interview, you talked about the f ighter maf ias unconventional approach to f ighter design. What were some of the conventions you challenged?
Range was associat ed wit h f uel capacit y. High speed was associat ed wit h bigger engines. Technology was associat ed wit h complexit y. Twin-engine designs were considered saf er. Size and cost were associat ed wit h capabilit y. T hese were t he reigning oversimplif icat ions.

Why were they accepted as truth?

People t end t o f ocus on one part of a given paramet er. You can, f or example, get a higher t hrust -t oweight rat io by increasing t he t hrust . You can also get a higher t hrust -t o-weight rat io by leaving t he t hrust alone and reducing t he weight , which is what we did on t he light weight f ight er. We had t o reduce weight because we had t o use a given engine, t he F100, which had been developed f or t he F-15. John Boyd [a f ight er maf ia member] had played a part in def ining t hat engine, and he f elt comf ort able wit h it . So t he engine was f ixed. T hat meant t hat t he t hrust was f ixed. If we want ed a high t hrust -t o-weight rat io, we had no choice but t o reduce weight . T he range equat ion can be t reat ed like t he t hrust -t o-weight rat io. T he t ypical approach t o increase range is t o simply increase f uel capacit y. But increasing f uel capacit y increases volume, which means more weight and more drag. People t hink t hat big is bet t er. It s not . Wit h t he light weight f ight er, we want ed t o achieve our ends t hrough dif f erent means. We increased range by reducing size.

Innovation requires breaking rules. But organizations are based on rules. How can this f undamental conf lict be overcome to encourage innovation?

It requires an at t it ude. One t hat places subst ance bef ore st yle. We dont mind coming up wit h somet hing t hat s mediocre. We dont st ep on anyones t oes. We dont break any t radit ions. T he easiest way t o change somet hing, unf ort unat ely, is t o have a disast er. You t ake innovat ive approaches when you have t o, when youre f orced t o.

Can companies encourage innovation by tolerating eccentricity in the right places, in places like advanced design departments?
Yes. You shouldnt const rain t he f ormulat ion of a design. Once you have one, you can let t he organizat ion t ake charge t o implement it . But even t hen, you need t o ret ain some f lexibilit y.

Who most inf luenced your career and how did they inf luence it?
Bob Widmer, GDs Vice President of Engineering in Fort Wort h, was my ment or f or much of my career. I learned a lot f rom him. He had vision and encouraged f ree t hinking. He is one of t hose guys wit h a lot of curiosit y. He was always asking why. Bill Diet z was inf luent ial lat er in my career. He was t he best person I ever worked f or. We underst ood each ot hers st rengt hs and skills. We complement ed each ot her nicely during t he light weight f ight er days. Bill recognized my t alent s and let me use t hem. It was one of t he f ew t imes in my lif e t hat I f elt f ree and comf ort able t o go out and do t hings t he way I saw t hem wit hout worrying about what my boss t hought . T hen t heres Ed Heineman. He was t he equivalent of vice president of engineering f or t he corporat ion. Earlier in his career, he was responsible f or t he A-4, t he Heineman Hot rod. He did f or t he Navy wit h t he A-4 what we did f or t he Air Force wit h t he F -16. He brought a lot of his ent husiasm t o t he F-16 program. T here were ot hers who inf luenced my career, people I debat ed wit h f requent ly, John Boyd and Pierre Sprey, t he ot her core members of t he f ight er maf ia. Wit h t hem, I was hearing music t hat I liked, so I danced t o t he beat . To sum up, design approaches - Widmer and Heineman. Working relat ionships - Bill Diet z. Fundament al concept s and approaches f or aircraf t and t heir use - John Boyd and Pierre Sprey.

Boyd and Sprey would later admonish you f or not sticking to the f ighter maf ias original intent summed up by the groups motto make it simple. They f ault the aircraf t f or getting heavy and overloaded with gadgetry. What is your response?
If we had st ayed wit h t he original light weight f ight er concept , t hat is, a simple day f ight er, we would have produced only 300 F-16s, t he same number of F-104s t hat were built . T his is not t o say t hat t heir complaint s are unreasonable. When you load up an F-16 wit h ext ernal f uel t anks, bombs, and an elect ronic count ermeasures pod on t he cent erline, youve doubled it s drag. For someone whos worked all his lif e t o achieve minimum drag, t hat s sacrilegious. Nonet heless, it speaks well f or t he airplane. T he F -16 has f ar exceeded my expect at ions. However, if I had realized at t he t ime t hat t he airplane would have been used as a mult imission, primarily an air-t o-surf ace airplane as it is used now, I would have designed it dif f erent ly.

Is this dif f erence represented by the F-16XL?

Yes. T he F-16XL had a bet t er balance of air-t o-air and air-t o-ground capabilit y. In f act , when I f irst st art ed going t o t he Air Force wit h plans f or t he F-16XL, some of t he Air Force people were so ent husiast ic about it t hat t hey accused me of holding t he design back so t hat we could sell t he airplane t wice. If you know anyt hing about t he hist ory of t he light weight f ight er, you know t hat t his was not t he case. Wit h t he F-16XL, we reduced t he drag of t he weapon carriage by sixt y-t hree percent . T he drag of t he XL wit h t he same f uel and t wice as many bombs is a lit t le over t hirt y percent less t han t odays F16 when you load it up. T his point s up a f allacy t hat has exist ed f or t hirt y years, and Im concerned t hat it may st ill exist . Our designs assume clean airplanes. Bombs and all t he ot her crap are added on as an af t ert hought . T hese add-ons not only increase drag but t hey also ruin t he handling qualit ies. T hey should be considered f rom t he beginning. We ought t o st art wit h t he weapon. T hat s really t he f inal product . We ought t o det ermine what t he weapon is and what it will t ake t o deliver it and t hen do t he airplane. Now, we design t he airplane and smash t he weapon on it .

Is anything being done to address your concerns?

Concurrent engineering, what is also called int egrat ed product development , is supposed t o address t hese concerns. However, I st ill dont see much hope. As a member of t he Scient if ic Advisory Board, Ive learned t hat even wit h concurrent engineering, we re st ill not considering t he weapon up f ront in t he design. T he weapon is not receiving equal considerat ion wit h t he engine, avionics, and ot her major syst ems.

What is your conception of concurrent engineering, and why isnt it being used to address these concerns?
T he primary object ive of concurrent engineering is t o end up wit h a mat ure design, one t hat is closer t o t he f inal product . It s t he kind of t hing t hat says were going t o st art everybody all at once and were going t o be f air. T he basic idea is t o reduce design changes once product ion models are rolling out of t he f act ory. I cant f ault t hat object ive. But I dont t hink it can be achieved by simply glamorizing a process. We wouldnt need t o do t hese t hings if we had t he right at t it ude and dedicat ion t o begin wit h. T he relat ionship bet ween t he Air Force and def ense cont ract ors is also import ant . T he Air Force would be well-advised t o concent rat e on what t o and leave t he how t o t o t he cont ract ors. I t hink you would end up wit h a bet t er, lower-cost product . Furt hermore, t his syst em - concurrent engineering - does not let you select a seed t hat you can cult ivat e. You need a skelet on f rom which t o st art . We now have people working on a project bef ore we know if it s skelet on has sevent een ribs or f our ribs, t hree or t wo arms.

Is concurrent engineering made necessary because people are specializing?

In part . You have t oo many people who want equal part icipat ion, equal considerat ion in t he design process. Too many insist t hat t hey belong in t he f ront row, even when it is more proper f or t hem t o be in t he second row.

Is this approach af f ected by the way engineers are educated?

Every spring I lect ure t o t he senior design class of t he Air Force Academy. T hey are a bright bunch. T here is no quest ion t hat t he kids get t ing out of school t oday are a lot smart er and know a lot more t han t hose of us who got out of school in t he 40s. T he big dif f erence bet ween t hen and now is t hat most of t he st udent s are specialist s. I t hink our hiring pract ices encourage t his. If a guy isnt a specialist , he f eels t hat he wont f it int o an organizat ion.

So, specialization is a problem?

Specializat ion is more of an ef f ect t han a cause. Several t hings are get t ing us in t rouble. One is schedules. Were a dynamic count ry and we want t hings done right now. When we st art a program, we want t o see t hat airplane f ly as soon as possible. As a consequence, everyt hing is driven by a deadline. If we dont f ly t hat airplane by t hat dat e, were in t rouble. Well t ake our chances on whet her it perf orms well or not , but t he f irst wicket is get t ing it up in t he air. Not t he cost . Not t he perf ormance. Most people assume t hat lengt hy development t imes increase cost . T hat s a f alse assumpt ion. You dont necessarily save money by short ening development t ime. It s what you do during t he development t ime t hat mat t ers. T hat get s t o t he heart of my concerns about concurrent engineering and int egrat ed product development . We want t o bring everyone on board right away t o avoid problems lat er on. But you cant have t hirt y-t hree engineers run t hrough one door at t he same t ime. You have t o queue up in some f ashion. I will end up wit h a bet t er and cheaper product if you let me add six or nine mont hs ont o a schedule and give me some t ime t o sit back and cont emplat e what Ive done. Our programs, wit h t heir t ight schedules and payment s condit ioned on meet ing t hose schedules, just dont allow us t o do t hat . I know of no airplane f lying t hat didnt go t hrough an addit ional phase of development . For example, af t er building t he f irst eleven F-l11s, we f ound out t hat it was not right . T he design needed some changes. So t he next airplanes were changed. T hose f irst eleven airplanes were really prot ot ypes, t hough t hey werent done under a f ormal prot ot ype cont ract . T he F -15 went t hrough t he same sort of t hing. McDonnell built so many, t hen t hey changed t hem. People dont go back and examine t he hist ory of t hese programs. You always have a cert ain number of product ion planes t hat never make it t o t he operat ional unit s.

Did those involved in the early days of the lightweight f ighter program take a historical perspective?
Boyd and Sprey did t wo t hings in t his respect . Sprey collect ed all t he dat a he could get his hands on concerning f ight er aircraf t reliabilit y and ef f ect iveness. T hey also collect ed cost dat a. T hey were t he f irst people I know of who t ook Air Force cost dat a and plot t ed it against t ime. T hey st art ed wit h t he P-51 Must ang. T he minimum increases in cost in jumping f rom one airplane t o anot her was a f act or of 1.9. T hey were as high as 3.1 in same-year dollars. You can see t he increment involved in going t o jet engines, t o swept wings, t o supersonic, missiles, and big radars. You could see what was dif f erent bet ween t his airplane and t hat airplane and it s ef f ect on cost .

T he cost per pound of succeeding airplanes went up at t he same rat e as t he overall cost . T his is t rue even f or t he F-16. T hat is, if I plot a curve of cost per pound f or succeeding aircraf t , t he F-16 is right on t he curve. It s increment of cost per pound has gone up t he same as any ot her airplane. However, if I plot a curve of unit f lyaway cost , t he F-16 f alls of f t hat curve. It reversed t he upward t rend in unit f lyaway cost . It was t he only aircraf t t o do t his. So t he way we got t he cost down was by get t ing t he size down. T hat was anot her mot ivat ion f or reducing size.

Has this approach been taken f or aircraf t f ollowing the F-16?

Weve done a pret t y good job on improving reliabilit y, but we havent on cost . Im at issue wit h t he Air Force at almost every SAB meet ing I at t end on cost and af f ordabilit y. In every present at ion, t hey t hrow out t he words af f ordable and low cost . When I ask t hem t o show me what t heyre doing t o keep cost s low, t hey cant point t o anyt hing. T hey just say t heyre going t o make it low cost . As much as I t hink t hings are a mat t er of at t it ude, heres a case where at t it ude alone is not going t o get you where you want t o go. You must incorporat e cert ain f eat ures t o have low cost . Im concerned t hat were only salut ing t he f lag when it comes t o low cost . I dont see anyt hing specif ic being done. T here are a f ew except ions t o t his. But t hese are relat ively small.

How can af f ordability be addressed in aircraf t design?

As an example, we can get rid of more of t he hydraulic and mechanical syst ems. We can make planes more elect ric and, of course, smaller.

You said earlier that specialization is more of an ef f ect of tight schedules than a root problem. How has an overemphasis on schedules resulted in specialization?
People argue t hat we need reliabilit y engineers because design engineers arent paying enough at t ent ion t o reliabilit y issues. T hat s not t rue. Design engineers are int erest ed in reliabilit y. But t hey just arent given t he t ime t o t hink about it . T he schedule doesnt allow it . T hey can only address so many t hings bet ween now and next Tuesday when t heir design is due. It s not because t hey dont want t o, or cant . T hey just dont have t he t ime. So we creat e reliabilit y groups, parade t hem over here, and give t hem t heir own vice president s . Now t he designer has even less reason t o address reliabilit y because t here is t his ot her group t hat does t his. Pret t y soon, you have reliabilit y engineers t alking t o reliabilit y engineers. Like t he t ight schedules, our increased size is also get t ing us in t rouble. For t he light weight f ight er, we had a small group. We had one maint ainabilit y engineer and one reliabilit y engineer, not a huge organizat ion or organizat ions devot ed t o reliabilit y and maint ainabilit y. Again, t his get s back t o schedules. All our ef f ort s on int egrat ion wit hin t he organizat ion seem t o have t he opposit e ef f ect : t hey have pulled us apart int o lit t le f act ions.

You seem to be dissatisf ied with integration attempted f rom within an organization. Can external f actors lead to integration?

St ealt h requirement s do t his. To be st ealt hy and t o f ly supersonic supercruise, you have t o carry weapons int ernally. So you have t o consider t he weapons up f ront . T hat benef it s t he design t o some degree, but t he approach t ends t o produce big airplanes. T hen you also have t he problems involved in get t ing weapons out of a cavit y at supersonic speeds. Technology it self may have an ef f ect . Wit h t odays comput er syst ems, we have a bet t er chance of int egrat ion because t heyre changing t he way we communicat e One of t he problems weve had over t he years has been our principal vehicle of communicat ion - a drawing. Wit h a drawing, coordinat ion can only come about by t wo means. Eit her people gat her around t he drawing t o see what was going on or t hey t ake t he drawing and copy it and pass it around. Bot h of t hese are int rusive and int erf ere wit h t he designer. A comput er drawing, on t he ot her hand, can be immediat ely t ransf erred t o ot her comput ers, t o ot her places, wit hout int errupt ing t he person doing t he work. So, t echnology may bring about new ways of organizing engineering groups.

With the lightweight f ighter, you seemed to have disregarded the organization. You worked outside of it, or at least out of its sight. Two questions: Is this an accurate observation? Could it be repeated today?
I dont t hink t oo many people wit hin t he company were aware of what was going on f or a long t ime. It was t hree or f our years bef ore anyone out side of Bob Widmer and one or t wo ot her people knew what we were doing. In answer t o your second quest ion, I ref er t o t he prot ot ype phase of t he light weight f ight er as a Camelot - a bright , shining era t hat will never ret urn. Nobody t old me t o st art working on t he airplane. I just did. I could because of t he environment t hat exist ed at t he t ime. Nobody t old me t o do it . Nobody t old me t o st op. T he syst em was such t hat it would let me do it . Today, were more concerned wit h st yle inst ead of subst ance. You couldnt do it t oday because it would look wrong. We have t oo many cont rols. Socalled cont rols. I dont t hink t hey really cont rol t hat much. If t hey did, I dont t hink CD would have run int o what it did wit h t he A-12. On t he light weight f ight er prot ot ype, t he ent ire SPO [Syst em Program Of f ice] consist ed of f ive people. Five people were just enough where you could have hands-on, f ace-t o- f ace cont rol, not paper-t o-paper cont rol. We had several advant ages. T he Air Force got exact ly t he same dat a, in t he same f ormat , as we prepared it , in virgin f orm. T he inf ormat ion didnt have t o go t hrough various cycles t o meet some milit ary f ormat . And it didnt go t hrough a bunch of approval cycles. T he way our engineer prepared it was t he way t he SPO engineer saw it . Because we didnt have t o go t hrough all t his f ormalizat ion, t hey also got t o see it a lot sooner.

What brought about all this f ormalization?

A great er degree of dist rust . T he overemphasis on schedules and t he specializat ion problem I ment ioned earlier. Also t he relat ionship t oday bet ween t he milit ary and indust ry is more adversarial, less personal. T he result is a f ormal syst em t hat insulat es engineers f rom t heir count erpart s on t he ot her side. We dont have t hat f ace-t o-f ace cont act t hat I ment ioned. We are rarely asked t o communicat e wit h people out side our own group, let alone our own company.

As your st ruct ure becomes more complex, you lose t hat personal cont act . Back in t he B-58 days, t he people working f or Bob Widmer were all locat ed in t he same place. We could see each ot her. Our of f ices were next t o each ot her. Wed f ind ourselves in big shout ing mat ches. We werent concerned about using direct language because we were close. We knew who we were t alking t o. When we were t hrough shout ing, we knew where we were going and why we were going in t hat direct ion. Today, you dont have shout ing mat ches. Because of t his, you dont know t he background t o t he decisions being made. T his is a result of our size and complexit y. T he f ormalizat ion also has a lot t o do wit h t he at t it ude of management . Management involves a lot of give and t ake. While engineers t end t o t hink more in t erms of black-and-whit e decisions, management does not usually involve problems wit h black-and-whit e answers. T hat s one reason good engineers dont necessarily make good managers. Some managers just want t o dict at e. T hey never get out of t heir of f ices and t alk t o t heir employees. T hat s what we miss most , t hat f ace-t of ace cont act . Were in a cult ure or an era in our cult ure in which we dont value cont ent ion. We place a great er value on conf ormit y. Inst ead of asking what s good f or t he company, which ref lect s on what is good f or t he cust omer, people are more of t en asking what s good f or t heir own personal pursuit s. Some people base t heir decisions ent irely on what t hey t hink t heir boss want s t o hear. In t he early days of t he F-16, our energy was f ocused on t he airplane. We had t o promot e our design. We had t o promot e not only t he airplane, but also t he concept behind it . We were breeding a t horoughbred, but t hat t horoughbred wouldnt do any good if t here wasnt a race f or it t o ent er. T hat s somet hing CD was very good at , t hat is, promot ing t he concept behind a plane, seeing t hat it f ulf illed an Air Force need. Today, Im not so sure companies do t hat . I dont t hink t hey have t he people who look t hat f ar int o t he f ut ure. T heyre more concerned wit h near-t erm problems and personal pursuit s. We have t oo many people t hinking about how t hey are going t o come out in pursuit of somet hing as opposed t o how t he company will come out . Now I dont really f ault t hem f or t he pursuit of t heir personal int erest s. For me, t he companys int erest s and my int erest s have always coincided. As a company grows, however, t hat basic relat ionship can be lost .

What part does communication, or lack of communication, play?

One of our biggest def iciencies t oday is not being able t o art iculat e our ideas and our t hought s. T he best idea in t he world isnt wort h a hoot if I cant explain it t o you clearly and wit h some conf idence. Most engineers do not communicat e well.

Why not?
Most report s are writ t en t o sat isf y an aut hor or a requirement , not an audience. We need t o make sure t hat what were saying is what our audience is hearing. T hat usually requires a second st ep. What ever you writ e and what ever you say should be t ailored t o your audiences background and int erest s. You have t o consider your audience, and you have t o know how t o consider your audience. More import ant ly, you have t o believe in somet hing in order t o art iculat e it . Today, it is harder f or people t o assess t heir roles in an organizat ion because organizat ions are so large and because t here are so many specialt ies. T his uncert aint y makes it more dif f icult t o have convict ions. It makes it more dif f icult t o be conf ident .

I always knew where I st ood wit h t he people I worked f or. It s ext remely dif f icult t o work f or people who never t ell you what t heyre t hinking. Id much rat her work f or someone who crit icizes me t han someone who says not hing. When you hear not hing, you t end t o assume t he worst . Our educat ion and t raining play an import ant role, t oo. What lit t le report writ ing we get in school, f or example, usually discourages t he use of act ive voice. T his pract ice is of t en reinf orced at work. Act ive voice requires a subject . When you associat e yourself wit h your subject , you are more likely t o f eel more responsible f or what you writ e. It s easier t o express conf idence. T he proposal f or t he light weight f ight er was writ t en in act ive voice. We used act ion t it les on all our f igures, and we t hrew out a f ull t hird of t he f igures t hat various people submit t ed f or t he proposal because t hey could not come up wit h an act ion t it le. Our rat ionale was t hat if you cant t hink of an act ion t it le f or a f igure, t hat f igure doesnt say anyt hing. It doesnt convey a message.

How was the proposal received by the Air Force?

When you submit a proposal, you normally send a t eam t o Dayt on t o t he Aeronaut ical Syst ems Division t o be on hand t o answer quest ions. I went up t here leading a t eam of about t en people. We sat around f or a long t ime and received only a couple of t rivial quest ions. At t he same t ime, our f our compet it ors were get t ing swamped wit h quest ions. We were pret t y let down by t his. We f igured our proposal wasnt good enough f or t hem t o ask us any quest ions. We t hought t hey just werent int erest ed. Like I ment ioned earlier, when you hear not hing, you assume t he worst . We assumed t he worst . It t urns out we were wrong. We won t he compet it ion f ar and away. We learned lat er t hat t hey didnt have any quest ions because t he proposal was so clear and concise. It t urned out t o be a classic. T he ASD said t hat it was t he best proposal it had ever seen. General Dynamics and ot her companies subsequent ly used t he proposal as a model.

What made your proposal so good?

One reason it was so good was t hat it was limit ed t o f if t y pages. Most proposals sound like t hey were writ t en by a lot of people. T he f if t y-page limit allowed me t o make it sound like one person wrot e it . I received t he f ourt h draf t and rewrot e t hat several t imes unt il it sounded right . T he page limit also allowed all t he evaluat ors t o see t he same t hing. It was so small, you couldnt split it up like t hey do wit h mult ivolume proposals.

How has the way proposals are evaluated changed since that time?
I came f rom an era when, by and large, t he most import ant f act or in a proposal was t echnical excellence. Today, you cannot win on t echnical aspect s. You can, however, lose on t echnical aspect s. T here are ot her considerat ions - like polit ics and cost . Back t hen, you could of f set a higher cost if you could show t echnical superiorit y over your compet it ion. But now youre judged t o be t echnically accept able or unaccept able. So everybody is normalized. Today, cost and polit ics playa much larger role.

T his approach diminishes t he advant ages of t echnically superior companies like General Dynamics. In my mind, GD is f ar superior t o any ot her company in f ight er aircraf t design, wit h t he possible except ion of McDonnell Douglas. Id say GD and McDonnell Douglas are about equal, but not equal in t he same sense. McDonnell Douglas does some t hings bet t er t han GD, and GD does some t hings bet t er t han McDonnell Douglas. But t he syst em f or evaluat ion no longer account s f or t hese dif f erences. It wipes t hem out . T hat s not good. T he syst em inhibit s companies f rom t aking t echnological risks.

Has the system changed, become normalized, because there are f ewer people who are capable of making these highly technical distinctions?
No, I dont t hink t hat s t he reason. In my recent work wit h t he Scient if ic Advisory Board, part icularly wit h people at t he Air Forces f light dynamics and aero-propulsion laborat ories, Ive met some ext remely qualif ied people. Id say t hat t hese people have more experience t han most people in indust ry because t hey are exposed t o what is going on at six or seven companies. A General Dynamics employee, f or t he most part , can only see what goes on at General Dynamics. I t hink t he government is capable of giving us good t echnical evaluat ions. T he reason behind t he changes get s back t o dist rust . We seem t o be consumed wit h all t he st andards and et hics.

Your current activities seem to concentrate on aerospace systems of the f uture. Do they include space?
A short t ime ago, at an SAB luncheon, I was seat ed next t o Dr. Edward Teller. He was preparing f or a t alk t he next day t o Space Command in Colorado Springs and asked me if I had anyt hing t o add t o his present at ion. I was quit e f lat t ered by his request , but I gave him my t rue f eelings. I t old him t hat our unsolved problems right here on eart h - pollut ion, educat ion, and povert y - seemed t o out weigh t he import ance of space project s. Aha, he said, t hose are t he very t hings t hat I want t o address t hrough t he use of space. He t alked about a syst em of space-based sensors t hat would provide cont inuous dat a on t he origins of acid rain, f looding, weat her pat t erns, and a host of ot her t hings t hat impact on our well being. I can now see t he pot ent ial f or some direct benef it t o t he inhabit ant s of t his increasingly ravished planet . Bef ore I get int o t rouble, I should quickly add t hat my at t it ude on space does not carry over int o hypersonic vehicles, such as t he Nat ional Aerospace Plane, which, by my def init ion, is a t ransat mospheric vehicle, not a space vehicle. I am a st rong support er of hypersonics.

What is the biggest challenge f acing todays aerospace engineers?

T here is no quest ion in my mind t hat f ly-by-wire made aircraf t design much easier. Bef ore f ly-bywire, you had a big debat e about whet her t o conf igure airplanes f or perf ormance or f or f lying qualit ies. Wit h f ly-by-wire, bot h sides are happy. T he t radeof f has been eliminat ed. Lockheeds F-117 St ealt h is an ext reme example. T he plane represent s everyt hing you would not do f or bot h perf ormance and f lying qualit ies. But t he design works because it has a f light cont rol syst em t hat is a direct descendant of t he F-16s f light cont rol syst em.

T he answer t o your quest ion goes back t o communicat ion. Our biggest challenge relat es t o int egrat ion and int erf aces. T here is no one person t oday t hat can, wit hin his own discipline, come up wit h a decent syst em. We may have seven engineers working on a syst em. T hey might t alk t o each ot her. And even when t hey do communicat e well, t hey dont really underst and what impact t heir f unct ion has on anot her f unct ion. You will always have t he problem of get t ing people t o work t oget her. Eric Hehs is the editor of Code One.