Globalization and the Study of International Security Author(s): Victor D. Cha Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol.

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? 2000 Journalof PeaceResearch, lvol 37, no. 3, 2000,pp. 391-4(03 Oaks, (London,Thousand Sage Publications CA and New Delhi) [0022-3433(200005)37:3; 391-403; 0126321

REVIEW ESSAY

Globalization and the Study of International Security*

VICTOR D. CHA
Department of Government and School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
In spite of the plethora of literatureon security and globalization, there is relativelylittle work written by securityspecialiststhat interconnects the two. In the case of securitystudies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the 'foodfight' of competing realist,liberal,and constructionist researchprograms. In the case of the globalization literature,it has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globalization.'lThis essay explores how the processes ofglobalization have fundamentallychanged the way we think about security.It argues that nonphysical security,diversificationof threats,and the salience of identity are key effects of globalizationin the securityrealm. Tlhesesecurityeffects translateinto certain behavioraltendencies in a state'sforeign First,globalizationcreatesan interpenetration policy that have thus farnot been studied in the literature. of foreign and domestic ('intermestic) issues such that national governments increasinglyoperate in spaces defined by the intersection of internaland external security.Second, globalizationputs unprecedented bureaucratic innovation pressureson governments in their searchfor security,and createsmultilateralistpressures to cooperate with substate and transnationalpartnersrather than traditionalallies. Third, globalization makes the calculation of relative capabilitiesextremely complex and non-linear. Finally,globalization compels contemplation of new modes of fighting as well as renders commonly accepted modes of strategicthinking and rationaldeterrenceincreasinglyirrelevant.The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasinglyin the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres:globalization and national identity.

Introduction
At the threshold of the 21 st century, two topics have dominated the study of international relations in the USA: globalization and the 'new' security environment after the end of the Cold War. The latter has been the object of intense debate, largely dominated by those arguing about the relative importance of structural, institutional, and cultural variables for explaining the likelihood of global or

regional peace.1 The former dynamic has been discussed so widely in scholarly and popular circles that it has reached the ignoble status of 'buzzword', familiarly used by many to refer to some fuzzy phenomenon or trend in the world, but hardly understood by any.2 This essay explores how the processes of globalization have fundamentally changed the way we think about security. In spite of the plethora of literature on security and
1 'I'he works here are too numerous to mention. See Lebow & Risse-Kappen (1995); Brown (1995, 1996); Katzenstcin (1996b); L,ynn-Jones (1993); Buzan et al.

* Thanks to Samuel Kim, Robert I,ieber and Robert Gallucci for comments and Balbina Hwang for research assistance.

(1997b).
2 For a recent insightful work in the non-academic litera-

ture, see Friedman (1999).

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Ac RES Rm3s E ARCH journal of PTR globalization, there is relatively little work written by US security specialists that interconnects the two. In the case of security studies, this has been in no small part because the field remains entrenched in the 'foodfight' of competing realist, liberal, and constructionist research programs. In the case of the globalization literature, this has stemmed from a relatively stronger focus on the social and economic processes of globalization. The 'new' security environment in the 21st century will operate increasingly in the space defined by the interpenetration between two spheres: globalization and national identity.

n 37 / number 3 / maj2000 volume sovereignty in that sovereign choices have to be made to accommodate these interdependent ties. Globalization processes are not just about linkages but about interpenetration. As Guehenno noted, globalization is defined not just by the ever-expanding connections between states measured in terms of movement of goods and capital but the circulation and interpenetration of people and ideas (Guehenno, 1999: 7). It affects not only external sovereignty choices but also internal sovereignty in terms of relations between the public and private sectors (Reinicke, 1997). Contrary to popular notions of globalization, this does not mean that sovereignty ceases to exist in the traditional Weberian sense (i.e. monopoly of legitimate authority over citizen and subjects within a given territory). Instead, globalization is a spatial reorganization of production, industry, finance, and other areas which causes local decisions to have global repercussions and daily life to be affected by global events. Comparisons are often made between globalization at the end of the 20th century and the period before World War I when the developed world witnessed unprecedented high volumes of trade across borders and movements of capital that led to the dissolution of empires and traditional structures of governance. However, these analogies are not accurate because the process of change at the turn of the 20th century was driven by, and had as its final outcome, nationalism and the consolidation of statehood. A century later, statehood and notions of sovereignty are not so much under attack by so-called 'globalization forces' as empires were, but are being modified and re-oriented by them. In short, the nation-state does not end; it is just less in control. Activity and decisions for the state increasingly take place in a post-sovereign space (Reinicke, 1997; Rosenau, 1996). In this sense, globalization is both a boundarybroadening process and a boundaryweakening one (Rosenau, 1996: 251).

Securityand Globalization
Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon.3 It is not an 'event', but a gradual and ongoing expansion of interaction processes, forms of organization, and forms of cooperation outside the traditional spaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takes place in a less localized, less insulated way as transcontinental and interregional patterns criss-cross and overlap one another.4 The process of globalization is analytically distinct from interdependence. The latter, as Reinicke states, denotes growth in connections and linkages between sovereign entities. Interdependence complicates external

3 Sec Held (1997: 253). As Rosenau (1996: 251) writes, 'It

refers neither to values nor structures but to sequences that unfold either in the mind or behavior, to interaction processes that evolve as people and organizations go about their daily tasks and seek to realize their particular goals.'
4 See Mittelman (1994: 427). Or as Goldblatt et al. (1997:

271) note: 'Globalization denotes a shift in the spatial form and extent of human organization and interaction to a transcontinental or interregional level. It involves a stretching of social relations across time and space such that day-to-day actixvities are increasingly influenced by events happening on the other side of the globe and the practices and decisions of highly localized groups and institutions can have significant global reverberations.'

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Much of the literature on globalization has focused on its economic rather than security implications.5 In part, this is because the security effects of globalization often get conflated with changes to the international security agenda with the end of Cold War Superpower competition.6 It is also because, unlike economics where globalization's effects are manifested and measured everyday in terms of things like international capital flows and Internet use, in security, the effects are inherently harder to conceptualize and measure. To the extent possible, the ensuing analysis tries to differentiate globalization from post-Cold War effects on security. As a first-cut, one can envision a 'globalization-security' spectrum along which certain dialogues in security studies would fall. For example, the notion of selective engagement, pre-emptive withdrawal, democratic enlargement, or preventive defense as viable US grand strategies for the coming century would sit at the far end of this spectrum because they are predominantly security effects deriving from the end of bipolar competition rather than from globalization.7 Progressively closer to the middle would be arguments about the 'debellicization' of security or the obsolescence of war which do not have globalization as their primary cause, but are clearly related to some of these processes.8 Also in this middle range
5 Examples of the non-security bias in the US literature on globalization include Mittelman (1994); Goldblatt et al. (1997); Reinicke (1997); Rosenau (1996); Nye & Owens (1998); Talbott (1997); Falk (1997); Ohmae (1993); Held (1997).

would be discussions on 'rogue' or 'pariah' states as this term is a function of the end of the Cold War; at the same time, however, the spread of information and technology exponentially raises the danger of these threats. Similarly, the end of the Cold War provides the permissive condition for the salience of weapons of mass destruction as the Soviet collapse directly affected the subsequent accessibility of formerly controlled substances such as plutonium or enriched uranium. But an equally important driver is globalization because the technologies for creating these weapons have become easily accessible (Falkenrath, 1998). Finally, at the far end of the 'globalization-security' spectrum might be the salience of substate extremist groups or fundamentalist groups because their ability to organize transnationally, meet virtually, and utilize terrorist tactics has been substantially enhanced by the globalization of technology and information. While the US security studies field has made reference to many of these issues, a more systematic understanding of globalization's security effects is lacking.9

Agency and Scope of Threats

The most far-reaching security effect of globalization is its complication of the basic concept of 'threat' in international relations. This is in terms of both agency and scope. Agents of threat can be states but can also be non-state groups or individuals. While the vocabulary of conflict in international security traditionally centered on interstate war (e.g. between large set-piece battalions and national armed forces), with globalization, terms such as global violence and human
x For the seminal work, see Mueller (1989). See also Mandelbaum (1999); Van Creveld (1991). 9 For a more comprehensive and useful characterization of security studies, see Buzan (1997a), although this categorization takes the post-Cold War rather than globalization as its point of departure.

' Representative of works looking at changing definitions of security at the end of the Cold War are Walt (1991); Gray (1992); Deudney (1990); Chipman (1992); Nye (1989); Lipschutz (1995). 7 For debates on selective engagement and pre-emptive drawback strategies, see Layne (1997); Ruggie (1997). Sec also Huntington (1999); Betts (1998). On preventive defense see Carter & Perry (1999). European international relations literature that has looked at the post-Cold War effects of security (as distinct from globalization's effects on security) include Kirchner & Sperling (1998); Leatherman & Vayrynen (1995); Buzan (1997a).

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journal of PEACE RESEARCH security become common parlance, where the fight is between irregular substate units such as ethnic militias, paramilitary guerrillas, cults and religious organizations, organized crime, and terrorists. Increasingly, targets are not exclusively opposing force structures or even cities, but local groups and individuals (Buzan, 1997a: 6-21; Klare, 1998: 66; Nye, 1989; Vayrynen, 1998; Waever et al., 1993). Similarly, security constituencies, while nominally defined by traditional sovereign borders increasingly are defined at every level from the global to the regional to the individual. Or as Buzan (1997a: 11) notes: 'What can be clearly observed is that the state is less important in the new security agenda than in the old one. It still remains central, but no longer dominates either as the exclusive referent object or as the principle embodiment of threat'. Thus the providers of security are still nationally defined in terms of capabilities and resources; however, increasingly they apply these in a postsovereign space whose spectrum ranges from nonstate to substate to transstate arrangements. For this reason, security threats become inherently more difficult to measure, locate, monitor, and contain (Freedman, 1998a: 56; Reinicke, 1997: 134). Globalization widens the scope of security as well. As the Copenhagen school has noted, how states conceive of security and how they determine what it means to be secure in the post-Cold War era expand beyond military security at the national level."? Globalization's effects on security scope are distinct from those of the postCold War in that the basic transaction processes engendered by globalization - instantaneous communication and transportation, exchanges of information and technology, flow of capital - catalyze certain dangerous phenomena or empower certain groups in ways unimagined previously. In the former
10 See Buzan (1997a). For applications, see Haas (1995); (:ha (1997).

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category are things such as viruses and pollution. Because of human mobility, disease has become much more of a transnational security concern.11 Global warming, ozone depletion, acid rain, biodiversity loss, and radioactive contamination are health and environmental problems that have intensified as transnational security concerns precisely because of increased human mobility and interaction (Matthew & Shambaugh, 1998; Vayrynen, 1998; Zurn, 1998). Globalization also has given rise to a 'skill revolution' that enhances the capabilities of groups such as drug smugglers, political terrorists, criminal organizations, and ethnic insurgents to carry out their agenda more effectively than ever before (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1996; Brown, 1998: 4-5; Godson, 1997; Klare, 1998; Rosenau, 1998: 21-23; Shinn, 1996: 38). It is important to note that the widening scope of security to these transnational issues is not simply a short-term fixation with the end of bipolar Cold War competition as the defining axis for security. The threat posed by drugs, terrorism, transnational crime, and environmental degradation has been intensified precisely because of globalization. Moreover, the security solutions to these problems in terms of enforcement or containment increasingly are ineffective through national or unilateral means. 12 Globalization has ignited identity as a source of conflict. The elevation of regional and ethnic conflict as a top-tier security issue has generally been treated as a function of the end of the Cold War. However, it is also a function of globalization. The process of globalization carries implicit homogenization tendencies and messages,13 which in combination with the 'borderlessness' of the
1l For example, the re-emergence of tuberculosis and malaria as health hazards has been related to the development of resistant strains in the South (because of blackmarket abuses of inoculation treatments), which then reentered the developed North through human mobility.

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globalization phenomenon elicits a cultural pluralist response.'4 At the same time, globalization has made us both more aware and less decisive about our motivations to intervene in such ethnic conflicts. Real-time visual images of horror and bloodshed in far-off places transmitted through CNN make the conflicts impossible to ignore, creating pressures for intervention. On the other hand, the hesitancy to act is palpable, as standard measures by which to determine intervention (i.e. bipolar competition in the periphery) are no longer appropriate, forcing us to grope with fuzzy motivations such as humanitarian intervention.

Non-Physical Security
Globalization has anointed the concept of non-physical security. Traditional definitions of security in terms of protection of territory and sovereignty, while certainly not irrelevant in a globalized era, expand to protection of
12 As Matthew & Shambaugh argue, it is not the luxury of the Soviet collapse that enables us to elevate the importance of transnational security but the advances in human mobility, communication, and technology that force us to. See Matthew & Shambaugh (1998: 167). A related example of how security agency and scope have changed is the privatized army. These groups are not a new phenomenon in international politics, dating back to the US revolutionary war (i.e. Britain's hiring of Hessian soldiers) and the Italian city-states (of the 14th century (i.e. the condottiers). However, their salience today is a function of the changes wrought by the globalization of technology. Increasingly, national armies are retooled to fight high-intensity, hightechnology conflicts and less equipped to fight loxv-intensity conflicts in peripheral areas among ethnic groups where the objectives in entering battle are unclear. This development, coupled with the decreasing Cold War era emphasis on the periphery and the absence of domestic support for casualties in such places, has made the 'jobbing-out' of war increasingly salient. See Shearer (1998); Silverstein (1997); Thomson (1996). 13 Examples of homogenization impulses include the diffusion of standardized consumer goods generally from the developed North; Western forms (If capitalism (and not Asian crony capitalism); and Western liberal democracy (not illiberal democracy).

and technology assets. For example, Nye & Owens (1998) cite 'information power' as increasingly defining the distribution of power in international relations in the 21st century. In a similar vein, the revolution in military affairs highlights not greater firepower but greater information technology and 'smartness' of weapons as the defining advantage for future warfare.'5 These non-physical security aspects have always been a part of the traditional national defense agenda. Indeed, concerns about the unauthorized transfer of sensitive technologies gave rise to such techno-nationalist institutions as COCOM during the Cold War. However, the challenge posed by globalization is that the nation-state can no longer control the movement of technology and information (Simon, 1997). Strategic alliances form in the private sector among leading corporations that are not fettered by notions of techno-nationalism and driven instead by competitive, cost-cutting, or cutting-edge innovative needs. The result is a transnationalization of defense production that further reduces the state's control over these activities.16 More and more private companies, individuals, and other non-state groups are the
14 As Falk (1997: 131-132) states, 'The rejection of these globalizing tendencies in its purest forms is associated with and expressed by the resurgence of religious and ethnic politics in various extremist configurations. Revealingly, only by retreating to premodern, traditionalist orientations does it now seem possible to seal off sovereign territory, partially at least, from encroachments associated with globalized lifestyles and business operations'. See also Mittelman (1994: 432); Guehenno (1999: 7); and Waver (1993). 15 These are defined in terms of things such as ISR (intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance), C41, and precision force that can provide superior situational awareness capabilities (e.g. dominant battlespace knowledge; 'pre-crisis transparency'). See Nye & Owens (1998); Cohen (1996); Freedman (1998b); Laird & Mey (1999). Freedman correctly points out that the emphasis on information and technology is not in lieu of, but in conjunction with, superior physical military assets. The former cannot compensate for the latter. See Freedman (1999: 51-52).

information

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H journal of PEACE RES E ARC( producers, consumers, and merchants of a US$50 billion per year global arms market (Klare & Lumpe, 1998). The end of the Cold War has certainly been a permissive condition for the indiscriminate, profit-based incentives to sell weapons or dual-use technologies to anybody. But globalization of information and technology has made barriers to non-state entry low and detection costs high. Moreover, while enforcement authorities still have the benefit of these technologies, two critical developments have altered the equation: (1) Absence of discrimination: over the past two decades, the private sector, rather than the government, has become the primary creator of new technologies, which in essence has removed any relative advantages state agencies formerly possessed in terms of exclusive access to eavesdropping technology, surveillance, and encryption.17 Governments once in the position of holding monopolies on cutting edge technologies that could later be 'spun off' in the national commercial sector are now consumers of 'spin-on' technologies. (2) Volume and variety: the sheer growth in volume and variety of communications has overwhelmed any attempts at monitoring or control (Mathews, 1997; Freedman, 1999: 53).18 As
16 As Goldblatt et al. point out, MNCS now account for a disproportionately large share of global technology transfer as a result of EDI; joint ventures; international patenting; licensing; and knowhow agreements. This means they are more in control of transferring dual-use technologies than traditional states. See Goldblatt et al.

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noted earlier, these phenomena of globalization most dangerously manifest themselves as the threat posed by substate actors with violent intentions. Through the Internet and the privatization of formerly secured national assets (e.g. plutonium or highly enriched uranium), these groups are now able to start substantially higher on the learning curve for building a weapon of mass destruction. Building an inefficient fission weapon capable of killing 100,000 in an urban center or cultivating cultures for biological use is child's play relative to the past (Falkenrath, 1998: 54-55; Carter & Perry, 1999: 151).19 Thus in a globalized world, information and technology increasingly are the currency of non-physical security.

Propositions for Security Behavior

If non-physical security, diversification of threats, and the salience of identity are key effects of globalization in the security realm, then how might this translate in terms of a state's foreign policy? The literature on globalization in both Europe and the USA remains conspicuously silent on this question. Globalization authors might argue that this criticism is inappropriate because it suggests an ideal endstate at which a 'globalized' country should arrive. However, the point here is not to suggest that there will be a single uniform model, but that as globalization processes permeate a state's security agenda, this might be manifested in certain general inclinations and contours of behavior. Put another way, we should observe globalization processes altering in some cases, and

(1997: 277-279). 17 On the growing commercial pressure for liberalization of encryption technology, see Freeh (1997). See also Falkenrath (1998: 56-57); Corcoran (1998: 13). On the growing reliance of the US Defense Department on commercial technological advances compared with the 19501970s, see Carter & Perry (1999: 197-198).
18 The results of this are well known: instantaneous com-

munication by facsimile, cellular phone, satellite phone, teleconferencing, alpha-numeric pagers, e-mail, computer modems, computer bulletin boards, and federal express are the norm. Approximately 250,000 Global Positioning System satellite navigation receivers are sold eachmonthfor commercial use.

19 In the case of biological weapons, effective delivery requires some form of aerosol spray technology. But the point is that such technology, if it were perfected, would most likely be the result of commercial needs and therefore easily available to anyone. In a related vein, Hoffman (1997) has found positive correlations between the spread of information and technology and the lethality of terrorist attacks.

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creating in other cases, new sets of security interests for states.

Intermestic Security
First, the globalization and security literature asserts but does not elaborate how security decisions increasingly take place outside the traditional purview of sovereignty. Globalization creates an interpenetration of foreign and domestic issues that national governments must recognize in developing policy. One example of this 'intermestic' approach to security policy might be an acceptance that the transnationalization of threats has blurred traditional divisions between internal and external security (Katzenstein, 1996a). The obverse would be the frequency with which a state adheres to 'delimiting' security, formulating and justifying policy on the basis of 'national security' interests rather than universal/global interests (Moon Chung-in, 1995: 64). Examples of the former are European institutions such as Interpol, TREVI, and the Schengen Accord, which represent an acknowledgment that domestic issues such as crime, drug-trafficking, terrorism, and immigration increasingly require transnational cooperation. TREVI was composed of ministers of the interior and justice of EC member-states whose purpose was to coordinate policy on terrorism (at Germany's initiative in 1975) and international crime. The Schengen Accords also represented a convergence of internal and external security with regard to common standards border controls, pursuit of criminals across borders, asylum procedures, and refugees (Katzenstein, 1998: 11-14). In Asia, one might see environmental pollution and transnational crime as issues where international and domestic security converge ('Special Focus: China and Hong Kong', 1996). However, in the near future, maritime piracy is the most likely focal point. These are cases where substate actors armed with sophisticated weap-

and ons, satellite-tracking technology, cutting-edge document-forging equipment hijack vessels in the South and East China seas with millions of dollars worth of cargo (Cha, 1998: 51-53; Sullivan & Jordan, 1999). These groups operate transnationally; planning may occur at one destination, tracking of the ship at another, the attack launched from another port, and the cargo off-loaded at yet another port. These acts fall under the purview of local law enforcement, but they are clearly 'intermestic' security issues. The attacks occur in overlapping sovereign waters or international waters, and sometimes receive the tacit consent of governments where the pirated vessels are clandestinely ported. Moreover, if targeted cargos move beyond luxury autos and video cassette recorders to strategic goods such as plutonium, then distinctions between external and internal security and criminal and strategic threats disappear (Falkenrath, 1998; Guehenno, 1999: 11).

Multilateralism
Second, the globalization literature acknowledges that security is increasingly conceived of in post-sovereign, globalized terms, but does not delineate how the modes of obtaining security should change. As noted above, globalization means that both the agency and scope of threats have become more diverse and non-state in form. This also suggests that the payoffs lessen for obtaining security through traditional means. Controlling pollution, disease, technology, and information transfer cannot be easily dealt with through national, unilateral means but can only be effectively dealt with through the application of national resources in multilateral fora or through encouragement of transnational cooperation. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan intimated, US bombing of targets in Sudan in retaliation for terrorist bombings of two US embassies in Africa is a unilateral

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journal of PTEACE(RESEARCH piecemeal approach far inferior to concerted global efforts at denying terrorists sanctuaries, financing, and technology and encouraging their extradition and prosecution.20 Thus one would expect globalized security processes reflected in a state's striving for regional coordination and cooperative security. It should emphasize not exclusivity and bilateralism in relations but inclusivity and multilateralism as the best way to solve security problems. At the extreme end of the spectrum, globalization might downplay the importance of eternal iron-clad alliances and encourage the growth of select transnational 'policy coalitions' among national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and individuals specific to each problem (Reinicke, 1997: 134). In conjunction with multilateralism, globalized conceptions of security should be reflected in norms of diffuse reciprocity and international responsibility. This is admittedly more amorphous and harder to operationalize. While some self-serving instrumental motives lie behind most diplomacy, there must be a strong sense of global responsibility and obligation that compels the state to act. Actions taken in the national interest must be balanced with a basic principle that contributes to a universal, globalized value system underpinning one's own values.

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and migration issues, and law enforcement (Talbott, 1997: 74). In a similar vein, the US State Department's Foreign Service Institute now has a new core course for FSOs on narcotics-trafficking, refugee flows, and environmental technologies (albott, 1997: 75). In May 1998, the Clinton Administration put forward its first comprehensive plan to combat world crime, identifying drug-trafficking, transfer of sensitive technology and WMD, and trafficking of women and children as threats to the USA (EWashington Post, 1998).21 One might also expect to see foreign service bureaucracies placing greater emphasis on international organizations and NGOs in terms of representation, placement, and leadership if these are recognized as the key vehicles of security and politics in a globalized world. Implicit in each of these examples is the trend toward greater specialization in the pursuit of security. As globalization makes security problems more complex and diverse, national security structures need to be re-oriented, sometimes through elimination of anachronistic bureaucracies or through rationalization of wasteful and overlapping ones. In the US system, for example, while combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction is widely acknowledged as a key security objective in the 21st century, various branches of the government operate autonomously in dealing with these threats. Hence, there are greater calls for renovation and coordination to eliminate the overlap, inefficiency, and lack of organization among State, Defense, Commerce, Energy, CIA, and FBI in combating proliferation.22 Another trend engendered by the security challenges of globalization is greater crossA1 The degree to which this is 'spin' or substantive

BureaucraticInnovation
The globalization literature has not done justice to the role bureaucratic innovation plays in response to the new challenges of globalization. On this point, indeed, the literature has not kept pace with the empirics. For example, in the USA, the Clinton Administration created the position of Undersecretary for Global Affairs, whose portfolio included environmental issues, promotion of democracy and human rights, population
20 See comments by President Clinton and UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan as cited in Crossette (1998).

remains to be seen. .2 For a detailed set of recommendations on how to renovate and create institutions to deal with these problems, see Carter & Perry (1999: 143-174). See also Schmitt (1999).

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fertilization between domestic law enforcement and foreign policy agencies. This relationship, at least in the USA (less the case in Europe), is at worst non-existent because domestic law enforcement has operated traditionally in isolation from national security and diplomatic concerns, or at best is a mutually frustrating relationship because the two have neither inclination nor interest in cooperating. States that understand the challenges of globalization, particularly on issues of drug-trafficking, environmental crimes, and technology transfer, will seek to bridge this gap, creating and capitalizing on synergies that develop between the two groups. Foreign policy agencies will seek out greater interaction with domestic agencies, not only on a pragmatic short-term basis employing law enforcement's skills to deal with a particular problem, but also on a longer-term and regular basis cultivating familiarity, transparency, and common knowledge. On the domestic side, agencies such as the FBI, Customs, and police departments (of major cities) would find themselves engaged in foreign policy dialogues, again not only at the practitioner's level, but also in academia and think-tank forums.23 One of the longer-term effects of specialization and cross-fertilization is that security also becomes more 'porous.' Specialization will often require changes not just at the sovereign national level, but across borders and with substate actors. 'Boilerplate' security (e.g. dealt with by 'hardshell' nationstates with national resources) becomes increasingly replaced by cooperation and coordination that may still be initiated by the national government but with indispensable partners (depending on the issue) such as NGOs, transnational groups, and the media. The obverse of this dynamic also obtains.
23 In this vein, it might not be unusual in the future to see

With globalization, specialized 'communities of choice' (e.g. landmine ban) are empowered to organize transnationally and penetrate the national security agendas with issues that might not otherwise have been paid attention to (Guehenno, 1999: 9; Mathews, 1997).

AggregatingCapabilities
The globalization literature remains relatively silent on how globalization processes substantially alter the way in which states calculate relative capabilities. The single most important variable in this process is the diffusion of technology (both old and new). In the past, measuring relative capabilities was largely a linear process. Higher technology generally meant qualitatively better weapons and hence stronger capabilities. States could be assessed along a ship-for-ship, tank-fortank, jet-for-jet comparison in terms of the threat posed and their relative strength based on such linear measurements. However, the diffusion of technology has had distorting effects. While states at the higher end technologically still retain advantages, globalization has enabled wider access to technology such that the measurement process is more dynamic. First, shifts in relative capabilities are more frequent and have occurred in certain cases much earlier than anticipated. Second, and more significant, the measurement process is no longer one-dimensional in the sense that one cannot readily draw linear associations between technology, capabilities, and power. For example, what gives local, economically backward states regional and even global influence in the 21 st century is their ability to threaten across longer distances. Globalization facilitates access to select technologies related to force projection and weapons of mass destruction, which in turn enable states to pose threats that are asymmetric and disproportionate to their size. Moreover, these threats emanate not

the commissioner of New York City Police or the head of the FBI participating in discussions of the Council on Foreign Relations or the Brookings Institution.

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world, traditional modes of deterrence become less relevant. Nuclear deterrence throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, for example, was based on certain assumptions. First, the target of the strategy was another nation-state. Second, this deterred state was assumed to have a degree of centralization in the decisionmaking process over nuclear weapons use. Third, and most important, the opponent possessed both counterforce and countervalue targets that would be the object of a second strike. While this sort of rationally based, existential deterrence will still apply to interstate security, the proliferation of weaponized non-state and substate actors increasingly renders this sort of strategic thinking obsolete. They do not occupy sovereign territorial space and therefore cannot be targeted with the threat of retaliation. They also may operate as self-contained cells rather than an organic whole which makes decapitating strikes at a central decisionmaking structure ineffective. In short, you cannot deter with the threat of retaliation that which you cannot target. Governments may respond to this in a variety of ways. One method would be, as noted above, greater emphasis on the specialized utilization of whatever state, substate, and multilateral methods are necessary to defend against such threats. A second likely response would be greater attention and resources directed at civil defense preparation and 'consequence' management to minimize widespread panic and pain in the event of an attack. A third possible response is unilateral in nature. Governments may increasingly employ pre-emptive or preventive strategies if rational deterrence does not apply against non-state entities. Hence one might envision two tiers of security in which stable rational deterrence applies at the state-state level but unstable pre-emptive/ preventive strategies apply at the state-nonstate level.

from acquisition of state-of-the-art but old and outdatedtechnology. Thus countries like North Korea, which along most traditional measurements of power could not compare, can with old technology (SCUD and rudimentary nuclear technology) pose threats and affect behavior in ways unforeseen in the past (Bracken, 1998).

Strategiesand Operational Considerations

Finally, the literature on globalization is notably silent on the long-term impact of globalization processes on time-tested modes of strategic thinking and fighting. In the former vein, the widening scope of security engendered by globalization means that the definition of security and the fight for it will occur not on battlefields but in unconventional places against non-traditional security adversaries. As noted above, when states cannot deal with these threats through sovereign means, they will encourage multilateralism and cooperation at the national, transnational, and international levels. However, the nature of these conflicts may also require new ways of fighting, i.e. the ability to engage militarily with a high degree of lethality against combatants, but low levels of collateral damage. As a result, globalization's widening security scope dictates not only new strategies (discussed below) but also new forms of combat. Examples include incapacitating crowd control munitions such as blunt projectiles (rubber balls), non-lethal crowd dispersal cartridges, 'stick 'em' and 'slick 'em' traction modifiers, or 'stink' bombs. 'Smart' non-lethal warfare that incapacitates equipment will also be favored, including rigid foam substances, and radio frequency and microwave technologies to disable electronics and communications (CFR Task Force, 1999). Regarding strategy, as the agency and scope of threats diversifies in a globalized

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Conclusion
What then is the 'new' security environment in the 21st century that the globalization/ security literature must strive to understand? It is most likely one that sits at the intersection of globalization and national identity. In other words, as globalization processes complicate the nature of security (i.e. in terms of agency and scope), this effects a transformation in the interests that inform security policy. Globalization's imperatives permeate the domestic level and should be manifested in some very broad behavioral trends or styles of security policy. Manifestations of this transformation are inclinations toward intermestic security, multilateralism, and bureaucratic innovation and specialization. However, it would be short-sighted to expect that all states will respond similarly. In some cases, policies will emerge that directly meet or adjust to the imperatives of globalization, but in other cases the policy that emerges will not be what one might expect to linearly follow from globalization pressures. The latter outcomes are the types of anomalies that offer the most clear indications of the causal role of domestic factors in the 'new' security environment (Desch, 1998: 158-160); however, these alone only highlight national identity as a residual variable (i.e. capable of explaining only aberrations) in the 'new' security environment. One would expect, therefore, that the former outcomes would be as important to processtrace: If policy adjustments appear outwardly consistent with globalization but the underlying rationale for such action is not, then this illustrates that the domestic-ideational mediation process is an ever-present one. The new security environment would therefore be one in which globalization pressures on security policy and grand strategy are continually refracted through the prism of national identity.

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