Chisholm - Referring To Things That No Longer Exist

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Referring to Things That No Longer Exist Author(s): Roderick M. Chisholm Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind (1990), pp. 545-556 Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2214204 . Accessed: 21/11/2012 12:20
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Philosophical 4 Perspectives, Action Theory and Philosophy ofMind, 1990
REFERRINGTO THINGS THAT NO LONGER EXIST

M. Chisholm Roderick BrownUniversity
Introduction Ifwe taketenseseriously and have no illusions with to respect everlasting existence, we should be puzzled abouthowitis that we areabletorefer tothose that butnolonger exist. onceexisted things Itis reasonable tosuppose no longer exists (1) that Socrates and(2) that we mayrefer to him. We may he was thefirst judge,say,that great philosopher todiebydrinking To makea judgment hemlock. about itmight be supposed, someone, istoputoneself into a certain with relation that no longer person. ButifSocrates howare exists, we able to putourselves withhim? intoanyrelation Ofcourse, there areeverso many inwhich we may be related ways to Socrates and to anyother that no longer thing exists. One may resemble injustthesamewaythat Socrates he did.The bywalking voters will American causeGeorge tohavea successor Washington he otherwise would nothavehad.We maythus seemtoreach back into thepast andcausethings that nolonger tochange invarious exist ways. tothings Relating ourselves that nolonger exist andevenacting tobe familiar would And uponsuchthings seem, then, phenomena. ourquestion suchthings but howitisthat is,notwhether occur, just theyoccur. A consideration ofhowitis that werefer towhat no longer exists willshowus howto deal with theother ofrelation types that we seemto bearto suchentities. WhatI willsayis intended to throw
546 / Roderick M. Chisholm light, therefore, notonlyon thenature ofreferring, buton certain fundamental metaphysical questions. Referring to ThingsthatDo Exist The"problem ofreference," as we here understand that expression, refers totheproblem epitomized byWittgenstein's question: "What makes aboutyoua thought mythought about you?"a question that had putin a variety Wittgenstein ofdifferent ways.'Ifwe attempt toformulate an intentional solution tothis problem, as I believe we we willdefend twotheses: must, oftheir (1) itis invirtue structure thatourintentional properties enableus to refer to entities other thanourselves; and (2) we can find out whatthisstructure is by reflecting upon these properties. The approach,therefore, is itpresupposes Platonistic; that are properties there andthat notall ofthem are exemplified. Consider judgment-judging to be such-and-such. something The traditional viewwas thatmaking a judgment involves a relation between a person andwhat hasbeencalled a "proposition." IfI judge thatthereare unicorns, say, thenthereis such a thing as the proposition that there areunicorns. Itwas heldthat this proposition is a kind ofensrationis-athing that is capableofbeing or grasped conceived Andit was also heldthat by rational beings. personslikeyouand me-are rational things As a rational beings. beingI canconceive theproposition that there areunicorns andI canaccept or rejectthisproposition. If I accept it, then,according to the traditional are unicorns. view,I judgethatthere Let us, forthe moment at least,accept thistraditional view: propositions are whatconstitute the content of our intentional attitudes. to thisassumption (I shallreturn below.) The propositional theory, somewhat is this:ifa oversimplified, x accepts theproposition that theonly person that isso-and-so thing is such-and-such, and ifan object that is so-andy is theonly thing x maybe saidtojudgewith so,then toy that it is suchand respect such;and x's judgment, is directed therefore, upony. Thisis how is supposed to be directed myjudgment uponyou.A preliminary oftheintentional formulation be put theory, then, may schematically in thisway:
Exist/ 547 ThatNo Longer Referring to Things thatis G; and (2) x x judgesy to be F =Df (1) y is thething that is G is F. theproposition] thatthething judges[accepts thanit accountmaybe morelatitudinarian Butthispreliminary be. should by Keith one suggested adaptedfrom thisexample, Consider ofthelocalTemperance SupposeI am theChairman Donnellan.2 annualparty. (1) I acceptthe and am attending theUnion's Union of the at is a member thatthe man I am looking proposition that theman (2) I acceptthefalseproposition Union; Temperance a martini whoisdrinking oneattheparty I amlooking at istheonly two (3) putting water intheglass); there is only realize that (I don't I accepttheproposition theonlyone at the that and twotogether, of theTemperance is a member a martini who is drinking party whois drinking a martini and (4) theonlyone at theparty Union; whoisstanding behind theperson at,but is,notthemanI amlooking me. inthesituation insuggesting that, that Donnellan is right I believe was notdirected standing upontheperson described, myjudgment is to him. Yet there with respect behind me;itwas nota judgment to" be saidto have "pointed might a sensein which myjudgment theperson behind me. doesnottellus whatitis tomakea judgment Ourformula, then, Butit does tellus whatit is thatis directed thing. upona certain Letus re-interpret toa certain thing. tomakea judgment that points ofpointing to: as a definition theformula, therefore, to y as an F =Df (1) y is that points DI x makesa judgment thatis G thething thething thatis G; and (2) x judgesthat is F. directed to a thing upony, being A judgment y without may point to y. with respect beinga judgment without with to you,thencertain Ifmyjudgment is a judgment respect I have someinformation havebeen fulfilled. conditions epistemic I stand I am referring to. Thismeansthat aboutjustwhoitis that to theproperty relation by meansofwhich in a specialepistemic theG is F, ifyouare theG,and I then single youout.IfI judgethat forme ifmyjudgment is directed uponyou,thenit is reasonable useofthecomparative epistemic theG exists. Making tobelieve that we may say more than," by "morejustified conceptexpressed
M. Chisholm 548 / Roderick to theG, respect with ifmyjudgment is a judgment that generally judging innot than theG exists that I ammore injudging justified then thattheG exists.3 consider Hencewe might saying: to it thatit is F =Df (1) respect x judgeswith y is suchthat theG exists that in judging y is theG; (2) x is morejustified and (3) x judgesthat thattheG exists; thanin notjudging theG is F. isnotyetsufficiently formulation inthis condition Buttheepistemic the y satisfies a thing mayjudgeinsucha waythat A person rigid. with isnota judgment andyethisjudgment definition ofthis terms is a compound whenthejudgment to y. Thismayhappen respect A thing satisfy ymay identity. a case ofmistaken involving judgment and yetnot be suchthatx makesa of thisdefinition the terms to it. with respect judgment "Theperson I madeattheparty: thecompound judgment Consider a martini and, I am looking at is theonlyone herewhois drinking theheadofthe Union, sincehe is alsotheheadoftheTemperance (We shouldremind a martini." Unionis drinking Temperance in morecomplex are considerably thatmost judgments ourselves inwhich we thanmaybe suggested bythesentences their content meistheonly behind Iftheperson standing them.) express ordinarily a martini andifI havebeenassured whoisdrinking oneat theparty who is justone person at theparty there that on reliable authority definition above would thentheproposed is drinking a martini, to is a judgment with respect myjudgment us to say that require with to the ofme andalso a judgment respect in front theperson formulated aboveis a thejudgment me.Butclearly behind person a judgment ofmeandnot infront with totheperson respect judgment me. behind to theperson with respect Andwhydo we say this? "the different namely, several descriptions: involves Thejudgment "the themartini," at," "thepersondrinking personI am looking The Union." behind me,"and "theheadoftheTemperance person I as anyoftheothers. oftheseis,for me,at leastas justified first thatanyoneof theotherthree in judging am notmorejustified ofthat that than injudging description exists something descriptions exists.
Referring to Things ThatNo Longer Exist/ 549 Whatwe should say,then, is this: D2 y is suchthatx judgeswith respect to itthatit is an F = Df (1) y is theG; (2) x is more justified in judging thatthe thattheG exists; G exists thanin notjudging and (3) x judgesin sucha waythat(a) x's judging includes judging thattheG is F and (b) ifit includes judging that theG is the H, thenx is notmoreiustified in judging thattheH exists thanin judging thattheG exists. Wecould that "follows the leadofthe closest say, then, intentionality Inother ifmy is directed descriptions." words, judgment uponyou, ofall thedescriptions that thejudgment onethat then, involves, you forme as anyoftheothers. fulfill is at leastas justified I canbe said,inthis tohave Onemay "But object: surely example, that he to theheadoftheTemperance Union judgedwith respect is is drinking a martini. Andifthisis thecase, thenyouranalysis mistaken." several Thereply is that mycompound judgment, which includes is not itself identity judgments, directed upon the head of the evenifone ofitscomponent Temperance Union judgments ("The isdrinking a martini") is directed headofthe Temperance Union upon Union.There is, of course,no the head of the Temperance ofthisform: "x is in asserting a statement involved contradiction is F." (Compare: "Thechair notF, butx hasa component that does as thebook,butone ofitscomponents nothavethesameweight as the book"; "The judgment is not nonhas the same weight butone ofitscomponents is non-compound.") compound, of judgment, an Here, then,we have an intentional theory itisthat makes intentional ofwhat a judgment theory my judgment aboutyou. to thequestion ofwhatitis to makea judgment Letus nowturn thatno longer exists. aboutsomething An Intentional Antinomy? ofa possible The Ourproblem maybe putintheform antinomy. hastheproperty ofbeing about thesis wouldbe: "Socrates judged that would be: "Itis false hasthe Socrates byus."Andtheantithesis ofbeing property judgedaboutby us."
550 / Roderick M. Chisholm A. Proof oftheThesis (1) We makejudgments aboutSocrates. Therefore (2) Socrates is judgedaboutbyus. Therefore (3) Socrates hastheproperty ofbeing judged aboutbyus. B. Proof oftheAntithesis no longer exists. (1) Socrates (2) Whatdoesn't existhas no properties. Therefore that (3)Itisfalse Socrates hastheproperty ofbeing judged aboutby us. One might oftheantithesis" put"theproof morebriefly this way: "Socrates can'tbe judged aboutbyus. Whenhe was there tohave theproperty ofbeing judged aboutbyus,we weren't there togive ittohim. Andnowthat we are here togiveittohim, heisno longer hereto receiveit." Some MisguidedApproaches (1) Onepossible moveis todeny thefirst oftheantithesis premise and to say thatSocrates does exist.Thisis suggested by Russell's somewhat of change in the Principles puzzlingdiscussion of Mathematics.4 Russell wrote: is due,ultimately, to thefact [C]hange thatmany terms have relations to someparts oftimewhich theydo nothave to others. Buteveryterm is eternal, and immutable; timeless, therelations it mayhaveto parts oftimeare equally It is merely immutable. thefact thatdifferent terms are related to different times thatmakesthedifference between whatexists at one timeand whatexists at another. And a term it cannot though cease to be; it is maycease to exist, still an entity, which can be counted as one, and concerning which somepropositions are trueand others false. Ifwe taketense and have,therefore, a "robust sense"(to seriously useRussell's ofwhat istemporal, wewill not phrase) seriously suppose that that haveceasedto existmayyet, things continue somehow, to be.
Exist/ 551 Referring to Things ThatNo Longer ofthe (2) Another possible moveis to reject thesecondpremise things do antithesis and to argue, as Meinong did,that nonexistent andonewhich, haveproperties. But this isa most drastic step totake it,we should ask for many ofus,is counter-intuitive. Before taking ofnonexistent that maybe said whether there areother types thing to have properties. Intentional examples("The devilis feared by him")wouldbe of"Pegasus haswings" and"Sherlock question-begging. What, then, ofas intentional Holmes wasa detective"? These, too, may be thought as implying that tolda story to which Pegasus someone according is a detective. has wings or Sherlock Holmes Arethere other that nonexistent things may grounds for thinking from Meinong: have properties? Thereare theexamples is golden. (a) The goldenmountain I am thinking ofis golden. (b) The mountain Itseemsreasonable inthecase of(a) and saythat to follow Russell like thesentence is false.Butwhatof(b)?It is deceptively I am climbing is steep. (c) The mountain in some Depending uponthecontext, we mayputthejudgment suchwayas this: of ofjustone mountain; and I am thinking (b') I am thinking a mountain as beinggolden. oftensed solveourproblem? (3) Willtheintroduction quantifiers In thiscase we might say: "Thereexistedan x suchthatx was tobe judged about move would andx wasgoing Socrates byus."This IfSocrates he wasgoing leave us with ourproblem. was suchthat at somelater time one tobe referred to byus,itwouldfollow that when "Now referred tobyus."But would could heis being sayofhim, thisbe-if Socrates we came intobeing? ceased to be before Tensed Properties modes Ifwe taketenseseriously, three thenwe willdistinguish In other for ofproperties-past, certain and future. words, present there properties (those that one can lose and thentakeon again), and the version willbe thepast-tense thepresent-tense version,
552 / Roderick M. Chisholm future-tense version ofthat property. Hencewe maydistinguish the three properties: walking, having walked andgoingto walk.Most, butnotall, things that are nowwalking haveall three. For many properties, thepresent-tense version-say, walkingwillbe suchthatit can be takenon and thenlostanynumber of times. Thisis nottrueofproperties in themodeofthepast-for example, having walked. Theseareall lostat thesametime-when thesubject ceasestobe.Butthey may be taken onatdifferent times. Andanalogously forfuture-tensed properties-for example, being suchas to be going to walk.Allone'sproperties inthemodeofthe future aretaken onatthesametime-namely, when onecomes into being;buttheymaybe lostat different times. Sincecertain properties havethree temporal modes, there arealso three modesofexemplifying suchproperties: (i) one maybe such thatone has theproperty; (ii)one maybe suchthat one didhave theproperty; and (iii)one maybe suchthatone is goingto have theproperty. Itwillbe objected: "Surely that's multiplying distinctions beyond Wedon't havetosay:'Youdidhavetheproperty necessity. walking.' Weneedsayonly'Youdo havetheproperty walked.' having And, we don't havetosay'Youwill similarly, havetheproperty walking.' We needsay only'You do have theproperty going-to-walk."' Thissuggestion will notdo inthecase ofsubjects haveceased that tobe orhaven't Wecannot yetcomeinto that being. sayofSocrates he has theproperty ofhaving and we cannot walked, say ofyour great grandson that hehastheproperty ofbeing that heisgoing such to walk. we must Moreover, distinguish between "Jones wassuch as tohave walked" and"Jones wassuchas tobe walking." Theformer butnot thelatter could havebeentrue ata time atwhich Jones wasnolonger able to walk. Hencethere are these9 possibilities: (i) x is suchas to be walking [tohave F]; (ii) x was suchas to be walking; (iii) x willbe suchas to be walking; (iv) x is suchas to havewalked[tohave had F]; (v) x was suchas to havewalked; (vi) x willbe suchas to have walked; to have F]; to walk[tobe going (vii) x is suchas to be going (viii)x was suchas to be goingto walk; to walk. (ix) x willbe suchas to be going
Referring to Things ThatNo Longer Exist / 553 Ourordinary languages-not only ordinary English-have difficulty with thedistinction between (ii)and(iv)andthat between (iii) and(ix). Letus say thatone property another property provided implies onlythat thefirst property is necessarily suchthat whatever has it either didhave,does have,or willhavethesecond.I presuppose: (1)walking doesnot imply having-walked; (2)walking doesnotimply going-to-walk; (3) it is logically possible to be walking at thefirst moment ofone'sexistence; and(4)itislogically possible tobe walking at thelastmoment ofone'sexistence. Representing "implies" by" 9", we nownote briefly certain logical relations holding between theselocutions.
(iv) (ii); (v) -* (ii);
(vi)
(viii) [(i) or (ii) or (iii)]; [(iii)and (vii)]. (ix)
(vii)
[(i) or (ii) or (iii)];

(iii);
alsonote Weshould "x hasF' and"x hasG"together that, although "x hasF and G,"no suchconjunctive imply principle holds for the Itis notthecase that"x had F" pastand future modesofhaving. "x had F and G." Andit is notthe and "x had G" together imply "x willhaveF" and"x willhaveG"together "x will case that imply to haveF and G." (Thislastobservation mayseemto do violence we say,ofa ladywhomarried her ourordinary language. Suppose toa clergyman "Shehasbeenmarried deceasedhusband's brother, notnormally andalsotohisbrother." Ourstatement would be taken as an accusation ofbigamy. Butso far as thephilosophical purposes we should notmakesucha statement oflanguage are concerned, iftheladyhad neverbeensuchas to be married to a clergyman and also to hisbrother.) and Future-Tensed Past-tensed Eliminating Quantifiers or ifthere no longer willbe Ifthere that was something exists, don't we needtemporal doesnotyet that something exist, quantifiers have:"There existed a casewe would Insuch torefer tothose things?
an x such that..
willexistan x suchthat .."
.";
"There existsan x such that.. ."; and "There
554 / Roderick M. Chisholm We need onlythepresent-tensed We mayavoidthe quantifier. what tensed properties with we havesaidabout others if wecombine that namely, properties ourPlatonistic assumption: theassumption, are eternal objects. and other abstracta thehemlock andwho Ifthere whodrank oncewasa philosopher will be something-for example, no longer then there always exists, there is a philosopher blue-which oncewassuchthat theproperty oncewassuchthat Andthis something whoisdrinking thehemlock. willbe something that thehemlock. there is drinking Let us say,then: (a) an x suchthat x was F = Df Either D3 Thereexisted exists an x there exists an x suchthatx was F or (b) there there exists a y suchthaty is F. which was suchthat D4 Therewillexistan x suchthatx willbe F = DfEither (a) x willbe F or (b) there exists an there exists an x suchthat x which willbe suchthat there exists a y suchthat y is F. them byreferring thetensed quantifiers, defining Thuswe eliminate to tensed-properties and to abstract objects. Solutionto the Supposed Antinomy to things no longer We maynowsay howitis that we refer that to. for us to refer exist-eventhough there are no suchthings thatwas G thatpoints to thething D5 x makesa judgment and points to it as an F =Df Thereexists which something a existed theG exists; and x judgesthatthere was suchthat y suchthaty was boththeG and an F. to thething D6 x makesa judgment that is meantto point thatwas G and to point to it as an F =Df (1) x makesa thatpoints to it to thething thatwas G and points judgment as an F; and (2) x is morejustified in judging thatthere existed a y suchthat y was theG thanin notso judging. to that points Itis inthis that one can makea judgment way,then, toSocrates; meant topoint Socrates andone can makea judgment there is no relation suchthatI bear one can do thiseventhough exists. no longer that toSocrates andeventhough Socrates relation we mayseemto putourselves What oftheother waysin which exist? intorelations with that no longer things
ThatNo Longer Exist / 555 Referring to Things Wecontemplated a person whoresembles inthat Socrates hewalks did.Sentences oftheform, "x walks exactly thewaythat Socrates this way:"(1)There justthewaythat theG did"maybe explicated there exists something which exists something which wassuchthat in manner F; and(2)x walks inmanner F." is theGandwhich walks that nolonger exist? What happens Andhowdoweactupon things to havea successor he never whenwe cause George Washington there exists something-it couldbe hadbefore? On suchoccasions, thefirst President ofthe theproperty blue-which (a) wassuchthat United Statesdoes exist,(b) whichwas also such thatthe first and(c) which is such President oftheUnited States ceasesto exist, theAmerican voters cause to be the that there is someone whom President oftheUnited States. to be to cease to be? It is for thething Whatis it for something ithasno future-tense as tocomeinto being properties just suchthat "x More properties. exactly, is tobe,such as to haveno pasttensed x is suchthat there isno property is coming into being" tells us that x is P suchthat us that away"tells x didhaveP; and "x is passing P suchthatx is going to have P. is no property suchthatthere An Alternative Approach I havebeensaying are what that What propositions presupposes Analternative is thecontent ofourintentional attitudes. constitute ofpropositions. of properties andnot toview this content as consisting this how I havedefended viewelsewhere andwillnoteonly briefly Giventhis it maybe adaptedto whatI have been saying here.5 we wouldtakeas undefined: alternative approach, it directly ofbeingF is suchthatx attributes The property to y. to y, a property thatifx attributes We wouldpresuppose directly with thenx is identical y. Thenwe couldhave: D7 x indirectly ofbeingF = Df attributes to y theproperty R suchthat: (1) x bearsR onlyto y, (2) x Thereis a relation of theproperty in directly is morejustified attributing R to justone thing thanin notdirectly attributing bearing includes thatproperty, and (3) x's directly attributing directly and to R to justone thing ofbearing theproperty attributing
556 / Roderick M. Chisholm a thing thatis F; and (4) ifit includes the directly attributing property ofbearing R to thething x bearsS to,thenx is notmorejustified theproperty in directly attributing of the bearing S to justone thing thanin directly attributing property ofbearing R to justone thing. D8 x judgeswith respect to y that it is F = Dfx directly or indirectly attributes to y theproperty ofbeingF. D9 x judgeswith respect to thething thatwas G thatit is F =Df (1) Thereexists something which was suchthattheG it is suchthatthere exists; (2) x judgeswith respect to x that exists is something something which was suchthat there in which is theG and an F; and (3) x is morejustified with to x thatit is suchthatthere exists judging respect something which was suchthat theG exists thanin notso judging.
Notes 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 177.Compare alsoWittgenstein's LastWritings on ofChicago the Philosophy ofPsychology, Vol.I (Chicago: TheUniversity Press, 1982): "What makes this sentence a sentence that hastodo with him?" (P. 43). 2. CompareKeithDonnellan, "Reference and Definite Descriptions," Philosophical Review, Vol.LXXV(1966), pp. 281-304. 3. Alternatives tothelocution are"more "more justified than" reasonable I havediscussed than" and"epistemically preferable to." this comparative in detailin Theory ofKnowledge, Edition concept Third (Englewood N.J.:Prentice Cliffs, Hall, Inc., 1989). 1 theretryto show thata is essential tothetheory ofknowledge. comparative epistemic concept 4. See Bertrand of Mathematics, Second Edition Russell, Principles The University (Cambridge: Press,1937), p. 471. AnEssay onReference andIntentionality 5. See TheFirst Person: (Brighton Limited andTheUniversity ofMinnesota andMinneapolis: Harvesters Press,1981).

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Philosophical 4 Perspectives, Action Theory and Philosophy ofMind, 1990

REFERRINGTO THINGS THAT NO LONGER EXIST

(viii) [(i) or (ii) or (iii)]; [(iii)and (vii)]. (ix)

[(i) or (ii) or (iii)];

willexistan x suchthat .."

"There existsan x such that.. ."; and "There

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