The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation Author(s): Rex Brynen Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 24, No.

3 (Spring, 1995), pp. 31-43 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2537878 . Accessed: 01/03/2014 18:31
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THE DYNAMICS OF PALESTINIAN ELITE FORMATION

REX BRYNEN

The signing oftheOslo Accordbetween Israeland thePalestine LiberationOrganization (PLO) in September 1993 generated important questions regarding political inclusion and thedynamics ofeliteformation.WiththeCairo Agreement ofMay 1994, Israeliwithdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA), thesequestionshave becomeeven sharper. Who occupies what in theemerging ofauthority PA?To whatextent willpolitical positions the democratic elitesbe held accountable, whether through process for an elected Palestinian (theCairoAgreement's provisions legislature) or through ofother themediation actorsand institutions (a free press, Paltheoffice ofa Palestinian and a watchful and vibrant ombudsman, theinstituestinian civilsociety)? How are elitecleavages to affect likely administrative and policychoicesofthePA? tionalization, development, Particular attention has been focussedon the personalleadership chairman of thePLO and now "President" of the styleofYasirArafat, PA.Arafat has beencriticized for centralizing decisionmaking, rampant Rex Brynen is associateprofessor ofpolitical scienceat McGillUniverThe author wishesto thank Montreal. theSocial Sciencesand Husity, manities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds FCAR, McGill and theInter-University for ArabStudies(MonConsortium University, in theresearch of and writing ofthisarticle, treal)for support portions whichwill appear in Louis Cantori, ed., The Politics of Inclusion and Westview Exclusion (Boulder: Press,forthcoming).
StudiesXXIV,no. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 31-43. Journal of Palestine

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and allowing administration, ofthePalestinian in thestaffing cronyism caeffective without ofthePLO and thePAto languish theinstitutions "cabinet"of the PA-thetwenty-four-member pacity.The centerpiece as Uncertain stillunfilled. portfolios withseveral remainsincomplete, about the Oslo to how much powertheymightenjoy(and doubtful haverefused personalities Palestinian prominent several processitself), overpolicy,have lack of influence by their frustrated to join.' Others, and competewithone proliferate Local offices to resign.2 threatened statusand to establishlinkswithexternal anotherto claim "official" and ReconCouncilfor Development Economic donors.The Palestinian conduitfor establishedas the primary (PECDAR)-initially struction comaid pledgedby theinternational the $2.4 billionin development and politbetweentechnocrats by tensions afflicted first munity-was by the marginalized ical appointees,and now appears increasingly confuadministrative Palestinian of regularPA ministries. emergence Palestinassistance. has further slowedinternational sion and paralysis in autonomy (NGOs) fearfortheir organizations ian nongovernmental and politicalcoopcentralization administrative the face of potential have essentially givenup in numberof NGO activists tion;a growing and his negotiating leadership style ofbothArafat's Critics frustration. movement" calling a in loose "democracy tacticshavejoined together elecof the date promised reform. Meanwhile, forfundamental political stalled unclear amid remains and Bank Gaza Strip the West tions in negotiations. Palestinian-Israeli abovebut willnotseekto addressall theissuespresented Thisarticle Palestinian politicsmight of contemporary will explorehow analysts litertheexisting itwillcritically review In particular, aboutthem. think forthestudy and assess its utility eliteformation, atureon Palestinian self-government. of Palestinian of theemerging dynamics

Elites Palestinian Conceptualizing

difelitetypesin very Palestinian scholarshaveunderstood Different can those views this however, analysis, ways.Forthepurposesof ferent (emperspectives primordialist majorcategories: be groupedintothree social social traditional perspectives change formations), phasizing ofnew social groups),and organizational theemergence (emphasizing monationalist of Palestinian thedynamics (emphasizing perspectives emis providedby a statist perspective category bilization).A fourth phasizingtheimpactof stateinstitutions. Primordialist Perspectives in Palestinian argues forcontinuity The primordialist perspective elitestructure remains, despite thattheunderlying suggesting politics, the hamula(clan) and leadingnotable the changein outwardform,

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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION

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families.3 This is true, it has been suggested, notonlyin theWestBank and Gaza, butalso amongtheexiledleadership ofthePLO.4The analysis further suggests thatregional, religious, and family rivalries remain theprimary axes of cleavagewithin Palestinian politics. It is difficult to sustainsuch a perspective in lightof the dramatic changesin theeconomicand political situation of Palestinians during thepast century.5 As elsewhere in thedeveloping world, growing integration intoglobalmarkets disrupted established patterns oftradeand production and generated new ones. In so doing,old social bonds and groupswereweakened, whileothers grew moreinfluential. In Palestine, this effect was compoundedby politicaldevelopments thatprior to 1948 led to a declinein thepowerofruralshaykhs (theconsequenceof thereforms ofthetanzimat period,as wellas ofgrowing urbanization); theentrenchment ofa class ofland-owning urbannotables(reinforced by their"capture" of local government councilsunderthe Ottomans, and theirsubsequentinteraction withthe British); and the growth in thecoastalareas ofa professional/entrepreneurial group(sustainedby urbanization, trade, and the expansionof small-scale manufacturing). Bythelatter partofthemandate, urbannotables-notably al-HajjAmin al-Husayni-dominated thenationalist movement. This elitestructure was severely disrupted by the establishment of Israel: Urban notables foundtheirpowerweakenedboth by loss of lands and by their politicalfailures, and much of the entrepreneurial elitewas exiled.In Gaza, administrative control restedin thehands of Egyptian military authorities, leaving onlya narrow rolefor supporting In theWestBank, local elites. rulefocussed on coopting indiJordanian thenotableclass as vidualnotableswhileat thesame timefragmenting a whole by emphasizing and rivallocal interests (and manipulating) ries.Although theexpansionofeducation led to thegrowth ofpotential middle-class challengers (oftensupporting pan-Arabist politicalagenwas suppressed whenever bytheHashemite regime das), thischallenge some of In therefugee necessary. campsofJordan, Lebanon,and Syria, was reprothe pre-1948 elite structure thatit provided duced,and-to theextent an immediatesocial supportnetwork- New structures created by At the same time,how- thePLO after evenreinforced.6 1969 thesewereundermined ever, bynewstruc- competedwithand local overlapped tures ofeconomicsurvival previous (UNRWA, labor force participation,migration), hierarchiesof class and which gave ancien elites littlematerial social control. overtheir former In control subordinates. Lebanonin particular, theestablishment funcof quasi-administrative tionsbythePLO after newstructures, controlled 1969 created bya new social behaviorand distributing resources.These elite,forregulating

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previoushierarchies of simultaneously competed withand overlapped class and social control.7 Withthe occupationof theWestBank and Gaza in June1967, furtherfragmentary forces wereunleashed.Israelsoughtto make continof social ued use of Jordan'sestablishedstructures and strategies Jordanian coopercontrol, often withtacit(and sometimes substantial) ation. But Israel was less able thanJordanhad been to controlthe These changessustainedby shifting patterns ofeconomicproduction. peasantsand refugee includedthe proletarianization of marginalized Israel;continued populations, often in theform ofcasual laborwithin expansionofeducation and an educatedmiddleclass,and longer-term labormigration generated newsources outsidePalestine (whichin turn of family All of thisfurther weakincomein theform of remittances). municipal leaders.In ened thepoweroflocal notablesand conservative to thesesocioeconomic addition theriseofPalestinian nationalforces, regime in 1970-71 ismand itsbloodyconfrontation withthe Jordanian weakenedpro-Hashemite further leaders.As the 1976 WestBank muPalestinian nationalism itselfbecame nicipal electionsdemonstrated, available itsproone ofthemostimportant resources, allowing political to mobilize mass constituencies (PLO and ponents and access external new avenuesof eliterecruitment-namely, This created Arab)support. on traditional statusor connationalist activism-not wholly dependent to thenationalist Commitment trolovereconomicproduction.8 struga counterweight to thefragmented localismamongelites gle provided underIsraeli)rule. promoted underJordanian (and, less successfully, elitescreamongnationalist Atthesame time, ideologicalfactionalism lines of other ated important cleavage. altered thissituIn the1980s other, largely political, changesfurther of thenationalist municipalleadership ation.One was theweakening oftheNationalGuidanceCommittee [NGC] and (marked bythefading because of this and of Palestinian Partly by the deportation mayors). base in Lebanon because of the loss of much of its territorial partly to increasedattention grass-roots after organiza1982, Fatehdirected ofthisinflow ofresources and As a consequence tionin theterritories.9 the level of popular organization spurredby factional competition, tradeunion,and women's of student, in the form grewdramatically local leaderships organizations. Suchorganization they (and thediffuse to Israelicountermeasures thanthe farmoreresistant spawned)proved small numberof public nationalist earlierreliance on a relatively oforganization also provided In terms ofelitetypes, thisform figures. both and upwardpolitical new mechanisms for mobility, participation in urbancenters and in ruralareasand thecamps,'0and wouldprovide fortheintifada.11 muchof theorganizational underpinning

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Social ChangePerspectives A farmore satisfying perspective thataccommodates manyof the previousobjections to a primordialist interpretation stressesnot continuity butchange. Particular emphasisis placed bothon theimpactof socioeconomic transformation on Palestinian society and on theparticular effects associatedwiththeexperience ofoccupation and diaspora: Themobilization ofPalestinian society bya newelite wasmade possiblebystructural changes that hadledtotheperipheralization ofthe traditional elite. Thethree most important structural changes were the dramatic riseofwage labor after 1967, which transfigured a basically peasant society, extensive land confiscations, and thewidespread ofuniversity availability education after 1972.Eachofthese developments helpedto breaktraditional patron-client relations thathad beenthe social baseoftheoldelite andpaved the way for the riseofa moreextensive, better educated, morerural, and nonlanded elite which hadgained cohesion inthe Palestinian universities. Inaddition, these developments, andin particular thediminution ofthePalestinian peasantry, meant that large ofthepopulation segments had,in beencleaved from effect, their socialmoorings andwere, thus, more into new forms open for recruitment of social relations and 12 organizations. Politically, thesesocial changesundercut Hashemite influence (tied to theconservative theemergence ofa new Palesnotables)and sustained tiniannationalist leadership.'3 some differences existbetween Theoretically, scholarswho conceptualizethisprocessin terms of modernization (withemphasison urbanization,education, and political-cultural change),'4 those who underscore changesin economicproduction, socioeconomic class and class conflict,'5and thosewho emphasizethe changing politicalcontext.Stillothershave pointedto the importance of generational and and theemergence elitechange, underoccupationof a new cohortof in theterritories.16 Palestinian leadership ofPalestinian in thecontext Whiletheexamination eliteformation of social changeis fundamentally it still risks important, missing partsof thepicture. Some scholars("neoprimordialists," for wantofa better tibetween"traditional" and "modern" tle) have attackedthe dichotomy on thegrounds often thatit presumed bythesocial changeperspective and to whichold social groups(families theextent mayunderestimate theirsalience despitesocioeconomicchange through clans) reassert in new patterns ofproduction and organization. As their participation one scholar undertheintifada ofPalestinian "Theclan society suggests, has become a pressuregroup,proving afreshits abilityto influence and social lifein thevillage," thusincreasing thesalienceand political of village clans to new levels."7Similarly, polarization regionaland other "traditional" linesofcleavage as elitesin difmaybe accentuated, ferent areas compete forscarceresources.18

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Genderis another problematic area.The considerable attention paid to thestatusofwomenhas usuallybeen confined to explicitly feminist analysis. Those who emphasize class struggle tendto gloss overgender differences, whilethosewho emphasize modernization tendto treat women's emancipation as intrinsic to the modernization process. Certainly,socioeconomicchange and nationalist struggle seem to have brought new levelsof activism by women,especiallyin the context of the intifada, but few women have been admittedto senior policymaking circles, and thedurability ofthegainsmade is uncertain.19 Indeed,counter to theassumptions ofmodernization approaches, theexperienceof manyliberation movements is thatnationalemancipation often bringsin its wake a redomestication ofwomen.20 Finally, whiletheemergence ofa "newmiddleclass"21 or "pragmatic, pro-PLOurban elite"22 may be explicablein modernization or class terms, the cleavages within thatelitecannotbe fully reducedto socioeconomicdifferences: survey data suggest thatsocioeconomic statusis a weak predictor of ideologicalorientation among Palestinians.23 As notedearlier, thegrowth ofPalestinian nationalist organization created new paths to positionsof social leadership, and upwardmobility has been shaped not onlyby education, class origins, and family connections,but also by individual politicalstrategies and organizational dynamics. In short,elite structure withinPalestinian politicsis also a productofvariablesintrinsic to nationalist organization.

Organizational Perspectives
Historically, organizational variableshave been particularly importantin shapingPalestinian eliteformation, cohesion,and cleavagein the diaspora. In the 1970s and 1980s, the PLO and its constituent groupssustaineda massive institutional at itspeak structure, involving in alover20,000 military and civilianpersonnel, offices diplomatic mostone hundred and an annualbudget wellover$200 milcountries, lion.24 While the externalstructure of the PLO was weakened substantially by the 1982 Israeliinvasionof Lebanon,and evenmore after the 1990-91 GulfWar, by the suspensionof petrodollar funding of the Gazathis structure remainedsubstantial: Priorto the signing in Tunis the PLO employed some 2,300 personnel Jericho agreement, and Lebato military cadresin Yemen, alone,in addition Algeria, Libya, in Egypt, non, and PalestineLiberation Army (PLA) forces Iraq, and forces the Of some 9,000 Palestinian called Jordan. police and security for from bytheagreeinent, up to 7,000willbe recruited amongexisting of onceFatehand PLA personnel.25 (external) Giventhe largeinflux into and the exiled PLO leaders,cadres,and military Gaza personnel and inWestBank,a fullunderstanding of Palestinian eliteformation and terimself-government to the historical clearlyrequiresattention of Palestinian nationalist contemporary dynamics organization.

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The organizational variable mostcommonly pointed to byscholarsof the Palestiniannationalist movement is ideological competition between Palestiniangroups. Several analystshave suggestedthat the PLO's policyprocessis fundamentally shapedby theinteraction oforganizational imperatives and centrifugal political pressures.26 In particular,fearsof organizational fragmentation have createdincentives for politicalinclusionand consensual,lowest-common-denominator policy-making.27 Atthesame time, efforts to avoidtheconstraints of consensus-building havespurred Fatehto construct itsownmechanisms of control,includingpatronageand hegemonyover the bureaucratic structure of the PLO.28 The rise of the Islamistmovement in the 1980s has involved new linesoforganizational recruitment, eliteselection, and ideological diviIn thecase ofHamas,for sion.29 example, manyofthefounding leaders wereofmiddle-class origin; somewerefrom the'ulama'.Important avenues of recruitment includemosques and Gaza's Islamic University, Within theleadership ofparticular organizations, analysts havehighlighted the importance not only of policydifferences, but of generationaldifferences and clique formation.31 Stillothershave pointedto tensions between theexileleadership ofthePLO and thelocal nationalist leadership in theterritories, particularly in the context of relations betweenthe PalestineNationalFront,the NGC, and the Fateh/PLO With the intifada, between"inside" and "outside"redifferences ceivednew scrutiny,33 as did thedifferences between activgrass-roots ists, the "organizational of the various groups,and the leadership" intellectual in the territories.34 Much of this literature "personalities" theextent to whichtheseniororganizational in emphasized leadership theWestBank and Gaza had risenthrough activism grass-roots (and rather thansocial position.35 longperiodsof imprisonment) and Finally,the debate on democracy, accountability, corruption, thatbegan,bothinsideand outsidetheterritories, bureaucratization in withthetransition to self-government.36 theearly1990s intensified Facand within Fatehin particularbetween tionalism-both organizations has been aggravated by debatesoverthe peace process and by "turf divided the various nascent ministries which have further battles," In particular, within the PA.37 therehas been considerable berivalry tweenthe variouseconomicportfolios held by AhmadQurai' (Econof PECDAR), Nabil Shaath (Planning), omy, and director-general MuhammadZuhdi al-Nashashibi(Finance), and Faruq al-Qaddumi head ofPECDAR).Therehavealso been signsofa powerstrug(deputy gle amongsome Palestinian security organs.38
leadership in the 1970s.32 and, fororganizational resources, the waqf administrations.30

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StatistPerspectives A final set ofpotential insights is offered by a statist perspective emphasizingtheimpactof Israelipolicy(in the territories) or Arab host government policies(in thediaspora)on Palestinian organization and hencetheemergence of Palestinian elites.This area of scholarship has not been fully developed, but it is implicit in a number of studies.39 Withthetransition to self-government, statist analysismayproveof increasing as the"rulesof thegame"-constitutional importance, structures,legal rights and prohibitions, electoral systems, electionprocedures,and so forth-could all have an impacton who can effectively competeforpositionsof authority. the formal Similarly, allocationof the PA structures discretionary powerswithin has important implicationsforeliteformation. At present, research in thisarea is however, limited and often bytheambiguous, centralized character personalized, ofpolitical institutions and authority within thePA.

EliteFormation Under Interim Self-Government

eliteformation has beenunderstood in different Palestinian waysand in different In indeedmustbe understood other ways. words,the imof social organization, pact of traditional patterns occupationand socioeconomic change, and the organizational dynamics of the nationalist Palestinian movement operatesimultaneously, generating lines of elitecleavdifferential and multiple paths of eliterecruitment the future of formal state structures age. Moreover, emergence may thispicture stillfurther. complicate of Palestinian structure oftheunfolding Examination politicalelites of thispoint (see table 1).40 At the providesempiricalconfirmation a member is YasirArafat. apex ofPalestinian self-government Although Arafat's ofa juniorbranchoftheal-Husayni family, positionof leaderand leaderof of his positionas co-founder a function ship is largely ofthePAappointed are Fateh.The members (or apparently appointed) in a statistical ofthebroadscope ofPalestinian reflective hardly society fromruralor refugee sense: thereis only one woman,fewmembers of middle-class backgrounds, disproportionate representation profesbers of the opposition.(Most of these The membershipof the PA characteristics are,of course,trueof cabithe Tharl reflectshi boAd hardlyreflects the broad netsaroundtheworld.)Atthesame time, scope of Palestinian society, the cabinet'scomposition clearlyreflects but it demonstratesa variety some effort at balancedrepresentation of of paths to inclusion within different constituencies,and certainly the political elite. demonstrates a variety of paths to inclusion within thepoliticalelite.
sionals and traditional elites,and no mem-

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Name YasirArafat

Table 1 Members of PA "Cabinet" January1995 Position Background Affiliation diaspora diaspora diaspora Gaza Jerusalem/ Jericho Ramallah Fateh Fateh independent Fateh Fateh Fateh Fateh FIDA Fateh PLF independent Fateh independent Fateh independent FIDA Fateh independent Fateh independent

President: Interior Minister Nabil Shaath Planning Muhammad Zuhdi Finance al-Nashashibi Zakariya al-Agha Housing Saeb Erakat MunicipalAffairs

'Abd al-'Aziz alTransportation Haj Ahmad Riyad al-Za'nun Health Gaza 'Azmial-Shu'aybi Youthand Sports deportee Intissar al-Wazir Social Affairs diaspora SamirGhawshah Labor diaspora IlyasFrayj Tourism and Antiquities Bethlehem Frayh Abu-Midyan Justice Gaza Yasir'Amr Education diaspora AhmadQurai' Economy diaspora 'Abd al-Hafiz alCommunications Hebron Ashab Yasir'AbidRabbu Information and Culture diaspora Faysalal-Husayni Jerusalem Hasan Tahbub Affairs Religious Jerusalem PASecretary Tayyib 'Abdaldiaspora Rahman Munibal-Masri diaspora
Italicsrepresent orjunior cabinetstatus. uncertain, unofficial,

the bulk of the members are either formal Fateh Organizationally, cadres or pro-Fateh independents (it should be remembered that repeated polls have givenFateh a majorityor large pluralityin the territories). There are two representativesfrom the Palestine Democratic Union (FIDA) and one from the Popular StruggleFront (PSF).41 Five membersof the PA are on the PLO ExecutiveCommittee,and many of the remainderare members of the PLO Central Council or Palestine National Council.42 Several othershead or have headed importantprothe fessionalorganizationsin the West Bank or Gaza.43 Geographically, exiles and local leaders cabinet is fairly evenly split between long-term Gaza and the southern and (or recent deportees) fromthe territories. centralparts of the West Bank (including Jerusalem) are represented. the cabinet consists of a mix of individuals from Socioeconomically, well-established notable families(e.g., al-Nashashibi,Frayj,al-Masri,alHusayni,Erakat) and those fromthe "new middle class." Many of those fromnotable families,however,also have long histories of nationalist activism.44

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Similar variation is evident amongthesenior policeand security officials appointed by Arafat, who comprise a mix ofpreviously-deported Fateh organizers and senior officers fromFateh's (external)military wing,Fateh/PLO covert security and intelligence organs,and regular PLA careerofficers.45 PECDAR-supposedly the primary conduitfor aid fortheterritories-is staffed bya combination ofinternal and external politicalappointees and technocrats. Counterelites-represented by groupsexcludedfrom the current PA (the PFLP, DFLP, Communists, Hamas, and the remnants ofJordan's traditional supporters)-are also drawnfrom diverse social and political backgrounds. Iftheproposedelections for a Palestinian legislature proceed as planned, theseindividuals maybe drawnintomoreformalized politicalrolesin theemerging Palestinian politicalsystem.

Conclusion: TheChallenges ofPolitical Management

The composition oftheemerging Palestinian political eliteis stillin a stateof flux.However, examination ofthiselitesuggests a multiplicity of recruitment paths and social backgrounds. While not all social groupsare represented, theeliteis farbroader thantheusual categorizationsoftraditional/modern or social class,and organizational factors are shownto playa keyrolein shaping theemergence ofpolitical leadThis underscores to whicheliteformation in contemership. theextent poraryPalestinecannot be understoodmonocausallybut must be approachedin a holisticand nuancedmanner. Taken together, the various factors sustain a fairly heterogeneous elitestructure, characterized of sources,overlapping by a multiplicity and multiple linesofelitecleavage.This in turn "elite-types," potential elite raises the questionof how, in the context of so much potential a sufficient to allow levelofcohesioncan be maintained fragmentation, effective Palestinian governance. whichproOne obvious answerhas been Palestinian nationalism, vides unifying goals and a commoncode of discourseformuchofthe discoursehas been under increasing elite.But nationalist challenge frame of referwhichprivilege a rather different from Islamistforces, nationalist discourseitselfcontainswide variations, ence. Moreover, frommilitant to pragmatic ranging rejectionism accommodationism, whichhaveonlybeen aggravated by thecurrent peace process.Finally, in opposition to Palestinian been defined nationalist has often "unity" an occupying of nationalliberation moveThe history Israeli"other." ments aroundtheworldsuggests fadesand fragthatanticolonial unity mentation increasesas movements pass fromtasks of resistanceto those of governance. The same holds trueof Palestinian self-government as itconfronts notIsraelbutquestions ofaccountability, developmentpriorities, and practical performance.

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Strong, charismatic leadership represents a second possiblemechanism for managingthe dangersof politicalfragmentation. Arafat's "charismatic autocracy" has playeda keyrolein maintaining thecohesion of the mainstream Palestinian nationalist movement in the past, buttoday itis clearthat whatever reserves he maystillhavein thePalestinianpolity are rapidly beingdepleted. Yetanother possibleresponseto thesedilemmas is politicaldemocracyinsofar as ithelpslegitimize boththestructures ofgovernance and thosewho occupythem. Democratic political institutions already exist at thelevelofcivilsociety, and democratic mechanisms havebeenbuilt intotheOslo and Cairo agreements in theform oflegislative elections. GiventhestateofPalestinian-Israeli at thetimeofwriting, negotiations thesepresently seema rather however, distant and theexperipromise, ence of otherdecolonizedsocietiesalso suggeststhe difficulties that new democracies can face. In thiscontext ofhighdegrees ofelitedifferentiation, political uncertainty, and thelimitsof ideologyand charisma, control overmaterial resources-the abilityto coopt through financial patronage, rewards, and contingent politicalinclusion-may alternative. provean attractive thecontours and dynamics Analytically, ofsucha neopatrimonial stratwillbe explored in a forthcoming article egyofpolitical in management thesepages. Practically, ofneopatrimonial manyof theaccoutrements and weak politics-personalism, cronyism, rent-seeking, corruption, in aspectsof the curpoliticalinstitutionalization-are alreadyevident renttransition to interim Palestinian self-government.
NOTES
and YuvalArnonYodfat 3. See, forexample,Aryeh 1. Perhaps the most notable person to decline a and Tactics(London: Croom Ohanna, PLO Strategy is Hanan Ashrawi,who appointment "ministerial" instead has devoted her attentions to the "In- Helm, 1981), pp. 68-72. forCitizens"createdas a Pal- 4. Donna Robinson Divine, "The Dialectics of PalCommittee dependent estinian ombudsman to oversee self-government. estinianPolitics,"in Joel Migdal et al., Palestinian down offers of appointment report- Society Othersturning University (Princeton:Princeton and Politics head of Press, 1980), pp. 227-28. Divine does not attribute edly include Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi(former the Palestinianteam to the bilateralnegotiations, this to some unchangingcharacteristic of Palestinpeace process),Mahmud ian politicalculture, and a criticofthe current but ratherto the parhowever, memberof ticular conditions of dependency engendered by independent Darwish(poet and former the PLO ExecutiveCommittee),and senior Fateh exile and occupation. minleaders Faruq al-Qaddumi(the PLO's "foreign Sosee Migdalet al., Palestinian 5. For an overview, ister")and Mahmud 'Abbas (a memberof the PLO Part I; and Baruch Kimmerling cietyand Politics, of the Oslo and an architect Committee Executive TheMakingofa People andJoelMigdal,Palestinians: Accord). AssociatedPress, 11 May 1994; United (New York:The Free Press, 1993). 11 May 1994. PressInternational, 6. Shafeeq Ghabra, "Palestiniansin Kuwait: The among these is Ahmad Qurai' (Abu 2. Noteworthy JPS 17, no. 2 a rather am- Familyand the Politicsof Survival," and thenwithdrew Ala'),who tendered in protestover a lack of polit- (Winter1988), pp. 62-83. biguous resignation and turf battleswithother 7. On this process,see RosemarySayigh,PalestiniArafat ical backingfrom (London: Zed associated withthePal- ans: FromPeasantsto Revolutionaries Two ministers PAministers. Books, 1979), pp. 118-24, 164-71, 177-81; Julie estinianDemocraticUnion (FIDA) have also been Resand Conflict Integration "Socio-Political party to resigntheirposi- Peteet, underpressure from their olutionin PalestinianCamps in Lebanon,"JPS 16, tions,on thegroundsthattheyhave been unable to "The no. 2 (Winter1987), pp. 29-44; Rex Brynen, PA policyin desiredways, influence

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42

JOURNAL OF PALESTINE STUDIES

Jour- 17. Majdi al-Malki, in Lebanon," ThePalestinians ofExile: Politics "Clans et partispolitiquesdans Studies3, no. 3 (Fall 1990). nal of Refugee trois villages palestiniens,"Revue d'etudes Palesclass tiniennes socioeconomic 8. Havingsaid this,higher 52 (Summer 1994), p. 126. and 18. See, forexample,the discussion on Gaza-West of education degrees clearly enabledhigher social net- Bank tensionsin Sara Roy, "Gaza: New Dynamics access to influential readier provided polit- of Civic Disintegration," to effective factors contributing works-both JPS 17, no. 4 (Summer (upper-)middle- 1993), pp. 27-28. For an interesting Consequently, ical leadership. recentattempt workorcasual peasants rather than classactivists how Gaza/WestBank differences to thinkthrough thebeneficiaries. erswere often mightbe accommodated in the structuresof an hadbeenthemost emerging theCommunists 9. Previously, see Khalil alPalestinianpoliticalsystem, joinedby the Shiqaqi, al-Diffaal-gharbiyya later at thislevel, active organizers wa qita' ghazza: al(PFLP) alaqat al-siyasiyya ofPalestine Liberation for the Front Popular al-niustaqbaliyya wa al-idariyya ofPales- [The WestBank and Gaza Strip:The future for theLiberation Front and Democratic political tine(DFLP). PASSIA, relations] (Jerusalem: and administrative fromstudiesof the back- 1994). 10. This is evident and de- 19. On the currentsituation,see Rita Giacaman detainees of bothadministrative grounds that, and Penny JadIsaac found theintifada. during portees The Johnson,"SearchingforStrategies: III camp, PalestinianWomen's Movementin the New Era," at theAnsar his fellow detainees among areas; Middle East Report186 (January-February orrural camps refugee camefrom 71 percent 1994); of 100 Sahar Khalifeh, "The Women's Movement,"in incomes monthly had average 48 percent laborers. Whither unskilled were JDsorless;and29 percent PolCenter for DC: (Washington, Palestine? Study ofAdministra-icy Analysison Palestine,1994); United Nations JadIsaac,"ASocio-economic at Ansar 3,"JPS 18,no. 4 (Summer Development tive Detainees Challenges At theCrossroads: Program, ac- and Choices of"leading Another survey 1989),pp. 102-109. Womenin theWestBank forPalestinian of the and Gaza Strip (New York:UNDP, 1994). Leadership National of theUnified tivists" or 20. See Maxine Molyneux,"Mobilizationwithout a third were from rural over found that Uprising orso Emancipation? Women's Interests, State, and only5 percent origins, andthat camp refugee MeirLitvak, "Palestin- Revolution,"in Richard Fagen, Carmen Diana families. werefrom notable in theTerritories Duringthe In- Deere, and Juan Luis Coraggio,Transition and Deian Leadership Orient34,no.2 (June 1993),p. velopment: 1987-1992," tifada, Socialism(New Problems of ThirdWorld 206. York MonthlyReviewPress, 1986); Gay Seidman, Behind the Ititifada:Labor "No Freedom without the Women: Mobilization 11. Joost Hiltermann, 1991). Press, Princeton University (Princeton: no. 2 (1993). "TheRoleoftheProfessional 21. Robinson,"The Role oftheProfessional Robinson, 12. Glenn Middle SoofPalestinian Middle Classin theMobilization Class," p. 322. and Agricultural The Medical Committees,"22. Sahliyeh,In Search Leadership, ciety: p. 163. of Journal International ofMiddleEast Studies25,no.2 Glenn 23. See, forexample, Michael Inbar and Ephraim (May 1993),p. 301. I wouldliketo thank "The People's Image of Conflict on an earlier Yuchtman-Yaar, hisinsightful comments for Robinson Resolution 33, no. 1 Journal Resolution," of Conflict ofthis version paper. 13. Moshe Ma'oz, PalestinianLeadership on the (March 1989); Marianne Heiberg and Geir 0venies in theOccupiedTerritor Movements and Women's 1970-1992," Signs 18, and Genderin South Africa,

Role of theMayorsunder WestBank: The Changing Jordanand Israel (London:FrankCass, 1984); In Search of Leadership:WestBank Emile Sahliyeh, InTheBrookings Politics since 1967 (Washington:

Bankand Arab in Gaza, West Society sen, Palestinian Jerusalem:A Survey of Living Conditions.(Oslo: FAFO, 1993), pp. 273-75. OrLiberation The Palestine 24. CherylRubenberg, (Belmont, ganization:Its Institutional Infrastructure 1988). stitution. in theWestBank, MA: Institute for Arab Studies, 1983); Adam Leadership 14. Ma'oz,Palestinian the PLO,' in AugustusRichard "The Role of the Profes- Zagorin,"Auditing pp. 127-30;Robinson, eds.. TheInternaofPalestin- Nortonand MartinH. Greenberg, Classin theMobilization sionalMiddle Liberation OrganizationalRelations of thePalestine 321-22. ian Society," pp. 301-302, al-tarkib al-ij- tion (Carbondale, IL: SouthernIllinois University 15. Jamil al-gharbiyya: Hilal, al-Diffa tinla'i wa al-iqtisadi [TheWestBank:Social and Press, 1989). and theJericho on the Gaza Str-ip PLO Research Centre, 25. Agreemiient economic structure] (Beirut: o IsWithdrawal Concerning and So- Area,AnnexI: Pr-otocol BankPolitics "West 1975); SalimTamari, Arand Security Arrangenments, For-ces MERIP Reports100/101 (October/De- raeliMilitary cialForces," thenumberofPalestinian police and the ticleIII.4.a. In fact, Palestine Ann cember Smith, 1981); Pamela Press,27 may now be as highas 15,000; Associated St.Martin's, 1984). Palestinians (NewYork. Wallach andJa- January 1995. Several hundred additional Fateh of 16. Thisis theassumption John Lebanon to from cadresmaybe transferred The New Palestinians:The Emerging military netWallach, Publish- Gaza in early 1995. Generation ofLeaders(Rocklin,CA:Prima theemphasis on political/ideoftheviewthatthein- 26. See, forexanmple, ing,1992). Fora critique in Helena Cobban, The Paleselitestructures, ological factionalism altered Palestinian tifada radically in theOccupied tinian LiberationOrganization:People, Power and Elites "Palestinian see AliJarbawi, Press, theIn- Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University and Changethrough Territories: Stability with competition in Jamal Nassarand Roger Heacock, eds., 1984). On theimpactof factional tifada," Intifada: Palestineat the Crossroads(New York: Palestinianmass organizationsin the West Bank BehindtheIntifada. and Gaza, see Hiltermann, 1990). Praeger,

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DYNAMICS OF ELITE FORMATION 27. Aaron DavidMiller, The PLO and thePolitics of Survival (New York:Praeger, 1983); and Shaul Mishal, ThePLO under'Arafat Between Gun and Olive Branch (New Haven:Yale University Press,

43 Afand democracy], paperpresented to theWorld fairsCouncilconference on "Democracy in the Arab World," Amman, July 1994. 37. See Sara Roy,"The Seeds of Chaos, and of Night: TheGazaStrip after theAgreement," JPS18, no. 3 (Spring 1994),pp. 85-89. 38. In particular, between "preventative security" Report and"presidential security" officers. Palestine 7, no. 36 (4 September 1994),p. 16. 39. See in particular in LaurieBrand, Palestinians
theArab World:Institution Buildingand theSearch

1986). 28. RexBrynen, Sanctuary and Survival: ThePLO in Lebanon (Boulder:Westview Press, 1990), pp. 174-75. 29. Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalisnm in the

1994). Press, Columbia University for State (New York: 30. Litvak, "Palestinian Leadership in theTerrito- 1988).Alsorelevant of are several oftheanalyses ries,"pp. 209-11.As Litvak notes, thesocioeco- theinterplay between Israeli policy andPalestinian nomic and educational profile of Islamist activist organization above underoccupation presented in Palestine leaders echoes that ofIslamic militants in the previous section on "organizational in theregion; elsewhere see,for example, Saad Ed- perspectives." dinIbrahim, ofEgypt's Militant "Anatomy Islamic 40. Itis indicative ofPalofthecurrent confusion Notes and Preliminaryestinian Groups:Methodological different proself-government that sources Findings," International Journal ofMiddleEast Stud- duce different listsof the PA cabinetmembers. ies 12,no. 4 (November 1980). Jerusalem-based Faysalal-Husayni was namedto 31. On Fateh, see Cobban, The Palestinian Libera- the in toprotect of cabinet butnotsworn thestatus tion Organization; on the PFLP, see As'ad Orient in House.Munibal-Masri was not sworn "Internal AbuKhalil, Contradictions in the PFLP: and is inactive devoting his as a cabinet minister, DecisionMaking and Policy Orientation," Middle efforts toprivate instead sector lobbying and a maEastJournal 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987). Tayyib jor Palestinian investment conglomerate. 32. Ibrahim "Back Dakkak, toSquare One:A Study 'Abdal-Rahim is "secretary" ofthePAbutdoesnot in theRe-emergence in formally of thePalestinian Identity occupya cabinetseat. Rabbi Moshe in Alexander theWest Bank, 1967-1980," Scholch, Hirsch Kartasecthas of theanti-Zionist Naturei Over theGreenLine: Studieson the beencited ed.,Palestinians as himself) bysomesources (including on the RelationsbetweenPalestinians BothSides of offiPA 'Minister of Jewish Affairs." several Finally. Lines Since 1967 (London:Ithaca 1949 Armistice title of "Minister of cialshaveused theunofficial Press, 1983). Because of the disproportionate with Israel"; "coordination (jamil Tarifi, PNFandNGC, State" in the ofleftist weight organizations Ahmad, HakamBalawi, "security," 'Abdal-Rahim overtheloss ofcentral "presidential and becauseofa concern affairs"). in theterritories, was control overactions Arafat are'Azmi (a deal-Shu'aybi ofboth conservative nota- 41. TheFIDAmembers suspicious groups. Later, in the West seniororganizer and former bles (like Ilyas Fray) and external resources portee 'AbidRabbu; Samir Yasir JointCommittee) Bank)and (FIDAleader) the PLO-Jordanian (through is from wasunsuccessful thePSF.Arafat control. Ghawshah be usedin an attempt to reassert would the Palestinian members of PFLP, DFLP, 33. Thedifferences areemphasized byZe'evSchiff inenticing Communist Party (PPP,theformer party), andEhud Ya'ari, Uprising- People's Intifada:The Palestinian but is into or Hamas holding probably hiscabinet, Simon andSchuster, Israel'sThird Front (NewYork: in the able to so so he be do seats that open may see HelenaCobnuanced 1990).Fora more view, MiddleEast Jour- future. ban,"ThePLO and theIntifada," and 'AbidRabbu, al-Nashashibi, 'Amr, nal 44, no. 2 (Spring1990). On inside-outside 42. Arafat, Committee relations and thePLO'sinstitutional development,Ghawshahare all PLO Executive The Challenge members. seeJamil Hilal,"PLO Institutions: Associa43. Theseincludeal-Shu'aybi (Dentists' Ahead,"JPS 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993),pp.46-60. Fray]Abu-Miydan (Bar Associawa al-qiyadat 34. AliJarbawi, al-siyasiyya tion,Ramallah), al-Intifada tion, Gaza), Zakariyaal-Agha(Arab Medical fi al-diffa wa-qita' ghazza: bahth alal-gharbiyya al-Za'nun Gaza), and Riyad (Higher and thepolitical Association, nukhbaal-siyasiyya [Theintifada headedtheHigher Health Council, Gaza). Tahbub A in the WestBankand Gaza Strip: leadership Council. Islamic Daral-Tali'a, ofpolitical study (Beirut: 1989); elites] of member Faysal al-Husayni-a Political Lead- 44. Forexample, ZiadAbuAmr, 'Noteson Palestinian alclan, and son of 'Abd al-Qadir ership," Middle East Report 154 (Septem- the Husayni herokilledin 1948)-has (a nationalist Husayni ber-October 1988). He housearrest. in prison and under years Hillel "ThePalestinian spent 35. See,for example, Frisch, ofPalestinUnion with theGeneral in theTerritories," Movement MiddleEasternStud- wasan activist in thelate 1950s and early1960s; ies29,no.2 (April 1993),pp.257-62;andal-Malki, ian Students office ofthePLO whenit at the Jerusalem "Clans etpartis danstrois villages p. worked palestiniens," in the in 1964;and was a Fateh organizer 120.Some80,000persons were heldin Israeli de- opened inJPS 18, Bankafter 1967.See hisinterview West tention between 1988and 1994. 1989),pp.4, 8. 36. Fora recent ofthe no. 4 (Summer discussion bytheSecretary forpublicsestructures "Palestinian for Citi- 45. The PAhas separate Commission Independent securcivil civil police, defense, presidential see As'ad'Abdal-Rahman, al-filas- curity, "al-Nidal zens," and intelligence. "preventative security," tiniwa al-dimuqratiyya," struggle ity, [ThePalestinian

WestBank and Gaza: MusliniBrotherhood and IslanuicJihad (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,

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