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Abdulhalim, Khadka, Lucero, Lumbera and Tan Group 7 Yanson vs Secretary of Labor G.R. No.

159026 Facts: On March 27, 1998, Mardy Cabigo and 40 other workers (private respondents) filed with DOLE Bacolod, a request for payroll inspection of Hacienda Valentin Balabag owned by Alberta Yanson. DOLE Bacolod conducted an inspection on May 27, 1998, and issued a Notice of Inspection Report, finding petitioner liable for the following violations of labor standard laws: 1.Underpayment of salaries and wages (workers being paid a daily rate of P90.00 since 1997 and P75.00 prior to such year); 2.Non-payment of 13th month pay for 2 years; 3.Non-payment of Social Amelioration Bonus (SAB) for 2 years; 4.Non-payment of employers 1/3 carabao share. DOLE directed Yanson to: 1,)Affect restitution and/or correction of the foregoing at the company or plant level within 10 calendar days from notice hereof. 2.) Any question of the findings should be submitted to this Office within 5 working days from notice otherwise order of compliance shall be issued. 3.) Notice shall be posted conspicuously in the premises of the workplace, removal of which shall subject the establishment to a fine and/ or contempt proceedings. 4.) When there is a certified union, a copy of the notice shall be furnished said union. DOLE Bacolod also scheduled a summary investigation and issued, by registered mail, notices of hearing as well as a subpoena duces tecum to the parties which Yanson never appeared to. In a Compliance Order dated August 12, 1998, DOLE Bacolod directed petitioner to pay, within 5 days, P9, 084.00 to each of the 41 respondents or a total of P372, 444.00, and to submit proof of payment. It also required Yanson to correct existing violations of occupational safety and health standards. Thereafter, DOLE Bacolod issued on December 17, 1998 a Writ of Execution of its August 12, 1998 Compliance Order. On February 17, 1999, Yanson filed with DOLE Bacolod a Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose Writ of Execution For Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process. She claims that she did not receive any form of communication, or participate in any proceeding relative to the subject matter of the writ of execution. She also impugned the validity of the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order subject of the writ of execution on the ground of lack of employment relationship between her and private respondents. DOLE Bacolod denied said motion. Petitioner filed with public respondent a Verified Appeal1and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, posting therewith an appeal bond of P1,000.00 in money order and attaching thereto a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond . Public respondent dismissed her appeal.. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari which was denied due course and dismissed by the CA. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not the CA and Secretary erred in dismissing the appeal

Ruling The appeal ultimately questioned the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order in which DOLE Bacolod, in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power, awarded private respondents P9,084.00 each in labor standard benefits or the aggregate sum of P377,444.00.2. For its perfection, the appeal was therefore subject to the requirements prescribed under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7730, Art. 128. Visitorial and Enforcement Power. - x x x (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders , except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of inspection. An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the POSTING OF A CASH OR SURETY BOND ISSUED by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in the amount EQUIVALENT TO THE MONETARY AWARD in the order appealed from. (Emphasis ours) When petitioner filed her Verified Appeal and Supplement to the Verified Appeal, she posted a mere P1,000.00-appeal bond and attached a Motion to be Allowed to Post Minimal Bond with Motion for Reduction of Bond. It was rejected for insufficiency of the appeal bond. There is no analogous application in the Office of the Secretary of the practice in the NLRC of reducing the appeal bond; the law applicable to the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment does not allow this practice. In other words, the respondents request for the reduction of the required bond cannot be allowed for lack of legal basis. Hence, for lack of the required bond, the respondents appeal was never duly perfected and must therefore be dismissed. The rationale behind the stringency of such requirement is that the employer-appellant may choose between a cash bond and a surety bond. Hence, limitations in his liquidity should pose no obstacle to his perfecting an appeal by posting a mere surety bond. Moreover, Article 128(b) deliberately employed the word only in reference to the requirements for perfection of an appeal in labor standards cases. It commands a restrictive application, giving no room for modification of said requirements. It should be borne in mind that reduction of bond in the NLRC is expressly authorized under the Rules implementing Article 223, It is of record that she received the August 12, 1998 Compliance Order. Petitioner does not question this, except to point out that the registry return card does not indicate the date she received the order. That is of no consequence, for the fact remains that petitioner was put on actual notice not only its existence but also of the summary investigation of her establishment. It behooves her to file a timely appeal to public respondent or object to the conduct of the investigation. Petitioner did

neither, opting instead to sit idle and wait until the following year to question the investigation and resultant order, in the guise of opposing the writ of execution through a motion dubbed Double Verified Special Appearance to Oppose 'Writ of Execution' For Being a Blatant and Dangerous Violation of Due Process. Such appeal already went beyond the ten-day period allowed under Section 8(b) of Rule X-B of the Implementing Rules. CA was correct in holding that public respondent did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the appeal of petitioner due to the insufficiency of her appeal bond. Also, in the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated January 29, 1998, petitioner acknowledged under oath that she is the employer of private respondents Mardy Cabigo, et al., who are members of the union known as Commercial and Agro-Industrial Labor Organization.

NESTOR J. BALLADARES, ET. AL. v. PEAK VENTURES CORPORATION AND YANGCO MARKET OWNERS ASSOCIATION G.R. No. 161794 June 16, 2009 FACTS: Balladares and co-petitioners were hired as security guards by Peak Ventures and were assigned at the premises of Yangco Market. They filed a complaint for underpayment of wages against Peak Ventures with the DOLE. The Regional Director of DOLE rendered judgment in favor of petitioners and ruled that Peak Ventures and Yangco Market are solidarily liable to petitioners. Said decision was upheld by the Secretary of Labor. On certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over the case because the claims of each petitioners exceeded P5,000. Therefore, power to adjudicate such claims belong to the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: WON the Regional Director correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. HELD: YES. The Regional Director correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. The complaint involved underpayment of wages. In order to verify the allegations in the complaint, DOLE conducted an inspection which yielded proof of violations of labor standards. By nature of the complaint and from the result of the inspection, the authority of the DOLE under Art. 128 of the Labor Code came into play regardless of monetary value of claims involved. The Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives is now empowered to hear and decide, in summary proceeding, any matter involving the recovery of amount of wages and other monetary claims arising out of employer-employee relationship at the time of inspections, even if the amount of money claims exceed P5,000. Said jurisdiction was in accordance with Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, and the case does not fall under the exception clause. We must take note that the doctrine in the Servando case is no longer controlling upon the amendment of Art. 128 by RA 7730. In this case, Peak Ventures did not contest the findings of the Regional Director. It even admitted before the Court of Appeals that petitioners were not paid correct wages and as a defense, tried to pass the buck to Yangco Market. Therefore the case does not fall under the exceptions provided in Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code which would have divested the Regional Director of jurisdiction over the case.

ALLIED INVESTIGATION BUREAU, INC. vs. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT G.R. No. 122006 November 24, 1999

Facts: Petitioner Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. is a security agency. On January 11, 1994, it entered into a security contract with Novelty Philippines, Inc. (NPI) whereby it obligated itself to provide security services to the latter.

On January 17, 1995, private respondents Melvin T. Pelayo and Samuel Sucanel, two of the security guards assigned by petitioner to NPI, filed a complaint with the Office of respondent Regional Director Romeo A. Young charging petitioner with non-compliance with Wage Order No. NCR-03, which increased the minimum daily pay of workers by P17.00, or from P118.00 to P135.00 effective December 16, 1993; and further, by P10.00, or from P135.00 to P145.00 daily beginning April 1, 1994. Private respondents, likewise, sought the recovery of wage differentials.

On February 9 and 14, 1995, the Office of Regional Director Young conducted inspection visits at petitioners establishment. Senior Labor Enforcement Officer Eduvigis A. Acero issued a Notice of Inspection Results, which reads: 1) Non-implementation under W.O. # NCR-03 from Dec. 16, 1993 to Dec. 15, 1994 to security guards assigned at Novelty Phils., Inc. 2) Excessive deduction or Bayanihan System (P20.00) every pay day instead of P5.00 only.

Thereafter, in order to facilitate amicable settlement between the parties, a series of conferences and hearings were scheduled by the Office of the Regional Director. However, despite due notice, petitioner failed to appear in any of said hearings.

On May 9, 1995, respondent Regional Director issued an Order, ordering ALLIED INVESTIGATION BUREAU, INC ordered to pay to the ninety-two employees the total amount of EIGHT HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS AND THIRTY-SIX CENTAVOS (P807.570.36) to be distributed to the individual employees in accordance with the schedule mentioned above, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Otherwise, Writ of execution shall issue to enforce this Order.

Petitioner appealed the above Order to respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, without however, posting a cash or surety bond equivalent to the monetary award in the said Order appealed from.

On September 19, 1995, the Secretary of Labor, thru Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano issued an Order dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to perfect said appeal.

Petitioner argues that the power to adjudicate money claims belongs to the Labor Arbiter who has exclusive jurisdiction over employees claims where the aggregate amount of the claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00.

Petitioner further contends that since the Order appealed from is void and without legal effect, said Order never assumed finality and, therefore, it was improper for the respondent Secretary of Labor to outrightly dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to post a cash/surety bond.

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

Issues: a. Whether or not respondent Regional Director acted without jurisdiction in adjudicating the private respondents money claims where the aggregate money claim of each of them exceeds P5,000.00. b. Whether or not respondent Secretary of Labor & Employment, acting through Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing herein petitioners appeal attacking the jurisdiction of respondent Regional Director in adjudicating subject money claims of private respondents.

Held: Petitioners arguments are untenable. While it is true that under Articles 129 and 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to hear and decide cases where the aggregate money claims of each employee exceeds P5,000.00, said provisions of law do not contemplate nor cover the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives.

In the case at bar, the Office of respondent Regional Director conducted inspection vi sits at petitioners establishment on February 9 and 14, 1995 in accordance with the above-mentioned provision of law. In the course of said inspection, several violations of the labor standard provisions of the Labor Code were discovered and reported by Senior Labor Enforcement Officer Eduvigis A. Acero in his Notice of Inspection Results. It was on the bases of the aforesaid findings (which petitioner did not contest), that respondent Regional Director issued the assailed Order for petitioner to pay private respondents the respective wage differentials due them.

Clearly, as the duly authorized representative of respondent Secretary of Labor, and in the lawful exercise of the Secretarys visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of the Labor Co de, respondent Regional Director had jurisdiction to issue his impugned Order.

Anent the issue of whether or not the respondent Secretary of Labor acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners appeal on the ground that petitioner failed to post the required cash or surety bond, we rule in the negative.

Article 128 of the Labor Code likewise explicitly provides that in case an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment involves a monetary award, an appeal by the

employer may be perfected only upon posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from.

It is undisputed that petitioner herein did not post a cash or surety bond when it filed its appeal with the Office of respondent Secretary of Labor. Consequently, petitioner failed to perfect its appeal on time and the Order of respondent Regional Director became final and executory.

Thus, the Secretary of Labor and Employment thru Undersecretary Cresenciano B. Trajano correctly dismissed petitioners appeal. Urbanes vs. Sec. of Labor G.R. No. 122791, Feb. 19, 2003 Facts: Petitioner Placido O. Urbanes, Jr., doing business under the name and style of Catalina Security Agency, entered into an agreement to provide security services to respondent SSS. During the effectivity of the agreement, Urbanes requested SSS for the upward adjustment of their contract rate pursuant to a wage order, however, such request remained unheeded even after several attempts so he pulled out his agencys services from the premises of the SSS and another security agency, Jaguar, took over. Urbanes then filed a complaint with the DOLE-NCR against the SSS seeking the implementation of the wage order. DOLE granted the petitioners request, however the order was set aside because when SSS appealed to the Sec. of Labor, the latter remanded the records of the case for recomputation of the wage differentials to the RTC. Issue: Whether or not the Sec. of Labor has jurisdiction to review appeals from decisions of the Regional Directors. Held: Petitioner asserts the implementation of Art. 129 and contends that as the appeal of SSS was filed with the wrong forum, it should have been dismissed. The SSS, on the other hand, contends that Article 128, not Article 129, is applicable to the case. Neither the petitioners contention nor the SSSs is impressed with merit. It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In this case, even if petitioner filed the complaint on his and also on behalf of the security guards, the relief sought has to do with the enforcement of the contract between him and the SSS which was deemed amended by virtue of Wage Order No. NCR-03. The controversy subject of the case is thus a civil dispute, the proper forum for the resolution of which is the civil courts. Zialcita, et al. v. PAL, RO4-3-3398-76, 20 February 1977

Facts: Complainant Zialcita, an international flight stewardess of PAL, was discharged from the service on account of her marriage. In separating Zialcita, PAL invoked its policy which stated that flight attendants must be single, and shall be automatically separated from employment in the event they subsequently get married. They claimed that this policy was in accordance with Article 132 of the Labor Code. On the other hand, Zialcita questioned her termination on account of her marriage, invoking Article 136 of the same law. Issue:

Whether or no Zialcita was validly terminated on account of her marriage? Held: NO. When Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise known as the Women and Child Labor Law, was promulgated in 13 March 1973, PALs policy had met its doom. However, since no one challenged its validity, the said policy was able to obtain a momentary reprieve. Section 8 of PD148 is exactly the same provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the Labor Code, which was promulgated on 1 May 1974 and took effect six months later. Although Article 132 enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish standards that will ensure the safety and health of women employees and in appropriate cases shall by regulation require employers to determine appropriate minimum standards for termination in special occupations, such as those of flight attendants, it is logical to presume that, in the absence of said standards or regulations which are yet to be established, the policy of PAL against marriage is patently illegal. Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women employed in ordinary occupations, or it should have categorically expressed so. The sweeping intendment of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is reflected in the whole text and supported by Article 135 that speaks of nondiscrimination on the employment of women.

Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006 Facts: Petitioner Star Paper Corp. is a corporation engaged in trading principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its Managing Director. Respondents Simbol, Comia and Estrella were all regular employees of the company. All three of them met their spouses while working for the company because they were co-workers and consequently, all three were forced to resign because of a company policy which states: 1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company. 2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above. Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the Labor Code. Issue: Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code is a valid exercise of management prerogative. Held: Respondents submit that their dismissal violates the above provision. Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136 of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign. The

employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence, it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management. It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability. These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives. Petitioners sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two (2) or more of its employees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame. That the second paragraph was meant to give teeth to the first paragraph of the questioned rule is evidently not the valid reasonable business necessity required by the law. It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees right to security of tenure. Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in one company. Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the legislatures silence 41 that married persons are not protected under our Constitution and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

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