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A.M. No.

L-363

July 31, 1962 PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY. DIOSDADO Q.

IN RE: DISBARMENT GUTIERREZ, respondent.

It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs. State the court said: We are of opinion that after received an unconditional pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article 226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony." Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this would not be a pardon, according to the judicial construction which that act of executive grace was received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95 U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191. And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows: A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil war) against government of the United States." The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the profession. The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or

Victoriano A. Nestor M. Andrada for respondent. MAKALINTAL, J.:

Savellano

for

complaint.

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293. Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429. The only question to be resolved is whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted."

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removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic. WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers. Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part.

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G.R. No. 1203 In the matter of the suspension of HOWARD D. TERRELL from the practice of law. Solicitor-General Araneta for Government. W. A. Kincaid for defendant. PER CURIAM: Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila, on the 5th day of February, 1903, why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons: First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city; and, Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its organization, which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law. The accused appeared on the return day, and by his counsel, W. A. Kincaid, made answer to these charges, denying the same, and filed affidavits in answer thereto. After reading testimony given by said Howard D. Terrell, in the case of the United States vs. H. D. Terrell, 1 wherein he was charged with estafa, and after reading the said affidavits in his behalf, and hearing his counsel, the court below found, and decided as a fact, that the charges aforesaid made against Howard D. Terrell were true, and thereupon made an order suspending him from his office as a lawyer in the Philippine Islands, and directed the clerk of the court to transmit to this court a certified copy of the order of suspension, as well as a full statement of the facts upon which the same was based. We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in connection with the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature and character as to warrant his suspension from practice. The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of law, are acts which justify disbarment. In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of the United States, vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding, while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.

It is therefore directed that the said Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year from February 7, 1903. It is so ordered.

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G.R. No. L-31865 November 26, 1973 PEDRO CABILDO, as Provincial Treasurer, Ilocos Norte, ADOLFO CALAPINI, as Municipal Treasurer, Burgos, Ilocos Norte, and THE ILOCOS NORTE COCONUT PRODUCERS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioners, vs. HON. RICARDO Y. NAVARRO, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Laoag City, Ilocos Norte., JOHN F. NORTHCOTT, JR., and ROBERT PATRICK NORTHCOTT, respondents. Hermenegildo A. Prieto and Antonio Foronda for petitioners. Manuel V. San Jose and Arturo B. Cristi for respondents. RESOLUTION CASTRO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the amended decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, in its civil case 4235, declaring valid and effective the redemption made by the private respondents, John F. Northcott, Jr. and Robert Patrick Northcott, of a parcel of land purchased by the petitioner Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association, Inc. at a public auction sale. The essential facts are not controverted. The Northcotts were the owners of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title 931 of the land records of Ilocos Norte. For tax delinquency, the land, which had an assessed value of P40,300, was sold at public auction by provincial treasurer Pedro Cabildo on December 27,1963 to the petitioner Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association, Inc. for the sum of P6,326. The certificate of sale, together with the final bill of sale, was registered on December 29, 1965. Thru their administrator, Jose Francisco, the Northcotts sought redemption of the land, and accordingly tendered to Cabildo the sums of P5,647.60 on January 21, 1966, P676.30 on February 7, 1966 and P2,553.98 on February 15, 1966, or the total amount of P8,877.88 including interests. Because the vendee association resisted the redemption, the Northcotts instituted civil case 4235; after joinder of the only issue the timeliness of the redemption the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. The respondents Northcotts (plaintiffs below) received a copy of the adverse decision on August 30, 1968. They filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on September 21, 1968. Upon an opposition to the approval of the record on appeal, the court ordered its amendment on October 28, 1968. On January 9, 1969, which was the date set for hearing for the approval of the record on appeal, the court suspended the said hearing until the resolution of a motion for reconsideration filed by the Northcotts on January 2, 1969. The

association opposed the motion. On January 18, 1969 the respondent court rendered an amended decision declaring valid and effective the redemption made by the Northcotts of the land in question. The petitioners appealed the amended decision to this Court; pursuant to our resolution dated February 6, 1960, they filed the present petition for review. We gave due course to the petition on March 13, 1970, and the case was submitted for decision on February 23, 1971. On August 8, 1973, thru new counsels, the parties filed, and moved for the approval of, a compromise agreement which recites as follows: 1. That for himself and in behalf of the Northcott Family, Robert P. Northcott filed a Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch I, against the Ilocos Norte Coconut Producers Association in Civil Case No. 4235 for Ownership and which was appealed later by the defendant Association in the Supreme Court and now pending therein under G.R. No. L31865, regarding the Dungon-Dungon Estate, situated in the Municipalities of Burgos, and Bangui, Ilocos Norte; 2. That both parties in this case now on appeal before the Supreme Court have donated the entire land in litigation to the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte, with the exception of 14 hectares thereof retained by and for them in equal shares of 7 hectares each, copy of said deed of donation is hereto attached as part of this Compromise Agreement, and the Provincial Government has immediately possession the land donated to it upon the execution of this instrument; 3. That both parties in this case before the Supreme Court have mutually agreed to have the case dismissed in view of the donation already issued by both parties in favor of the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte. On August 30, 1973 a "Manifestation" was filed by the law firm of San Jose, Cristi, Enriquez & San Jose, alleging,inter alia, that Atty. Manuel V. San Jose is the counsel of record of the Northcotts who had retained him on a contingent fee of 60% of all lands and properties which Atty. San Jose might recover for them; that the said lawyer had rendered services and spent considerable amounts pursuant to their retainer contract; that there is also an attorney's lien charged on the subject property in favor of one Atty. Manolo Tolentino; that Atty. San Jose has not been paid any amount; and that the donation made by Robert P. Northcott is intended to defraud him of his attorney's fee. Required to comment on the "Manifestation," Robert P. Northcott stated as follows:

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In connection with the retainer contract dated December 22, 1969, wherein sixty per cent (60%) as retainer's fee will be given to my counsel, since then and until now, no property whatsoever has yet been recovered, received or delivered to me from the cases, so that there is nothing from which the 60% could be taken and given by me to my counsel; in other words, the 60% is only collectible if any property is recovered or received. This is the same situation with Atty. Manolo Tolentino, who never recovered anything. When the Lower Court set aside its original decision, it was already outside the reglementary period, so that the Appellate's opinion, most probably, will be against me, and I will not be able to realize anything except by virtue of the compromise agreement which was submitted for approval by this Honorable Tribunal in the interest of justice and equity. By resolution of August 30, 1973 the Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte took note of the aforequoted compromise agreement and expressed its gratitude to the parties for donating the land to the province. The claim for attorney's fees does not render infirm the to agreement and is no obstacle to its approval, for a client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. 1 However, since it is not disputed that Atty. Manuel V. San Jose had rendered legal services (although short of recovery by the Northcotts of any property) as stipulated in the retainer contract, and the non-recovery may in the very least be partially attributable to the Northcotts' entering into the compromise agreement, it is but fair and just that the said lawyer be compensated for his services on aquantum meruit basis and, to assure the payment thereof, that a lien be constituted in favor of Atty. San Jose on the 7 hectares retained by the Northcotts under the deed of donation, without prejudice to the immediate effectivity of the compromise agreement. ACCORDINGLY, the compromise agreement is approved, and the parties are hereby enjoined to comply faithfully with its terms. After this resolution shall have become final, let the record be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte which is hereby ordered to hear and determine, on the basis of quantum meruit, the amount of the attorney's fee that may be due to Atty. Manuel V. San Jose. Let the corresponding lien be constituted upon the 7-hectare land retained by the respondents Northcotts under the deed of donation. No costs. Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE vs. REMEGIO ESTEBIA, defendant-appellant.

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

FERNANDO, J.: What is before this Court is the automatic review of a lower court decision convicting the accused and sentencing him to death. Its correctness is to be tested in the light of the principal contention that the plea of guilty of the accused under the circumstances disclosed did not suffice for the lower court's judgment of conviction. There is, as will hereinafter be made evident, justification for such a stand as a reading of the transcript would indicate that there were positive and categorical statements denying culpability by the accused in the course of answering questions asked by the lower court. Accordingly, the conviction should be reversed and the case remanded. The information under which the accused was arraigned reads as follows: "That on or about the 7th day of June, 1966, in the afternoon, in Bo. Gobarogwan, Municipality of Mondragon, Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, actuated by lust and with lewd designs and by means of force and intimidation, and with the use of deadly weapon locally known as "depang" did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Felisa Buenaobra, 26 years old, an unmarried woman of good reputation, against the will and consent of the latter. That in the commission of the crime, the following aggravating circumstances were present: (1) in an uninhabited place; and (2) recidivism, the accused having been convicted by final judgment before the Honorable Court of First Instance, Branch IV, Catarman, Samar, in Criminal Case No. C-445 for Forcible Abduction, on May 18, 1959, convicting the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Six (6) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to Twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P500.00 and to pay the costs." This information filed by an assistant provincial fiscal on August 26, 1966 arose from a complaint for rape against the accused by the offended party, Felisa Buenaobra, dated June 21, 1966. The arraignment was held on August 26, 1966 in the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch IV, then presided by Judge Manuel R. Pamaran. The accused was represented by an attorney de oficio, Gabriel de Guia. After the counsel de oficio stated that the accused would want to enter a plea of guilty, the lower court twice asked him whether such was the case, after informing him that the penalty imposed could be death. Twice the accused answered in the affirmative. 1 He was then informed by the presiding judge that in order to give him enough time to deliberate maturely on such a grave matter, he was given up to 2:00 o'clock that afternoon. Accordingly, when the session was resumed, he was asked "what is his stand now?" This was the reply of his lawyer: "Upon arrival, this representation inquired from the accused, after having been duly informed by the Court of the effect of the plea of guilty, and he still makes his decision to proceed with his plea of guilty as stated this morning to this Court." 2 When the accused was asked directly whether such manifestation of the lawyer was true, the accused categorically affirmed "Yes, sir." 3 Then, through the court interpreter, this question was put to him: "Are you guilty or not?" The answer: "Guilty." 4 Thus far, it would seem that the accused did really intend to enter such a plea, but what transpired in the subsequent questioning would, at the very least, raise doubts on the matter.

The court wanted to find out why he entered the plea of guilty. This was his response: "To be candid, sir, I would have not entered the plea of guilty." 5 When the question was repeated, he answered: "Because I already asked the woman to marry her. What was lacking was our marriage." 6 Again, when queried as to his plea of guilt, he spoke of the real reason, which was not an admission of culpability: "Because, I cannot do anything, sir, because I cannot fight this case as I am very poor." 7 He was given the opportunity to elaborate by the court stating that he would be furnished counsel de oficio. What came from him in effect was a denial that the crime of rape was committed: "To tell the truth also, sir, in this case when it happened it is not true that I raped her. We were at that time going to town to buy our necessities. It so happened that my supposed brother-in-law, a younger brother of the woman, desires that another person marry her. As a matter of fact, I was even wounded. The first slash blow I received was this one. (Witness showing a scar extending one finger at the lower left scapula and about 1 centimeter wide)." 8 When pressed further why he had to plead guilty, if what he said was true, he had an explanation: "Because I had already a previous case, and I believe that the government will still prosecute me." 9 The lower court, desirous of further clarification, informed the accused that he could reconsider his plea and that he would be given a lawyer so that he would have a fair trial. All that was said in reply was: "I submit myself to the discretion of the Court." 10 When pressed to be specific on the matter, he categorically stated: "I would desire not to plead guilty in this case if I have the funds or money to pay for this." 11 There would still, however, appear to be some slight confusion in the mind of the accused, for when reminded that he did not have to pay a single centavo, he surprisingly came out with the statement that "he would plead guilty to the charge." 12 At that stage, he was reminded again that the penalty imposed would be death. 13 Then and there, in open court, the decision now on review was rendered, with the accused sentenced to death, the crime being one of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, attended by the two aggravating circumstances of uninhabited place and recidivism, which was offset by the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty. This Court, as announced, is of a different mind. The plea, considering the totality of the replies made by the accused to the questions propounded by the lower court, could not in law be said to be one of guilt. The conviction cannot stand. 1. The principal error assigned, as set forth in the very able brief of counsel de oficio, Atty. Gonzalo W. Gonzalez, is that the lower court did not fully inform the accused of the consequences of a plea of guilt. In a recent opinion promulgated a year ago, 14 this Court speaking through Justice Dizon, there is this timely reminder to trial judges as to the course of conduct to be followed whenever an accused in a capital offense enters such a plea. Thus: "We have gone over the record and We find that the motion for new trial mentioned heretofore is justified. The present being one for murder for which the defendant was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, We find it proper to invite the attention of the court a quo and of all trial courts in general to what We said in People v. Apduhan, G.R. L-19491, August 30, 1968 and People v. Solacito, G.R. L-29209, August 25, 1969 on the matter of what the trial court should do upon arraignment of a defendant charged with a capital offense, before he is allowed to enter a plea of guilty." 15 In People v. Apduhan, 16 Justice Castro, for the Court, did properly stress the need for such care and circumspection in these words: "Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend the trial judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the entry of an improvident plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan,

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notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a counsel de oficio and hence presumed to have been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the accused clearly and fully understood the seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the penalty attached to it. When the accused proposed to confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned him that the death penalty might be imposed despite his plea of guilty. As aforementioned, when it appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge Alo re-opened the case to determine with definitiveness the nature of his plea. The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge of the significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial judges who must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." 17 In People v. Solacito, 18 there is this realistic appraisal of the matter by the Chief Justice: "No comparable assurance is imparted by defendant's affirmative answer to the questions propounded by the lower court "whether he understands the meaning of a plea of guilty and whether he is admitting all the material averments in the information." The questions were, apparently, formulated in such a technical language that a layman is likely to miss the far-reaching implications thereof. There is every reason to believe that the accused, who claims to be an "ice-plant delivery boy" is not capable of understanding the precise connotation of the term "material averments" of the information, used by His honor the trial Judge, without any explanation thereof, which, seemingly, was not given." 19 There is, in addition, this equally relevant excerpt from People v. Arpa, 20 where Justice Teehankee, as ponente, after referring to the early cases of United States v. Talbanos 21 and United States v. Rota, 22 quoted with approval this excerpt from People v. Bulalake: 23 "It is of course true that the taking of such evidence is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. Nevertheless, inasmuch as judgments of conviction imposing the extreme penalty of death are subject to review by the Supreme Court as law and justice shall dictate, whether the defendant appeals or not, which automatic review neither the Court nor the accused could waive or evade, it would seem that the proper and prudent course to follow where the accused enters a plea of "guilty" to capital offenses specially where he is an ignorant person with little or no education, is to take testimony not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea." 24 Tested by such authoritative pronouncements, it would appear that the lower court, while not lacking in awareness of the proper procedure to be followed in the event that the plea of the accused is one of guilt, ought, in the light of the answers made, to have called to the stand witnesses to ascertain exactly what did really transpire. 2. In that sense, the principal error assigned is not without basis. Moreover, precisely because of the line of questioning pursued, the answers elicited from the accused did cast enough doubt as to his intention to accept culpability. There were explicit statements made that cannot be interpreted as other than a denial that he was liable for the crime of rape imputed to him. It has been the constant, uninterrupted holding of this Court from United States v. Dineros 25 that the essence of such plea "is that the accused, on arraignment, admits his guilt, freely, voluntarily, and with a full knowledge of the consequences and the meaning of his act." 26 As further elaborated by Justice Carson, who likewise penned the opinion in the subsequent case of United

States vs. Jamad: 27 "The effect of that ruling is to make it clear that the doctrine just referred to is not applicable unless the plea of "guilty" is in truth and in fact made under the conditions indicated, that is to say on arraignment, freely and voluntarily, as an express admission of the guilt of the accused of the offense with which he is charged, and with full knowledge of the consequences and the meaning of his act. A mere formal plea of "guilty" made under compulsion, or under any condition other than those just indicated will not suffice." 28 There is need, then, for such a categorical declaration by the accused that he is guilty of the crime charged, one made with full knowledge of the consequences that such an admission would entail. The plea entered in this case was not impressed with such an attribute. To so construe the statements of the accused, characterized by inconsistencies and express disclaimers of guilt, as amounting to an acknowledgment of criminal liability, would be to disregard what has so long and so constantly been adhered to. 29 There is force in the observation that the Constitution cannot be satisfied with anything less. 30 It presumes the innocence of the accused; it is imperative then that the fact of guilt be demonstrated by competent and credible evidence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused could, of course, dispense with the need of proof by the express admission at his arraignment that he is guilty of the offense charged. There must be a clear and categorical showing, though, that such indeed was his intention. The plea of guilt must be unequivocal. It must not give rise to contrary interpretations. Unfortunately, that is what happened in this case. The lower court should not have been satisfied that the accused did in fact plead guilty. Thus, his judgment of conviction cannot stand. 3. With the conclusion thus reached there is no need to pass upon the other three errors assigned by the accused to the effect that the lower court should not have appreciated the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place, should not have imposed the death penalty, and should not have considered plea of guilt as an admission of the allegations in the amended information. WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of August 26, 1966, convicting the accused of the crime of rape with the use of a deadly weapon and sentencing him to death, is set aside, and the case remanded to it for further proceedings in conformity with law. Without pronouncement as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur. Dizon and Castro, JJ., are on official leave.

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AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANTONIO M. LLORENTE and LIGAYA P. SALAYON, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyers oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.[1] Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the Senate in that election. Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), [2]respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs. Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath. Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12 canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue. In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was done under their control and supervision. On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit.[3] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c). It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,[4] this Court set aside the

resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents. Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000. Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct. First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c)[5] and, therefore, the filing of such motion before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that, assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999 resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c). The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,[6] in which this Court held: Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[7] On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15 -day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c), although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it. Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days.[8] The delay may be overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. [9] For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy[10] or prescription[11] or with procedure like verification of pleadings[12] and prejudicial questions[13] have no application to disbarment proceedings.

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Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed six,[14] four,[15] and three[16] days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious. Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them, such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents.[17] The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is required to establish liability. [18] As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial notice of by the Court [19] is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto, [20] the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the SoVs. This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.[21] In rejecting this allegation and ordering respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said: There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22] Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs[23] but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101 precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18 SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those indicated in the SoVs.[24]Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as

reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their correctness is belied by the certification which reads: WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________ this _______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added) Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein. Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [25] However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.[26] Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision of Canon 6 , this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to do no falsehood. Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better expressed in Sabayle v. Tandayag[27] in which this Court said: There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . .[28] It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust. Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service.[29] Under the circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient.

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WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

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FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. L-9609. March 9, 1956.] OTILLO R. GOROSPE and VITALIANO GOROSPE, Petitioners, vs. MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, CEFERINA SAMU, FRANCISCO DE LA FUENTE, ET AL., Respondents.

DECISION BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to set aside an order of Respondent judge rendered on August 2, 1955 in criminal case No. 29736 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ceferina Samu, et al., pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting the motion ofDefendants to disqualify the counsel for the private prosecution to intervene in behalf of the offended party. On October 6, 1954, Petitioners filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan against Respondents Ceferina Samu, Ester Campus alias Rosa Lopez, Carmelita de la Cruz alias Josefina Dizon, and the General Indemnity Co., Inc., to annul certain contracts entered into by the latter and to recover the damages they suffered as a consequence thereof. Upon the initiative of Petitioners, an action for estafa through falsification of a private document was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the same Respondents, with the exception of the insurance company, who, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Ester Campus filed a petition in the criminal case praying that the counsel for the offended parties be prevented from intervening on the ground that the latter have already filed a civil action for the annulment of the same documents involved in the criminal case and for the recovery of damages resulting therefrom, and as such they have no right nor authority to assist the fiscal in the prosecution of the case. The trial court found the petition meritorious and disauthorized the private prosecutor to intervene in behalf of the offended parties. A motion to reconsider the order was filed which was denied in an order entered on August 2, 1955. To set aside this order, the present petition for certiorari has been interposed. It appears that, upon the instance of Petitioners, an action for estafa through falsification of a private document was filed by the city fiscal of Manila against Respondents Ceferina Samu, Ester Campus, Carmelita de la Cruz and Francisco de la Fuente who, upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charge. It likewise appears that before the institution of the criminal case Petitioners filed an action against the same Respondents for annulment of the same documents involved in the criminal case for damages resulting from their execution. The attorneys for the offended parties entered their appearance in the criminal case but, upon petition of Respondent Ester Campus, they were prevented from doing so on the ground that, the offended parties having already instituted a civil action, they have no right nor authority to be represented in the criminal case. Has Respondent judge abused his discretion in issuing the order of disqualification?

Section 15, Rule 106 provides that Unless the offended party has w aived the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it after the termination of the criminal case cralaw he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense. The wording of the law is clear. It states that an offended party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense if he has not waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute it. The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he has waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that by such action his interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. This is our ruling in the decisions hitherto rendered in this jurisdiction interpreting the above provision of our rules of court. In People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil, 676, this court said that the offended party may, as of right, intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but then only when, from the nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action thereof has not by him been waived or expressly reserved. (Italics supplied.) The same ruling was reiterated in People vs. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026 and People vs. Capistrano, 90 Phil., 823. In the former case, we said, The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case if he has waived his right to institute a civil action arising from the criminal act, or has reserved or, a fortiori, already instituted the said civil action, is that he has no special interest in the prosecution of the criminal action. (Italics supplied.) And in another case we likewise said that since the offended party has already filed a civil action arising from the criminal act, he has no right to intervene in the prosecution of the case (People vs. Olavides, 80 Phil., 280; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary45 Off. Gaz., 3834). It therefore appears from the foregoing that an offended party losses his right to intervene in the prosecution of a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute it, but also when he has actually instituted the civil action even if he has not made the waiver or reservation above adverted to. This ruling is further strengthened by Article 33 of the new Civil Code which provides that In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party, and that such action may proceed independently of the criminal and for its determination preponderance of evidence would suffice. The present case comes within the purview of this provision. Petition is denied, with costs against Petitioners. Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

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G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON anddefendant-appellant. PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended vs. HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. * Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego. Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson. Office of the Solicitor General for appellee. party-appellee,

Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer. Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads: I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment. This is signed by the auditor. Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher. Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him): Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No. ................................. CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson." Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers. The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances: (a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).

AQUINO, J.: In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of P57,048.23. The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the governor's representative. The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for public works projects. Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer.

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(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged. (c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the company to the provincial government (d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their genuine signatures. (e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words "Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office. (f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18, 1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature. (g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his signatures. (h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10). The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible. Other five forged voucher. Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed payments of certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified. These five vouchers are the following: (1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).

(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P) (3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q). (4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R). (5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S). As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who handcarried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's office the papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented in evidence. Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious. The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the provincial government. Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22 Sendaydiego's brief).

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The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were handcarried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD). Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69. Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW). From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC). Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers. The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor. Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine. In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows: 1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.

2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253. 3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254. After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the following penalties: (1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount; (2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and (3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount. Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court. Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows: The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565). The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final

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judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23). The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8). When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court). The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394). The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583). In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).

The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the following.Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego. Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable. Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence. In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political selfinterest. Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970. At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty. Millora replied that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor. The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969). Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No. 23350). After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated November 4, 1969. At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).

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At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The trial court granted the motion (155 tsn). The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant fiscal were present together with the private prosecutor. Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code). The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction. Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not complex. The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance between" the two. Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to that unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969). Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969). The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of the

symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account Number". The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson. The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier. The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments were received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate. Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks would have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with Samson. Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer. The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13). Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the treasurers inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn). Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the facts proven by

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the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers. The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the same as its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith. We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial. Samson's appeal. Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy. As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had conducted the preliminary investigation. Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not show that he had already prejudged their guilt. Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits. We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary investigation. The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a

preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated ( por delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice. Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signatures. Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and the same person (Exh. 20). After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic signatures. But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof. The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The surname Samson is encircled. On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the provincial government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes. Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official receipts of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970). Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).

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Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969). Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in the vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970). The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers. The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial government and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S). As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is not correct. We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The

trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26). Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson signed the vouchers). Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is no proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH). These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH). And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence fictitious sales of construction materials. Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23. The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct. Recapitulations. In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor had approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried Construction Co. On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office. These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing

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in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described in the six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales. The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved. The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but which were intrinsically fake. Penalties. The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation through falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong. The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used as a means to commit malversation. In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43). In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any labor. It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses which must be punished separately. The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.

In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation. The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a single criminal impulse. Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956). And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve offenses. As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer. He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457). Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil. 245). Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000. For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and medium. For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum. For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.

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In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to the imprisonment penalty. In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate sentence. WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and six crimes of malversation. In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following penalties: For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of three thousand pesos. For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years ofreclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252). For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years ofreclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254). For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L33253). For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as

minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayorminimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L33253). For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253). In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peas, 68 Phil. 533). The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil. 58). The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23. Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs. SO ORDERED. Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur. Fernando, J., took no part.

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