B-Series Temporal Order in Dgen's Theory of Time Author(s): Dirck Vorenkamp Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and

West, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 387-408 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399395 . Accessed: 09/08/2012 16:33
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B-SERIESTEMPORALORDER IN DOGEN'S THEORY OF TIME

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controversial J.M.E. McTaggart's argumentagainstthe realityof time has since it was firstpublished in 1908. promptedmany counterarguments Richard Gale says thatthe responsesto McTaggart are in agreementwith either the so-called "A," "B," or "Either/or" theories of time.1 Each of these theories is based on the idea that time is either "dynamic" or "static" (and only dynamic or static). If this is true, then as a group they exhaust all possible ways to conceive of time, and any theory of time must include elements of one or more of the three responses to McTaggart. Given the argumentsabove, and the fact that Dogen also wrote about the natureof time, one is led to the question, "Do Dogen's views of time fall anywhere within the "A-theory,""B-theory,"or "Either/orBecause the question is too broad, as theory"responsesto McTaggart"? stated,for a work of this length, I proposeto examine D6gen's teachings in lightof the "B-theory" responseto McTaggart. This essay will show that Dogen's views on time do contain elements of each of the four main tenets of the B-theory.Furthermore, in pointing out these aspects of his thought,we will find that the assumption of consistency that has characterized modern interpretations of view of time reevaluation. In order to show Dogen's requires why this is true, we will brieflyexamine McTaggart's originalargument,and then summarizeeach of the four main tenets of the B-theorywhile asking whetheror not Dogen's theoryof time reflectssimilarideas. The term "B-theory"is defined according to the synopsis of the Btheorist'spositionsprovidedby RichardGale.2The details of that definition will follow shortly.As for the phrase"Dogen's theory of time," it is defined as those teachings found in the Sh6obgenzo that deal with the concepts of uji, hoi, and/or nikon. Eachof these three termswill in turn be defined before they are used to supporta conclusion.3 McTaggart's Argument In order to understandthe B-theory,it is necessary to summarize work McTaggart's originalargument.First publishedin 1908, McTaggart's that time is unreal.4 The starts two basic argues argument by establishing aspects of time. The first aspect is associated with the dynamic flux called time's passage, and with our tensed ways of both conceiving and speakingof time. Accordingto this way of viewing time, things are said to exist in the future,then become present,and finallyenterthe past. It is this mode of time wherein the futureand past are said to differontologcalls this aspect of time the A-series.5 ically. McTaggart

Lecturer in the HistoryDepartment at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

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Evenif events Yet,time also seems to have a staticorderor structure. do pass fromfutureto presentto past,they do so with an orderthat never seems to change. That order is the relationshipbetween "earlierthan" and "laterthan."6The "earlierthan/later than" relationshipis tenseless, for the statementthat an event is earlierthan another is not dependent upon the particular temporal frame of reference from which it issues. is the Such reHere, emphasis on time as a set of relativerelationships. if be could viewed from a outside lations, they time, would position presenta patternof things and times laid out like a mosaic. Eventhough Grunbaumholds that such a patterndoes not necessarilyconstitutethe of time, it is neverthelessfixed as regardsthe temporal hypostatization between the individualcomponents.7McTaggart called this relationships the B-series.8 The issue at the heartof McTaggart's work is how these two ways of time can related to of be one another.McTaggart firststates conceiving that events cannot undergo changes in their B-relations.Dbgen's birth is earlier than mine, and that is a tenseless fact that will not change. Accordingly,the only changes that an event can undergo are A-series changes in which the event changes fromfutureto presentto past.9 then argues for the unrealityof the A-seriesbased upon McTaggart the notion that, assumingthere are no firstor last events in the series, then every event must simultaneouslyshare the mutuallyincompatible of future,present,and past.10Forexample, in the year 1980, attributes the year 1981 was the present-future. Such a state is contradictory and, to unreal. therefore,according McTaggart, To claim, however, that any event has only one of these attributes at a given time and successively, that is, that an event X was future, is present, and will be past, invokes an infinite regress. According to such a statement means that at a past time, event X was McTaggart, future,and at a futuretime it will be past.11It is true that the firstcontradiction has been explained away, but only by creating a secondlevel temporalorder within which the firstorder must exist. The statetense itself relies ments that event X is, was, or will be some particular upon a tense for comprehension.Assumingthat the goal is to prevent incompatibletense overlaps, then the second order itself must be reorderjust as the firstis relatedto the second. At latedto a "higher"-level no point are we freedfromthis necessity, and so the regressis infinite.12 thereforeconcludes thatthe tenses are logically incompatible McTaggart and that the A-seriesis unreal. holds that "realtime" needs both the A-seriesand Since McTaggart B-seriesto exist, he concludes that "realtime" mustbe nonexistent.This are more basic than Bconclusion restsupon the notion that A-relations relationsbecause (1) all B-relations can be reducedto A-seriesrelations East &West with no loss of meaning, and (2) the same is not true in reverse.Once Philosophy

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has demonstratedthat the A-series is unreal, then it follows McTaggart that the B-seriesis unreal,and so, too, "realtime" itself.13 As previouslystated, philosophershave taken three approaches to answer McTaggart. The so-called B-theoryis one such answer. Richard Gale statesthat there are four basic tenets that constitutethe B-theory.14 They are: (1) The A-seriesis reducibleto the B-serieswith no loss of meaning. (2) The passage of time, or "temporalbecoming" is psychological since it necessarilyinvolves a B-relation to a perceivingsubject. All events are hence the B-series is objective. (3) equally real; in termsof B-relations alone. (4) Change is understandable While analyzing these statements according to the summarythat Gale has provided,we can ask whetherthese tenets, or partsof of them, are found anywhere in D6gen's view of time. The First Tenet of B-theoryand Dogen's View of Language Concerning the first tenet, B-theoristsclaim that the tenses past, present, and future do not refer to ontological times, but are actually relativeto events and/orevent expressionsfortheirmeaning.15 The terms "is past," "is present,"and "is future"are actually "tenselesstwo-place predicates"that take as their ground some event or expression.16For example, the phrase "is past"-as in "1980 is past"-actually means "1980 is past at some other time." It is correct, then, for me to say in 1988 that "1980 is past,"but the same sentence is false in 1978. Hence, the futurity, argue B-theorists, presentness,or pastnessof an event is not an ontological fact, but only an expressionof that event's relationship to another event or expression. That two-place relationshipis a tenseless truththat holds for all times and framesof referencefromwhich it might be uttered. Regardless,for example, of the year in which I make the statement,it is, and always will be truethat 1980 is past at 1988. In light of this, B-theorists are more fundamentalthan Asay that B-statements statementsand that all A-statementscan be "reduced"without loss of meaningto B-statements. use two primary methodsof reducing Accordingto Gale, B-theorists A-statements to B-statements. The firstis the so-called psychological reduction, and this will be considered shortly.The second is the linguistic reduction. 7 The linguisticreductionclaims that statementsassertingan event's tense are relativeto the speakersince they necessarilyindicate and rely upon the speaker'stemporal relationshipto the reportedevent.18 Such statementsare said to be "token-reflexive" because the statement"1980 is past" actually means "1980 is past relativeto this utterance(token)." An important point to notice in the modified (i.e., "reduced")statement is that it makes no mention of the currenttemporalstatusof the token- DirckVorenkamp 389

reflexive. That is why B-theorists claim that the reduced statement is timelessly, or tenselessly, true and freely repeatable.19 B-theorists who use this method claim that the sole purpose of A-series statements is to express a B-series relation between the expressed event and the utterance (token).20 Does Dogen ever utilize a similar reduction? Certainly Dbgen never spoke of "reduced A-series relations." But, did he "reduce" events to linguistic expressions in order to recognize language itself as a "reflexive" vehicle referring to uji?21 When we examine Dogen's statements about the nature of language and words, a type of implicit token-reflexive argument is apparent. First,on the nature of words, Dogen had this to say: Ifthe Buddha'sspeech is shallow, turningthe flower mustalso be shallow. If the Buddha'sspeech is only letters and sounds, that is not the words of learningthe BuddhaDharma.Althoughit is known that speech is lettersand sounds, it is not knownthatto the Buddhait is not just lettersand sounds.22 ... if it [enlightenment]is not speech, you cannot realize the Buddha's when speech is manifested,that itself is the Buddha's progress.... Therefore, progress.23 The Dharma-nature speaking the spoken of by Baso is the Dharma-nature Dharma-nature.24 and also: are The capabilityto suggestthatbeings who do not leave the Dharma-nature is or four It three even not the Dharma-nature may accomplish something. new levels of Dharma-nature. Speaking,answering,using,and actingas if it is not the Dharma-nature mustbe the Dharma-nature.25 What we see in all these quotations is that Dogen does not just conceive of language as merely a verbal representation of some other feature of reality. Language is not purely symbolic of what we think and perceive and hence has some separate existence from these thoughts and perceptions. For Dogen, language has another level of meaning. At the secondary level, words are nothing except what they express. As Dogen said, even "the nature of things spoken of by Baso is the nature of things spoken of by the nature of things." Dogen emphasizes the importance of speech and words because he understands them as the Buddha-nature itself.26 Accordingly, the dualism that characterizes our general notions of the relationship between expression events and the expressed event is absent in his view-as he states above, "there are no mere words with the Buddha." If it is appropriate to apply this expanded definition to the term "reduction," then Dogen can be said to claim that all reality is "token-reflexive." Note, though, that this claim does not entail the assertion that Dogen PhilosophyEast& West is giving special status to linguistic expressions. In fact, quite the contrary

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is true. The point is that linguisticexpressionsare no more nor less privGiven the interrelationships ileged than any otheraspect of being-time.27 between dharma-positions as elements of being-time(which will be discussed shortly),D6gen's insistence on including language as a form of is in fact an affirmation of the tokenexpression of the Buddha-nature reflexivenatureof that Buddha-nature. since Dogen's concept of uji clearly intertwinesbeing Furthermore, and time, we can conclude that this type of "token-reflexivity" means not just that the past and futureas concepts are relativeto a particular statement,but that tensed and nontensed locutions are token-reflexive, because the phraseitselfmust, in a sense, be the times to which it refers. In other words, the expression event's expression of past or future is exactly where these tenses (i.e., past and future)are found. The statement "1980 is past" exists at the moment it is uttered,and in that statementmustlie the referencedevent (i.e., "1980"), not merelyas a referent, but as a factual (i.e., actuallyexisting now) component of the event. Of course this sounds fantasticalto anyone acquaintedwith modern Western language theory. But D6gen's thought is grounded in the concept of sunyataand specifically in the Hua-yen school's elaborationof it.28Since linguisticexpressionsare neithermore nor less important than otherphenomena,there is, then, an interdependent between relationship words and what they signify precisely because both are expressionsof the Buddha-nature. If, in Dogen's view, words are in fact what they signify,then we can certainlysay that not only are A-series statementsreducibleto B-series statementswith no loss of meaning, but the act of the reduction itself adds meaningto the "token"because the token itselfis then also seen as the symbolized. The Second Tenet of B-theoryand Dogen's View of TemporalBecoming The second element of B-theoryis that temporalbecoming is subuse one of two differentmethods jective. Accordingto Gale, B-theorists to argue for an a priorisubjectivepresent in the A-series.The firstis the token-reflexive argument, which we have just covered. The second method is the egocentric-particular analysis,which attemptsto show the mind-dependenceof A-determinations.29 the tenses are relativeto the perceptionof Accordingto B-theorists, some subject in much the same way that they are token-reflexive.In what is past, present,or future,we must draw definingor understanding a referenceto a mental event. Forexample, in explainingwhat is past, we will typically referto a memory;for the present,a sense datum;for the future,an expectationor anticipation.In each case the tense, or that object which supposedly is tensed, is relativeto a mental event. It folthat because the tenses are psychological,then so, Dirck lows, say B-theorists, Vorenkamp 391

too, is temporal becoming.30 Is there anything similar to this in Dogen's thought? Inspeakingof passage,to thinkthe place [of passage]is outsidethe mind,and that the dharmasthat can pass, pass to the east past a hundredthousand worldsover a hundredthousandeons, that is not devotingyourselfonly to the studyof the BuddhaWay.31 The three heads and eight arms [i.e., the stateof unenlightenment] pass as my being-time.Althoughit seems to be "there,"it is Now (nikon).32 time. ... every being in the whole world,while being lined up, is an individual Becausethey are being-time,they are my being-time.33 One must study that if there is not now the passage of my utmostexertion, then there is not the manifestation or passageof one dharmaor one thing.34 In each of the quotations above, Dogen is clearly making a statement concerning the relativity of time and passage to the individual subject. In the case of B-theorists, their contention is clear: in stating that temporal becoming is subjective, B-theorists mean that it is relative to, a product of, the individual mind and is not an objective feature of the cosmos. Although we see that similar statements can be found in the Shobogenzd, the matter is not that simple. In many places Dogen speaks of time's passage without making reference to a subject. For example: You should learnthatpassageoccurs withoutanythingexternal.Forexample, spring'spassage is necessarilythatwhich passes throughspring.35 Uji has the virtueof passage. Itpasses fromtoday to tomorrow,it passes from today to yesterday,it passes fromyesterdayto today.36 On the face of it, these passages indicate that Dogen also sees temporal becoming as an objective feature of reality unrelated to the subject. But is this the whole story? Two interrelated questions need to be answered before we can decide whether or not "subjective" temporal becoming exists in his thought. First,what does "subjective" mean? And secondly, what is the nature of the temporal interaction between subject and object? To answer these questions, it is first necessary to know what Dogen meant by dharma-positions. Dharma-positions designate the spatial and temporal characteristics of a particular, discrete aspect of uji.37 Uji itself is a four-dimensional matrix of the three spatial dimensions and time. Each particular phenomenon is a four-dimensional point of space-time and constitutes a unique thing-time distinct from all other thing-times (i.e., dharmapositions). For example, a partial description of the dharma-position that is a rock in the garden might include the fact that it is round, about the size of a baseball, gray, located next to the fence, and that it is all West East & these Philosophy things at a particular time. The time of the rock is not defined by

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the movement of the hands of a clock, but by the spatial characteristics that describe it. Dogen calls these particularized, discrete parts of uji, "dharma-positions." Now, if dharma-positions are four-dimensional, and if, as D6gen indicates, they do move relative to one another, then their movement must take place within a second-level temporal order. As J.J.C.Smart has indicated, by definition, space-time entities (i.e., four-dimensional phenomena) must merely exist "en bloc" as a thing defined as having such and such characteristics at such and such a time.38 These are, by definition, tenseless statements, and the concept of change is not a factor. But the definition of movement involves change (or at least the perception of change) in both position and time. In the case of four-dimensional phenomena such as Dogen's dharma-positions, since the definition of any particular thing's position already includes time, then movement must be defined as "something occupies spacetime-1 at ?-1, and spacetime-2 at ?-2." The question mark indicates that some other temporal order is required to account for change. Now we are in a position to answer our two earlier questions by simply asking, "Is there such a second level temporal order in Dogen's views, and if so, how does that affect the interaction between dharma-positions?" You should not understand thattime only flies past.You should not learnthat flying past is time's only ability. If time were [only] given to flying past, it would have to have gaps.39 Dogen states that to conceive of time as only a progression of discrete instants is erroneous. He demonstrates this by pointing out that a linear progression of radically discrete temporal instants is experientially inconsistent.40 The problem is that if time passes us by, then when does the future become the present and then the past? In other words, when does the present moment suddenly cease to be that moment and become a past moment? Central to this issue is a "present now." Everyone intuitively knows what time is, but according to D6gen no one can adequately explain it according to a progression of radically discrete temporal instants. Attempting to do so leaves us with a time that "flies by," and which has "gaps" that cannot be experientially verified. For Dbgen, the view that time only "flies by" is deficient because it fails to recognize the relationship of the past and present to the nikon. The now (konji) under consideration is everyone's [each person's] Now #B1 (nikon).Evenif I make myselfthinkof tens of thousandsof pasts,futures,and Tffi presents,they are now (konji),they are the Now (nikon).Everyone's destiny necessarilyexists now (konji).41 For Dogen, the nikon is that aspect of uji that is ever present and DirckVorenkamp

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mediatingbetween the other tenses. In fact, as he has stated, the future and past exist within the matrixof the nikon. Forexample, the notion of time as a linearontological continuumwould hold that Dogen himselfis in the past, while the year 2000 is entirelyunconnected and in the future. Butas we have seen above, the nikon is used to create a two-place to say that Dogen's existence is relationshipthat makes it appropriate while the year 2000 is what-Now-is-not-yet. what-Now-is-no-longer, The concepts of past and futuretake their meaningfromthe relativerelationshipto that Now (nikon).Consequently,the futureactually exists, mediated by the nikon, as the Now-not-yet;the present exists as the This can be Now-present;and the past exists as the Now-no-longer.42 seen in the where discusses the interclearly Dogen passage below, of the tenses. relationship the future hasnotyet come,and Itis said,the pastlifehasalready perished, the the present does not stay.Thepast is not necessarily already perished, is not is notnecessarily the future necessarily not-staynot-yet-come, present andalready the qualities perished not-yet-come, not-staying, ing.Ifyou learn the reason the not-yetandpresent, as past,future, grasp you mustcertainly andfuture.43 come is past,present, with regardto the present,Dogen says that it is not necessarily First, The presentis not just a fleeting instantforeverpassingus "not-staying." the futureand past and always gone as we tryto "catch it." Similarly, by are not just the "not-yet-come"and "already perished." Instead, all dimensionsof meaningderivedfromthe functhese tenses have further tion of the nikon as the Now common to each. Accordingly,tensed can be viewed as always existing in twoevents (i.e., dharma-positions) "Now" (nikon)as the relativetemporal that take the place relationships than" strucframeof referencefromwhich a B-series,"earlierthan/later ture is generated.The only differencewith the token-reflexive argument discussed above is that these statementseach take the nikon as one of theirtwo parts. But isn'tthis just anotherway of expressinga contradictionin terms? Doesn't this in essence only say that the past, for example, is the stated, isn'tthe "presentpast" contra"presentpast,"and, as McTaggart I In the think dictory? Dogen's case, only correctanswer is yes and no. To understandwhy, and determinewhether temporalpassage is "subjective," we have to take a look at where Dogen locates the nikon. There is a clue in the quotationabove: "The now underconsideration is each person's nikon." In another section of "Uji," Dogen reinforcesthis notion: thetimeof the mountain Iftimeis notthe aspectof comingandgoing,[then] the aspectof comingandgoing, nikon.Iftimemaintains top is being-time's nikonis in the self.44 [then] being-time's

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Two points in this passage are particularly importanthere. Dogen if then time is not time is the nikon of uji, (1) any given says: dynamic, and (2) if time is dynamic, then nikon is in the self. Here the nikon is a twofold function that allows D6gen to speak of both twoperforming place temporal relations and time's passage. In the first case, Dogen states that where passage is not present,then time is all nikon (i.e., uji's mosaic in which nikon).Uji can then be thoughtof as a four-dimensional the temporalrelationshipsbetween the individualdharma-positions are "earlierthan" and "laterthan" (i.e., B-seriesrelations).Inthis sense, because the cosmos is given en bloc as right-Now,as nikon, change is not a factor,and McTaggart's objection about tense overlapsdoes not apply. But,as Dogen states,there is also a sense in which time is dynamic, and in that case, the nikon is "in the self." We can recall two other passages from "Uji"that state:
Inspeakingof passage,to thinkthe place [of passage]is outsidethe mind,and that the dharmasthat can pass, pass to the east, past a hundredthousand worldsover a hundredthousandeons, that is not devotingyourselfonly to the studyof the BuddhaWay.45

and also:
The three heads and eight armspass as my being-time.Althoughit seems to be "there,"it is the nikon.46

When passage is the feature of uji evident to the subject (i.e., any then the nikon seats itself in, and is specific particular dharma-position), In performing this role, nikon can be to, that particular dharma-position. understood as the required second-level temporal order needed for are in themselvesfour-dimensional passage, given that dharma-positions space-time points. When the nikon is performing this second role, Dogen is presenta view of ing temporal becoming that in one sense is similar to the B-theorists. Time'spassage is "subjective"preciselybecause it is relative to the nikon seated in all dharma-positions. Of course, here, "subject" means only an arbitrarily chosen frameof reference,that is, any dharmaposition then acting as the "subjective seat" of the nikon. This helps explain the apparent incongruence between those sections that speak of passage as relative to an individualand those, like the one about springtime's passage, where there is no mentionof an individual.In both cases, however, we might say that a "subject" is present since any can seat the nikon. dharma-position This second role of the nikon, however, also creates problemsin the formof an infiniteregress.Ifthe "objective"dharma-positions constitute four-dimensionalphenomena passing throughthe "subjectiveseat" of the nikon, then that "subjectiveseat" must be a five-dimensionalphe- DirckVorenkamp

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nomenon. Thatfive-dimensionaldharma-position can then in turnonly relative to a six-dimensionaldharma-position. At no point does the pass regressend, and McTaggart's objection would seem to apply. In spite of this problem, however, we can conclude that while pasthe sage is not purely "psychological" in the sense of the B-theorists, does contain to evidence supportthe idea that it is "subSh6obgenz6 jective" (i.e., relativeto any given dharma-position acting as the seat of the nikon).And in the case of either a static or dynamic relationship between events (i.e., dharma-positions), does of the speak D6gen generated as the two-place "earlierthan"and "laterthan." temporalrelationship The ThirdTenetof B-theoryand D6gen's Dynamic Uji The third tenet of B-theorystates that "all events are equally real, hence the B-seriesis objective." Gale states that the objective natureof the B-seriesis a logical entailmentof the subjective natureof temporal tenet number2).47 Of course, the implication becoming (i.e., B-theorist is that if temporal becoming is "only" subjective, then the "real" or mustbe only the B-series. objective temporalrelationship As we have seen, there are places in the Sh6obgenz6 where Dogen as occurringin "my" nikon, speaks of the passage of dharma-positions and in "my" uji. But the notion of passage also occurs in situations notable for their lack of a sentient subject (e.g., "springtimepasses through springtime").Hence, the subjective nature of becoming for Dogen is not a statementabout the "merely"psychological natureof passage, but an affirmationof the dynamic nature of all reality. For Dogen, since the nikon can and does seat itself in any and all dharmaof these dharma-positions that positions, it is in the dynamic interaction subject and object come to define one another.And so, it is precisely the "subjective"natureof becoming as relativeto the nikon that constitutesa kindof objective, two-place, temporalrelationship. But, the logical entailment of this conclusion is that Dbgen has affirmedboth an A-series(the change of events in respect to tense, i.e., temporalbecoming)and a B-series.As we will see below, it is correctto of these two ideas. wonder about the logical compatibility The Fourth Tenet of B-theoryand Dogen's Discrete Dharma-positions in The fourthtenet of B-theorystates that change is understandable alone. Accordingto Gale, this means accountingfor termsof B-relations two types of change.48The firstconcerns changes "in" time. As Gale states, "Whatwe mean by the change of a thing in time is a sequence of successive events all regardedas states of one thing."49 When realityis viewed as a four-dimensional mosaic, we note that the times. Dogen seems to same substancehas differentqualitiesat different East & West in of this idea the Philosophy following passage. speak 396

Firewoodbecomes ashes, and ashes cannot return to firewood.However,you should not understand that ashes are afterand that firewood is before. You should know that firewood dwells in the dharma-position of firewood, and has beforeand after.Althoughfirewoodhas beforeand after,beforeand after are disconnected. Ash is in the dharma-position of ash, and has before and after.50 Dogen starts by saying that there is a temporal progression from firewood to ashes. Obviously the concept of dharma-positions includes different qualitative states of things that we believe are one and the same object. Because these causally related dharma-positions present us with a temporally seamless picture of change "in" time, we commonly say firewood "becomes" ashes. Of course, this should not be construed to mean that D6gen is affirming the idea of changes "in" an enduring substance. His point is simply that spatiotemporally proximate, yet discrete dharma-positions provide a continuity to experience. In this limited sense, D6gen does affirm changes "in" time. The second type of change is called changes "of" time. Changes "of" time are changes in an event's status as future, present, and past. This type of change is found in D6gen's writings, where he speaks of time as if it were constituted of a progression of discrete dharma-positions. The firewood-to-ashes section above is a good example-and some others include: Priorthought,succeeding thought,thoughtsdo not wait for each other. Prior dharma,succeeding dharma,dharmasdo not oppose each other.51 To tell the main point, every being in the whole world, while being lined up, is an individualtime.52 and the section seen earlier, Uji has the virtueof passage. Itpasses fromtoday to tomorrow,it passes from today to yesterday,it passes fromyesterdayto today.53 Sections like these suggest a recurrent temporal passage. There is a sense in which dharma-positions are unrelated; they do not "wait" for each other. When one time is here, the time "before" is no longer here, the time "after" is not yet here, and in combination they can be thought of as being "lined up" like a series. In any case, the idea is of discrete temporal moments succeeding one another in a "linear" fashion as they flow from the future, through the present, and into the past. In this sense, we can say that change is nothing but a change "of" an event's temporal status as it "proceeds" through the three times. A problem that arises here, though, is how one reconciles the idea of changes "of" time with the notion of two-place relations between disconnected dharma-positions. The difference between ash and firewood is obvious. But, just for the sake of argument, what about the difference

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between burningfirewoodat time-1 and burning firewoodat time-2?The differencebetween time-1 and time-2 can be as small a temporalspan as we care to make it. To be consistent with Dogen, we have to say that each of these two times is also an independent dharma-position with before and after. But these correlated dharma-positionswill not in themselves account for the experienced sense of continuity in the passage of time. When and how does time-1 stop being the time presentand time-2 "become" the time present?Itis true,as D6gen stated,thatwe do not experience "gaps"in time's passage. Of course, one mightreasonablyobject to this by sayingthat if there were gaps between dharma-positions, we could never know it. In such a case (assumingan Abhidharmic-type succession of instantswhose flashings are all preciselycoordinatedwith simultaneousflashingsof instants of consciousness),theirexistence is not merelyunknown,but completely unknowable,and we, as Dogen has pointed out, experience only continuity in time's passage. Yet the originalproblemstill remainsbecause Dogen has, in fact, differentiatedbetween different,discrete dharmapositions. In other words, he has said we do know that the various are different.So, again, we have to ask how the exdharma-positions of perience continuityis relatedto discrete,two-place dharma-positions? Several Dogen interpreters have suggested that the nikon plays an role in this regard.54 At firstthought, and in light of what we important have said above, this seems a plausible answer. When discussing the second tenet of B-theory,we saw how B-theorists attemptto reduce the notionof passageto a bipartite relationship dependentupon a token. We also saw how D6gen's nikon can be interpreted as performing the function of such a "token." Depending upon its placement, the nikon both (1) mediates between the tenses as uji's nikon and (2) allows for the passage of dharma-positions through"my" Now. But, even though the nikon is common to both views, we must not confuse the two. As soon as the notion of nikon as a temporalreferentfor the past and the future was introduced,we stopped speaking of passage and startedspeaking only in termsof two-place relations.But,when Dogen spoke of the nikon of the self, that nikon performsan entirelydifferentfunction. By seating itself in any particular (i.e., the "subject"),it allows for dharma-position a passage through that dharma-position'sexperiential Now. This is change in respectto tense (i.e., an A-seriespassage). The fact thatthese types of A-seriesnotions not only exist in Dogen's found alongside B-theory views is problematic thoughtbut are frequently in light of the fact that Western philosophersconsider the two views Since Dogen clearlyconsidersA-seriespassage logically incompatible.55 as essential to his view of time, the A-theoryphrases(and the use of the randomly seated nikon) would seem to mitigate against the B-theory PhilosophyEast& West views we have also found. But is this the case?

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Firstwe should note that descriptivelypointingout these apparently contradictorypositions is not equivalent to assigning priorityto either. Nor does the fact of uncovering an apparent contradiction weaken the validity of the descriptive evidence for the existence of the problem. Nevertheless, this obviously does not answer the question, and we are still left wondering about the consistency of Dogen's theory of time. The fact that the two very differenttypes of assertionsoften occur in close proximityto one another (e.g., the firewood-to-ashespassage) suggeststhat Dogen had some sortof congruentwhole in mind when he utteredthem. This is certainlythe positionof most interpreters of Dogen. Ifwe make the reasonableassumptionsthat Dogen's statementson time are consistent with one another, and probably reflect the influence of his own intellectualtradition,then several options are available in our attemptto explain the problem. The firstoption would involve the claim that these apparentlyconwelltradictorystatementssimply reflect an applicationof Nagarjuna's known tetralemma.Advocates of this view could assert that since the contradictionsare a skillfulapplicationof conventional-leveltruths,the this option suffersfrom textual problem is apparentonly. Unfortunately and philosophicalproblemsthat renderit untenable. First,it is not obvious that D6gen had such a hermeneutic(i.e., a fourfoldnegativedialectic)in mind in the specific case of his discussions on time. Forexample, while it is certainlytruethat Dogen utilizedsuch a dialectic in his discussionof k6ans, readingthe "Uji"fascicle as a whole in lightof an assumedtetralemma structure does not give readyevidence that it reflectsa consistent,widespreaduse of such a device. In fact, the only clear-cut case of the presence of the tetralemmain the "Uji" fascicle occurs in one k6an cited toward the end of the piece. But even there, Dogen's explanationof the k6an does not reflectan applicationof the tetralemma.56 Secondly, even if we still insist on hermeneuticallyapplying the tetralemma,the conclusion of inconsistencystill follows-but for different reasons. Itwould take us too far afield to discuss them in detail here, but suffice it to say that Nagarjuna's use of the tetralemmais ultimately That grounded in an inherentlynormative,a prioritwo-truthsstructure. fact alone renders assertions based on it contradictoryaccording to nonnormative criteriaof validity.57 Anotherpossible option is to explain away the passages containing temporaldiscretenessby relyingon other passagesthat express Hua-yen notions of interpenetration. Earlier it was stated that Dogen's thought is in If that is true,then it is reasonableto view grounded Hua-yenthought. these statementsin a similar light. To do so would entail assertingthat the passage of discrete dharma-positions and the idea of two-place rela- Dirck Vorenkamp 399

tions are related in a mannersimilarto Hua-yenteachings on the interof li and shih. Butthis option, too, is ultimatelyuntenable. relationship The pertinentquestion in this case is not whether Dogen's discussions of time are based on Hua-yen notions-we have alreadyassumed that they are (see note 28 below), instead, it concerns whetheran application of Hua-yen notions of interpenetration can logically resolve the between and incongruencies A-theory B-theoryphrases.The answer, in is no. short, Without strayingtoo far from the topic at hand, the reason is that Hua-yenexplanationsof temporalinterpenetration strugglewith the exfact of assertion of a relativeand periential temporalasymmetry.58 Any Ain a Huabetween and views interdependentrelationship B-theory context would have to be yen predicatedupon first establishinga biand posterior between anterior temdirectional,symmetrical relationship events. Because of time "flows" (i.e., poral temporalasymmetry always toward the future),it is the effect-to-causeaspect of that bidirectional relationshipthat causes the problems. Fa-tsangstrugglesunsuccessfully with this very issue in sections of his Wu-chiao chang.59The Hua-yen failureon this count meansthatultimatelyit cannot adequatelyreconcile the A- and B-theoryviews. A thirdpossible option would involve explainingaway the passages expressing notions of two-place relations by means of the passage of discrete dharma-positions (i.e., negating Hua-yen notions of mutual inand To do this one mustassign greater nonobstruction).60 terpenetration to the sections on discrete ratherthan to significance dharma-positions those on two-place relations. But this option suffersfrom at least two problems. First,there is not only no evidence suggesting Dogen had such a position in mind,but in fact plentyof evidence indicatingthathe was not to the other. Sectryingto subordinateeither view (i.e., A- or B-theory) ondly, this option has the added disadvantageof raisingserious questions about the larger issue of the internal consistency of the whole discussion). Sh6bogenzo (see note 28 for further In lightof the problemswith each of the three alternatives above, we must be open to a fourth option: the real problem on this issue may simply lie with our assumption of consistency. Simply put, Western philosophical views concerning the incompatibilityof the A- and Btheories may be correcteven within the context of traditionalBuddhist philosophy, and Dbgen is thereforeofferingus an inconsistentphilosophy of time. Inany case, what may be mostsignificanthere is the existence of the problem itself. In this fact, Dogen shares the problem with B-theorists. Many A-theoristshave accused B-theoristsof positing a theory that East &West cannot adequatelyaccount for the differencesbetween B-seriesrelated Philosophy
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temporal phenomena and the manner in which we experience time's passage.61 Conclusion We have seen thatthere are elements of B-theory thoughtin Dbgen's time's passage views about time: he viewed Realityas "token-reflexive," and events as existing in as subjective(i.e., relativeto dharma-positions), with one another.62Finally,he objectively real, two-place relationships differentstatesof a thing. analyzed change as relatingto qualitatively But there are also importantareas of divergence between the Btheoristsand Dogen. In claiming that the tenses of expressed events are relativeto the expression, Dogen does not conclude that the past and futureare simply linguisticconventions.Infact, quite the contraryis true: because they are linguisticconventions,they cannot simply be symbols but must be the symbolized itself. In addition, the idea that temporal becoming is "subjective"does not mean that Dogen dismissedit as only "psychological."Instead,throughthe mediationof the nikon, temporal becoming is a notion that standsside by side with the idea of two-place relationsbetween dharma-positions. In outliningsome of the B-theoryelements in Dbgen's philosophyof time, we also discovered a fundamental incongruencythat calls into question the consistency of his views. The problem concerns the relaas discretespace-time phenomena and the tionship of dharma-positions of as a smooth and continuous"flow." Dogen's noexperience passage tion of nikon allows for dynamic interactionbetween dharma-positions but not without entailing the apparently inconsistent notion of tense overlaps.Inaddition,althoughthe nikonhas a functionwithin (1) time as a set of two-place relations,and (2) time as the passagefromthe futureto the past, it does not reconcile the two. Since it is clear that two-place temporalrelationshold between four-dimensional phenomena,temporal becoming continues to be an issue withoutan adequateanswer.

NOTES

This article is dedicated to AlfonsoVerdu. 1 - RichardM. Gale, ed., The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays(GardenCity, New York:Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 70-77. The explanation of McTaggart's position and the summaryof Bare both based and draw on, theory heavily from, Gale's explanation.
2 - Ibid. DirckVorenkamp

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3 - I do not claim thatthese are the only definitionsof these terms.The definitionsare stipulativeand functiononly to establishsome workfor the study. The intent in formulatingcategories ing parameters the of stipulativedefinitionsbeforethe startof the study use through is to create a question that is verifiableor falsifiableaccording to available historicalrecords.As RobertBairdhas shown, this provides the basic framework for a nonnormative answer to a historical question. See Robert D. Baird, Category Formationand the History of Religions (The Hague, Netherlands:Mouton and Co., of Religionat the 1971). I am gratefulto RobertN. Minor,Professor Universityof Kansas,for his suggestions on ways to use Baird's method. 4-J.M.E. McTaggart, "The Unreality of Time," in Philosophical Arnoldand Co., 1934), Studies,ed. S. V. Keeling(London:Edward
pp.110-131.

5 - Ibid.,pp. 110-111, and also Gale, Philosophyof Time,p. 67.

6 - Ibid.

7 - Adolf Grunbaum,"The Status of Temporal Becoming," in Gale, Philosophyof Time, p. 322. 8 - McTaggart, "Unrealityof Time," p. 111; also Gale, Philosophyof 67. Time,p. 9 - McTaggart, "Unrealityof Time," pp. 113-116, and Gale, Philosoof phy Time,p. 67. 10 - McTaggart, "Unrealityof Time," pp. 123-126, and Gale, Philosoof Time, p. 68. phy 11 - Ibid.
12 - Ibid.

13 - McTaggart, "Unrealityof Time," p. 126, and Gale, Philosophyof Time,p. 67. 14 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,pp. 70-77.
15 -Ibid., pp. 70-71.

16- Ibid. 17- Ibid.

18- Ibid., pp. 72-73.

19- Ibid.
20 - Ibid.

&West 21 - Hee-JinKim,"The Reasonof Words and Letters: East Philosophy Dogen and Koan

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(Honolulu: Language,"in Dogen Studies, ed. William R. LaFleur of Hawaii Press,1985), pp. 54-82. KurodaInstitute/University from Nihon This is my translation 22 - Dogen, Shobogenz6, "Mitsugo." shis6 taikei, vols. 12 and 13, ed. TeradaT6ru and Mizuno Yaoko "Dogen." "Mitsugo"is fromvol. (Tokyo:Iwanami,1972); hereafter 12, p. 57. vol. 12, pp. 300-301. 23 - Dogen, "Bukkojoji," 24 - D6gen, "Hossho,"vol. 13, p. 84.
25 - Ibid., p. 85.

26 - Kim,for example, has pointedout that Dogen uses the term d6toku to signifythe importanceof wordsthemselves. See Kim,"Reasonof Words and Letters," p. 67. See also Hee-JinKim, D6gen KigenMystical Realist (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1975), esp. chap. 3. 27 - Kim has argued that Dogen is careful not to exclude linguistic Note that there expressionsfromexpressionsof the Buddha-nature. is no fundamentaldisagreementin our positions. My claim here is not that linguisticexpressionsare privileged in any way, only that Dogen views them, just as any other phenomenon, as expressions of the Buddha-nature. See Kim, D6gen Kigen, chap. 3, esp. pp. 103 ff. 28 - Note also that CandrakTrti defines sarhvrti three ways in chapter24, verse 8, of his Prasannapada. Accordingto Nagao, the third definition refers to "conventional terminology, manner of speaking, name." See Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyamikaand Yogacara,trans. LeslieS. Kawamura (Albany:SUNY Press,1991), pp. 14-15. HereIam, of course,assumingthatD6gen'sthoughtis grounded in Hua-yen thought. This position has been questioned, however, based on the fact that Dogen does not quote the Hua-yen ching directly,does not referto the school itself in his discussionsof time and being, criticizes the Hua-yen masterTsung-mi,and makes extensive use of other, non-Hua-yen texts. But, setting aside these objectionsforthe moment,the claim that his thoughtis groundedin Hua-yen thought is much less problematicthan the alternativenamely, that it isn'tgroundedin Hua-yenthought.Butwhy? Assumingfor the moment (1) that the reasonable (and historically verifiable/falsifiable) assumptionthat Dogen's thought owes an intellectual debt to past Buddhistthought, (2) that some acknowledgmentof that influence is necessary in orderto be able to make sense out of otherwiseincongruent assertions,and (3) thatthe two options (i.e., Hua-yenor not Hua-yen)are mutuallyexclusive, DirckVorenkamp

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then I note that assertinga groundingin Hua-yen Buddhismallows for a consistencyof thoughtin the Shobogenz6on issues (including time-other problemsmentionedaside) that cannot be found if we utilize the other claim. The alternativeposition (i.e., not grounded in Hua-yen thought)is not able to make such a claim, given the nature of many of the seemingly contradictorystatementsin the Sh6bogenzo. Since an assumptionof consistency underliesboth possible inthe importantquestion is, which of the alternatives terpretations, a more consistent coherence to the text? The Hua-yen asyields has the benefitof being able to explain those itemswhich sumption would otherwise be irreconcilable(e.g., Sarvastivada-type notions of spatial and temporaldiscretenesswith Hua-yen-likenotions of while the otheroption (including spatial/temporal interpenetration), tetralemmainto D6gen's discusthe attemptto read a Nagarjunian sions of time) will not be as successful in this regard.This is particularlytruefor the "Uji"fascicle, which is difficultif not impossible to interpret consistentlywithout assumingthe Hua-yen view. This myself included, read probably explains why many interpreters, Dogen in that light.To take any other view requiresthe interpreter to explain how such glaring inconsistenciesare reasonable. If we make the reasonableassumptionthat D6gen wasn't offeringus a view view, then the alternative completelychaotic and incongruent becomes very difficultto maintain. The next question,then, is, does any of the evidence in the text The answer is no-even that necessitateagainstthis interpretation. evidence pointed out above. The objections above are predicated upon the assumption that Dogen (1) would have made more referenceto the Hua-yen ching and the Hua-yen school if in fact his thought was grounded in that school's doctrine, and (2) he that he didwould not have made referenceto the texts/doctrines did-if his in the manner that he even thoughtis grounded perhaps in Hua-yen.Clearly,though, neitherassumptionis necessarilyvalid and both do not thereforeconstitutenecessaryor sufficientgrounds for rejectingthe Hua-yenreading.They certainlymay give us pause in the historicalsense-but, upon reevaluation,as above, there are good reasonsto rejectthe alternative. Thereis, however,anotherpossibilitythatmustbe addressed.A reviewerof this articlehas noted thatthe issue may not be either/or in nature,but simply a question of extent. The reviewer suggests that the consistency of the "Uji" fascicle, for example, is not dependent on whether or not it utilizes Hua-yen views, but rather where and how it utilizes them. This is certainly reasonable and requiresfurtherinvestigation.But, while the exact details of how

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and where these views apply exceed the scope of this essay, we should note that acceptingthis view does not change the validityof the assumption regardingHua-yen as a basis for understanding Dogen's views. 29 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,pp. 73-74. 30 - Ibid. For the purposes of this essay, I take the term "temporal becoming" as synonymous with the notion of time's "passage," "change," "flow," etc. 31 - Dogen, "Uji",vol. 12, p. 260.
32 - Ibid., p. 258. 33 - Ibid. 34 - Ibid., pp. 259-260. 35 - Ibid., p. 260. 36 - Ibid., p. 258.

37 - See, for example, the "Uji" and "Genjok6an"chapters. 38 -J.J.C. Smart, "SpatializingTime," in Gale, Philososphy of Time, p. 164. 39 - Dbgen, "Uji," vol. 12, p. 258. Other scholars (e.g., Abe and Kim) the term'gap' in the sense of a separationbetween have interpreted the event and the 'self'. There is no fundamentaldisagreement, Given though, between my reading here and their interpretation. on the idea that refer to Dogen's dharma-positions paragreement ticularized segments of being-time (ontological/spatialand temporal in nature),then it is not a matterof one view being correct while the other is incorrect.They are not mutuallyexclusive. 40 - The experiential issue being referredto here is our conscious experience of the passage of time as a smooth, seamless continuum withoutfragmentedbreaks,or gaps. Forexample, see the next sentence (not cited) of the passage mentionedabove. 41 - Dogen, "Daigo," vol. 12, p. 123. of Philosophyat 42 - I am deeply indebtedto Alfonso Verdu, Professor the Universityof Kansas,for his many insightsand discussions on time and Zen Buddhism.He graciously let me have a copy of his unpublishedarticle, "Zen and Time."While neitherthe article nor our discussionswere specificallyconcerned with B-theoryviews of time, they did suggest to me the possibilityof a study using this and "now-noapproach.The terms"now-not-yet,""now-present," longer" are developed by Verdu in the "Zen and Time" article. I DirckVorenkamp 405

have utilized the terminology here as proper to Dogen's views on time and the B-theory elements in his teachings. Note that the point made in this section of the essay does not lead to the conclusion that D6gen was a determinist. Within the context of Dogen's thought, stating that a B-series future is what is "now-not-yet" entails nothing furtherthan the conclusion that what will be (no determinism implied or intended) stands in a two-place temporal relation to the present Now. Nevertheless, as we will see, this issue is an important one for another reason. B-theorists have been accused of "statizing" time in a way that is experientially inconsistent. Dogen certainly does not "statize" time, but, as shown, those passages which do speak of time's "flow" do so in an Atheory manner. While those A-theory-type passages do not challenge the descriptive conclusion that B-theory views also exist in the Shobogenzo, they do raise the issue of whether or not Dogen's views are internally consistent. 43 - Dogen, "Juki,"vol. 12, p. 273. 44 - Dogen, "Uji," vol. 12, pp. 257-258. 45 - Ibid., p. 260. 46 - Ibid., p. 258. 47 - Gale, Philosophy of Time, p. 74. 48 - Ibid., pp. 74-75. 49 - Ibid., p. 75. 50 - Dogen, "Genjokoan," vol. 12, p. 36. 51 - Dogen, "Kaiinsammai," vol. 12, p. 141. 52 - Dogen, "Uji," vol. 12, p. 258. 53 - Ibid. 54 - For example, see Francis Cook, Hee-Jin Kim, Steven Heine, and Joan Stambaugh. Also, compare the following passages: (items in brackets are my additions): The processivenatureof realizationconsists in the fact thatthe at-one-ness or immediateexperience must be repeated over and over as each new event occurs.... However, according to him, the actual realization is in Dogen's Zen," timeless each time it occurs. (F. Cook, "Enlightenment IABS6 [1]: 25) Whetherit be firewood or ash, birthor death, the winteror the springwhich is absolutely discrete and diseach has its own dharma-position continuous. Each has its "before"and "after,"but is cut off from those dharma-situations "preceding"and "following" [B-seriesrelations in an

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as fromfutureto past]. (Hee-jinKim,"Existence/Time A-seriesprogression Buddhist11 [2]: 54-55) the Way of Ascesis," Eastern

Thereare other examples as well, and I do not mean to imply here thatthe two scholarsabove have misinterpreted Dogen. In fact, the with The lies the case. is problem Dogen's view opposite probably of time itself. 55 - Gale, Philosophyof Time,p. 69. 56 - See Dogen, pp. 261-262. I quicklywant to add, though,thatthis is not to claim that Dogen was not aware of, or did not employ, the tetralemma-only that it is not evident in the discussions of time used as a basis for the inquiry. One possible objectionto this observation,noted by a reviewer, filteredthrough is that Dogen may have used a formof tetralemma As mentionedabove, of ChineseCh'anBuddhism. the k6antradition there is no disagreementon the point that there are koan in the The point in Shdobgenz6 that obviously reflect the tretralemma. sections the other the notion would be here that, somehow, dispute different is form that in modified a of the text also utilize it-only from the one used by Nagarjuna.I do not want to take issue with the notion that ideas can change over time, but we have to be very carefulabout assertionssuch as these, which can amountto claimbut it really is not ing that Dogen used Nagarjuna'stretralemma, tetralemma.The process of modifyingsuch assertions Nagarjuna's can renderthem nonfalsifiable. 57 - The reason is that the use of such a tetralemmaultimatelymust involve the assertionof a propositionsomethinglike: "Dogen cannot be said to hold either extreme as his position...." But this is problematicbecause the assertionitselfis subjectto some criteriaof opponent validity.This is precisely the point made by Nagarjuna's in the VigrahavyavartanT (i.e., that in orderto assertthat he had no position, Nagarjunahad to assert something and hence immedihave attemptedto defend ately contradictedhimself).Prasanghikas him and themselves by invokingboth the notion of nonpresuppositional negation and an a prioritwo-truthsstructure.Those famiwill know that there is liarwith modernscholarshipon Nagarjuna an ongoing debate concerning whether or not Nagarjunaand the answer is valid. I have argued in detail elsewhere Prasanghikas' that it is in fact inherentlynormativeand hence cannot meet noncriteriaof validity.To defend Nagarverifiable/falsifiable normative, juna's approach on this point would involve one in attemptinga claim. defense of the inherentlynormativetwo-truths A furtherobjection often raised by defendersof the validityof this method is that it is not appropriateto criticize Buddhistsfor Dirck Vorenkamp

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their use of this device, because they had a decidedly religious purposein mind.While this lastpoint certainlynecessitatesa pause in orderto ensure that our conclusions are historicallyvalid, philosophically speaking it is a red herringand has no impact on this (and Dogen in this specific essay's conclusions. To grantNagarjuna
case) a kind of intellectual "immunity" on these points because

they may have had a religiouspurpose in mind is to abrogateour rightto ask of them, "is this reasonable,"and expect that in answer we will, in the secularacademy at least, not rely upon unfalsifiable/ normativecriteriaof validity.The issue, then, becomes whetherthe tetralemma meets this criterion. As mentionedabove, I Nagarjunian thinkthe only answer is no. 58 - See, for example, Fa-tsang'sWu-chiao chang, T. 45, pp. 486a, 490a-b, 504b, 505c, etc.
59 - Ibid.

60 - Thisamountsto asserting that Dbgen holds thatthe A-seriesis more fundamentalthan the B-series.But note that the firstchoice mentioned (i.e., using Hua-yen notions of interpenetration) does not to the alternative of that the B-series is more correspond asserting fundamental. 61 - Forexample, see C. D. Broad's"OstensibleTemporality," in Gale, of 7-142. 11 Time, Philosophy pp. 62 The conclusion here is not intended as a criticism, but simply a comparison. I have no interest in forcing Dbgen to fit into the and Gale. Whetheror not Dogen's agenda categoriesof McTaggart was differentfrom that of the two men whose thought has been used as a basis for the comparisonwill not necessarilyaffect the descriptive resultsof asking the question "Are there any similarities?"It certainlywould, however, have to figure into any discussion of why they are different or the same-but these matters exceed the scope of this essay.

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