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Mignolos Lpisicmology
of Colonialiiy
I i n d a Ma r i n Al c o f f
Syracuse University
wni1rn xioNoios rvis1rxoiooicni cinixs nnoU1 sUnni1rnN xNowi-
cdgc owc much for ihcir inspiraiion io ihc work of Michcl Ioucauli. Tus
ii is liiilc wondcr ihai, in somc imporiani rcspccis, Mignolo bcars a similar
rclaiionship as Ioucauli io ihc disciplinc of philosophy, and io cpisicmology
in pariicular. Lvcn ihough ihc cniirciy of Ioucaulis ihcorciical wriiings con-
ccrncd knowlcdgc in ihc human scicnccs, ihc principal discussions in Anglo-
Amcrican cpisicmology coniinuc io ignorc Ioucaulis work, an inaiicniion
considcrcd jusiincd on ihc grounds ihai Ioucaulis analyscs of knowlcdgc
arc iakcn io bc a spccics of criiical sociology, noi normaiivc cpisicmology.
Ii is also largcly bclicvcd ihai Ioucauli rcpudiaicd ihc vcry possibiliiy of ihc
normaiivc goals of cpisicmology givcn ihc consiiiuiivc rclaiionaliiy bciwccn
powcr and knowlcdgc.
Yci Ioucauli himsclf formulaicd ihai rclaiionaliiy as dyadic raihcr ihan
rcduciivc, insisiing ihai knowlcdgc is noi rcduciblc io powcr, cvcn ihough
ii cannoi bc propcrly undcrsiood as disassociaicd from powcr (Ioucauli
Michigan Siaic Lnivcrsiiy Prcss. CR: Te New Centennial Review, Vol. ,, No. , oo,, pp. ,:o:. issN :-68,x
Mi g no l o s Lpi s i c mo l og y of Co l oni a l i i y 80
; Alcof ). Power operates not only in the spheres of application and
discoverythe two spheres traditional epistemologists acknowledge as af-
fected by irrational elementsbut also in the spheres of justifcation and
the delimitation of the regime (or sphere) of the truth, or what passes for
truth. Foucault worked out these claims with detailed case studies that both
supported them and elucidated their meaning. For those of us who found
these arguments plausible, even persuasive, the normative implications
are clear: epistemology needs to work with this better and more truthful
description of how actually existing knowledges (as opposed to idealized
reconstructions) emerge, and needs to incorporate not only an analysis
of power in its analysis of knowledge but also a set of normative criteria
for judging various relationships between power and knowledge. Foucault
provided such criteria in his epistemic assessments of hegemony-seeking
versus subjugated knowledges: subjugated or local knowledges always tend
to do less violence to the local particulars and are also less likely to impose
hierarchical structures of credibility based on universal claims about the
proper procedures of justifcation that foreclose the contributions of many
unconventional or lower-status knowers.
Like Foucault, Mignolo has also spent a considerable amount of time
analyzing knowledge in its relationship to power and presenting case stud-
ies of hegemony-seeking power-knowledges that arose in the context of
European colonialism. For Mignolo, the epistemic efects of colonialism are
among its most damaging, far-reaching, and least understood. Also like Fou-
cault, Mignolos critical project has produced new conceptual formulations
in the attempt to explain and describe colonial knowledge practices and
anti-colonial epistemic resistance. Te question of how these new concepts
ft with the existing problematics of epistemology has given rise to a similar
cognitive dissonance, which it will be the project of this article to reduce.
One of the main problems in Foucaults work was his own colonial un-
conscious, however, and here his infuence on Mignolo comes to a striking
end. Foucault characterized the formation of disciplinary power-knowledge
regimes as originating within Europe, and he presented the development of
the modern episteme in such a way that divorced it from its colonial context.
New publications of Foucaults lectures from the s reveal a sustained
Li nda Mar t n Al c o f f 81
discussion of race on his part, and a real attempt to understand the formative
role that constructions of race have played in the processes of governmental-
ity and especially in the development of bio-power. Yet in these lectures, he
does not thematize race or colonialism in his analyses of knowledge.
()
I think he is making two points here. Te frst is that, although the interpretive
refexivity of hermeneutics might allow one to represent both sides (that
is, colonizer and colonized) by bringing in the spatial location of meaning,
this is not a suffcient corrective, or even the best way to articulate the goal,
because it leaves unanalyzed the formation of the representational divide
itself. We need to take a further step back to reach the level of exteriority
where representations are made possible in the frst place. It is not enough
to acknowledge the interpretive frame if that frame itself is not theorized
in relation to coloniality and its construction of the colonial diference. His
second point is that hermeneutics is still implicated in the ontological bifur-
cation of subject and object presupposed by epistemology. Tis unmediated
approach blocks our ability to critique the mediations by which objects are
constructed, and then known.
Li nda Mar t n Al c o f f 91
I remain unconvinced that hermeneutics presupposes an unmediated
subject-object opposition, because it comes precisely out of a Hegelian rejec-
tion of such dualism, and because the concept of horizon works efectively
to show that neither understanding nor truth can be accounted for if we
accept such bifurcations. In general, Mignolo is often operating with what
appears as an overly simplifed account of Western philosophical positions,
although simplifcations are understandable and arguably even necessary
to try to think at the very broad level of coloniality. And moreover, for those
(like me, at least occasionally) who want to remind Mignolo and others of
the complexity of the Western epistemological tradition, we would still be
rightfully called to account for the uniform way in which that very complex
tradition efects a simplifcation and repudiation of non-Western thought.
Tat is, if Western epistemology is truly complex, as it would certainly seem
if one sets Putnam or Quine or Brandom against Frege or Russell or Popper,
then how does one explain the lack of complexity in the way in which most
Western philosophers attend to the thought that originates from feminists
or any of those outside the West? Western epistemologys internal complex-
ity is somehow able to coexist with a uniform resistance to engaging with
the implications of the fact that its own historical genealogy precisely maps
onto the period of European colonialism. For this reason I believe we should
consider seriously Mignolos insistent claim in recent years that paradigms
originating in the West do not need to be expanded or pluralized but
more robustly transcended.
In some respects Mignolo suggests that the cause of the problem is less in
content than in goal. Tc iargci of his criiiquc is rarcly ihc conicni of spccinc
epistemological positions or theories but rather of their imperial assump-
tions and scope of application. Te philosophy of science, for example, never
presents itself as the philosophy of Western science, but as the philosophy
of science tout court. Tis leads me to the last aspect of Mignolos critique of
epistemology I want to discuss before turning to the constructive project: his
argument with social science. Mignolo takes issue with Immanuel Waller-
steins idea that the social sciences need to be opened up, arguing that
instead of being opened up, they need to be superceded. Wallerstein wants
to open up the social sciences to a more planetary enterprise, to transcend
Mi g no l o s Lpi s i c mo l og y of Co l oni a l i i y 92
the segregated model of area studies in favor of a unifed domain of inquiry.
Tus he wants to expand their scope and range of reference as a way to
correct for Anglo- and Eurocentrism. Te problem with this plan, Mignolo
suggests, citing Orlando Fals-Borda, Vine Deloria, and others to support him,
is ihai opcning is noi ihc samc as dccolonizing (oooa, 8o). Tc projcci of
opcning up wiihoui dccolonizing runs ihc risk of simply furihcring colonial
cxpansion if ihc mcihodology rcmains dcpcndcni on ihc cpisicmology of
Norih Ailaniic modcrniiyihc norms of ihc disciplincs and ihc problcms
of ihc Norih Ailaniic (8o), ihai is, on ihc conccpiual imagcry of colonial
cpisicmologics.
Ior Mignolo, ihc basic problcm is ihai ihc sysicms of knowing and
rcprcscniing ihai dcvclopcd in Luropcan modcrniiy wcrc consiiiuicd by
and wiihin ihc colonialiiy of powcr. Tus, Mignolo has movcd furihcr and
furihcr ancld of iradiiional Wcsicrn philosophical conccpis in his aiicmpi
io discnianglc his approach io knowlcdgc from ihc snarcs of colonizing as-
sumpiions. Ior ihis, as ihc rcccni criiical discussion in South Atlantic Quar-
terly indicaics, hc is losing somc of his posimodcrn allics. Posimodcrnisis,
howcvcr radical ihcir criiiqucs, arc rarcly in ihc busincss of rcconsiruciing
cpisicmic norms, a projcci ihai in ihc ncxi scciion I will arguc has cngagcd
Mignolo.
I I . R r c o N s 1 n U c 1 i o N
Tc conccpis jusi discusscdcolonialiiy of powcr, ihc colonial diucrcncc,
and colonial scmiosiscan bc ihoughi of as conccpiual iools for dccolo-
nizing boih ihc mciaphysics and cpisicmologywhai ihcrc is and whai wc
knowof conicmporary ihoughi. Tcy also providc a lcxicon for mcihod-
ologics in ihc social scicnccs and humaniiics. Clcarly, Mignolo has iakcn
up and dcvclopcd ihcsc conccpis as a way io aid in ihc rcasscssmcni and
rcariiculaiion of icmporal grand mcianarraiivcs, as wcll as io assisi in morc
local projccis of analysis, such as asscssmcnis of indigcnous movcmcnis
in pariicular placcs. Siill, ihcsc conccpis arc born oui of a foundaiion of
criiiquc: a criiical analysis of ihc ways in which colonialism siill infccis ihc
way ihc world is vicwcd.
Li nda Mar t n Al c o f f 93
I want next to consider in a more general way what the normative
epistemic lessons might be of this work, and in particular, the concept Mi-
gnolo develops as a successor to both epistemology and hermeneutics: border
ihinking, or morc propcrly, bordcr gnosis. Tis conccpi, as Mignolo dcvclops
ii, is noi aimcd so much ai ihc usual normaiivc cpisicmic conccrns aboui
jusiincaiion and bclicf formaiion, bui raihcr ai ihc way in which knowlcdgc
is normaiivcly dcnncd in rcfcrcncc io iis oihcr(s).
Thc idca of bordcr ihinking is io spccify ihc localiiy of subalicrn
knowlcdgc as a border locaiion raihcr ihan simply ihc bcyond of Wcsicrn
knowlcdgc or ihc siic of purc diucrcncc. Siiuaiing knowlcdgc and knowcrs
in a local nonfungiblc conicxi is rcvoluiionary in iisclf, going againsi whai
Mignolo rcfcrs io as ihc normal proccdurc in modcrn cpisicmology io
delocalize concepts and detach them from their local histories (b, ).
Logic, procedures of justifcation, and the whole range of epistemic virtues
are still generally presented as having universal reach.
. And this is true even though he was developing his account of power-knowledge in the
very same period as the lectures on race. In these lectures, race is the locus of operation
for bio-power, it is the target or frame around which bio-power develops, but it is not a
category that organizes knowledge.
Mi g no l o s Lpi s i c mo l og y of Co l oni a l i i y 100
. I would note that this is a much more sophisticated epistemology than Scott Michael-
son and Scoii Cuilcr Shcrshow givc him crcdii for in ihcir rcccni criiiquc (oo,). By
ihcir accouni, hc crccis a ncw mciaphysically csscniialisi binary bciwccn Luropc and
iis colonics and hc romaniicizcs Amcrindian culiurcs. Howcvcr, as ihis passagc makcs
clcar, Mignolos accouni of whai ihc colonial diucrcncc involvcs rcjccis iransparcni
rcprcscniaiions of ihc oihcr.
. Tis csscniially posiiivisi approach io knowlcdgc has bccn cucciivcly criiiqucd wiihin
boih analyiic and coniincnial cpisicmologics, as Quinc and Kuhn dcmonsiraicd ihc
paradigm- or ihcory-spccinc naiurc of obscrvaiion and ihc phcnomcnological and
dcconsiruciivc movcmcnis also iargcicd ihc iransccndcnial prcicnsions of Wcsicrn
ihoughi. Noncihclcss, nonc of ihcsc movcmcnis againsi posiiivism wcrc rcucxivc aboui
ihc colonial conicxi of ihc wcsi or ihc way in which ihis pariicular conicxi may havc
impacicd ihc dcvclopmcni of a paradigm of conicxi-frcc knowlcdgc.
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