FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

1. ACAR VS. ROSAL All over the world, Constitutions share one purpose: to protect and enhance the people's interest, as a nation collectively and as persons individually. The Philippine Constitution is no exception. Interpretation of its provisions, therefore, should be done with a view to realizing this fundamental objective. Among the provisions in our Constitution is one both, timely and far-reaching, as it affects the people at large and relates to social justice problems of the day. It is Subsec. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." It is the one involved in this case. A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten persons for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compaia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata, Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar, molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions of Republic Act 809 (The Sugar Act of 1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof: SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them as follows: Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which is not more than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to sugar centrals with an actual production of less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs; Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds four hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed six hundred thousand piculs; Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed nine hundred thousand piculs; Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds nine hundred thousand piculs but does not exceed one million two hundred thousand piculs;

Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds one million two hundred thousand piculs. By actual production is meant the total production of the mill for the crop year immediately preceding. xxxxxxxxx SEC. 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in the participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the plantation in the following proportion: Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the supervision of the Department of Labor. The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations under this Act and in the Minimum Wage Law shall not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts known as "by the piece," "by the volume," "by the area," or by any other system of "pakyaw," the Secretary of Labor being hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders for the enforcement of this provision." Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the aforementioned court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 22. Pauper litigant. Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificate of the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority once given shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond, printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides. invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that they had no means, to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on their daily wages for livehood and possessed of no properties. And in support of the foregoing, the ten named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of their places of residence stating that they have no real property declared in their names in said municipalities. Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an order on May 27, 1963, denying the same upon the ground that the plaintiffs have regular employment and sources of income and, thus, can not be classified as poor or paupers. Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but reconsideration was denied in an order dated June 11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI orders and asserting their alleged right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed herein, on August 1,

1963, the present special civil action or certiorariand mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper in the instant case before Us was also filed. And on August 16, 1963, We allowed petitioners herein to litigate in this Court as paupers and required respondent to answer. Respondent's answer was filed on November 2, 1963. After hearing on February 10, 1964 this case was submitted for decision. The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were deprived, by the orders in question, of free access to the courts by reason of poverty. In denying petitioners' motion to litigate as paupers, respondent Judge adopted the definition at "pauper" in Black's Law Dictionary (at p. 1284) as "a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense". And, as afore-stated, he ruled that petitioners are notthat poor. Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suitsin forma pauperis and the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." As applied to statutes or provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus been recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper; the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs" (14 Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the difference between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the latter are "persons who have no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though self-supporting when able to work and in employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913, "Indigent", citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this sense of being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis. Black's Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be supported at public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without being chargeable with costs" (p. 1284, emphasis supplied). It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500 would very well be shouldered by petitioners since there are around 9,000 of them. It must be remembered, however that the action in question was filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of Court allowing such procedure state under Sec. 12, Rule 3: SEC. 12. Class suit. When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case the court shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and representative so that all interest concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest. So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten named petitioners herein are the ones suing, albeit for the benefit of all the others. It follows that the payment of docket fee would be directly charged upon them, not upon the unnamed "9,000 other laborers." And even if the

9,000 other laborers should later bear the payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same would be spread among them at about P1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their respective average demand of P1.60 each is, to Our mind, a substantial imposition on a seasonal farm laborer earning barely subsistent wages. And as pointed out, this is only the initial fee; subsequent fees and charges would have to be paid. The philosophy underlying the constitutional mandate of free access to the courts notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls for exemption of herein petitioners from payment of the aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and claim of substantial rights under the Sugar Act of 1952. Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as mentioned earlier, We find this course the most sensible, logical and practical construction demanded by the free access clause of the Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not make said provision the living reality that it is designed to be. As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to bring all the other 9,000 laborers before the court. This Court finds the supporting evidence of indigence adequate, showing in petitioners' favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent Judge, the right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty. Since they were excluded from the use and enjoyment of said right, mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal was unavailing, since they were not even accorded the status of litigants, for non-payment of docket fee; and perfecting an appeal would have presented the same question of exemption from legal fees, appeal bond and similar requisites. Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate in forma pauperis. No costs. So ordered.

2. MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. But this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided to give it due course to resolve the question whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper litigant.[1] The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City.[2] During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitioner represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office of Butuan City objected to petitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike out the entire testimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it was inadmissible for being violative of the testimonial privilege afforded to children in cases involving their parents. The Presiding Judge[3] deferred his ruling on the objection and allowed the testimony to be continued.[4] On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order overruling the objection. On 8 August 1994 the court denied the motion for reconsideration.[5] This prompted petitioner to go to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.[6] On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate as Pauper attaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by two (2) ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of this privilege.[7] The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution dated 21 March 1997 denying the motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the total amount of P420.00 within five (5) days from notice.[8] On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarly denied in the resolution of 8 October 1997.[9] Petitioner then filed a Manifestation on 28 October 1997 wherein he stated through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required of his client "under protest" and that the money remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. Jesus G. Chavez himself.[10] The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2) postal money orders attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper.[11] In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, citing petitioners failure to pay the required docket fee.[12] Petitioner moved for reconsideration citing his compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in his Manifestation adverted to above.[13] However, the Court of Appeals in the second assailed Resolution of 21 January 1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that, per verification by the Judicial Records Division, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00.[14] Msesm The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper can be entertained by an appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original motion to appeal as pauper before the appellate court the applicable rule was the second paragraph of Sec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which providesSec. 16. Appeal by pauper Where a party desiring to appeal shall establish to the satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, by reason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought

to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an order entitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellate court the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same. Esmso A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court. Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly frowned upon appellate courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the question of whether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a question of fact which is best determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court which may properly decide or pass upon the question of fact which may require presentation of evidence whether the appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the case is of such importance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature of the question raised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.[15] When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure came into effect on 1 July 1997 the provision abovequoted was not reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedure for, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as pauper Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing, is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient and available for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family. Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may order to be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which the indigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.Esmmis Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time before judgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine after hearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficient income or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessed and collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixed by the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice to such other sanctions as the court may impose. On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for the exemption of pauper litigants from payment of legal fees Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants (a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed four thousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b)

who do not own real property with an assessed value of more than fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos shall be exempt from the payment of legal fees. Esmsc The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgment rendered in the case favorably to the pauper-litigant, unless the court otherwise provides. To be entitled to the exemption herein provided, the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he and his immediate family do not earn the gross income abovementioned, nor do they own any real property with the assessed value aforementioned, supported by an affidavit of a disinterested person attesting to the truth of the litigant's affidavit. Any falsity in the affidavit of a litigant or disinterested person shall be sufficient cause to strike out the pleading of that party, without prejudice to whatever criminal liability may have been incurred. Esm It cannot be inferred from any of the aforementioned provisions that the restrictive policy enunciated by Sec. 16, Rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court was carried over to the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Nowhere can we find a provision to the effect that "(a) petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate court." We resolve to apply the present rules on petitioner retrospectively. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. In that sense and to that extent procedural laws are retroactive.[16] We therefore hold that a motion to litigate as an indigent can be made even before the appellate courts, either for the prosecution of appeals, in petitions for review or in special civil actions. Jksm We believe that this interpretation of the present rules is more in keeping with our Bill of Rights, which decrees that, "(f)ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty."[17] Our espousal of the democratization of appellate remedies is shared by the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay the costs in advance x x x x Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.[18] A perusal of the records shows that petitioner has complied with all the evidentiary requirements for prosecuting a motion to appear in court as a pauper. He has executed an affidavit attesting to the fact that he and his immediate family do not earn a gross income of more than P3,000.00 a month, and that their only real property, a hut, cannot be worth more than P10,000.00.[19] He has also submitted a joint affidavit executed by Florencia L. Ongtico and

Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who generally attested to the same allegations contained in petitioner's own affidavit.[20] Based on this evidence, the Court finds that petitioner is qualified to litigate as an indigent. Chief WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 1997 dismissing the petition for certiorari of petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution dated 21 January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for appropriate action to the Court of Appeals which is further ordered to allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him the amount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid. SO ORDERED.