Cultural Clash: The Sinhalese Lion and Crouching Tamil Tiger in Perpetual Conflict By Richard L.

Dixon

The recently concluded war etween the Sinhalese ma!ority go"ernment of Sri Lan#a and the Li eration Tigers of Tamil $elam %LTT$& led y the late 'elupillai Pra ha#aran %who was #illed y Sri Lan#an soldiers& was one of forceful rutality( mass human suffering( and the displacement of o"er )**(*** Tamil refugees in the +orthern Part of Sri Lan#a. ,t played itself out in the li"ing rooms around the world. The Sri Lan#an Ci"il -ar was one of the fiercest fought in the world that claimed o"er .*(*** li"es in a /0 year period. 1n one hand you had a Sinhalese go"ernment that su !ected the Tamil minority to one of the cruelest forms of racism( torture( and ethnic cleansing that the world has e"er #nown. The Tamil2s were discriminated in employment( housing( !o s( and stripped of their language and culture. They were reduced to second class ser"itude in all matters 3et on the other hand with the Tamil Tigers you had one of the most ruthless and loodthirsty re el groups who utili4ed the tactics of suicide om ing( #idnapping( assassination of high ran#ing go"ernment officials %such as Sri Lan#an President Ranasinghe Premadasa in 566)( and former ,ndian Prime 7inister Ra!i" 8andhi in 5665&( the targeting of innocent ci"ilians %the 9ranthalawa 7assacre( 9nuradhapura massacre( :attan#udy mos;ue massacre( and :e ithigollewa massacres&( and am ushing of go"ernment troops and soldiers. ,t is stated that the LTT$ also had esta lished connections with other 7uslim terrorist that were associated with the first attac# on the -orld Trade Center in 566). They engaged in smuggling arms to the Tali an in 9fghanistan( and hea"ily recruited child soldiers into their ran#s. <7ost child soldiers( oth oys and girls( are drawn from the poorest( least educated and most marginali4ed social sectors. $specially at ris# are children with a disrupted family ac#ground( refugee and internally displaced children( children li"ing in conflict 4ones and garrison towns( children from a particular ethnic( racial or religious group( and former child soldiers. The recruited children are used to fight( lay mines and explosi"es and as spies( messengers( guards( scouts( coo#s( porters( ser"ants and for sexual purposes.=5 ,t was the scope and le"el of these acti"ities y the Tamil Tigers that resulted in them eing placed on the list of ruthless terrorist organi4ations y the >nited +ations( $>( and the State Department. The Sri Lan#an Ci"il -ar etween the Sinhalese ma!ority go"ernment and LTT$ is a text oo# example of Samuel ?untington2s Clash of Ci"ili4ation and @ohn 7ueller2s Banality of $thnic -ar analogy. <9 group of wellAarmed thugs and ullies encouraged y( and wor#ing under rough constraints set out y( official security ser"ices would arri"e or and together in a community. Sometimes operating with local authorities( they would then ta#e control and persecute mem ers of other ethnic groups( who would usually flee to areas protected y their own ethnic ruffians( sometimes to !oin them in see#ing re"enge. Carni"als of oftenAdrun#en looting( destruction( and "iolence would ta#e place( and othersAAguiltily or not so guiltilyAmight !oin in. 8radually( howe"er( many of the people under the thugsB ar itrary and chaotic
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Peters, Lilian. War is no Childs Play: child Soldiers from Battlefield to Playgrounds. Geneva Centre for the emocratic Control of !rmed "orces # C!"$, %ccasional Pa&er, '(, )uly, *++,, *.

Cprotection(C especially the more moderate ones and young men unwilling to e pressed into military ser"ice would immigrate to safer places. ,n all this( nationalism was not so much the impelling force as simply the characteristic around which the marauders happened to ha"e arrayed themsel"es.=/ Sri Lan#a was a country that was di"ided into four separate distinct cultures( religions( and races that was on a spontaneous collision course of ethnic conflict. This conflict was directly and indirectly influenced y outside actors such as the ,ndian D Chinese go"ernment. <9ccording to the C,9 Eact oo#( the ethnic( rea#down of Sri Lan#a was as follows( Sinhalese F).GH( Sri Lan#an 7oors F./H( ,ndian Tamil I..H( Sri Lan#an Tamil ).6H( other *.0H( unspecified 5*H %/**5 census pro"isional data&. Religiously the Sinhalese were primarily BuddhistJChristian( %.6. 5H and ../H& the 7oors were 7uslim %F..H&( and the ,ndian Tamil and Sri Lan#an Tamil were ?indu %F.5H&.=) ,n some ways( the ethnic and religious situation in Sri Lan#a was a mirror image of the Bal#ani4ation that transpired in the now defunct 3ugosla"ia Repu lic under the leadership of the deceased @oseph Tito. The ig difference was that there was no fatherland concept or ideology that ounded the Sri Lan#ans under one national anner. <The ethnic differentiations within the category KCeylonese2( of course( were not sustained only y political competition. Their foundational sources were %a& sets of cultural practices that( amidst commonalities( implanted difference in oth explicit and insidiously powerful ta#en-for-granted ways and % & widespread practices of endogamous marriage among the Sinhalese( Tamils and 7oors that were in turn ased on the propensity for Sinhalese and Tamil people to marry within their own caste L with the caste identities nestling differentially within each ethnic grouping.=I To fully understand the separatist tendencies of the Tamils as well as that of the Sri Lan#an 7oors one must go ac# to the history of Sri Lan#a as a former British Colony. Sri Lan#a was originally an ancient #ingdom esta lished y the Sinhalese in the .th century BC. Later in the 5I century 9D( ,ndians from the su continent esta lished a #ingdom in the Southern Region of the island nation. During this era Sri Lan#a was #nown as the #ingdom of Ceylon and went through a cycle of colonial rulers starting with the Portuguese( Dutch( and finally the $nglish in 5F6.. >nder British rule( ethnic tendencies etween the Sinhalese and Tamils were played out for political ad"antages. The same tactics were utili4ed successfully in the British colonies of 7alaysia( 7auritius( ,ndia( and Singapore. ,n all instances( the British go"ernment rought in cheap la or from either ,ndia or China. The British rought in thousands of Tamils to wor# administrati"e functions as well as the tea plantations. ,t wasn2t long after that the Sinhalese ma!ority started a mo"ement for independence in Ceylon led y S - R D Bandaranaya#e which resulted in a negotiation of independence in 56IG from the British 8o"ernment. 3et it ecame apparent from the start that the mo"ement for independence y the Sinhalese ma!ority was done at the exclusion of the Tamil minority who at this time made up 5FH of the population. 1nce Ceylon had gained its independence they initiated a proASinhalese platform in the new constitution( passed laws to ma#e Buddhism the official state religion( and the implementation of
*

.ueller, )ohn. /he Banality of 0thnic War, 1nternational Security, 2ol. *,, 1ssue 1, Summer, *+++, 1.
3

C1! World "act4oo5, Sri Lan5a, accessed on %cto4er *(, *++6, from: htt&s:77888.cia.gov7li4rary7&u4lications7the98orld9fact4oo57geos7ce.html ;o4erts, .ichael. S&lit !sunder: "our <ations in Sri Lan5a, :.

the Sinhala Language only act. = This was soon followed y the KSinhala only2 Language 9ct that made the Tamil spea#ing people stripped of their right to use their language in their !o s( in their courts( and in their communications with the State. The sense of alienation from the State was further intensified when Tamils were faced with discrimination in education and !o s as well.=0 Sri Lan#a2s peaceful transition failed ecause its legislati"e framewor# was in a -estminister democratic strait!ac#et that did not ta#e into account the plurality of its ethnic and religious minorities into a cooperati"e go"ernment framewor#. ,ndeed the -estphalian System of go"ernment from a western perspecti"e was totally inade;uate to handle the multitude of sects( clans( religions( and races in the former colonial empires ha"e contri uted greatly to the ethnic conflicts that ha"e flared up on the continents of 9frica and 9sia. $"en Samuel ?untington referred to the failure of the -estphalian System as one of the primary causes of ethnic conflict. The former British Colonies of 7alaysia and Singapore unli#e their Sri Lan#an counterparts reali4ed the shortcomings of the -estminister system and made concessions to accommodate their ethnic and religious minorities. ,n the case of 7alaysia( the 7alay ma!ority were resentful of the Chinese and ,ndian minorities who held significant economic power in the country and culminated in the 7ay56.6 riots which #illed hundreds. The 7alaysians sought to remedy the situation y ringing the 7alay ma!ority in the mainstream with the passage of the +ational De"elopment Plan( Eirst 7alaysian Plan( and 'ision /*/* to incorporate all citi4ens into a go"ernment of national unity. The Sinhalese ma!ority on the other hand sought to capitali4e on its status y alienating the other ethnic groups such as the Tamils. -hen the Tamil tried to protest the alleged cases of discrimination and alienation that was perpetuated upon them y the Sinhalese ma!ority( they were demoni4ed and were massacred y the Sinhalese population who were wiped up into fren4y y the politicians. <,t is e"ident that the "iolence and ethnocentric policies of the Sinhala ruling elites contri uted to the growth of Tamil nationalism in Sri Lan#a. Tamil moderate parties( such as the Eederal Party %EP& led y s#illful politicians such as S.@.'. Sel"anaya#am( articulated frustration among common Tamil people into a Kdefensi"e nationalism2 with peaceful protests. ?owe"er( Sinhalese collecti"e( competiti"e chau"inism responded "iolently to the Tamil moderatesM. Scholarly wor#s on the Sri Lan#a ethnic conflict suggest that communal riots in 560G( 56.5( 56FI( 56FF and 56G) in which Tamils were #illed( maimed( ro ed and rendered homeless were carefully designed y the Sinhala elites. This persistent pattern of "iolence set the stage for "iolent Tamil retaliation and efforts to secede=. The eatings and massacres of ethnic Tamils y their Sinhalese counterparts such as the ,nginiya#ala massacre( Tamil research conference massacre( urning of the @affna li rary( 56FF communal pogrom( and 560G pogrom were sa"age and inhuman. $"en those these atrocities were committed y the Sinhalese ma!ority( there were moderates within the Tamil community who were still committed for the continued process of attempting to integrate their communities into the Sri Lan#an political process through constructi"e dialogue. Those efforts though were
,

<orth 0ast Secretariat on =uman ;ights #<0S%=;$, Lest We "orget, .assacres of /amilis, 16,>9*++1, #?ilinochchi, Sri Lan5a: Statistical Centre for <orth 0ast S<, *++@$, vii.
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Stavis, Ben, A 1mtiyaB, !.;... 0thno9Political Conflict in Sri Lan5a. /he )ournal of /hird World Studies, 2ol. *,, <o. *, "all, *++(, (, 1+.

negated y a strong Sinhalese nationalist mo"ement that sought to ha"e a ha"e a mandated affirmati"e action program at the expense of the Tamil people ecause at the time they occupied high status positions in the ci"il ser"ice sector of the go"ernment and were well represented as students and instructors in the uni"ersity le"el. <Erom the 56F*s the democratic political system and the territorial integrity of Sri Lan#a came under increasing threat of growing political conflict concurrently in two facets. ,n 56F5( there emerged an insurrection( organi4ed y the youth of the Sinhala community to capture state power. The Sinhala community is the main ethnic group of the country accounting for nearly threeAfourth of the total population. The Sinhala community is concentrated largely in the Southern part of the country. The militant organi4ation of the Sinhala youth( #nown as the @'P %@anatha 'imu#thi Peramuna( which means People2s Li eration Eront&( after its first a orted attempt( dissol"ed temporally. The @'P arose again y the early 56G*s and made their second attempt launching an armed struggle since 56G. to capture state power. The largeAscale "iolence spread o"er the Southern parts of the country and lasted for a period of four years till 56G6. But the @'P has continued to remain as an important force in the political scene.=F The mo"ement manifested itself in the denial of uni"ersity of Tamil youth y the Sinhalese ma!ority go"ernment. <,n 56F*( the go"ernment inter"ened in the uni"ersity admission process So that( in effect( Tamil students had to o tain higher mar#s than Sinhalese students for admission. This came as a huge low to the Tamil youth who were strongly focused on gaining an education and entering professions due to the lac# of economic alternati"es in their stronghold of @affna in the north( a terrain that was singularly inhospita le for most traditional farming( and distant from the commercial centers of the country. Tamil students were particularly hard hit in medicine and engineering where they had een performing well for decades.=G The rampant discrimination led the frustrated Tamil youth to form a separate mo"ement for an independent state. <This chipping away of the economic rights of the Tamils was clearly a factor in the out rea# of Tamil militancy for the first time in 56FF.=6 The most militant of the Tamil mo"ement for independence was the LTT$ group. <The Li eration Tigers of Tamil $elam( led y its charismatic founder and chief strategist 'elupillai Pra ha#aran( was esta lished in 56F. and emerged as the strongest and est organi4ed of these groups.=5* ,n essence( the stage was set for a full scale ci"il war which commenced in 56G). There were two opposing nationalist mo"ements in the guise of the Sinhalese and Tamil student mo"ements that had no intention of reconciliation or dialogue which had truly fragmented. Both groups throughout the course of the ci"il war would acts of sa"agery( ar arism( and rutality that would garner the condemnation of the entire world community. There was no room for compromise and any indi"idual or group that tried would meet a ;uic# demise. This was especially true of the LTT$ Tigers whose forte
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!4eyratne, Sirmal. 0conomic roots of Political Conflict, the Case of Sri Lan5a, of 0conomics, Cniversity of Colom4o, >.
(

e&artment

%lla&ally, ee&a, .. /he Politics of 0Dtremism in South !sia, Cam4ridge: Cam4ridge Cniversity Press, *++(, 1>3.
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14id, %lla&ally, 1>3.

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?ronstadt, ?. !lan A Bruce 2aughn. Sri Lan5a: Bac5ground A C.S. ;elations. Congressional ;esearch Service, )une :, *++6, (.

was assassinating moderate Tamil politicians who tried to reach out to the %such as Thiagara!ah 7aheswaran from the >nited +ational Party >+P& Sinhalese ma!ority go"ernment. 1"er the years during the ci"il war( the Tamil Tigers was one of the most efficient para re"olutionary organi4ations in the world. Contrary to what has een written a out 9l Naeda and militant ,slamic groups( it was they who speciali4ed in suicide om ings y de"ising the suicide elt to use in con!unction against Sri Lan#an go"ernment and military targets. They also pioneered the use of women as suicide om ers as well. <1"er the course of the conflict the LTT$ waged an insurgent campaign against the Sri Lan#an state in the course of which the insurgents carried out hundreds of suicide attac#s and om ed pu lic uildings( transportation hu s( Buddhist temples and other locations. ,n 566F( the LTT$ was designated a foreign terrorist organi4ation y the >.S. Secretary of State( and is elie"ed to e the only terrorist group to ha"e assassinated two world leaders L President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lan#a in 566) and former Prime 7inister Ra!i" 8andhi of ,ndia in 5665.=55 The Tamil Tigers also earned a reputation of eing oth loyal and ruthless when it came to dealing with their own people. ,t is said that they re;uired an oath of loyalty as well as their followers wearing "ials of cyanide capsules to e ta#en if they were captured y go"ernment soldiers. These actions garnered a measure of respect from the Tamil population. ,n addition( they forcefully merged other Tamil insurgent groups under the LTT$ um rella. Their ruthlessness was shown towards where they were #nown to use whole "illages as a human shield against go"ernment forces. <,n desperation( the Tamil Tigers are using tens of thousands of locals as human shields. The Sri Lan#an go"ernment declared a ceaseAfire and called on the Tigers to release their hostages( ut unmannedAaerialA"ehicle "ideo footage shows the terrorists holding masses of innocents at gunpoint( refusing them freedom.=5/ , had attri uted at the eginning of this paper that the go"ernments of ,ndia and China were outside actors who played a ma!or role in the shaping and influencing of this conflict. Starting in 56GF ,ndia tried to ro#er a ceasefire etween the Sri Lan#an 8o"ernment and the Tamil separatist. They also ought in an ,ndian Peace#eeping force to police the region. The go"ernment of ,ndia had a "ested interest in the ,ndian Tamil people ecause they were predominantly ?indu and saw an opportunity to extend their strategic influence within the region. >nfortunately oth the Sinhalese 8o"ernment and the Tamil Tigers a andoned support for the peace initiati"e y continuing attac#s on oth ci"ilian and military targets. <Paradoxically( LTT$ dominance in the north and east was finally entrenched in the context of a failed peace initiati"e. ,n 56GF( ,ndia and Sri Lan#a signed an 9ccord designed to ring a out a ceasefire and an end to the conflict. The 9ccord offered a degree of autonomy for Tamil ma!ority areas in the +orth and $ast( ut not independence. 9n amendment %#nown as the 5)th 9mendment& to the 56FG Constitution was passed that pro"ided for the esta lishment of Pro"incial Councils and specified a range of powers that would e de"ol"ed to them. 9n interim !oint +orthA$ast Pro"incial Council was soon created in an effort to meet Tamil demands for the two regions to e administered as one. The merger was to e put to a referendum at the end of
11

C.S. e&artment of State, ;e&ort to Congress on 1ncidents during the ;ecent Conflict in Sri Lan5a, *++6, >.
1*

Sri Lan5a =igh Commission on %tta8a, Canada, E1ssues A 2ie8sF, !&ril, *++3, 3.

the interim period. Tamil was also upgraded to an Kofficial language2. -hile it did not initially oppose the 9ccord as a whole( the LTT$ re!ected the proposed autonomy arrangements. Erom the other end of the political spectrum( it was !oined in opposition y a re"i"ed @'P( which after a rief period of engagement with parliamentary politics( had a andoned them. The organisation was anned again in 56G).=5) The inter!ection of the ,ndian go"ernment into the conflict went adly for them as well with the assassination of former Prime 7inister Ra!i" 8andhi and the am ushing of the ,ndian Peace#eeping Eorce %,P:E& y the Tamil Tigers. The ,ndian go"ernment then initiated counterA insurgency operations which pro"ed to e unpopular with the Tamil population within the region ecause hundreds of ci"ilians were either #illed or wounded. <,n 5665( the LTT$ assassinated Ra!i" 8andhi( the former Prime 7inister of ,ndia( who had authorised the sending to Sri Lan#a of the ,P:E. Since then( while mindful of sentiment in the south ,ndian state of Tamil +adu( the ,ndian 8o"ernment( which prior to 56GF had at points displayed considera le sympathy for its cause( has een "ery hostile to the LTT$. 7any ha"e argued since that the assassination was a ma!or miscalculation y the Tigers. ,n 56G6 a second @'P insurrection ro#e out( mainly triggered y "ociferous opposition to the presence of the ,P:E on the island( although the social and economic discontent that had led to its first insurrection had also deepened. 9t one point( the insurrection loo#ed as if it might succeed in capturing power. ,n response( many leftAwing Sinhalese acti"ists were targeted y go"ernment death s;uads and ultraAnationalist groups. The role of the ,P:E in the north and east freed up much of the Sri Lan#an armed forces to com at the insurrection and y 5665 it had een loodily ;uelled.=5I ,n 56G6 the ,ndian 8o"ernment e"entually withdrew their peace#eeping forces from Sri Lan#a and the status of the Ci"il -ar went from ad to worst. The ,ndian tried to mediate the conflict from ehind the scenes role ut were ineffecti"e. ,t was during this time that the LTT$ gained the upper hand from the Sri Lan#an go"ernment forces in solidifying their gains in the captured territory in their ;uest to esta lish a separate Tamil autonomous region. 9nother attempt for peace and ceasefire was made etween the years /**/A*) in 1slo( +orway etween the warring parties and the international community. <The 7emorandum of >nderstanding %7o>& that was signed y the Sri Lan#an go"ernment and the Li eration Tigers of Tamil $elam %LTT$& with the help of +orway2s mediation in Ee ruary /**/ and the international donor conference in To#yo in @une /**) ha"e created new hopes for a peaceful settlement of the war in Sri Lan#a. 1n the national le"el the elections etween 5666 and /**/ helped to reduce the fragmentation of the political landscape. The coha itation created for the first time an institutional framewor# in which the two ma!or parties were forced to coAoperate and to share go"ernmental responsi ility. 9t the international le"el the mediating efforts of +orway since spring /***( the impacts of the 55 Septem er /**5 attac#s in the >.S.( and the financial engagement of the international community at the To#yo conference contri uted to this optimism. These de"elopments seemed to ha"e opened a new window of opportunity for a dura le peace to end the protracted conflict etween the Singhalese ma!ority and the Tamil minority.=50
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=ouse of Commons. War and Peace in Sri Lan5a, ;esearch +,7,1, )une ,, *++6, 1*. 14id, =ouse of Commons, 1*.

1:

1,

Wagner, r. Christian. Sri Lan5a <e8 Chance for PeaceG German 1nstitute for 1nternational and Security !ffairs, )anuary, *++:, 3.

$"en with the added enthusiasm to mediate the conflict it was doomed to fail for se"eral reasons.
1. The disagreement that occurred etween the newly elected president %Chandri#a :umaratunga& and Prime 7inister %Ranil -ic#remesinghe& on which direction to mediate

the conflict. Prime -ic#eremeisnghe supported conciliatory tal#s with the Tamil Re els while President :umaratunga opposed them. ,t should e noted that President :umaratunga had lost "ision in one eye prior to her election from a Tamil Re el suicide attac# which #illed /. people. Due to this dispute etween President :umaratunga and Prime 7inister -ic#remesinghe( the parliament was dissol"ed and new elections were called. The Tamil faction "iewed this as a lac# of good faith on the part of the go"ernment to settle the conflict. ,n addition( the terms of the 1slo accord as had een the case with the 56GF ,ndian ro#ered accord called for new elections with the participation of the Tamil minority. The Sri Lan#an go"ernment failed to follow thru on their end.
*. The continued isolation of the Sri Lan#an 7uslim community who were left out of the

process. Throughout this conflict( the Sri Lan#an 7uslim found themsel"es forced to ta#e side and also ore the runt of ci"ilian casualties from oth the go"ernment and Tamil forces. Since the independence of Sri Lan#a from British rule( the 7uslim community ha"e een marginali4ed and discriminated in terms of educational( economical( and political opportunities. <To understand why the 7uslim has een marginali4ed from the peace process and their #ey issues repeatedly ignored at the national le"el( it is necessary to recogni4e the contri uting roles played y the ethnic Sinhala ma!orityAcontrolled Sri Lan#an state( the ruthless Tamil separatist mo"ement( and the selfAinterested 7uslim political elites.=5.
3. 1pposition to the peace accord y the Sinhala nationalist parties such as the SLEP(

@athi#e ?ele >rumaya %@?>&( and @anatha 'imu#thi Peramuna %@'P&. Both the SLEP and @'P had a long history of antagoni4ing and disrupting mediation efforts to settle the ongoing ci"il war etween the Sinhalese ma!ority and Tamil minority. ,t was they that stirred up nationalistic tendencies among the Sinhalese ma!ority that resulted in the mass pogroms against the Tamil minorities and Sri Lan#an 7uslim 7oors in 560G and 56G). Their opposition to the 1slo 9ccord split the Sinhalese ma!ority in pro treaty and antiA treaty camps. -ith the collapse of the tal#s( the war too# a turn in fa"or of the Sri Lan#an military starting with the election of 7ahinda Ra!apa#se as President in /**0. President Ra!apa#se opposed the Peace Process of /**/ ecause he elie"ed it ga"e the LTT$ the upper hand and was dedicated to smashing the Tamil Tigers as oth a political and military entity. President Ra!apa#se united the Sinhalese ma!ority in support of this goal y forming an alliance with the notorious @'P who too were opposed to the peace process. The military was completely rearmed and refinanced from money from the Peoples Repu lic of China. ,n fact( the Sri Lan#an go"ernment formed an agreement of understanding in oth diplomatic and trade relations with the Chinese. <China and Sri Lan#a issued a @oint Communi;ue in Colom o
1>

.cGilvray, ennis B., A .ira5 ;aheem. .uslin Pers&ectives on the Sri Lan5an Conflict. 0ast9West Center, Policy Studies ':1, *++@, *.

Saturday at the end of Premier -en @ia aoBs official "isit. Both sides declared that( as 9sian neigh ors with a long tradition of friendship( ased on the Ei"e Principles for Peaceful Coexistence( China and Sri Lan#a will esta lish and de"elop an allAround cooperati"e partnership featuring sincere mutual support and e"erlasting friendship( said the communi;uO. Eollowing are a series of agreements and memorandums of understanding signed during premier -enBs "isit in the !oint communi;uO: 9greement on the Eurther De"elopment of Bilateral $conomic and Trade Relationship etween the 8o"ernment of the PeopleBs Repu lic of China and the 8o"ernment of the Democratic Socialist Repu lic of Sri Lan#a.=5F The Chinese and Sri Lan#an 9lliance was ideal for se"eral reasons:
1. Both the Chinese and Sri Lan#an go"ernments had similar ideologies in terms of

socialism. Sri Lan#a was one of the first Southeastern nations to esta lish a social welfare safety net for its people in ad"ancing free healthcare and education. The Sri Lan#an go"ernment has also adopted a strategy of esta lishing a freeAmar#et economy within a socialist framewor# !ust as the Chinese ha"e done.
*. The diplomatic and trade relationships with Sri Lan#a y China( continued its long

standing policy of trading with go"ernments with less than impressi"e human rights records without trying to in"ol"e itself in that country2s domestic affairs. +umerous human rights organi4ations( the >nited States( and the $> ha"e een highly critical of China in this regard especially it comes to its relationship with Sudan. ?owe"er( the Chinese pro"ed instrumental in thwarting efforts y the >+ Security Council to condemn the Sri Lan#an go"ernment2s ma!or military offensi"e to crush the Tamil Tigers for good.
3. The Chinese "iewed the island of Sri Lan#a from a strategic perspecti"e in esta lishing a

foothold in the ,ndian 1cean to guard its trade routes from the 8ulf of 1man to the mainland through K9 String of Pearls2 strategy y uilding na"al ports in Pa#istan( 7yanmar( Bangladesh( Sri Lan#a( and the Strait of 7alacca. <Chinas develo&ment of these strategic geo&olitical H&earls has 4een nonconfrontational, 8ith no evidence of im&erial or neocolonial am4ition. /he develo&ment of the HString of Pearls may not, in fact, 4e a strategy eD&licitly guided 4y Chinas central government. ;ather, it may 4e a convenient la4el a&&lied 4y some in the Cnited States to descri4e an element of Chinas foreign &olicy. Washingtons &erce&tion of Chinas de facto strategy may not 4e a vie8 shared in BeiIing, 4ut the fact remains that economic 4enefits and di&lomatic rhetoric have 4een an enticement for countries to facilitate Chinas strategic am4itions in the region.F1(
1@

Peo&les aily. China, Sri Lan5a issue )oint CommuniJue to S&ecify Coo&eration in !ll !reas. !&ril 1+, *++,. !ccessed on %cto4er 31, *++6 from: htt&:77enlish.&eo&le.com.cn7*++,+:71+7eng*++,+:1+K1(+*6+.html.

1(

Pehrson, Christo&her ). Strings of Pearls: .eeting the Challenge of Chinas ;ising Po8er across the !sian Littoral. Strategic Studies 1nstitute, )uly, *++>, 39:.

1ndeed China s&ent over one 4illion dollars in the 4uilding of a maIor naval &ort on the island of Sri Lan#a in the fishing "illage of ?am antota. Sri Lan#a ser"es as the "ital lin# in their geoAstrategy of ecoming a ma!or +a"al Power within the region and around the world. Now that they had money, weapons, and technical advisors from the Chinese Military, the Sri Lankan government went about the task of destroying the Tamil separatist movement with brute force and superior firepower. The howls of human rights abuses and atrocities by the international community fail on deaf ears within the Sri Lankan leadership. The doctrine of the responsibility to protect as advocated by the nited Nations failed to materiali!e because of the diversionary tactics of the Chinese during Security Council proceedings and the reali!ation by the international community to inter"ect itself in the Sri Lankan Civil #ar, would result in a $uagmire worst than %fghanistan. &y the late spring of '(() the territory that the Tamil Tigers had captured in earlier military successes was reduced to a *' mile parcel where +((,((( refugees were caught between the advancing Sri Lankan %rmy and the rapidly retreating Tamil rebels who continually used them as human shields. There were eye witness accounts of the government forces deliberately bombarding hospitals with critically wounded noncombatants because of the suspicion that Tamil rebels were being harbored in the camps. ,undreds of civilians were killed in similar cross fires inside Tamil territory. %s the Sri Lankan %rmy advanced closer, the Tamil rebel leader 'elupillai Pra ha#aran e-horted his warriors to fight to the last man or woman and not to dishonor themselves by being captured. ,e also vowed to commit suicide by taking the "ial of cyanide capsules that hung around his neck. .n the end though, it was the Sri Lankan %rmy who ended the life of one of the most notorious, vicious, and charismatic rebel leaders since Che 8ue"ara or 3asser 9rafat of the PL1. 1n 7ay 56 /**6( Sri Lan#an President 7ahinda Ra!apa#sa declared an end to the war and a "ictory for all the Sri Lan#an citi4ens. 1r was itP Sri Lan#an faced the daunting tas# of reintegrating hundred of thousands of ,DP citi4ens who were stuffed into refugee camps that were lac#ing in water( food( sanitation( and were incu ators for disease such as dysentery. The go"ernment had to decide the est approach to engage a disillusioned Tamil as well as a disgruntled 7uslim minority who themsel"es were ha"ing rum lings of nationalistic tendencies. ,t also has to deal with the nationalistic hardcore ideologies of the SLEP( @athi#e ?ele >rumaya %@?>&( and @anatha 'imu#thi Peramuna %@'P& which does not allow for any dialogue etween the Tamil and 7uslim communities and was a contri uting factor to the e"ents that led to the Ci"il -ar in the first place. ,f Sri Lan#a is to achie"e peace it must in"ol"e the international community to ro#er a peace with all parties in"ol"ed as e;ual partners and the tolerance of differing cultures( races( and religions. -hen the British granted Ceylon independence in 56IG( it was the crown !ewel of its colonial empire in Southeast 9sia ecause it had de"eloped a strong democratic model and tolerance for all citi4ens. <Thus( come independence( Ceylon had( y de"elopingAcountry standards( a well de"eloped infrastructure( an efficient pu lic administration and !udiciary( and a democratic

-estminsterAtype political system. >nli#e ,ndia( there was a peaceful hando"er of power in sta le political conditions. ,n addition to a prospering plantation economy( there were significant achie"ements in health and education. The literacy rate( for example( was the highest in 9sia outside @apan and the Philippines. The one lac# spot L in the eyes of de"elopment economists at the time L was the lac# of industrialisation.=56 7any had expected oth Singapore and 7alaysia to disintegrate into sectarian fighting ut yet it was the Sri Lan#ans who went down that path ecause of nationalism( intolerance( and an unwillingness to engage in constructi"e dialogue and the implementation of policies to successfully integrate their marginali4ed minorities as the Singaporeans and 7alaysians ha"e successfully done. Sri Lan#a has the opportunity to start on a clean slate to rectify past disagreements( reintegrate its Tamil and 7uslim refugees( guarantee the security of its minority community( and to re uild its warAtorn country through foreign in"estments and aid y pro"iding essential ser"ices such as water( healthcare( power( sanitation( and permanent housing. Current Sri Lan#an President 7ahinda Ra!apa#sa has declared that the top goal in the healing of the rift that has tragically di"ided his country. The world will now wait to see if his actions will match his rhetoric.

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