We sense, between ourselves and this alien text, the presence of another reader, of the Other reader, for

whom a narrative, which strikes us as conventional or naive, has a freshness of information and a social interest that we cannot share. The fear and the resistance I'm evoking has to do, then, with the sense of our own non-coincidence with that Other reader, so different from ourselves; (JAMESON, 1986, p. 66). All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: they are to be read as what I will call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I should say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly western machineries of representation, such as the novel. (JAMESON, 1986, p. 66). MARIA ROSA LOJO If we replace the idea of the nation with that larger, less restricting idea of collectivity, and if we start thinking of the process of allegorisation not in nationalistic terms but simply as a relation between private and public, personal and communal, then it also becomes possible to see that allegorisation is by no means specific to the so-called third world. (AHMAD, p. 15, 1987) - MARIA ROSA LOJO E JAMESON All of which slowly brings us to the question of the writer himself in the third world, and to what must be called the function of the intellectual, it being understood that in the third-world situation the intellectual is always in one way or another a political intellectual. No third-world lesson is more timely or more urgent for us today, among whom the very term "intellectual" has withered away, as though it were the name for an extinct species. (JAMESON, 1986, p. 66). MARIA ROSA LOJO Third, I want to insist that within the unity that has been bestowed upon our globe by the irreconcilable struggle of capital and labour, there are increasingly those texts which cannot be easily placed within this or that world. Jameson's is not a first-world text, mine is not a third-world text. We are not each other's civilizational Others. (AHMAD, p. 15, 1987) JAMESON Ranging from beasts, spirits, and gods to ineffable forces, by the way of the generic dead or the ancestors, and of other peoples with their remarkable gifts, the extraordinary agents that control the human fate live outside the space of human control. More precisely, the lack of control translates as being-in-otherspace. (SAHLINS, 2008, p. 139). Or, notably, the other peoples of their ken: peoples whose cultural existence may be enviable or scandalous to them. But in either case, by the very difference from themselves, ken are strangers who thus offer proof of a transcendent capacity for life. It is as if nothing foreign were merely human to

them. Endowed with transcendent powers of life and death, the foreign becomes an ambiguous object of desire and danger. (SAHLINS, 2008, p. 139140). YAY USAR ESSA Differentiation and cultural emptiness objectify the natives and confirm the tabula rasa characteristic of the other. (BONNICI, 2000, p. 53). More than the obstacle of speech, there was the deeper and inherent impediment of a subject oriented person to maintain any communication with a differentiated person. (BONNICI, 2000, p. 53). PARA ANLISE DOS CONTOS Os homens descobriram a totalidade de que fazem parte. At ento, formavam uma parte sem todo. (TODOROV, 1983, p.6). Se consigo me comunicar de maneira satisfatria com outrem, preciso imaginar um quadro de referncia que englobe seu universo e o meu. Ao se desejar estabelecer o dilogo com outros cada vez mais distantes, deve -se postular um horizonte universal para nossa busca de entendimento, mesmo que esteja claro que na prtica jamais tratarei com categorias universais mas apenas com categorias mais universais do que outras. (TODOROV, 1993, p. 89). A linguagem s existe pelo outro, no somente porque sempre se fala a algum, mas tambm na medida em que permite evocar o terceiro, ausente. (TODOROV, 1993, p. 189). Para dar conta das diferenas existentes no real, preciso distinguir entre pelo menos trs eixos, nos quais pode ser situada a problemtica da alteridade. Primeiramente, um julgamento de valor (um plano axiolgico): o outro bom ou mau, gosto dele ou no gosto dele, ou, como se dizia na poca, me igual ou me inferior (pois, evidentemente, na maior parte do tempo, sou bom e tenho autoestima...). H, em segundo lugar, a ao de aproximao ou de distanciamento em relao ao outro (um plano praxiolgico): adoto os valores do outro, identifico me a ele; ou ento assimilo o outro, impondo-lhe minha prpria imagem; entre a submisso ao outro e a submisso do outro h a inda um terceiro termo, que a neutralidade, ou indiferena. Em terceiro lugar, conheo ou ignoro a identidade do outro (seria o plano epistmico); aqui no h, evidentemente, nenhum absoluto, mas uma gradao infinita entre os estados de conhecimento inferiores e superiores. (TODOROV, 1993, p. 222). In an anthropological spirit, then, I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. (ANDERSON, 1991, p. 49). It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (ANDERSON, 1991, p. 49).

the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation. (ANDERSON, 1991, p. 58). The deepest problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual to maintain the independence and individuality of his existence against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of the historical heritage and the external culture and technique of life. (SIMMEL, 1950, p. 11). Indeed, if I am not mistaken, the inner side of this external reserve is not only indifference but more frequently than we believe, it is a slight aversion, a mutual strangeness and repulsion which, in a close contact which has arisen any way whatever, can break out into hatred and conflict. (SIMMEL, 1950, p. 15). To the extent that such forces have been integrated, with the fleeting existence of a single cell, into the root as well as the crown of the totality of historical life to which we belongit is our task not to complain or to condone but only to understand. (SIMMEL, 1950, p. 19). Among the most important of these influences have been according to what I have called the catastrophic theory of progress migration and the incidental collisions, conflicts and fusions of people and cultures which they have occasioned. (PARK, 1928, p. 882). Migration as a social phenomenon must be studied not merely in its grosser effects, as manifested in changes in custom and in the mores, but it may be envisaged in its subjective aspects as manifested in the changed type of personality which it produces. (PARK, 1928, p. 887). The stranger stays, but he is not settled. He is a potential wanderer. That means he is not bound as others are by the local proprieties and conventions. (PARK, 1928, p. 888). For our present purposes the term "stranger" shall mean an adult individual of our times and civilization who tries to be permanently accepted or at least tolerated by the group which he approaches (SCHUETZ, 1944, p. 499). He becomes essentially the man who has to place in question nearly everything that seems to be unquestionable to the members of the approached group. (SCHUETZ, 1944, p. 502). The discovery that things in his new surroundings look quite different from what he expected them to be at home is frequently the first shock to the stranger's confidence in the validity of his habitual "thinking as usual." (SCHUETZ, 1944, p. 503).

In other words, the cultural pattern of the approached group is to the stranger not a shelter but a field of adventure, not a matter of course but a questionable topic of investigation, not an instrument for dis-entangling problematic situations but a problematic situation itself and one hard to master. (SCHUETZ, 1944, p. 506). If wandering is the liberation from every given point in space, and thus the conceptional opposite to fixation at such a point, the sociological form of the "stranger" presents the unity, as it were, of these two characteristics. (SIMMEL, 1971, p. 143). The person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going. (SIMMEL, 1971, p. 143). As a group member, rather, he is near and far at the same time (SIMMEL, 1971, p. 148). culpabilidade e inocncia supem um ser, que no coincide com a totalidade do ser, j que ele culpado ou inocente em relao a outrem, ou, ao menos, em relao a um princpio que ultrapassa o eu. (LVINAS, 1997, p. 42). deve-se perguntar se, na multiplicidade humana, a alteridade do Outro homem significa originalmente a partir de um saber - saber poltico, mas essencialmente saber - em que o eu se reconhece como frao de um Todo que comanda a solidariedade dos membros. Ou - e este seria o segundo termo de uma alternativa - deve-se perguntar: a alteridade do outro homem, a alteridade de outrem, no ter para o eu, logo, um carter de absoluto, no sentido etimolgico deste termo, como se outrem no fosse somente, no sentido lgico e formal, outro (isto , outra de uma autoridade logicamente ou mesmo transcendentalmente supervel, prestando-se sntese da unidade do "eu penso" kantiano), mas fosse outro de maneira irredutvel, de uma alteridade e de uma separao refratrias a toda sntese, anteriores a toda unidade e onde a relao possvel do eu com outrem, alteridade de estranho indesejvel [...] (LVINAS, 1997, p. 236). o Outro no a negao do Mesmo, como desejaria Hegel. O facto fundamental da ciso ontolgica em Mesmo e em Outro uma relao no alrgica do Mesmo com o Outro. (LVINAS, 1980, p. 285). o pluralismo realiza-se na bondade que vai de mim ao outro em que o outro, como absolutamente outro, pode apenas produzir-se sem que uma pretensa viso lateral sobre esse movimento tenha qualquer direito de se apoderar de uma verdade superior que se produz na prpria bondade. (LVINAS, 1980, p. 285-286).

A unidade da pluralidade a paz, e no a coerncia de elementos que constitui a pluralidade. A paz no pode, pois, identificar-se com o fom dos combates por falta de combatentes, pela derrota de uns e a vitria dos outros, isto , com os cemitrios ou os imprios universais futuros. A paz deve ser a minha paz, numa relao que parte de um eu e vai para o Outro, no desejo e na bondade em que o eu ao mesmo tempo se mantm e existe sem egosmo. (LVINAS, 1980, p. 286). CONCLUSO