Reid Vapor Pressure

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Jump to: navigation, search Reid vapor pressure (RVP) is a common measure of the volatility of gasoline. It is defined as the absolute vapor pressure exerted by a liquid at 100 F (37.8 C) as determined by the test method ASTM-D-323. The test method applies to volatile crude oil and volatile nonviscous petroleum liquids, except liquified petroleum gases. The matter of vapor pressure is important relating to the function and operation of gasoline powered, especially carbureted, vehicles. High levels of vaporization are desirable for winter starting and operation and lower levels are desirable in avoiding vapor lock during summer heat. Fuel cannot be pumped when there is vapor in the fuel line (summer) and winter starting will be more difficult when liquid gasoline in the combustion chambers has not vaporized. Thus, oil refineries manipulate the Reid Vapor Pressure seasonally specifically to maintain gasoline engine reliability. The Reid vapor pressure (RVP) differs slightly from the true vapor pressure (TVP) of a liquid due to small sample vaporization and the presence of water vapor and air in the confined space of the test equipment. That is, the RVP is the absolute vapor pressure and the TVP is the partial vapor pressure. Conversion between the two measures can be found here, from p. 7.1-54 onwards.

Seems it is caused more by the lower Hydrocarbon like methane, ethane etc
Answer:
Improve

It is absolute vapor pressure exerted by a liquid at 100 F. It is a measure of volatility. It is measured by ASTM-D-323 test method. Note: There are comments associated with this question. See the discussion page to add to the conversation.

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Accidents during the offshore oil and gas development

by Stanislav Patin, translation by Elena Cascio based on "Environmental Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry"

Below you will find a short overview of drilling, transportation and storage accidents during the offshore oil and gas activities. To find more information on Environmental Impact of the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry click on the links at the end of the page.

Oil and gas accidents

Accidents inevitably accompany offshore development. They are the sources of environmental pollution at all stages of oil and gas production. The causes, scale, and severity of the accidents' consequences are extremely variable. They depend on a concrete combination of many natural, technical, and technological factors. To a certain extent, each accidental situation develops in accordance with its unique scenario. The most typical causes of accidents include equipment failure, personnel mistakes, and extreme natural impacts (seismic activity, ice fields, hurricanes, and so on). Their main hazard is connected with the spills and blowouts of oil, gas, and numerous other chemical substances and compounds. The environmental consequences of accidental episodes are especially severe, sometimes dramatic, when they happen near the shore, in shallow waters, or in areas with slow water circulation.

Drilling accidents
Drilling accidents are usually associated with unexpected blowouts of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons from the well as a result of encountering zones with abnormally high pressure. No other situations but tanker oil spills can compete with drilling accidents in frequency and severity. Broadly speaking, two major categories of drilling accidents should be distinguished. One of them covers catastrophic situations involving intense and prolonged hydrocarbon gushing. These occur when the pressure in the drilling zone is so high that usual technological methods of well muffling do not help. Lean holes have to be drilled to stop the blowout. The abnormally high pressure is most often encountered during exploratory drilling in new fields. The probability of such extreme situations is relatively low. Some oil experts estimate it at 1 incident for 10,000 wells [Sakhalin-1, 1994]. The need to drill lean holes emerges, on average, in 3% of accidental episodes. The other group of accidental situations includes regular, routine episodes of hydrocarbon spills and blowouts during drilling operations. These accidents can be controlled rather effectively (in several hours or days) by shutting in the well with the help of the blowout preventers and by changing the density of the drilling fluid. Accidents of this kind are not so impressive as rare catastrophic blowouts. Usually, they do not attract any special attention. At the same time, their ecological hazard and associated environmental risk can be rather considerable, primarily due to their regularity leading, ultimately, to chronic impacts on the marine environment.

Transportation and storage accidents

Tanker transportation. Oil extracted on the continental shelf accounts for a considerable part (probably at least 50%) of annual volumes of oil transported by tankers (the latter constitute over 1 billion tons). On some fields, the shuttle tankers are the main way of delivering hydrocarbons to the onshore terminals. The main causes of tanker accidents that lead to large oil spills include running aground and into shore reefs, collisions with other vessels, and fires and explosions of the cargo. According to official data [IMO, 1990], the amount of oil spilled during tanker accidents in 1989 and in 1990 were 114,000 and 45,000 tons, respectively. At the same time, the total volume of oil pollution caused by marine oil transportation was 500,000 tons a year.

Significantly, both large drilling accidents and large tanker catastrophes occur relatively rarely. The frequencies of such incidents as well as the oil volumes released in large spills differ from year to year. The history of tanker accidents has been thoroughly described by both the scientific literature and the media. Analyzing the statistics and circumstances of such events indicates that they can hardly be avoided. Although the rate of tanker accidents has been declining over the past two decades, we should be prepared to deal with them in the future. While speaking about the history of tanker transportation, we want to mention a sequence of large supertanker accidents starting with the catastrophic grounding of the tanker Torrey Canyon in the English Channel in 1967. The spill of 95,000 tons of oil caused heavy pollution of the French and British shores with serious ecological and fisheries consequences. This accident was followed by a number of other tanker accidents, including Amoco Cadiz (1978, 220,000 tons of oil spilled), Exxon Valdez (1989, 40,000 tons of oil spilled), and Braer (1993, 85,000 tons of oil spilled). Each of these episodes developed in accordance with its unique scenario. In all the situations, though, the levels of oil pollution reached lethal limits for marine fauna, mainly for birds and mammals. The consequences included much more damage than just ecological disturbances in the sea and on the shore. Chapter 7 will discuss this in more details. In some cases, the tanker accidents occurred right in the zone of the oil field development. One of them happened in 1978 in the Shetland basin. The tanker Esso Bernica was holed during the mooring, and 1,100 tons of heavy oil fuel spilled into the coastal zone causing serious damage to nature and the local population. One of the most dramatic situations developed in 1989 in the shallow waters of Prince William Sound near the Alaskan southern shore. The oil tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground and spilled over 40,000 tons of crude oil. As the oil spread along the coastline, it covered sea animals, birds, and plants. It turned hundreds of miles of this area (unique for its cleanness and biological resources) into an area of ecological disaster. This relatively recent episode in the history of the offshore oil and gas industry causes an alarming association in the mind of a Russian reader. The Exxon Valdez catastrophe happened approximately at the same latitudes where the grand projects of the oil and gas developments on the Russian Arctic shelf have already been started (the shelves of the Barents and Kara Seas in vicinity of the White Sea). The association gets even stronger if we take into account that considerable amounts of hydrocarbons extracted here are going to be transported by the tanker fleet. This will include tanker shuttles (including the ice types), large tankers with dead weight up to 120,000 tons, and supertankers. Each of these vessels is going to make hundreds of trips a year. This regular transportation activity is going to take place with the rest of the traffic in the area of the oil field developments and in addition to the general intense shipping and fishing in this Arctic basin. All of these factors considerably increase the probability of accidental situations occurring in the region. We must remember the high productivity and high vulnerability of the Arctic marine ecosystems. This region contains unique natural resources that are comparable to the rich resources of the Alaskan shelf. This primary background information and general statistics about large tanker accidents (about 2% a year) allow us to conclude, without any calculations and modeling, that the risk of transportation accidents occurring on the Arctic shelves is going to be high. The consequences of these accidents can be catastrophic. Moreover, the environmental damage of possible accidents can exceed everything that has happened before in such cases, including the accidents on the Alaskan shelf. Very dangerous situations can emerge in case of a gas tanker accident. Gas carriers are going to be used together with oil tankers in the Barents Sea as well as on the eastern shelf of Sakhalin to transport liquefied natural gas. Gas tanker accidents, although less probable than the accidents with oil tankers, can cause so-called flameless explosions. It happens due to the rapid evaporation of the liquefied gas on

the sea surface and formation of pieces of ice and gas clouds followed by combustion and explosions. 2 Such explosions can destroy everything alive in areas of up to 400 km . At last, the tragic apotheosis of possible outcomes is an accident involving a tanker that is transporting methanol - a rather toxic substance that is completely soluble in water. In case of an accident of such a vessel with a freight-carrying capacity of 35,000 tons, for example in the coastal zone of the Western Murman, the area of lethal impact to marine organisms will be from dozens and hundreds to thousands of square kilometers. In fact, it could cover the whole fisheries regions [Borisov et al., 1994]. Storage. Underwater reservoirs for storing liquid hydrocarbons (oil, oil-water mixtures, and gas condensate) are a necessary element of many oil and gas developments. They are often used when tankers instead of pipelines are the main means of hydrocarbon transportation. Underwater storage tanks 3 with capacities of up to 50,000 m either are built near the platform foundations or are anchored in the semisubmerged position in the area of developments and near the onshore terminals. Sometimes, the anchored tankers are used for this purpose as well. Of course, a risk exists of damaging the underwater storage tanks and releasing their content, especially during tanker loading operations and under severe weather conditions. However, no summarizing quantitative assessments and statistics of such events are available. After the spill of 1,200 tons of crude oil in 1988 from an underwater storage tank during a storm in the North Sea, some countries introduced restrictions on installing such structures near the shore [Cairns, 1992]. The most dangerous are the accidents involving underwater storage tanks that contain toxic agents, for example methanol. Such accidents are possible in the area of Shtokmanovskoe field developments in the Barents Sea where over 3,000 tons of methanol products are planned to be stored underwater. Pipelines. Complex and extensive systems of underwater pipelines have a total length of thousands of kilometers. They carry oil, gas, condensate, and their mixtures. These pipelines are among the main factors of environmental risk during offshore oil developments, along with tanker transportation and drilling operations. The causes of pipeline damage can differ greatly. They range from material defects and pipe corrosion to ground erosion, tectonic movements on the bottom, and encountering ship anchors and bottom trawls. Statistical data show that the average probability of accidents occurring on the -4 -4 underwater main pipelines of North America and Western Europe are, respectively, 9.3x10 and 6.4x10 . The main causes of these accidents are material and welding defects [Sakhalin-1, 1994]. Depending on the cause and nature of the damage (cracks, ruptures, and others), a pipeline can become either a source of small and long-term leakage or an abrupt (even explosive) blowout of hydrocarbons near the bottom. The dissolution, dilution, and transferring of the liquid and gaseous products in the marine environment can be accompanied in some cases by ice and gas hydrates formation. The intensity and scale of toxic impacts on the marine biota in the accident zone can be, of course, very different, depending on a combination of many factors. Modern technology of pipeline construction and exploitation under different natural conditions, including the extreme ones, achieved indisputable successes. However, pipeline oil and gas transportation does not eliminate the possibility of serious accidents and consequences. It is important to take into consideration that in a number of cases, the accidental oil and gas spills and blowouts on the onland main pipelines can pose danger to the coastal marine ecosystems. This can happen when onland pipeline accidents take place near big rivers or in locations of their crossing. Any pollution of river waters eventually affects the sea zone near the river mouth. Such a situation happened at the end of 1994 in the Usinsk area, Russia. An onland pipeline rupture led to the spill of more than 100,000 tons of oil with the danger of heavy pollution of the basin of Pechora River. The potential hazard of such situations can be even higher during oil and gas development on Sakhalin. The main pipelines are supposed to be laid along the entire eastern coast of the island, right across the main spawning rivers where reproduction of the unique populations of Sakhalin salmon takes place.

Hydrocarbon dew point

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The hydrocarbon dew point is the temperature (at a given pressure) at which the hydrocarbon components of any hydrocarbon-rich gas mixture, such as natural gas, will start to condense out of the gaseous phase. It is often also referred to as the HDP or the HCDP. The maximum temperature at which such condensation takes place is called the cricondentherm.[1] The hydrocarbon dew point is a function of the gas composition as well as the pressure. The hydrocarbon dew point is universally used in the natural gas industry as an important quality parameter, stipulated in contractual specifications and enforced throughout the natural gas supply chain, from producers through processing, transmission and distribution companies to final end users. The hydrocarbon dew point of a gas is a different concept from the water dewpoint, the latter being the temperature (at a given pressure) at which water vapor present in a gas mixture will condense out of the gas.

Contents
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1 Relation of the term GPM to the hydrocarbon dew point 2 See also 3 References 4 External links

[edit] Relation of the term GPM to the hydrocarbon dew point

In the United States, the hydrocarbon dewpoint of processed, pipelined natural gas is related to and characterized by the term GPM which is the gallons of liquifiable hydrocarbons contained in 1,000,000 cubic feet (28,000 m3) of natural gas at a stated temperature and pressure. When the liquifiable hydrocarbons are characterized as being hexane or higher molecular weight components, they are reported as GPM (C6+).[2][3] However, the quality of raw produced natural gas is also often characterized by the term GPM meaning the gallons of liquifiable hydrocarbons contained in 1,000 cubic feet (28 m3) of the raw natural gas. In such cases, when the liquifiable hydrocarbons in the raw natural gas are characterized as being ethane or higher molecular weight components, they are reported as GPM (C2+). Similarly, when characterized as being propane or higher molecular weight components, they are reported as GPM (C3+).[4]

Care must be taken not to confuse the two different definitions of the term GPM. Although GPM is an additional parameter of some value, most pipeline operators and others who process, transport, distribute or use Natural Gas are primarily interested in the actual HCDP, rather than GPM. Furthermore, GPM and HCDP are NOT interchangeable and one should be careful not to confuse what each one exactly means. Methods of HCDP determination There are primarily two classes of HCDP determination. One category is "theoretical" methods, and the other is "experimental" methods. "Theoretical" methods of HCDP determination The Theoretical methods, use the component analysis of the gas mixture (usually via Gas Chromatography GC) and then use equation of state (EOS) to calculate what the dew point of the mixture should be at a given pressure. The Peng-Robinson and Kwong-Redlich-Soave equations of state are the most commonly used for determining the HCDP in the natural gas industry. The theoretical methods suffer from two sources of error. The first source is the error on the analysis of the gas mix components. When using a C6+ GC these errors can be as high as 50F depending on the gas mixture and the assumptions made regarding the composition of the C6+ fraction. For "pipeline quality" natural gas, a C9+ GC analysis will reduce the uncertainty to approximately 10-15F. Using a laboratory C12+ GC analysis can reduce the error further to less than 1C. However, using a C12 laboratory system can introduce additional errors, namely sampling error. If the gas has to be collected in a sample bottle and shipped to a laboratory for C12 analysis, sampling errors can be significant. Obviously there is also a lag time error between the time the sample was collected and the time it was analyzed. [5]. The second source of error relates to the errors embedded in the equation of state model use to calculate the dew point. Different models are prone to varying amounts error at different pressure regimes and gas mixes. The significant advantage of using the theoretical models is that the HCDP at several pressures (as well as the cricondentherm) can be determined from a single analysis. This provides for operational uses such as determining the phase of the stream flowing through the flow-meter, determining if the sample has been affected by ambient temperature in the sample system, and avoiding Amine foaming from liquid hydrocarbons in the Amine contactor. GC vendors with a product targeting the HCDP analysis include ABB, Thermo-fisher, Emerson, as well as some other companies. "Experimental" methods of HCDP determination In the "experimental" methods, one actually cools a surface on which gas condenses and then measures the temperature at which the condensation takes place. The experimental methods can be divided into manual and automated systems. Manual systems, such as the Bureau of Mines Dewpoint Meter, depend on an operator to manually cool the chilled mirror slowly and to

visually detect the onset of condensation. The automated methods use automatic mirror chilling controls and sensors to detect the amount of light reflected by the mirror and detect when condesation occurs through a drop in measured light. The chilled mirror technique is a first principle measurement which is not suspect to "calculation" or "choice of model" errors; however, some liquids must condense before the detection of condensation on the mirror can occur, and therefore reports values lower than the theoretcial methods[5]. The experimental method also suffers from two sources of error. The first error is in the detection of condensation. A manual chilled mirror device relies on the operator to determine when a mist has formed on the mirror, and is highly subjective. The automated chilled mirror devices are significantly more repeatable but can be affected by contaminants that condense on the mirror before the hydrocarbons. The second source of error is the speed of the cooling of the mirror and the measurement of the temperature of the mirror when the condensation is detected. This error can be minimized by controlling the cooling speed, or having a fast condensation detection system. The experimental methods only provide a HCDP at the pressure at which the measurement is taken, and cannot provide the cricondentherm or the HCDP at other pressures. However, most operators like to know the HCDP at their current line pressure anyways. Given that the input pressure of the experimental systems can be adjusted by a regulator, one can also measure the HCDP at other pressures by adjusting the input pressure.

WHAT IS HCDP (HYDROCARBON DEW POINT)

Principles of HCDP | Why Control HCDP | Specifications for HCDP | Cricondentherm Temperature | Hydrocarbon Gas Dew Point Curve

Principles of Hydrocarbon Dew Point

Dew point is defined as the temperature at which vapor begins to condense. We see it in action every foggy morning. Air is cooled to its water dew point and the water starts condensing and collects into small droplets. We also see it demonstrated by a cold glass "sweating" on a humid day. The cold glass lowers the air temperature below the water dew point temperature and the water condenses on the sides of the cold glass. Water dew point is relatively simple and easy to predict since it is a single component system. It is easily removed using conventional techniques, primarily TEG (Triethylene Glycol) dehydration units. Hydrocarbon dew point (HDP) is similar to the water dew point issue, except that we have a multicomponent system. Natural gas typically contains many liquid hydrocarbon components with the heavier components found in smaller amounts than the lighter gaseous ends. It is the heaviest weight components that first condense and define the hydrocarbon dew point temperature of the gas. The dew point temperature also moves in relation to pressure. One of the first questions we are asked by producers with a hydrocarbon dew point issue is: "How can my hydrocarbon dew point be so high?" In return, we ask the producer at what temperature does his high-pressure production separator operate? By definition, a production separator separating oil from gas operates at vapor-liquid

equilibrium. Therefore, the gas leaving the separator is in equilibrium with the oil. In other words, the gas leaving the separator is at its hydrocarbon dew point that equals the separator operating temperature (and pressure.) If the separator is operating at 100F, then the gas has a 100F dew point at separator pressure. As the gas leaves the separator and cools flowing through the piping system, liquids condense and the dew point decreases as the heavy ends condense. The TEG dehydration unit will remove some heavy hydrocarbons, in addition to water, and further reduce the hydrocarbon dew point. At the sales meter, (without a conditioning unit) the hydrocarbon dew point is usually close to the lowest temperature the gas has achieved on the location before it was sampled, at operating pressure.

Why Control Hydrocarbon Dew Point?

The gas transportation companies have come to the realization that managing hydrocarbon dew point reduces system liabilities, opens up new gas markets and generates operating revenue. By managing hydrocarbon dew point, hydrocarbon condensation can be prevented in cold spots under rivers and lakes where the liquids collect in the low areas and then often move as a slug through the system, over pressuring the pipe, and overpowering liquid handling facilities, flowing into compressors and end user sales points. Most importantly, liquids in burners and pilots onsite and at end user locations at LDCs, can cause fire and explosion hazards. Also, removing pipeline liquids helps prevent pipe corrosion in the low areas where water is trapped under the hydrocarbon liquid layer and slowly destroys the pipe integrity. Proper managing of gas dew point can also prevent liquids from forming as the gas cools while flowing through pressure reduction stations (e.g. citygates) that feed end user supply systems. Controlling dew point is also necessary to qualify the pipeline to market gas to high efficiency gas turbine end users that require a dry and consistent quality fuel.

Specifications for HDP

Pipelines use two main methods to specify contractual natural gas hydrocarbon dew points. 1. Limit on C5+ or C6+ components by analyzing for: o GPM (gallons of liquid per thousand SCF) o Mole % 2. Specifying an actual HDP by: o Setting a hydrocarbon dew point temperature maximum at operating pressure o Setting a maximum cricondentherm hydrocarbon dew point In addition, typical pipeline specifications, or tariffs, almost always specify a maximum GHV (Gross or Higher Heating Value), which is greatly affected by heavy hydrocarbons contained in the gas stream.

Cricondentherm Temperature
The cricondentherm temperature is the highest dew point temperature seen on a liquid-vapor curve for a specific gas composition over a range of pressure, e.g. 200-1400 psia. When you look at a hydrocarbon gas dew point temperature curve (phase envelope,) the curve bends with pressure. Shown below is a dew point curve, after conditioning, for a south Texas gas analysis. The transporting pipeline requires a 20F cricondentherm temperature. At the time this sample was taken, the cold separator on the gas conditioning equipment was operating at 9F and 875 psig.

Hydrocarbon Gas Dew Point Curve

Dew Point Pressure Temperature The temperature shown in the F PSIA HDP curve represents the gas 9.0 200 dew point at the corresponding 12.9 250 pressures. 15.6 300 17.5 350 A cricondentherm specification at 18.8 400 first seems like the best way a pipeline can protect its assets. 19.5 450 The transporting pipeline operator 19.7 500 Cricondentherm knows if it sets a cricondentherm 19.6 550 temperature restriction below the 19.1 600 lowest temperature seen in its 18.2 650 system, it can raise and lower the 17.0 700 gas pressure in the pipeline 15.4 750 transportation system, and not 13.5 800 have to worry about liquid condensation. 11.1 850 Operating at 9F and 875# 8.5 900 The problem a pipeline operator 5.2 950 has in using a cricondentherm 1.4 1000 specification is in the calculation -3.3 1050 of the cricondentherm -9.4 1100 temperature. The cricondentherm -18.7 1150 temperature is calculated by obtaining an extended gas analysis and then inputting the analysis data into a software package, using equations of state to predict the dew point temperatures at the range of pressures. However, many gas-transporting companies tend to collect gas composition data using on-line chromatographs or composite samples with a grouped C6+ component. The C6+ component does not provide any information on the heavier hydrocarbon (C7+) components that determine the gas hydrocarbon dew point. To calculate a cricondentherm the pipeline operator must make some assumptions. It is these assumptions that are causing problems. The pipeline operator must decide how to distribute the C6+ component for his calculation. The most commonly used distribution assumptions are the Daniels/El Paso distribution (i.e. 48% C6; 35% C7; 17% C8+) and the GPA distribution (i.e. 60% C6, 30% C7, 10% C8+). If the Daniels distribution shown in the previous sentence is used on the gas represented in the dew point curve above, the cricondentherm dew point calculates to be 38.1F, which is 18.4F higher than its actual cricondentherm temperature. The producer would need to operate his cold separator on his conditioning unit at -10F (negative 10F) to meet the system requirements due to the assumptions made in calculating the gas cricondentherm. Another popular mistake is to perform an analysis that groups the C6, C7 and C8+ components, rather than using the detailed component-by-component breakdown. Grouping also skews the cricondentherm. If you group the above components, the cricondentherm calculates at 32.6F or 12.9F high. It is DPC's experience that grouping will add a minimum of 3F to 5F to the calculated cricondentherm temperature. To be useful in a commercial environment, pipeline hydrocarbon dew point specifications must be easily measured with existing equipment. The majority of the transporting pipeline systems measure

using a C6+ component system. These systems can be used to track cricondentherm based specifications as long as the heavier components are not distributed arbitrarily.

It is DPC is recommendation that when using a C6+ based component analysis system, the following steps should be taken to monitor a sales point location where the transporter is receiving gas that is being dew point controlled based on a cricondentherm requirement. At time of initial delivery, when the receiving gas is meeting pipeline specification, a spot sample should be collected and analyzed with a detailed analysis through C8+. The detailed extended analysis needs to be inputted into a software program using the full analysis to verify the cricondentherm temperature requirement is achieved. The C6+ mole percentage (or GPM) shown on the qualifying extended analysis can then be used as the threshold standard that must be met by the gas being received at this sales meter. Online chromatography or composite samples can then be used to compare against the threshold standard to verify qualification of the cricondentherm specification. The threshold standard should be updated or qualified as needed to handle changing gas compositions.

DPC does not recommend detailed analysis be taken beyond C8+ on dew point conditioned gas streams as it is not useful and results in unnecessary expense.