AFAN V DE GUZMAN (1960) CONCEPCION, J.

FACTS: Before the distribution of the estate but after expiration of the period for the presentation of claims, De Guzman filed a claim for P1000 in the settlement of intestate estate of Arsenio R. Afan invoking Sec2, Rule 87. The administratrix opposed on the ground of expiration of the period for the presentation of claims. The probate court dismissed the claim. ISSUES: WON the present claim filed after the expiration of the period for the presentation of claims against the estate but before the distribution of the estate could be entertained. HELD: No, respondent failed to comply with the requisites. The court has authority to permit the filing of a claim after the lapse of the period, but prior to and distribution, subject to the following conditions (Sec 2, Rule 87): (1) there must be tin application therefor; (2) a cause must be shown why the permission should be granted; (3) the extension of time granted for the filing of the claim shall not exceed one month. In this case, De Guzman has not sought permission to file the claim and did not allege any reason why he should be excused for his failure to file the claim within the period stated in the RoC. Defense that "he had no actual knowledge of the fact that the estate of the deceased was then already in the process of settlement was raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. Contrary to De Guzmans claim, he had actual knowledge of the intestate proceedings long before filing his claim. a. During the lifetime of Afan, De Guzman already filed a case to recover the amount aforementioned where the former died in the course of such proceeding. When he died, the court issued an order requiring counsel for his heirs "to submit to the court the number of the intestate estate proceedings of the deceased Arsenio R. Afan now pending in the CFI Manila This order was complied with and a copy was served upon counsel for De Guzman. b. Subsequently, De Guzman submitted the names of the Afans heirs who could be appointed to substitute Afan as defendant therein, in compliance with an order of the court.

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ESTATE OF OLAVE V REYES (1983) RELOVA, J. FACTS: Despite the lack of approval of the probate court which had jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Olave, the administrators entered into an Amicable Settlement with SAMCO which filed an ordinary civil case for the collection of indebtedness of the deceased Amadeo. The administrators conveyed and ceded to SAMCO a parcel of land belonging to the estate as payment for the indebtedness. Respondents assert that no approval was necessary because the Amicable Settlement was entered into in another independent action and in another court of co-equal rank. ISSUES: WON the Amicable Settlement needed approval from the probate court HELD: Yes. In fact, respondent court erred in giving due course to the civil case instituted by SAMCO and in approving the Amicable Settlement. Section 1, Rule 87 "no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator" The claim of private respondent SAMCO being one arising from a contract may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings in the CFI for the settlement of the estate of the deceased... within the period prescribed, otherwise, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Section 5, Rule 86) Purpose of presentation of claim in probate court: to protect the estate of deceased persons, to enable the executor or administrator to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed, and to apprise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration. Section 1, Rule 73 "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The administrator cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court.

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GUTIERREZ V BARRETTO-DATU (1962) MAKALINTAL, J. FACTS: The lessee Ricardo Gutierrez commenced an ordinary civil action in the CFI of Rizal against the executrix of the testate estate of the lessor Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto for the recovery of damages in the concept of unearned profits which Ricardo failed to realize due to the governments order to open the dikes of the fishpond (leased property). He alleged that the lessor committed a breach of contract. ISSUE: whether or not his claim for damages based on unrealized profits is a money claim against the estate of the deceased Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto within the purview of Rule 87, Section 5. HELD: YES. Applicable rule: Rule 87, Sec 5. The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded upon contract. Breach of contract falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87. The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those to recover real or personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal (Rule 88, section 1). The instant suit is not one of them. Gavin v. Melliza is not in point. The claim therein, which was filed in the testate proceeding, was based upon a breach of contract committed by the executrix herself, in dismissing the claimant as administrator of the hacienda of the deceased. While the contract was with the decedent, its violation was by the executrix and hence personal to her. Besides, the claim was for indemnity in the form of a certain quantity of palay every year for the unexpired portion of the term of the contract (not a money claim). RTC Order affirmed. 3
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AGUAS V LLEMOS (1962) REYES, J.B.L., J. FACTS: Francisco Salinas and the Spouses Aguas filed an action to recover damages from Hermogenes Llemos for maliciously serving them by registered mail a copy of a petition for writ of possession which was to be submitted on Feb 23, 1960 (8AM), even if no such petition has been filed; thereby causing the plaintiffs to incur expenses in travelling from Manila to Catbalogan, Samar. Defendant died before he could file his Answer. ISSUE: WON the claim should be filed in a testate/intestate proceeding of the estate of the deceased HELD: NO. Actions for damages caused by tortious conduct of a defendant survive the death of the latter. Action herein is not one of those actions that are abated by death under Rule 87, Sec5: (1) claims for funeral expenses and those for the last sickness of the decedent; (2) judgments for money; and (3) "all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract express or implied" Rule 88, section 1, enumerates actions that survive against a decedent's executors or administrators, and they are: (1) actions to recover real and personal property from the estate; (2) actions to enforce a lien thereon; and (3) actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property. The present suit is one for damages under the last class, it having been held that "injury to property" is not limited to injuries to specific property, but extends to other wrongs by which personal estate is injured or diminished. Other questions have been rendered moot by the amicable settlement of the parties, as approved by the Court.

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IMPERIAL INSURANCE CO V DAVID (1984) RELOVA, J. FACTS: Felicisimo Reyes and his wife jointly and severally executed 3 indemnity agreements in favor of appellee Imperial Insurance. Felicisimo Reyes died and intestate proceedings were instituted where his wife was appointed administratrix. Pursuant to her liability under the Agreement, appellee made demands on Emilia David, the wife. When David failed to pay, appellee filed a civil case for collection of sums of money. ISSUE: WON the lower court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs cause of action. HELD: YES. When the obligation is a solidary one, the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. If husband and wife bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent and separate from her husbands. She may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the claim against her husband should be made in the decedents estate. As distinguished from a joint obligation where each of the debtor is liable only for a proportionate part of the debt and the creditor is entitled only to a proportionate part of the credit, in a solidary obligation the creditor may enforce the entire obligation against one of the debtors. Phil Intl Surety v Gonzales: Where the obligation assumed by several persons is joint and several, each of the debtors is answerable for the whole obligation with the right to seek contribution from his co-debtors. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co v Villarama: The Civil Code expressly allows the creditor to proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. Hence, there is nothing improper in the creditor's filing of an action against the surviving solidary debtors alone, instead of instituting a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased debtor wherein his claim could be filed.

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VELASQUEZ V GEORGE (1983) GUTIERREZ, JR., J. FACTS: Plaintiffs, the widow and legitimate children of the late Benjamin George, filed a complaint against defendants (officers of the corporation where Benjamin George has 64.8% interest ) including the administrator in Benjamins estate. Plaintiffs allege that the defendants executed a Deed of First Real Estate mortgage and power of attorney in favor of defendant Villanueva without the proper approval from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction. Villanueva contends that plaintiffs have no capacity to file the complaint because the general rule laid down in Rule 87, Section 3 states that only the administrator or executor of the estate may bring actions of such nature as the one in the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether or not the proper party to file the complaint is the administrator HELD: NO. The administrator is the same person charged by the plaintiffs to have voted in the board of directors without securing the proper authority from the probate court to which he is accountable as administrator. Ramirez v Baltazar: since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be far-fetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased.

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DE LA CRUZ VS. CAMON (1966) SANCHEZ, J. FACTS: Camon was the lessee of the entire Hacienda Rosario, two-fourths of which was owned pro-indiviso by the estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon-Murphy. De la Cruz, the administrator of the estate, moved that the probate court direct Camon to pay accrued rentals from the estates 2/4 share. Camon challenged the probate courts jurisdiction over his person. ISSUE: WON demand for rentals from third person may be made by the administrator through a mere motion in the intestate proceedings HELD: NO. Recovery should be by separate suit commenced by the administrator. The amount demanded in this case is not, by any means, liquidated. Conceivably, the lessee may interpose defenses. The right to collect the rentals is still in a fluid state. That right remains to be threshed out upon a full-dress trial on the merits. Not having been liquidated, the money (rentals) allegedly due is not property in the hands of the administrator. It is not thus within the effective control of the probate court. Neither does the money come within the concept of money of the deceased "concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away", which would confer upon the court incidental prerogative to reach out its arms to get it back and, if necessary, to cite the possessor thereof in contempt. At best that money is debt to the estate not against the estate. There is no express statutory authorization which coerces the lessee debtor into defending himself in the probate court. Paula vs. Escay: When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person. Cunanan vs. Amparo: Even matters affecting property under judicial administration" may not be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceedings, if the "interests of third persons are prejudiced."

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VALERA VS. INSERTO (1987) NARVASA, J. FACTS: The Heirs of Teresa Garin, daughter of the deceased Spouses Valera and Carosa, asked the court to declare Cabado, one of the administrators, in contempt for her failing to render an accounting of her administration. As reply, Cabado asked for the delivery to him as administrator of the fishpond allegedly held in trust by Jose Garin (Teresas husband) for the deceased spouses. The Court issued an Order commanding the Heirs of Teresa Garin to reconvey the fishpond immediately to the estate of the deceased spouses. It was made clear by the Probate Court, as understood by the administrators, that the hearing was merely provisional in character, only to determine won the fishpond should be included in the inventory. Despite voluntary relinquishment by the caretaker Fabiana, she later on filed a Complaint-in-Intervention seeking vindication of his right to the possession of the fishpond. ISSUE: WON the order of the probate court was conclusive on the question of ownership over the fishpond HELD: NO. The general rule is that a probate court has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent. The exceptions are: 1) if the claimant and all the other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or 2) the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced. The facts in this case do not call for the application of the exceptions. If cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, but for determining whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory. This determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive. The question as to the title over the property is subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties. The same norm governs Sec. 6 of Rule 87 which is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent. If the latter lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to turn it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the probate court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the probate court would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to recover the property. 8
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GODOY V ORELLANO (1921) VILLAMOR, J. FACTS: A document providing for an option to buy in favour of Eusebio Godoy was executed by Felisa Pagilinan, administrator of the estate of her father Julio Orellano, over a dredge belonging to the estate of Julio Orellano. Godoy was ready to make complete payment, but Pagilinan failed to deliver the dredge. Godoy brought suit against Pagilinan and coowners before the CFI to deliver the dredge.

ISSUE: WON Pagilinan, as judicial administratrix of the estate of Orellano, was authorized to sell the dredge belonging to said estate. HELD: NO. A power of attorney authorizing the sale of properties of the estate executed by the heirs in favor of the administrator, without authority of court, has no legal effect. Sections 717, 718, 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribes the proceedings to be had before an administrator of an intestate or testate estate may sell personal or real property and also the conditions under which the personal or real property pertaining to an estate may be sold or disposed of by the administrator. Unless compliance is had with these provision, the sale of the dredge by the administratrix, or her promise to sell it, is null and void. Huse vs. Den: A sale and conveyance by executors without an order of the probate court, under a will devising property to them in trust, but not authorizing any sale of the realty, otherwise than by a direction to pay the debts of the testator, is void, and passes no title to the purchase. Wyatts Admr vs. Rambo: A sale by an administrator of the personal property of the estate, without the authority of an order of court, or of a will, or under an order of court which is void for want of jurisdiction, does not confer on the purchaser a title which is available against a succeeding administrator. The court has exclusive jurisdiction to authorize the sale of properties like the one under consideration and the power of attorney executed by the heirs of Orellano in favor of the administratrix, without authority of court, has no legal effect. This is more so, since 2 of the said heirs are under age, and the others did not ratify the option contract, as provided in the power of attorney. 9
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ESTATE OF GAMBOA V FLORANZA (1908) WILLARD, J. FACTS: The commissioners allowed a claim secured by real estate mortgage in favor of Balbino Jaucian against the estate of Luis Gamboa. The court, without hearing, directed the administrator to present a motion asking for the sale of the mortgaged property. Upon motion, the court issued another order, also without notice and hearing, directing the sale of the property for the purpose of paying Jaucian. A creditor appealed saying that the document evidencing the loan of Jaucian is not a mortgage, although the document has not been brought to court (not sustained). ISSUE: WON the assailed orders of sale are valid. HELD: NO. The probate court has no power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of paying a specific mortgage debt which is a lien thereon. An order made by the probate court for the sale of real property of the estate is invalid when no notice of the hearing upon the petition for such sale is given. The code states in sections 714 to 721 various conditions under which the real estate of the deceased may be sold for the payment of debts. There is nothing there which indicates that the CFI, in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon. It may be that the court would have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying other debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving the court authority to sell it for the purpose of paying that specific debt. The order directing the sale failed to comply with the provisions of section 722 of the Code of CivPro requiring the administrator to present a petition asking for the sale of the real estate. It also distinctly provides that, when such petition is made, the court shall appoint a time and place for hearing it and shall require notice of the petition and of the time and place of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the court may order such further notice given as it deems proper. No notice whatever was given to any of the persons interested of the application for license to sell. The orders appealed from are reversed and the case remanded.

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CFI OF RIZAL QC V CA (1981) CONCEPCION, JR., J. FACTS: The executrix of the testate estate of Ponciano Ong Lacson asked the probate court for authority to sell property of the estate to pay taxes and other claims against the estate. She was given authorization to sell the property for not less than P360,000. The property was sold to intervenor Han Geng for P400,000, but Felix Ong opposed, saying that he offered to buy the property for P50,000 more. ISSUE: WON the sale to Han Geng should be set aside HELD: NO. The court has discretion to determine the conditions with which a sale is most beneficial to the estate. Such buyer needs to be an interested party if it is a private sale, and needs to comply with the rules, i.e. submission of a bond. 1. For a person to be able to intervene in administration proceeding concerning the estate of a deceased person, it is necessary for him to have an interest in such estate. What the court authorized was a private sale, not a public auction. As such, Felix Ong, who merely offered to buy, has no legal personality to impugn its validity. And as he is neither heir nor creditor, he has no right to intervene. 2. The probate court has ample discretion in determining under what conditions a particular sale would be most beneficial to all persons interested. Unless there is abuse of discretion, appellate courts are not to interfere. In this case, the offer of a higher price does not make approval a grave abuse of discretion, as the difference in prices is not the only factor taken into consideration. Also, creditors and heirs of the estate had no objection to the sale to Han Geng. 3. Felix Ong did not comply with Rule 89, Section 3, which required the submission of a bond to prevent the sale. 4. Re executrix prayer to withdraw the approval of the sale, alleging that such is detrimental to the estate: highly iniquitous to set aside such when the executrix has already accepted the benefits. The subsequent increase in the value of the property is not sufficient for turning down a conveyance made by an administrator. 11
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JARODA V CUSI, JR. (1969) REYES, JBL, J. FACTS: Special administrator Tan was granted authority to withdraw sums from the bank which were not listed in his petition for administration as among the properties left by the deceased Carlos Villa Abrille, alleging that although in the name of the deceased, they actually belonged to the co-owners of the Juna Subdivision. As regular administrator later on, he was also granted by the court a power of attorney appointing himself as attorney-in-fact to sell the lots in the subdivision. Petitioner moved to nullify the orders granting withdrawal of deposits and approving Power of Atty. ISSUE: WON both orders of the probate court were valid. HELD: NO. 1. Re the withdrawal: Such is foreign to the powers and duties of a special administrator (Sec2,Rule80). The order was issued without notice to and hearing of the heirs. As the deposits were in the name of the deceased, they belong prima facie to his estate after death. Until the contrary is shown, the special administrator cannot waive or hand over a part of the estate to other persons on the ground that the estate is not the owner thereof. Even if sold for valuable consideration, Rule 89 requires prior written notice of the application to the heirs, legatees or devisees. Without such notice, the order of the court authorizing the sale is invalid and improper. 2. Re the authority for sale: void for want of notice under Rule 89,Sec4, which requires written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees. Without notice, the order of the court is void. 3. An administrator is not permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any transaction concerning trust property. This is in view of the fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to the heirs of the deceased and their responsibilities toward the probate court. A contrary ruling would lead to fraud and maladministration. Courts will not even permit any investigation into the fairness of the transaction, or allow the trustee to show that the dealing was for the best interest of the beneficiary.In this case, Tan became the agent of 2 principals: the court and the heirs on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of the subdivision. Respondents dual agency is highly undesirable, if not improper. An administrator, as court officer, cannot look to both the wishes of strangers and the court that appointed him.

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BOAGA V SOLER (1961) REYES, JBL., J. FACTS: As authorized by the probate court, the administrator of the intestate estate of the spouses Isaac, Juan Garza sold parcels of land in favor of Roberto Soler (to whom the heirs of Maria Isaac subsequently sold all shares and interests over the parcels of land). Upon reconstitution of the records after the war, the newly-appointed administrator Julian Boaga filed for the annulment of the sales. On the third motion to dismiss by Soler, where he raised for the first time the issues of estoppel and prescription, the court ordered the dismissal of the action. ISSUE: WON the lower court erred in dismissing the action w/o hearing HELD: YES. 1) There should be showing that the mandatory requisites of hearing and notice to the heirs under Sections 4&7, Rule 90 were complied with. Without notice and hearing, the sale would be null and void. 2) Sec2, of Rule 90 could not be invoked. Neither the deeds of sale nor the court orders show that personal properties were insufficient to pay the debts and expenses of administration. There is also no showing that the sale was for the purpose of paying debts and expenses of administration. 3) Just a decedents representative is not estopped to question the validity of his own void deed purporting to convey land, his successor can also not be estopped to question the acts of his predecessor. 4) The claim of prescription is untenable. Actions to declare the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. Besides, such a defense is deemed to have been waived since it was not set up in the 2 earlier motions to dismiss or in the answer.

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