Architectural Identifications We might attempt to develop Metzs theory for an architectural discourse by looking for equivalent processes of 'mirrorings'

that take place within a specific architectural environment. These processes would themselves be dependent on the 'intro ection' of the e!ternal world into the self" and the 'pro ection' of the self on to the e!ternal world" such that there is an equivalence # the one 'reflects' the other # and identification may take place. The sense of 'intro ection'" of the absorption of the e!ternal world" described by Metz" is echoed within an architectural conte!t in the work of Walter $en amin" who presents the mind as a kind of camera obscura" a photosensitive 'plate' on to which certain interiors are etched in moments of illumination. $en amin" however" adds a crucial gloss to these processes of intro ection and pro ection% &$uildings are appropriated in a twofold manner% by use and by perception # or rather" by touch and sight. 'uch appropriation cannot be understood in terms of the attentive concentration of a tourist before a famous building. (n the tactile side there is no counterpart to contemplation on the optical side. Tactile appropriation is accomplished not so much by attention as by habit. )s regards architecture" habit determines to a large e!tent even optical reception. The latter" too" occurs much less through rapt attention than by noticing the ob ect in incidental fashion. This mode of appropriation" developed with reference to architecture" in certain circumstances acquires canonical value. *or the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved by optical means" that is" by contemplation" alone. They are mastered gradually by habit" under the guidance of tactile appropriation. + ,n $en amin's terms" buildings are 'appropriated'. They are intro ected # absorbed within the psyche # not ust through vision" but also through touch. We should perhaps e!tend this to include the full register of senses. Moreover" for $en amin" these 'appropriations' are reinforced by habit. -ere memory plays a crucial role. (ver a period of time the sensory impulses leave their mark" traces of their reception. These traces are themselves not forgotten" but constitute a type of archive of memorised sensory e!periences. ,ndeed life itself can be seen to be conditioned by these impulses" such that it is these that constitute our background horizon of e!perience. ,n this sense" identification might be understood as an ontological condition that is consolidated through memory. We could therefore reflect upon the model of the oneiric house offered up by .aston $achelard in The Poetics of Space./ ,t is precisely the odour of drying raisins
1$en amin" Illuminations" trans. -arry 0ohn" 1ondon% *ontana" +22/" p. /33. 2The notion of oneiric space is also central to de 4erteau's concept of space. )s he observes% '*rom this point of view"

after having compared pedestrian processes to linguistic formations" we can bring them back down in the direction of oneiric figuration" or at least discover on that other side what" in spatial practice" is inseparable from the dreamed

# parallelling 1efebvre's equally evocative description of the sound of singing echoing through the cloisters # that points to the very 5roustian way in which the oneiric house is itself a type of intro ection of previous e!periences.3 The second part of the 'double6movement of vision' in Metz's terminology is the pro ective one. This remains a crucial aspect of the process of identification which involves a two fold mechanism of grafting symbolic meaning onto an ob ect and then reading oneself into that ob ect" and seeing ones values reflected in it. The environment must therefore serve as a kind of &screen onto which we would pro ect our own meaning" and into which we would &read ourselves. We need to pro ect something of ourselves on to the other in order to recognise # or misrecognise # ourselves in the other. This was recognised by 7obert 8ischer in the conte!t of empathy theory% &)t this point" however" our feeling rises up and takes the intellect at its word% yes" we miss red6blooded life" and precisely because we miss it" we imagine the dead form as living. We have seen how the perception of a pleasing form evokes a pleasurable sensation and how such an image symbolically relates to the idea of our own bodies # or conversely" how the imagination seeks to e!perience itself through the image. We thus have the wonderful ability to pro ect and incorporate our own physical form into an ob ective form" in much the same way as wild fowlers gain access to their quarry by concealing themselves in a blind. What can that form be other than the form of a content identical with itself9 ,t is therefore our own personality that we pro ect into it. : This reveals the subtlety of a psychoanalytic account of identity" in which the mechanisms of pro ection and intro ection work in tandem" in a model that replicates the operations of the cinema" in which we become the &pro ectors and the environment the &screen. This pro ection of personality or intentionality on to an ob ect is one that is overlooked by much mainstream architectural commentary. The investment of meaning not only e!plains the creative potential of seeing the self in the other in moments of identification" but it also illuminates the problematic foundation of any discourse of architecture and politics that" as it were" attempts to 'pro ect' a range of political values on to an edifice as though they were a property of that edifice. ; This would further e!tend
place.' <e 4erteau" +2=:" p. +>3. 3.aston $achelard in Rethinking Architecture" p. 2/? -enri 1efebvre in Rethinking Architecture" p. +:/. 4 7obert *ischer" Empathy, Form and Space" p. +>:. 5,f we are to look for a model of the way in which content might be understood as a kind of &pro ection we could consider the work of the 5olish64anadian public artist" @rzysztof Wodiczko" who literally pro ects politically loaded images on to buildings as a commentary on the politics of use of that building. ,n +2=; Wodiczko pro ected the image of a swastika onto the pediment of 'outh )frica -ouse in Trafalgar 'quare" 1ondon. This act was intended as a political protest against the trade negotiations then underway between the apartheid government of 'outh )frica and the $ritish government under prime minister" Margaret Thatcher. The pro ection of the swastika onto the building raises some interesting questions about the relationship between buildings and politics. ,n particular it highlights the condition of buildings which have been blemished with the stain of evil. -is pro ection of &content6laden images on to monuments and buildings echoes the process by which human beings &pro ect their own readings onto them" as though on to some blank cinematographic screen. (n the work of @rzysztof Wodiczko" see &5ublic 5ro ections and &) 4onversation with @rzysztof Wodiczko" October" 3=" 36;/.

to the question of memorials" and serve to undermine the naAve claims that buildings can be in and of themselves the &sites of memory. $uildings" monuments" or indeed any form of memorial" it could be claimed" are essentially &inert. )s *redric Bameson observes" they do not have any inherent meaning. They need to be 'invested' with meaning. C They have to be inscribed within an allegorical narrative that gives them their meaning. This meaning is simply &pro ected on to them ,dentification with a particular place could be therefore perceived as a mirroring between the sub ect and the environment over time. -ere we might understand the sub ect" in Metz's terms" as both 'screen' and 'pro ector'. *or in moments of identification we effectively see ourselves in ob ects with which we have become familiar. )t the same time we have intro ected them into ourselves. The registering of impulses as a kind of intro ection leads to one type of 'reflection' # the recognition of the other in the self. Meanwhile the pro ection of the self on to the e!ternal world leads to a second type of 'reflection' # the recognition of the self in the other. The recognition of the &other in the self or the self in the &other are # in effect # two sides of the same coin. ,n either case what results is a form of mirroring. *rom this two6way process a fusing between self and other is achieved. )nd here we can recognise a second order of mirrorings. *or mirrorings occur not only in the engagement between the self and the environment" but also between that engagement and memories of previous engagements. There is an originary e!perience that is repeated in all similar such e!periences. )nd in that process of repetition there is a reinforcement of the original moment of identification. ,n this sense habit # as a ritualistic replication of certain e!periences # is" as $en amin observes" precisely that which consolidates the process of identification.D The built environment may therefore serve as a form of 'background' with which we might identify. 1ike Metz's 'primary filmic identifications' these are 'primary architectural identifications'" which likewise operate
6&, have come to think that no work of art or culture can set out to be political once and for all" no matter how

ostentatiously it labels itself as such" for there can never be any guarantee it will be used the way it demands. ) great political art E$rechtF can be taken as a pure and apolitical art? art that seems to want to be merely aesthetic and decorative can be rewritten as political with energetic interpretation. The political rewriting or appropriation then" the political use" must also be allegorical? you have to know that this is what it is supposed to be or mean # in itself it is inert. *redric Bameson in Geil 1each Eed.F" Rethinking Architecture" 1ondon% 7outledge" +22D" pp. /;=6;2. 7The seemingly static model of identification forged through a 'reflection' # as though in a mirror # appears at first sight to contrast markedly with the more dynamic notion of identity based on performativity" as e!plored by Budith $utler and others. Het" if we perceive the former as being grounded in a certain intentionality" we should recognise the actative dimension to the gaze itself. *or performativity is not merely a question of physical performance. ,t e!tends also to modes of perception" such as the gaze. This can be e!tended to the gaze as the potential site of an identification with place" since any act of viewing may be charged with a conscious moment of politicized reading. 8isual attachments might therefore be read as containing an actative" performative moment. )nd what applies to the gaze may equally apply to the other senses. What we find" then" is that identification based on a process of mirroring is but a variation on the actative identification with place embodied in ritualistic patterns of behaviour. ,t is through the repetitive performativities of these various modes of perception that a mirroring can be enacted and a sense of identification with place can be developed and reinforced through habit.

within the overall realm of secondary identification. )s such" architectural identifications may prove to temporary" strategic identifications. This is what allows us" for e!ample" to transfer the notion of 'home' from one architectural environment to another. This process of identification may also operate at a group level" spreading like a virus as individuals identify with other individuals and replicate their behaviour" in so doing forging a collective identity. )t the same time" collective identities will always remain 'contested' identities # hybrid" fractured" conflictual. ) mediation will therefore operate between the individual and the group behaviour" such the individual may either &buy into or re ect the dominant trends. )n obvious e!ample of a collective sense of identity would be national identity. We might therefore ask what role the built environment comes to play in the forging a sense of national identity.