The Round Table (2001), 359 (213227)

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY FORCES

NEIL SAMMONDS

Accountability of a countrys police, military and intelligence agencies to ensure that they remain within their mandates is a critical element for democracy in Commonwealth countries. The author compares the effectiveness of monitoring systems across a spectrum of Commonwealth nations with variable records of democracy and human rights. Even where a strong mix of mechanisms to oversee the security forces exists, sections of the security forces can retain an officially sanctioned free rein over their activities with no guarantee of parliamentary accountability.

EMOCRATIC, CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT of a states security forces is essential for an effective security sector, good governance and, most importantly, to help protect the human rights of the population. It should be a key element in Commonwealth countries, with their parliamentary systems, commitment to just and accountable governme nt, the rule of law and fundamental human rights, as expressed in the Harare Declaration and in growing intolerance of m ilitary takeovers. W ith a states virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and intrusion, the security forcesnamely the police, military, and intelligence agenciesneed to be monitored by a variety of mechanisms to ensure that they do not overstep their mandates. This article reviews the oversight systems of Sri Lanka, Nigeria, South Africa, Barbados and St Lucia. It investigates how accountable security forces really are across a spectrum of nations differing in size, geography, historical and political context:
Neil Sammonds is associat ed with the Commonw ealth Policy Studies Unit of the Institute of Commonw ealth Studies, Universi ty of London. This article is based on research and a report (funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ford Foundation and the Commonwealt h Parliamentary Association) entitled A Need to Know: the Struggle for Democratic, Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries (ISBN 1855071061). He also writes for Index on Censorship and is involved in the Mariam Appeal. ISSN 0035-8533 print/1474-029X online/2001/020213-15 The Round Table DOI: 10.1080/0035853012005007 1

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THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY from St Lucia with a population of 170 000 to Nigeria with 120 million; from southern Asia via Africa to the eastern Caribbean; from war-torn Sri Lanka, to transitional Nigeria and South Africa and to the stable island democracies in Barbados and St Lucia; and from militarized politics in State of Emergencyridden Colombo, to the demilitarizing politics of Abuja and Cape Town, to the small, police-centred security forces of Bridgetown and Castries. The Tamil (1983 ) and JVP (1987 90) insurrections have provided some excuse for Sri Lankan states appalling human rights record, which includes over 10 000 disappearances. Sri Lankas State of Emergency provisions grant extensive powers to the security forces and strengthen the climate of impunity. In Nigeria, a transition to civilian governance led to the May 1999 presidential inauguration of retired General Olusegun Obasanjo and to the re-establishment of democratic institutions. But the top-down constitution making process leaves Nigeria far behind examples from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Uganda and South Africa,1 and reflects the ongoing political leverage of military elites and the weakness of civilian democracy. The South African Police Service, rationalized and transformed from its 11 apartheid era police agencies, is under-trained, criminalized and corrupt and contributes to 700 deaths annually, but does have a number of civilian mechanisms overseeing it. In a remarkable turnaround ,2 defence institutions of the apartheid era have been transformed and accompanied by the formalization of civilian oversight, although inadequacies remain. The Royal Barbados Police Force (RBPF) and the Barbados Defence Force (BDF)3 sometimes use excessive use of force against civilians, and a complaints body is being created to deal with the problem. The rotten4 Royal St Lucian Police Force (RSLPF) is unable to provide a quality policing service,5 and has generated widespread allegations of police brutality, shootings6 and impunity,7 and of corrupt and crim inal behaviour. A Police Reform P roject is now attempting to improve the police force, its oversight and its poor image.

Parliamentary oversigh t
Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon recently observed that almost everywhere the balance has swung much too far in the direction of the executive and away from the legislature and that Parliaments vital task of scrutiny must be safeguarded and strengthened.8 This judgement resonates clearly in Sri Lanka. G. L. Peiris, ex-Minister of Constitutional Affairs and Professor of Law at Colombo University, has written that the central feature of the 1978 Constitution, which established an Executive Presidency, is the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the president. In Parliament the govern ment inhibits debate on the security forces and its three-monthly extension of the State of Emergency is a mere rubber-stamping of its powers. The Presidentwho is also Minister of Defencerarely attends parliament herself. Roy Denish, former defence corresponden t of the Sunday Leader, says that when opposition MPs have raised questions over defence procurement the Deputy Defence Minister usually says hell respond later but never does, or says its a matter of national security and says nothing.9 Parliament has been denied the reports of commissions investigating a decade of disappearances. There are also more sinister obstacles to debate: a respected source says that a 214

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY prominent politician who criticized the Secretary of Defence found that his number of protection vehicles was immediately reduced. In Nigerias 1998/99 elections only three of 26 political associations were permitted to stand and after decades of military rule the House and Senate are still learning the arts of civilian government and the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and All Peoples Party (APP) have not established themselves as strong and viable opposition parties. Considerable political bickering has hampered parliamentarians from doing little more than award them selves generous furniture allowances. Ninety-three military officers corrupted by political office were retired by Obasanjo, in an act requiring political courage. Although political military elites are well versed in accountability narrative many are suspicious of their motives. The South African National D efe nce Force is now accountable to the Minister of Defence, the President, and Parliament. Richard Pillay of the Westminster-style opposition Democratic Party says the Ministers of Safety and Security, of Intelligence and of Defence have all responded well to security sector questioning in parliament,10 even if Parliament is still lied to about the security forces.11 Bishop Mogoba of the Pan African Congress (PAC) and Louis Green of the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) say far too many questions are avoided. 1 2 There are concerns that the A NC m em bers who dominate Parliament and its committees are reluctant to put hard questions to their own Ministers. In Barbados the budgets of the police, BDF and Regional Security System are discussed openly and negotiated with ministers against other departments, and Parliament was relatively quick to respond to calls for a police complaints body. But with only one sitting member of the opposition debate is weakened, although leader of the opposition David Thompson says there is ongoing informal contact between the Prime Minister and himself. Similarly in St Lucia debate is weak with only two of 28 MPs representing the opposition. Nonetheless security forces are discussed six or seven times a year.13 Good signs for progr ess with the Police Reform Project are that Prime Minister Kenny Anthony is said to be enthusiastic and that the Minister of Home Affairs reportedly has a hotline for police whistle-blowers.

Parliamentary committees
The Sri Lankan Consultative Defence Com mittee is a weak parliamentary committee chaired, inappropriately, by the Deputy Defence Minister. Almost no-one outside its nine members knows of its existence. It may sit monthly but usually sits every three months. It clearly is not over-active,14 and is reportedly supine to the executive. Air Vice-Marshall (Retired) Harry Goonatilleke says that when he appeared before the committee to testify over procurement in the air force, he tried to name high-placed people involved in profit-making deals but was told to keep quiet.15 The Nigerian Senate, with 109 senators, has 53 committees while the House has 360 Representatives and 50 committees. Each chamber has defence, police and intelligence committees whose chairs are appointed by the Senate President in consultation with the Senate party leaders, often on the basis of loyalty rather 215

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY than experience. The Defence Committee, with 35 members, has oversight over all defence issues, and it can initiate enquiries on any issue. Ibrahim Zailani (APP) says meetings are very well attended and there are very good relations with the military. But these immature committees are yet to prove themselves and are reportedly sidelined by the Presidency and the Defence Minister, and by the military itself and its foreign consultants.16 In 1994 the Safety and Security ministry put SAPS, with its National Police Com missioner and 128 000 officers, on a level with the small and active civilian-headed Secretariat oversight body. However, given the violent crime wave certain politicians and Minister Tshwete emphasized their support for macho policing,17 and the Secretariat consequently became less influential and its staff was decimated. Similarly weakened was the once promising Safety and Security Committee overseeing the police. The South African 12-member Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence has wide-ranging functions and is said to have open, vibrant debates. The Com mittee is well attended but research capacity is quite low and the agencies are slow in coming forward. The two reports in six years of the JSCI have been a little disappointing, lacking in detail and hard to obtain.18 Question marks hang over the JSCIs appointments procedure which failed to give security clearance to Mogoba and Pillay.19 Mogoba remains disenchanted with the whole committee system for the security forces, convinced that real oversight goes on elsewhere, namely in the Cabinet. A political journalist calls the JSCI useless for not hauling the agency [the NIA] over the coals for its spying on the German embassy, and a diplomatic source says the Committee makes very few waves. Apparently reflecting a popular swing against human rights policing the Safety and Security Committee is becoming less vigorous in its probing of the executive and the police.20 The opposition Democratic Labour Party (DLP), in addition to civil society, has been credited with the establishment of a parliamentary committee on law and order but the terms of reference of the committee exclude oversight of the police itself and David Thompson considers it a waste of time. DLP Secretary George Pilgrim feels that a committee system in small states could function more efficiently if there were fewer parliamentarians on it and it had more interaction with enlightened members of the public and civil society. There are no parliamentary standing committees in the St Lucian parliament and hence there is no standing committee to oversee the RSPLF. There is not known to have been any proposal to establish such oversight committees in St Lucia.21

Complaints bodies
The powers of the Sri Lankan police, swollen by the State of Emergency and Prevention of Terrorism Act, are not known to be challenged by any meaningful police complaints body. The Nigerian federal police force is grossly under-resour cedthe whole of Lagos (with a population of over 10 million) has only 1500 officersand the rapid response anti-crime teams are Nigerias most egregious human rights offenders. Obasanjo has prioritized police reform but non-governm ental organization (NGO) propos als to include an oversight function in regional 216

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY Police Relations Committees have not been accepted. The South African Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) has been investigating deaths in police custody or arising through police action since 1997. However, due to under-staffing, under-re sourcing, difficulties with its mandate, and lacking clear empowerment it has opted mostly to supervise and monitor investigations. The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR) has advocated various measures to improve the powers and performanc e of the ICD,22 which is otherwise seen to be playing a crucial rle in a hostile environment. 23 South Africa also has Com munity Police Forum s (CPFs), established to promote accountability to local communities but so far with a mixed record of performance.24 Still, even in the areas with limited physical and intellectual resources, the CPFs still play an important rle in airing explanations for police action, and for listening to complaints. Since 1964 police complaints in Barbados have been dealt with by a department headed by a superintendent at the Central Police Station in Bridgetown. 25 However, a working-grou p was established leading to the October 2000 Bill to establish a new complaints authority, hopefully to be running by the end of March 2001. The body will have three or five members, appointed by the Governor-Ge neral on the advice of the Attorney-General, of whom at least one will be representing the public. The 1998 Appraisal gives a sobering picture of the current St Lucian police complaints department which can best be described as piecemeal. In [the capital] Castries, one Inspector located at the Central Police Station works, currently without support, to deal with all local complaints. In addition to matters outstanding from previous years, the Inspector has received almost 50 complaints this year, half of them alleging brutality from officers. He is under considerable pressure and the location of the Unit at CPS is far from ideal if independence and confidentiality are to be respected The Commissioner refers some complaints to middle-ranking officers for investigation. This has to be carried out in addition to their primary workload and delays are common. There is no automatic referral of cases to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) where a police officer has committed a criminal offence. The net result of this system is a lack of police officer and public confidence in the impartiality and confidentiality of the system.26 DCP Parker envisages the establishment of a new strong and transparent complaints unit. While recognizing that some civilian oversight through a body of interested stakeholders would be beneficial, such a unit need not necessarily be external.27 Parker feels that any fatal shooting should be automatically referred to the DPP, that crime statistics and commissions of enquiry reports should be made public, and that the public should have input into needs analysis for the police. Furthermore there should be a drive towards more community-based policing. In the meantime, Home Affairs Minister Velon John has been outspoken in exhorting the public to report unbecoming police conduct via his Crime Action Line or personal fax machine.28

Civil society
Press Freedom Director of the Commonwealth Press Union, Lindsay Ross, says 217

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY Sri Lanka has one of the most repressive censorship regimes in the Commonwealth. Editors and journalists face frequent court cases, harassment and threats, and slander in the state media if they cover the northern war and its accompanying corruption and bungling in defence procurement. The ever-busy Competent Authority (chief censor) is empowered to cut liberally articles loosely deemed to be against national security or risking demoralization of the armed forces, while it is widely felt that the lack of transparency is hurting the national interest more. Roy Denish says the Leader s and Timess defence reports sink like stones into deep water. Deepika Udagama says that the Emergency Regulations underlying the censorship regime are incompatible with international human rights law. They place over-broad powers on the state, are inaccessible to the public and have no central registry. The state does not fulfil its obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding notification of reasons for derogation, nor by tying the Regulations strictly to the exigencies of the situation. Sri Lanka has one of the highest NGO densities in the world, and Tyrol Ferdinands of the National Peace Council says NGOs feel relatively safe provided they do not touch the holy cow of the war effort. The bringing to trial of security officers who abducted, raped and killed Krishanthy Kumaraswamy shows the strength of a mobilized civil society, but the dropping down the agenda of the investigations into the Chemmani mass graves shows its inconsistency. Nigerian civil society has little oversight over the security forces which rem ain buffered by low societal expectations and a reluctance to demand legitimate information. When the security forces are held to account by civil society the state may simply deny any validity to the storyas in the allegedly fake October 1999 Punch photos of soldiers raping women in Choba. Obasanjo has begun a w elcom e if slightly syc opha ntic Monthly M edi a Chat w ith journalists. Human rights activists like Matthew Kukah have been drawn into policy making, and the International Committee for the Red Cross is undertaking human rights training with the police. NGOs and journalists generally concur that there is a slightly largerand saferspace for them in Nigerias inchoate transition to democracy. With apocalyptic crime levels and 200 to 300 police officers being killed every year, SAPS currently has a lot of public sympathy in its use of force against the crime wave. Recent footage of police brutality in Brixton and against black immigrants has led to trials of the perpetrators but generally there are three less positive common strands to opinions on security sector media coverage: firstly that outside the Mail and Guardian there is little informed debate and few heavy-weight, independent journalists; secondly, that the media frequently gets the facts wrong; thirdly, the white-managed press allegedly distorts criminality into something habitually black and beyond the control of the (black-led) government and security sector. Media oversight became more problematic when Police Commissioner Jack Selebi joined Minister Tshwetes hardline stance by inexplicably banning the dissemination of certain crime statistics, and by ordering police officers not to speak to the media without the Ministers prior consent.29 Barbados produces comprehensive monthly crime statistics but while the figures are discussed fairly openly by ministers and senior police officers they 218

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY are not disseminated as a public document and so debate remains controlled. The Government is regularly criticized in the rather sensationalist30 media31 and some debate is highly informed.32 The radio call-in programmes are a particularly popular media for venting steam and debating serious issues including police brutality.33 Rickey Singh, journalist and m em ber of the Caribbe an Hum an Rights Network, believes it was the pressure from NGOs and the media which forced the Barbadian government and security forces to end its period of denial over police brutality, and to initiate moves for an independent complaints body. Singh resents the marginalization of NGOs and society from debates over crime statistics and policing, citing the recent establishment of the polices Rapid Response Units (RRU)a high-profile force of 70 elite police designed to patrol areas mainly with high tourist densities and to respond immediately to criminal actswhose raison dtre has not been fully explained. If its true that the crime rate has fallen from 13 000 to 10 000, then why is there a need for such a new unit? There has been no explanation of this, said Singh. Singh also expressed concern regarding what he considers to be inadequate accountability of the RRU. It is feared may be able to use force more liberally with less oversight. For Attorney-General David Simmons there is a tendency in the small Barbadian community to get over-emotional about crime and not to understand it scientifically34something which might perhaps be strengthened by bringing the public into closer dialogue on police and policing, or by allowing them better access to crime figures. The St Lucian mass media carries a wide spectrum of political opinion and is often critical of the government.35 One particularly loud voice against police brutality and impunity is Rick Wayne (who one diplomat termed the real opposition), whose Star articles and controversial Talk TV programme frequently engage the issue.36 Yet Wayne says civil societys criticisms of the police have drawn no obviou s successes other than occasional police statements and a general increase in popular awareness of rights. Similarly Ione Erlinger-Ford of the Crisis Centre in Castries says that despite 10 years of dealings with the police over rape and abuse cases, that the RSPLF was still incompetent and judgem ental and had no specialized rape units. Erlinger-Ford is one of a number of St Lucians believing the only way to overcome the ineffective and nepotistic police is to have its members recruited from overseas. DCP Parker is open to the notion, aware that this is already the practice of Bermuda, but believes direct entry recruitment at every level is more realistic. Wayne is less optimistic, believing that while new faces are needed to make reform work, a rotation of officers would only mean a rotation of mediocrity when the fundamental problem is one of hum an resources. Parker agrees, aware that an enlightened and experienced workforce could only truly materialize if and when St Lucians have significantly higher socioeconomic conditions.

National Human Rights Commissions

The Sri Lankan Human Rights Commissions (HRC) substantial if unrealized powers include to monitor those detained under the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The second HRC, chaired by Faiz Mustafa, 219

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY announ ced it will prosecute the police if they fail to report detentions and Commissioner Goonatilleke says there has been by and large observance. However, NGO members believe adherence is very limited, and that the Human Rights Task Force, which previously monitored adherence to the PTA, was much more pro-active. A leading UNP MP adds he has not heard of a single case of reporting happening within 48 hours and believes the police have not even been issued with receipt books.37 The 16-member presidentially-appointed Nigerian Human Rights Commission is still establishing its regional offices and is said to have over 2000 petitions awaiting the Commissioners signature. In four years the presidentially appointed NHRC has produced only one inaccessible annual report and of the 343 complaints received in 1999 only 12 relate to police brutality, 37 to detention and nine to extra-judicial executions. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has focused on racial equality rather than security sector abuses,38 and has not done human rights training since 1995, although it is involved in monitoring criminal justice legislation.

Other mechanisms
In Sri Lanka in November 1994 three regional Presidential Commissions of Enquiry into Disappearance were established, and investigated 27 526 petitions. However, the United Nations (UN) Working-Group on Disappearances stated a number of complaints: that the publications were very difficult to obtain; families were not informed; disappearances under the UNA government were investigated more thoroughly than those under the PA; the HRC was kept on the sidelines; that very few of the suspected perpetrators were convicted, and some were even prom oted; and that the disappearance-friendly PTA and Emergency Regulations have not been abolished. Until the late 1980s it was very difficult to challenge Sri Lankan state violence which was legally abetted by 18-month detentions of suspects, preventative detention, exe m pt ions from prosecution of security officials, and politically appointed judges. Now, writes Dr Deepika Udagama, the courts almost presume executive wrongdoin g [placing] a higher onus on the executive to prove that it has acted constitutionally. In its fundamental rights jurisdiction the Supreme Court has now made progressively bold judgements, has recognized that torture includes mental torture, and has repeatedly censured the Secretary of Defence for approving detention orders mechanically. 39 Dr Saravanamuttu of the Centre for Policy Alternatives adds that the courts could be significantly more proactive, could take on board public interest litigation, and should accept more cases. A number of bodies with governme nt-sanctioned oversight functions have been created in Nigeria but they remain under-resourced, under-publicized and lack teeth. In 1999 Obasanjo appointed retired Judge Oputa to lead a panel of investigators into abuses committed between 1966 and 1999 40 and by February 2000 it had received 11 000 complaints. The Commission has been starved of adequate funding and has yet to organize hearings. The media has allowed the Panel to slide out of the news, and Commission members are said to be increas220

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY ingly disillusioned. Obasanjo also appointed a panel under Dr Kolade to review 1999s civil and military deals but no findings have been released and the media has dropped the issue. How over 1000 civilians have been killed in 18 months of politicized inter-ethnic clashes is being reportedly investigated but NGOs do not expect to hear any findings. In a spiral of violence in November 1999 hundreds were killed as the military besieged Odi. The (now impeached) Senate President Okadigbo led a fact-finding mission with the Senate Committee on Judiciary, Ethics and Human Rights but no-one has been charged with perpetrating violence and Lieutenant-Colonel Agbabiaka, who led the assault, was promoted to Colonel. The renowned South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) investigates the causes, nature and extent of gross human rights violations committed between 1 March 1960 and 10 May 1994. Degrees of accountability in the process include full, public disclosure of individuals and that responsibility for violations be taken by all individuals which benefited from the security forces abuses. The new post of Inspector General of Intelligence (IG) was finally filled by Fazel Randera, a former Commissioner of the TRC. The IG is responsible to the President, has functions including monitoring and reviewing activities of the services, and has powers of access to any information or facility which the intelligence community possesses. Randera appears a wellrespected appointment but there is discomfort over the location of the IGs officein the same building as NIA, SASS and Nicoc. The Auditor-Ge neral audits the accounts of all national, provincial and m unicipal departments including the intelligence agencies, and has made a number of criticisms regarding the lack of sufficient controls on the agencies. He also emphasizes that: A number of audit queries which were raised in previous reports show little or no progress towards being resolved. This is of major concern to the Office. Alleged high-level corruption in arms deals is being presently investigated by the Public Account s Com m ittee, and the Auditor-Gene ral, but President Mbeki has blocked the probing of Judge Willem Heaths Special Investigative Unit.41 The lid has been kept on 10 commissions of enquiry into the St Lucian police,42 reportedly the most damning being the Hudson-Phillips Report of the late 1980s. The enquiry was embarked upon following a media and NGO campaign and is said to include information about killer squads and a certain officer who shot dead 11 civilians and still faced no disciplinary charges. The ruling SLPs stated intention to release the document is doubted43 since they have managed to sit on it for three years already.

Expanding accountability issues

Alleged collusion between multinational oil companies and the Nigerian states security forces includes that Shell provided money, weapons and logistical support in the violent suppression of popular protest, and instigated the imprisonment, torture and killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the rest of the Ogoni Nine.44 Redress appears unlikely domestically, but Shell will be facing a legal case in the United States under laws allowing action against firms accused of human rights violations anywhere in the world. In the chequered record of the 221

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY large Nigerian contingent in the Liberian and Sierra Leonian peacekeeping missions HRW reports that the forces prevented wider civilian bloodshed but were also responsible for looting, illegal detentions and summary executions.45 The transfer of the Sierra Leone security mandate from ECOMOG to the UN im proved the N igerian forces re cord, 4 6 but they still traded drugs an d diamonds. 47 The National Assembly has not scrutinized ECOMOGs activities, and Abacha has refused to state the human or financial costs of the interventions. 48 The South African private security industrys turnover rocketed from R141 million in 1978 to R8.8 billion in 1998. It employs 470 000 people and has 80 000 vehicles compared with 128 000 and 37 000 respectively for SAPS49 yet has less oversight mechanisms, since it operates on a profit motive and is accountable to its clients only.50 New regulation in the Security Officers Act has been attacked for excluding comprehensive regulation on the issuing and carrying of firearms, the standards and conduct of security guards, and the gathering of information which may violate peoples rights and civil liberties.51 Allegedly permeating the South African agencies blurred edges are the intelligence organizations of the ANC and of President Mbeki. The impression is that the ANCs agencies overlap to some extent with the agencies of the state, and it that sometimes the party machinery takes precedence over that of the state. The President also takes primary responsibility for the multi-tasked Scorpions who are recruited from the police, yet have twice the guns and salaries but half the oversight.52 Intelligence units are also mushroo ming in the Department of Finance and Ministry of Home Affairs and there are worries that the NIA may be able to slide certain activities into these less scrutinized domains. Observers note that there must be oversight of any intelligence activity, not just of specific agencies. Barbados is a member of the seven-member Regional Security System and its Council of Ministersnamely the Prime Ministers of each country meet annually to discuss plans and budgets. As a treaty organization contributions do not need parliam entary approv al, but the Barbadian Auditor-General does scrutinize the RSSs accounts. The RSS does not need parliamentary approval for deployment of forces either, and it is feared the RSS is the baby of its Coordinator, Rudyard Lewis.53 When asked how the 1983 Grenada intervention which Brigadier Lewis had ledhad been overseen, he replied: It was successful; we restored democracy! The lack of awareness of the RSSs existence creates room for potential ill-discipline.

Conclusion
A strong mix of parliamentary and civil societal mechanisms is required in overseeing security forces, yet even where such a mixture exists, eg in South Africa, there are various lacunaepresumably sanctioned by the executive affording a disturbing free rein to sections of the security forces. The five studies presented in this article show how lacunae exist throughout all oversight systems. Parliament is frequently sidelined for major statements and even for decisions over whether to deploy armed forces. Having a civilian legislature does not guarantee democratic oversight as debate can be stifled or discouraged, 222

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY parliamentarians may be unprepared or unable to assert themselves, and parliament may be superseded anyway by the executive. Indeed, the reviews of Sri Lanka and Nigeria suggest that parliament at times may be little more than a faade behind which political decisions are made by unaccountable elites. Oversight must be democratic as well as civilian. A review of the security committees of Commonwealth countries reveals some glaring strengths and weaknesses. Committees should be chaired by well respected, experienced and independently minded individuals, free to criticize the executive where necessary. A good example of this is when the committee is chaired by a high-standing member of the opposition (eg JSCI, UK), while bad cases are when the chair is the Prime Minister (ISC, New Zealand) or relevant minister (CDC, Sri Lanka). The committees may have excellent (New South Wales) or abysmal (Papua New Guinea) resources, and may have had substantial effects on policy (Australia) or none at all (Namibia). Committee members should be able to act independently but this is unlikely if they are selected by the party whips (UK, in effect) or by the leader of the government (Papua New Guinea). As expressed by Don McKinnon, it is the process of democracy and accountability which is the benchmark for success, not the mere ticking-over of an assembly or a committee. Just as security committees are a litmus test of democratic, civilian control in a country they are also a realm for potential progress,54 given their unique location, mandates, and access to people and papers. Recommendations to help them realize their potential include that power to appoint m em bers is taken away from party whips or the Prime Minister, that Parliam ent should debate all com m ittee reports, 55 and that committees have greater information about security issues and of their counterpart committees abroad.56 Police complaints mechanisms are another good indicator of how closely a state wishes its police to be monitored. The present examples in Barbados and St Lucia are inadequate but the proposed new systems should be much better. Even the more complex bodies in South Africa and the UK have drawn many criticisms and are liable to be changed.57 Quasi-independent national Human Rights Commissions have great potential to improve systems of accountability but, where they have been established, they tend to focus on other human rights issues or are still finding their feet. They are uniquely placed, tend to have strong mandates, and should have kudos with people, parliament and security forces alike. However, for various political and economic reasons they remain lacking in teeth. In smaller states, such as in the Caribbean, nations could create perhaps a regional HRC, just as there are plans to create a Caribbean Court of Justice.58 The situations in St Lucia and Barbados lend themselves towards a wider debate about accountability in small states: Is the Parliament of a small state able to scrutinize adequately its security forces, given the vagaries of local politicsthe tidal changes in election results which produce tiny opposition parties, the limited numbers of MPs to sit on committees, the networks of ties which may undermine independence, etc? Could regional bodies, such as a Caribbean Human Rights Commission, play a rle in monitoring the security sector and its oversight mechanisms? The enquiry into the RSPLF by former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney-General Hudson-Phillips points to the possibility 223

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY of other reviews by regional experts or organizations? Could the present example of the Commonwealth being actively involved in the security review of Papua New Guinea be a blueprint for further reviews in states with problematic finances and human resources? The Bermudan example of recruiting certain police officers from off the island is an imaginative means of countering some of the political problems of effective policing is a small state, although increased cost m ay be an issue. How ever, even with imported or rotated police officers, low socioeconomic conditions will hamper the evolution of a high level police force, whatever the size of the state. The higher socioeconomic conditions in Barbados contribute to its having more effective oversight mechanisms than in St Lucia. While calls for revitalizing of legislatures should be heeded, research points to a parallel need to strengthen democratic processes between parliament and civil society, and within civil society itself. Civil actors inside and outside parliament often lack the relevant experience and leverage with which to feed into the democratic and accountability processes. This appears starkly to be so in Nigerians inability to challenge their countrys personality-led security policiesas shown in the states announc ing the establishment of an 83rd Division to police the Deltaa decision taken solely by executive members in consultation with the US MPRI consultancy company. The media and NGOs are often unable to fulfil their public watchdog rle with limited access toand awareness ofsecurity and security sector oversight issues. This may be a particular concern in states coming out of a period of military rule or civilian dictatorship, where journalists have been reporting on security forces in a meaningful way, and public discourse has been severely restricted. The Commonwealth Journalists Association, Commonwealth Press Union and Commonwealth Broadcasting A ssociation could carry out training sessions w ith appropriate media representatives. Journalists who are security sector literate could increase general security sector literacy amongst the wider population. Governments should be encouraged to follow the example set at present by South Africa in having links from its government website to dozens of NGOs monitoring the democratic process. Developments in information gathering highlight a need for oversight bodies to be scrutinizing intelligence and security activities, rather than of specific agencies, since various departm ents (Finance, Im migration, etc) are now involved in intelligence work and will be less monitored than their more established counterparts. Similarly the growth of private security, notably in South Africa, has occurred outside the umbrella of meaningful oversight and generates a pressing need to establish accountability mechanisms for private as well as public security officers. The ultimate call is for society to be as literate as possible in security sector issues. For a real national dialogue to occur, the general public needs to be more aware of its rights against defence and intelligence agencies, to know what information it may legitimately expect, to comprehend the workings of parliament and the whole oversight system, and to know which complaints bodies they can access. The sporadic bursts of human rights training conducted by NHRCs or via education systems contributes to better public understanding but is far too limited. Journalists need to understand how to carry out responsibly 224

THE SLOW MARCH TOWARDS SECURITY FORCE DEMOCRACY their watchdog rle, 59 and the CPU and other freedom of expression NGOs should continue to support those struggling against strict censorship regimes, particularly when they are covering security sector issues. Crucially, as Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon has stated, it is vital to recognize that democracy is a process rather than an event. The greater the level of popular participation in the process the better for all concerned. The people must be de-marginalized from the political process and from discourse on the security forces. This will stimulate national debate, increase understanding of security issues, and provide an extra tier of oversight at the most important, popular level. It will also rejuvenate regime legitimacy and the concept of democracy.

Notes and references

1 2 Julius O. Ihonvbere, How to make an undemocratic constitution: the Nigerian example, Third World Quarterly, Vol 21, No 2, 2000, pp 343366. On 24/25 April 1994 the South African Defence Force (SADF) became the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the ex-military commander of the ANC, Joe Modise, was appointed Minister of Defence. Under him was ex-SADF Commander General G eorge M eiring who had previou sly led the m ilitary campaign against the ANC. Respected journalistic and human rights sources say it is an open secret that when the Barbado s Defence Force (BDF) supports the police it uses force liberally. Earl Bousquet, Prime Ministers Press Secretary, telephone conversation with author, September 2000. Government of St Lucia: Institutional Appraisal and Strategic Review of the Royal St Lucian Police Force, 18/9/98. Mary Francis, a respected human rights lawyer, says 12 to 20 civilians were shot in 2000 while Deputy Police Commissioner Parker, while saying he does not have exact figures, accepts there were two fatal killings in the five months up to October. Deputy Police Commissioner Neal Parker says police officers have been disciplined for misconduct, but human rights lawyer Mary Francis, journalists and diplomats have not heard of a single case. In his address to the 46th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, 28 September 2000. Conversation with author, July 2000. Conversation with author, August 2000. MPs lied to over military spying, Mail and Guardian , 1117 August 2000, p 8. Conversations with author, August 2000. During the Appropriation Bill, for example, the police is discussed at length and the head of police is called to account. We just sit back in our chairs, dont talk very much, and look from side to side until someone thinks its about time that something else was said, a member explained. Conversation with author, July 2000. Conversation with author, July 2000. A military makeover, Africa Confidential, Vol 41, No 20, 13 October 2000, p 6. Tshwete has said, We want the criminals to have bleeding noses by the time they reach the police station and has called for a review of the rights of criminals. In the 20-page 1997/8 Report, for example, the Committee notes with concern the

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massive growth of the private security and intelligence industry, yet makes no recommendation as to how this should be responded to. Both nominations were repeated; Mokobas was vetoed again, and Pillays rejection was overturned. Peter Gastrow, Director of the ISS, Cape Town, South Africa, August 2000, conversation with author. There are only 17 St Lucian MPs, with heavy constituent and national workloads, but with discussions on creating a new tier of local government MPs might be left with the time in participate in such committees. CSVR, Submission regarding the proposed ICD white paper, September 1999. Director of the Institute of Security Studies Cape Town office and former adviser to the Minister of Safety and Security, Peter Gastrow says that the ICD is playing a crucial rle in a hostile environment. It does investigate major assaults by the police, but it isnt liked by the police, nor is it supported by the Minister of Safety and Security. Their effectiveness has varied greatly across the country. Black communities have been generally more concerned with ameliorating socioeconomic causes of crime while white communities are more concerned with keeping crime and criminals out of their areas. Other CPFs have become allegedly more concerned with finding egalitarian representation than with probing the important issues. I called the office of Superintendent Lewis every day for one week bu t he remained unavailable, apparently failing to receive permission from the Commissioner of police to meet with me. Government of St Lucia: Institutional Appraisal and Strategic Review of the Royal St Lucian Police Force, 18/9/98, p 22. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police Force has a 90 per cent favourable rating by the Canadian people while investigating itself, Neal Parker says. St Lucia Star , 30 December 2000. Nevertheless, comprehensive commentary on crime statistics is available on the SAPS web-site at: http://www.saps.co.za/78_crimeinfo/bulletin/index.htm. For example, when security forces resorted to lethal force in apprehending a pirogue of 11 Venezualan suspected drug traffickers, the media went to town on a minute-by-minute description of eventsbut yet not a single line was printed questioning the fatal shooting. Similarly on 26 September, the Nation newspaper devoted its full front page to Robbery at salon in which three women at a hairdressers had been robbed of their purses at gunpoint. US Department of State, p 3. The previous days edition of the Nation included: a letter on whether condoms should be distributed in prisons; a comparison of the merits of prison compared with rehabilitation; a debate on the death penalty in the Caribbean; and an article considering whether the UK should sell arms to Jamaica given the Jamaican police forces high levels of excessive use of force. For example, in August 2000 a woman called in to complain about her son who had been beaten up for alleged marijuana possession, and soon after the Police Commissioner rang in to say he would look into the matter. Conversation with author, September 2000. US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: St Lucia, 1999 , February 2000. For example, in mid-2000 a girl said her brother had been shot five times in the back, with two witnesses present, and yet the police were still not holding an inquest and, importantly, the government had failed to call for one either. Conversation with author, July 2000.

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38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Louis Green (ACDP) of the parliamentary committee of the HRC believes it is time for a change of focus. Conversation with author, August 2000. Dr Deepika Udagama, Taming the beast: judicial responses to state violence in Sri Lanka, LST Review, Volume 9, Issue 137, March 1999. The dates were initially 1994 to 1999 but Obasanjo bowed to pressure and extended them. Heath was investigating alleged corruption in a 43 billion Rand ($6 billion) arms deal with Britain. Conversation with Earl Bousquet, September 2000. Star editor Rick Wayne, conversation with author, September 2000. Shell to face US lawsuit for Saro-Wiwa execution, Th e Indepe ndent , 19 September 2000, p 13. Human Rights Watch, Nigeria Report 2000 . http://www.hrw.org/reports98/sierra/Sier988-05.htm#P623_127748 . UN gets warning shot on peacekeeping, The Guardian , 9 September 2000, p 16. Kayode Soyinka of Africa Today says the Liberian operation alone cost Nigeria some $3 billion. Martin Schonteich, Fighting crime with private muscle: the private sector and crime protection, African Security Review , Vol 8, No 5, 1999. Jenny Irish, Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africas Private Security Industry , ISS Monograph Series, No 39, August 1999. Ibid. Richard Pillay, MP, conversation with author, August 2000. A military source said Lewis makes all appointments, and there is little known of his plans for the RSS or for his successor. As recognized by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in sponsoring the strengthening of committees, via, eg CPA, Parliamentary Committees: Enhancing Democratic Government, London, Cavendish, 1999, and Neil Sammonds, A Need to Know: the Struggle for Democratic, Civilian Oversight of the Security Sector in Commonwealth Countries , London, CPSU, 2000. U K Liaison Comm ittee, Sh ifting the Balance: Select C om mittees and the Executive, 2 March 2000. Sammonds, p 44. The author also noticed the astonishment in the face of a member of the Sri Lankan CDC when informed that the UK Commons Intelligence and Security Committee is chaired by Tom King, an opposition Tory MP. Such good case examples can be cross-fertilized around the Commonwealth with improved awareness. Plans for the UK include having less investigators from police backgrounds. Recommendations from the legal NGO Liberty are available at www.freedomtocare.org/page144.htm . See, for example, Hugh Rawlins, The Caribbean Court of Justice: The History and Analysis of the Debate , Georgetown, Guyana, 2000. The Emeritus President of the Commonwealth Journalists Association, Derek Ingram, is sympathetic to the idea of developing security sector training for journalists in the Commonwealth. Discussion with author, December 2000.

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