G.R. No. 102786 August 14, 1998 ALEJANDRO B. DE LA TORRE, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. MENDOZA, J.: This case is here on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated June 18, 1991, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finding petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre guilty of qualified theft and sentencing him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day, as maximum, and ordering him to indemnify the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO), the offended party, in the amount of P41,786.000. The facts are as follows: In the afternoon of April 18, 1989, Alexander Manalo, an electrical engineer of MERALCO assigned to inspect six electric meters installed in the premises of the Cathay Pacific Steel and Smelting Corporation (CAPASSCO) on De la Cruz Street in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, discovered that the said electric meters were missing. He reported the loss to the MERALCO office in Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City. On April 20,1989, Manalo and Felino Olegario, also of MERALCO, gave statements to the Northern Police District at Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City regarding the loss of the electric meters. They suspected that CAPASSCO employees must have damaged the electric meters while tampering with them and that to conceal the attempt, the employees must have removed the electric meters. They expressed suspicion that MERALCO personnel were involved. Patrolman Edgar Enopia, who was assigned to the case, proceeded to the scene of the crime and inquired from people he saw there if they had seen the electric meters being taken down from the post near the gate of CAPASSCO. According to Enopia, one of those he asked, Danilo Garcia, said he had seen at about 10:00 p.m. on April 11, 1989 four crewmembers in a MERALCO service truck, with the number 522 painted on its side, removing the electric meters. Acting on this lead, Enopia asked MERALCO for the identities of the men, one of whom turned out to be petitioner de la Torre. It appears that MERALCO service truck number 522 had specific crewmembers assigned to it. On July 4, 1989, the crewmembers were taken to the NPD headquarters for investigation. They were included in a line-up of eight (8) persons. Garcia pointed to petitioner de la Torre as the leader of the group which took down the electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises, but he did not recognize the three (3) other crewmembers. Based on the statements of Alexander Manalo, Felino Olegario, Edgar Enopia, and Danilo Garcia, Assistant City Prosecutor Demetrio Macapagal filed on July 13, 1989 an information charging petitioner de la Torre with Qualified Theft as defined in Arts. 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: The case was raffled to Branch 92 of the RTC of Quezon City, presided over by Judge Pacita Caizares-Nye. Trial was held from December 28, 1989 to February 1, 1990. In a decision rendered on March 16, 1990, Judge Caizares-Nye, relying heavily on the testimony of Garcia, found petitioner de la Torre guilty of Qualified Theft and thus sentenced him to an indeterminate prison term of 6 years, 1 month, and 11 days of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day ofprision mayor, as maximum; and ordered him to pay MERALCO the amount of P41,786.00. Petitioner de la Torre appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending first, that his constitutional rights were violated during the custodial investigation conducted in the case; second, that the RTC erred when it admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when the same were not formally offered; third, that the RTC took into account hearsay evidence in arriving at its judgment; and fourth, that the uncorroborated testimony of Garcia was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, the Court of Appeals 2 affirmed the lower court's decision. 3 The Court of Appeals subsequently denied reconsideration. Hence, this appeal. Second. Petitioner contends that the trial court admitted in evidence the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when the fact is that before they testified, their testimonies were not formally offered as required by Rule 132, 35 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, as held in People v. Java: 7 . . . Rule 132, Section 34 of the Revised Rules of Court requires that for evidence to be considered, it should be formally offered and the purpose specified. . . . Under the new procedure as spelled out in Section 35 of the said rule which became effective on July 1, 1989, the offer of the testimony of a witness must be made at the time the witness is called to testify. The previous practice was to offer the testimonial evidence at the end of the trial after all the witnesses had testified. With the innovation, the court is put on notice whether the witness to be presented is a material witness and should be heard, or a witness who would be testifying on irrelevant matters or on facts already testified to by other witnesses and should, therefore, be stopped from testifying further. . . . Sec. 36 of the aforementioned rule requires that an objection in the course of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. 8 Petitioner raised this point, however, only in the Court of Appeals. He thus waived his objection by his failure to raise it at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence in the trial court. As already noted, the trial in this case took place from December 28, 1989 to

February 1, 1990. That was after the adoption of the new rule which required that the offer be made at the beginning of the testimony of a witness. Petitioner should have invoked this rule and objected to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, if not before each of their testimonies, then at least at the time their testimonies were formally offered at the close of the presentation of the prosecution evidence. Not having done so, he must be deemed to have waived his objection based on this ground. Consequently, the trial court committed no error in considering the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in its decision despite the fact that such testimonies had not been offered before they were given. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and petitioner Alejandro B. de la Torre is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED. "Alonte VS. Savellano, Jr. (287 SCRA 245)" Facts: Pending before the court are two separate petitioners, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.r. No. 131652, and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of the respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.., of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitioners were consolidated. On December 5, 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian Laguna and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan. The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and as signed by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian Laguna presided over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco. On December 13, 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a petitione for a change of venue (docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila. On June 28, 1997, Atty. Ramon C.Casano on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainants affidavit of desistance. On August 22, 1997, ACSP Guiab filed his com ment on the motion to dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss. On September 17, 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal case No. 97-159935 by the Clerk of Courts of Manila, was assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding. On October 7, 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Atty. Balbin, submitted to the Manila court, a compliance where she reiterated her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance. In an order, dated October 9, 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts, of the vo luntariness and validity of the private complainants desistance in the lights of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab. ISSUE: *Whether or not an evidence which a party desires to submits for the consideration of the court must formally be offered be offered by him.

Held/Ruling: The admission of private complainants affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in response to respondent judges questi oning. It was this affidavit which respondent judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was it formally offered before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide that the court shall consider no evide nce which has not formally offered. Evidence not formally offered in court will not be taken into consideration by the court in disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is excluded and rejected. The Court hereby RULES that(a) The submission of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Juvie-lyn Y.Punongbayan on June 25, 1997, having been filed after the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, does not warrant the dismissal of said criminal case; (b) For failure of due process, the assailed judgement, dated December 12, 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL and VOID and thereby Set Aside; accordingly, the case is Remanded to the trial court for further proceedings; and (c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano Jr., presiding judge of Branch 53 of RTC of Manila, is ENJOINED from further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other branches of that court for proper disposition.

Version of the Prosecution

The Appellees Brief presented the prosecutions version of the facts, as follows:[9] Sometime in [sic] September 1, 1991 at around 4:00 p.m. Ricardo de la Cruz was playing mahjongg [sic] together with four (4) others in the store of a certain May at Riverside Street, Barangay Commonwealth, Quezon City (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14). Suddenly, he heard people shouting outside (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14). Immediately, Ricardo rushed outside of the store and saw Rolly Obello holding Danilo de Claro by his two (2) arms and a certain Antonio Go (Tony) who came from the back of Rolly suddenly stabbed Danilo on the abdomen with a fan knife (tsn, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 14-15). After stabbing Danilo, Tony and Rolly ran away (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 9). Ricardo chased them, picked up a stone and when he was about to throw the stone, Rolly stopped him and said: Buda (Ricardos nickname), hinde katalo yan (referring to Tony) (TSN, de la Cruz, February 4, 1992, pp. 9 -10, 15). Ricardo desisted from throwing the stone, then Tony and Rolly boarded a jeep and speed [sic] away (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 10, 15). As soon as the two fled, Ricardo returned to Danilo to help him. When Ricardo lifted Danilo, he noticed that blood was oozing from Danilos chest, so he inserted his finger on the stab wound to stop the flow of blood but the same proved to be futile (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 10). Danilo said: Buda, take care of me, and then pushed Ricardo and he (Danilo) fell to the ground (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, p. 10). Ricardo together with Danilo de Claro, Jr. carried Danilo and brought him to the hospital. At the hospital, they were informed by the attending physician that Danilo suffered three (3) stab wounds which caused his death (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 10-11).

[G.R. No. 108772. January 14, 1998] However, of the three (3) stab wounds suffered by Danilo, Ricardo only witnessed T ony deliver his last stab blow which hit Danilos abdomen (TSN, de la Cruz, Feb. 4, 1992, pp. 8, 15). PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLLY OBELLO y PROQUITO, accused-appellant. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The appreciation of and the weight accorded to the testimony of witnesses are better left to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal, unless the defense shows that he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if properly considered, may affect the result of the case. Version of the Defense

Accused Rolly Obellos defense is denial

The Issues

The Case 1. This principle is used by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, in Crim. Case No. Q-91-24295 finding Rolly Obello y Proquito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. In view of the penalty imposed, the appeal was filed directly with this Court.[8] 2. 3.

In his Brief, appellant imputes to the trial court the following errors:[11] The court a quo erred in holding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The court a quo erred in giving credence to the testimony of Ricardo dela Cruz. The court a quo erred in disregarding the testimony of the accused. In the main, appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

The Facts

The Courts Ruling

In any event, the alleged inconsistencies refer to minor details and not to the basic elements of the crime. They do not cast doubt on the identification of appellant as the assailant. Hence, they cannot impair the credibility of Witness dela Cruz. Such minor inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor,[20] for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[21] WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the award of funeral expenses is herebyDELETED. Costs against appellant. G.R. No. 117322 May 21, 1998 THE PEOPLE vs. ULYSIS CLOPINO y VARGAS, accused-appellant. OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The appeal is not meritorious.

First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

Prosecution Witness Ricardo dela Cruz testified that appellant held the two arms of Victim Danilo de Claro, while a certain Antonio Tony Go came from appellants back and fatally stabbed the victim in the abdomen. Ricardo testified: [12] Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of dela Cruz and in disregarding his own testimony.[13] We disagree. It is doctrinal that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest resp ect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and, thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth. Such assessment is generally binding on this Court, except when the same has been reached arbitrarily or when the trial court has overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which could have affected the result of the case.[14] We have examined the records of this case and the arguments raised by appellant, but we find no reason to apply these exceptions. Between a positive and categorical testimony on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. Indeed, the testimony of a single witness, when positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even of murder. Testimonies are to be weighed, not numbered; hence, a finding of guilt may be based on the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness when the trial court finds such testimony positive and credible.[15] Appellant also alleges inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses on the following matters: (1) the date when dela Cruz executed his affidavit and (2) the identities of the persons who brought the victim to the hospital. Appellant contends that the testimony of Ricardo de la Cruz was merely an afterthought, a re sult of the manipulation of either the police or the heirs of the deceased.[16] While Ricardo testified that he executed an affidavit on September 1, 1991 at the police station, said affidavit was in fact dated September 15, 1991, as affirmed by the investigating officer, Pat. Sotero Basilio, who investigated him on that day. Within a period of fourteen days from September 1, 1991 to September 14, 1991, Ricardo could have made a statement and identified appellant as a conspirator. Hence, appellant surmises that the statement was executed only on September 15, 1991, when it became apparent that the police could not apprehend Antonio Go. Appellant also contends that the prosecution account is inconsistent in respect to the persons who brought the victim to the hospital. In his affidavit dated September 15, 1991, Nestor Cruz averred that he did so, but he failed to mention that he had companion(s). Ricardo dela Cruz testified, however, that Danilo de Claro, Jr., the victims brother, accompanied him in bringing the victim to the hospital. Witness Lourdes Faigane testified also that the victims brother brought the victim to the hospital, but she did not mention Ricardo de la Cruz.[17] Appellants contentions do not persuade. The alleged discrepancies in dela Cruz testimony may be attributed to his inabili ty to recall correctly the date of his interview with the police and of the execution of his sworn statement. It is entirely possible that the police talked to Ricardo on September 1, 1991, but that he executed his sworn statement on September 15, 1991. This slight error is not unlikely considering that Witness dela Cruz is unlettered, as admitted by appellant.[18] Likewise, the alleged inconsistencies regarding the identity of the person or persons who brought the deceased to the hospital do not discredit the account of the prosecution. Lourdes Faiganes[19] testimony that the victim was brought to the hospital by his brother is not necessarily inconsistent with Ricardos testimony that he and the brother did so. The testimony of Faigane did not purport to be a complete enumeration of the persons who brought her brother to the hospital. Hence, while she averred that the victims brother brought the victim to the hospital, this does not necessarily mean that he alone did so. Besides, Lourdes testimony was not based on her own personal knowledge since she was not physically present at that time. Furthermore, Nestor Cruzs affidavit stating that he and the victims brother brought the victim to the hospital is worthless as evidence, because Nestor did not testify in open court. His affidavit is therefore hearsay and has no probative value. It cannot prevail over the clear, direct and straightforward testimony of dela Cruz that he and Danilo de Claro, Jr. brought the victim to the hospital.

MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from a decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Virac, Catanduanes, finding accused-appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the complainant Melody Quintal the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The trial court believed the prosecution's theory and found the accused-appellant guilty of rape. Hence, the appeal. First. The defense maintains that there is an inconsistency between the sworn statement given by Melody to the PC on the one hand, and her testimony in court on the other. The defense cites the following portion of the sworn statement dated February 18, 1992 which she gave at Camp Francisco Camacho, Virac, Catanduanes: 5 In the complaint she filed with the Municipal Trial Court on the same day, February 18, 1992, she stated . . . [H]is personal organ did not penetrate instead he used his finger to guide his penis but ultimately did not succeed for reasons of independent to his well [sic] and the timely arrival of the people who were informed of the incident by her companions. . . 6 However, it is asserted in Melody's The contention has no merit. The alleged inconsistency is more apparent than real. It must not be forgotten that the victim was only 16 years old at the time of the rape, inexperienced in the ways of the world. It is evident that what she meant by accused-appellant's organ not being able to penetrate her vagina was that there was no full penetration. But it is clear that accused-appellant did all he could to have sexual intercourse with her. If he was not able to have full penetration, it was because the victim was still a virgin. According to Melody, accused-appellant went on top of her, removed his brief and tried to insert his penis into her vagina. Indeed, how would accused-appellant know his penis would not go in unless he first tried to insert it into his victim's vagina? That was all that was necessary to commit consummated rape. It would have been a different story if there was no attempt at all to have sexual intercourse. It is thus clear that accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into the victim's vagina. If it did not go the full length and accused-appellant was not able to attain full penetration, it was not because he did not try to have intercourse with her but because the victim, being still a virgin, required stimulation. That was the reason accused-appellant "fingered" her private part, apparently to arouse her. It is not necessary, in order to have rape, that accused-appellant succeed in having full penetration. The slightest touching of the lips of the female organ or of the labia of the pudendum constitutes rape. 12 Accused-appellant is certainly wrong when he states that because his penis was not able to penetrate the vagina despite his efforts to do so, the crime should only be either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. As the Solicitor General rightly states, it can be logically concluded that when the accused-appellant was trying to insert

his penis into the victim's vagina, his penis touched the middle part of the complainant's vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. 13 It is impossible for the penis of the accused-appellant not to touch the labia of the pudendum in trying to penetrate her. As Melody narrated at the preliminary examination conducted on February 18, 1992: 14 What happened to her. The inconsistencies in her testimonies are understandable. More importantly, during her cross-examination, Melody was able to explain satisfactorily why she knew that the accused-appellant was able to put about an inch of his penis into her vagina:15 Moreover, under Rule 132, 13 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, in order to impeach a witness by evidence of prior inconsistent statement, the statement must be related to him and the circumstances of its execution stated. Then he must be asked whether he made such inconsistent statement. In this case, no attempt was made to impeach Melody's testimony in court. She was not shown the complaint of February 18, 1992 and the sworn statement of the same date nor was she asked to explain any discrepancy, instead, what she was asked was the following question: 16 The question was misleading because she never really said that accused-appellant did not succeed in penetrating her. The trial court properly sustained the objection of the prosecution. We have reviewed the records, and we found no reason why Melody should concoct a story as damaging to her reputation as this, if it were not true that she was raped. We have held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified is not true. 17 Second. Accused-appellant contends that Judge Nilo B. Barsaga had no basis for saying that the testimony of Melody was given in a straightforward manner and, therefore, was credible. He points out that because Judge Barsaga did not try the case, another one, Judge Eduardo Israel Tanguanco, having done so, the former did not observe the witness' demeanor so as to be able to say that her testimony was straightforward. It may be that a judge who tried the case and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses has an advantage over another who did not have such an opportunity. But such lack of opportunity does not necessarily prevent him from determining from the transcript of stenographic notes whether a witness was forthright and frank. How often has this Court itself found the testimony of witnesses to have been given in a straightforward manner on the basis solely of the records of the case. For example, in People v. Compedio, Jr., 18 we said: In the first assigned error, the accused-appellant attacks the credibility of prosecution witness Trinidad Sabando. On this score, the oft-repeated rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. This case, however, falls under one of the exceptions to the above rule, namely, where one judge heard the testimony of the witnesses and another penned the decision; hence, we are not precluded from making our assessment of the probative merit and value of the testimony of the witnesses on the basis of the transcripts of the stenographic notes thereof. 19 After poring over Sabando's testimony, we find her to be a trustworthy witness. Her narration of the events and observations of what transpired before her were delivered in a direct, unaffected, and convincing manner. She stuck to her story and was uncompromising in regard thereto on cross-examination and on questions from the court. We detect no indication of prevarication. Indeed, there is no claim in this case that at any time in her testimony Melody Quintal hedged or even hesitated or otherwise indicated that she was withholding anything from the court. As held in People v. Tuvilla, 20 While the trial judge who presided over the trial of the case would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just

decision. The full record was available to him. It is evident from the knowledgeable and analytical decision he has written that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge. 21 WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P50,000.00 should be considered indemnity to the offended party Melody Quintal.

[G.R. No. 131820. February 29, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ATIENZA Y BAUTISTA, accused-appellant. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: ROLANDO ATIENZA Y BAUTISTA was charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, with having raped through force and intimidation one Maria Theresa Obias y Raola, a 13-year old minor. He was thereafter sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the private offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.[1] Supremex These are the facts on which the Decision was based: Complaining witness Maria Theresa Obias was alone in the room which her family was renting at Rizal Street, Goa, Camarines Sur, in the afternoon of 22 September 1996. At around 3:00 o'clock, 35-year old Rolando Atienza, her mother's godson and a former neighbor, arrived inquiring about his Ninang Feling. Ninang Feling is Maria Theresa's mother, Felicisima Obias, who stood as principal sponsor in Rolando's wedding. Upon learning that she (Maria Theresa) was alone, Rolando closed the door and windows, dragged her towards her mother's bed and forcibly tried to remove her shorts, but she cried, "Habo ko!" (I don't want!). But the accused succeeded despite her resistance. He then laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. All the while Maria Theresa was pushing him away saying, "Habo ko, habo ko!"[2] After satisfying his lust, the accused gave Maria Theresa two (2) five-peso bills[3] with a threat however before he left that he would harm her family should she reveal the incident to her mother.[4] The offended party also testified that Rolando Atienza had previously kissed and embraced her on three (3) occasions when her family was still staying in Panday.[5] After the physical examination conducted by Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella, the Rural Health Physician of Goa, Camarines Sur, Felicisima learned further that Maria Theresa was no longer a virgin even before the incident as Rolando had sexually abused her previously.[6] [T]he Court believes that the accused Rolando Atienza sexually assaulted the offended party, Maria Theresa Obias with the use of force. It is true that neither the offended party nor the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella, testified that there was physical force sustained by the former. But, force or violence required in rape is relative x x x x Being relative, the force needed to overpower the resistance of the offended party is that which is necessary to consummate the offense. Besides, in the instant case, it is hard to believe that a 13-year old girl, with a mental age of an eight (8) years of age would voluntarily submit sexually to a man more than twice her age if no force was exerted. Moreover, if the mental age of a woman above twelve (12) years of age is that of a child below twelve (12) years of age voluntarily submits herself to the bestial desire of the accused, or even if the circumstances of force or intimidation do not exist, or of the victim being deprived of reason or otherwise rendered unconscious, are absent, the accused would still be liable for rape (People v. Bulaybulay, 248 SCRA 601). The thirteen (13)-year old private complainant tearfully recounted on the witness stand how accused-appellant forcibly dragged her to her mother's bed upon learning that she was alone, undressed her, sexually abused her despite her resistance - Habo ko! Habo ko! (I don't want! I don't want!)[23] - and that after having succeeded in his evil design, threatened her and her family with harm should she reveal the incident to her mother. justice

It is well-settled that testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age deserve full credence[24] and should not be so easily dismissed as a mere fabrication.[25] No woman, much less a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and impassioned to seek justice for the wrong done to her being.[26] What makes private complainant's testimony doubly credible was the fact that no improper reason or ill motive could be imputed to her as would impel her to falsely charge accusedappellant, her mother's godson and a former neighbor, of such a grave crime as rape. Moreover, private complainant's testimony was corroborated by Dr. Diosdado Fuentebella who affirmed on the witness stand the presence of spermatozoa in her vaginal secretion, consistent with the claim of recent sexual contact WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant ROLANDO ATIENZA Y BAUTISTA guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt, imposing upon him a prison term of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify private complainant Maria Theresa Obias in the amount of P50,000.00 is AFFIRMED. He is further ordered to pay her an additional amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages in accordance with recent jurisprudence. Costs against accused-appellant Rolando Atienza y Bautista. G.R. No. 130969. February 29, 2000 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERTO SAN JUAN, Accused-Appellant. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: Crucial in any prosecution for rape is the credibility of the complaining witness for that alone is sufficient to convict the accused.1 It is therefore with extreme caution that this Court examines the veracity of the testimony of the complaining witness in the light of human nature and experience. Roberto San Juan was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Talavera, Nueva Ecija with rape for having carnal knowledge of Rowena Morla while poking a bladed instrument at her neck; with violence and intimidation in other words.2crlwvirtualibrry On the basis of the narration of Rowena, the trial court convicted the accused. It found her actuations consistent with her charge that the accused raped her -Sc Accused-appellant now argues that no violence or intimidation was employed on Rowena since neither her clothes were soiled nor did she sustain any external injury. As it was, she did not put up a struggle against him. He then invites attention to her testimony that she was the one who woke her parents up which contradicts the testimony of her mother Gloria that she and her husband were roused from sleep when Rowena returned to their house that night. He insists that Rowena voluntarily went with him to the back of the chapel because she was his sweetheart for several months and their coitus was just a consequence of their love affair. After thoroughly reviewing the evidence on record, this Court cannot rest easy on the conviction of the accused by the court a quo. Thus, we are impelled very strongly to overturn the verdict. No evidence was presented by the prosecution on how accused-appellant gained entry into the Morlas residence that evening of 4 May 1994 as to show that his claim was just a cock-and-bull story, i.e., that he only acceded to the invitation of Rowena to go to her house and that she herself opened the door. Rowena narrated that she was awakened when she felt somebody kissing her on the lips and then she recognized accused-appellant. However, in the preliminary investigation conducted a day after the incident her account changed. She said, "While I was sleeping on that

night of May 4, 1994, I saw Roberto San Juan entered (sic) my mosquito net and pointed a bladed weapon at me x x x x."6 The preliminary investigation was conducted at 9:45 o'clock in the morning of 5 May 1994 7 so it was to be expected that her recollection of the incident was fresh. But, it is indeed perplexing why she did not stand by her prior narration when she testified in court. The inconsistency in her narrations appears to be a clear manifestation of her prevarication in an effort to hide the truth. Rowena testified that her bedroom only had a curtain to serve as a shutter of her door. 8The same was true with her parents' bedroom which was merely four (4) to five (5) meters away from hers.9 She recognized accused-appellant easily after she was awakened by him. Given the circumstances that her bedroom and that of her parents only had curtains for door shutters and merely four (4) to five (5) meters apart, and that accused-appellant was not covering himself, much less was he in disguise, as he was readily recognized by Rowena, it is hard to believe that he entered the house with a criminal mind or malicious design. A criminal would not be so bold as to enter a house at night with at least two (2) occupied bedrooms a few meters apart, with curtains only for door shutters, and then proceed to enter one of them to rape its resident, with his face uncovered. The occupants in the other bedroom could easily come to the rescue of his victim and perhaps kill him for being an intruder in their abode. Rowena narrated that her father heard her cry which prompted him to call out to her and ask what was the matter. Her plain answer was, "Wala, po!" From this, it appears that her father was satisfied with her reply because he remained in his bedroom. This story is difficult to accept. It is not a natural behavior for a father who heard his young daughter cry out in the middle of the night, alone in her room, to simply ask for the reason therefor and leave it at that. He could have requested her mother to ascertain if their daughter was all right. Rowena estimated that her bedroom was only five (5) meters from the door of their house.10 This is a considerable distance but she failed to demonstrate how she and accused-appellant were able to leave the house unnoticed by her parents, especially by her father, taking into account that her loud cry had awakened him. Rowena continued to picture accused-appellant as a lionhearted felon who could afford to snatch her from her room holding her throat on the front with one hand while pointing a knife at her nape when her parents were apparently awake in the other room some four (4) to five (5) meters away from hers, and then passing two (2) houses and the chapel where they made love behind it. On this score lies another improbability. A criminal would not hold the throat of his victim with one hand and poke a knife at her nape with the other while passing by inhabited places even if the surroundings were tranquil and the neighbors were believed to be asleep. The probability was not remote that someone could be awake and see them by accident. From whatever direction Rowena and accused-appellant might be viewed while walking under those circumstances, no other conclusion could be reached than that accused-appellant really meant to harm Rowena. It was also thoroughly inconvenient, if not unnecessary, for Tomas and Rowena to walk a distance of forty (40) meters in such an ungainly stance. Thus, the likelihood that they in fact assumed that position appears improbable. Rowena also testified that the sharp point of the knife touched her skin. But if so, the contact should have left a distinct mark because the hand holding the knife could not so easily be controlled as to prevent it from hurting the skin of Rowena; yet, the medical examination conducted on her body failed to show any marks on her neck. The scenario depicted by Rowena may be typical of a hostage-taking drama, resorted to whenever the life or liberty of the hostage-taker is at stake. However, in the present case, neither the life nor the liberty of accused-appellant was in any way imperiled so there was absolutely no reason for him to intimidate Rowena in such manner. After all, she did not appear to have offered any resistance to him. The narration that accused-appellant wanted to get the necklace of Rowena but since she was not wearing it at that time he agreed to let her go home then return with the necklace is quite incredible, if not absurd. Noteworthy is that Rowena did not mention in her testimony that accused-appellant threatened her or the members of her family with harm should she fail to return, or in case she divulged the incident to anyone. We gather from her account that after accused-appellant stole her chastity he also wanted to steal her jewelry. It is unthinkable that a rapist who laid bare his identity even at the initial stage of the crime would require his victim, after the consummation thereof and without threat of harm, to go home forty (40) meters away to get her jewelry and then wait for her to deliver it to him. The risk that the victim might blow the whistle along the way, even before reaching home, was great. Moreover, a criminal demands delivery of valuables to him when ransom, blackmail or trickery (e.g., a relative of the victim is supposedly in a state of emergency and needs a certain amount of money or jewelry to be exchanged for cash) is involved. The common denominator in these situations is reciprocal giving and taking by the victim and criminal. The criminal has the cutting edge, leaving his victim with no other choice but to give up his money or other valuables. Here, accused-appellant did not even have an assurance, other than Rowenas promise, that she would come back with the jewelry.

During the cross-examination, Rowena disclosed that accused-appellant not only asked for her necklace From Rowenas own lips, she unwittingly lent credence to accused-appellants claim that they actually planned to elope. If his intention was to take the necklace of Rowena, it would be irrelevant to further require her to bring her clothes. After all, a sixteen (16)-year old high school student like her would not normally have expensive pieces of clothing. According to Rowena, she woke her parents up when she reached home and disclosed the rape committed against her. However, this was contradicted by her mother who said that she and her husband were awakened when Rowena came home. Rowena then told them she was raped by accused-appellant. The inconsistency as to whether Rowena woke her parents up or her parents were awakened when she arrived home may appear trivial but only at first glance, for it gains significance when taken together with our previous assessment of her testimony. We consider the inconsistency as another badge of falsehood. We also consider the fact that accused-appellant did not flee. When he went home at around 2:00 o'clock the following morning, the policemen were already there waiting for him. They invited him to the police station for questioning. A few hours thereafter, he was subjected to preliminary investigation. If Rowena was indeed telling the truth, i.e., that accused-appellant raped her and then ordered her to go home to get her necklace, the mere fact that she failed to return was a warning signal for him to immediately hide himself and not to go home. The logical post-incident impulse of a criminal is to distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable to avoid discovery and apprehension.14crlwvirtualibrry Taking Rowena's version in its totality, we find ourselves unable to concur with the credibility accorded to it by the trial court. For evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. 15 The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.16 Whatever is repugnant to these standards becomes incredible and lies outside of judicial cognizance.17crlwvirtualibrry It is notable that the contradictions and vacillations we observed in Rowenas testimonies referred to the initial and final stages of her story. Was she awakened by a kiss on the lips by accused-appellant, or was she awakened when he entered her mosquito net? Did she purposely wake her parents up or were they simply awakened when she returned home? Her anamnesis wavered on these aspects apparently in her obvious desire to twist the events to suit her purpose. The other portions of Rowenas testimony were simply unreliable. Her statements that accused-appellant shoved a knife at her neck inside her bedroom without explaining how he was able to enter their house at that late hour when everybody was already asleep; that her father was awakened when she cried; that she and accused-appellant were able to leave the house unnoticed; that accused-appellant held the front of her neck or throat with one hand and poked a knife at her nape with the other hand while walking towards the open field; that she was raped with the knife still pointed at her neck; and, that she was able to leave accused-appellant by promising that she would return with her jewelry, all appear to have been scripted by her or for her. The knife pointed at her neck was mentioned to show the use of violence or intimidation but the plot was too simplistic that it overlooked vital angles. Rowena adhered to the claim that accused-appellant held a knife at her neck from beginning to end, that is, from the time she was awakened inside her bedroom and while walking towards the open field forty (40) meters away from her house until the consummation of the rape. When a witness fabricates a story, he usually adopts a simple account because a complex one might lead to entanglement which may be difficult to disentangle. Along the same line, the experience of the courts and the general observations of humanity teach us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness delivers in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.18crlwvirtualibrry Rowena stated that her mother consulted her relatives after the incident. We infer therefrom that these relatives took the occasion to collectively exert moral ascendancy over her and pressured her into immediately seeking medical examination, and to file the rape charge. It is not farfetched to state that they injected diametrical details into her memory to distort the real occurrence. As Rowenas testimony was thus unravelled, she contradicted herself on certain points while the rest was dubious or wanting in significant details. On the other hand, we find worthy of credit the version of accused-appellant that his sexual union with Rowena was consensual. He declared that Rowena asked him in the early hours of 4 May 1994 to go to her house in the evening. When he arrived there at past ten,

she opened the door then invited him to her bedroom to get something. While inside, they talked. Her father was awakened and from his bedroom asked, "Sino yan?" She answered, "Wala, po!" Accused-appellant then left the house followed by Rowena. She suggested that they go behind the chapel to avoid being seen by her parents who were against their relationship. There, they talked then made love. Afterwards, Rowena agreed to elope with him but since she knew that he did not have much money she told him about her necklace which she left at home. They agreed that she would go back home for the necklace and some clothes, then she would return and join him. He got tired waiting for her so he went near her house and overheard Rowenas mother berating her. He left. The trial court considered as proof that there was no planned elopement the circumstance that accused-appellant had allowed Rowena to go home by herself and just waited for her to return and that after hearing Rowenas mother scolding her he left instead of waiting around for a chance to at least talk with Rowena. We do not share the view of the trial court. We believe instead that his departure meant that he accepted the fact that their plan to elope had been thwarted. And while he might have failed to introduce proofs of his "sweetheart theory" such as love letters, gifts and the like,19 other than the testimony of his sister which we find to be biased per se, we find these no longer pertinent. The unwitting disclosure of Rowena herself that she was ordered by accused-appellant to return with her jewelry and clothes was already an adequate indication that the two (2) intended to run away. The present case brings to mind People v. Godoy20 where accused-appellant, a physics teacher of the rape victim, likewise proferred the main defense that he and the complainant were sweethearts. In acquitting him we ratiocinated x x x x While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victims parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to appellant x x x x WHEREFORE , the Decision appealed from convicting accused-appellant Roberto San Juan of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, ordering him to indemnify Rowena Morla in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from custody unless held for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision forthwith and to inform this Court within five (5) days from receipt hereof of the date accused-appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTHUR DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant. BELLOSILLO, J.: ARTHUR DELA CRUZ was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, for the death of Marbel Baptista on 24 October 1994 allegedly committed with treachery and evident premeditation.[1] On 19 June 1997 the trial court adjudged him guilty as charged but qualified only by treachery. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P35,000.00 as funeral and burial expenses, and to pay the costs.[2] On 24 October 1994 Diego Pelonio planned an evening party to celebrate the birthday of his younger child. The party was to be held in his house in Brgy. Bay-ang, Batan, Aklan. Arthur dela Cruz, nephew of Diego, helped prepare the food. The guests started to arrive at around 7:30 in the evening. Among them were Arthur's father Felix and townmates Marbel Baptista, Romeo Bitamor, Jerry Paclibare, Felipe Bustamante, Nestor Prado and Pepito Dalipe. They drank tuba and beer. A few minutes past 8:00, Carlita dela Cruz, mother of Arthur, arrived to fetch her husband Felix, after which, the spouses proceeded home. Before long, screams of a woman were heard from the national road. Diego and Jerry rushed to where the sound seemingly came from. Arthur followed. When Diego and Jerry returned, they told the other guests in the yard that Felix was boxed by somebody. Arthur thereafter reappeared and approached them clutching a knife. Without uttering a word he stabbed Marbel Baptista several times. Marbel was then sitting with his left leg raised on the bamboo bench and about to light a cigarette. Thus, with this position when stabbed, Marbel was unable to thwart the attack. Marbel fell lifeless on the ground. Arthur ran away. This startling occurrence was witnessed by Diego,

Romeo, Jerry and some other guests. According to the examining physician, of the eleven (11) wounds inflicted on Marbel five (5) were mortal since they involved the heart, lungs and abdomen, and all the wounds could have been brought about by a knife or a sharp, bladed and pointed instrument. Accused Arthur dela Cruz, on the other hand, claimed that while watching television in the house of his uncle Diego at the time of the incident he heard his mother shouting for help. Immediately, he ran towards the direction from where his mother's voice was coming. Some forty (40) meters away from the house of his uncle Arthur found his father lying on the ground being kicked by Marbel. Arthur told Marbel to stop but the latter replied, "Ikaw, maapin ka pa."[4] Simultaneously, Marbel drew a knife. Arthur ran. Marbel pursued him and lunged his knife at Arthur. While Arthur was able to foil the blow, Marbel slipped and fell down. Arthur, taking advantage of the situation, wrestled with Marbel for the possession of the latter's knife. Arthur succeeded and stabbed Marbel four (4) times. Marbel ran towards the house of Diego. Arthur chased him but desisted when several persons went to the rescue of Marbel upon reaching Diego's house. Arthur had to hide himself behind the bamboo groove until he went home. Later, Arthur surrendered to the Barangay Captain who accompanied him to the police station. Arthur admitted to the Barangay Captain and to the police that he stabbed Marbel but claimed he forgot where he placed the knife. The trial court accorded full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, especially that of Arthur's uncle Diego Pelonio, regarding the manner of the attack on Marbel by Arthur and the place of its commission. On the other hand, it found Arthur's claim of self-defense to have been contrived since he failed to raise it when he surrendered to the authorities. Besides, he also failed to establish the elements of self-defense. In this appeal, the question to be resolved is which version should be believed That accused-appellant is guilty for the death of Marbel stands on solid ground. The testimony of Romeo Bitamor is clear on this point. He was only three (3) meters away from accused-appellant and his victim and the place was adequately illumined by an electric light. Romeo was afforded the opportunity to view at close range the incident as it unfolded As thus narrated, however, there was a hiatus between the time when Arthur proceeded to the source of the screams and when he suddenly stabbed Marbel. Such lapse in the continuity of the witnesses accounts is decisive in determining the crime committed by Arthur and the commensurate penalty therefor. We find it unnatural for Arthur to have been suddenly infuriated upon his return to the house of Diego with Marbel as the target of his furor, to the exclusion of the other guests of Diego. It should be recalled that during the drinking session, Arthur was watching television. When he heard the shouts of a woman, he proceeded to the direction where the sound came from. His parents Felix and Carlita must have then disclosed to him the identity of Marbel as the one who boxed Felix, that is why he directed his stab blows solely at Marbel upon his return to the house of Diego. We draw this inference from a consideration of the other portions of the testimony of Romeo manifesting that indeed it was Marbel who physically assaulted Felix on the road. Otherwise, it would be very unnatural for Arthur to stab Marbel for no reason at all. It may be recalled that Arthur was in the house of Diego helping the latter prepare the food for his guests. Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of criminal violence have a penchant for seeing the faces and features of their attackers and remembering them.[9] In the present case, Marbel was known to Felix, both being residents of Batan, Aklan. Felix must have acquiesced to the infliction by his son Arthur of the injuries Marbel sustained as may be gathered from the testimony of prosecution witness Romeo Bitamor, the fishpond operator and resident of Bay-ang, Batan In other words, if the one who boxed Felix was a person other than Marbel, Felix could have remonstrated then and there against the attacked by Arthur on Marbel. Consequently, we find it difficult to sustain the testimony of Romeo and Jerry that when they heard the shouts Marbel was still sitting on the bench. We seriously doubt this particular narration of Romeo and Jerry. The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity with human knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.[12] Aside from subjecting the testimony of a witness under the most careful scrutiny, of equal importance is getting the complete picture of the events the witness is narrating. [13] What is more in accord with the ordinary course of events was that Marbel boxed Felix on the road then returned to the house of Diego, perhaps unaware that Arthur was there. But Arthur must have learned that it was Marbel who boxed his father Felix, so that in immediate vindication of a wrong done to his father, Arthur stabbed Marbel. The rule that the factual findings and assessment of credibility of a witness generally binds the court cannot be strictly applied in this case. Significant facts and circumstances were overlooked and disregarded by the trial court which when properly considered affected the result of the case. There were strong and cogent reasons that justified departure from the trial courts finding.[14] At any rate, only that aspect of the testimonies of Romeo and Jerry is not sustainable. Even where a witness has been found to have deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole of his testimony be

rejected.[15] The testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved in part, depending upon the corroborative evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities of the case.[16] However, we agree with accused-appellant that the trial court should not have relied on the testimony of Diego Pelonio because he was not cross-examined. After his direct examination, the defense counsel moved for continuance as he was committed to appear before another Branch of the trial court.[26] In the subsequent hearing, the defense counsel manifested that Diego was not available for crossexamination since he was suffering from severe stomach pain. Diego failed to attend the rest of the hearings. To give weight to his testimony is to gravely violate the constitutional right of accused-appellant to meet the witnesses face-to-face and to subject the source of the information to the rigid test of cross-examination, the only effective means to test their truthfulness, memory and intelligence.[27] This notwithstanding, the rejection of Diego's testimony does not produce a crippling effect on the prosecution because the testimony of Romeo as corroborated by Jerry adequately established the guilt of accused-appellant. The circumstance that Romeo was the victim's friend and compadre does not automatically impair his credibility nor render his testimony less worthy of credence since no improper motive has been ascribed to him for testifying against accusedappellant.[28] On the other hand, whether the woman who was shouting was unidentified, as declared by Jerry in court, or the voice of the woman was that of accused-appellant's mother, as stated in Jerrys affidavit, refers to a trivial matter which cannot in any manner serve to discredit him.[29] Besides, whenever there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight because the affidavit is almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[30] Thus, we hold that accused-appellant Arthur dela Cruz is guilty of homicide, not murder. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused-appellant Arthur dela Cruz guilty of murder is MODIFIED. This Court finds him guilty instead of homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Appreciating the mitigating circumstances of (a) voluntary surrender and (b) immediate vindication of a grave offense under par. 5, Art. 13, of the Revised Penal Code, the Court imposes upon accused-appellant Arthur dela Cruz a prison term of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to eight (8) years and two (2) months of prision mayor medium as maximum, and orders him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marbel Baptista the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P35,000.00 for funeral and burial expenses. Costs de oficio.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RICKY BANELA y ARCEGA, accused-appellant. MELO, J.: When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility and unless the same is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This principle guides the Court in resolving this appeal from the amended decision rendered on December 21, 1995 by the Honorable Augusto T. Parcero, Presiding Judge of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of the Fifth Judicial Region stationed in Daet, Camarines Norte, finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of rape. The factual background of the imputed felony, as summarized by the Solicitor-General in the appellees brief, is as follows: The incident occurred on October 7, 1993 Shortly before midnight Marilou, was asked by her father to pick up the latters clothes in Barangay Mantagbac, Daet, Camarin es Norte, after which they were to proceed to the latters house in Moreno District, After getting the clothes, Marilou started on her way home. Along the route, she passed by Summer Place, a restaurant located in the Daet Public Market. She entered the restaurant and decided to stay a while to listen to her favorite music played in a jukebox (p. 6, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). While enjoying the music, she noticed appellant, Norlito Cereno and two other men having a drinking spree inside the restaurant (p. 6, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). After the tune ended, Marilou left Summer Place. She resumed her trek home, passing through the fruit stalls near the public market. Looking back, she saw appellant and his companions trailing her (pp. 7-8, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). She quickened her pace. The men chased her and eventually caught up with her. Appellant accosted her and asked where she was going; to which she replied that she was going home (p. 8, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). All of a sudden, appellants companions grabbed her arms while

appellant covered her mouth. They dragged her back to where she came from stopping right behind Summer Place (pp. 8-10, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). Two of appellants companions firmly held Marilous arms. One of them forced Marilou to lie down on her back (p. 10, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). Norlito Cereno then tore off the victims red shirt and removed her white short pants, bra, and panty. Marilou cried and struggled with all her might to free herself but she was easily overpowered by brute force (pp. 11-12, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). Norlito Cereno stripped and place himself on top of Marilou (pp. 12-13, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). As appellant held Marilous legs, Norlito Cereno succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her (p. 12, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). After Norlito had satisfied his lust, appellant took his turn and likewise had sexual intercourse with Marilou. He covered her mouth with his hand and threatened to kill her if she reported to the police (pp. 1415, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). After appellant, the third malefactor attempted to have sexual intercourse with Marilou but failed when several security guards on foot patrol arrived at the scene after hearing the victims cries (p. 15, TSN, Oct. 21, 1994). Avoiding a confrontation, the culprits hurriedly fled into the dead of night (p. 15, TSN, Oct. 1, 1994). The security guards found Marilou totally naked, writhing in pain and blood oozing from her lips (pp. 5 and 6, TSN, Dec. 9, 1994). They brought her to a stall nearby and gave her a piece of cloth to cover herself (p. 6, TSN, Dec. 9, 1994). When asked by the guards what happened to her, she responded that she was raped (p. 6, TSN, Dec. 9, 1994). One of the security guards proceeded to the police station to report the incident (p. 7, TSN, Dec. 9, 1994). SPO3 Salvador Bamba, PO3 Teresita Montoya, and SPO1 Corpuz arrived and brought Marilou to the police station. Afterwards, she was brought to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital for examination (p. 9, TSN, December 9, 1994). Meanwhile, in their search for the culprits whom they believed were lurking in the vicinity of Zabala Street and Vinzons avenue, the police finally found a suspect in the person of Norlito Nazareno whom they brought to the police station for investigation (p. 10, TSN, Dec. 9, 1994). Dr. Marcelito Abas conducted an examination on the victim at about 1:55 in the morning of October 8, 1993 Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. The alibi did not impress the trial court. Hence, the instant appeal. The arguments advanced in the appeal mainly revolve on the issue of credibility. It is contended that Marilou could not have possibly made any positive identification of her assailants since she was sexually abused in an unlighted place. Accused-appellant further claims that in her direct examination, Marilou positively identified accused-appellant as the person who raped her, whereas in her Salaysay executed immediately after the incident, she failed to name him. It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimony is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and to note the demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. A trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses carry great weight and respect and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. In the instant case, we see no cogent reason to depart from this established rule as accused-appellant has failed to present any substantial evidence which would merit a reversal of the findings of the court below. The fact that the crime was committed in a dark and unlighted place does not cast doubt on the complainants positive identification of the culprits. Marilou was able to clearly establish that she was raped by accused-appellant since she actually saw him lying on top of her. She felt his penis inserted into her sexual organ which caused her pain. Moreover, the face of accused-appellant was in full view of Marilou and very near her while he was covering her mouth and warning her not to report the matter to the police. Recognition was easy for she had known accused-appellant for sometime because they are neighbors in Mantagbac, Daet, Camarines Norte. The alleged inconsistency between Marilous sworn statement or Salaysay, and her testimony in open court is more apparent than real, brought about by the way the questions to Marilou were phrased. In recent cases, this Court had the occasion to rule that inconsistencies between testimony in open court and sworn statements given to investigators do not necessarily discredit the witness since ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. Sworn statements are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.

Further, it is an oft-repeated rule that when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against an accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. In the case at bar, accused-appellant was not able to show any improper ulterior motive on the part of complainant to falsely incriminate him in such a serious offense. Indeed, her only motive can well be to bring before the bar of justice the person who had abused her. Moreover, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, oftentimes the only evidence that can be offered to prove the guilt of the perpetrator is the testimony of the offended woman herself. Thus, her testimony, standing alone can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony meets the test of credibility. We have consistently held that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the rape has been committed, and that if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof. This is true in the instant case where the trial court found that there is clear, convincing, and competent physical and testimonial evidence to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against accused-appellant. WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, including the award of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Ricky Banela is ordered to pay the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. No special pronouncement is made as to costs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTEMIO CALAYCA, accused-appellant. MARTINEZ, J.: A daughter was again allegedly raped by her own father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who is now facing a death sentence after having been found guilty of said crime in a Decision [1] dated June 13, 1995, rendered by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 95-129. Hence, this automatic review. The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on the testimony of 16-year old Neddy Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at about 1:00 oclock in the morning of January 29, 1994, she was sound asleep inside their house at Barangay S olo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when she was awakened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was already on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull motion. Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his onslaught by kicking and boxing him, telling him with bitter tears, I wish you would die. You are a father without good morals.[5] But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened her with a knife saying, I will kill you if you will not agree.[6] After the sexual assault, she picked up her clothes, dressed up and was left weeping. She was then 15 years old when this incident happened.[7] Neddy Calayca first thought of immediately filing a case against appellant but was prevented by his threat to kill her. She, however, reported her awful experience with the appellant to her relatives in Mambayaan. She informed them that even before the January 29, 1994 incident, appellant had sexually abused her many times. Her relatives, who were also afraid of appellant, merely advised her to sue him. She immediately went home in Solo because she feared her father. When she reached home, her eldest sister Betty Lani Calayca also arrived from Manila. Informed of the rape incident, Lani and Neddy decided to leave the appellant. The two then traveled to Don Carlos, Bukidnon and worked as servants of the mayor, thinking their father could no longer find them there. However, appellant was able to locate them. While in the house of the mayor, appellant harassed them, so Betty Lani had him arrested by the police.[8] While appellant was in jail, Neddy reported to the police authorities that he raped her. The police then took her sworn statement[9] on the rape incident. Thereafter, Neddy filed her complaint for rape against the appellant. Betty Lani Calayca was 22 years old when she testified on May 18, 1995. She narrated that she was the eldest and Neddy was the second among the six (6) children of appellant. Their mother died when she was 9 and Neddy was 7. At 11, she left Balingasag for Manila where she stayed for 10 years. While in Manila, her aunt wrote that Neddy was sexually abused by the appellant and that she should come home. When she arrived home in Solo, she slept in the house of her father so she could observe him. That night, the appellant came to her and touched her body, but she quickly managed to get out of the house and stayed outdoors until morning. She then convinced Neddy to run away from home so they could avoid appellant. They went to Bukidnon to work, but their whereabouts was discovered by appellant, who then started to harass them. Undaunted by the appellants threat, the two sisters reported to the authorities what Neddy suffered in the hands of appellant. Thus, his arrest.

The last witness for the prosecution was Dr. Angelita A. Enopia, a physician at the Balingasag Medicare Hospital, Misamis Oriental. She declared that on January 3, 1995 she conducted a pelvic examination[10] on the private complainant, who informed her that she was raped by her own father even when she was only seven (7) years old, and the last time was in January, 1994. Dr. Enopia noted that there were healed lacerations in the hymen of Neddy at 3, 4, 6, 7 and 9 oclock positions. She likewise found that there was a thickening of the hymen which was indicative of frequent sexual intercourse.[11] Appellant Artemio Calayca, on the other hand, did not deny the imputation of her daughter Neddy Calayca that he raped her in the early morning of January 29, 1994. All that he testified to was that he was a widower in 1998 and has six (6) children by his late wife, two of whom he identified as Neddy, the private complainant, and Betty Lani. He claimed that Neddy was only nine (9) years old when his wife died. The private complainant stayed with him together with his five other children, while Betty Lani stayed with his (appellants) brother at San Juan, Misamis Oriental. Betty Lani and Neddy left his house on August 19, 1993. They took his savings from the proceeds of the sale of his pig in the amount of P5,000.00. He then looked for his two daughters and found them at Bocboc, Don Carlos, Bukidnon. When he asked them why they took his money, his two daughters did not say a word, forcing him to slap them.[12] The defense did not present any other witness nor any documentary evidence. Appellant hammers on the alleged inconsistencies in private complainants testimony regarding the frequency of the commission of rape by appellant against her and the kind of weapon he used in forcing her to succumb to his bestial lust. More specifically, appellant pointed out that private complainant, at one instance, testified that he raped her for the first time on January 29, 1994, [14] and yet, she later declared that she was raped by him several times even before that date. Appellant further claims that private complainant likewise testified that he threatened her with a bolo when she tried to resist his bestial act on January 29, 1994,[15] but afterward she stated that it was a knife which appellant used to threaten her.[16] These contradictory declarations by private complainant, appellant argues, only cast doubts on her claim that she was raped b y her father on January 29, 1994.[17] Appellants contention fails to persuade us. We have ruled in numerous cases that an errorless recollection of a harrowing incident cannot be expected of a witness especially when she is recounting details of an experience so humiliating and so painful as rape.[18] Minor errors in the testimony of a rape victim tend to buttress, rather than weaken, her credibility since that would indicate that her testimony was not contrived.[19] The alleged conflicting statements of private complainant is more imagined than real. Private complainant has made it clear in her testimony that even before the rape incident on January 29, 1994, appellant had raped her several times. But whether the rape committed on January 29, 1994 was the first or just one in the series of rapes is, to our mind, immaterial in the prosecution of appellant for the rape he committed on said date, although this particular telling circumstance of habitual sexual abuse convincingly shows the appellants perversity to commit the crime of rape. Also, the seeming confusion by private complainant on the kind of weapon used by appellant to threaten her does not belie the fact of the commission of rape by him against her on January 29, 1994. Moreover, when the trial court clarified with private complainant what exactly was the weapon used by appellant, she made a definite declaration that it was a knife, not a bolo, thereby removing any confusion as to this matter. The inaccuracy in private complainants description of the weapon used is insignificant and understandable. To a young and nave girl, there is not much difference between a bolo and a knife since both weapons are sharp and deadly. What is important to consider is that the weapon was effectively used by appellant to intimidate private complainant into submission to his dastardly act. Notwithstanding these minor flaws in the testimony of private complainant, the latter remained consistent and firm in her denunciation of appellant, her very own father, as the person who sexually abused her on January 29, 1994. The records bear this out as she testified as follows: Private complainant on direct examination: Q In what specific place at Solo, San Juan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental where you were situated on January 29, 1994? A Inside the house.

Q At about 1:00 at dawn, more or less, were you still in your house? A I was asleep inside our house. Q When you were asleep inside the house, was there any unusual incident? A Yes, sir. Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what it was all about? A My father placed himself on top of me and made a push and pull motion. Q Was he dressed or naked? A He was naked. Q How about you at that time? A He undressed me. Q What did you do, when your father made sexual intercourse with you? ATTY. FELICIA No basis, Your Honor. FISCAL KHO I will reform the question, Your Honor. Q You said that your father undressed you and he placed himself on top of you and made a push and pull motion, was there anything that happened to you. A Yes, there was. Q And, you please tell the Court what it was all about? A It was painful. Q Why is it that you felt a pain? A Because he made a push and pull motion. Q What particular part of your body was painful? A My vagina. Q Why what happened to your vagina? A It was inserted. Q What was inserted? A A penis. Q The penis of whom that inserted your vagina? A Of my father. Q Is your father around in Court? A Yes, sir.

Q Will you please point on him? A Yes, sir, he is there. (witness pointing to a man, and upon asked of his name responded that he is ARTEMIO CALAYCA). Q What did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina? A I was lying down. Q Did you agree that your father will have a sexual intercourse with you? A I did not agree but I just followed him because he had a bolo with him. Q What did he do with the bolo? A He would hacked me if I will not agree. xxx COURT Q How old have you been at that time? A 15 years old.[22] The victims brief but candid and straightforward narration of how she was raped by appellant bears the earmarks of a credible witness.[23] Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Enopia, the examining physician, corroborated private complainants claim that she was sexually abused. We believe that a teenage unmarried lass would not ordinarily file a rape charge against anybody, much less her own father, if it were not true.[25] For, it is unnatural for a young and innocent girl to concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter subject herself to a public trial if she has not, in fact, been a victim of rape and deeply motivated by a sincere desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[26] The alleged slapping by appellant on private complainant over money in the amount of merely P5,000.00 is too frail a reason for a teenage daughter to falsely charge her own father with the heinous crime of rape that is punishable by death. It is significant to note that, as likewise emphasized by the trial court, appellant did not deny the imputation of private complainant that he raped her on January 29, 1994 at his house in Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.[27] His silence on the evidence of rape against him is a mute but eloquent admission of the crime charged.[28] WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellant ARTEMIO CALAYCA of qualified rape is MODIFIED in the sense that appellant is declared guilty of simple rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay Neddy Calayca the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZALDY P. PADILLA, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.: For review in this case is a decision, dated May 8, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLV, at Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant Zaldy P. Padilla guilty of rape and imposing on him the penalty of death. The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around 5 oclock in the afternoon on April 27, 1995, Maria Aurora, a 13 -year old retardate, was in the citrus farm owned by a neighbor, Jose Sagun, when accused-appellant accosted her. The latter, who is married with two children, was then 26 years old and employed by Sagun as a farmhand. Armed with a scythe and a knife, accused-appellant forced Maria Aurora to undress and lie down on the grass. As she lay on there, accused-appellant forced himself on her, saying: Kantot tayo (Lets have sexual intercourse). Maria Aurora resisted accused-appellants advances, but she proved to be no match for him. Accusedappellant succeeded in ravishing her. xxx xxx

Maria Aurora told her father, Engracio L. Bautista, what happened to her in the evening. She was taken to the Governor Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital, where she was examined by Dr. Luisa F. Cayabyab. Afterwards, the matter was reported to the Pozorrubio Police Station.[1] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE LATTER IS INCOMPETENT TO TESTIFY DUE TO HER MENTAL HANDICAP. Accused-appellants contention is without merit. First. The basic test of a witness qualification is of course whether he can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his perception to others.[4] Negatively put, Rule 130, 21 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully. Hence, a mental retardate is not, by reason of such handicap alone, disqualified from testifying in court. He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If the testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the same is admissible in court.[5] Thus, we have in several cases[6] upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate. Trial courts, which have the opportunity to observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tone of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony will be given credence. [7] In the instant case, the trial court accorded weight to the testimony of Maria Aurora. Indeed, the complainants truthfulness is evident in her testimony: The complainants testimony is corroborated by the finding of Dr. Luisa F. Cayabyab, who examined Maria Aurora in the evening of April 27, 1995. Dr. Cayabyab found fresh lacerations in her hymen, most probably caused by the entrance of a hardened penis. There are minor inconsistencies in the testimony of Maria Aurora, such as her confusion whether it was a knife or a scythe which accused-appellant placed on the grass above her head after he had forced her to lie down. However, as we have held in a number of cases, such inconsequential lapses can be expected of a young girl who was raped, in view of the harrowing experience she is called upon to recall.[21] Such minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of her testimony, in fact tend to bolster it.[22] WHEREFORE, the decision dated May 8, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLV, Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay P50,000.00 to Maria Aurora B. Bautista by way of moral damages in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 which the trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay as indemnity. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE ANTONIO, MANUEL ANTONIO, and ROMEO ANTONIO, accused. VICENTE ANTONIO and MANUEL ANTONIO, accused-appellants. MENDOZA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 30, finding accused-appellants Vicente Antonio and Manuel Antonio, together with Romeo Antonio, guilty of murder in connection with the killing of Edgardo F. Hernandez on December 26, 1989 and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Hernandez damages and attorneys fees. The other accused, Romeo Antonio, was also convicted but he escaped before the promulgation of the sentence and has remained at large.

Three witnesses for the prosecution claimed to have seen the killing. The first was Zacarias Hernandez, who testified that at around 8 oclock in the evening of December 26, 1989, in Almaguer North, Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, while on his way home from a birthday party, he met the victim, Edgardo Hernandez. After stopping by a store to buy cigarettes, he and Edgardo proceeded home. After a while, Zacarias said that he heard a gunshot and when he looked around to determine where it came from, he saw T/Sgt. Wilfredo Bala, with a rifle pointed at them, who cursed them saying, vulva of yo ur mother. Frightened, Zacarias said he ran to his brothers house, for which reason Vicente, Manuel, and Romeo pelted him with stones, one of which hit him on the head.[2] The second witness was Rosalinda Reyes, who was in Zacarias house at the time of the incident. She heard the gunshot [3] and ran towards the direction of the sound. She saw accused-appellant Manuel and accused Romeo take turns in boxing and kicking the victim while accused-appellant Vicente Antonio was strangling the latter.[4] She heard the victim shouting in Ilocano, I will not fight you, Manong Enteng, referring to accused-appellant Vicente Antonio,[5] but all three men did not relent. She wanted to help him but Sgt. Bala pointed his rifle at her.[6] Rosalinda said she later learned that Edgardo had died that same evening.[7] The third witness was Feliciana Napao, also a resident of Almaguer North. She said that she went outside her house because she heard a gunshot.[8] She claimed she heard another shot and Edgardo Hernandez saying, I will not fight you Manong Enteng, Romeo and Manuel Antonio.[9] Feliciana said her daughter, Rosalinda Reyes, ran towards Edgardo, who asked her to help him. Antonio Lucas, a police officer at Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya, testified that he and other members of the Philippine National Police found the victim lifeless on the ground some 15 meters away from an electric post near the place where the mauling was committed.[10] He also noticed 3 pairs of sandals and 1 sandal (without its pair) near the scene of the crime.[11] The death certificate prepared by the Municipal Health Office of Bambang gave asphyxia due to strangulation and suffocation as the victims cause of death.[12] Accused-appellant Vicente Antonio claimed he acted in self-defense. Accused-appellant Manuel Antonio interposed alibi. Accused-appellants contend that: I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ZACARIAS HERNANDEZ, FELICIANA NAPAO AND DAUGHTER ROSALINDA HERNANDEZ;

The fact that appellants were ten (10) meters away from Sgt. Bala at the start does not negate the fact that they were together in attacking the victim later on. Ten (10) meters is not a great distance to preclude appellants participation in the murder of the victim, considering that it was established that the victim ran to the ricefield while being pursued by appellants. The testimony made by Hernandez that the victim was left behind when he ran away is not inconsistent with the established fact that the victim later ran towards the ricefields...[26] Nor did the trial court err in giving credence to the testimonies of Rosalinda Reyes and Feliciana Napao. That the victim was a boarder of Napaos son, Rodrigo Reyes, and the owner of the land being tilled by the latter are not sufficient reasons not to believe this witness. Time and again we have said that mere relationship of a witness to a party, without more, cannot impair the witness credibility.[27] No reason or motive has been shown for us to doubt the truthfulness of Rosalinda Reyes and Feliciana Napao. They positively identified accused-appellants, together with T/Sgt. Bala, as the perpetrators of the crime. Like Zacarias Hernandez, they pointed to accused-appellants as the persons who attacked Edgardo Hernandez and they were positive they were the assailants because they know them, they being their neighbors. It has been held: . . . [I]f there is nothing in the record to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by any improper motive to accuse falsely the appellants of so grave a crime as murder, then the findings of the trial court as to the credibility must be respected.[30] Absent any indication of a sinister scheme to prevaricate, the affirmative statements uttered by the Peoples witnesses showing accused appellants culpability must be respected inasmuch as positive declarations subordinate disclaimers emanating from the defense.[31] Nor was there anything shown that would have impaired the power of observation of these witnesses. That there were bushes and trees near the electric post did not necessarily mean that the place was dark. There is no proof that because of these, identification of the protagonists was impossible. In the absence of evidence to this effect, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court must be given great weight. In a number of cases, this Court generally accords the highest respect to the evaluation of the testimonies of eyewitnesses by the trial court. Long settled in criminal jurisprudence is the rule that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court. This rule is justified by the fact that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question. Having the advantage of directly observing witnesses, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fac t and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict.[32] WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUDITO ALQUIZALAS Y ALQUILITA, accused-appellant. QUISUMBING, J.: This is an appeal from the decision[1] rendered on September 12, 1996, by the Regional Trial Court of Barili, Cebu, Branch 60, in Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-013, which found accused-appellant Judito Alquizalas guilty of the crime of rape. The trial court summarized the testimony of private complainant, as follows: That she is the victim of Rape, allegedly committed by the accused, Judito Alquizalas; that she has known personally and ver y well the accused for a long time because he is her cousin, her mother and the mother of the accused being first degree cousins; that she is living

These contentions are without merit. First. Accused-appellants contend that prosecution witness Zacarias did not say (1) whether T/Sgt. Bala alone or all of the accused-appellants attacked the victim; (2) whether several stones were thrown at him or only one stone hit him while he was running away from them; (3) whether T/Sgt. Bala (who was ten meters away from accused-appellants) actually joined accused-appellants in mauling the victim. They further contend that Zacarias could not remember whether he left the victim behind with T/Sgt. Bala when he ran, or the victim himself ran to the ricefield. The trial court correctly found that Zacarias Hernandez positively identified accused-appellants, accused Romeo Antonio, and T/Sgt. Bala as the persons who attacked him and the victim on the night of December 26, 1989. It is true that Zacarias was uncertain whether one or several stones were thrown at him and whether accused-appellants were actually joined by T/Sgt. Bala later on in attacking Edgardo Hernandez. This fact does not detract from his testimony positively identifying accused-appellants as their assailants, which is corroborated by the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Rosalinda Reyes and Feliciana Napao. As the Solicitor General says: . . . Fear gripped his person when Sgt. Bala aimed a gun at them and when appellants started pelting them with stones causing him to run for his life. As a result, he did not see every detail that the defense wanted him to narrate. A confused and agitated mind cannot be expected to pay attention to every detail that was happening. Saving ones life is [a] primal human instinct that takes precedence over all other concerns. But suffice to reiterate here that in his testimony, Hernandez is clear and positive in pointing to appellants and Sgt. Bala as the persons who attacked them.

in Bolocboloc, Barili, Cebu, Philippines and also the accused; that she properly identified the accused; that on October 5, 1995, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, she was in her grandmothers house, Lola Remedios, because her grandfather, the husband of Lola Remedios was sick; that the accused, Judito Alquizalas, arrived and told her to accompany him to Ronda, Cebu to get medicine water for her LOLO who was sick; that she conceded because she pitied her Lolo Pedro; that she rode on a motorcycle with the accused, Judito Alquizalas driving at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon; that before reaching the place where they were supposed to get medicine water, the accused brought her to sitio Cabunan, Jandili-og, Ronda, Cebu which is very far from national highway; that when she asked if the place they are going to is the place they are going to get medicine water, the accused answered her, Dont make any noise. You might fall down from the motorcycle; that she was brought to a thicketed area and very far from the houses; that they walked towards the thicketed area thinking that it was the place of the medicine man from whom they will get medicine water; that while walking, the accused pulled her and pointed a knife at her and boxed her abdomen three times and she felt very weak and dizzy; that she fell down with her back on the ground and in that position, the accused pulled down her pants and her underwear and her panty with his right hand and the other hand still holding the knife; that being undressed with her pants and panty, the accused placed himself on top of her; that she was not able to run because she was tired and weak and she could not shout because the accused covered her mouth; that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina; that after the insertion, it took the accused about five minutes, more or less, to finish his sexual lust; that once the penis of the accused was inserted into her vagina, she felt extreme pain and it was bleeding; that after the accused had exhausted his lust, he lifted her up from the ground and he brought her to the medicine man at Ylaya, Ronda Cebu, riding the same motorcycle and they were able to get the medicine water; that they went home after securing the medicine water to Bolocboloc, Barili, Cebu; that she reported the incident to her grandmother, Remedios Alquilita in the presence of the wife of the accused, Judito Alquizalas, that she was raped by the accused; that her grandmother requested her auntie, Gertrudes Balongoy to accompany her to the municipal building to report the matter to the police and to go to the Barili District Hospital for medical examination and there, she was examined by Dr. Servillano Nemir who issued a medical certificate.[4] Dr. Nemir later testified in this case that in his examination of private complainants genitalia, he found lacerations and s mall amount of blood. He also attested the presence of secretion which looked like semen, while the laboratory examination of the smear from vaginal secretion disclosed the presence of spermatozoa. He further opined that the lacerations of the hymen could have been inflicted within two or three hours before the examination was conducted.[5] The accused-appellant told a different version. As his lone assignment of error, appellant faults the trial court in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape despite insufficiency of evidence.[7] In his bid to obtain reversal of his conviction, appellant casts doubt on the testimony of private complainant. He claims that the fact that private complainant rode again with him in the motorcycle after the alleged bestial act is an unlikely at titude of a rape victim.[8] He insists that his carnal knowledge of private complainant was with the latters consent.[9] We find appellants attempt to impugn the credibility of the prosecution evidence not convincing at all. Private complainants attitude after the sexual assault is understandable. There is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident especially if the assailant is physically near. Some may shout, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, while others may even welcome intrusion.[11] On her part, private complainant was only waiting for the proper time to reveal her harrowing ordeal as soon as possible and that is the reason why she just took the same ride with the appellant to Barili, Cebu. In fact upon her arrival home, she immediately reported the incident to her grandmother in the presence of the wife of appellant. Moreover, there is no reason to doubt private complainants story. The records reveal that private complainant could not help but cry during her direct examination.[12] The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature and experience. [13] Besides, evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself as when it conforms to common experience and observation mankind can prove as probable under the circumstances.[14] In the instant case, private complainant is a young country girl and virgin. The parties are cousins and there is nothing to show that private complainant was actuated by ill motive to testify against appellant. In previous cases, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that it is highly inconceivable for a young barrio lass inexperienced with the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial and tarnish her familys honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justic e for the wrong committed against her.[15] Certainly, if private complainant had consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant, her natural reaction would have been to conceal it or keep silent as this would bring disgrace to her honor and reputation as well as to her family. [16] Hence, the claim of appellant that private complainant voluntarily had sexual intercourse with him is far from credible.

Private complainants failure to resist strongly is explained sufficiently. Appellant had boxed private complainants abdomen thrice, making her weak and dizzy. Neither could she run because she was tired and weak. Moreover, appellant pointed a knife at her. Threatening the victim with a knife, a deadly weapon, is sufficient to cow the victim, and it constitutes an element of rape.[21] Expectedly, she could not thwart her attacker. The fist blows debilitated her, thus, making easy for appellant to accomplish his lecherous desire. At this juncture, it is worth stressing that the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance. What has to be established is the use of force or intimidation by the accused in having carnal knowledge of the victim. [22] This element, the prosecution was able to prove. WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court convicting appellant JUDITO ALQUIZALAS Y ALQUILITA of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO BEA, JR., accused-appellant. ROMERO, J.: Accused-appellant Antonio Bea, Jr. was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 177 before the Regional Trial Court[1] of Irosin, Sorsogon, Branch 55. The evidence for the prosecution establish the sequence of event, thus: Jocelyn Borral, 17 years old and a resident of Danao, Bulan, Sorsogon, testified that she was employed by the spouses Bea for four months as househelper from February up to the month of June 1983.[3] Sometime in September 1983, with the employment already terminated, appellants wife, Yolanda, requested through Jocelyns mother if she could take care of their four children as she was going to Sorsogon on such date for medical treatment.[4] As Yolanda was due to return the following day, she was advised to spend the night at the formers place to which she acceded. While asleep, however, appellant forcibly went on top of her and with a knife poked at her neck, proceeded to consummate his bestial act. In the course of the sexual assault, she lost consciousness. With the accused no longer in the house and before leaving the same the following day, Jocelyn fed the children their noon meal after which she went home. Upon reaching her house, she saw her mother but never told the latter of her ordeal in the hands of the accused. As they were residents of the same barangay, she kept this harrowing experience to herself for fear that the accused might carry out the veiled threats made upon her. Her seeming helplessness dragged on for five months until her mother noticed her enlarging abdomen. Hence, she was accompanied to Drs. Luzurriaga and Villareal both of whom confirmed her pregnancy. Compelled to explain the cause of her condition, she admitted that she was sexually violated by the accused. The defense, on the other hand, presented Beverly delos Santos, Shiela Bea and the appellant himself. Beverly delos Santos, 13 years old and a resident of Danao, Bulan, Sorsogon, testified that sometime in September 1983, she frequented the accuseds residence to play with the latters children. In one of those days, at around 1:00 p.m., she allegedly saw Gerry Borris[5] climb over the fence and enter the house to see Jocelyn who works as a housemaid of the spouses Bea. Thereupon, Gerry invited Jocelyn inside the bedroom where they had carnal knowledge. Beverly declared that, together with her playmates, they witnessed the coitus which lasted until 3:00 p.m. as they peeped through a hole. On the other hand, Shiela Bea, a daughter of the accused, merely corroborated the testimony of Beverly. In his defense, appellant Bea, 45 years old and a fisherman by occupation, denied the charge against him and declared that such grave imputation was a means employed by Jocelyn to get back at him for ejecting her as househelper. Defending his action for terminating the latters employment, he explained that he cannot countenance the immoral acts done by Jocelyn and Gerry in his house, allegedly in full view of his minor children, while he was away at sea. When Jocelyn became pregnant by her boyfriend who, upon knowledge thereof, absconded to Manila, the former, accompanied by the barangay captain, purportedly threatened him with a rape charge unless he extend financial support to her. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE UNCONVINCING AND IMPROBABLE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT JOCELYN BORRAL. The issues raised by the appellant do not persuade us.

The three guiding principles in the review of evidence in rape cases are: (1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.[9] Thus, the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[10] In the instant case, the trial court found Jocelyns testimony to be clear, convincing and straightforward. It must be noted that in several stages[11] of the trial where Jocelyn took the witness stand, the trial court observed that she became hysterical, causing the court, upon agreement of both counsel, to defer the proceedings to a later date. Thus, in People v. Gecomo,[12] it was correctly observed that the crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the rape charge with the verity born out of human nature. The contention that Jocelyns failure to report the sexual assault until after five (5) months is fatal to the crime imputed is likewise unfounded. In a similar rape case[13] involving a 16-year old victim, the Court held that it is not uncommon for a young girl at the tender age of 16 years to be intimidated into silence and conceal for some time the violation of her honor, even by the mildest threat against her life. Contrary to appellants assertion, there is nothing in the record which indicates her testimony to be improbable or incredible. As specifically pointed out by the appellant in his brief: Complainant failed to shout for help when accused was on top of her. Complainant testified on cross-examination that she was not able to resist the alleged sexual assault on her because the accused was holding a pointed instrument. Further, a careful scrutiny of the records reveals the plausible reason for the failure of the defense to directly oppose and rebut the issue on hand. The glaring inconsistensies of the defense witnesses, Beverly de los Santos and Shiela Bea, were deplorably, yet expectedly, perpetuated by no less than the appellant himself. In another instance, Beverly, on cross-examination, contradicted her previous testimony that she saw Gerry climb over the fence and afterwards lead Jocelyn inside the room, thus, rendering her story unworthy of belief. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Antonio Bea, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall indemnify Jocelyn Borral an additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Costs against appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO GONZALES y MENDOZA alias BOBBIT, accused-appellant. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated April 8, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. DNO-1385 finding accused-appellant Roberto Gonzales y Mendoza alias Bobbit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. Trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Dr. Ariel C. Roque, the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the autopsy of the victims corpses; (2) Mary Iris Hortezano, the eight-year old eyewitness and sister of the victims; (3) PO3 Elvis M. Arche, the police officer who facilitated the arrest of the accused-appellant; and (4) Yolanda Hortezano, the mother of the victims who was presented to prove the civil aspect of the case. Only the accused was presented as witness for the defense. Dr. Ariel C. Roque is the Municipal Health Officer of Sogod, Cebu whose duties include, among others, conducting autopsy examination and other medico legal cases. He testified that he examined the three (3) dead bodies of the children of Mr. Hortezano in their house at 10:30 p.m. on November 20, 1994. He first examined Yolen, 16 years old; then Jocelle, 9 years old; and finally, Aileen, 5 years old.[3] Dr. Roque further testified that the wounds suffered by the three (3) children were all caused by slashing of the necks with a knife cutting the carotid arteries and veins which caused the instantaneous death of the children. Their eyes were closed and somewhat swelling; their bodies were already in rigor mortis at the time of the examination. The body of Yolen, the eldest, was in a position which

could be described as struggling with her hands in half raised frontal position like an L. Their bodies were all bathed with blood. The instrument used in slashing the children was a sharp bladed instrument.[7] Mary Iris Hortezano, eight (8) years old and sister of the victims, was presented as an eyewitness to the incident which happened in their house on November 20, 1994 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening. She testified that she was asleep with her brothers and sisters Yolen, Jocelle, Aileen and Junjun. On the date of the incident, their parents were not at home because they were at the fiesta at Lapulapu City. At around midnight of November 20, 1994, while sleeping with her brothers and sisters, she was awakened by the entry of Noy Bobbit, their neighbor, who barged into their house through the window. [8] Noy Bobbit immediately placed (patong) his body over that of her sister Yolen, whose stomach was being pressed by Noy Bobbit; when Yolen kept on resisting, Bobbit slashed her sisters neck with a knife.[9] Her brother Jocelle, who was beside Yolen, was also awakened by the entry of the accused into their house. Jocelle fainted but accused also slashed his neck; then, accused slashed the neck of Aileen who was then sleeping beside Mary Iris because she had fever at that time.[10] Prosecution witness Mary Iris further testified that she was not killed because her body was already stained with blood and accused probably thought she was already dead.[11] After accused killed Aileen, he stood up, placed his hands in akimbo and left passing the main door of the victims house.[12] After accused left the house, Mary Iris went downstairs to go to the house of Noy Eleazar.[13] On cross-examination, prosecution witness Mary Iris testified that when the incident happened, she was 7 years old and in Grade I.[14] On the night of the incident, she slept at 6:00 oclock in the evening, ahead of her sister Yolen. They slept in one room and in one line. Aileen was at her right while Junjun was beside Aileen. To her left were Jocelle, then Yolen. At the time, the house was lighted by a lamp. Accused was wearing a white t-shirt.[15] She further testified that when accused attacked her sister, Yolen pleaded Please Noy Bobbit, its enough, it is very hurt; that her sisters shouting was loud which awakened her and Jocelle; and that when she saw accused slashed her sister Yolens neck, she fainted.[16] When she regained consciousness, she saw accused slashing the necks of Jocelle and Aileen.[17] Junjun, who was then sleeping, was not harmed.[18] Prosecution witness PO3 Elvis Arche, who went to the victims house at midnight immediately after the report of the incident, saw three (3) bodies lying down and already dead.[19] He testified that he saw a pair of slippers and footsteps of blood leading to the house of the accused and thereafter arrested the latter. He found the slippers at a distance of around three (3) meters outside the house of the victims[20] but there was no blood.[21] In the cemented pathway from the entrance of the fence to the house of the accused were more than ten (10) bloodied footprints. The bloodied footprints ended at the entrance of the house of the accused. [22] Witness called out at the accused at the latters house who responded Dont shoot me, I will go out. [23] Accused went out and looked for some slippers but he could not find any because it could not fit his feet.[24] Witness further found a knife under three layers of hollow blocks located at the left corner inside the house of the accused.[25] This knife was clean but was still wet.[26] Witness further testified that when he searched the body of the accused, he found some scratches on his body, as if he is coming from the bushes.[27] On cross-examination, PO3 Arche testified that when he was searching for evidence at the crime scene, he saw a pair of blue slippers with shoetack protruding, about 11 inches in size.[28] The house of the accused was about 150 meters from the place of the incident.[29] The defense presented accused himself as sole witness. Accused, a welder, denied the allegations in the complaint. I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EYEWITNESS MARY IRIS HORTEZANO AND THE TESTIMONY OF PO3 ELVIS ARCHE DESPITE THEIR LACK OF CREDIBILITY. In the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the direct examination of prosecution Mary Iris Hortezano was replete with leading questions which would give the impression that the answers given by her were all coached and not spontaneous. He argues that witness Mary Iris was only 7 years old at the time the incident happened and she could not have possibly recalled with strikingly precise detail the gruesome events as they unfolded. Appellant further argues that the testimony of Mary Iris that she saw appellant slash the throats of her siblings, despite the insufficient illumination, leaves much to be scrutinized; that the line of questioning of the prosecutor suggests a series of rehearsed responses to compensate for the deficiencies in the testimony of the prosecution witness; and that the witness should have been disqualified by reason of her immaturity pursuant to Section 21(b) of Rule 130. The contentions are untenable.

The fact that prosecution witness Mary Iris Hortezano was merely seven (7) years old at the time of the incident and eight (8) years old at the time she testified does not disqualify her from being a witness nor does this circumstance render her testimony incredible. It is well-settled that any child regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a childs competence as a witness are: (a) capacity of obs ervation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c) capacity of communication.[33] Even a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.[34] And, there is no minimum age for witnesses, even a child can be a witness so long as he can perceive and relate his perceptions. Besides, the testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons.[35] As regards the claim that the direct examination of prosecution witness Mary Iris was replete with leading questions, there is no doubt that witness Mary Iris was a child of tender years as she was only 8 years old at the time she testified. Section 10 of Rule 132 is clear on this matter, thus: SEC. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except: (a) x x x (b) x x x (c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf mute; (d) x x x (e) x x x. (underscoring supplied) Moreover, minor lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic experience too painful to recall.[36] A witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minor and minute details. [37] Furthermore, it has been held that minor inconsistencies do not discredit but rather strengthen the testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[38] Thus, the testimony of witness Mary Iris that there was a lamp and the reference to a parol[39] and a kerosene lamp[40] by the prosecution, are mere minor inconsistencies which do not destroy the fact that the place of the incident was lighted; enough for witness Mary Iris to identify accused-appellant whom she has known because they were neighbors.[41] And it has been held that the illumination from a kerosene lamp is sufficient to permit the identification of a malefactor.[42] WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED, and accused-appellant Roberto Gonzales y Mendoza is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) sentences of reclusion perpetua.. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victims in the amount of P150,000.00 as civil indemnity; P150,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFREDO ALBA, accused-appellant. PER CURIAM: For review is the decision,[1] dated November 7, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Naga City, in two consolidated cases, finding accused-appellant Alfredo Alba guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him, in Criminal Case No. 94-5517, to suffer the penalty of death, and in Criminal Case No. 94-5516, the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The cases were tried jointly. The evidence of the parties is fairly summarized in the decision of the trial court, thus:[2] The cool and clear mountain creek seemed inviting to nine year old Janette Alba, that early morning of May 1993. She yielded to the temping waters and leisurely dipped her young body. Then, her widowed father, Alfredo Alba came, disturbed her communion with nature and abruptly ended her sweet innocence.

The first sexual desecration was not to be the last. The abuse was repeated and the last time happened in the afternoon of February 7, 1994, at their very own dwelling. While her Mama Maria, her fathers second wife, was not at home, Janette Alba, again , was sexually molested by her own father. As in the first instance, Alfredo went on top of Janette, and had carnal congress with his daughter. Janel felt pain as before. She wept. The experience was too painful to bear for the ten year old, who had no one to turn to. Her mother was already dead and her only brother whom she hadnt seen was allegedly in Candelaria, Quezon. Janette wished her father dead. Janette Alba reported the incident to a fat man whose name she does not know, who took pity on her and bought her a dress. The fat man brought her to the police authorities. Later, she was brought to a doctor, who examined her. The medical certificate of Dr. Marita B. Reyes, Janette Alba is now in the protective custody of the Department of Socia l Welfare and Development, at the Center for Girls in Pampang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, according to Paciencia Relayo, a social worker who also testified for the prosecution. The child was referred to the DSWD and was fetched at Tinambac, Camarines Sur in February 1994. Ms. Relayo secured the birth certificate and baptismal certificate of Janette. It is shown that Janette was born on January 7, 1984, at Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, to spouses Alfredo Mariano Alba and Cristina Saldaa (Exhibit C, p. 64, Record). She was baptized on April 15, 1984 (Exhibit B, p. 65, Record). For the defense, only Alfredo Alba testified, although his counsel manifested that he will present three witnesses. Alfredo Alba denied the charges against him At the time he was picked up from his house, Janette was not at home, because she asked permission to go to church. At 9:00 oclock, she did not go home yet, and he came to know later, that Janette was taken by the barangay tanod. Janette Alba, was already a thirteen year old girl, when she testified in Court about her fathers sexual abuses. Actually, her father had carnal congress with her thrice, but she could no longer recall the facts of the second sexual imposition. The offended party, who was too small and short for her age, narrated in Court, that the first sexual abuse happened while she was bathing in the creek in Tamban, Tinambac, near their house and she was just a mere nine year old motherless child. The last molestation happened in their house, while her stepmother was not around. This was the time that she aired her complaint and a fat man helped her. The Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and has found accused-appellants contentions to be without merit. FIRST. Accused-appellant points to the alleged failure of the offended party, Janette Alba, to give the exact date she was raped by accused-appellant for the second time and the date when she was turned over to the custody of the DSWD as indicating that she was prevaricating. With respect to the date of the rape, she said it was in February of 1994. She was not asked when exactly it was committed. If the defense wanted to test her credibility, it should have pointedly asked her for the exact date. It is noteworthy that the information in Criminal Case No. 94-5517 alleged that the second time Janette was raped by her father was on February 7, 1994. At any rate, proof of the exact date the rape was committed is not required so much so that the offended partys failure to recall the exact date is fatal. As this Court has held in several cases,[3] the exact date of commission of rape is not an element of the crime. As for the date the victim was entrusted to the custody of the DSWD, it has not been shown in what way the victims failure to recall it can affect her credibility. The fact is that for lack of anyone to take custody of her, considering her tender age, she was entrusted to the care of the DSWD. Nor is it clear that there exists an inconsistency in the testimony of the offended party as to the place where she was raped for the first time. Janette Alba, the offended party, said she was raped the first time at a creek in Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. The second time she was raped was in their house.

She appears to have been merely confused in saying that when she was first abused in May 1993 she was in their house because, immediately before she was asked by the private prosecutor where she had been raped in May 1993, she was asked when she was raped for the last time, and she answered it was in February 1994. It is clear that when she was next asked where she was raped in May 1993, she was laboring under the impression that she was being asked where she had been raped in February 1994. At any rate, if the defense wanted to impeach her credibility, she should have been confronted with the alleged inconsistent statements and asked to explain the same.[6] As accused-appellant did not do so, it waived the defense based on this ground. THIRD. Accused-appellant contends that the victims competence as a witness should have been first e stablished considering that she was a minor at the time she testified. There is, however, no law requiring that a witness competence be first established before he can testify. The pertinent provisions of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence state: SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. x x x SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses: (a) Those whose mental conditions, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others; (b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully. The burden of showing that a witness is incompetent to testify is on accused-appellant.[9] The fact that the offended party is a minor does not mean that she is incapable of perceiving and of making her perception known. In the case at bar, the offended party was questioned by accused-appellants counsel concerning her competence, and her answers show that she was competent to testify, thus:[10] Indeed, as this Court observed in one case,[11] children of sound minds are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Other than the allegation of minority, the defense failed to adduce other grounds for the disqualification of the victim as a witness. The offended party related her ordeal in the hands of her father in a straightforward, candid and categorical manner. So it was held by the Court that when the testimony of the victim of rape is simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination and unflawed by any inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit . (Pp. Saballe, 236 SCRA 365, 1994) The cross-examination yielded nothing to assail Janettes credibility, on the contrary, vital matters which were no t taken up during the direct were revealed on cross. Her declarations do not reveal that she foisted these rape charges against her father just to get even, after the latter punished her for a wrongdoing. It is likewise not shown that she was merely taught or coached on what to say about the incidents. It is hard to believe that at her tender age and naivette, Janette would fabricate such a sordid tale against her father that would send him to the gallows for most of his life or to his death. Even when consumed with revenge, it takes a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father for the most of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a lifetime of shame . (Pp v. Melivo, 253 SCRA 347, 1996) The Court likewise said that it is most improbable that a victim of tender years and not one exposed to the ways of the world, would impute a crime as serious as rape to any man if it were not true, (Pp. v. Dela Cruz, 251 SCRA 77 (1996), more so, if the man is her father, whom she had known all her young life to be her guardian, protector and defender. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23 of Naga City, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Alfredo Alba is ordered to pay the offended party, Janette Alba, in Criminal Case No. 94-5516, the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages and, in Criminal Case No. 94-5517, the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity andP50,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is disallowed.

In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for his reference in case he decides to exercise his prerogative of mercy. No pronouncement as to costs. PEOPLE MELO, J.: In an Information dated August 11, 1983, Alfonso Badon, Arnold Arellano, and Nilo Cafino, were charged with the crime of murder, thusly: The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses, to wit: Edwin Gomez was a bus conductor and inspector working at the Ceres Bus Company (p. 12, TSN, August 28, 1990). His wife, Florencia, and their children live with him in Barangay Cabangahan, Negros Oriental (pp. 6-8, Id.). Among their neighbors is Demetrio Macayan, Sr. whose house is about thirty (30) meters away from the common residence of Restituto Elma Arellano, his son, Arnold (herein appellant), and his stepson, Alfonso Badon (herein appellant). (p. 5, TSN, December 4, 1990; pp. 3-4, TSN, February 18, 1994). Alfonso is the nephew of Glicerio Badon, the barangay captain at Cabangahan (p. 7, TSN, November 4, 1986). On June 17, 1983, at half past 7:00 oclock in the evening, Demetrio was downstairs in his house w hen he suddenly heard gun shots (p. 5, TSN, December 4, 1990). Shortly, Edwin appeared at Demetrios doorstep, asking for help because Restituto had shot him when he (Edwin) passed by the house of Restituto (Ibid.). Demetrio readily obliged and decided to go to their barangay captain for assistance. On their way to Glicerios house, Edwin related to Demetrio that while he was passing the house of Restituto, the latter accused Edwin as the assassin hired by Remigio Asenas Quiqui a.k.a. Baloloy to kill him. Then, Restituto shot Edwin. Confirming Edwins story is the wound on his breast which Demetrio saw (p. 6, Id.). Arriving at the house of Glicerio, Edwin requested that he be brought to a hospital so his wound may be treated (pp. 6-7, TSN, December 4, 1990). Since there was no available transportation, Glicerio with some companions went to the house of Crispin Encontad to borrow his pedicab. Crispin agreed and when they returned to the house of Glicerio to pick up Edwin (Ibid; pp. 8-9, TSN, June 7, 1991), Crispin saw a bullet wound on the chest of Edwin who told him he was shot (pp. 10, 12-13, TSN, June 7, 1991). Thereafter, Edwin was seated on the passenger side of the pedicab and ready to be taken to the hospital. However, Alfonso and Arnold, together with Nilo Cafino, came rushing in (p. 7, TSN, December 4, 1990; p. 13, TSN, June 7, 1991). With a bolo two (2) feet long, Alfonso stabbed Edwin who, luckily, was able to parry the thrust which instead landed on the pedicab roofing that was torn as a result (p. 14, TSN, July 7, 1991). Edwin was not as lucky the next time as Alfonso succeeded in stabbing him on the breast. As Edwin cried out, he disembarked from the pedicab and tried to walk away. But Arnold and Nilo followed and shot Edwin with a .38 caliber pistol (p. 8, TSN, December 4, 1990; pp. 14-15, TSN, June 7, 1991). Edwin fell to the ground and lay prostrate. As Nilo left the scene, Alfonso and Arnold took turns in hacking Edwin many times with a bolo. Finally, they walked away leaving their victim dead (pp. 8-12, TSN, December 4, 1990; pp. 15-18, TSN, June 7, 1991). Meanwhile, Demetrio and the other neighbors either scampered away or inconspicuously retreated from the scene of the crime out of fear (p. 13, TSN, November 4, 1986; p. 19, TSN, December 4, 1990). On the other hand, Glicerio sought assistance from barangay Malo whose barangay captain reported the incident to the Siaton Police Station (p. 13, TSN, November 4, 1986). Responding to the report, SPO3 Donaldo Gadingan and other policemen went to Cabangahan and found the dead body of Edwin lying along the highway near Glicerios house. The police investigated the incident and requested a medico legal to conduct an autopsy of Edwin (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 4, 1986; pp. 6-9, TSN, August 29, 1995). Subsequently, a municipal health officer at the Siaton District Hospital issued the certificate of death of Edwin (pp. 8-9, 12, TSN, October 24, 1989). Based on the death certificate issued by Health Officer Rodolfo P. Jalalon, Edwin Gomez died of shock, hemorrhage, and stab and bullet wounds (p. 282, Record). Accused-appellants denied killing the victim. We affirm. OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALFONSO BADON, ARNOLD CAFINO, accused. ALFONSO BADON and ARNOLD ARELLANO, accused-appellants. ARELLANO and NILO

Accused-appellants contend that their guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. They assert that the instant case was not wholly heard and tried by the judge who rendered the decision, and thus, was not in a position to ascertain the credibility of prosecution witnesses, mainly Crispin Encontad and Demetrio Macayan. They consequently maintain that the general rule of according great weight and respect to the findings of the trial court finds no application in the case at bar. On the contrary, however, even if, as pointed by accused-appellants, the ponente of the assailed decision did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh conflicting testimony, having heard only the testimony of all witnesses for the defense and the rebuttal evidence of the prosecution, the Court finds no misappreciation of facts committed by him. The circumstance alone that the judge who wrote the decision had not heard the testimony of the prosecution witnesses would not taint his decision ( People vs. Folina, 247 SCRA 28 [1995]). In the case at bar, the full record was available to Judge Alfonso P. Briones and a perusal of his decision readily shows that it was duly based on the evidence presented during the trial, including the stenographic notes. It is evident that he thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the credibility of the witnesses with the perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge. While the judge who presided over the entire trial of the case would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimony of all the witnesses, it does not follow that a judge who only took over from a colleague who had earlier presided over the trial cannot render a valid and just decision. The decision of a judge who did not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous (People vs. Gazmen,247 SCRA 414 [1995]). In the case at hand, Judge Briones was indeed aware of his duties and responsibilities as a judge who had taken over another in midtrial. His words deserve to be quoted: Based on the record and evidence at hand, the Court finds that the guilt of accused-appellants has been established beyond reasonable doubt in consequence of the fact that they have been positively identified by prosecution witnesses Demetrio Macayan and Crispin Encontad. The bare denial and weak alibi of accused-appellants are insufficient to overcome the positive identification by prosecution witnesses (People vs. Nazareno, 260 SCRA 256 [1996]). According to Crispin Encontad, the victim was stabbed by Alfonso Badon and then shot by Nilo Cafino. Afterwards, Alfonso Badon stabbed the victim several times. Although Crispin testified that he was not sure whether Arnold Arellano was armed or not, Demetrio Macayan, on the other hand, testified earlier that Alfonso Badon stabbed the victim while he was inside Crispins pedicab and when the victim alighted therefrom, he was shot by Nilo Cafino and Arnold Arellano. Thereafter, Nilo left the scene and Alfonso and Arnold took turns in hacking and stabbing the victim. Accused-appellants endeavor to discredit the testimony of Demetrio and Crispin based on the lack of absolute harmony in their testimony. However, this Court cannot and does not expect absolute uniformity in every detail, because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear depending upon their situation and state of mind. It is of common experience that the perception of individuals may vary depending on their location and the extent of their peripheral vision. To expect identical features in the testimony of witnesses cannot but generate the suspicion that the material circumstances testified to by them were integral parts of a well thought out and prefabricated story (People vs. De Castro, 252 SCRA 341 [1996]). Probing into the whole testimony of Crispin and Demetrio would show that Crispin is not as incisive and keen as Demetrio. There are matters which Crispin failed to recall, like who were with the barangay captain when the latter asked for his assistance, or whether Arnold was armed or not. He could not remember that Demetrio, among other persons, was actually with the barangay captain. Under the circumstances, however, this Court fully recognizes the difficulty of remembering what another would not otherwise forget. It is not common experience for a person to witness the perpetration of a crime, and the startling experience usually perverts his normal pattern of reaction. Crispin may not have been able to completely tell the tale but what is significant is that Demetrio was able to fill in the details. He positively identified Arnold Arellano as one of the three assailants of Edwin Gomez. Verily, inconsistencies in minor details do not impair the credibility of witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants (People vs. Panganiban, 241 SCRA 91 [1995]). Further, accused-appellants contend that Crispin Encontad falsely testified against them because they are members of Iglesia Ni Kristo while Crispin is a Roman Catholic. The testimony of Crispin cannot be discredited on this basis alone, as indeed, accused-appellants failed to prove that their religious differences have reached such an intensity as to cause Crispin to falsely attribute a crime to them. Anent Demetrios testimony, accused-appellants assert that this cannot be relied upon because he testified seven years after the occurrence of the incident. But delay in revealing the names of the perpetrators of the crime does not necessarily render a witness less credible witness if such delay is sufficiently explained ( People vs. Alcantara, 254 SCRA 384 [1996]). Likewise, failure to volunteer what one knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witness credibility (People vs. Alberca, 257 SCRA 613 [1996]).

WHEREFORE, the decision under review finding accused-appellants Alfonso Badon, and Arnold Arellano, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder is AFFIRMED, with the modification above-stated. Accused-appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and are each ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death in accordance with current jurisprudence, P6,829.35 as burial expenses andP15,000.00 as and for attorneys fees. In addition, accused-appellants are likewise each ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO MANGAHAS, accused-appellant. GONZAGA-REYES, J.: This is an appeal from the decision[1] dated December 2, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 16) in Malolos, Bulacan finding accused-appellant Rodrigo Mangahas guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing him as follows: In support of its case, the prosecution presented two alleged witnesses to the shooting incident, as well as the doctor who performed the autopsy on the victim. The aunt of the deceased was likewise called to testify on the civil aspect of the case. First to testify was Police Captain Florante Baltazar, the medico-legal officer at the PC-INP, Quezon City, who conducted the examination of the cadaver of the deceased on August 14, 1990. He testified that according to the results of his post-mortem examination, the victim died from cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wounds.[3] His findings showed that the deceased sustained 3 (three) gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal as they penetrated the thoracic cavity.[4] He estimated the distance between the assailant and the victim at more than 24 inches as he did not find any powder burns on the body of the deceased.[5] The prosecution next presented Diosdado Padios, an alleged witness to the shooting incident. He testified that he had known the victim and the accused-appellant prior to the August 14, 1990 incident. On the said date, he saw the accused and the late Rufino Gestala drinking at a store near the latters house in Tungkong Mangga, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.[6] He was at the store at that particular time as he was just called by the victim to discuss some matter. While the two were drinking, he saw accused-appellant suddenly shoot Rufino Gestala, who was then seated less than one meter away from the former. He himself, was one meter away from the two when the incident occurred.[7] On cross-examination, it was revealed that he left his former residence on September 1990 to live with a certain Cristy Balatbat, an aunt of the deceased. He admitted that while he was staying with Balatbat, he depended on her for his own subsistence. [8] He likewise admitted that he was a close friend of the deceased for more than five (5) years prior to the incident.[9] The prosecution next presented Renato Panoso, another alleged witness to the shooting. He testified that he recalled the date of August 14, 1990 as that was the date that his best friend Rufino Gestala was shot.[10] While he was on his way home from work, he stopped by the store of a certain Mr. Tiangko at the corner of Pecsonville, Barangay Tungkong, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to talk to the victim about the job in Bahrain they were both applying for.[11] They had been conversing for about four (4) minutes when Rudy Mangahas arrived. Therafter, the accused bought three (3) bottles of beer and offered one each to him and the victim. [12] They had been drinking for only a short time when the accused suddenly approached Rufino Gestala, pulled out a gun and shot him.[13] After the shooting and upon seeing Gestala bloodied and clutching his chest, the witness ran away in the direction of his house and reported the matter to his uncle.[14] On cross-examination, it was gathered that Rufino Gestala was his best friend, having known him for about six (6) years prior to his death.[15] Ibid., p. 21.15 He also stated that he transferred his residence to Fort Bonifacio in the last week of October 1990 but prior to that, he, like witness Diosdado Padios, was staying in the house of Trinidad Balatbat, the aunt of the deceased. He admitted that he depended on Balatbat for his daily sustenance while he was staying with her and that he consulted with Trinidad Balatbat before giving his statement to the Office of the Public Prosecutor.[16] On questions propounded by the trial court, the witness testified that at the time of the alleged shooting incident, he was at the left side of the victim while the accused was in front of the victim. He was the only one sitting on the sill of the store while the victim was leaning on it.[17] He likewise stated that the accused took only one step towards them as he was just in front of the victim and that the barrel of the gun was less than one foot away from the chest of the victim. He likewise recalled that at the time of the incident, he saw witness Diosdado Padios but the latter did not drink beer nor was he offered one as he was just passing by.[18] The aunt of the victim, Trinidad Balatbat, was likewise presented and she testified mainly on the expenses their family incurred as a result of the death of the victim.[19]

For its part, the defense admitted that the accused shot the victim but alleged that the killing was done in self-defense. In support, counsel for the accused presented three witnesses, namely: the accused-appellant Rodrigo Mangahas, Nestor dela Rosa, and SP03 Mario Fernandez. AccusedOn cross-examination, he testified that he has known Renato Panoso for about a year and Rufino Gestala for about 3 years before the incident.[29] He characterized Rufino Gestala as an intimidating person and that his group is known in Pecsonville as notorious for taking drugs.[30] He further claimed that Gestalas source of income while he was still alive was selling marijuana and drugs. [31] The accused also testified having seen witness Diosdado Padios in the store on August 14, 1990 talking to Gestala but when the shooting incident occured, Padios was about 3 or 4 meters away from the store.[32] He admitted that Padioss view of the shooting was unobstructed by any barrier.[33] When asked why it was Gestala who got angry with him when he refused to get the gun from Panoso, the accused said that Gestala and Panoso were associates in the business of selling guns. [34] He clarified that Gestala poked the gun at him only once, while he also shot at the victim only once while they were both standing up. He did not know that the victim was hit and had suffered three gunshot wounds.[35] Finally, it was found out that after the accused failed to find anyone in the barangay hall, he did not try to report the matter to the police authorities within San Juan del Monte nor did he do so when he was in the house of his in-laws.[36] For his part, Nestor dela Rosa collaborated the accuseds account of the incident. He testified that at about 1:00 p.m. on August 14, 1990 he was at the Quirino Highway, San Jose del Monte some 150 meters away from the place of his Comadre in Pecsonville. [37] He was walking towards his destination when he saw four persons in front of a store but one was about to leave. [38] Of the four, he was only able to recognize the accused as he had previously worked with him. As he continued walking; he saw one person whom he did not recognize holding a gun. He saw this person squeeze the trigger of the gun although it did not fire.[39] He then saw the accused pick up something from the counter of the store and then he heard a shot. He did not know what happened right after as he ran away from the scene out of fear.[40] On cross-examination, he stated that the man on the right side of Mangahas did not do anything to pacify the man holding the gun.[41] He testified that he heard only one shot fired by accused-appellant[42] He admitted further that he did not report the incident to the police authorities in San Jose del Monte because he was not advised by anyone.[43] Finally, the defense presented SP03 Mario Fernandez who testified on the procedures undertaken by his police detachment in investigating the shooting of Rufino Gestala.[44] After a thorough review of the records of the case and a careful consideration of the arguments of accused-appellant, the Court does not find enough basis to reverse the judgment of conviction. Accused-appellants plea of self-defense once again brings the Court to the crucial question of credibility of witnesses and the weight that should be given to testimonial evidence. On this issue, the Court has almost invariably ruled that the matter of assigning value to the declaration of witnesses is best done by trial courts which, unlike appellate courts, can assess such testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the trial stage and thus, unless cogent reasons are shown, the findings of the trial court are accorded great respect and credit. In discrediting the defense of accused-appellant that he shot the victim in self-defense, the trial court held: Accuseds defense is devoid of merit. At first, accused put up the defense of alibi when the instant case was being investigated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan (Exhs. N, N-1, and N-2). Then, he sets up self-defense at the trial on the merits of the case. These two defenses are incompatible with each other. They do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the commission of the crime charged against him. Setting up such contradictory defenses will lead to the conclusion that the accused is confused of what defense is for real. This being so, accuseds testimony is wanting of credence at the outset. Finally, however, accused adopts self-defense saying that the victim pulled out a gun from his right side then poked it to the accused, squeezed its trigger once but misfired. Reacting to the situation, accused picked up the gun from the pasimano of the store, fired it once to the victim and then ran away from the scene of the incident. Analyzing the testimony of the accused, the inevitable conclusion would be that such testimony is unreasonable and improbable. If the victim really intended to kill the accused, it is natural for him, under the situation, to squeeze the trigger of his gun not only once if the first squeeze missed, but for several times until his gun fired or to pick up the gun on the pasimano of the store and use it instead in shooting the accused. It is inconceivable also that the victim would have to kill the accused just because the latter refused to buy or accept as pledge the gun Renato Panoso was offering to the accused. Incidentally, the alleged gun of the victim was not presented in Court. Likewise unbelievable is the claim of the accused that he picked up the gun from

the pasimano of the store then shot the victim. At the moment of the incident, accused was facing the store and 1 meter, more or less, away from the victim who was sitting on the said pasimano indicating that that the victim was nearer to the gun on the pasimano than him. This being so, the victim should have picked up the gun from the pasimano ahead of the accused or should have grappled for the gun taken by the accused after his gun misfired at first squeeze of the trigger. This should have been the natural reaction of the victim when his life was placed in imminent danger after his gun misfired. Moreover, it is strange why Renato Panoso a best friend of the victim and who was much nearer to the gun on the pasimano th an the accused and the victim did not react to the situation when the life of his best friend was in imminent danger. It is likewise strange why Renato Panoso should place and leave the gun on the pasimano and then continued drinking beer while the transaction on the gun has already been through. Another doubt on the testimonies of the accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa lies on their claims that the accused fired his gun only once. The victim sustained 3 gunshot wounds of separate and different entries and exits on his body. For a single shot to produce those wounds is highly irreconcilable. Further, the accused claimed as he demonstrated in open Court, that while he was standing he pointed his gun towards the victim at the level of his (accuseds) chest. The accused and the victim were of the same height. If the accused fired his gun in the position demonstrated, the wounds would be through and through straight at the level of the chest from the point of entry to the point of exit. But, as it will be noted in Exh. B, the 2 gunshot wounds of the victim were through and through from his chest towards the lower exit at his back, indicating that the position of the accused was higher than that of the victims when the fatal shots were fired. In other words, the allege position of the accused is inconsistent with the location and direction of the wounds. It is rather consistent with the established facts that the accused was standing when he shot the victim who was then sitting and facing him. In the case of People vs. Kok Tieck Hong, G.R. Nos. 48535-36, Dec. 21, 1990, the Supreme Court held: As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. By the same token, the corroborating testimony of defense witness Nestor dela Rosa likewise lacks credence. The fact that he could not identify or name the person who pointed a gun to the accused and squeezed its trigger once but misfired and other persons in the group, even as he has already discussed the incident with the accused, indicates that he was not an eye witness to the incident. It is doctrinal that the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to see witnesses on the stand and determine by their conduct and demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully or are simply lying. The determination of credibility is the domain of the trail court, and the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of the witnesses is best performed by it; thus the evaluation by the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses is well nigh conclusive on this Court.[47] At the onset, the trial court was correct in pointing out the inconsistent defenses put up by the accused during the preliminary investigation and trial of the case. As noted by the prosecution, the accused, during the preliminary investigation of the case, executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[48] dated October 18, 1990 wherein he alleged that at the time of the incident, he was with three other persons in Caloocan City and not at the scene of the shooting incident. At the trial of the case however, accused makes a complete turn-around and claims that he was at the scene of the crime but that he shot the victim only in self-defense. Verily, these two defenses are incompatible with each other. As such, they do not at all provide shield to the accused to ward off the crime imputed against him. When a witness makes two statements, both being sworn to as a witness in one case, and these statements incur in the gravest contradiction, then the court cannot accept either the first or the second statements as proof. He himself by his own act of giving false testimony impeaches his own testimony and the court is compelled to exclude it from all consideration.[49] The discrepancies in his two testimonies are too glaring to overlook. Another factor which contributes further to the doubtfulness of the veracity of the testimony of the accused and his witness Nestor dela Rosa is their insistence that accused-appellant shot the victim only once. As stated by the medico-legal officer in his direct examination, the victim sustained three (3) gunshot wounds with three (3) different e xit and entry points on different parts of the victims

body.[54] If, as accused-appellant insists, there was only one shot fired, it would be impossible for the single bullet to produce such wounds. Moreover, accused-appellant claims that he pointed his gun towards the victim at the level of his chest while the latter was standing. Considering that the accused and the victim were of the same height, the wounds suffered by the victim would have gone straight through and through from the point of entry on his chest up to the exit point on his back. But as noted by the medico-legal officer in his report,[55] the 2 gunshot wounds of the victim exited on the lower back of the victim, indicating that accused was in a higher position than the victim when he fired the fatal shots. Thus, the alleged position of the accused as stated in his testimony is inconsistent with the location and direction of the wounds suffered by the victim. Likewise, the presence of several gunshot wounds on the body of the victim is physical evidence which eloquently refutes accused-appellants allegation of self-defense. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED, and the accused-appellant is found GUILTY OF HOMICIDE and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the death indemnity of P50,000.00; and actual damages of P21,875.00. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: Ramon Chua Uy (hereafter RAMON ) appeals from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, Metro Manila, in Criminal Cases No. 16199-MN and No. 16200-MN, which decreed him guilty of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Article III, R.A. No. 6425,[2] as amended, for the illegal sale of 5.8564 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," and possession of 401 grams of the same drug, respectively. RAMON was arrested in the evening of 11 September 1995 by the elements of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Philippine National Police in Malabon, Metro-Manila, in the course of a buy-bust operation[3] and a follow-up search of his residence, and was subsequently charged in three cases, In Criminal Case No. 16201-MN, RAMON was charged with the illegal possession of "traces" of shabu found on three (3) plastic scoops and other drug paraphernalia which were seized from his supposed residence in a follow-up search. No bail was recommended. When arraigned, RAMON pleaded not guilty in each case. At the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses SPO1 Alberto G. Nepomuceno, Jr., who acted as the poseur-buyer, and SPO4 Eddie Regalado, another member of the buy-bust team, as rebuttal witness. The defense presented RAMON and Maritess Puno. The trial court summarized the prosecutions evidence, thus: The evidence on record shows that at around 5:00 o clock in the afternoon of September 11, 1995, a female confidential informant personally informed the members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Malabon Police Station, which was then holding office at Barangay Concepcion, Malabon, Metro-Manila, that accused Ramon Chua Uy "alias Chekwa" had asked her to look for a buyer of shabu at a price of P1,000.00 per gram. Acting on the given information, the members of the unit subsequently planned a buy-bust operation against the accused. SPO4 Eddie Regalado instructed the confidential informant to consum[m]ate a deal with the accused by telling him that a prospective buyer is willing to purchase five (5) grams of the illicit drug to be delivered in front of the Justice Hall of Malabon located along Sanciangco Street, Barangay Catmon. At 6:30 p.m., the confidential informant called up and informed the police officers that accused Chua Uy already agreed on the transaction as well as to the place of delivery. P/Insp. Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Narcotics Unit, at once formed the buy-bust team composed of SPO4 Federico Ortiz and PO1 Joel Borda. After securing five (5) P1,000.00-peso bills to be

used in the operation from P/Inp. Aquino, SPO4 Regalado have (sic) them photocopied, after which, [he] affixed his signatures (sic) on each of the xerox copies although the serial number of the bills were previously recorded. The group then proceeded to Barangay Catmon at about 7:00 p.m., with SPO1 Nepomuceno designated to act as the poseur buyer. When they reached the place, SPO1 Nepomuceno first went to a store near the tennis court while the rest of the team positioned themselves in strategic locations. At 8:20 of the same evening, SPO1 Nepomuceno saw a white Toyota car came to a stop. Their confidential informant immediately stepped out of the car and approached SPO1 Nepomuceno and ordered him to board the vehicle. Once inside, SPO1 Nepomuceno caught sight of the driver and the other male companion of accused Chua Uy through the back seat where he and the accused together with the confidential informant were seated. After a few minutes conversation, accused Chua Uy opened up his brown attach case and ensuingly handed over to SPO1 Nepomuceno five (5) grams of shabu placed in a transparent plastic packet. In exchange for the substance, SPO1 Nepomuceno delivered the five (5) P1,000-peso bills which accused Chua Uy put in his right front pocket. SPO1 Nepomuceno then simply opened the rear right door of the car and lighted a cigarette as pre-arranged signal. SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz consequently closed in on the vehicle. Thereupon, SPO1 Nepomuceno introduced himself and informed the accused of his constitutional rights before placing him under arrest. He later turned over to SPO1 Regalado the five (5) grams of shabu (Exh. "E"- Crim. Case No. 16199-MN). Thereafter, SPO4 Regalado and PO3 Ortiz seized the brown attach case from accused Chua Uy which yielded five (5) more plastic packets of "shabu," (Exhs. "D" to "D-4" -- Crim. Case No. 16200-MN), along with several drug paraphernalia. SPO4 Regalado likewise recovered the buy-bust money from the accused after the consumated (sic) transaction, (Exhs. "K" to "K4"). The one packet of suspected "shabu" which was the subject of the sale including the five (5) packets of the same substance, taken from the brown attach case, bearing the respective initials of SPO4 Regalado and SPO1 Nepomuceno were brought to the NBI Forensic Division. Laboratory examination of the pieces of evidence shows positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exh. "C"). The team brought accused Chua Uy to their office where he was referred to SPO2 Vicente Mandac for proper investigation. In the course thereof, it was learned that there were still undetermined quantity of shabu left at the residence of the accused at No. 402 Gen. Vicente St., San Rafael Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. Forthwith, SPO4 Regalado applied on the following day for a search warrant before this Court to lawfully search the said premises of the accused for methamphetamine hydrochloride (Exh. "I"). During the search and in the presence of Bgy. Kagawad George So and Rodolfo Salvador including Maritess Puno, the alleged owner of the house and live-in partner of accused Chua Uy, the team was able to confiscate assorted articles intended for the repacking of the regulated drug (Exh. "I-1"). SPO1 Nepomuceno identified them as follows: one (1) white plastic scoop; one (1) blue plastic scoop; one (1) tangerine plastic scoop; one (1) Selecta ice cream cup; and one (1) white plastic container (Exhs. "G," "G-1," "G-2," "H and "H-1"). All the items were marked by SPO1 Nepomuceno with his initials "AGN." Along with the aforesaid articles were three (3) pieces of plastic scoops and two (2) plastic glasses (sic) with traces of "shabu." Laboratory examination made on them gave positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibit "F"- Crim. Case No. 16200-MN). These antecedent facts which lead to the filing of the present cases against accused Chua Uy are embodied in the sworn affidavit of SPO1 Nepomuceno marked and offered in evidence as Exh. "J." SPO4 Eddie Regalado corroborated the testimony of SPO Nepomuceno, claiming that he was positioned fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away when he saw SPO1 Nepomuceno entered the white Toyota car at the time of the operation. He further went to say that a caliber 9mm pistol was also recovered from accused Chua Uy but considering that up to now they have not received any certification from the Firearms and Explosives Unit, showing whether accused is authorized to carry firearm, no case has yet been filed against the latter. Further, SPO4 Regalado said that accused Chua Uy has admitted to him that he is just a neophyte in the illegal trade.[8] Accused Chua Uy claimed his innocence by insisting that the quantity of the illicit drug allegedly seized from him were merely "planted" by the police officers. Maritess Puno, the other defense witness, testified on the events which transpired during the follow-up search by the police of RAMONs suspected house at No. 402 Gen. Vicente Street, San Rafael Village, Navotas, and on the fact that she knew RAMON.[10]

On rebuttal, SPO4 Regalado reiterated that the five (5) transparent plastic bags of "shabu" were indeed found inside RAMONs confiscated attache case and that they recovered therefrom only P20-peso bills amounting to P2,200 and not P1,000-peso bills as RAMON claims.[11] The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions story of a legitimate buy-bust operation; declared that poseur-buyer SPO1 Nepomuceno creditably testified as to how the sale took place inside the white Toyota car of RAMON and that his testimony "was amply corroborated" by SPO4 Regalado. It held that RAMONs entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard wa y with the police undertaking "the rigors of planning" the buy-bust operation. The presumption that they regularly performed their duty was not rebutted by proof of any ulterior motive. It concluded that the prosecution has proved with certainty all the elements necessary for the crime of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and since RAMON was caught in flagrante delicto selling a regulated drug, his warrantless arrest was valid and the seizure of five (5) more packets of shabu weighing 401 grams (Exhibits "D" to "D-4") from the confiscated attache case of RAMON was justified and legal in light of the prevailing rule that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any property found upon his person in order to find and seize things connected with the crime. The trial court also cited the confirmation by the NBIs Forensic Division Chemist, Loreto F. Bravo, that the packets of shabu bought and seized from RAMON, was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug (Exhibit "C"). Unsatisfied, RAMON appealed from the decision. In view of the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed in Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, the appeal is now before us. In his Appellants Brief, RAMON submits that the trial court erred (1) in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the evidence for the defense; and (2) in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of drug pushing and drug possession. He assails the credibility of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses on the buy-bust operation, contending that the price of P1,000 for a gram of shabu is "so exorbitant"[13] as to be in credible and claims that the police officers only made it to appear that the price was exactly P1,000 per gram because there wereP1,000-peso bills among the P132,000 which they got from his attache case. He insists that he is a legitimate garments businessman who need not resort to selling illicit drugs to make money; in fact, he was carrying his days collection amounting to P132,000 when accosted by the police in the evening of 11 September 1995. Thus, the female confidential agent/police informer should have testified in court to prove her claims against him. In the Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urges us to affirm RAMONs conviction. It agrees with the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. The price of shabu at P1,000 per gram is not incredible. It was the price quoted by the informant, prompting the buy-bust team to prepare five (5) P1,000-peso bills which they actually paid to RAMON but later recovered. We find no merit in this appeal. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan; it is a procedure or operation sanctioned by law and which has consistently proved itself to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, and unless there is a clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimony on the operation deserved full faith and credit.[18] As has been repeatedly held, credence shall be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary; moreover in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been framed.[19] The price of P1,000 per gram of shabu paid by the "poseur-buyer" Nepomuceno to RAMON cannot be considered "so exhorbitant" as to render the account of the buy-bust improbable. In fact, in a buy-bust operation conducted by the policemen in Sampaloc, Manila on 5 July 1995, or more than a month earlier, P500 only fetched 0.395 gram of shabu,[25] which meant that the selling price then was already more than P1,000 for a full gram of shabu. As to the buy-bust money, Nepomuceno categorically stated that after receiving the information from their informant, Police Inspector Ricardo Aquino, Chief of the Anti-Narcotic Unit, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation "and prepared marked money

worth P5,000 in P1,000 denomination and instructed [him] to act as poseur buyer in the operation." They photocopied (xeroxed) them and "got the serial numbers." After the operation, they submitted them to the prosecutors office. [26] Nepomuceno underwent grueling crossexamination by defense counsel[27] but he never wavered on his testimony on the conduct of the buy-bust operation. On crossexamination, Nepomuceno revealed that the source of their buy-bust money is Mayor Amado S. Vicencio.[28] The failure to present the informer did not diminish the integrity of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. Informers are almost always never presented in court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.[29] Their testimony or identity may be dispensed with since his or her narration would be merely corroborative, as in this case, when the poseur- buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.[30] On the other hand, RAMON only offered an unsubstantiated tale of frame-up. He did not even present his own driver named "Lolong" to corroborate his tale. As against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they caught RAMON in a buy-bust operation, supported by other evidence such as the packets of shabu sold by and seized from him, RAMONs negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially when it comes from the mouth of credible witness.[31] WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 170, in Criminal Case No. 16199-MN and Criminal Case No. 16200-MN, is hereby affirmed in toto. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABUNDIO TOLENTINO, accused-appellant. DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: This case is before us for the automatic review[1] of the decision[2] of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 96-1763, in view of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant Abundio Tolentino (hereafter TOLENTINO). TOLENTINO was charged with the crime of rape. The facts as synthesized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in the Appellee's Brief,[4] which we hereby quote and adopt as our own for being fully in accord with the transcript of stenographic notes of witnesses, are as follows: On May 1, 1995, at past noon, Rachelle Parco, 8 years old, was inside one of the two bedrooms at the second floor of the house of her grandmother, which was located at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga (TSN, January 22, 1997). Rachelle was arranging the clothes while in the room (Ibid, p. 7). Suddenly, Abundio Tolentino, the stepfather of Rachelle Parco, entered the same room and closed the door (Ibid). Abundio Tolentino ordered Rachelle Parco to stand up and lie down on the bed (Ibid, pp. 7-8). When Rachelle Parco was already on the bed, Abundio Tolentino removed his short pants and the short pants of Rachelle Parco (Ibid, p. 8). Abundio Tolentino placed his sex organ on Rachelle Parco's genitals and bumped ( binubundol-bundol) hers with his (Ibid). At that moment, Rachelle Parco remained silent, because she was afraid and did not know what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her (Ibid, pp. 89). Abundio Tolentino's carnal act lasted only for three minutes, because Rachelle Parco's brother knocked at the door and ask money from Abundio (Ibid, p. 9). Abundio Tolentino told Rachelle's brother to ask money from Lola Iding (ibid). Thereafter, Abundio Tolentino put on his short pants and hers and went down the house (Ibid). Abundio Tolentino repeatedly did the same thing to Rachelle Parco at least three to four times a week in May, June, and July 1995 (Ibid, pp. 11-12). Rachelle Parco was overc[o]me by fear that she did not tell anyone about what Abundio Tolentino was doing to her.

When the family [of] Rachelle Parco transferred residence to Taguig, because Masantol became flooded, it was then that Rachelle Parco mustered enough courage to tell her mother, Maria Teresa David, about Abundio Tolentino's bestial behavior (Ibid, pp. 12-13). Upon learning her daughter's sad flight, Maria Teresa David accompanied her on May 20, 1996, to the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila, to file a complaint against Abundio Tolentino (TSN, February 10, 1997, p. 14). The victim, Rachelle Parco (hereafter RACHELLE) was likewise subjected to a physical examination, the result of which revealed that she was still a virgin and that her hymen was still intact and its orifice was 0.5 cm. in diameter "as to preclude complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any genital injury.[5] In his defense, TOLENTINO interposed alibi, claiming that it was impossible for him to be in Masantol on 1 May 1995 because as a taxi driver he would come home to Masantol every Sunday only, which was his rest day. He also claimed that the incident was a concoction of Cecille Yabut, the grandmother of RACHELLE, as she was opposed to his relationship with her daughter Ma. Teresa David.[6] Pertinent portions of the findings[9] of Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Uniel, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, are as follows: In light of these findings of the medico-legal officer, a rigorous scrutiny of the testimony of RACHELLE must perforce be made to determine whether there was evidence of the entrance of TOLENTINO's male organ within the labia of the pudendum or the lips of the vagina of RACHELLE, without necessarily reaching either the orifice or the hymen. There was nothing from RACHELLE's testimony that proved that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of RACHELLE's vagina. As translated, she only said: "He placed his sex organ to my sex organ, sir." This was the translation of the word binubundul-bundol. And when asked to explain what she meant by it, she answered: He was trying to force his sex organ into mine, sir. The prosecution did not ask her the appropriate questions to get some more important details that would demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that TOLENTINO's penis reached the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. It should have, for instance, asked whether TOLENTINO's penis was firm and erect or whether RACHELLE's legs were spread apart to bring us to the logical conclusion that, indeed, TOLENTINO's penis was not flabby and had the capacity to directly hit the labia of the pudendum or the lips of RACHELLE's vagina. There is paucity of evidence that the slightest penetration ever took place. Consequently, TOLENTINO can only be liable for attempted rape. In this case, there is no doubt at all that TOLENTINO had commenced the commission of the crime of rape by (1) directing RACHELLE to lie down, (2) removing his shorts and hers, and (3) "trying to force his sex organ into" RACHELLE's sex organ. But there is no conclusive evidence of the penetration, however slight, of RACHELLE's sex organ. The penetration was an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, in the absence of a convincing evidence thereof, TOLENTINO should be given the benefit of the doubt and can be convicted of attempted rape only. The information specifically alleges that RACHELLE was eight years old when the crime was committed and TOLENTINO was "the stepfather... being the common-law spouse of [RACHELLE's] mother, Teresa David." That allegation is inaccurate. TOLENTINO was not RACHELLE's step-father, for that relationship presupposes a legitimate relationship, i.e., he should have been legally married to Teresa David. A step-father is the husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring;[12] or, a stepdaughter is a daughter of one's spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former a marriage.[13] Nevertheless, since the information specifically alleges that TOLENTINO was the common-law-spouse of RACHELLE's mother and that RACHELLE was under eighteen years of age, we shall appreciate these special qualifying circumstances. We disagree with the contention of the OSG that "relationship" is an aggravating circumstance in this case [14] in that TOLENTINO was the step-father of RACHELLE. In the first place, as stated earlier, TOLENTINO was not the step-father of RACHELLE. Second, the alternative circumstance of relationship can be considered only "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degree of the offender.[15] RACHELLE does not fit in any of the enumeration. At any rate, the circumstance that TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of RACHELLE's mother, together with the fact that RACHELLE was eight years old when the rape was committed, has already served as a special qualifying circumstance in this case. TOLENTINO's allegation of ulterior motive cannot be sustained. We cannot believe that the grandmother would expose her granddaughter RACHELLE, a young and innocent girl, to the humiliation and stigma of a rape trial just to stop the relationship between TOLENTINO and her daughter, the mother of RACHELLE. There is, as well, no showing whatsoever that RACHELLE allowed herself to be manipulated by her grandmother to tell a lie just to satisfy the wishes of the latter. Granting arguendo that TOLENTINO and

RACHELLE's grandmother did not get along well, we do not see how RACHELLE would be able to concoct a story of rape, risk public censure, and expose herself to the rigors and embarrassment of a public trial if her motive had been other than to secure justice.[16] Besides, against RACHELLE's positive testimony, TOLENTINO had nothing to offer but denial and alibi. Settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.[17] Equally settled is that alibi is a weak defense, for it is easy to concoct and fabricate. It cannot prevail over, and is worthless in the face of, the positive identification by a credible witness that the accused committed the crime.[18] RACHELLE positively identified TOLENTINO as her rapist. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the appealed decision of 19 May 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 961763-M. As modified, accused-appellant ABUNDIO TOLENTINO is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of attempted rape, under Article 335, in relation to Article 51, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; and, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment penalty ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the victim RACHELLE PARCO the sums of P50,000 as indemnity and P25,000 as moral damages. Exec. Judge DAVID C. NAVAL and DSWD Secretary CORAZON ALMA DE LEON, complainants, vs. Judge JOSE R. PANDAY, RTC, Branch 27, Naga City, Judge SIMON D. ENCINAS, RTC Branch 51, Sorsogon, and Judge RICA H. LACSON, MTC, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, respondents. PER CURIAM: From the Decision of the Court dated July 21, 1997,[1] the dispositive portion of which reads: IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court RESOLVES as follows: 1. Judge Jose R. Panday is found administratively liable for immorality and obstruction of justice. Accordingly, he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leaves, and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. 2. Judge Rica H. Lacson is found administratively liable for engaging in notarial services in connection with cases unrelated to her official functions as municipal judge of Sorsogon. Accordingly, she is meted a FINE of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) with warning that a repetition by her of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. 3. Judge Simon D. Encinas is found administratively liable for improper conduct or conduct unbecoming a judge. Accordingly, he is meted a FINE of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with warning that a repetition of similar acts of impropriety on his part will be dealt with more severely. Respondent Judge Jose R. Panday filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 1997[2]seeking a partial reconsideration by: a.] absolving him from the charges of immorality and obstruction of justice; b.] dismissing the same for utter lack of merit; c.] lifting his preventive suspension, and d.] reinstating him to his position as presiding judge of Branch 27 of the RTC of Camarines Sur, or, in the alternative, to consider him retired from the service with all his retirement benefits and accrued leaves intact including the removal of the ban on his employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government-owned and controlled corporations. On the charge of immorality, respondent judge insists that the alleged incident at the Bodega Tigaon did not take place. In support thereof, he reiterated the testimonial declarations of Wilfredo Bolalin, Domingo Pasibe and Delia Cea. In sum, the testimonies of Bolalin and Pasibe are to the effect that they were in the immediate vicinity of the compound of the inn where the alleged incident took place on July 24, 1994 from 11:00 a.m. until the early evening the duration of the alleged incident of rape, which took place at around 2:00 p.m. or thereabouts. Bolalin and Pasibe declared that they observed nothing untoward from their vantage point and that nothing could have transpired without their knowledge during that busy afternoon where there was even a boxing practice. Counsel for respondent argues that the foregoing testimonies of Bolalin and Pasibe fall clearly under the category of positive testimony citing as authorities Revilla v. Court of Appeals[7]and Tanala v. NLRC.[8] These affirmative testimonial declarations according to counsel ...puts in serious doubt the already deemed incredible [as to certain facts] testimony of the alleged victim Cecile Buenafe.

Respondent judge and counsel likewise capitalize on the testimony of Delia Cea who declared on the strength of the Bodega Tigaon's Registry Book for July 1994[9] that with the exception of those customers who checked-in but requested that their names be not entered in the logbook, no one with the name Jose R. Panday or Cecile Buenafe or persons who bore such names registered and checked-in at the pension house on July 24, 1994. We remain unimpressed. For all the evidentiary hairsplitting of respondent judge and counsel on what positive and negative testimony is supposed to be, the primordial question to be resolved still boils down to the credibility of the said witnesses' averments. To reiterate what has been stated earlier in the Decision [10] sought to be reconsidered, such testimonies failed to convince the Investigating Justice and the Court is likewise not convinced by them. As pointedly observed therein ... [t]he testimonies of Wilfredo Bolalin, Domingo Pasibe and Delia Cea to the effect that they did not see judge Panday at the Tigaon pension house on 24 July 1994 constitute negative testimonies which can not prevail over Cecile's positive testimony that she was there with him on said date. Testimony is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur. [11] A positive testimony, such as Cecile's is stronger than a negative one. The former has more value than the latter for the reason that he who denies a certain fact may both remember exactly the circumstances on which he bases his denial.[12] Delia Cea's claim that based on their logbook for July 1994, no one checked in at Bodega Tigaon on 24 July 1994, cannot be relied upon by Judge Panday to support his denial. Cea herself admitted, in response to the clarificatory questions of the Investigating Justice, that there were occasions when the names of the customers of the pension house were not recorded in the logbook upon request of the customers themselves: Hence, the fact that Judge Panday's name was not recorded in the logbook kept by the Tigaon pension house does not prove that he was not there on 24 July 1994. As it was, the logbook failed to negate Cecile's testimony that she was there with Judge Panday and that they had sexual intercourse in Room 6 thereof in the afternoon of 24 July 1994.[14] Testimony is affirmative or positive if it consists of statements as to what the witness heard or seen. It is negative if the witness states that he did not hear or did not see the phenomenon in question.[15] The Court has held in at least two (2) cases that the testimony of a credible witness that he saw or heard a particular thing at a particular time and place is more reliable than that of a witness who with the same opportunities, testified that he did not hear or see the same thing at the same time and place.[16] Moreover, the positive testimony of a single witness is entitled to more weight and credence than the testimony of several witnesses who testified in the negative or to collateral matters. Thus, in People v. Tibayan,[17] the sister of the victim testified that she and her father saw the accused shoot her brother to death while a farmer and his mother testified for the defense that they were near the scene of the crime; that they did not see the sister of the victim and her father; and that they neither saw the accused and his companions. In affirming the judgment of conviction, the Court held that the negative testimony of the farmer and his mother is not conclusive proof that the accused did not shoot the victim nor does it completely belie the sister's testimony that she and her father witnessed the shooting. In this case, no weight and credit can be given to the testimonies of Bolalin and Pasibe for while they claim that they were in the immediate vicinity of the compound of the Bodega Tigaon on the day, time and place of the incident while there was an ongoing boxing practice, their failure to see and observe the alleged incident can be attributed to want of particular attention considering their preoccupation with the boxing practice. Moreover, the testimony of a witness that he does not remember or has no knowledge of a particular matter has little or no weight as against the direct testimony of a witness who does remember the matter or against the positive evidence that an event occurred which is not contradicted by a witness' testimony that he does not remember whether it occurred or not.[18] [T]hat the prosecution had only one eyewitness hardly affects its cause. There is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration except where the law expressly mandates such corroboration.[23] Verily, criminals are convicted, not on the number of witnesses against them, but on the credibility of the testimony of even one witness who is able to convince the court of the guilt of the accused beyond a shadow of doubt.[24] To rephrase what had been said earlier, the Investigating justice found the testimony of Cecil Buenafe more convincing than those of respondent judge's witnesses. So does this Court.

So too must be rejected the contention that since the Court made a finding that Cecile Buenafe was not forcibly raped by the respondent judge, this can only lead to the dismissal of the criminal case for rape against him. It needs be stressed in this regard that in the instant proceeding, respondent judge is being administratively held to account for serious misconduct or malfeasance in office. The quantum of proof required to establish respondent judge's misconduct in the administrative complaint is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial evidence. By having sexual congress with Cecile who was then only fifteen (15) years old, respondent Judge violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to live up to noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of members of the judiciary. Additionally, his subsequent act of offering Cecile's father a substantial amount of money in consideration for the withdrawal of their charges against him is considered, by law, an obstruction of justice.[28] That the respondent Judge even reneged on the agreed amount for the withdrawal of the charges against him only serves to underscore the greater perversity of his character and betrays his disdain for the lowly whose rights he has sworn to protect. To repeat: All told, the Court remains convinced that respondent judge's penalty is commensurate to his misdeed. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge Jose R. Panday's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO BIHISON y SILENCIO, PEPITO KADUSALE y DEIS and RELITO TIPONTIPON y ESTOY,accused-appellants. VITUG, J.: In their appeal from the decision, dated 10 October 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite Branch 18, to the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants Pepito Kadusale, Relito Tipontipon, Eduardo Bihison and Leonardo Bihison sought a reversal of the verdict finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. That on or about the 23rd day of February 1992 at Barangay Adlas, Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Philippines an d within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, being then armed with bladed and pointed weapons, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and, there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, hit, assault and stab one Honorio Lintag inflicting upon him mortal wounds which caused his subsequent death, thereby causing damage and prejudice to his legal heirs.[1] Of the fourteen accused, only Eufemio Cabingan, Pepito Kadusale, Relito Tipontipon, Leonardo Bihison and Eduardo Bihison had been arrested and brought to trial following a plea of not guilty entered by the accused at the arraignment. The prosecution presented its case. After the prosecution had rested, the defense started to give its own account of the evidence the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the convic,tion of appellants but increasing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua; it explained: The core issue raised by appellants in their appeal is indeed factual and involves nothing more really than the credibility of the witnesses. Under prevailing jurisprudence,[7] the assignment of values to the testimony of witnesses is virtually left to the trial court which is considered to be in the best position to discharge that function. Its findings on that issue almost invariably are given the highest degree of respect and, absent strong cogent reasons to the contrary, are not disturbed on appeal. Appellants have not been able to successfully show sufficient justification to warrant a reversal at this time and in this instance of that long standing rule. The main argument of appellants hinges on certain supposed inadequacies in the testimony of Rosalinda Mendoza and that of Irenea Zacarias. Appellants claim that Rosalinda Mendoza should not be considered a credible witness because she could not recall the exact sequence of the attack and the relative positions of appellants in assaulting and stabbing the victim. The credibility of Irenea Zacarias, in her case, is also assailed for her inability to name the respective instruments used by each of the appellants. The argument is feeble. Eyewitnesses to a horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if they are unable, to be completely accurate in picturing to the court all that has transpired and every detail of what they have seen or heard. Various reasons, mostly explainable, can account for this reality; the Court has long acknowledged the verity that different human minds react distinctly

and diversely when confronted with a sudden and shocking event, and that a witness may sometimes ignore certain details which at the time might have appeared to him to be insignificant but which to another person, under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy.[8] The Court has closely examined the testimony of Rosalinda Mendoza, and her narration of the stabbing and hacking incident is far from being incredulous. The probative value of testimonial evidence, particularly that which relates to the identity of the culprits, will not be diminished as long as the mass of testimony jibes on material points. Neither the slight variation in the statements of witnesses nor a want of perfect recollection down to minute details dilute their credibility or reduce the veracity of their declaration. Indeed, inadequacies on minor matters can even enhance the worth of testimony and indicate that the responses are honest and unrehearsed.[12] WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court of Appeals under review, finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED. The award for civil liabilities is modified by DELETING the exemplary damages of P25,000.00. Costs against accused-appellants. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO SARABIA, accused-appellant. PURISIMA, J.: Appeal from the Decision dated May 4, 1992, handed down by Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 10201, finding appellant Armando Sarabia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder The prosecutions case, as well as the trial courts conviction of appellant, is primarily anchored on the testimony of eyewitness Joelouie Dolorosa, a cable tender of the Victorias Milling Companys Murcia Transloading Station and a resident of New Barrio Central, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Dolorosa testified that on March 16, 1991, he was working at the Murcia Transloading Station at Hda. Josefa, Brgy. Blumentritt, Murcia, Negros Occidental (Tsn, Aug. 22, 1991, p. 7). With him were Raul Villanueva and Edward Liza, who had similar tours of duty for that day, i.e., from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. (id., p. 9). Liza was the office clerk in that transloading station. Around 11:00 oclock in the evening, while Dolorosa and Liza were inside the office of the transloading station, appellant suddenly barged into the room with a bolo (ginunting) in his hand. Without warning, appellant hacked the unsuspecting Liza twice, once on the head and once on the neck (id., pp. 12-14). Fearing for his life, Dolorosa instinctively rushed outside the office and hid himself at the nearest refuge he could think of --- an old, enclosed cane car used for stockpiling sugar (ibid.). This car was the favorite resting place of employees in that transloading station. When Dolorosa went inside the car, he saw Raul Villanueva there together with about four (4) other employees (Tsn, Oct. 3, 1991, pp. 38-40). Immediately, he narrated to Villanueva what happened. As they were about to leave the car, they saw the appellant, still clutching a bolo and shouting Who are the others? (Tsn, Aug. 22, 1991, pp. 15-16). Thus, they decided to stay in the car for some time. While they were inside, they saw appellant being accosted by a certain Junior, the stations overseer (id., p. 18). The overseer brought appellant to the Municipal Hall and it was only then that Dolorosa and company got out of the car. They went back to the station office. At the time the entire incident happened, the transloading station was well-lighted. Around five (5) or six (6) powerful search lights surrounded the station and were in full operation (id., pp. 16-17). Inside the station office, Dolorosa and Villanueva saw Liza dead and covered with blood. Lizas neck was almost severed. They saw a hacked wound on the left portion of Lizas neck measuring about three (3) to four (4) inches in length (id., p. 36). Without touching the corpse, Dolorosa and Villanueva contacted the Victorias Milling Company by radio and reported the incident. Then, policemen arrived at the scene, followed by an investigator and photographer from the Victorias Milling Company. Rolando Liza, father of the deceased victim, also arrived at the station (id., pp. 19-22). Photographs were taken of Lizas corpse and the interior of the station office. All these were identified by Dolorosa in open court. Thereafter, Lizas corpse was loaded on a truck and taken to the Alisbo Funeral parlor (id., p. 33).

The Post-mortem Certificate issued by Dr. Emmanuel Bando, Murcias Rural Health Physician who autopsied Edward Lizas cadaver on March 17, 1991, Dr. Bando indicated the cause of Lizas death to be cardio-respiratory arrest due to multiple hack wounds and stab wound (id., p. 13). He testified further that the deceased-victims wounds were caused mainly by a sharp and pointed instrument, probably a bolo or ginunting (id., pp. 13-19). In his expert opinion, the position of the assailant, at the time of the attack, could have been at the left side of or directly behind the victim (id., pp. 28-31).[2] Assisted by the Public Attorneys Office, appellant placed reliance on self-defense Rogelio Onate testified that he is a laborer at MUCH Transloading Station. He had known accused Sarabia for about three to four years being likewise a resident of Hacienda Josefa. He had also known victim Edward Liza for almost three years. Accused and the victim were kumpadres. At around 9 p. m. of March 16, 1991, he was at the store of the overseer drinking Pilsen as it was pay day and a Saturday. Armando Sarabia was also there, standing by the side of the store and asking from the overseer the computation of his indebtedness. Victim Edward Liza was in front of MUCH office, six to eight meters away. Edward Liza arrived and told Sarabia to go with him to the office. Liza went back to the office. After Sarabia had the computation of his indebtedness, or after about 15 minutes, he went to the MUCH office at the invitation of Liza. As it was already late in the evening, and his house was still one (1) kilometer, more or less, away, he already went home. At about 8 oclock the following morning, he learned about what happened to Armando Sarabia (TSN., January 21, 1992, pp. 3 12).[3] The trial Court gave credence to the testimony of eyewitness Joelouie Dolorosa who narrated that there was a sudden assault against Liza, identifying the herein appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Dolorosa, together with Mr. Raul Villanueva, testified on the exact location of the crime. Dr. Emmanuel Bando identified the death certificate and explained the post-mortem examination he conducted on the victims body. As regards the civil aspect of the case, the victims father was called to the witness stand. The trial Court also gave credence to the testimony of Pfc. Jose Laboyo who narrated: The appeal is devoid of merit. To begin with, having invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the appellant is deemed to have admitted having killed the victim and the burden of proof shifted to him to establish and prove the elements of self-defense, to wit, (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. (People v. Cahindo, 266 SCRA 554). Self-defense, xxx, should be established as convincingly as possible and the onus falls on the appellant who relies on it to prove its unequivocal signification The plea of self-defense cannot justifiably be entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful. The question of whether the appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of fact. In the present case, one Rogelio Onate merely testified that they (Onate and the appellant) were together on that fateful day of killing. Nothing was mentioned in Onates testimony that he witnessed the killing and the appellant just defended himself. It has also been held by this Court that, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of selfdefense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude Absent such unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense In this case, appellant Sarabia was unable to substantiate his claim. A careful scrutiny of the facts showing that Sarabia admitted that Liza was very much surprised when he saw the former. Appellant also claimed that Liza had even asked Sarabia why he was there. If Liza, indeed, invited Sarabia, Liza should not have been surprised and the latter would not have asked appellant why he went to the MUCH office. The appellant insisted that the trial court of origin erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation against the appellant. If evident premeditation is also proven, it shall be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance. The essential element s for evident premeditation to be appreciated are: (1) the time when the appellant decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the appellant clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of the act (People v. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600).

In this case, there is direct evidence showing that the appellant meditated and reflected on his intention to kill the victim. The medical findings proved that Sarabia deliberately employed reliable and unfailing means to ensure the killing without giving the victim an opportunity to defend himself. The appellant begged of this Court to give a second look to the lower courts finding of probative value in the testimony of Pfc. Jose Laboyo which he claimed was nothing but hearsay evidence. This Court is aware that hearsay evidence carries no probative value. When evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the same is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay Generally, a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof except (1) when it is made through palpable mistake and (2) when it is shown that no admission was in fact made. In spite of the presence of judicial admission in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented ( Atillo III v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 596). Undaunted, the appellant inflicted eight (8) wounds on the victims body. Six (6) of them were hack wounds, one (1) stab wound and one (1) contusion in the right forearm. The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted on the victim thus belie and negate the claim of self-defense In a long line of cases, it was held that the findings of the trial cour t on the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to highest degree of respect All things studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court finds the guilt of the appellant proven beyond reasonable doubt. His allegation that he acted in self-defense has not been substantiated. The prosecution was also able to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the evident premeditation as generic aggravating circumstance, beyond reasonable doubt. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 10201 finding appellant guilty of murder is hereby AFFIRMED with modification that the awards for moral damages and loss of income are hereby deleted. Costs against appellant. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DAVID ANDALES y MALOBAGO alias "Abie," accused-appellant. BELLOSILLO, J.: This is a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 16408 declaring David Andales y Malobago and Jellie Andales y Malobago guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The evidence shows that on 4 September 1993, at around 6 a.m., in Sitio Banica, Brgy. Bugko, Mondragon, Northern Samar, the spouses Sonia Malobago and Rodolfo Malobago were at their coconut plantation about thirty (30) yards away from their house. Sonia was looking for some fallen nuts while Rodolfo was on top of a coconut tree tapping tuba. Suddenly, from among the reeds appeared the brothers David Andales and Jellie Andales. Jellie rushed towards the tree where Rodolfo was straddled and without compunction fired several shots at him with a handgun. Stunned by the attack, Rodolfo slid down from the tree trunk with a bleeding nose, and upon reaching the ground, ran with his wife Sonia towards the highway. Anacorita de Guia, who was then waiting for Rodolfo and Sonia at their residence, saw David and Jellie pursuing the couple, still firing at them whenever they could. Sonia was able to run towards a nearby uninhabited house, while Rodolfo fled towards the highway. Weak and wounded, Rodolfo collapsed and fell face down on the ground. David then turned Rodolfo over and with the use of a bolo savagely hacked him repeatedly, ending Rodolfos life with a viciou s cut on his throat. After David and Jellie left, Sonia went over to her husbands lifeless body and, upon confirming that he was dead frantically ran towards their house. There, she met Anacorita de Guia to whom she recounted the atrocity suffered by her husband in the hands of David and Jellie. Sonia Malobago intimated during the trial that a boundary dispute concerning land situated in Sitio Bangon could have precipitated the attack. The lands of the Malobagos and Andaleses were adjoining each other and demarcated by a pili tree which the Andaleses cut. So that since then the Andaleses claimed as theirs the land of the Malobagos, then occupied by Rodolfo as caretaker. [6] Genaro Malobago, father of Rodolfo, testified that he had already gratuitously given a portion of the land, a half hectare of riceland, to the Andaleses to resolve the conflict.[7] However, he surmised that the latter might have continued to harbor ill feelings towards his son Rodolfo.[8] As proof of this, he revealed that David and Jellie had on three previous occasions made attempts on the life of Rodolfo Malobago for which two criminal charges were filed against them although they were acquitted.[9] David Andales denied any participation in the crime. Jellie Andales claimed self-defense.

With regard to the two (2) criminal cases previously filed against David and Jellie Andales, accused David and Jellie reasoned out that they had already been exonerated of those charges and that the complaints, like the instant case, were only fabricated by the Malobagos to prevent them from tilling the land.[10] The trial court did not believe David and Jellie Andales. We sustain the conviction of David Andales. Findings of fact by the trial court are given great weight and credence and, absent any arbitrary or compelling reason, are not to be disturbed on appeal. We find no reason to deviate from the rule. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimonies of Sonia Malobago and Anacorita de Guia to establish its case against David and Jellie Andales. The Court has no reason to discredit them as they each gave a clear, straightforward and unequivocal narration of the events that transpired. The fact that Sonia and Anacorita are related to the victim - the former being the widow of Rodolfo Malobago and the latter the mother-in-law of Rodolfos sister - does not render their clear and positive testimonies less worthy of full credit. No law disqualifies a person from testifying in a criminal case in which his relative is involved if the former was really at the scene of the crime and witnessed the execution of the criminal act. [15] Sonia was within the vicinity when Jellie Andales shot her husband Rodolfo. From the coconut plantation to the highway, she not only saw but even experienced the terror of being relentlessly chased and fired at by David and Jellie Andales. Anacorita, for her part, witnessed David and Jellie Andales hotly pursuing the couple from a distance of thirty (30) yards while waiting at the Malobago residence. Each of them gave a convincing and straightforward testimony and no degree of relationship can detract from the veracity of their statement that they each saw David and Jellie, at different stages, attack Rodolfo Malobago. We are not convinced that Sonia Malobago merely implicated David and Jellie Andales as part of a scheme to displace David and Jellie from their possession of the farm at Sitio Bangon.[16] It is inconceivable that Sonia would risk the life of her husband for the sole purpose of laying claim over a piece of farm, least of all, if they are indeed its actual owners. The Malobagos did not seem overly concerned about the issue of ownership and possession of the farm such that Genaro Malobago even gratuitously gave a portion of the farm to the Andaleses just to avoid any conflict.[17] On the contrary, it seemed that the Andaleses were very anxious to claim and assert their rights over the farm, staunchly declaring that at no event would they surrender the land.[18] Neither do we conform to the idea that the instant case was simply hatched to exact revenge from the Andaleses since they were acquitted of the charges of frustrated murder previously filed against them by the Malobagos.[19] No evidence was presented to show spite or evil motive on the part of Sonia to demand retribution from the previous offenses done against her family. The existence of the previous criminal charges instead suggests that the Malobagos would rather resort to judicial proceedings than take matters into their own hands. Jellie also claims that when Rubencio Malobago attacked him he was able to overpower Rodolfo and used him as shield against Rubencios shots. We find these reasons lame considering that Rodolfo is much bigger in height and built than Jellie . That he got hold of Rodolfo and moved him from side to side in an effort to dodge the bullets fired at him is likewise preposterous and not worthy of belief. His narration could have only been lifted from pocketbooks and quite akin to what could only be seen in movies. As aptly noted by the Court of Appeals, they were quite theatrical in execution. For evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself, i.e., it must conform to ordinary human experience and the normal course of human conduct. Jellie's version does not meet this test. For his part, David Andales completely denies any participation in the offense and argues that his presence at his sisters place exonerates him from the crime charged.[20] Moreover, his alibi cannot prosper against the positive assertion of witnesses that he was present at the crime scene at the time of the incident. David was positively and unequivocably identified by Sonia Malobago as the one who brutally hacked her husband repeatedly. This was corroborated by Anacorita de Guia who saw him and Jellie relentlessly chase Rodolfo and Sonia from the coconut plantation, and to whom Sonia recounted the beastly manner by which David and Jellie killed her husband. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals (modifying that of the Regional Trial Court) finding accused-appellant David Andales guilty instead of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of Rodolfo Malobago in the amount of P50,000.00, jointly with his brother Jellie Andales, and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARK PERUCHO alias NICK PERUCHO, accused-appellant. PANGANIBAN, J.:

Evidence, to be believed, must conform with human knowledge, observation and experience. Testimonies that do not adhere to this standard are accorded no credence or weight. Mark Perucho appeals the August 1, 1995 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 19, convicting him of (1) illegal possession of firearms, for which he was penalized with imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to reclusion perpetua, based on Presidential Decree 1866; and (2) disobedience to a person in authority, for which he was sentenced to 2 months and 1 day to 4 months of arresto mayor, based on Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Facts Version of the Prosecution

In convicting the accused, the trial court relied on the testimonies of SP03 Armando Ballon and SP04 Winifredo Nemeno who, together with three other policemen, arrested the accused. For the sake of clarity, the allegations of the two are outlined below: 1. The PNP Order of Battle named appellant as the leader of the Perucho Gang, which was engaged in bank robberies and composed mostly of former military men.[22] 2. Because the gang was the prime suspect in the kidnapping of Grace Chico and her grandfather in Cavite, the policemen conducted a surveillance of the gang members[23] and the kidnap victims.[24] 3. In the course of their surveillance around 7:30 p.m. on December 21, 1992, the policemen saw appellant. Tucked in his waist was a .45 caliber pistol, which was in plain view because he did not have a shirt on. At the time, the appellant was allegedly supervising the construction of a house. Immediately, all the five policemen approached and arrested him without a warrant. 4. Appellant resisted arrest and knocked down SPO4 Nemeno with a punch, but the four other policemen subdued him and seized his unlicensed pistol. 5. Before being taken to Camp Crame, he asked and was given permission to go to his hut and take with him his stereo and television, among others. Appellant came out not only with those appliances, but also a second unlicensed pistol which he surrendered to the police. The Court finds the foregoing version improbable, incredible and incompatible with human experience. First, it is unlikely that the leader of a gang included in the PNP Order of Battle would be supervising a construction work at night, unescorted, with a gun tucked in his waist in plain view. Likewise, it is dubious that such a man would be oblivious to the approach or the presence of an unfamiliar car in that secluded place at that late time. Such nonchalance is uncharacteristic of men, especially former military men, who lead undercover lives due to illegal activities. More disturbing, however, is the manner in which the policemen effected the arrest. SPO3 Armando Ballon admitted that the object of the surveillance was the Perucho Gang[25] and the kidnap victims.[26] Considering that appellant allegedly led the gang that was believed responsible for the kidnapping, his presence would have alerted an average policeman to the following possibilities: (1) the kidnap victims were being kept there; (2) the victims were being guarded by the Perucho Gang, not by Perucho alone; and (3) even if the kidnap victims were not there, the leader was with the other members of the gang. But the five policemen made no effort to ascertain the presence of the kidnap victims or the other gang members. Moreover, there was no showing that they stayed in the vicinity long enough to find out. Instead, SPO4 Nemeno declared that he and the four other policemen approached appellant immediately when they sa w him carrying a pistol. This is clear from the following excerpts of his direct testimony: In immediately confronting appellant, the five policemen did not take the time to determine whether the victims or the other gang members were in the vicinity. Instead, they rushed from their observation post to arrest him, heedless of the possibility that the other Perucho gangsters might shoot them and the kidnap victims. In fact, during the time that they were in the place, the police never took measures commensurate to the danger posed by their mission. The same carelessness was shown when they subdued appellant. When he allegedly resisted arrest and punched Nemeno, the four other policemen helped each other pin the former to the ground. Significantly, none of them positioned himself to guard against any other threat and to provide cover for the rest Even after they had arrested appellant, the police displayed the same unbelievable nonchalance . Based on the PNP Order of Battle, it is clear that the alleged Perucho Gang was no pushover, for it was composed of former military men, including a sergeant and several corporals, equipped with assorted high-powered firearms. It must be stressed that the alleged objective of the policemen was to conduct a surveillance of the gang and the kidnap victims. Yet, they did not try to find out if any of these persons were in the vicinity. They did not even attempt to check whether the three construction workers were similarly armed or were also members of the gang. In failing to do so, they were imprudently exposing themselves and the kidnap victims to danger. True, such recklessness on the part of the policemen may signify mere incompetence. But it is unbelievable that they, or any other law enforcers for that matter, are capable of such gross ineptitude. Their wanton disregard of their own safety and that of the victims is incompatible with common experience. Otherwise stated, their story is too improbable to be accorded credence.

On or about December 16, 1992, the Task Force Habagat of the Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, organized a team of police officers to track down suspects, believed to be associated with either the Galicia gang or Perucho gang, w ho may have perpetrated the kidnapping of Grace Chua and her grandfather in Bacoor, Cavite (pp. 3 to 4, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; p. 7, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). In the course of police investigation, Engineer Miranda, a witness to the kidnapping, pointed to the picture of appellant Nick Perucho, whom he allegedly saw in the house of the victims before they were kidnapped. (pp. 8-9, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). On December 21, 1992, around 7:30 in the evening, members of the Task Force Habagat, namely - Inspector Narciso Quano, Jr., SP04 Winifredo Nemeno, Sr. Inspector Noel Estanislao, SP03 Armando Ballon and SP02 Renero Agustin, [were] able to locate the residence of appellant in Barangay Gumaok, San Ildefonso,[11] Bulacan (p. 4. tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; p. 10, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). As said police officers posted themselves some 15 to 20 meters from the house, they saw appellant supervising three (3) men doing construction work (pp. 4 & 23, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; p. 10, tsn, Dec. 14, 1003). The police officers saw appellant standing, half-naked, wearing only short pants with a gun tucked [i]n his waist (ibid; ibid.). Immediately, the police officers approached appellant, introducing themselves as members of Task Force Habagat PACC (pp. 4 -5, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; p. 10-12, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). When the policemen inquired if appellant had any authority to carry the gun, appellant resisted and boxed SP04 Nemeno who was able to parry the blow (pp. 4-5, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; pp. 12-13, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). Thereupon, the police officers, combined their efforts to subdue appellant (p. 13, tsn, Dec. 14, 1993). Inspector Quano confiscated appellants firearm, a .45 caliber bearing Serial Number 716352 (p. 5, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; Exh. A , see p. 58, Record). When Inspector Quano asked appellant if he had the license or authority to possess the firearm, and the latter replied wala, wala akong papeles (p. 5, tsn, ibid.). Appellant was informed that he would be brought to Camp Crame, so he told the police that he [could] not leave his valuable belongings inside his nipa hut (pp. 5-6, id.). There, another pistol .45 caliber with SN 4746986 and two (2) magazines loaded with ammunition were recovered (p. 6, tsn, Aug. 5, 1993; Exhs. B and series, see p. 58, Records). On December 23, 1992, the arresting police officers executed their joint affidavit attesting to the facts and circumstances antecedent and leading to the arrest of the appellant (p. 16, tsn, Dec. 14, 1995; Exh. C, p. 97, Record). On December 28, 1992, they were able to verify and secure a certification from the Firearms and Explosives Office at the General Headquarters of the Philippine National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City, that appellant ha[d] no license or authority to possess any firearm (p. 15, tsn, Dec. 14, 1995; Exh. F, p. 109, Record). In the main, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution evidence. The appeal is meritorious. As a general rule, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the authority of the trial court, as it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.[17] For this reason, appellate courts accord its factual findings[18] and assessments of witnesses[19] with great weight and even finality, barring arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and substance. In the present case, however, this Court sees flimsy support for the findings and conclusion of the trial court. The oft-stated truism is that evidence must not only proceed from a credible witness, but also be credible in itself.[20] Thus, this Court has held: We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience.[21] After careful examination of the records, we find that the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses do not pass this test.

That a person who was arrested and about to be detained would worry about his personal belongings, such as stereo and television, is hardly believable. But to maintain that he, a supposedly notorious gangster, would voluntarily retrieve from his hut a second gun and surrender it meekly and perfunctorily to the police, after he had already been apprehended, is ridiculous. The police did not say that the second firearm was a product of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest; they said that appellant just voluntarily surrendered it. Why he did so the prosecution did not and could not explain.[32] In fact, common sense completely rejects this account. Because the improbabilities pertain to matters of weight and substance, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses cannot be given full faith and credence. Clearly, the requirement of moral certainty has not been fulfilled. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the court a quo is hereby REVERSED and VACATED. Accused Mark Perucho alias Nick Perucho is hereby ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to cause the release of appellant forthwith, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten days from notice. No costs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMANO VIDAL y DANIEL, GLEN ALA y RODRIGUEZ, and ALEXANDER PADILLA y LAZATIN, accused-appellants. BUENA, J.: Sir William Blackstone once said, It is better that ten guilty persons escape than one innocent suffer.[1] Appellants Glen Ala, Romano Vidal and Alexander Padilla were charged with, tried for and thereafter convicted of kidnapping with rape under an amended Information reading: The prosecution's version of the incident was anchored mainly on the testimony of the victim, 16 year old Geraldine Camacho. She recalled that on September 19, 1987, she was at the Roosevelt College in Marikina taking a dry-run examination preparatory to the National College Entrance Examination (NCEE). Geraldine left the compound at about 12:45 in the afternoon and waited for a jeepney ride at the corner of Sta. Teresita Village along J.P. Rizal Street, Lamuan, Marikina. The six accused then approached her. One of the accused poked a knife at her left side while another poked an ice pick at the right side of her body. The four others surrounded her, two in front and two behind her. Thereafter, Geraldine was led towards Sta. Teresita Chapel where a black car was waiting. Upon reaching the chapel, Geraldine was pushed inside the car and was blindfolded. Four of the accused boarded the car. Geraldine was later brought to a house after about an hour of travel. She was led inside a room where her hands and feet were tied to a chair. A few minutes later, she heard another car arrive and canned goods and alcoholic beverages being opened. Shortly, the accused went inside the room, untied her and forced her to lie down. Thereupon, Geraldine was made to smell a substance which made her drowsy. She felt that someone mounted her and had carnal knowledge of her for about 30 minutes, after which three more of the accused followed, one after the other for about the same duration as the first. At around 7 o'clock in the morning the following day, Geraldine was awakened by the noise of bottles being broken outside. Hungry and feeling pain in her groin and private part, she found herself still blindfolded and tied to the chair with her clothes and shoes already on. Moments later, the accused entered the room and repeatedly asked her if she knew the fraternity "Hard Core." Whenever she denied having knowledge about said fraternity, the accused would punch her on the different parts of her body. Subsequently, Geraldine was untied, brought outside the house and made to board a car together with four of the accused. She was later dropped at the NGI Public Market in Marikina where her blindfold was removed. She was threatened not to tell what happened to her otherwise she and her parents will be killed. Geraldine boarded a tricycle and went to her grandmother's house in Parang, Marikina and ate breakfast. Later, her mother arrived but did not talk to her for she was mad at her for not going home that night. In the afternoon, she was brought home by her mother. Fearful that her parents would get angry, Geraldine lied that she attended a class reunion when asked where she went the previous night. Not believing her story, her parents went to her school the next day to verify her story and were told by her classmate that there was no class reunion. Geraldine finally revealed the incident to her parents. On September 22, 1987, Geraldine and her parents went to the Marikina Police Station to report the incident. She was referred to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City for physical examination. The examination conducted by Dr. Desiderio A. Moraleda revealed that Geraldine suffered hematoma on the left breast and her internal sex organ showed a healing shallow laceration of the hymen at 3 and 9 o'clock. The external vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and virgin-sized vaginal speculum.[5]

After submission of the above-stated medical examination report to the Marikina police, an investigation was conducted by Pat. Jota. Through the help of one Marites Quasay, they were able to trace the whereabouts and identity of one of the appellants, Romano Vidal. During the interrogation, Romano Vidal denied the accusation but named appellant Alexander Padilla. On September 30, 1987, during the investigation, appellant Padilla voluntarily admitted being in the company of appellants Vidal and Ala when they abducted Geraldine but denied participation in the rape. On the same day, Geraldine positively identified appellants Vidal, Padilla and Ala in a police line-up after which she executed a sworn statement.[6] Thereafter, the police, together with the appellants and Geraldine, proceeded to Aqua Pool Resort, San Rafael, Montalban where the crime was committed, per appellant Padillas confession. The appellants re-enacted the crime and the police photographer took pictures thereof. On October 3, 1987, in another police line-up, Geraldine identified the other two accused and thereafter executed a Supplemental Affidavit.[7] The accused-appellants denied any participation in the crime imputed against them, alleging that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed. Appellant Romano Vidal claimed that on September 19, 1987 at around 12:30 in the afternoon, he went to the house of appellant Alexander Padilla at Batino St., Project 3, Quezon City to fetch their girlfriends Harlene Baldemero and Maritess Aclad at Quirino High School. When they arrived at the school premises, they did not find their girlfriends. After waiting for about one half hour, appellant Vidal went home but asked appellant Alexander to wait for the girls and to fetch him in his house should the girls arrive. Fifteen minutes after appellant Vidal arrived in his house, appellant Padilla arrived and told him to meet their girlfriends at St. Joseph Church located at the corner of Narra St. and Aurora Boulevard, Project 3, Quezon City. They reached the church at about 3:30 p.m. and met their girlfriends near the office of the priest. Both appellants helped their girlfriends copy their assignments. They left each other's company at 11:30 P.M. Appellant Vidal went home, had supper and slept. Appellant Glen Ala, on the other hand, narrated that he was playing basketball at the plaza of Rona's Garden, Loyola Heights, Quezon City on September 19, 1987 at around 10 o'clock in the morning. He went home at 12:30 noon, ate his lunch and slept until 3 o'clock p.m. Thereafter, he went to Rona's Garden and assisted in fixing the fence because a public dance will be held there until 5 o'clock. Then he went home to take a bath for the dance. He went back to the plaza to check on the sound system but since it had not arrived, he proceeded to the house of Leonila Batiller where he played chess with the latter's son Bong, until 8:00 p.m. The dance was postponed so he headed back to Batiller's house and played chess till 11 o'clock in the evening, afterwhich, he headed for his home and slept. Appellant Padilla, other than his voluntary confession, did not present any evidence although he participated in the trial. Weighing the evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense, the trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version

The case was certified to this Court which required the parties to submit their respective briefs. Reduced to bare essentials, the only issue to be resolved is one of credibility. In reviewing the findings of trial courts respecting credibility of witnesses, we have, in a plethora of cases, accorded great weight and respect to the conclusions reached by the court below which had the opportunity to observe closely in the first instance the demeanor of the witnesses presented before it. [9] The only exception is when the trial court overlooked or misunderstood significant contrarieties in the testimony of witnesses which if considered would materially affect the result of the conviction.[10] The case at bar falls under the recognized exception. In her testimony, complainant Geraldine Camacho narrated that while she was waiting for a ride at the Sta. Teresita, Lamuan, six men approached and surrounded her. Two men were in front, two were at the back while the two were at her side. The men on her side poked a knife and an ice pick.[11] When asked if she recognized the men who poked a knife, complainant answered in the affirmative.[12] However, upon questioning by the court, complainant recanted by saying that she recognized only one of the two men and pointed at accused Christopher Cristobal.[13] Again, complainant substantially deviated and contradicted her earlier statement when she unequivocably stated that appellant Glen Ala was not one of the knife wielders: If complainant was so positive that one of the knife wielders boarded the vehicle, pointing to appellant Ala, why did she insist that she only recognized one of the two men who jabbed a knife at her?

Still on another point, complainants identification of the other abductors in like manner is indistinct. In her testimony of February 10, 1988, complainant narrated that after her abductors removed her blindfold at the NGI Market, somebody opened the door of the car for her. When asked who opened the door, she said she could not recognize him because the sun was glaring. [17] However, when asked the same question on May 17, 1988, she identified accused-appellant Glen Ala explaining that the glare of the suns rays were not hitting her eyes because her head was bent and she was looking back at them The obvious contradictions in the complainants testimony are further shown when she was asked about the manner she was raped. Complainant narrated that she was brought to a room, still blindfolded, where she was tied to a bench (which she later said to be rattan chair). The accused entered the room, untied her, made her smell a substance which made her dizzy. She was ordered to lie down on the floor and it was in that position that the accused undressed her. Few minutes later, she fell asleep and did not know what had happened the whole night.[19] She woke up at seven oclock the following morning and felt hungry and pain in her private parts.[20] Again, on further questioning by the defenses counsel, complainant controverted her previous statement asserting that after she was made to smell something, she remained conscious[21] and even described in detail how the accused molested her.[22] Not only that, complainants testimony in court also substantially repudiated material points in her Sinumpaang Salaysay given before the Marikina Police Station. In her sworn statement dated October 3, 1987 complainant explicitly asserted that Christopher Cristobal and Henson Salas were the two men who poked a knife and an ice pick at her, materially deviating from her earlier statements in court. Complainant also stated in her sworn statement dated September 30, 1987 that she immediately reported the incident to her parents.[24] In her testimony however, complainant maintained that she told the incident on September 21, 1987 because she was afraid of her mother.[25] Again, in her sworn statement of October 3, 1987, complainant claimed that the six (6) accused were in the car when they brought her to the NGI Market in Parang, Marikina, which contradicted her testimony that there were only four men in the car when she was brought to that place. While courts generally brush aside inconsequential contradictions between declarations of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in court, the rule is otherwise where the discrepancies touch on substantial and irreconcilable facts such those omissions in the affidavit concerning important details which the affiant would not have failed to mention and which omission could well affect the credibility of that affiant.[26] We cannot understand why the trial court failed to entertain serious misgivings about the patently inconsistent and contradictory testimony of the complainant. True, Geraldine appeared clear and straightforward on direct examination, where questions and answers could be prepared and rehearsed beforehand. But she was a different witness when the court and the defense counsels took over the questioning. Her testimony was obviously not as clear and straightforward, as the trial court would want us to believe. Geraldines overall demeanor, the serious gaps in her testimony, the uncertainties in identifying the accused during the testimony, her fickleness in answering the questions hardly give the kind of credence to her supposed positive-testimony which would warrant a conviction based on the quantum of evidence required by our penal laws. [27] In crimes against chastity, the testimony of the offended party should not be received with precipitate credulity. The exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt acquires more relevance in rape because such charges are fairly easy to make but difficult to establish, and harder still to defend by the accused party, who may be innocent.[28] Moreover, accused Padilla's allegation that the crime was committed at the Aqua Pool Resort in Montalban, Rizal is of doubtful veracity. The testimony of Federico Magayon, corroborated by his wife Erlinda Magayon, undisputably show that the crime could not have taken place in the said resort. The sketch of the resort and the pictures[37]taken reveal that to enter the abandoned resort, one must pass through a small gate. To go to the abandoned bungalow where the crime was allegedly committed, one must pass through the caretaker's house. We sympathize with the complainant who was undoubtedly ravished by four (4) men. But we can not sustain the trial courts decision that the accused-appellants were indeed the perpetrators of the crime. It is only when the conscience is satisfied that the crime has been committed by the person in trial that the judgment be for conviction. For only when there is proof beyond the shadow of doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that only those responsible should be made answerable. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 56 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The accusedappellants Romano Vidal y Daniel, Glen Ala y Rodriguez and Alexander Padilla y Lazatin are ACQUITTED , on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the crime charged and ordered released from prison unless they are being held for some other lawful cause. The Director of

Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDGAR BAYRON y MANTILLA, accused-appellant. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City (Branch 1), finding accused-appellant guilty of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant P50,000.00 as moral damages. The prosecutions evidence shows the following: Complainant was, at the time material to this case, 37 years of age, married and had three children. She sold fruits and vegetables from a stall which she rented at the Langihan public market in Butuan City. Every Saturday night she slept in her stall so that she could open her store early Sunday morning, which is market day. In the evening of January 15, 1994, which was a Saturday, complainant was in her stall, lying on a bamboo bench which also served as her bed. The stall had a door which was closed by a rope at the top. To open it, the door only had to be pushed as it had no lock. On the two preceding Saturdays, complainant did not sleep in her stall. Apparently, accused-appellant used the stall as his sleeping quarters during complainants absence. On the night in question, he went to the stall and was surprised to find complainant there. He said Oy, naa man diay natulog, kinsay mong kauban? (Oh, somebody is sleeping here, who is your companion?). Complainant, who was still awake, was herself startled. She asked accused-appellant what he wanted. Without a word, accused-appellant left. Complainant followed outside to see that accused-appellant was gone. Then she went back to her store an lay on the bench again. After about 30 minutes, accusedappellant came back, armed with a knife. He ordered complainant, Higda, ayaw paglihok, ayaw pagbanha (Lie down, dont move and keep quiet). Complainant immediately recognized accused-apellant. To parry the knife, she held accused-appellants wrists. Accusedappellant tried to free himself from complainants hold by suddenly moving the knife downwards and, as a result, cut the litt le finger of complainants left hand. Complainant became frightened and she started to tremble.[3] Accused-appellant knelt on the bench at complainants feet and, at knife point, ordered her to unbutton her pants. As she stalled, accused-appellant pulled down her loose trousers and underwear with his left hand. Accused-appellant then got off the bench, pulled his pants and underwear all the way down and told complainant to lie down or he would kill her. Accused-appellant went on top of complainant and proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. While accusedappellant was still doing the sex act, complainant told him that she wanted to go to the toilet on the pretext that she had an upset stomach. Accused-appellant told her, Not yet, you respond first. After a while, complainant again told accused-appellant that she wanted to go to the toilet. This time, accused-appellant agreed to let her go but not until he had left first.[4] As sson as accused-appellant had left, complainant ran out into the street, still fastening her pants, and asked for help. Some people responded. They got a pedicab and told its driver to take complainant to the nearby Langihan police sub-station. There she filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant. The police took complainant along to the Langihan public market, but accused-appellant was no longer around when they arrived. At around 9:00 of the same morning, complainant went to the Butuan City General Hospital where she was examined by the physician on duty Dr. Carmelita T. Arante.[5] On the witness stand, Dr. Arante stated that the positive finding of spermatozoa in private complainants vaginal canal indicated that sexual contact preceded the examination. Upon request of the defense, Dr. Arante sketched the location of the wound in the small finger of complainants left hand which she indicated to be at the side of the middle joint, almost horizontal in direction.[7] Accused-appellant admitted having sex with complainant on January 16, 1994, but he claimed it was with the consent of complainant Accused-appellant claimed, on the other hand, that complainant saw him to ask for money for her support and that of her children because her husband had left them. Accused-appellant said he agreed on condition complainant dropped this case. Accused-appellant presented Herculio Bustillo, an inmate of the city jail, who testified that sometime during the first week of April 1994, while he was in the visitors room of the city jail, he saw complainant talking with a ccused-appellant on a tricycle parked beside the jail wardens office. Complainant allegedly looked happy as she often laughed and even gave accused-appellant a pack of cigarettes.[9] On cross-examination, Bustillo said he was about 20-30 meters away from accused-appellant and complainant, and thus he did not hear what they were talking about. He claimed that accused-appellant was a live-out prisoner, who ran errands for other inmates in the prison compound.[10]

First. In this appeal, accused-appellant insists that complainant consented, if not encouraged him, to have sexual intercourse with her. It is true the Court has sustained the defense of consensual sex in a number of rape cases. [12] But, in those cases, evidence was presented, consisting of letters and the testimonies of witnesses, to corroborate the claim of the accused that the alleged rape was actually a sexual intercourse between consenting adults. Here, not only is there no evidence of this nature presented but, on the contrary, the evidence shows that the parties did not know each other before the alleged tryst on January 16, 1994. If accused-appellants claim were to be believed, within minutes of their meeting, he and complainant simply engaged in a sexual intercourse with not even nary a word said between them. We find this claim to be highly incredible and contrary to ordinary human behavior. No woman, much less a married one with three children, would just lie with a complete stranger. Indeed, complainants conduct immediately after accused-appellant had left belie the latters claim that they had enged in voluntary sexual intercourse. She ran outside the stall, still fastening her pants, to ask help from the people gathering on the street. She immediately reported the matter to the Langihan police and afterwards submitted to a physical examination at the Butuan City General Hospital at 9:00 that morning. The examining physician found not only spermatozoa in complainants vaginal canal but also a cut in the small finger of her left hand and hematoma on the right side of her neck, confirming complainants allegation that accused -appellant had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. These circumstances are consistent with the conduct of one who has just undergone a harrowing experience. As this Court has pointed out, the conduct of a woman immediately following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim.[13] If complainant had not been forced and intimidated into submitting to the lustful designs of accused-appellant, her natural reaction, as a married woman, would have been to cenceal her illicit activity instead of denouncing it immedaitely as rape, for otherwise, her conduct would constitute adultery.[14] Indeed, that complainant could not have gone to the city jail to ask for support from accused-appellant because her husband had allegedly left her, is confirmed by the presence of complainants husband during the trial[16] to give moral support to her. Nor is the fact that accused-appellant is younger than complainant relevant. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accusedappellant is further ordered to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity. RESTAURANTE LAS CONCHAS and/or DAVID GONZALES, petitioners, vs. LYDIA LLEGO, SERGIO DANO, EDWARD ARDIANTE, FEDERICO DE LA CRUZ, SHERILITA ANIEL, LORNA AZUELA, ZENAIDA HERMOCILLA, FELICIDAD ROLDAN, HELEN MANALAYSAY, LUZ BALDELAMAR, FELICIDAD MENDOZA, DOLORES BAQUIZO, RODOLFO BAS, CIRIACO BATITES, and THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,respondents. KAPUNAN, J.: The Petition for Certiorari before us seeks the reversal of the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in favor of private respondents and its resolution denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of said decision. Private respondents were employees of petitioner Restaurante Las Conchas which was allegedly operated by the Restaurant Services Corporation and by petitioners David Gonzales and Elizabeth Anne Gonzales who are members of the board of directors and officers of the corporation. While private respondents were being employed by petitioners, the Restaurant Services Corporation got involved in a legal battle with the Ayala Land, Inc. over the land allegedly being occupied by petitioners for their restaurant. Ayala Land, Inc. obtained a favorable judgment in the case filed against Restaurant Services Corporation for unlawful detainer and the latter were ordered to vacate the premises. The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals and ultimately to this Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court.[1] Petitioners attempted to look for a suitable place for their restaurant business at the Ortigas Center but to no avail, thus, on February 28, 1994, they shut down their business. This resulted in the termination of employment of private respondents.

Private respondents filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for payment of separation pay and 13th month pay. This was, however, dismissed by the Labor Arbiter prompting the private respondents to appeal the case to the respondent NLRC. On November 29, 1994, the NLRC rendered a Decision favorable to private respondents. The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioners claim that the private respondents were not entitled to separation pay because under the law, the payment of separation benefits is mandated only when the closure of business or cessation of its operations was not due to serious business losses or reverses.[4] In this case, they contend that the restaurant was encountering serious business losses, thus, private respondents were not entitled to the separation benefits provided for under Art. 283 of the Labor Code. We are not persuaded. While it is true that the law does not obligate an employer to pay separation benefits when the closure is due to losses,[5] petitioners have the burden to prove that such losses actually exists.[6] In the present case, petitioners mentioned for the first time that they were suffering serious business losses when they filed their appeal with the NLRC. Such issue was never raised during the hearing with the Labor Arbiter. This belated act of petitioners clearly shows that the main reason for closing the restaurant was not due to losses. The allegation of business losses was a mere afterthought and a last ditch effort to evade their obligation under the law. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioners to prove that they are suffering business losses consists merely of statements of the corporations assets and liabilities which were not even certified by a certified public accountant or an accounting firm. Neither were the corporations Income Tax Return (ITR) which they submitted in evidence duly certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue ( BIR) as true copies of the original. They were mere self-serving declarations[7] which under the law are inadmissible as evidence.[8] While it may be true that the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, still, we cannot admit the self-serving evidence presented by petitioners since there is no way of ascertaining the truth of their contents. To admit them would open the floodgates to violations of employers of the provisions of the Labor Code to the detriment of labor which, under the Constitution is to be protected. Petitioners also posit that since private respondents failed to refute the aforesaid financial statements and income tax returns, they are deemed to have waived their right to object to the admissibility thereof.[10] We disagree. Well-settled is the rule that while lack of objection to a hearsay testimony or evidence results in the admittance thereof as evidence, said evidence cannot be given any credence and probative values unless it is shown that it falls within the exceptions to the hearsay rule.[11] In the present case, petitioners failed miserably to show that the financial statements and income tax returns are exceptions to the hearsay rule, thus, their contents have no probative value whatsoever. In the present case, the employees can no longer claim their separation benefits and 13th month pay from the corporation because it has already ceased operation. To require them to do so would render illusory the separation and 13th month pay awarded to them by the NLRC. Their only recourse is to satisfy their claim from the officers of the corporation who were, in effect, acting in behalf of the corporation. It would appear that, originally, Restaurante Las Conchas was a single proprietorship put up by the parents of Elizabeth Anne Gonzales, who together with her husband, petitioner David Gonzales, later took over its management. Private respondents claim, and rightly so, that the former were the real owners of the restaurant. The conclusion is bolstered by the fact that petitioners never revealed who were the other officers of the Restaurant Services Corporation, if only to pinpoint responsibility in the closure of the restaurant that resulted in the dismissal of private respondents from employment. Petitioners David Gonzales and Elizabeth Anne Gonzales are, therefore, personally liable for the payment of the separation and 13th month pay due to their former employees. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the respondent National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED in toto. [G.R. No. 117384. October 21, 1998] HEIRS OF TEODORO DELA CRUZ represented by EDRONEL DELA CRUZ, petitioners, vs. CO URT OF APPEALS, PACIFICO MARQUEZ,FILOMENOandGREGORIO, both surnamed MADRID, resp ondents.

Petitioners seek the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm ing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela. FACTS: On November 20, 1986, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance with damages against private respondents involving a parcel of land situated in Pobla cion, San Mateo, Isabela with a total area of3,277 square meters petitioners ass ert that the subject land was bought by their predecessor-in-interest from the p rivate respondents, Madrid brothers, for P4,000.00 on May 18, 1959. Since then t hey have been in actual, physical, continuous and open possession of the propert y. However in October 1986, private respondents managed to obtain a Torrens Titl e over the said land, the Madrids denied having executed the said deed of sale a nd alleged that the document was fictitious and falsified. Meanwhile, Pacifico M arquez contends that he is an innocent purchaser for value of the property havin g bought the same from the Madrid brothers in 1976. During the trial, petitioners were unable to present the original deed o f sale since it was lost. They were constrained to offer, as Exhibit A, a photo copy of the purported original carbon copy of the deed of sale in an effort to prove the transaction, The trial court ruled that Exhibit A was inadmissible in evidenc e, for No proof was adduced that this remaining copy was lost or destroyed.. no attempt was done to produce the copies retained by the notary public although th ere is a possibility that the same still exist.. Neither was there any proof tha t the copy sent to the court as required by the notarial law is unavailable. the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint.. Declaring the defendants the la wful owners .. Ordering the plaintiffs.. to vacate the portions of Lots 7036-A-1 0-A,.. 70360A-10-B and 7036-A-10-C.. Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC rendering its judgment which r uled that Exhibit A was admissible in evidence for failure of the private responde nts to object when it was offered during the trial, but it had no probative valu e to support the allegation of the petitioners that the disputed land was sold t o them in 1959. Failing in their bid to reconsider the decision, the petitioners have filed the present petition. Issue: Whether Exhibit A is admissible as evidence? Exhibit A is admitted in evidence, we agree with the Court of Appeals that its probative value must still meet the various tests by which its reliability is to be determined.Its tendency to convince and persuade must be considered for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. A cu rsory glance will immediately reveal that it was unsigned by any of the parties and undated as to when it was executed. In other words, Atty. Tabangay s failure t o determine the accuracy of the carbon copy requested by the petitioners predeces sor-in-interest renders Exhibit A unreliable. Petitioners explanation that these copies were lost or could not be found in the National Archives was not even supported by any certification from the s aid office. It is a well-settled principle that before secondary evidence can be pre sented, all duplicates and/or counterparts must be accounted for, and no excuse for the non-production of the original document itself can be regarded as established until all its parts are unavailable. Whether their long possession of the land in question, bolstered by the construc tion of various improvements gives rise to the disputable presumption of ownersh ip? The records show that the disputed property has been in the possession o f the petitioners since 1959. They have since been introducing several improveme nts on the land which certainly could not have escaped the attention of the Madr ids. The construction of various infrastructure on the land - rice mill, storage house, garage, pavements and other buildings - was undoubtedly a clear exercise of ownership which the Madrids could not ignore. The Failure of the Madrids raise a restraining arm or a shout of dissen t to the petitioners possession of the subject land in a span of almost thirty (3 0) years is simply contrary to their claim of ownership. Whether neither prescription nor laches can operate against the madrid because t heir title to the property is registered under the Torrens system and therefore imprescriptable? The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It has never been reco gnized as a mode of acquiring ownership, especially considering the fact that bo th the Madrids and Marquezes obtained their respective TCT s only in October 1986, twenty-seven long (27) years after petitioners first took possession of the lan d. They should have filed a judicial action for recovery of possession and not m erely to have the land registered under their respective names. Lastly, Marquez claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value does not inspire any merit. Where a purchaser was fully aware of another person s possession of the lo t he purchased, he cannot successfully pretend later to be an innocent purchaser for value. Moreover, one who buys without checking the vendor s title takes all t he risks and losses consequent to such failure. The decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Instead, petitioners are hereby declared as the legal owners of the subject land. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO LASOLA y JAIME, accused-appellant. PER CURIAM: For automatic review here is a judgment rendered by Branch 16[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, convicting Rodrigo Lasola y Jaime of two counts of rape of an under-aged relative and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one count and the supreme penalty of death for the other count.

Filed on April 6, 1995 by the victim, Rudymer Lasola, and her mother, Myrna Lasola, the Complaint against Rodrigo Lasola y Jaime in Criminal Case No. 13196, alleges: In arriving at its aforesaid finding of guilt, the trial court gave credence to the version of the victim, and culled the inculpatory facts and events, thus: Rudymer Lasola y Magos was born, per her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 'G'), on October 5, 1982 at Kayatian, Poblacion, Siocon, Zamboanga del Norte. She is the only child of accused Rodrigo Lasola and his wife Myrna Magos who were living together as husband and wife since 1980 without the benefit of marriage. In April 1995, they were residing at Pasonanca, Zamboanga City, in a small hut without any room measuring only two meters in width and four meters in length with nipa shingles as roof and sacks as its walls. Its floor which is made of plywood is about 17 inches from the ground. Rudymer is a frail, petite child with morena complexion. She finished Grade III at Pasonanca Elementary School. She testified without much emotion, as if enfeebled by the cruel fate that has befallen her at a tender age. At about 9:00 in the evening of April 4, 1995, she was in the house of Tata Quijano (Marialyn Quijano) watching a television program together with her mother, Myrna Lasola, and an old woman whom she calls Lola, and the children of Tata Quijano, and Tata Quijano herself. The house of Tata Quijano is adjacent to that of the Lasolas. Myrna Lasola works as a laundry-woman for Tata Quijano and her family. While Rudymer was watching the TV show, her father, Rodrigo Lasola, arrived. He ordered her to go home because there is no one in their house. Rydymer obeyed and went home. She fell asleep. She was awakened by her father who ordered her to take off her short pants and panty. She obeyed because her father had a bolo and told her that if she will not obey, he will kill her. Her father ordered her to spread her legs (Iya akong gipabika). He took off his short pants and brief, went on top of her, and inserted his erect penis inside her vagina (Iyang gipasulod ang iyang utin ug lagay) xxx xxx xxx xxx

While Rodrigo was on top of Rudymer doing the sexual act, Myrna Lasola arrived. When she saw what Rodrigo was doing, she upbraided the latter saying nganong gibuhat nimo ni sa imong anak (why did you do this to your daughter). Rodrigo got mad and shouted at her: Buwisit ka; mogawasay na; naabot ka pa; demonyo ka (It is about to come out; you arrive; you devil). Rodrigo got a bolo and chased Myrna. When he realized that he was naked from the waist down, he stopped chasing Myrna who ran to the house of Tata Quijano. After pulling her short pants and panty, Rudymer followed her mother. Myrna told Tata Quijano what happened and the latter reported the incident to her brother-in-law, SPO2 Efren Asoy, a policeman assigned in the Police Training Center in Pasonanca. Rudymer declared that prior to April 4, 1995, her father already had sexual intercourse with her many times (tsn, p. 32, May 15, 1995). The first was in 1991 when she was nine years old. She could not remember the exact date. It was after her ninth birthday, maybe in the month of November. While she was sleeping, her father woke her up and ordered her to take off her short pants and panty. Then he went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Blood came out of her sex organ. Her father warned her not to report the incident to her mother otherwise he will kill her. xxx xxx xxx xxx

After the first sexual intercourse, her father had repeated sexual congress with her until her mother caught them in the evening of April 4, 1995 in the act of sexual intercourse. She never reported the incidents to her mother because his father threatened to kill her if she will report to her mother. Her father used to beat her and maul her mother (tsn, p. 38, May 15, 1995). The facts as testified on by the victim, Rudymer, were corroborated on material points by the testimony of her mother Myrna, who actually witnessed what transpired on April 4, 1995. To her testimony, Myrna added that she remembered that she saw blood in Rudymers panty and blanket when she was nine (9) years old[5] and that accused appellant was lazy, often drunk and used to beat her and Rudymer. The prosecution likewise presented Tata Quijano and PO2 Renato de la Pena, who brought Rudymer to the Zamboanga City Medical Center for physical examination. Conducted by Dr. Rodolfo M. Valmoria, the medico-legal examination yielded the following report:

FINDING: Scant growth of pubic hair. Labia majora full, convex and slightly gaping. Labia minora is light brown in color and presenting in between is a fleshy type hymen with deep healed lacerations at 12 and shallow healed lacerations at 9 and 3 oclock positions . Vaginal canal narrow and hardly admits examining index finger. Abdomen is flat and tight. Breast infantile and flat with dark brown areolae and nipples. Vaginal and cervical smears negative for spermatozoa and grm negative diplo. Pus cells many. CONCLUSION: Subject is of non-virgin state physically[6] Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial. Accused-appellant did not present any witness other than himself. Upon elevation of the cases to this Court, the Free Legal Assistance Group, Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, entered its appearance for the defense. In attacking the judgment of conviction under review, accused-appellant placed reliance on the lone albeit encompassing ground, that: The judgment of conviction is inconsistent with the evidence presented and did not take into consideration the clear motive behind the filing of the complaint.[11] In more than one instance,[12] this Court has had the opportunity to lay down the basic principles and guidelines for the determination of rape cases, to wit: 1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. More in point to the present case is this Courts ruling in People vs. David Silvano [13] that in cases of qualified rape of an underaged relative, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of 1) sexual congress, 2) with a woman, 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and 5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim. Well-settled too, is the doctrine that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to constitute the commission of the crime, and this rule applies with more vigor when the culprit is a close relative of the victim. [14] The victims lone testimony, if credible, is sufficient to convict.[15] After a painstaking examination of Rudymers narration of the events as well as of Myrnas own account thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion that, indeed, the victim Rudymer and her mother Myrna were telling the truth with all candor and honesty. Their testimonies were positive, straightforward and free from embellishments such that they must prevail over the bare denials of accusedappellant. The Court discerns no cause for doubting the veracity of their testimonies. Except for their desire to put an end to the dastardly deeds perpetrated by appellant and to find vindication in the arms of justice, it cannot conjure of any other reason as to why accusedappellant will be brought to fore by the very people with whom he shares marital as well as filial love and affection. The Court cannot accept accused-appellants theory that the charges filed against him were motivated by the desire of Myrna to get rid of him due to the maltreatment which both mother and daughter suffered in his hands. Time and again, this defense has been raised and each time, the Court has struck it down as incredible, contrary to reason and too unnatural to merit faith and credit. Neither is there need to delve at length into the issue that the medico-legal report is inconclusive proof of the commission of the offense, much less the guilt of the accused.[24] A medico-legal report is not indispensable when evidence other than the same point to the inescapable guilt of the accused. It is merely corroborative evidence, the absence of which

would not prevent the prosecution from establishing the fact of rape, which in this case, was proved not just by the lone testimony of the victim but also by another witness in the person of her mother. WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant RODRIGO LASOLA y JAIME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and imposing upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case No. 13196 and that of DEATH in Criminal Case No. 13197 is AFFIRMED with the modification that apart from the moral and exemplary damages awarded below, accusedappellant is sentenced to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 13196 and P75,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 13197. In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.