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Dynastic Succession and Territorial Consolidation in Europe Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science

Association, Washington D.C., September 1- , !""#.

$i%e& S. Sharma Department of Political Science 'ale (ni%ersit) P.*. +o, !"-."1 /e0 1a%en, C2 "3#1" %i%e&.sharma4)ale.edu 5ough Draft6 Do /ot Cite Without Permission.

I am surprised that ancient and modern political writers have not attributed a greater influence on the conduct of human affairs to laws dealing with successions. True, these laws belong to civil affairs, but nonetheless they belong at the forefront of political institutions because they exercise an incredible influence upon the social status of a people, of which political laws are but a reflection. 1 The role of social institutions as an explanatory variable in international relations has been neglected. In this paper I will lay the ground work for an institutionalist account of the

international politics of premodern Europe. Specifically, this paper will show how the laws of succession, to a very large extent, determined the political geography of Europe. here

primogeniture was practiced !in combination with female inheritance" polities got larger as a result of a logic endogenous to the laws of property that governed the transmission of political power in this society. here partible inheritance persisted !despite female inheritance" we #y showing the institutional basis of territorial

observe continued fracturing of holdings.

consolidation in premodern Europe I am calling into $uestion the view of international relations in the this period that can be described as %&arwinian'. ( The &arwinian model of the international system is emphatically not an accurate framework with which to understand the international politics and war of late medieval and early modern Europe. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the very power structure of the )atin European international system was determined by dynastic social institutions. Internally, the logic of high politics followed different rules* rules, that channeled political competition in a way less dependent upon raw coercion. The logic endogenous to the laws of succession created uni$ue mechanisms for the consolidation of territory and power short of all out war. The

vagaries of birth, life and death in dynastic ruling families under conditions of the prevailing laws of succession meant that marriage provided bargaining chips that had high value in this society. #ecause of dynasticism the politics of inheritance that was played out at all levels of society became of paramount importance at its highest levels when the inheritances being transmitted
+lexis de Toc$ueville, Democracy in America, chapter ,. See -ivek Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions on /onflict and /ooperation in Early 0odern Europe1, 2npublished 3ew 4ork 2niversity &issertation, (556.
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were principalities and varying configurations of lordship. The power configurations of this world moved in different ways from the modern world and rules of inheritance meant that houses like +ustria, with poor resources bases, could inherit their way to a world empire that could never have been created through con$uest. 7f course, as is the case with modern families, disputes over inheritances were a ma8or source of social strife and violence. &ynastic wars of succession were a logical conse$uence of this configuration of property rights in which political power is transmitted in much the same way as peasants transmitted their worldly goods. +s 9ames /ollins notes .The families of European rulers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries followed reproductive and lineal strategies entirely similar to those of the peasant families over whom they ruled.1 dynastic wars of succession elsewhere.
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I have addressed the issue of

;ere I simply wish to note the sheer novelty of

dynastic politics. The ability to transmit political power through kinship created a uni$ue kind of composite polity in which a common heir exercised rule over disparate lordships !whether kingdoms or castles" as a conse$uence of inheritance. The potential for the consolidation of political power to occur without coercion and by the mere act of following simple and generally accepted rules of property permeating all levels of society, differentiates the patterns of behavior of this society from all others. This is behavior rooted in social institutions not in the power configurations of the international system. To be sure, strategic power considerations dictated kinship strategies and violence often accompanied the assertion of dynastic rights, but the fact remains that dynastic succession more often than not was entirely regular and peaceful and much of the violence surrounding succession occurred under conditions of regencies when minors had succeeded. The fact that minors succeeded to European kingdoms as a matter of course with generally little danger of displacement through coups is evidence of 8ust how stable this system of succession was.

.State #uilding in Early<0odern Europe= The /ase of >rance1 in Modern Asian Studies ,1 !9uly, 1??@", pp. A5,<A,,, p. A5:. : See chapter : of Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions1.
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+s will be shown below, this remarkable institutional innovation occurred within a deeply troubled society. The Bermanic successor kingdoms of the west Coman empire were inherently unstable political organisms. inheritance. +t the root of this instability was the practice of partible

hat Cichard >letcher has to say about the -isigothic kingdom of SpainDthe

largest and wealthiest of the sub<Coman kingdoms of the seventh centuryDapplies e$ually to, among others, the )ombard, #urgundian and >rankish entities. ;e writes, .like all other early medieval monarchies, -isigothic kingship was basically unstable. 3o clear conventions

governed the succession to the throne, and faction<fighting among the higher aristocracy who backed rival claimants was common.1
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+s will be seen below, the conse$uence of the practice

of partible inheritance when the inheritance in $uestion was a kingdom or principality, was to create a cycle of violent competition that created serious political problems. &ynasticism, at its core, was an elegant solution to a set of problems common to all political associationsDthe transmission of political power and authority from one generation to another. Eartible

inheritance practices had been the norm of agrarian societies throughout the world because without the provision of land, younger sons could not survive let alone marry and establish families of their own. A +mong a cascade of institutional innovation that occurred around the turn of the millennium were= 1" primogeniture and (" female inheritance.
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These two institutions were part

The Quest for El Cid, p. 1:. This point can be best illustrated by an examination of eighteenth century Cussia. In the early eighteenth century Eeter the Breat, as a part of his %moderniFation' program, sought to impose upon the Cussian nobility a law of single inheritance. The Cussian nobility, like all aristocracies that practiced partible inheritance, had become weakened and fractured by the fragmentation of their estates. Eeter, who was concerned about the capacity of the nobility to provide military support and taxes for the crown, sought to do something about this. The attempt to impose a law of single inheritance on the Cussian nobility failed in the face of sustained opposition because parents refused to disinherit any of their sons. See )ee >arrow, .Eeter the Breat's )aw of Single Inheritance= State Imperatives and 3oble Cesistance1 in Russian Review, 66 !," !9uly, 1??A", pp. :,5<::@ and -alerie Gievelson, .The Effects of Eartible Inheritance= Bentry >amilies and the State in 0uscovy1 in Russian Review, 6, !(" !+pril, 1??:", pp. 1?@< (1(. @ See 9ane 0artindale, .Succession and Eolitics, c. 1555<11:51 in 0ichael 9ones and 0alcolm -ale !eds." England and her Neigh ours, !"##$!%&', )ondon= ;ambledon, 1?H?* idem., .The >rench +ristocracy in the Early 0iddle +ges= + Ceappraisal1 in (ast and (resent @6 !0ay, 1?@@", p. 6<6:* Garl Schmid, .The structure of the nobility in the earlier middle ages1 in Timothy Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility, +msterdam= 3orth<;olland, 1?@?* Garl >erdinand erner, .Important noble families in he kingdom of /harlemagneDa prosopographical study of the relationship between king and nobility in the early middle

of a process through which a new form of political organiFation uni$ue to )atin EuropeD dynastic lordshipDcame into being.
H

Erimogeniture and female inheritance unleashed forces

that reshaped the )atin European world. The fragmentation of landholdings that had developed by the tenth century was reversed and in short order what had been a world under siege and in contraction began a long period of expansion whose conse$uences are still being felt today. #efore getting to the institutions of dynastic succession it is important to first briefly place the
ages1 in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility* T.3. #isson, .3obility and the >amily in 0edieval >rance= + Ceview Essay1 in )rench *istorical Studies 1A !," !Spring, 1??5", pp. 6?@<A1,* idem., .The .>eudal Cevolution11 in (ast and (resent 1:( !>eb., 1??:", pp. A<:(* Timothy Ceuter and /hris ickham, .The %>eudal Cevolution'1 in (ast and (resent 166 !0ay, 1??@", pp. 1@@<(5H* /hris ickham, .Eroperty ownership and signorial power in twelfth<century Tuscany1 in endy &avis and Eaul >ouracre !eds.", (ro+erty and (ower in the Early Middle Ages, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??6* 9enny 9ochens, .The Eolitics of Ceproduction= 0edieval 3orwegian Gingship1 in American *istorical Review ?( !(" !+pr., 1?H@", pp. ,(@<,:?* +ndrew )ewis, Royal Succession in Ca+etian )rance, Studies on )amiliar -rder and the State, /ambridge, 0+= ;arvard 2E, 1?H1* idem., .+nticipatory +ssociation of the ;eir in Early /apetian >rance1 in American *istorical Review H, !:" !7ct., 1?@H", pp. ?5A<?(@* Stuart +irlie, .The +ristocracy1 in C. 0cGitterick !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory .., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??6* Cobert #artlett, The Ma/ing of Euro+e, Con0uest, Coloni1ation and Cultural Change 2&"$!'&", Erinceton= Erinceton 2E, 1??,* Eaul >ouracre, .The 7rigins of the 3obility in >rancia1 in +nne &uggan !ed." No le and No ility in Medieval Euro+e, Cochester= The #oydell Eress, (555* 9anet 3elson, .3obility in the 3inth /entury1 in &uggan !ed.", No le and No ility in Medieval Euro+e* idem., .The >rankish Gingdoms, H1:<H?H= The est1 in Cosamond 0cGitterick !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory ..* /onstance #ouchard, .The 7rigins of the >rench 3obility= + Ceassessment1 in American *istorical Review HA !," !9un., 1?H1", pp. 651<6,(* idem., .The #osonids or Cising to Eower in the )ate /arolingian +ge1 in )rench *istorical Studies 16 !," !Spring, 1?HH", pp. :5@<:,1* Garl )eyser, .The Berman +ristocracy from the 3inth to the Early Twelfth /entury. + ;istorical and /ultural Sketch1 in (ast and (resent :1 !&ec., 1?AH", pp. (6<6,* 9erome Groll and #ernard #achrach, .0edieval &ynastic &ecisions1 in 3ournal of .nterdisci+linary *istory (1 !Summer, 1??5", pp. 1<(H* Theodore Evergates, .3obles and Gnights in Twelfth</entury >rance in T.3. #isson !ed.", Cultures of (ower, 4ordshi+, Status and (rocess in Twelfth$Century Euro+e, Ehiladelphia= 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??6* 9ohn >reed, .Ceflections on the 0edieval Berman 3obility1 in American *istorical Review ?1 !," !9un., 1?HA", pp. 66,<6@6* &avid hitton, .The Society of 3orthern Europe in the ;igh 0iddle +ges1 in Beorge ;olmes !ed.", The -5ford *istory of Medieval Euro+e, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1?HH* Beorges &uby, The Chivalrous Society, #erkeley= 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, 1?@@* idem., )rance in the Middle Ages 267$!%#", 7xford= #lackwell 1??1* idem., The 8night, the 4ady and the (riest, The Ma/ing of Modern Marriage in Medieval )rance, 3ew 4ork= Eantheon 1?H,* &avid #ates, . est >rancia= the northern principalities1 in Timothy Ceuter !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory ..., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1???* and +my )ivingstone, .Gith and Gin= Ginship and >amily Structure of the 3obility of Eleventh< and Twelfth</entury #lois</hartres1 in )rench *istorical Studies (5 !," !Summer, 1??@", pp. :1?<:6H. H See T.3. #isson, .0edieval )ordship1 in S+eculum @5 !:" !7ct., 1??6", pp. @:,<@6?* 9.;. #urns, 4ordshi+, 8ingshi+ and Em+ire, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??(* Cees &avies, .The 0edieval State= The Tyranny of a /onceptI1 in 3ournal of *istorical Sociology 1A !(" !9une, (55,", pp. (H5<,55* Susan Ceynolds, 8ingdoms and Communities in 9estern Euro+e 2""$!'"", 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??@* idem., )iefs and :assals, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??:* Beorges &uby, 4ove and Marriage in the Middle Ages, /hicago= 2niversity of /hicago Eress, 1??:, pp. 156<11?* Scott augh, .Tenure to /ontract= )ordship and /lientage in Thirteenth</entury England1 in English *istorical Review 151 !:51" !7ct., 1?HA", pp. H11<H,?* Berd Tellenbach, ./arolingian nobility and Berman princes1 in Ceuter !ed." The Medieval No ility* E.C. /oss, .#astard >eudalism Cevised1 in (ast and (resent !1(6" !3ov., 1?H?", pp. (@<A:* idem., .#astard >eudalism Cevisited= Ceply1 in (ast and (resent !1,1" !0ay, 1??1", pp. 1?5<(5,* &avid /rouch and &.+. /arpenter, .#astard >eudalism Cevised1 in (ast and (resent 1,1 !0ay, 1??1", pp. 1A6< 1H?* and ;ugh Thomas, :assals, *eiresses, Crusaders and Thugs, The ;entry of Angevin <or/shire,

problem of succession in a broader framework. +mong a cascade of institutional innovation that occurred around the turn of the millennium were= 1" primogeniture and (" female inheritance.
?

These two institutions were part

of a process through which a new form of political organiFation uni$ue to )atin EuropeD dynastic lordshipDcame into being.
15

Erimogeniture and female inheritance unleashed forces

that reshaped the )atin European world. The fragmentation of landholdings that had developed
!!&%$!=!#, Ehiladelphia, 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??,. ? See 9ane 0artindale, .Succession and Eolitics, c. 1555<11:51 in 0ichael 9ones and 0alcolm -ale !eds." England and her Neigh ours, !"##$!%&', )ondon= ;ambledon, 1?H?* idem., .The >rench +ristocracy in the Early 0iddle +ges= + Ceappraisal1 in (ast and (resent @6 !0ay, 1?@@", p. 6<6:* Garl Schmid, .The structure of the nobility in the earlier middle ages1 in Timothy Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility, +msterdam= 3orth<;olland, 1?@?* Garl >erdinand erner, .Important noble families in he kingdom of /harlemagneDa prosopographical study of the relationship between king and nobility in the early middle ages1 in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility* T.3. #isson, .3obility and the >amily in 0edieval >rance= + Ceview Essay1 in )rench *istorical Studies 1A !," !Spring, 1??5", pp. 6?@<A1,* idem., .The .>eudal Cevolution11 in (ast and (resent 1:( !>eb., 1??:", pp. A<:(* Timothy Ceuter and /hris ickham, .The %>eudal Cevolution'1 in (ast and (resent 166 !0ay, 1??@", pp. 1@@<(5H* /hris ickham, .Eroperty ownership and signorial power in twelfth<century Tuscany1 in endy &avis and Eaul >ouracre !eds.", (ro+erty and (ower in the Early Middle Ages, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??6* 9enny 9ochens, .The Eolitics of Ceproduction= 0edieval 3orwegian Gingship1 in American *istorical Review ?( !(" !+pr., 1?H@", pp. ,(@<,:?* +ndrew )ewis, Royal Succession in Ca+etian )rance, Studies on )amiliar -rder and the State, /ambridge, 0+= ;arvard 2E, 1?H1* idem., .+nticipatory +ssociation of the ;eir in Early /apetian >rance1 in American *istorical Review H, !:" !7ct., 1?@H", pp. ?5A<?(@* Stuart +irlie, .The +ristocracy1 in C. 0cGitterick !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory .., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??6* Cobert #artlett, The Ma/ing of Euro+e, Con0uest, Coloni1ation and Cultural Change 2&"$!'&", Erinceton= Erinceton 2E, 1??,* Eaul >ouracre, .The 7rigins of the 3obility in >rancia1 in +nne &uggan !ed." No le and No ility in Medieval Euro+e, Cochester= The #oydell Eress, (555* 9anet 3elson, .3obility in the 3inth /entury1 in &uggan !ed.", No le and No ility in Medieval Euro+e* idem., .The >rankish Gingdoms, H1:<H?H= The est1 in Cosamond 0cGitterick !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory ..* /onstance #ouchard, .The 7rigins of the >rench 3obility= + Ceassessment1 in American *istorical Review HA !," !9un., 1?H1", pp. 651<6,(* idem., .The #osonids or Cising to Eower in the )ate /arolingian +ge1 in )rench *istorical Studies 16 !," !Spring, 1?HH", pp. :5@<:,1* Garl )eyser, .The Berman +ristocracy from the 3inth to the Early Twelfth /entury. + ;istorical and /ultural Sketch1 in (ast and (resent :1 !&ec., 1?AH", pp. (6<6,* 9erome Groll and #ernard #achrach, .0edieval &ynastic &ecisions1 in 3ournal of .nterdisci+linary *istory (1 !Summer, 1??5", pp. 1<(H* Theodore Evergates, .3obles and Gnights in Twelfth</entury >rance in T.3. #isson !ed.", Cultures of (ower, 4ordshi+, Status and (rocess in Twelfth$Century Euro+e, Ehiladelphia= 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??6* 9ohn >reed, .Ceflections on the 0edieval Berman 3obility1 in American *istorical Review ?1 !," !9un., 1?HA", pp. 66,<6@6* &avid hitton, .The Society of 3orthern Europe in the ;igh 0iddle +ges1 in Beorge ;olmes !ed.", The -5ford *istory of Medieval Euro+e, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1?HH* Beorges &uby, The Chivalrous Society, #erkeley= 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, 1?@@* idem., )rance in the Middle Ages 267$!%#", 7xford= #lackwell 1??1* idem., The 8night, the 4ady and the (riest, The Ma/ing of Modern Marriage in Medieval )rance, 3ew 4ork= Eantheon 1?H,* &avid #ates, . est >rancia= the northern principalities1 in Timothy Ceuter !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory ..., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1???* and +my )ivingstone, .Gith and Gin= Ginship and >amily Structure of the 3obility of Eleventh< and Twelfth</entury #lois</hartres1 in )rench *istorical Studies (5 !," !Summer, 1??@", pp. :1?<:6H. 15 See T.3. #isson, .0edieval )ordship1 in S+eculum @5 !:" !7ct., 1??6", pp. @:,<@6?* 9.;. #urns, 4ordshi+, 8ingshi+ and Em+ire, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??(* Cees &avies, .The 0edieval State= The Tyranny of a /onceptI1 in 3ournal of *istorical Sociology 1A !(" !9une, (55,", pp. (H5<,55* Susan Ceynolds, 8ingdoms and Communities in 9estern Euro+e 2""$!'"", 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??@* idem., )iefs and :assals, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1??:* Beorges &uby, 4ove and Marriage in the Middle Ages,

by the tenth century was reversed and in short order what had been a world under siege and in contraction began a long period of expansion whose conse$uences are still being felt today. #efore getting to the institutions of dynastic succession it is important to first briefly place the problem of succession in a broader framework. The Succession + comparative perspective may help to clarify the problem of the succession. +ll monarchies !except elective kingships" must devise strategies to transmit, as peacefully and orderly as possible, the highest office of the polity. 2sually !even in elective monarchies" some form of kinship is a critical factor in deciding the succession. e often refer to closely related peoples

who successively occupy the office of king !or whatever title is used to refer to the highest office of the land" as %dynasties'. Thus, we hear of dynasties of Coman emperors, dynasties of

7ttoman emperors, dynasties of 0ughal emperors and even dynasties of merchants and industrialists in more recent times. The presumption most of the time is that a reasonably competent adult son of a reigning monarch will have at least a strong claim to succeed his father.
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/hicago= 2niversity of /hicago Eress, 1??:, pp. 156<11?* Scott augh, .Tenure to /ontract= )ordship and /lientage in Thirteenth</entury England1 in English *istorical Review 151 !:51" !7ct., 1?HA", pp. H11<H,?* Berd Tellenbach, ./arolingian nobility and Berman princes1 in Ceuter !ed." The Medieval No ility* E.C. /oss, .#astard >eudalism Cevised1 in (ast and (resent !1(6" !3ov., 1?H?", pp. (@<A:* idem., .#astard >eudalism Cevisited= Ceply1 in (ast and (resent !1,1" !0ay, 1??1", pp. 1?5<(5,* &avid /rouch and &.+. /arpenter, .#astard >eudalism Cevised1 in (ast and (resent 1,1 !0ay, 1??1", pp. 1A6< 1H?* and ;ugh Thomas, :assals, *eiresses, Crusaders and Thugs, The ;entry of Angevin <or/shire, !!&%$!=!#, Ehiladelphia, 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??,. 11 It is important to underline here that dynastic composite monarchies were uni$ue to )atin /hristendom* 7rthodox societies were not dynastically organiFed. >or example, 0uscovyJCussia was not a dynastic state in the sense that the European monarchies were. Cussia was an autocratic state created solely by military con$uestDdynastic states were primarily the product, as will be demonstrated below, of the networks of kinship ties binding the leading princely houses of Europe. %+utocratic' is used here in the strict sense of the term, i.e. the tsar's power was unconstrained by constitutions, by laws or representative institutions as was the case in all European polities including those labeled %absolutist'. So while the ruling dynasty of the Cussian state did use a form of %kinship diplomacy' !whence /atherine II", it was not a dynastic polity in the sense used here because the legal, moral and social framework that governed European dynastic succession politics did not apply in Cussia. This fact helps demonstrate the %otherness' of Cussia* while it became a regular member of the European states system over the course of the eighteenth century, it occupied a position somewhat analogous to that of the 7ttoman Empire, which of course, was also not a part of the fabric of European dynastic politicsDthe Cussian polity was therefore much more within the Eurasian norm than any of the dynastic composite polities of Europe ever were.

;owever, most societies, including those mentioned above !the Coman, 7ttoman and 0ughal empires" fail to establish clear and indisputable lines of succession. There was no law of the Coman succession* there were many attem+ts !such as under &iocletian" to create a stable system of succession, but in practice the Coman succession from the very beginning under +ugustus was determined by the army, usually through civil war. The Coman empire never became a hereditary dynastic monarchy. This is not to say that kinship played no role in determining the potential candidates* only to say that blood !or adoption as was possible in the Coman kinship system ut not the )atin European one" did not determine or create an

automatic presumption. It follows from this discussion that the Coman political system had a ma8or institutional flaw* an unstable succession system led repeatedly to civil war. 1( Similarly, while 7ttoman sultans usually transmitted their empire to one of their sons, there was no mechanism to determine which son !and given that the concept of illegitimacy had no meaning in Islamic societies this was all the more complicated by the fact that a sultan could produce doFens of sons all e$ually legitimate". mechanism of the 7ttoman succession.
1,

>ratricide, therefore, became the selection

In both of the cases alluded to here the imperial

succession owed nothing to property law* partibility, as practiced by the Bermanic kingdoms, was out of the $uestion !and, as we shall see, was a less than desirable system in any case". This discussion is meant to convey the fact the familiarity of the term %dynasty' should not distract the reader. The dynastic system of succession as it emerged in Europe has no analogy in other monarchic systems. Importantly, the dynastic system as it had emerged by 1(55, as I demonstrate below, was also fundamentally different from the prevailing practices of the early medieval period. I retain the term %dynasty' for simplicity sake, but do not wish to imply any commonality with other systems of rule. Politics and Property in Early Medieval Europe

1( 1,

See +ppendix 1 for a more detailed discussion of the Coman case. See +ppendix ( for the case of the 7ttoman Empire in more detail.

>amilies in early medieval Europe were loose kinship groupings> 1: In this social system private property mattered less than family property and political offices were not hereditary.
16

The rules

governing inheritance were fluid and to a large extent ad hoc with a loose form of partible inheritanceDthe practice by which an estate is divided among heirsDbecoming the norm by the sixth century. #ecause the governing classes of early medieval society did not discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate sons or rank their sons in order of birth, inheritance was an uncertain affair with no set rules of succession and within the extended kinship grouping all males !legitimate and illegitimate" were likely to press claims. There were two significant political conse$uences of early medieval inheritance practices. >irst, the lack of fixed and stringent rules of inheritanceJsuccession under conditions of partible inheritance created enormous uncertainty among a large number of potential claimants that made violent successional conflict almost inevitable. Since all male kin !through both the male and female lines" were potentially legitimate claimants to the succession and it was rarely the case that any given claimant was clearly dominant, coalitions played an

important role in determining outcomes. ;owever, neither the composition, ambition, nor the stability of these coalitions were certain creating a fertile ground for misperception and violence.
1A

Second, the practice of partible inheritance inexorably led to diminishing family holdings over

time. In societies in which one of the fundamental currencies of power is land, the results of partible inheritance is the dissipation of political power and a further invitation to coalition born instability. The impact of these forces are well<illustrated by the history of the 0erovingian and /arolingian families between the sixth and ninth centuries.1@
1:

hen /lovis, king of the >ranks,

>or an overview of the historiography of the European family in the middle ages see 9anet 3elson, .>amily, Bender and Sexuality in the 0iddle +ges1 in 0ichael #entley !ed." Com+anion to *istoriogra+hy, 3ew 4ork= Coutledge, 1??@. 16 See 9ean &unbabin, )rance in the ma/ing, 6%'$!!6", 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, !second edition (555", p. 151. See also )eopold Benicot, .Cecent research on the medieval nobility1 in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility, p. (@. 1A )irst Euro+ean Revolution c> 27"$!=!&, 7xford, #lackwell, (555, p. A?. 1@ This discussion is based on Eatrick Beary, ?efore )rance and ;ermany, The Creation and Transformation of the Merovingian 9orld, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1?HH* Cichard Sullivan, .The /arolingian +ge= Ceflections on Its Elace in the ;istory of the 0iddle +ges1 in S+eculum A: !(" !+pr., 1?H?", pp. (A@<

and founder of 0erovingian kingdom died in 611 he divided among his four sons the >rankish kingdom he had spent thirty brutal years uniting. #etween 611 and 66H the various heirs and descendants of /lovis maneuvered, fought and killed each other until in 66H the kingdom of the >ranks once again was reunified in the hands of a single man= /hlothar I. In 6A1 /hlothar died leaving four sons to be provided for and the kingdom of the >ranks was partitioned among them. This cycle of violence continued for :( years until A1, when the only prince of the royal house left alive reunited the >rankish kingdom yet again. #etween A1, and A,? the >rankish royal house was united in the person of /hlothar II and his only son &agobert I. 2pon &agobertKs death in A,? the 0erovingian realm was partitioned yet again, this time into two parts ruled by Sigebert III and /lovis II. #y the end of the seventh century the incessant internecine fighting had fractured the authority of the 0erovignian family beyond repair and de facto political authority devolved to the %0ayor of the Ealace' Eippin II, the great<grandfather of /harlemagne. In @61 Eippin the Breat, /harlemagneKs father, became the first /arolingian king of the >ranks. +lthough he assumed power over a united >rankish realm, the 0erovingian practice of partible inheritance was maintained.
1H

2pon his death in @AH Baul was partitioned between his

two sons, /harlemagne and /arloman, and the traditional >rankish pattern of partition and conflict began to assert itself. /arloman died in @@1 with two young sons as his heirs and a further partition of his portion of Baul was a possibility. It was only after /harlemagne

dispossessed his young nephews that he assumed control over a united >rankish realm, which he spent the rest of his long life expanding. /harlemagne is, of course, famous for having been crowned Coman emperor on /hristmas day of the year H55 by Eope )eo III.
1?

It is clear, however, that despite his %imperial'

,5A* illiam 0. &aly, ./lovis= ;ow #arbaric, ;ow EaganI1 in S+eculum A? !," !9uly, 1??:", pp. A1?<AA:* Edward 9ames, .The 3orthern orld in the &ark +ges, :55<?551 in ;olmes !ed.", The -5ford *istory of Medieval Euro+e* idem., The -rigins of )rance, )rom Clovis to the Ca+etians &""$!""" , )ondon= 0ac0illan, 1?H(* idem., The )ran/s, /ambridge, 0+= #asil #lackwell, 1?HH* and Ian ood, The Merovingian 8ingdoms %&"$7&!, )ondon= )ongman, 1??:. 1H The /arolingians, while maintaining the 0erovingian practice of partible inheritance, introduced one important innovationDthey restricted the succession!s" to legitimate sons. 9ochens, .The Eolitics of Ceproduction1, p. ,,5. 1? See ;enry 0ayr<;arting, ./harlemagne, the Saxons, and the Imperial /oronation of H551 in English *istorical Review 111 !:::" !3ov., 1??A", pp. 111,<11,,.

pretensions he never intended to deviate from what had become the long established >rankish custom of inheritance and succession. disposition of his realm= So as not to leave my sons a confused and unsettled matter of dispute and contention as regards the status of my entire kingdom, I have divided the whole body of the realm into three portions* the portion that each of them is to guard and rule, I have caused to be described and designated. I have done this so that each may strive to defend the borders of his kingdom which face foreign peoples and maintain peace and charity with his brothers. (5 ith these words /harlemagne revealed himself to be the >rankish chieftain that he was.(1 In the event, upon his death in H1: /harlemagneKs empire was transmitted intact to his son and successor )ouis the Eious, but only because his two other legitimate sons predeceased him. The twenty<eight year long reign of )ouis the Eious was dominated by various schemes for partition interspersed with revolts led by his sons and other members of the /arolingian dynasty. The tripartite division of the >rankish realm envisioned by /harlemagne in H5A was actually implemented in the next generation among the sons of )ouis the Eious. #y the Treaty of -erdun !H:," the /arolingian dynasty divided the >rankish realm into East >rancia !what would eventually become the ;oly Coman Empire", est >rancia !what would become the In H5A /harlemagne laid out his wishes for the

kingdom of >rance" and the short lived middle kingdom of )otharingia. 2nfortunately, a failure to reform the underlying social institutions that governed inheritance and success meant that the partition of H:,, like all other property division treaties that had preceded it, was only a temporary fix. ith the successional conse$uences of a ma8or land holders death still ill<

defined, internecine strife $uickly resumed. The internecine violence caused by partible inheritance !a normal part of the >rankish world" is one of the contributing factors to the crises of the ninth and tenth centuries. The more
/ited by Eierre CichL, The Carolingians, A )amily who forged Euro+e, Ehiladelphia= 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??,, p.1,6. See also 0athew Innes, ./harlemagne's ill= Eiety, Eolitics and the Imperial Succession1 in English *istorical Review 11( !::H" !Sept., 1??@", pp. H,,<H66. (1 Coger /ollins, Charlemagne, Toronto= 2niversity of Toronto Eress, 1??H and +lessandro #arbero, Charlemagne, )ather of a Continent, #erkeley= The 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, (55:.
(5

proximate cause, however, were the barbarian invasions that increased in tempo and intensity around the middle of ninth century. )atin Europe, after expanding under /harlemagne to

encompass the Bermanic tribes settled between the Chine and the Elbe, suffered devastating attacks at the hands of the -ikings from the north, the 0agyars from the east and the Saracens from the south. Coyal authority, already partitioned by the descendants of /harlemagne,

disintegrated in the face of the onslaught. This process of disintegration began at the highest levels of royal administration and slowly but surely made its way down the hierarchy. Erior to the mid<ninth century the provincial administration of the >rankish kingdom!s" had been in the hands of officials appointed by the crown. The highest of these officials bore the Coman military titles of count or duke. The crown maintained control over the realm by ensuring that loyal officials, serving at the pleasure of the court and dependent upon royal favor, occupied these offices. The 0erovingian and

/arolingian aristocracies did not, therefore, possess hereditary rights to the high offices of the realm. This began to change in the mid<ninth century as counts and dukes began to occupy their offices for life and then gained the right to transmit them to their offspring. 7ver time the same process occurred among the subordinates of the counts and dukes. #y the eleventh century this process of %feudaliFation' had reached down to the level of the castellans. The prologue to the 4i ri )eudorum, the compilation of feudal laws of the Empire !circa 11(6" nicely explains the process by which offices became hereditary property and came to transmitted to sons and daughters. In the very earliest times the benefice was so far sub8ect to the lord's authority that he might take it away at will what he had granted in fee. #ut afterwards it came about that the vassal had security of tenure for a year only= and then it was ordained that this should be extended to the length of his life. #ut still his sons had no right of succession* so the next stage was that the benefice should pass to the sons, that is to whichever of them the lord chose to grant it, which today is agreed to mean that it belongs to all of them e$ually. hen, however, MemperorN /onrad 8ourneyed to Come, the vassals in his service petitioned him to enact a law extending the succession to the sons of a son, and granting that the brother of a man who died without legitimate heirs would succeed him

in their father's beneficeOSo that in contemporary law a benefice passes to the male descendents in infinitum. (( Eolitical authority had become hereditary property and in becoming so gave rise to a new form of political organiFation best understood as dynastic lordship. Primogeniture The >rankish custom of partible inheritance acted as a catalyst to the process of %feudaliFation'. %>eudaliFation' under conditions of partible inheritance transformed the nature of successional conflict because political offices were now transmitted !and partitioned" along with real property. Eartible inheritance had created an increasingly absurd and unsustainable situation where ownership of castles, villages and fields was held in fractions. 2ltimately, the problem of how to exercise ownership of a fraction of an office !say 1J1A of a castle" had to be confronted. )atin European civiliFation was on the brink of total collapse. Erimogeniture emerged as one of several institutional mutations that provided a solution to this problem. It has been such an artifact of the ancien r@gime that its true novelty is difficult for moderns to appreciate. Erimogeniture altered inheritance practices by restricting the

paternal inheritance to the oldest surviving son to the exclusion of younger brothers who were disinherited.
(,

The ob8ective was to concentrate the familial resources in the interests of

/ited by Calph Biesey, .The 9uristic #asis of &ynastic Cight to the >rench Throne,1 Transactions of the American (hiloso+hical Society, 3ew Series 61 !6", p. H. The obvious $uestion that this process of fragmentation raises is why the ultimate authority of kings and emperors was not repudiated by those players that ac$uired the rights and privileges of the crown as propertyI Beoffrey GoFoil provides a preliminary answer. .The most elemental reason is that a duke or margrave could not repudiate the legitimacy of a king's office, a count repudiate a duke's, a castellan a count's without repudiating the very basis of his own authorityDthat was anarchy dreaded by all, for it could have no winners.1 .Eolitical /ulture1, in 0arcus #ull !ed.", )rance in the Central Middle +ges, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, (55(, p. 66. (, 2sually systems of primogeniture give primacy to the eldest son and do not disinherit the other siblings entirely. See &.+. #ullough, .Early 0edieval Social Broupings= The Terminology of Ginship1 in (ast and (resent :6 !3ov., 1?A?", pp. ,<1H* 9ack Boody, The Euro+ean )amily, 0alden, 0+= #lackwell, (555* and &avid Baunt, .Ginship= Thin Ced )ines or Thick #lue #lood1 in &avid GertFer and 0arFio #arbagli !eds.", )amily 4ife in Early Modern Times !&""$!762, 3ew ;aven= 4ale 2E, (551. In the language of historical anthropology the transformation of the European noble family was from Si++e !clan" to ;eschlecht !%dynasty' in the strict sense of the term". The first two dynasties to emerge in tenth century )atin Europe were the Saxons in East >rancia !what later became the ;oly Coman Empire" and the /apetians in est >rancia !what became the kingdom of >rance". See )ewis, Royal Succession in Ca+etian )rance, pp. 1< @@* idem., .+nticipatory +ssociation of the ;eir in Early /apetian >rance1* and Schmid, .The structure of the nobility in the earlier middle ages1 in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility.
((

maintaining and enhancing the wealth and social standing of the entire family which remained the basic unit of political life in this world. That the )atin European aristocracy was able to disinherit its younger sons in good conscience is attributable to the uni$ue structure of Coman /atholicism. The Coman /atholic /hurch had, for reasons beyond the scope of this pro8ect, evolved rules that profoundly impacted society. The emergence of dynasticism occurred within the context of a /hurch that was by far the best organiFed and wealthiest institution in society. The structure of the /hurch impacted the emergence of dynasticism in two significant ways= 1" #y the tenth century the /hurch had begun to successfully impose upon society a particular definition of marriage. This definition of marriage had three important aspects= +" marriage had to be sanctified in a /hurch ceremony conducted by a priest* #" these unions had to be monogamous* and, /" the /hurch imposed a particularly strict definition of incest by prohibiting marriage between people related within the seventh degree. These rules were enforced by imposing a high cost on deviance through the disinheritance of %illegitimate' children. 0onogamy decreased the probability of producing a male heir and the prohibition of marriage between people related within the seventh degree vastly complicated the search for suitable matesDparticularly among the highest echelons of society. In other words, the children

produced of unions unsanctioned by the /hurch, whether it be for reasons of incest, polygamy or improper ceremonial procedure, were separated into an inferior legal category consisting of people who could not inherit property rights in the same way as did those born of sanctioned unions. (:
The importance of this point can be best illustrated by the case of the 3orman ducal house. hen Cobert I, duke of 3ormandy, died in 15,6 he was succeeded by his illegitimate infant son illiam %the #astard'. Illegitimacy, therefore, was not yet an absolute bar to the succession. ;owever, a century later, when illiam the /on$ueror's youngest son, ;enry I, king of England and duke of 3ormandy, died in 11,6 without legitimate male issue, he designated his legitimate daughter 0atilda as his heiress. This was in spite of the fact that ;enry I had at least nine surviving illegitimate sons including the influential, powerful and highly regarded Cobert, earl of Bloucester. It is also worth emphasiFing that in the early twelfth century female succession had not yet been firmly established as the law of +nglo<3orman succession and it was, therefore, far from inevitable that the baronage would accept her as heiress of England and 3ormandy. ;enry I would have preferred to have left his inheritance to a son to continue his male line, but was prevented from doing so because of this change in the laws of the succession. In order to ensure that the succession went to his line, ;enry I had, therefore, to bypass his illegitimate sons
(:

(" The Coman /atholic /hurch, because of its autonomous wealth and vast patronage powers became, unlike the 7rthodox /hurch, an attractive and honorable career for the younger sons of the nobility. In fact, all noble families vigorously competed to place their cadets in higher /hurch benefices where they could utiliFe the immense prestige and wealth of the /hurch to enhance the social standing and wealth of their families. The fact that the /hurch demanded celibacy simply meant that the children produced by clerics had no legitimate claims on the wealth of the /hurch. The /hurch was, therefore, a massively endowed autonomous institution in which younger sons could participate in dynastic high politics while permitting their families to institute primogeniture. The /hurch became another venue in which noble rivalries were played out. Erimogeniture halted the fragmentation of estates and principalities by transmitting patrimonial lands to the eldest son while disinheriting younger sons who could be provided for in four ways= 1" they could be placed in the /hurch* (" they could be married off to heiresses !see below"* ," they could be provided for out of collateral inheritances* and :" they could be forced to make their own way in world by 8oining the military retinues of greater lords and hope for suitable rewards !above all fiefs of their own".
(6

This shift in successional practices came with

an additional cost= the /hurch gained control over the institution of marriage and, in doing so,

and attempt to designate his legitimate daughter as his heir even though he understood that this would likely lead to a contested succession. In the event, Stephen of #lois, count of #oulogne and 0ortain, illiam the /on$ueror's grandson through his daughter +dela, was accepted as king of England making civil war inevitable. The point is that the bar against illegitimate sons succeeding their fathers vastly complicated the probability that a father would leave his inheritance to a son. See Gathleen Thomspson, .+ffairs of State= the illegitimate children of ;enry I1 in 3ournal of Medieval *istory (? !(55,", pp. 1(?<161* 9ohn )e Eatourel, .The 3orman Succession, ??A<11,61 in English *istorical Review HA !,,?" !+pr., 1?@1", pp. ((6<(65* idem., .3ormandy and England 15AA<11::1 in 9ohn )e Eatourel, )eudal Em+ires, Norman and (lantagenet, )ondon= ;ambledon, 1?H(* Trevor Cowley, The Normans, Stroud, 2G= Tempus, (55:* &avid /rouch, The Normans, The *istory of A Dynasty, )ondon= ;ambledon, (55(* and &avid &ouglas, The Norman )ate !!""$!!&%, #erkeley= The 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, 1?@A. See also 9ane >air #estor, .#astardy and )egitimacy in the >ormation of a Cegional State in Italy= The Estense Succession1 in Com+arative Studies in Society and *istory ,H !," !9ul., 1??A", pp. 6:?<6H6. (6 Erimogeniture applied only to the patrimonial lands, that is, those lands that a lord had inherited from his parents !both the father and the mother". If a lord married an heiress and had more than one son to be provided for he could chose to leave the younger son his mother's inheritance or could transmit both to his eldest son. 3ote that it took only one inheritance for land to become patrimonial. + collateral inheritance could also be obtained if a more distant relative died without direct heirs !males or females".

made it more difficult for lords to transmit their estates to a legitimate son. (A The high fre$uency of failures of families in the male line made the $uestion of further inheritance an urgent $uestion and led to the second ma8or innovation in property rightsDfemale inheritance. (@ Female Inheritance and Dynastic Unions The Salic )aw, the sixth century legal code of the >ranks, had barred females from the inheritance. This exclusion of women did not, however, extend to their male offspring who were potentially legitimate heirs. The Salic )aw was updated on numerous occasions until the time of /harlemagne and then fell into abeyance in the ninth century.
(H

In the tenth and eleventh

centuries the laws of dynastic inheritance were refined and clarified to cover the scenario of the absence of legitimate sons. In essence, the $uestion was were daughters and their offspring to be privileged over more distant male relativesI Initially, two different answers were provided to the $uestion. In matters of %private' property !i.e. excluding land to which political power was attached" daughters came to be privileged over more distant male relatives, but in the case of fiefs daughters continued to be excluded. 7ver time, however, the customs governing the devolution %private' property came to be applied to fiefs and principalities. The ability of women to inherit and transmit %public' rights and offices in addition to strictly %private' property constituted the second key component of dynasticism.
(?

This second

aspect of dynastic inheritance practice when coupled with primogeniture led to the formation of a new kind of polity that was uni$ue to )atin Europe= dynastic unions.
(A

,5

&ynastic unions were

It is important to emphasiFe that the role assumed by the /hurch was an extraordinary development. Coman marriage practices had always been governed by secular law !there was ecclesiastical law of course"* and the rise of /hristianity did not change this. It was only in this period that the features of marriage that we take for granted came into being. The best introductions to the history of European kinship are 9ack Boody, The Euro+ean )amily, 0alden, 0+= (555 and 9ames /asey, The *istory of the )amily, 3ew 4ork= #asil #lackwell, 1?H?. (@ See below for more on this issue. 3ote that the high failure rate of families in the male line was overwhelmingly a conse$uence of /hurch policies. The aristocracies of the Islamic or of the early medieval >rankish worlds, for example, were never so constrained. They could produce %legitimate' heirs with as many women as they pleased. (H See 3ancy >ischer &rew, .+nother )ook at the 7rigins of the 0iddle +ges= + Ceassessment of the Cole of the Bermanic Gingdoms1 in S+eculum A( !:" !7ct., 1?H@", pp. H5,<H1(. (? See Beorges &uby, . omen and Eower1 in #isson !ed.", Cultures of (ower> ,5 &ynastic unions can also be usefully conceptualiFed as %feudal empires'. See the essays collected in )e Eatourel, )eudal Em+ires.

polities comprised of two or more separate political entities united in the person of a common ruler who had inherited them through legitimate succession. In other words, they were

conglomerations of territories !or empires" united as a conse$uence of the laws of succession. It is important to emphasiFe here that a dynastic union did not imply that absorption and incorporation of one polity into another. %crowns' not a union of %parliaments'. ,1 Benerally, in the absence of near male heirs, estates, principalities and kingdoms were permitted to pass through daughters. The conse$uence of female inheritance under conditions of feudal lordship was that when nobles married heiresses they .took both her and her lands. There had of course been heiresses for centuries, but up until the 1(th century daughters had been permitted to inherit %ordinary' property, but not property that was coupled with political power. >rom now on, however, as a result of a new development in inheritance custom we find daughters being allowed to succeed to principalities and kingdoms. The twelfth century is a %century of heiresses.'1 ,( >rom an institutional standpoint, female inheritance made possible the peaceful consolidation of property that formerly could only have been united through con$uest. Eredictably, actors $uickly adapted themselves to the incentive effects provided by this new transaction cost savings strategy. 0arriages now took on an entirely different significance and the ac$uisition of an heiress became as much of an imperative for ambitious dynasts as the launching of military campaigns aimed at territorial con$uest. .To an ambitious politician capturing heiresses came to be at least as important as capturing castles.1 polity was born.
,1

In other words, a dynastic union was a union of

,,

+ new type of

+ dynastic composite monarchy was a %personal union' of two or more

This distinction can be best appreciated by considering the union of England and Scotland in 1A5, when 9ames -I, king of Scotts, became 9ames I, king of England. England and Scotland from 1A5, to the +ct of 2nion in 1@5@ had the same ruler* but they were not the same polity. They only became a %united' kingdom when the Scottish Earliament was absorbed into the English Earliament. 7nce this happened the kingdoms of England and Scotland ceased to exist and a new entityDthe kingdom of Breat #ritainDcame into being. ,( 9ohn Billingham, Richard Coeur de 4ion, 8ingshi+, Chivalry and 9ar in the Twelfth Century, )ondon= ;ambledon, 1??:, p. (:H. ,, Ibid., p. 1(.

principalities in the person of a common ruler brought about by the marriage of two heirs. 2nder this political system there was, over time, a general tendency for the concentration of more and more estates, principalities and wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer families. ,: The Fragility of the Dynastic Family This tendency towards the concentration of territory into fewer and fewer hands was exacerbated by the fragility of the direct male line in dynastic families which led to dynasties arising and then dying out at a rapid pace. E. Eerroy has estimated that the noble family lasted on average three to six generations in the male line.
,6

This meant that at each succession

there was only a fifty percent chance of an adult male succession in the direct line. ,A There were many reasons for this fragility, as may well be imagined. +side from the everyday perils that afflicted the entire medieval and early modern worlds, among the aristocracy the perils of discharging the obligations of dynastic lordship took its toll. 9onathan &ewald explains= ;istorians of several countries have established the dimensions of this dying out and replacement process, and it could be astoundingly rapid. +mong the lesser nobility of fifteenth century >rance, about one<fifth of the family names disappeared with each generation* in the course of a century, most of the group had been replaced by new families. 0ore or less happened in Bermany. In lower Saxony, 8ust over half of the noble families disappeared between 1:,5 and 1665* in two regions of the Chineland, fewer than one<fifth of the fifteenth century noble families survived in 1665. In Spain, only six of the noble families prominent in 1,55 survived among the fifty<five titled nobles of 16(5. +nd the same process had been seen in England. 7f 1,A peerage families in 1,55, fewer than half survived in the male line by 1:55, and only sixteen survived in 1655. ,@ This fragility can be best illustrated through the example of early modern >rance. #etween 1:H, and the end of the monarchy there was only one instance of an adult son succeeding his
0ay 0cGisack, The )ourteenth Century !'"7$!'22, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2E, 1?6?, p. (A5. .Social 0obility among the >rench noblesse in the later middle ages1 in (ast and (resent (1 !+ug., 1?A(", pp. (6<,H, p. ,1. /ompare this to the rate of senatorial family failure in the Coman world. See >rank Billiard, .The Senators of Sixth</entury Baul1 in S+eculum 6: !:" !7ct., 1?@?", pp. AH6<A?@, p. A?6. ,A ;.B. Goenigsberger, (oliticians and :irtuosi, Essays in Early Modern *istory, )ondon= ;ambledon, 1?H:, p. 1?. ,@ The Euro+ean No ility !%""$!6"", 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??A, p. 1@. See also Sigismund Eeller, .#irths and &eaths among Europe's Culing >amilies Since 16551 in &.-. Blass and &.E./. Eversley !eds.", (o+ulation in *istory, Essays in *istorical Demogra+hy, )ondon= Edward +rnold, 1?A6* and Benicot, .Cecent research on the medieval nobility1 in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility, pp. 1H<(5.
,: ,6

+s

father !in 16:@ when ;enry II succeeded his father >rancis I". +part from this case there were six minorities !/harles -III, >rancis II, /harles IP, )ouis PIII, )ouis PI- and )ouis P-", three adult collateral successions !)ouis PII, >rancis I and ;enry I-" and two successions of younger brothers !/harles IP who was a minor upon succeeding the short lived >rancis II and ;enry III who succeeded /harles IP".
,H

The fragility of the dynastic family can be further illustrated by

the fate of the last -alois kings of >rance. ;enry II, king of >rance !16:@<166?", and /atherine de 0edici had four sons and two daughters who survived into adulthood. ;enry II was killed in a 8ousting accident in 166? and was succeeded in turn by his sons >rancis II !166?<16A5", /harles IP !16A5<16@:" and ;enry III !16@:<16H?".
,?

2pon ;enry III's accession, his successor

was his younger brother >rancis, duke of +lenQon and +n8ou, and when he suddenly died in 16H:, the end of -alois dynasty became a foregone conclusion. So whereas in 166? ;enry II had died leaving the -alois dynasty with excellent chances for survival !four sons should have been more than ade$uate to keep the dynasty well stocked with heirs", within exactly thirty years of his death the -alois had failed. :5 First Order Implications of Dynasticism: Territorial onsolidation The collective impact of the replacement of partible inheritance by primogeniture, the innovation of female inheritance, and the fragility of families brought about by the vagaries of medieval life
The application of strict male primogeniture !Salic )aw" meant that even very distant relatives in the male line were privileged over women and men more closely related in the female line. The conse$uence of this was seen in 16H? when ;enry I- succeeded ;enry III. ;enry I- was separated from his predecessor by twenty<two degrees. Salic )aw, therefore, ensured that the kingdom of >rance would always be inherited by >rench princes* but it also meant that the >rench royal family ran the risk that when there was not a male heir, the crown would fall to a relatively distant claimant, thereby harming the political interests of those near to the deceased monarch. ,? 3ote that >rancis II was married to 0ary, $ueen of Scots, and was, therefore, king of Scotland in right of his wife. ;is early death in 16A5 ended this dynastic union between the two kingdoms. :5 It is worth emphasiFing here how conse$uential the death of a single individual could be in this political systemDat the international and domestic levels. ;enry II's youngest son, >rancis, duke of +lenQon and +n8ou, was, in 16H:, not only heir to the king of >rance, but was also engaged to EliFabeth I, $ueen of England, and therefore a potential king<consort of England not to mention %prince and lord' of the &utch provinces then in revolt against Ehilip II, king of Spain. ;ad EliFabeth I and the duke of +n8ou produced a male heir !since >rench succession law barred females from the inheritance", he would have united the kingdoms of >rance and England in a dynastic union and possibly those parts of the )ow /ountries that became the &utch Cepublic. Such intriguing possibilities were constantly raised and dashed in a world of dynastic composite units. 7n the marriage negotiations between EliFabeth I and the duke of +n8ou and its implications see 3atalie 0ears, .)ove<making and &iplomacy= EliFabeth I and the +n8ou 0arriage 3egotiations, c.16@H<16H(1 in *istory HA !(H:" !>all, (551", pp. ::(<:AA.
,H

had a dramatic consolidating effect.

Table (.1 shows the decline in the number of ruling

dynasties that took place in )atin Europe over the ,15 year period from 1,55<1A15. Table (.1= The 3umber of Culing &ynasties in )atin Europe, 1,55<1A15 :1 1,55 1,65 1:55 1:65 1655 1A15 of 1( ? ? H H 6

4ear 3umber &ynasties

The number of dynasties ruling the sixteen kingdoms of )atin Europe shrank from twelve in 1,55 to five in 1A15. The trend is clearly towards increasing concentration of territory in fewer and fewer hands. E$ually important is the fact that this trend was not a conse$uence of

con$uest. The kingdoms of /astile and +ragon were united as a conse$uence of the marriage of >erdinand of +ragon and Isabella of /astile* the kingdoms of England and Scotland were united as a conse$uence of 9ames Stewart, king of Scotland, succeeding EliFabeth Tudor as her legitimate heir* the %empire' of /harles - was a conse$uence of his being legitimate heir to the house of /astile<+ragon !itself a dynastic union" and the house of #urgundy<+ustria !also a dynastic union"* and so on and so forth.
:(

The institution of dynastic succession, driven by the

contingency of birth, marriage and death in the leading princely families of Europe, determined the distribution of power in Europe. :, The Second Order Effects of Dynasticism The dramatic territorial consolidation outlined above is the most visible and gripping of the effects of dynasticism on political outcomes. ;owever, the fact that vast wealth and power could be ac$uired through marriage had other effects on the incentive structures of the actors. Indeed, we can go further and say that the fact that marriage was the most effective and
Taken from + olf, .The >amily of &ynasties in 0edieval Europe= &ynasties, Gingdoms and TochterstAmme1 in Studies in Medieval and Renaissance *istory 1( !1??1", pp. 1H,<(6?, p. 1?(. :( See below for more on this. :, 2nlike polities ac$uired by right of con$uest, the polities of each of the dynastic union recogniFed the prince as their own legitimate ruler by hereditary right. 2pon accession the prince would swear to uphold the rights of his sub8ects and abide by the fundamental laws of the land and it is this contractual aspect of authority that underlay dynastic unions. +s 9ohn Elliot notes, .The greatest advantage of ae0ue +rinci+aliter was that by ensuring the survival of their customary laws and institutions it made it more palatable to the inhabitants the kind of transfer of territory that was inherent in the international dynastic game.1 .+ Europe of /omposite 0onarchies1, in (ast and (resent, 1,@ !3ov., 1??(", pp. :H<@1, p. 6,.
:1

efficient way to ac$uire political power altered the nature and purpose of conflict and cooperation in this society. &ynastic actors when interacting with other dynastic actors had political tools at their disposal not available to their predecessors in early medieval Europe or to their descendants after the >rench Cevolution. These second order effects are= 1" Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries was a violent and turbulent place. &ynasticism did much to channel this energy outwards by forcing younger sons to seek their fortunes as soldiers.
::

Coman /atholic Europe had reached the nadir of its fortunes around the year ?66

when the 0agyars were defeated at the )echfeld. >ifty years later )atins were on the offensive across the board. The greatest strides of the recon0uista took place in the eleventh and twelfth centuries* the 3ormans, through con$uest, brought England and Sicily into the )atin European mainstream. Shortly afterwards Scotland followed by emulation and was reorganiFed along %feudal' lines. The most spectacular phase of expansion began in 15?A with the launching of the >irst /rusade* less well known, but more enduring, was the great )atin offensive into the lands east of the Elbe called the drang nach osten that would lead to the establishment of )atin societies among the western Slavs and all along the #altic. In all of these cases the social organiFation of societies was changed, sometimes by force, but mostly through emulation and immigration, to make them resemble the world of dynastic lordship. (" The nature of conflict and cooperation between actors within the family of dynastic )atin Europe differed fundamentally from the nature of conflict and cooperation between the actors of )atin Europe and those of the Islamic and 7rthodox /hristian worlds. In the later case conflicts could not be resolved with marriage nor could marriages be used to seal instruments of cooperation !alliances". It was, therefore, not possible for marriage to be used as an instrument for territorial expansion for non<)atin Europeans. The institutions of dynastic lordship could not be used to further cooperation between societies that did not share underlying forms of social organiFation. This implies that what the actors sought !i.e. the goals", how they sought them
See especially Cobert #artlett, The Ma/ing of Euro+e, Con0uest, Coloni1ation and Cultural Change 2&"$!'&", Erinceton= Erinceton 2E, 1??,.
::

!i.e. the tools" and the types and range of outcomes in this society cannot be understood without reference to the underlying incentive structures of the actors. :6 ," hile presumably contingency is a universal feature of human affairs, the institutional

structure of societies determine in what ways contingency will o+erate. Eolitical institutions channel the pursuit of interests in particular ways and make specific variables sub8ect to the forces of contingency in specific ways. The cycle of birth, death and marriage in the dynastic world had immense conse$uences for the stability of polities, the shape of alliances, the concentration of power and the timing of events like wars. In other words, while contingency acts upon both all polities it does not do so in consistent ways. The ways in which contingency can impact the course of events is a function of political organiFation.
:A

Eolities headed by

regencies were vulnerable to external intervention. Similarly, the imminent failure of a dynasty created uncertainty and therefore weakness. The birth of an heir to a ruler always strengthened the hands of the ruler in relationship to his sub8ects, his allies and his enemies. +ll of these scenarios were a normal part of the political landscape of )atin polities because of the underlying social institutions that structured political life in this society. /ontingency, therefore, cannot be properly understood outside of this larger context. International !elations in a "orld of Dynastic omposite Monarchies: +n important implication of dynasticism is that maps that delineate early modern dynastic composite monarchies as blocs are very misleading if they imply that these polities are like modern nation<states in which the authority of the central government is uniform over a territorially defined space. These dynastic composite polities !or %multiple monarchies' as they are sometimes known" were, instead, a personal union of autonomous parts which had their own interests that may or may not have coincided with the interests of the other components of
These issues are dealt with extensively in chapter : of Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions on /onflict and /ooperation in Early 0odern Europe1. :A + comparison may be helpful here. hile it is undoubtedly the case that the death in office of a leader a modern democratic state would have political implications, it is the political structure of the polity in $uestion that determines what precisely those implications are likely to be. The death in office of an +merican president, $uite obviously, could not lead to a minority, a regency or a dynastic union. Such occurrences were routine under the prevailing institutional structure of premodern Europe.
:6

the dynastic union or with those of the ruler. +s a conse$uence of its political structure these dynastic composite monarchies had different inherent strengths and weaknesses when compared to other kinds of polities. These polities used different kinds of tools in the pursuit of different kinds of goals with different kinds of results* and this has ma8or implications for how we conceive of international politics. ;.B. Goenigsberger writes= 0ost ma8or monarchies of early modern Europe were composite states whose parts had different social structures, different laws and institutions and sometimes, different religions. Ruite often they were not even contiguous but were separated by other countries or by a stretch of sea, and yet the more distant parts were not colonies in the sense which the Spanish or English settlements were colonies. In Europe this composite structure of states meant that not only was tension between center and periphery an inbuilt pattern of early modern states but that, in the case of actual conflict, the resources which the contestants could command depended on countries, or parts of countries, which were not involved in the causes of the conflict, or only remotely so. :@ hat is important to underline here is that it is erroneous to assume that these unions constituted single political entities, let alone a stable foundation for the long term establishment of larger territorial entities. hat it is in fact going on in these kinds of political associations is

the union of disparate offices within the person of a common ruler. There is, in other words, no a +riori reason why some dynastic unions led to permanent polities and others did not. :H
(oliticians and :irtuosi, Essays in Early Modern Euro+ean *istory, )ondon= The ;ambledon Eress, 1?HA, p. P. :H 9ohn Elliot explains that there were two kinds of dynastic unions= !1" %accessory' unions in which the a newly ac$uired polity is 8uridically incorporated into an existing polity !as was the case with the Indies, which was part of the kingdom of /astile or ales which became part of the kingdom of England through the +cts of 2nion of 16,A and 16:," and !(" the more typical ae0ue +rinci+aliter in which the distinctiveness of each component part was maintained. 7ver time those dynastic unions which became permanent !the kingdoms of England and Scotland for example" converted the second type of dynastic union into the rarer first type. The vast ma8ority of dynastic composite polities in early modern Europe were ae0ue +rinci+aliter, in which each part maintained its own institutions of social and political life. .+ Europe of /omposite 0onarchies1, pp. 6(<6,. The second type of dynastic union ! ae0ue +rinci+aliter" could be of two varieties= 1" those between two or more hereditary principalities and (" those involving one or more elective monarchies. >or example, the kingdom of ;ungary was an elective monarchy until 1AH@. #etween 16(A and 1AH@ it had a dynastic union under the house of +ustria with the kingdom of #ohemia !an elective monarchy until 1A(5" and the hereditary patrimonial lands of the ;absburgs. Similarly, the elective kingdom of Eoland<)ithuania had a dynastic union with the electorate of Saxony between 1A?@<1@A,. Eerhaps the most interesting %hybrid' dynastic union was between 1AHH and 1@5, between the 2nited Erovinces and the hereditary kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland. illiam III, prince of 7range, was Stadholder !chief executive" of the 2nited Erovinces who then became king of England etc. in 1AHH by overthrowing his uncle and father<in<law 9ames II in the %Blorious Cevolution'. See also /onrad Cussell, ./omposite monarchies in early modern Europe= The #ritish and Irish example1 in +lexander Brant and Geith Stringer !eds.", Bniting the 8ingdomC The ma/ing of ?ritish *istory, 3ew 4ork= Coutledge, 1??6.
:@

hat generally explains the difference between those dynastic unions that eventually turned out to be permanent !for example +ragon and /astile" and those that were temporary alignments are three factors= 1" the continuity of the line of the succession !this was also dependent on whether the laws of succession barred females from the inheritance"* (" factor 1 is dependent on the degree to which the laws of the succession of the various component parts are uniform*
:?

and ," the nature of the offices themselves, i.e. whether or not one of the crowns

was an elective monarchy like the kingdom of Eoland, which during much of the eighteenth century had a dynastic union with the electorate of Saxony. 65

Take the example of the /apetian inheritance in the early fourteenth century. Ehilip I-, king of >rance !1(H6<1,1:" had married 9eanne I, heiress of 3avarre, thereby creating a dynastic union between the kingdoms of >rance and 3avarre. 2pon his death in 1,1: Ehilip I- was succeeded by his eldest son )ouis P, king of >rance and 3avarre !1,1:<1A". )ouis P died after a short reign leaving a daughter 9eanne !and a posthumous son 9ohn I who died shortly after childbirth". )ouis P was succeeded in turn by his two younger brothers Ehilip -, king of >rance and 3avarre !1,1A<((", and then /harles I-, king of >rance and 3avarre !1,((<(H", both of whom also died without leaving surviving male heirs. ith the death of all the sons and direct male descendants of 9eanne I, heiress of 3avarre, the kingdom of 3avarre was transmitted to her eldest granddaughter !the daughter of )ouis P" 9eanne II, heiress of 3avarre, who brought the kingdom of 3avarre to the family of her husband Ehilip, count of Evreux. The kingdom of >rance, on the other hand, was transmitted to the closest male relative in the male line, Ehilip of -alois, who now became king of >rance but not of 3avarre. It was the contingency of the failure of three of Ehilip I-'s sons to produce legitimate surviving male heirs that led to the rupture of the dynastic union between >rance and 3avarre. #etween 1,(H and 16H?, the kingdoms of >rance and 3avarre were ruled by different branches of the royal family. In the sixteenth century 3avarre came through marriage into the possession of the house of #ourbon !a cadet branch of the royal family". hen the -alois line failed in 16H? the closest male relative in the male line happened to ;enry of #ourbon, king of 3avarre, who upon accession restored the dynastic union of the kingdoms of >rance and 3avarre after a separation of (A1 years. 65 See chapter , of Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions1 for more on how dynastic politics functioned in elective monarchies. Elective monarchies used the office of king to establish alliances with foreign powers. Eoland had a very long tradition of establishing this kind of relationship !in the early modern period reaching back to the election of ;enry of -alois, duke of +n8ou, the future ;enry III, king of >rance, in 16@,", as did the kingdoms of #ohemia and ;ungary !#ohemia became hereditary in the ;absburg line in 1A(@ and ;ungary, albeit with less drastic conse$uences, in 1AH@ as a conse$uence of the 7ttoman ars". The election of >erdinand, king of the Comans, and younger brother of the emperor /harles -, as king of ;ungary and of #ohemia, in the aftermath of the catastrophic battle of 0ohacs in 16(A, is a prime example of elective monarchies using dynastic unions as a deeper form of cooperation. The #ohemians and the ;ungarians, by electing the ;absburg archduke as king were gaining the alliance of the most powerful princely house in Europe against a mortal threat !the 7ttoman Turks". Similarly, between 1A?@ and 1@A,, the electors of Saxony were elected kings of Eoland, in some sense as an alliance against Erussia and Sweden* Eoland remained an elective monarchy until the very end when in a desperate set of reforms implemented to stave off extinction, the Eoles made the crown hereditary in the Saxon line in 1@?1Dthe ultimate acknowledgment that hereditary monarchy, by the eighteenth was the only stable form of the institution, because elections always gave ample opportunity to foreign princes to meddle in the affairs of the kingdom. Thus, by the eighteenth century, this venerable form of alliance became increasingly anachronistic and even dangerous.
:?

>urthermore, the authority wielded by the common ruler was extremely varied across these component parts. >or example, the emperor /harles -, was obeyed in /astile as /harles I, king of /astile* in +ragon as /harles I, king of +ragon* in ;olland he was obeyed in his dual capacity as hereditary count of ;olland and as feudal overlord in his capacity as emperor !this was also the case in all of the ;absburg patrimonial lands including the archduchies of +ustria proper"* and, he was obeyed in the Empire as liege overlord of all imperial fiefs. hat all of this

amounted to was a plethora of dyadic idiosyncratic relationships, the substance of which varied enormously between, say, /astile where the crown exercised relatively strong authority and the electorate of Saxony where the authority of the emperor consisted of bundles of rights and obligations which were constantly sub8ect to negotiation and fluctuating interests !especially after the Erotestant Ceformation". There was nothing at all unusual about this state of affairs. The +ngevin %empire', formed in 116( from the union of the houses of England<3ormandy, Eoitou<+n8ou and +$uitaine in the person of ;enry II, king of England, and his wife Eleanor, heiress of +$uitaine, is an earlier example of exactly the same phenomenon. +s Calph Turner writes= .The +ngevin king's power ranged from .the intensive and authoritative1 in England and the 3orman duchy to .diffused and occasional1 in the domains ac$uired through ;enry II's marriage to Eleanor of +$uitaine.1
61

It was somewhere in between these two extremes in the

central core of the %empire', the counties of +n8ou, )a 0arche, Eoitou, Touraine and 0aine. This has implications, then, for how we conceive of these entities. hen scholars are

referring to the %Spanish Empire' what they really are describing is nothing along the lines of a traditional %empire' like Come or the 7ttoman Empire. Indeed, early moderns themselves would not have referred to this entity as the %Spanish Empire', but would have referred to it as the Spanish monarchia. In calling it the Spanish monarchy, it was understood that Spain did not %own' Sicily or 3aples or 0ilan* it so happened that the king of Spain was also king of Sicily and 3aples and duke of 0ilan and for convenience called by his senior title. &ynastic unions were,
.The Eroblem of Survival for the +ngevin .Empire1= ;enry II's and ;is Sons' -ision versus )ate Twelfth< /entury Cealities1 in The American *istorical Review, 155 !>eb., 1??6", pp. @H<?A, p. @?.
61

therefore, deeper forms of cooperation that enabled certain kinds of sustained collective action otherwise not easily attainable through normal contractual forms which were sub8ect to a range of disputes not applicable in dynastic unions. These polities cannot be assumed to be the functional e$uivalent, in terms of behavior, of all other polities. +s this discussion hints at, dynastic composite monarchies were fragile and often temporary personal unions that did not have any implications of uniformity. This meant that it was by no means obvious that war involving one part of this union applied to any other part. &uring certain phases of the Italian ars, the #urgundian inheritance under its regent 0argaret

of +ustria maintained neutrality while other components of the ;absburg monarchy were fighting the >rench for control of Italy. Benerally, the various constituent components of these monarchies were loathe to have their blood and treasure expended on conflicts which they felt had nothing to do with them. In other words, they experienced moral haFard problems and sought institutional solutions to them.
6(

The king of %Spain', then, could not count on the

automatic support of +ragon, >landers, 0ilan or Sicily in his wars with the king of >ranceDand any attempt to force them into support for %foreign' wars was dangerous in the extreme.
6,

The

>rench could, therefore, be at war with the king of +ragon without being at war with +ragonD and this distinction mattered. In sixteenth century #arcelona, what the kingdom of +ragon had to do with >landers was far from obvious to the fiercely independent estates which managed to spare the people of +ragon the misery of supporting their king's foreign wars. Minorities# $%senteeism and !egencies hile one of the strengths of this form of political organiFation was its ability to consolidate power and authority through dynastic succession and thereby to enable the succession to become an instrument of power politics, this form of dynastic succession gave rise to two phenomena that had implications for how these political forms behaved= 1" minorities and ("
See chapter , of Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions1 for more on this. Erobably the best way to appreciate 8ust how tentative these relations were between the various component parts of dynastic unions is through the medium of biography. +n excellent example of such work is 9ohn Elliot, The Count$Du/e of -livares, The Statesman in an Age of Decline . 3ew ;aven, /T= 4ale 2E, 1?HA.
6( 6,

absenteeism. #oth of these situations led to the pervasive use of regents to govern in the name of a ruler who was either a child or physically absent !or mentally incapacitated as occasionally was the case".
6:

7ne of the perennial problems of European hereditary dynastic succession was the occurrence of minoritiesDa time period of potential instability. 2nder conditions of a regency, government was conducted by proxies who were unlikely to be fully accountable for their actions until the monarch came of age and was able to rule as well as reign in their own right. Cegencies were times of intense political competition between the highest echelons of society and it was an axiom of the early modern world that it was impossible to pursue an active foreign policy under conditions of a minority. 0inorities were sub8ect to greater incidents of revolt, dissent and opposition to the crown than was the case during ma8oritiesDa time period when those in control of the regency were able to use their temporary custody of the crown's power to rewire the system to suit themselves and settle personal scores with enemies. This kind of polity was, therefore, wea/er during a minority than during a ma8orityDa problem, of course, that does not occur in modern nation<states, or, it could be added, in ancient Come. #ut note that the fact that minors succeeded to thrones and offices as a matter of course with generally little threat of displacement through coups shows 8ust how stable this system was. hile disputes over the distribution of the bounties of royal patronage were more likely under conditions of minorities and regencies, it was extremely rare for the contestants to attempt to seiFe the throne and reign in their own right. &uring )ouis PI-'s minority, for example, the regency exercised by Cichelieu's successor, /ardinal 0aFarin, was challenged in 1A:H by a series of risings collectively called the %>rondes'. These were, as always in medieval and early modern minorities, revolts led by princes of the blood who were seeking to remove, in the

hile absenteeism was a problem for a society in which the physical presence of the prince was of enormous importance for the proper functioning of the polity, an adult prince was, however imperfectly, at least able to issue commands and when necessary come in person to have affairs settled to their liking. 0inorities were, therefore, far more serious than absenteeism.
6:

%greater interests of the king and kingdom' of course, the perceived sinister and harmful influence of ministers then in control of the regency. 66 In this sense, early modern polities were fragile, and dependent upon legitimacy and consent* and legitimacy and consent were simultaneously the source of the greatest strengths and weaknesses of these polities.
6A

So while consent and legitimacy set strict limits on the

freedom of maneuver that the crown possessed, it was this precise variable that enabled dynastic composite monarchies to exist and function during times of regency or minority. This means that the crown's greatest source of strength and its greatest potential weakness was the attitude of the nobility. ;.0. Scott and /hristopher Storr note that .the military and

administrative changes at this time did not destroy the nobility's political role= on the contrary, in important respects it consolidated and even extended this MroleN.1
6@

This fact of noble power

and noble<crown cooperation leads 9ohn Elliot to conclude .The greatest advantage of ae0ue +rinci+aliter Mdynastic unionN was that by ensuring the survival of their customary laws and institutions it made it more palatable to the inhabitants the kind of transfer of territory that was inherent in the international dynastic game.1
6H

;e goes on to write= ./omposite monarchies

were built on a mutual compact between the crown and the ruling class of their different provinces which gave even the most arbitrary and artificial of unions a certain stability and resilience. If the monarch could then go on from here to foster, especially among the higher nobility of his different kingdoms, a sense of personal loyalty to the dynasty transcending
+s this date suggests, >rance was engulfed by revolt led by princes of the blood at a moment when the monarchy was fighting the Thirty 4ears' ar under a regency and desperately seeking a strong bargaining position in the then ongoing talks at estphalia. 3ote that in this case, as in most others, the princes were not seeking to overthrow )ouis PI-* only to replace his advisors until )ouis reached his ma8ority. + good short summary on the >rondes in available in &avid Sturdy, 4ouis D.:, 3ew 4ork= St, 0artin's Eress, 1??H, pp. ((<,:. 6A &onna #ohanan writes= .It is widely understood now that sixteenth century kings governed through patronage by making the great nobles provincial governors. Brandees who served in this capacity then brokered the king's patronage to their clientele who assisted them in governing the region. The problem with this use of clientage was that it enabled great nobles to build huge power bases in the provinces which they would later put to use in civil war.1 Crown and No ility in Early Modern )rance, 3ew 4ork= Ealgrave, (551, p. 6@. 6@ .The /onsolidation of 3oble Eower in Europe1 in ;.0. Scott, !ed." The Euro+ean No ilities in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century, vol. 1, 3ew 4ork= )ongman, 1??6, p. H. 6H .+ Europe of /omposite 0onarchies1, p. 6,.
66

provincial boundaries, the chances of stability were still further improved.1

6?

The potential long<

term benefits resulting from this institution can be best seen in the profound stability in the succession to the kingdom of >rance. In spite of all the turbulence in >rench history, its crown passed in the direct male line in an unbroken chain of successions lasting from ;ugh /apet's coronation in ?H@ to the accession of )ouis P-I in 1@@:Da not negligible span of time for any institution and is a testament to the endurance and durability of dynastic political organiFation. $n E&ample: The 'Empire( of harles )

/harles, the fifth of that name, Coman emperor, sem+er augustus* elected king of Bermany and Italy* by the grace of Bod, king of /astile, +ragon, Sicily, 9erusalem, the #alearic Islands, the /anary Islands, the Indies and the mainland on the far side of the +tlantic* archduke of +ustria* duke of #urgundy, 0ilan, #rabant, Styria, /arinthia, /arniola, )uxemburg, )imburg, +thens and Eatras* count of ;absburg, >landers, ;olland, Seeland and the Tyrol* count palatine of #urgundy, ;ainault, Efirt, Coussillon* landgrave of +lsace* count of SwabiaOetc. A5 So reads the principal titles of the emperor /harles -. These few lines summariFe the profound conse$uences of dynastic political organiFation. The emperor /harles - ruled over a collection of European territories that was vaster than that of any other ruler between the years :55 and
Ibid., p. 6@. +dapted from ilfried Seipel !ed." 8aiser 8arl : E!&""$!&&6F, Macht und -hnmacht Euro+as, -ienna= G;0 ien, (555= p. xi. 0y translation. It is important to note that /harles - was %the emperor' by virtue of his election as king of Bermany. In European history prior to the age of 3apoleon there was properly speaking only one empireDthe ;oly Coman EmpireDwhich was the successor to the Coman Empire. It is customary to refer to this entity as %the Empire'. There were, however, in )atin Europe in the dynastic period other %empires' in an informal sense* that is, collections of diverse territories and peoples that recogniFed the authority of a single ruler. These can be understood to be %dynastic' or %feudal' %empires as distinct from other historical entities !like the 7ttoman, 0ughal and Coman empires" which had been created by con$uest. In the language of the day these %dynastic' empires !or as Elliot calls them %dynastic composite monarchies'" were called %monarchies' not %empires' because Europeans only recogniFed one empire. hat moderns sometimes call the %Spanish empire', for example, was referred to by contemporaries as the %Spanish monarchy' !monarchia". The authority exercised by /harles - in /astile was that of a hereditary king of /astile !he was /harles I, king of /astile" and was in no way related to his imperial title. It is important to emphasiFe that the %empire' of /harles - was of the same species as those %feudal empires' of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. )ike its predecessors of the middle ages, the empire of /harles - was comprised of components that were themselves %feudal empires'. /harles -'s %dynastic empire' was simply a larger and grander version of the +ngevin %empire' that came together between 1165 and 116: when ;enry Elantagenet inherited the kingdom of England and the duchy of 3ormandy from his mother, the counties of +n8ou, 0aine and Touraine from his father and married Eleanor, heiress of +$uitaine and Eoitou. This was an entity that stretched from the Scottish lowlands to the Eyrenees. See .). arren, *enry .., #erkeley= The 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, 1?@,* /. arren ;ollister and Thomas Geefe, .The 0aking of the +ngevin Empire1 in The 3ournal of ?ritish Studies, 1( !0ay, 1?@,", pp. 1<(6* 9ohn )e Eatourel, .The Elantagenet &ominions1 in )e Eatourel, )eudal Em+ires* idem., .+ngevin Successions and the +ngevin Empire1 in )e Eatourel, )eudal Em+ires* and 9ohn Billingham, The Angevin Em+ire, )ondon= +rnold, (551.
6? A5

1H55. In 16,5 his (H million sub8ects comprised :5T of the )atin European population.

A1

This

extraordinary collection of territories, rights, and 8urisdictions is simply the grandest conse$uence of a system of politics that operated at all levels of European society. The story of the creation of /harles -'s inheritance is, therefore, illustrative of the general processes unleashed by dynastic political organiFation. The core of /harles -'s inheritance was the #urgundian inheritance. The house of #urgundy was one of the greatest princely dynasties of late medieval Europe.
A(

#etween 1,A?

and 1:@@ the dukes of #urgundy, mostly through inheritance, ac$uired a vast collection of territories, titles and rights that collectively placed them in the first tier of princely rulers. They were exemplary only in the extent of their success, not in the methods they used. The -alois house of #urgundy was founded in 1,A, when Ehilip the #old was granted in appanage the recently escheated duchy of #urgundy by his father 9ohn II, king of >rance !reigned 1,65<1,A:".
A,

In granting ducal #urgundy to his fourth and youngest surviving

legitimate son, 9ohn II was following longstanding /apetian precedence. Ehilip's good fortune
im #lockmans, Em+eror Charles : !&""$!&&6, 3ew 4ork= +rnold, (55(, pp. ,6<,A. In the same period the king of >rance had 1? million and the 7ttoman Sultan had 1, million sub8ects. A( 7n #urgundy see ;.B. Goenigsberger, Monarchies, States ;enerals and (arliaments, The Netherlands in the )ifteenth and Si5teenth Centuries, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, (551* +ndrew #rown, The :alois Du/es of ?urgundy, 7xford= &avenant Eress, (551* im #lockmans and alter Erevenier, The ?urgundian Netherlands, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1?HA* idem., The 4ow Countries under ?urgundian Rule, !'#2$!&'", Ehiladelphia= The 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1???* alter Erevenier, .The )ow /ountries1 in 0ichael 9ones !ed." The New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, (555* 9ohn )e Eatourel, .Gings and Erinces in 1: th</entury >rance1 in )e Eatourel, )eudal Em+ires* #ertrand Schnerb, .#urgundy1 in /hristopher +llmand !ed." The New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :.., 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??H* 9oseph /almette, The ;olden Age of ?urgundy, The Magnificent Du/es and their Courts, )ondon= Ehoenix Eress, 1?A(* Cichard -aughan, The Du/es of ?urgundy, : vols., oodbridge= The #oydell Eress, 1?A(<1?@5. A, +ppanages were fiefs of the crown granted to male cadets of the royal family. They were transmitted by the same rules governing the >rench royal succession with the proviso that if the cadet branch failed in the male line or if the cadet branch succeeded to the throne, the appanage reverted to the crown, which could then either grant the appanage to another prince of the blood and his male line, or incorporate the fief into the royal domain proper. The creation of appanages was a part of a dynastic strategy that put a premium on the production of heirsDenabling younger sons to marry and produce heirs increased the chances that the dynasty would survive even if only in a cadet line. 7n the political conse$uences of appanages see +. . )ewis, .The /apetian appanages and the nature of the >rench kingdom1 in 3ournal of Medieval *istory ( !1?@A", pp. 11?<1,:* idem., Royal Succession in Ca+etian )rance* 9ean &unbabin, Charles . of AnGou, (ower, 8ingshi+ and State$Ma/ing in Thirteenth$Century Euro+e, )ondon= )ongman, 1??H* /harles ood, The )rench A+anages and the Ca+etian Monarchy !==%$!'=6, /ambridge= ;arvard 2E, 1?AA* and Cichard 9ackson, .Eeers of >rance and Erinces of the #lood,1 )rench *istorical Studies @ !Spring, 1?@1", pp. (@<:A.
A1

continued six years later when, in an alliance between the >rench royal house and )ouis of 0Ule, count of >landers, Ehilip the #old, duke of #urgundy, married 0argaret of 0Ule, heiress of >landers, +rtois, the >ranche</omtL !the imperial palatine county of #urgundy", 3evers, etc. making Ehilip, upon his father<in<law's death, one of the greatest princes of his time.
A:

It is

important to underline here that Ehilip did not con$uer this collection of strategic and wealthy principalitiesDhe ac$uired them by lawful inheritance through marriage. Ehilip the #old and 0argaret of 0Ule had three sons= 9ohn the >earless, +nthony and Ehilip. 2pon Ehilip's death in 1:5: his principal heir, 9ohn the >earless, received the patrimony !i.e. the duchy of #urgundy and the county of /harolais" plus a substantial portion of his mother's inheritance !the counties of >landers, +rtois and the >ranche</omtL". Their second son +nthony, was provided for by marriage to an heiress, 9ohanna of )uxemburg, and through a collateral inheritance from his maternal grandaunt 9ohanna, duchess of #rabant and )imburg !who died without issue in 1:5A". The youngest son Ehilip was provided for out of his mother's inheritance !the counties of 3evers and Cethel". A6
0argaret of 0Ule had been married to Ehilip of Couvres, duke of #urgundy, !stepson of 9ohn II, king of >rance" the last of a line of /apetian dukes that had originated in 15,(. ith his death without issue in 1,A1 his appanage escheated to the >rench crown and his twelve year old widow released back onto the marriage market. Biven that these events were coterminous with the ;undred 4ears ar !1,,@<1:6," the inheritance of 0argaret of 0Ule was of vital strategic importance to the royal houses of >rance and England. #oth Edward III, king of England, and /harles -, king of >rance, vigorously competed for her hand. Initially Edward III, who was bidding for his son Edmund of )angley, earl of /ambridge, !later duke of 4ork", had the upper hand and a marriage treaty between the king of England and the count of >landers was signed in 1,A:. ;owever, given their consanguinity !they were related within the fourth degree" papal dispensation was re$uired and this Eope 2rban - refused to grant. 3egotiations were then undertaken by )ouis of 0Ule with the >rench royal family. These were concluded in 1,A? in two treaties of alliance between the >rench crown and the count of >landers. These events were of the outmost importance in the %international' politics of the period. ;ad Edmund of )angley, earl of /ambridge, succeeded )ouis of 0Ule as count of >landers, +rtois, 3evers and Cethel and as count palatine of #urgundy, a cadet branch of the English royal house would have been established on the northern and eastern perimeter of the >rench royal domain. To add insult to in8ury, it would also have made the earl of /ambridge and his line peers of >rance and amongst the greatest vassals of the king of >rance. The stakes could not have been higher. The ac$uisition of this great heiress by the duke of #urgundy vastly increased the power base of the >rench royal family at a time when its fortunes had reached their nadir. See -aughan, (hili+ the ?old, The )ormation of the ?urgundian State and .C. 7rmond, .Edward III and ;is >amily1 in The 3ournal of ?ritish Studies (A !7ct., 1?H@", ,?H<:((. A6 Two of the three sons of Ehilip the #old, duke of #urgundy, +nthony, duke of #rabant, and Ehilip, count of 3evers, were killed fighting for >rance at +gincourt in 1:16. Ehilip the #old's principal heir 9ohn the >earless, duke of #urgundy, who had murdered his cousin )ouis, duke of 7rlLans, !the younger brother of /harles -I, king of >rance" in 1:5@, was conspicuously absent from the battle and it was largely his enemies in the royal family and their partisans that were killed or captured. The murder of )ouis, duke of 7rlLans, triggered a civil war within the royal family which profoundly destabiliFed the >rench kingdom in
A:

9ohn the >earless, duke of #urgundy, was murdered in 1:1? as a part of a feud that tore the >rench royal family apart with devastating conse$uences for the kingdom of >rance. ;e transmitted his inheritance !which now became an indivisible patrimony" intact to his heir Ehilip the Bood, duke of #urgundy. The second son of Ehilip the #old, +nthony, duke of #rabant, )uxemburg and )imburg, had two sons. Three years following +nthony's death in 1:16, his eldest son and heir 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant, married 9ac$ueline of #avaria, heiress of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland. Through this marriage 9ohn I- became in right of his wife count of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland. The two senior branches of the house of #urgundy, by right of inheritance, now controlled between them, much of the )ow /ountries and greatest royal fiefs in eastern >rance and its imperial frontiers. 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant, died without issue in 1:(@ leaving his paternal inheritance to his younger brother Ehilip, who died in 1:,5, also without issue.
AA

ith the death of Ehilip, duke of #rabant, this collateral line of the house of

the years before and after +gincourt. 9ohn the >earless was himself murdered in 1:1? by the partisans of the &auphin /harles !the future /harles -II, king of >rance" in retaliation for the killing of )ouis of 7rlLans and 9ohn's alliance with ;enry -. The point here is to emphasiFe the fact that relationships within the royal family determined the fundamental stability of any dynastic polity. The endowment of cadet branches of the royal family with great appanages was a strategy that increased the likelihood of survival of the lineage in the male lineDit did not and could not ensure that the resources used to endow these cadet branches would be used in the interests of the crown or of the kingdom. In other words, a distinction has to be drawn between the interests of the dynasty, its individual members, the crown and the kingdom. 7n the complicated !and convoluted" politics of of the royal family in this period see 0ichael 9ones, .The )ast /apetians and early -alois kings, 1,1:<1,A:1 in 9ones !ed." The New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :.* >ranQoise +utrand, .>rance under /harles - and /harles -I1 in 9ones !ed." The New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :.* 0alcolm -ale, Charles :.., #erkeley= 2niversity of /alifornia Eress, 1?@:* and 9ohn #ell ;enneman, -livier de Clisson and (olitical Society in )rance under Charles : and Charles :., Ehiladelphia= 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??A. AA The death of 9ohn I- without legitimate issue ended the short lived dynastic union between #rabant< )imburg and ;ainault<;olland<Seeland. #rabant was inherited by 9ohn I-'s younger brother Ehilip. The story of the ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland inheritance is more complicated* it begins with a double wedding in 1,H6. Ehilip the #old's heir, 9ohn the >earless, married 0argaret of #avaria. Ehilip the #old's daughter, 0argaret of #urgundy, married illiam of #avaria, heir of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland. 9ac$ueline of #avaria was the only daughter of illiam of #avaria, count of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland and 0argaret of #urgundy. In 1:5? 9ac$ueline was married to 9ohn of Touraine, dauphin of >rance, who died without issue in 1:1@. In other words, had 9ohn of Touraine and 9ac$ueline of #avaria produced a son, he would have been heir to the kingdom of >rance and to the counties of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland. In the event, when 9ohn of Touraine died in 1:1@, 9ac$ueline of #avaria came into the custody of her uncle 9ohn the >earless, duke of #urgundy. !9ohn the >earless was 9ac$ueline's uncle twice over= he was 9ac$ueline's mother's brother and her father's sister's husband". 9ohn the >earless, as her closest male relative, had control over her next marriage and therefore had the counties of ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland within his gift. In 1:1H 9ohn the >earless arranged for his niece !his sister's daughter" to marry his nephew !his younger brother's son" 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant. 9ohn the >earless was killed in 1:1? leaving Ehilip the Bood as his heir. hen 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant, died in 1:(@ Ehilip the Bood, as the closest male relative of 9ac$ueline of #avaria became her heir. 9ac$ueline of #avaria, after leading a colorful life, died in 1:,, without legitimate issue. Ehilip the Bood, therefore,

#urgundy failed leaving its territories, titles and rights to the head of the house of #urgundy. #y outliving his childless relatives Ehilip the Bood, duke of #urgundy, inherited #rabant, )imburg, ;ainault, ;olland, Seeland and )uxemburg.
A@

The remarkable territorial consolidation of the

)ow /ountries outlined here was a conse$uence of genealogical accident. AH Ehilip the Bood left his son one of the greatest inheritances of late medieval Europe. ;is territories stretched from the 3orth Sea to the +lps. +mong his principalities were some of the wealthiest and most urbaniFed regions of Europe. ;is reckless son and heir /harles the #old, duke of #urgundy, after a reign of less than eleven years, was killed in the battle 3ancy in 1:@@. The death of /harles the #old, the last in the male line of the -alois dukes of #urgundy, was an event of momentous conse$uence in European historyDit lead to the merger of the domains, dignities and titles of the house of #urgundy with those of the house of +ustria. A? In 1:@@ /harles the #old's only legitimate child, 0ary of #urgundy, the greatest heiress of the fifteenth century, married, in accordance with her father's plans, 0aximilian of ;absburg,
inherited ;ainault, ;olland and Seeland as the closest male relative of 9ac$ueline of #avaria which was a conse$uence of the double marriage concluded by their grandparents in 1,H6. A@ In addition to these inheritances Ehilip the Bood ac$uired the #oulonnais by marriage, the counties of 3amur and #Lthune by purchase and Eonthieu, +miens and -ermandois by treaty. AH There are other fifteenth century examples of massive territorial consolidation occurring as a conse$uence of dynastic accidents. )ater in the fifteenth century a similar series of fortuitous genealogical accidents laid the foundations for the resurgence of the power of the >rench crown. In the reign of )ouis PI there was a remarkable demographic windfall that accrued to the crown. The se$uence of events is nothing short of astonishing= 1" )ouis PI's brother, /harles of >rance, duke of #erry, died without heirs in 1:@( leaving #erry and 3ormandy to the crown* (" in 1:@, the count of +rmagnac was killed in battle leaving his fiefs to )ouis' daughter +nne* ," in 1:@@ /harles the #old, duke of #urgundy, was killed in battle and )ouis PI asserted the rights of the crown over #urgundy, Eicardy and the #ouillonnais* :" in 1:H5<H1 the +ngevin cadet line of the royal family failed leaving +n8ou, 0aine and Erovence along with the +ngevin claim to the kingdom of 3aples !the %cause' of the Italian ars which began in 1:?: when /harles -III, king of >rance, asserted his rights to it". +fter the death of )ouis PI's son, /harles -III, he was succeeded by the 7rlLans branch of the family in the person of )ouis PII. ;e brought with him the great appanage of 7rlLans and in turn married !as /harles -III had" +nne, heiress of #rittany, and their child /laude of >rance, heiress of #rittany, married >rancis I, so that their son ;enry II united #rittany to the >rench crown. So within a few generations all of the great fiefs of >rance !except >landers" and all of the great appanages except the #ourbonnais were united with the crown. +ll of this constituted a massive accretion in the strength of the crown. 3one of this, as Barrett 0attingly has noted, was the conse$uence of well laid plains or the consummate political skills of )ouis PI who .was successful chiefly by surviving his relatives.1 Renaissance Di+lomacy, 3ew 4ork= &over, 1?66, pp. 11(< 11,. A? 3ote that the duchy of #urgundy itself, as an appanage of the >rench royal house, reverted to crown control upon the demise of the direct male line of the house of #urgundy in 1:@@. +lthough the duchy of #urgundy reverted to the >rench crown, 0ary of #urgundy and her heirs continued to use the ducal title and the collection of territories that had been accumulated by the -alois dukes of #urgundy continued to be called the %#urgundian inheritance'.

king of the Comans and archduke of +ustria.

@5

The death of /harles the #old and the marriage

of his daughter provide a perfect illustration of the role of contingency in dynastic politics. ;ad /harles died leaving a legitimate son rather than a legitimate daughter as his heir, his death, while conse$uential, would not have led to the dramatic redistribution of power in Europe that it did. #y the single act of marriage, 0ary brought to the house of +ustria what con$uest could never haveDa collection of principalities that were the envy of Europe. 0ary, heiress of #urgundy, and the emperor 0aximilian I had two children. In 1:?A their heir Ehilip the >air, archduke of +ustria, duke of #urgundy, etc., married 9oanna of /astile, daughter, and as fate would have it, heiress of >erdinand, king of +ragon, 3aples, Sicily etc. and Isabella, $ueen of /astile and the Indies.
@1

Two generations of heirs of the house of

+ustria had married great heiresses. It was these twists of dynastic fortune, and not military prowess, that laid the foundations of ;absburg power. It is important to appreciate that the creation of this %empire' was entirely the conse$uence of marriage and inheritance. This is not to say that strategic considerations did not underlie the patterns of dynastic marriageDclearly they did. It is simply to note that dynastic unions came into being and dissolved for reasons $uite independent of geopolitics. Indeed, the transmission of these polities occurred without much reference to the %interests' of the principalities. +s #en8amin +rnold notes .Othese

assemblages of multiple principalities under a single dynastyOdemonstrate the tendency of aristocratic family right to outweigh any other considerations or claims of power politics, economic geography and social structure.1
@(

Through the laws of inheritance the unimaginably

They had been betrothed in 1:@,. The case of 9oanna of /astile is another powerful illustration of the role of contingency in dynastic high politics. She was the second of five surviving children of Isabella of /astile and >erdinand of +ragon. +s such, she had a low probability of succeeding her parents. + series of demographic accidents laid the foundations for her improbable fortune. The first in the line of the succession, 9oanna's only brother 9ohn, died without issue in 1:?@. 9ohn's death made Isabella, 9oanna's older sister, first in the line of the succession. Isabella was married to 0anuel I, king of Eortugal, and it therefore seemed likely that Eortugal, /astile and +ragon would become part of a dynastic union. Isabella died in 1:?H leaving a son, 0ichael of Eortugal, as heir to Eortugal, /astile and +ragon. ;e, however, suddenly died in 1655 ending this prospect. ith 0ichael's death, 9oanna of /astile became heir to /astile and +ragon. @( (rinces and territories in medieval ;ermany, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1??1, p. (AA.
@5 @1

vast inheritances of the houses of +ragon, /astile, #urgundy and +ustria became the patrimony of the eldest son and heir of 9oanna of /astile and Ehilip the >airDthe emperor /harles -. +s has been shown above, the house of #urgundy was shaped by forces that were contingent upon the vagaries of lifeDbut that it was shaped by these specific variables was not contingent. /ontingent events impacted the history of dynastic Europe, but in specific and predictable ways as a conse$uence of its political structure. The successional system of

premodern Europe produced political forms that were sub8ect to the forces of contingency in ways that differentiates them from all other political forms. These dynastic composite monarchies stand in sharp contrast to both the other Eurasian empires of its dayD0uscovy, the 7ttoman, Eersian and 0ughal empiresDwhich had been created by military con$uest as well as the great empires of anti$uity all of which had also been forged primarily by force of arms. It is only in )atin Europe between the twelfth and eighteenth centuries, which were also the only places that combined primogeniture and female inheritance under conditions of feudal lordship, where empires were created by law rather than by the sword. Parti%le inheritance in Early Modern Europe hile primogeniture became the dominant form of inheritance practice among the nobility of late medieval and early modern Europe there were ever diminishing Fones where partible inheritance persisted into the seventeenth century. e can, therefore, get an idea of the impact

of primogeniture by comparing the experience 8ust described with that of those areas of )atin /hristendom that adopted the reform much later. The most important of these areas was the ;oly Coman Empire !henceforth the Empire". @, The Empire was an elective monarchy comprised of estates of varying constitutional status possessing territorial lordship !4andeshoheit". ith the exception of the ecclesiastical

principalities and the imperial cities, these lordships were fiefs of the Empire sub8ect to
See chapter , of Sharma, .The Impact of Institutions1 for an extensive analysis of the functioning of the Empire.
@,

hereditary tenure and governed by princes with varying titles !prince, archduke, duke, count palatine, margrave and landgrave". @: The patchwork of miniature principalities that stands out so markedly on maps of the early modern Empire was a product of the nature of partible inheritance in the Empire. .In the thirteenth century there were around ninety spiritual princes and only thirteen secular ones. + hundred years later, the second group had grown to a little more than forty. #y 16H( it

numbered forty<six, a number made even more impressive in light of the territorial losses that seculariFation in the name of the Erotestant reform had brought to the spiritual principalities.1
@6

The obvious advantages of primogeniture notwithstanding, the custom of partible inheritances remained prevalent in Bermany until the end of the 1@th century. The core issues at stake in the debate between partible inheritances and primogeniture were related to the vital problem of sustaining the dynasty. Too many male children made providing for them a problem and in any case was the source of discord within the dynasty* too few male heirs and the basic survival of the house came into $uestion. @A In contrast to their brethren to the west, Berman princes continued to use partible inheritance to provide for their younger sons. illustrated through the case of the house of
@@

The results of partible inheritance can be best


@H

ettin !Saxony".

In 1:H6 the primary division of

the house of Saxony was made whereby electoral Saxony and ducal Saxony were separated
Bood introductions to the Empire are= #en8amin +rnold, Medieval ;ermany, &""$!'"", A (olitical .nter+retation, Toronto= 2niversity of Toronto Eress, 1??@* idem., (rinces and territories in medieval ;ermany, Eeter ;. ilson, The *oly Roman Em+ire !%2&$!6"#, 3ew 4ork= St. 0artin's, 1???* 0ichael ;ughes, Early Modern ;ermany, !%77$!6"#, Ehiladelphia, 2niversity of Eennsylvania Eress, 1??(* 9ohn Bagliardo, ;ermany under the -ld Regime, !#""$!72", 3ew 4ork= )ongman, 1??1* idem., Reich and Nation, The *oly Roman Em+ire as .dea and Reality, #loomington= Indiana 2E, 1?H5* Thomas #rady, Turning Swiss, Cities and Em+ire !%&"$!&&", 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1?H6* and, Beoffrey #arraclough, The -rigins of Modern ;ermany, 3ew 4ork= . . 3orton, 1?H:. @6 Eaula Sutter >ichtner, (rotestantism and (rimogeniture in Early Modern ;ermany. 3ew ;aven= 4ale 2E, 1?H?, p. 1A. @A See 9udith ;urwich, .Inheritance Eractices in Early 0odern Bermany1 in 3ournal of .nterdisci+linary *istory (, !:" !Spring, 1??,", pp. A??<@1H. @@ See 9ohn /ooper, .Eatterns of Inheritance and Settlement by Breat )andowners from the >ifteenth to the Eighteenth /enturies1 in 9ack Boody et. al. !eds.", )amily and .nheritance, Rural Society in 9estern Euro+e !=""$!6"", 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, 1?@A, p. (??<,56. @H The details of the house of ettin are taken from >ichtner, (rotestantism and (rimogeniture in Early Modern ;ermany, pp. 1,<1:. See also +rnold, (rince and territories in medieval ;ermany, especially chapters 1( and 1,.
@:

between the Ernestine

ettins !electoral Saxony" and +lbertine

ettins !ducal Saxony"* control ar

of these dignities was reversed by the emperor /harles - as a result of the Schmalkaldic !16:@". The +lbertine

ettins adopted primogeniture relatively early for a Berman princely

house !although not consistently" in 1:??. In 1A6(, however, 9ohn Beorge I, elector of Saxony, established three lines of +lbertine ettinsDSaxony< eissenfels, Saxony<0erseburg and

Saxony<SeitFDwhich maintained $uarrelsome relations with one another until 1@:A when the lands of electoral Saxony were finally reunited and primogeniture reestablished in the +lbertine line. The Ernestine ettins of ducal Saxony, however, maintained the custom of partible

inheritance and the various branches of the house proliferated. #y 1A55 two basic branches of the Ernestines had appearedDSaxony< eimar and Saxony<Botha. These two branches gave rise to eleven further divisionsDfour from Saxony< eimar and seven from Saxony<Botha. #y the early eighteenth century the four cadet

branches of Saxony< eimar had failed, leading to the reestablishment of primogeniture in Saxony< eimar in 1@1@. #y the early 1Hth century, the seven branches of Saxony<Botha

became four and these began to introduce primogeniture in their housesDSaxony<Botha< +ltenburg !1AH6", Saxony<Botha<;ildburghausen !1@5,", Saxony<Botha</oburg !1@:A" and Saxony<Botha<0einingen !1H5(".
@?

These 8leinstaaterei, as they would be contemptuously

called by Berman nationalist historiography, were devoid of economic or military logic and can be only explained by dynasticism !indeed, contemporaries in >rance, England and even the princes themselves realiFed that the custom of partible inheritance was creating polities unable to fulfill the proper functions of a %state'." H5
The experience of the ettins can be contrasted with that of the ;ohenFollerns. + ma8or factor in the rise of the house of ;ohenFollern was its early shift from partible inheritance to primogeniture. The ;ohenFollerns had received the electorate of #randenburg in 1:11 and for the next six decades the ;ohenFollern inheritance was repeatedly partitioned. Benealogical accident worked, however, to reunify the ;ohenFollern lands in the hands of 0argrave +lbert +chilles. In 1:@, 0argrave +lbert +chilles issued the so<called %&ispositio +chillea' which made primogeniture the law of the house of #randenburg. The introduction of primogeniture plus several fortuitous marriages laid the foundations of the consolidated %Erussian' state of early modern Europe. The contrast with the fate of the Saxon ettins could not be greater. See /.+. 0acartney, The *a s urg and *ohen1ollern Dynasties in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 3ew 4ork= alker and /ompany, 1?@5, pp. (5@<(1@. H5 I have argued above that one of the motivations of aristocratic families to introduce primogeniture was the problem of providing security for ever smaller holdings. The persistence of partible inheritance in
@?

The persistence of partible inheritance in Bermany raises the obvious $uestion of why it deviated from the )atin norm over many centuriesI The answer here is the continued

expansion of the Berman nobility into lands both internally !i.e. bringing abandoned or virgin lands under cultivation" and externally. hile the crusades against Islam are the best

remembered, aside from Iberia and Sicily they were not enduring successes. East of Elbe, however, the northern crusades led principally by Bermans !including the Teutonic Gnights which carved out a crusader lordship that endured until seculariFed in the sixteenth century" brought Erussia and the #altic coastline under )atin rule.
H1

This movement of the Berman

nobility into Slavic and #altic territory provided an additional outlet for younger sons and contributed to an environment in which the need to institute primogeniture was less pressing. +s this source of land dried up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Berman nobility began to institute primogeniture bringing Bermany into line with the rest of the European nobility. H( hat this discussion has shown is that the exact configuration of the dynastic laws of succession had profound impact upon the political geography Europe. e have here an

example of simple micro<level rules of property that have immense conse$uences at the systemic level* that the bandwidth of political behavior traditionally covered by scholars of international relations. Conclusion= The history of premodern Europe reveals the extent to which political behavior was rooted in social institutions. It was not a &arwinian system in which the principle %survival of the fittest' defined the essence of political competition. This is a surprising conclusion to draw.

Bermany, therefore, raises the obvious $uestion of why Berman princes in the late medieval period were able to contemplate continuous divisions of their lands. The answer to this $uestion lies in the institutional structure of the ;oly Coman Empire which had evolved institutions over the centuries that acted like a cocoon for the smaller principalities. These institutions, along with dynasticism are critical to understanding how international politics actually worked in the premodern era and is extensively addressed in chapter ,. The fact that partible inheritance practices could occur without parents worrying about the military viability of these principalities is prime evidence of the non<&arwinian nature of international relations in premodern Europe. H1 See Eric /hristiansen, The Northern Crusades, 3ew 4ork= Eenguin, 1??@. H( See +rnold, (rinces and Territories, chapter ?.

Eremodern Europe has long been viewed as an archetype of an anarchical system of international relations in which international politics is largely a function of power relationships understood in starkly materialist terms. Cealists, whether balance of power or hegemony

theorists, and those that share their world view, build on the assumption that power relations in premodern Europe approximate a %survival of the fittest' logic. +s I show elsewhere, there was indeed a lot of war in the premodern era* precious little of it, however, was actually leading to con$uest. This paper has shown that vitally important aspects of the power structure of )atin European international relations were grounded in dynastic social institutions. The logic

endogenous to dynastic configurations of property and kinship explain the movements in the political of Europe in this period far better than do realist theories. /on$uest and survival were phenomena of the frontiers of )atin European civiliFation. ithin the boundaries of )atin +s a

Europe, dynasticism provided different mechanism for the transmission of power.

conse$uence of the use of dynastic tools vast patrimonies could be built solely on the basis of legitimate succession. e can observe the fact that different configurations of dynastic

succession produced different outcomes. In those parts of Europe in which primogeniture and female inheritance had been adopted a logic endogenous to laws of succession drove a process of consolidation that was independent of the power structure of political relationships. In Bermany, by contrast, which formed an integral part of )atin Europe, we observe a process of dramatic fragmentation driven by partible inheritance practices. Two important theoretical conclusion can be drawn from this fact. >irstly, social

institutions and not the power configuration of the international system are what most responsible for these patterns. Indeed, the power configurations of the international system in this period are caused by the contingent nature of dynastic succession. Secondly, the

fundamental unit of analysis in international relations in this period is not the state. In fact, by focusing on the state entire domains of what constituted international relations is lost. +s I show

elsewhere, lordship along with dynastic institutions continued to be the primary arena of international relations into the post< estphalian period. International relations after the Treaty of estphalia continued to operate in ways inconsistent with the assumption that the state had &ynasticism and its central explanatory role in )atin

become the primary unit of analysis.

European international relations reveals 8ust how limited the realist theoretical apparatus is. International order in )atin European history !pre and post 1A:H" was ultimately derived from social institutions and not from the anarchical nature of the international system. Appendix 1: The Roman Succession: The importance of the successional system to the stability of any polity can be best appreciated in comparative perspective. The Coman Cepublic had, until the age of /aesar, /rassus and Eompey, an extraordinarily stable system of succession for its magistrates. Erior to this period, only Sulla had successfully used force to ac$uire the chief magistracy of the republic and even he, after instituting constitutional reforms to his liking, voluntarily laid down his dictatorship after the re$uired ten years and $uietly retired from public life. hile the republic was dominated by

the senatorial aristocracy, comprised of a few doFen families organiFed around competing and ever shifting networks of alliances !sealed by marriages and adoptions", the offices of the republic never became hereditaryDComan magistrates did not own their offices. The

republican nobility conducted its conflicts within the framework of an electoral system that was designed to prevent the emergence of monarchy and in the context of a society in which blood was not the sine 0ua non of kinship. The greatest testament to the genius of this system is the chaos and violence that marked the successional system of its imperial successor that never managed to satisfactorily solve this most fundamental of political problems. The prolonged agony of the /ivil ars that ended in ,1 #/E resulted in the principate

as instituted by +ugustus. This was, for all practical purposes, a monarchy, albeit a peculiar one in the sense that +ugustus simply accumulated in his person the more significant Coman magistracies !in order to preserve the illusion that the republic was %restored' under his

benevolent auspices". +ugustus, adopted son of /aesar, never formally created an imperial office let alone one that was hereditary property. 2pon his death in /E 1: Tiberius, his chosen successor, was %voted' by the Coman Senate all of the offices that +ugustus had held. The formula of the %imperial succession', therefore, remained firmly anchored within the framework of republican magistracies. Eolitical office and authority, therefore, had no basis for hereditary succession of any kind, let alone one organiFed around a line of succession determined strictly by blood or kinship. This is not to say that +ugustus did not envision a %dynastic hereditary monarchy' when he overthrew the republic. 7n the contrary, he clearly sought, in some sense, to establish the %imperial dignity' as the %possession' of the 9ulian</laudian family. 7ctavian had, after all, fought the /ivil ars as /aesar's heir and upon his assumption of the principate

he had stamped on every coin in the empire the phrase divi filius !son of the deified 9ulius /aesar". In doing so +ugustus was advertising his ties of kinship on every billboard in

0editerranean world. The issue, then, is not whether kinship ties mattered, but how and with what implications. Biven the stark separation in Coman society and law between %the public' !that could not in any sense be a form of property" and %the private' there was very little raw material for +ugustus to work with. Tiberius was, in any case, not a blood relative of +ugustus !he was his stepsonDthe Coman kinship system, being much more concerned with establishing the authority of the +ater familias, did not discriminate between naturalJlegitimate and adopted sons". hile the successors of Tiberius were direct descendants of +ugustus !in the female

line", all three of them !/aligula, /laudius and 3ero" were assassinatedDthe ultimate proof that +ugustus had failed to establish a legitimate system of succession. ith the death of 3ero, the

9ulian</laudian dynasty was wiped out to a person and the Coman succession ac$uired its principal characteristicDit was determined by %the +rmy'. Typically, the succession was

determined by civil war, with the candidate of the last legion standing !or of the Eraetorian Buard" becoming emperor. This system of succession was a recipe for all kinds of trouble. >or

example between /E 1?( and (H: there were H: emperors !give or take a few who %reigned' too short a time to really count" of whom only two died peacefully. In the fifteen years between (6, and (AH there were 1: emperors !all of whom met violent deaths". This failure in the early years of the empire to establish a secure and stable basis of succession !whether dynastic or not" was to have disastrous conse$uences for the rest of imperial history. The Coman emperors never had an unambiguous and legitimate right to

transmit the imperial dignity to anyone including their offspring or other kin !let alone through the strict primogeniture that brought such a high degree of stability to the late medieval and early modern worlds". The Coman empire did see relatively brief periods of successional stabilityD most importantly at the end of the first century and much of the second centuryDbut for the most part the Coman succession was a violent and uncertain affair and dangerous in the extreme to those who sought the imperial dignity. The Coman empire %experimented' !so to speak" with a variety of ad hoc successional practices, none of which accomplished the vital task of ensuring a peaceful, legitimate and uncontested transfer of power. The one period in which there was a prolonged respite in successional crises is the so called era of the %five good emperors' !/E ?A<1H5, covering the reigns of the emperors 3erva, Tra8an, ;adrian, +ntonious Eious and 0arcus +urelius". The practice under the first four of these five great emperors was to select a %worthy' successor from within the upper echelons of the Coman army command and gain his acceptanceJlegitimacy by acclamation of the army !in some sense, therefore, the imperial dignity was elective". This is not to say that these four emperors did not utiliFe kinship bonds to cement ties between emperor and successor. 7nly that these kinship ties, unlike late medieval and early modern Europe, in no sense implied a claim or legitimate right upon the imperial dignity. This period !coinciding with the %golden era of classical civiliFation'" came to an end when 0arcus +urelius had his son /ommodus accepted as his successor. The worthless /ommodus, like the vast ma8ority of Coman emperors, met his deserved end by assassination in 1?(. The next ?: years !with one ma8or interlude" were years of political turmoil and violence

on a grand scale. The Coman succession was, therefore, determined by the army and the %selection process' was typically civil war. The third century and much of the fourth were dominated by attempts to devise a satisfactory solution to the problem of the imperial succession!s". The most important of these was &iocletian's creative but ultimately failed attempt to create a tetrarchy with two senior emperors !one each in the west and east" and their designated successors !called /aesars" in theory sharing authority and working together to ensure a smooth transfer of power. This

innovative but failed solution to the problem of the Coman succession ended with yet more civil wars and this round of successional fighting was finally settled by the battle of the 0ilvian #ridge that paved the way for /onstantine's assumption of power as sole emperor. So aside from a golden age lasting less than a century and a few other interludes, the political history of the Coman empire can be written from the vantage point of the problem of the imperial succession. Appendix 2: The Expansion of the Ottoman Empire: The formation and expansion of the 7ttoman Empire, the greatest Eurasian land power of the sixteenth century, provides a stark contrast to how the European dynastic composite monarchies of the same period were formed and expanded. .most highly developed example of a near<eastern empire1.
H,

The 7ttoman Empire was a Eossessing neither the law of

H:

primogeniture or female succession, it serves as a perfect counterfactual to its rivals the European dynastic composite monarchies of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 2nlike

European dynastic monarchies the 7ttoman Empire was a military empire that expanded and contracted in accordance with its fortunes on the battlefield.
This section is based on a reading of= ;alil Inalcik, The -ttoman Em+ire, The Classical Age !'""$!#"", )ondon= Ehoenix Eress, (555* &aniel Boffman, The -ttoman Em+ire and Early Modern Euro+e, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, (55(* Choads 0urphy, -ttoman 9arfare !&""$!7"", 3ew #runswick, 39= Cutgers 2E, 1???* Ivan Earvev, *a s urgs and -ttomans etween :ienna and ?elgrade E!#6'$!7'2F, 3ew 4ork= /olumbia 2E, 1??6* &onald Ruataert, The -ttoman Em+ire, !7""$!2==, 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2E, (555* >ranF #abinger, Mehmed the Con0ueror and *is Time, Erinceton= Erinceton 2E, 1?@H* 9ason Boodwin, 4ords of the *ori1on, A *istory of the -ttoman Em+ire, 3ew 4ork= ;enry ;olt, 1??H* I. 0etin Gunt, .The rise of the 7ttomans1 in 9ones !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :.* EliFabeth Sachariadou, .The 7ttoman world1 in +llmand !ed.", New Cam ridge Medieval *istory :..* and 9ustin 0c/arthy, The -ttoman Tur/s, 3ew 4ork= )ongman, 1??@. H: Inalcik, The -ttoman Em+ire, p. ,.
H,

The Ottoman Succession The successional practices of the 7ttoman Empire differed in fundamental ways from those of the )atin European monarchies of the late medieval and early modern periods. The contrast between the two can be used to arrive at a deeper understanding of dynasticism and its uni$ueness. 7ttoman sultans, like all Islamic ruling families, practiced polygamy. + central part of the imperial household was the harem in which the wives and concubines of the sultan were maintained. 2nlike European rulers who, for the purposes of producing legitimate successors, were restricted to one lawful wife at a time !and, as ;enry -III found out, for whom divorce was not necessarily a simple matter", the sultans of the Islamic world could produce legitimate heirs with as many women as they pleased. The status of their mates was irrelevant to the issue of the succession* the mothers of sultans could be of any religious, social or legal status !including slaves and /hristians". The successional practices of the )atin /hristian world were, therefore, firmly grounded in the institutional structure of western /hristianity and was not transplantable to societies in which family structures and property rights were so different from those obtaining in )atin Europe. The 7ttoman succession was open to all sons of the deceased sultan with no legal restrictions on the pool of potential claimants other than paternity and age at the time of the succession !Islamic custom held that the successor had to be a male of full age and of sound mind". 2nder conditions of polygamy the numbers of potentially legitimate successors e$ualed the total number of sons sired by the deceased ruler. The 7ttoman succession was, therefore, governed by imprecise laws and customs with no nonviolent way to distinguish between the claims of the contestants. Essentially, . hichever 7ttoman prince succeeded in securing the empire's capital, Treasury, archives and in winning the support of the 9anissaries Mthe slave army owned by the sultanN, ulema, bureaucracy and Ealace officials, was the legitimate sultan. In practice after 1:(1, the support of the 9anissaries became a fundamental factor in the succession.1 H6

H6

Ibid., p. 6?.

The conse$uence of this was something approximating the situation obtaining in early >rankish Europe with the significant difference that the 7ttomans of the early modern period did not practice partible inheritance !see above". /ivil war was an endemic conse$uence of this system of succession. 2nder these circumstances the 7ttomans devised a %solution' to the problem of the succession= legaliFed fratricide. >rom the early years of the empire the

successful claimant eliminated all other potential claimants to throne by killing them. 2nder 0ehmet II !reigned 1:61<H1" this practice became legally codified= .>or the welfare of the state, the one of my sons to whom Bod grants the sultanate may lawfully put his brothers to death.1
HA

Indeed Selim I !161(<(5" took this one step further= not only did he kill all of his brothers upon his accession in 161(, he also killed all of his sons save one !SVleyman the 0agnificent". In the early modern period the 7ttoman succession was literally a Fero<sum game for the contestants. on*uest and the E&pansion of the Ottoman Empire In the thirteenth century the 7ttomans were one of doFens of minor principalities that emerged out of the ruins of the +natolian Cum Sel8uk Empire. #etween 1(H1 and 1,A(, under the leadership of 7sman I and his son 7rhan, the 7ttoman principality expanded from being an insignificant nomadic Turkish principality on the #yFantine frontier to being a ma8or marcher sultanate. It expanded, by con$uest, into the remnants of #yFantine +natolia by attracting to its standards Turkic nomads and Islamic adventurers of varying stripes in search of booty !including slaves" and holy war. #y 1,6:, after decades of raiding into Breece and the #alkans, the 7ttomans gained a permanent foothold on the European side of the &ardanelles in Ballipoli and Thrace. #etween 1,A( and 1,H? the 7ttomans, under 0urat I, expanded its #alkan and +natolian territory by con$uest, annexing much of Thrace, 0acedonia and #ulgaria while reducing Serbia and the remnants of #ulgaria and #yFantium to tributary status. 2nder #ayeFit I !1,H?<1:51" the

7ttomans continued their expansion in the #alkans, mainland Breece and +natolia* by 1,?@

HA

Ibid., p. 6?.

#osnia and Empire.

allachia were 7ttoman tributaries and all of western +natolia was annexed to the

#y the early fifteenth century the 7ttomans had experienced a century of expansion and territorial growth. This phase of expansion was interrupted in the early fifteenth century by the catastrophic defeat of #ayeFit I at the hands of the great con$ueror Tamerlane in 1:5( at the battle of +nkara. +fter a few decades of recon$uest and retrenchment, the expansion of the 7ttoman Empire resumed in earnest in 1:6, with the con$uest of /onstantinople. The period 1:61<16AA, covering the reigns of the sultans 0ehmet II, #ayeFit II, Selim I and SVleyman I, is the classical period of 7ttoman history. This period conveniently coincides with the events that led to the formation of the inheritance of /harles - outlined above. The 7ttoman Empire underwent an explosive period of expansion making it by far the most powerful and dynamic power of the time. The con$uests of this period are= Table 1.(= The expansion of the 7ttoman Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries= H@ Date Territory 1,6:<16(( +egean +rchipelago 1:6, /onstantinople 1:6? Serbia 1:A5 0orea !Breece" 1:A1 TebiFond !+natolia" 1:A, #osnia 1:AH<@: Garaman !+natolia" 1:@6 Gefe !+natolia" 1:@6 Tatars of /rimea accept 7ttoman overlordship 1:H:J1:?A<?H #lack Sea coast north of the &anube to the /rimean peninsula 1:??<165, )epanto and other -enetian fortresses in 0orea 161: Eastern +natolia and northern 0esopotamia 161A +lgeria 161A Syria 161@ Egypt 161@<,H 4emen 16(A<:1 ;ungary 16,, /entral and Southern 0esopotamia 16,: Tunisia 1661 )ibya 166( TemesvWr !;ungary" 1666<6@ +byssinia 16@5 /yprus
H@

Sources= Inalcik, The -ttoman Em+ire, p. 15A and 0c/arthy, The -ttoman Tur/s, pp. ,6<155.

+s Table 1.( shows, beginning in 1:6, the 7ttoman Empire expanded at a phenomenal rate. +t a time when the ;absburg %empire' came into being as a conse$uence of genealogical accident, the 7ttomans were forging their own state through con$uestDthe 7ttomans were very much in the mold of all other near<eastern empires of the past, but utterly different from its rivals to the west. It is important to emphasiFe here that the 7ttoman Empire, in its interactions with )atin Europeans, was constrained in the types of relations that could be conducted between them. The 7ttoman Sultan could not marry into the ranks of European royalty and thereby inherit territory to the west. They were necessarily restricted to more superficial instruments and these instrument restricted the types and total range of outcomes of relations between the 7ttomans and the )atins.

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