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Philosophy as practices of virtue Arto Tukiainen Critical Academy Helsinki, Finland info@artotukiainen.

net Abstract My purpose is to examine the concept of philosophical practice. I will first elucidate the three different meanin s of !practice! "discussion, exercise and way of life#, and then proceed to pro$ide an account of what makes these practices philosophical. My proposal for the definin characteristic of philosophical practices is that they reco nise $irtues and encoura e their de$elopment. I will specifically descri%e three core $irtues& disinterestedness, openness, and independence. Keywords philosophical counsellin , philosophical exercises, philosophical way of life, $irtues Resumen Mi proposito es examinar el concepto de pr'ctica filos(fica. )rimeramente aclarar* los tres diferentes si nificados de la !pr'ctica! filos(fica& discusi(n, e+ercicio y modo de $ida. ,espu*s proceder* a plantear los factores primarios -ue determinan -ue estas pr'cticas sean filos(ficas. Mi su erencia se %asa en -ue las pr'cticas filos(ficas poseen como caracter.stica determinante el reconocimiento y la estimulaci(n de $irtudes. /n particular $oy a descri%ir tres $irtudes esenciales& desinter*s, mente a%ierta e independencia. Palabras clave asesoramiento filos(fico, e+ercicios filos(ficas, modo de $ida filos(fico, $irtudes

0et us %e in %y distin uishin the phenomenon of philosophy as theory1producin work from the idea of philosophy as a set of practices. )hilosophy as a set of practices em%odies the ancient conception of philosophy as lo$e of wisdom, and wisdom in its turn can %e approached from the perspecti$e of such $irtues as disinterestedness, openness and independence. 1 Philosophy as theory-oriented work versus philosophy as practices An influential and perhaps e$en dominatin $iew of philosophy in contemporary academic en$ironments can %e formulated as 2theory1oriented work2.3 4ften the concept of philosophy is also used to refer to the theories themsel$es in addition to the process of de$elopin them.5 Theory1 producin philosophy is di$ided into fields that are defined %y central -uestions and at least some inherited ways of answerin them. These di$isions are reflected in the phrase 2philosophy of x2, where x can %e for instance mind, science, lan ua e, lo ic, $alues, or some narrower speciality. 6ince no one can master all of these fields, theory1oriented philosophy is characterised %y di$ision of la%our analo ously with the sciences. The contemporary philosophical practice mo$ement incorporates an understandin of philosophy as a practice or set of practices that need not result in theories. Three different meanin s of the word !practice! can %e discerned.
3 7esearch into the history of philosophy "includin what we call contemporary philosophy# is not philosophy as such %ut a part of the science of history. 6ince one can of course de$elop one!s philosophical $iews in discussion with historical fi ures, the difference %etween history of philosophy and philosophy proper is not always clear. 5 A theory is a description or explanation of some part of the world or of the world as a whole, a prediction of future e$ents, or a $iew of the desira%le future direction of some aspect of the world. The truth of philosophical theories cannot typically %e ascertained %y simple o%ser$ation %ut re-uires inferences. 8erificationism in philosophy of lan ua e and utilitarianism in moral philosophy are examples of philosophical theories.

The first meanin of !practice! is discussion, or talkin . )hilosophical counsellin as pri$ate discussion %etween a counsellor and a sin le counsellee is an example of philosophical practices. Many kinds of formal and non1formal roup discussions are also referred to as philosophical practice, and e$en lecturin can %een seen in this li ht.9 :hate$er the specific format of philosophical practice as talkin , it typically ets its moti$ation from the concerns of the participants rather than the needs of theoretical work. )hilosophers hope to %e of some help in concrete pro%lems of life. :hile theory1oriented philosophy tends to emphasise written works, most of the lan ua e of philosophical practice as discussion is spoken. :ritten material is of course often used in these discussions for the purpose of creatin new ways of seein oursel$es and our worlds. The lan ua e of philosophical practice is more $aried than that of philosophy as theory1 oriented work. In the latter the primary form of lan ua e1use is ar umentation& a theory is a proposition or set of propositions which is defended a ainst opposin $iews %y means of ar uments. )hilosophical counsellors, for instance, may occasionally de$elop an ar ument, %ut the eneral atmosphere of the situation is one of en-uirin and pro%in rather than ar umentation. Counsellin in$ol$es predictin and e$aluatin the lon 1term outcomes of possi%le choices. Counsellors may encoura e and console their counsellees, and many practitioners tell anecdotes and +okes in order to elicit fruitful ideas in the minds of their discussion partners. The second meanin of !practice! is exercise. To some extent philosophical exercises prepare us for somethin that comes after them, %ut often they are also done for their own sake and for immediate ratification. Althou h we will return to these exercises later on, let us here mention that they may include discussions in which one tries to distance oneself from partiality and e oism; practicin detached awareness; facin ordeals as opportunities for learnin how to %end one!s will; thinkin a%out possi%le misfortunes in order to prepare oneself for them in a spirit of ac-uiescence and to increase one!s ratitude for one!s present condition; accustomin oneself to the thin s one fears in order to %roaden one!s ran e of choices; cleansin one!s mind of di$ersions and openin oneself to transformati$e influences; writin to oneself as an effort to clarify one!s thou hts, to influence one!s attitudes, and to persuade oneself to follow certain courses of action; readin philosophical texts for edification and renewal; takin an ima inary $iew from a%o$e the /arth!s surface in order to promote o%+ecti$ity; contemplatin one!s finitude in an attempt to hei hten one!s consciousness of what ultimately matters in life. I will claim that e$en some physical exercises can %e seen as philosophical insofar as they ena%le us to li$e more wisely. The third and most inclusi$e meanin of !practice! is way of life. "The <erman word !0e%enspraxis! %rin s out well this meanin of !practice!.# The philosophical life is composed of actions and omissions as well as the thou hts, attitudes and feelin s that moti$ate them; and it essentially in$ol$es reflectin on one!s $iew of life in order to impro$e it. )hilosophy in this sense is not a part1time acti$ity like counsellin or lecturin . From the standpoint of the idea of philosophy as a way of life, pri$ate philosophical counsellin has some ad$anta es o$er lecturin and roup discussions as forms of philosophical practice. Firstly, philosophy as a way of life must in the end %e the philosophy of some indi$idual, and counsellin ena%les us to concentrate on a particular person with a possi%ly uni-ue way of thinkin in a concrete situation of life. ,ifferent people need different words and estures.= 6econdly, many life issues are seen as too sensiti$e to %e discussed with a roup or an audience. Thirdly, in a pri$ate con$ersation one does not feel that one ou ht to say somethin merely to satisfy the percei$ed expectations of a roup. These points do not imply that other forms of philosophical practice as talkin are suspect. <roup discussions, for example, are ood when we
9 6aarinen, /sa, and 6lotte, 6e%astian& 2)hilosophical lecturin as a philosophical practice2, in Practical Philosophy >, 5, 5??9. = This aspect of pri$ate philosophical discussions was stressed %y many ancient authors. 6ee @uss%aum, Martha& The therapy of desire, )rinceton Ani$ersity )ress, )rinceton, @B, 3CC=, esp. pp. 99D19=3. A widely used analo y was that +ust like a ood doctor does not prescri%e medication without examinin the patient, philosophical ad$ice must %e %ased on first1hand understandin of the counsellee!s perspecti$e. 4ne does not send prescriptions throu h mail %ut must feel the pulse.

need multiple perspecti$es on some issue, and lectures i$e us a chance to %e inspired and uplifted %y the $iews of a sin le interestin person in a way that roup discussions do not often allow. )hilosophical practice as exercises and as a way of life is not merely work. This is firstly related to the fact that althou h philosophers are entitled to ask for a financial compensation for their ser$ices +ust like physicians or musicians, it makes no sense to say that philosophy is always paid, or that it should always %e paid. The analo y with reli ions is appealin & a person may %e et paid for doin some work related to a reli ion, %ut a reli ion is clearly not merely paid time %ut also an outlook on life and a way of life. 6econdly, the ideas of specialisation and di$ision of la%our do not apply to philosophy as a way of life& philosophers are philosophers in relation to e$erythin in their li$es, and they cannot dele ate parts of this philosophy to others in the way that work tasks can often %e di$ided and performed %y more than one person. Ha$in pointed out these facts, we should remind oursel$es that all kinds of work, whether intellectual or manual, scientific or non1scientific, can %enefit from philosophy as practices of $irtue. The notions of philosophy as exercises and as a way of life correct the $er%al %ias of the pre$ailin $iews of philosophy.D :hile discussions certainly %elon to the philosophical way of life, lar e parts of philosophy are not $er%al %ut rather actions and experiences. Moreo$er, the lan ua e of philosophy is not always intersu%+ecti$e& silently con$ersin with oneself in one!s mind and writin to oneself are also important forms of philosophy. )hilosophy as practice ne$ertheless appears to ha$e a characteristic literary enre, namely accounts of ood practices.> If philosophy is a set of practices, there is o%$iously a need to reflect on those practices, to in$esti ate the reasons for their oodness, and to inform others of their specific nature. )hilosophy as practice is essentially experimental philosophy where the oodness of the results is a crucial indicator of the oodness of the ideas that lead to them 1 and we want to read reports of successful experiments in order to ain from them in our own practices.E There is no reason why these reports could not %e academic for instance in the sense that they include comparisons of contemporary practices with similar examples from the history of philosophy. Althou h much of contemporary academic philosophy is theory1oriented, we should not see any necessary conflict %etween philosophical practice and academic philosophy. 2 Philosophy as practices of virtue It may perhaps %e said that the moti$es of philosophy as practice deri$e from pro%lems of life that are often accompanied %y ne ati$e states of mind such as anxiety.F )hilosophy is an attempt either to circum$ent those pro%lems, to sol$e them, or to accustom oneself to their insol$a%ility. As has %een seen since ancient times, this implies that philosophy must %e true to its name and aim at wisdom, %ecause wisdom is precisely the understandin one needs in order to li$e well.C 6tated
D In ancient <reece and 7ome many statesmen, for example, were called philosophers on account of their attitudes and actions e$en if they didn!t spend much time discussin philosophical doctrines or writin a%out them. Hadot, )ierre& What is ancient philosophy?, Har$ard Ani$ersity )ress, Cam%rid e, Mass., 5??=, p. 3E9. > This includes case studies. Many philosophers ha$e also pu%lished $ideos of their counsellin sessions. 6ee for example 7an 0aha$!s $ideos at http&GG$imeo.com "last access 59rd April 5?33#. E 4n the idea of experimental philosophy, see 7aa%e, )eter& Issues in Philosophical Counseling, )rae er )u%lishers, :estport, Conn., 5??5, ch. 9. The history of philosophy is replete with insi hts that ha$e %een tested in all kinds of circumstances; %ut we ha$e to %e a%le to choose the ideas that suit our current situations. :e also ha$e to formulate them in an effecti$e, natural way that ena%les us to see their contemporary rele$ance. F For a similar formulation, see 6chmid, :ilhelm& Mit sich selbst befreundet sein, 6uhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 5??E, pp. 5=19D. The idea that philosophy sprin s from a need to ease worries of all kinds dates %ack to anti-uity. /picurus and /pictetus, amon many others, $oiced $ersions of this $iew. It does not mean that philosophers ha$e to exclude scientific -uestions from their minds. A philosophical "i.e. an open, disinterested, and independent# attitude towards scientific pro%lems ena%les us to do %etter science. 6imilarly, this idea does not mean that philosophers should stop thinkin a%out lo ic, %ut su ests that what we need is not necessarily a theory of lo ic %ut lo ic in practice, ood reasonin in all kinds of circumstances. C 7o%ert @oHick writes& 2:isdom is what you need to understand in order to li$e well and cope with the central pro%lems and a$oid the dan ers in the predicament"s# human %ein s find themsel$es in.2 The Examined Life,

more cautiously, wisdom increases the likelihood of a tolera%le or e$en satisfactory life. It does not uarantee the oodness of one!s life, %ut makes it more pro%a%le, +ust like o%ser$in some uidelines for ood physical health increases the likelihood of one!s %ein a%le to a$oid diseases and infirmity. The notion that wisdom is the understandin we need in order to li$e well is insufficiently concrete. I propose that the concept of $irtue offers a ood way of makin our idea of wisdom more comprehensi%le.3? If wisdom is composed of the dispositions or character traits we call $irtues "and if foolishness is composed of $ices#, sayin that we need wisdom in order to li$e well e-uals sayin that we need $irtues in order to li$e well.33 I now intend to discuss three $irtues that seem to me to %e of some special si nificance in philosophical practices, namely disinterestedness, openness, and independence. These are fairly eneral $irtues in the sense that they ha$e lots of constituent and conse-uent $irtues.35 My +ustification for emphasisin +ust these three $irtues is twofold. Firstly, they ha$e %een hu ely influential in the history of philosophy as a history of pursuit of wisdom. 6econdly, I ha$e found them fruitful in my own philosophical practices. )ractices in the three senses of this term can %e seen as philosophical insofar as they in$ol$e and foster these cardinal $irtues. For instance, philosophical counsellin is %ased on the con$iction that all kinds of confusions, dan ers and predicaments are opportunities for our $irtues to row and to show their force. )hilosophical exercises aim at a li$in relationship with these $irtues, and philosophy as a way of life as a whole is a lon process of practisin them.39 In %rief, the philosophical life is a life defined %y lo$e of such $irtues. It is e$ident that none of us are e$er completely $irtuous I and it is difficult to ima ine what such perfection could e$en mean. 3 Disinterestedness ,isinterestedness first of all means impartiality, and impartiality is a disposition not to rant one!s own desires automatic preference %efore the needs and aspirations of other human %ein s, animals, or e$en plants. Minimally such impartiality manifests as cautiousness and as a tendency to refrain from doin harm. In discussions impartiality includes a readiness to su%mit one!s plans and $iews to the appraisal of others. 4ne has to take into account the possi%ility of ha$in erroneous or one1sided notions, and try to see oneself throu h the eyes of another person 1 an impartial discussion is not a
Touchstone )ress, @ew Jork, 3CFC, p. 5>E. 6ee also Achen%ach, <erd& Lebens !nnerschaft, Herder 8erla , Frei%ur . 5??3. Achen%ach clearly sees a connection %etween the concept of wisdom and the idea of li$in well. There are of course doHens of dispositions that ha$e %een re arded as $irtues %y some siHa%le roup of people. An encyclopedia1article on $irtues lists the followin , amon many others& acceptance, altruism, asserti$eness, attention, autonomy, %alance, candor, carin , charity, creati$ity, curiosity, detachment, dili ence, fairness, friendliness, hopefulness, humility, humor, independence, lo ic, mercy, mindfulness, non1$iolence, openness, optimism, patience, prudence, resilience, sta%ility, $i ilance and wit. 6ee :ikipedia& 28irtue2, a$aila%le at http&GGen.wikipedia.or GwikiG8irtue "last access April 3st 5?33#. ,ifferent spiritual traditions emphasise different $irtues. For example, Confucianism lays reat stress on humanity, sincerity and +ustice, whereas the Three Bewels of Taoism are compassion, simplicity, and not wantin to put oneself ahead of e$ery%ody else. "These are not the only possi%le translations. 4ld Chinese $irtue concepts are e$en more difficult to translate into /n lish than, say, ancient <reek terms relatin to $irtues.# The concepts of way and $irtue connect philosophy as a western tradition with Taoism and Confucianism. For related $iews in the contemporary philosophical practice mo$ement, see Achen%ach, <erd& 2)hilosophical practice opens up the trace to 0e%enskKnnerschaft2, in Herrestad, Hennin , Holt, Anders, and 6$are, Hel e "eds.#& Philosophy in society, Anipu% Forla , 4slo, 5??5; and Cohen, /lliot& 2The Metaphysics of 0o ic1Lased Therapy2, International "ournal of Philosophical Practice 9, 3, 5??D. Cohen, for example, says that temperance, authenticity, and a%ility to accept imperfections in oursel$es and the world, are some of the cardinal $irtues of philosophical practice. For a more eneral $iew of the $irtues that ha$e %een associated with wisdom, see www.wisdompa e.com "last access April 5rd 5?33#. 6ince these three $irtues imply so many other $irtues, they could e$en %e called 2cardinal2. :e will see, for instance, that the classical cardinal $irtues of prudence " ood +ud ement in practical affairs#, +ustice, temperance, and coura e are closely related to them. As Aristotle said, one %ecomes $irtuous %y practisin $irtues.

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ne otiation or a $er%al fi ht where one tries to make one!s predefined ideas pre$ail without wantin to take a critical look at them. ,iscussion as an attempt to distance oneself from one!s conceptions and to scrutinise them from the $iewpoints of others can %e considered a philosophical exercise. Impartiality is closely related to o%+ecti$ity, a $irtue of distance that can %e $isualised %y the aid of the a e1old philosophical exercise of ima inin oneself ho$erin a%o$e /arth!s surface and seein oneself and one!s worries in a lar er perspecti$e.3= Impartiality and o%+ecti$ity are essential elements in our notion of +ustice, and insincerity, cruelty, reed, malice, in ratitude, treachery, thou htlessness and manipulati$eness are all forms of thinkin and %eha$in in which a +ust relationship to the world is shattered. 0ack of o%+ecti$ity can also manifest as %oundless impatience that cannot %ear any delay, incon$enience, or o%struction. 4%+ecti$ity is ti htly linked to a lofty $irtue we call reatness of soul, which in$ol$es an awareness of the shortness of our li$es, of the puniness of our physical aspect, and of the importance of o$ercomin all limited $iewpoints.3D It!s opposites include pettiness, mawkishness, narcissism, recklessness, irasci%ility, stu%%ornness, deceitfulness, %itterness and hu%ris. ,e$elopin o%+ecti$ity a%out oneself can also enhance coura e, %y which we mean not i$in up in situations of real or ima ined dan er that cause fear. 4ur su%+ecti$e tendency to exa erate the num%er and siHe of our dan ers makes us una%le to act as we should in the name of our own lon 1term interests and the interests of others. ,isinterestedness as impartiality and o%+ecti$ity often calls for the $irtue of a$oidin hasty conclusions, and e$en suspension of +ud ment. For instance, we cannot easily determine whether we should see our li$es "or some parts of our li$es# as ood or %ad. This is partly %ecause it is next to impossi%le to know all the facts upon which such e$aluations depend. :e cannot for example predict the total conse-uences of our past and present actions. /$ents that at first si ht appeared like ood fortune can ultimately lead to our ruin, and thin s that initially seem like a disaster can e$entually i$e us stren th and make us happier. Moreo$er, e$aluations are relati$e in the sense that thin s can always et %etter or worse than they are& e$en a situation that seems hopeless is %etter than an e$en more hopeless one. It is therefore difficult to say how much we should ultimately lament or re+oice the e$ents of our li$es. ,etachment is yet another facet of disinterestedness.3> ,etachment "or non1attachment# as a $irtue is a disposition to let o of e$aluations and to experience the world as it is in itself and not as it is for us and our pro+ects.3E "!:orld! here refers %oth to the external world and the internal world of our %odies and minds 1 insofar as such a distinction %etween the inner and the outer exists.# A detached mind neither praises nor condemns, and can e$en %e descri%ed as %ein in a state of indifference I althou h this familiar word from 6toic scriptures is %ound to sound suspicious to many of us. Indifference does not here mean cold1heartedness %ut a condition of lettin thin s happen as they happen without +ud in them. 6ince willin deri$es from e$aluations, detachment can further %e characterised as a state of non1willin ; and a consciousness in a state of non1willin and non1choosin is unfocused, e-ually close to, and aware of, e$erythin in the world "as experienced#.3F ,etachment as non1willin also accentuates the present moment I or e$en a sense of timelessness 1 and ena%les the mind to free itself from many re rets of the past and cares a%out the future. )racticin detachment is a philosophical exercise that enhances, or e$en is, peace of mind. There are many painful and detesta%le thin s in our external and internal li$es that we cannot a$oid in any way, and such ordeals re-uire the $irtue of disinterestedness in the form of
3= 4n soul!s fli ht and the $iew from a%o$e, see Hadot, )ierre& Philosophy as a #ay of life, Llackwell, 4xford, 3CCD, ch C. @owadays we could speak of 2satellite perspecti$e2 or 2helicopter perspecti$e2. 3D Lertrand 7ussell writes that a person with reatness of soul sees 2himself and life and the world as truly as our human limitations will permit2, and realises 2the %re$ity and minuteness of human life2. 7ussell also says that a person 2who has once percei$ed, howe$er temporarily and howe$er %riefly, what makes reatness of soul, can no lon er %e happy if he allows himself to %e petty, self1seekin , trou%led %y tri$ial misfortunes, dreadin what fate may ha$e in store for him.2 The Con$uest of %appiness, 7outled e, 0ondon, 5??>, p. 3DC. 3> For a classical treatise on detachment, see Meister /ckhart& The Essential &ermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and 'efense. )aulist )ress, Mahwah, @B, 3CF3, pp. 5FD15C=. 3E Hadot, i%id, p. 5D=. 3F ,etachment as non1focused awareness typically %lurs the distinction %etween the e o and non1e o.

acceptance.3C Acceptance "or resi nation# is a mode of detachment where one has to con-uer some unwillin ness.5? It does not necessarily mean considerin one!s ordeal a ood thin , %ut rather conformin to one!s situation and refusin to make it worse %y distortin its true nature, or %y complainin a%out it. The ordeal demands %endin one!s will, and the %etter one is a%le to do this, the li hter the ordeal %ecomes. )racticin acceptance is a philosophical exercise. 6ocrates, for example, saw his marital life with the hot1tempered Manthippe as an ordeal, and said that it makes other compara%le ordeals easier to endure.53 Many ordeals are pro$ided to us independently of our will, %ut sometimes it may %e prudent to choose short1term ordeals for oneself. This is the case when our ran e of possi%le choices %ecomes too limited due to our reluctance to face certain kinds of anxiety1producin situations, or when we cannot en+oy peace of mind in the present %ecause of our fear of some future misfortune. 6eemin ly terri%le conditions of life often appear more tolera%le when we familiarise oursel$es with them. Praemeditatio malorum, an ancient philosophical exercise of acceptance, means that we picture in our minds all kinds of disasters, losses, and unpleasant episodes that we may %e re-uired to under o.55 First of all, this exercise creates a contrast %etween a ood present and a possi%le %ad future, and thus makes us more rateful for the thin s we now ha$e and en+oy. 6econdly it trains our minds for these %ad thin s 1 unexpected disasters are usually more difficult to %ear than ones we ha$e %raced oursel$es for, +ust like unexpected military actions tend to cause more ha$oc than ones for which soldiers ha$e prepared themsel$es.59 Praemeditatio malorum therefore stren thens the attitude acceptance %oth in the present and in possi%le futures. A complementin exercise of acceptance is payin attention to e$erythin that either is or has %een ood in our li$es without introducin a contrast to a ne ati$e future.5= 6chopenhauer remarks that one small painful spot in our %odies makes us o$erlook the fact that we are otherwise healthy,5D and in the same way we sometimes ha$e a tendency to ma nify the si nificance of our ad$ersities and shortcomin s at the expense of those thin s that ri htly should %e a cause of pleasure and +oy. !penness The $irtue of openness can %e approached %y distin uishin %etween temporal and spatial openness. The opposite of temporal openness is mechanical repetition, and the opposite of spatial openness is enclosure. The spatial meanin is primary, %ecause escapin repetition seems to re-uire %reakin the enclosure and lettin in influences.5>
3C 6ome of the ordeals are accidents, and some %elon to the eneral course of human life. 6ometimes their inescapa%ility depends on our ha$in adopted aims that we deem too fundamental to sacrifice so as to circum$ent the pro%lematic points alon the ways of our li$es. 5? 4ne form of acceptance is mercifulness in relation to our own inescapa%le faults and those of others. 53 6ocrates famously -uipped that if one marries, one will re ret it, %ut if one remains unmarried, one will re ret it too. Here is another una$oida%le contradiction of life, at least for some of us. 55 4n this exercise, see Ir$ine, :illiam& ( )uide to the )ood Life* The (ncient (rt of &toic "oy. 4xford Ani$ersity )ress, 4xford, 5??C. 59 6eneca for example writes to 0ucilius& 2/$eryone faces up more %ra$ely to a thin for which he has lon prepared himself N...O Those who are unprepared, on the other hand, are panic1stricken %y most insi nifcant happenin s. :e must see to it that nothin takes us %y surprise.2 Letters from a &toic, )en uin, 0ondon, 3C>C, p. 3CF. <ettin our clue from the military analo ies and examples often used %y 6eneca, we could see life as a trainin camp that constantly tests our endurance and makes us readier for further ordeals. 5= The /picureans fa$oured this exercise. /picurus ad$ises us to recall our past pleasures and think of our present ones. He also says that unless we ha$e unnatural and unnecessary desires, it is likely that our pleasures will continue. 6ee Hadot, i%id., p. FF. 5D Counsels and maxims, )rometheus Looks, Amherst, @J, p. E 5> It is a conceptual truth that spatial openness re-uires the distinction %etween the inside and the outside, +ust like temporal openness re-uires the distinction %etween the past and the future. If there are experiences where these forms of experience cease to apply "and I do not dou%t that there are such experiences#, openness is not possi%le.

Much of what we think, feel, and do, is repetiti$e; and some of these patterns may cause us pro%lems. For example, we interpret -ualitati$ely new phenomena throu h the lens of our old conceptions and thus et them wron . 7epetition can lead to %oredom, and depression is often a result of our repeatedly returnin to painful thou hts and memories. 6tu%%ornly clin in to one!s ori inal hopes and plans in circumstances that will not allow their fulfillment will lead to lamentation and despair. If the desires that connect our minds to the world are unchan in and inflexi%le, they will dra us down when the world suddenly starts mo$in in an unexpected direction. 6ince repetitions express certain ways of understandin oursel$es and the world, or a particular $iew of life, we occasionally need no$el words and ideas that enrich our understandin and that may ha$e the power to transform our emotions and our entire manner of existence I to turn us into somethin that we were not %efore. The course of our thou hts and feelin s can naturally pro$e resistant to chan e, and in that case there may %e no alternati$e to adoptin a resi ned, %eni n stance towards our present sel$es. )hilosophy either alters our harmful patterns or lets us come to %etter terms with them.5E 4penness is a state of recepti$ity in which mental mechanisms cease to operate at least momentarily.5F 4ften the disposition of recepti$ity can %e descri%ed as one of waitin , welcomin , inspiration and responsi$eness. :onderin "or mar$ellin # is an attitude of openness in which one asks -uestions as well as encounters perplexities and causes of astonishment. In the en-uirin mode of openness the mind acti$ely seeks to %e exposed to facts and ideas that can chan e it. As to the the spatial meanin of openness, one can first of all %e open to the external world that includes e$erythin from the thin s, texts and people in one!s $icinity to the outer space %eyond the /arth!s atmosphere. /xternal openness means recepti$ity of the understandin to the transformati$e influences of the fi$e senses that connect it to the surroundin world. 6uch openness may seem simple and easy, %ut in reality it offers endless challen es %ecause of the mind!s distractions and past1dri$en preoccupations. The opposite of external openness is self1centeredness. 6elf1centeredness is a $ice not only %ecause it fre-uently occasions displeasure in others and makes us less useful than we would otherwise %e, %ut also %ecause it ensnares us in our own pro%lems and often makes them worse than they would %e without constant attention. 6ometimes pro%lems of life are not so much sol$ed as mo$ed aside when we start concernin oursel$es with somethin else.5C 4penness to the senses can de$elop into curiosity and a search for knowled e. /$en if philosophy is not a science in itself, interest in science %elon s to philosophy, %ecause knowled e
6ayin that 2you are in e$erythin there is, and e$erythin is in you2, as 7an 0aha$ does, comes close to denyin the rele$ance of the concept of openness. 6ee 2:hat 0u told me2, at http&GGwww.trans1sophia.net "last access May >th 5?33#. It also seems to deny the rele$ance of the $ery distinction %etween the e o and non1e o. 5E 7an 0aha$ has a fairly pessimistic $iew of the powers of philosophy to affect our repetitions& 2The forces that maintain our patterns and conceptions are extremely powerful, and mere philosophical understandin cannot usually o$ercome them.2 6ee http&GGwww.trans1sophia.net, Course on philosophical practice and trans+sophia "last access May >th 5?33#. 6uch an estimation may or may not %e warranted, %ut as the 6toics of all times ha$e pointed out, philosophy also shows in how we relate to thin s that are not in our control. 5F 0aha$, 7an& 2)hilosophical practice as contemplati$e philo1sophia2, in Practical Philosophy, F, 3, 5??>, and 2)hilosophical practice& Ha$e we one far enou hP2, in Practical Philosophy, C, 5, 5??F. 6ee also Course on philosophical practice and trans+sophia, where 0aha$ writes& 24ur task, then, is to open in oursel$es a small space that is empty of oursel$es I empty of our usual patterns and conceptions, free from our normal attitudes and e o.2 2:e do not criticiHe or analyHe, we do not worry a%out correct or incorrect, we simply open oursel$es for new understandin s.2 0aha$ tends to re ard openness and the resultin enrichment of understandin as the sole definin feature of wisdom& 2As human %ein s we ha$e definite psycholo ical and cultural structures. Lut while we li$e our normal life, we can also maintain an openness to %eyond these structures. This state of mind is 6ophia 1 wisdom. It is the state of mind that is open to the many fountains of understandin , of plenitude, of life.2 2A wise person is not limited to his self1centered concerns, %ut is in touch with a reater reality, with wider horiHons of human existence.2 I think that there is a need for other $irtues as well& wisdom is not exhausted %y openness. 5C 0ei%niH for instance recommended ardenin , research and collectin curiosities as remedies for painful passions. 6ee 7oinila, Markku& Leibni, on -ational 'ecision+Ma ing, at http&GGwww.doria.fiG%itstreamGhandleG3??5=G=5FEGlei%niHo.pdfPse-uenceQ5, p. 559 "last access April 3>th 5?33#. 7ousseau em%raced %otany as a cure for his sense of ha$in %een re+ected.

may ena%le us to %ypass all kinds of dan ers and to pursue worthy ends more efficiently.9? For example, knowled e of ecolo ical threats and of possi%le ways of a$oidin them can %e considered a part of philosophy in our time. Much of what we call ood +ud ment is simply useful knowled e 1 or often more precisely know1how 1 that one ains throu h %ein open to the world.93 :hile a lar e part of the knowled e re-uired %y ood +ud ment is non1scientific, some of it may %e modern technolo ical knowled e that has %een arri$ed at throu h scientific procedures.95 The second spatial direction of openness is inward, towards our own minds and %odies. 4ur minds contain aspects and layers that do not %elon to what we can call our official, or mainstream, self 1 the cluster of thou hts, attitudes and feelin s that we ha$e rown accustomed to include in oursel$es. Internal openness is recepti$ity to ima es, conceptions and emotions that ha$e %een excluded from this pri$ile ed circle of the e o. For example, it often appears as if our dreams %rou ht us messa es from the i nored or hidden parts of our minds.99 Attunin oursel$es to these si nals mi ht enlar e our self1conception and thus ena%le us to reco nise our own nature more thorou hly. Insofar as we identify oursel$es with some specific part of our %ody "and in particular our head#, internal openness also si nifies recepti$ity to internal %odily sensations. )roprioception is an example of an area of human experience that one can %ecome closed to. Feelin our stomachs and %reathin is similarly a form of internal recepti$ity that may i$e us somethin new to understand. " #ndependence Autarchy, or independence, is a crucial $irtue.9= I will here di$ide this $irtue into independence of thou ht, independence of aims, and independence of emotions.9D Independence of thou ht means thinkin accordin to one!s own nature and enrichin the ideas one already has. The stream of one!s thou hts can %e di$erted from its true course, +ust like innumera%le cultures ha$e %een destroyed %y adoptin too many forei n ways. Independence of thou ht is not stu%%ornness, %ut it is still an antidote to excessi$e openness& we need to %e oursel$es, not play rounds for external influences. The $ice that contrasts to independence of thou ht is su esti%ility. Firstly, a critical attitude is essential for independence of thou ht. )hilosophers think for themsel$es and en-uire after reasons of %elief instead of simply %elie$in whate$er it is that someone asks them to %elie$e. Critical thinkin sculpts our minds so that we are finally left with
9? 6ee Maxwell, @icholas& 2Can Humanity 0earn to Lecome Ci$iliHedP The Crisis of 6cience without Ci$iliHation2, "ournal of (pplied Philosophy, 3E, 5???; and .rom /no#ledge to Wisdom0 ( re1olution for science and the humanities, 0ondon, )entire )ress, 5??E. 6ee also http&GGwww.nick1maxwell.demon.co.uk "last access 5nd April 5?33#. 93 The importance of worldly knowled e for ood +ud ment in practical affairs has %een reco nised in philosophy at least since Aristotle. Hursthouse, 7osalind& 2)ractical wisdom& a mundane account2, Proceedings of the (ristotelian &ociety, 3?>, 3, 5??E. A$aila%le at http&GGonlineli%rary.wiley.comGdoiG3?.3333G+.3=>E1C5>=.5??>.??3=C.xGpdf "last access Bune 9rd 5?33#. 95 6ee 0om%ardo, Thomas& 2Creati$ity, wisdom, and our e$olutionary future2, at http&GGwww.wisdompa e.comG0om%ardo11Creati$ity:isdom/$olFuture.pdf "last access Bune 5nd 5?33#. 99 4n dream interpretation as a part of philosophical practice, see 7aa%e, )eter& 2)hilosophical counselin and the interpretation of dreams2, International "ournal of Philosophical Practice 3, 9, 5??5. The idea that interpretin dreams is a part of philosophy deri$es from )lato, Reno of Citium, and other ancient philosophers. 6ee Hadot, What is ancient philosophy?, p. 3CC. 9= Hadot has shown that autarchy was a key ideal across the ancient philosophical scene from /picureanism to Cynicism, 6toicism and 6kepticism. What is ancient philosophy?, ch. C, see esp. p. 553. Autarchy can also %e defined as self1sufficiency. 9D These are dimensions of mental or spiritual independence as opposed to material independence. The latter can %e descri%ed %y the phrase 2of independent means2, and there are two main forms of such independence. First of all, one can practice huntin , atherin , small1scale a riculture etc. in an effort to produce e$erythin one needs %y oneself. Another form of material independence is possessin wealth. If neither of these is possi%le, one has to sell one!s la%our either to customers or to employers.

only those ideas that we can truthfully reco nise as our own. Another way to stren then independent thinkin is solitude, perhaps to ether with disconnection from communications media. Lein alone creates a silent space where we are left free to think the kinds of thou hts that express our own nature, and, if necessary, to distin uish them from the thou hts of other indi$iduals and the supposed thou hts of anonymous multitudes. 4ur ownmost thou hts partly define who we are, and there is no reason to ne lect and lose oursel$es under the 1 often ima inary 1 pressure of others.9> An independent person seeks to adopt aims that express her inner nature. Althou h she does not support social or political acti$ities and currents without wei hin them a ainst her own ideals, we should not confuse her with a principled re%el who wants to %e different from others and assert her indi$iduality.9E An independently aim1settin person wants to %e solely responsi%le for the fulfillment of her aims whene$er possi%le, and this implies that if she participates in a collecti$e endea$or where her own input is not decisi$e to the outcome, she e$aluates her own performance on the %asis of her moti$es rather than end1results. The opposite of independence of aims is heteronomy. Independence of aims is %enefited %y meditatin on one!s life from the perspecti$e of the last moment, the end of that world of which one has any knowled e. There should not %e any reason to re ret the way one li$ed and si h& 2:hy did I not pursue oals I found worthwhile, why did I waste my time on inessential thin s and denied myself the +oys of self1realisationP2 4n the one hand, meditation on death stresses the importance of each particular moment "our time is limited, and any moment could %e the last#, and on the other hand it creates a perspecti$e on one!s life as a whole in which all indi$idual acti$ities should find their considered places. 6elf1knowled e as a $irtue is necessitated %y independence of aims& one cannot know where to o unless one knows who one is and where one stands. )hilosophical practice as counsellin has %een descri%ed as 2world1$iew interpretation2 and 2critical examination of life1directin conceptions2,9F and since our $iews "or conceptions# certainly %elon to our sel$es, these characterisations are -uite understanda%le from the standpoint of self1knowled e. Conceptual in$esti ations can %e a necessary part of such self1examinations, %ecause we do not always know what the content, or meanin , of our $iews is. Howe$er, in order to a$oid too co nition1centered $iews of self1knowled e in which the self is defined solely in terms of concepts and conceptions, we must recall that this $irtue also concerns our %odies and emotions. :ritin to oneself is a philosophical exercise that can often %e seen as an attempt to clarify one!s understandin of one!s thou hts and feelin s. Monolo ical philosophical writin may also mould one!s moti$ations for action.9C The difference %etween writin to oneself and writin to others is not always sharp, %ecause it is possi%le to pu%lish writin s that one initially or primarily intended for self1reflection and self1formation, and con$ersely writin to some pu%lic often promotes one!s own self1understandin and self1renewal.=? Independence of emotions means a$oidin excessi$e worldly ties of cra$in and a$ersion. The more stron ly one is %ound to the $a aries of fortune, the more helpless one feels; and the more

9> 7ousseau!s -e1eries of the &olitary Wal er ")en uin Looks, 0ondon, 5??=# is a classic exposition of the importance of solitude for philosophers. 7ousseau writes "p. 9D#& 2These hours of solitude and meditation are the only ones in the day when I am completely myself and my own master, with nothin to distract or hinder me, the only ones when I can truly say that I am what nature meant me to %e.2 An excellent recent account of the effects of solitude to one!s way of thinkin is Sull, 7o%ert& &olitude* &ee ing #isdom in extremes. @ew :orld 0i%rary, @o$ato, CA, 5??F. 9E /rnst BTn er!s description of an anarch exemplifies the distinction %etween independence and %ein a re%el. Eumes#il, Marsilio )u%lishers, @ew Jork, @J, 5??=. 9F 0aha$, 7an& 2A conceptual framework for philosophical counselin & world$iew interpretation2; 6chefcHyk, Michael& 2)hilosophical Counselin as a Critical /xamination of 0ife1,irectin Conceptions2. Loth in 0aha$, 7an and Tillmanns, Maria "eds.#& Essays on Philosophical Counselling, Ani$ersity )ress of America, 0anham, M,, 3CCD. These descriptions of philosophical practice apply e-ually well to solitary thinkin & we need to examine our thou hts %y oursel$es. 9C Marcus Aurelius may %e the most well1known example of such writers. 6ee Hadot, )ierre& Philosophy as a #ay of life, ch. >. =? 6eneca says in one of his letters to 0ucilius& 26o listen to me as if I were speakin to myself.2 I%id., p. E9.

one thinks that one will mana e in all kinds of circumstances, the more peaceful one!s mind is.=3 Immoderately stron desires for wealth, power, fame, reco nition or pleasure are forms of uneasiness and distress in themsel$es, and additionally they tend to cause us to lose the purity of our hearts and consciences.=5 Feelin s like en$y, +ealousy, resentment and despair are similarly symptoms of a stron conati$e attachment to definite states of affairs. Independent emotions, %y contrast, are caused %y our own actions, can %e fulfilled without special fa$ours of the world, and lead us towards sources of harmless +oy. 4f course we all need many worldly thin s to sur$i$e and still more to li$e comforta%ly, %ut there clearly are de rees of %onda e and freedom, of addiction and self1mastery, of tur%ulence and tran-uility. For instance, a passion for music or research is much more independent in its terms of fulfillment than a passion for the top position in a race for possessions. It does not lea$e one at the mercy of the world. Many of the philosophical practices that either pre$ent or com%at dependent emotions deri$e from the $irtues of disinterestedness and openness. )ractices of detachment and impartiality are ood medicine, as are openin oneself to the world and immersin oneself in some ho%%y or serious undertakin . )ractices of solitude, critical thinkin and independent aim1settin will amplify the effects of these exercises. The purpose of all of them is to consolidate temperate ha%its that radually lessen the need for conscious effort. $ %onclusion& virtues in ways of life' in e(ercises' in counsellin) Firstly, philosophical practice is a life of $irtues. :hereas forward1lookin $irtues like ood +ud ment, coura e, and autonomous thinkin ena%le us to circum$ent many potential sources of confusion, irritation, an er, resentment and depression, %ackward1lookin $irtues like mercifulness with respect to our own imperfections and those of others make it more likely that we are a%le to reco$er from traumatic experiences 1 as in the practice of medicine, there are %oth pre$enti$e and healin philosophical practices.=9 8irtues also affect our relationship to the present moment. For instance, detachment, sense of relati$ity, flexi%ility, and mental independence increase our endurance and resilience while the disasters are upon us. The philosophical way of life undenia%ly confers therapeutic %enefits, %ut at the same time the idea of philosophy as a comprehensi$e way of life %reaks down the analo y %etween philosophy and therapy, %ecause it is senseless to say that one!s entire life is characterised %y therapy. Therapy is a part1time acti$ity, somethin one enters and lea$es; philosophy is a whole1time preoccupation and an existential attitude. Moreo$er, the focus of modern psychotherapies has usually %een on alle$iatin sufferin and enhancin well1%ein . :hile the philosophical life certainly in$ol$es an effort to feel at least tolera%ly ood a%out oneself and one!s world, it also includes co niti$e and moral $irtues that do not necessarily enhance one!s emotional well1%ein . The a%ility to think clearly and truthfully is an aspect of philosophy, and so is the readiness to accept the fact that we are accounta%le to a wider community of %ein s. )erhaps one could speak of a philosophical, $irtue1 related concept of health that is more inclusi$e than the one used in psychotherapies.==
=3 The sa e as depicted %y ancient philosophers did not typically ha$e intensi$e and $aried desires. :hen strollin in the nearness of shops, 6ocrates said& 2How many thin s I do not needU2 /picureanism 1 with its distinction %etween the natural and the unnatural desires 1 is a life1style of simplicity. The Cynic spirit of ascetism is an extreme example of autarchy. =5 This is related to yet another philosophical exercise, namely examination of one!s conscience. There should %e no reason to hide our moti$es and actions from anyone. 4n this exercise, see Hadot, )ierre& What is ancient philosophy?, pp. 3CF15?5. =9 Accordin to an ancient analo y philosophy takes care of our souls while medicine takes care of our %odies. 6eneca for instance writes that 2I am committed to writin some helpful recommendations, which mi ht %e compared to the formulae of successful medications.2 I%id, p. =D. 4n the analo y %etween philosophy and medicine in ancient <reece and 7ome, see @uss%aum, i%id. == )hilosophers do not typically employ modern psycholo ical classifications of mental disorders "or diseases#, and neither do they use psycholo ical theories to explain those disorders, or psycholo ical techni-ues to treat them. 8ices can %e called diseases of mind, %ut this does not imply that one should use some scientific procedure to

6econdly, philosophical practice means exercisin $irtues. /xercises like writin to oneself, lookin at oneself from a%o$e, detached awareness of e$erythin that happens, praemeditatio malorum, examinin one!s conscience, thinkin of one!s life from the point of $iew of the last limit, openin one!s self to the senses 1 these are ways to emphasise $irtues, to make them effecti$e and ali$e. The expression 2exercisin $irtues2 can also refer to a life where $irtues ha$e a central place, and in a way our li$es are lon processes of philosophical exercise. The distinction %etween philosophical and physical exercises is not always sharp, and many physical exercises such as runnin and swimmin can %e seen as philosophical.=D "Mental philosophical exercises can con$ersely ha$e positi$e physical aspects and effects.# Firstly, physical exercises make our %odies stron er, more flexi%le, and more resistant to afflictions, and this accords with prudence and other $irtues that relate to our present and lon 1term well1%ein . 6econdly, physical exercises refresh and purify our minds. This prepares us for reater independence and openness as well as ena%les us to take a calmer, more detached $iew of our li$es.=> Finally, as to the meanin of !practice! as discussion& philosophical counsellors sur$ey and foster their counsellees! powers of $irtue 1 their o%+ecti$ity, mercifulness, flexi%ility, openness to the world and new ideas, self1understandin , authentic thinkin and independent oal1settin , a%ility to disen a e from sla$ish dependencies, etc.=E The point of counsellin is to ena%le the counsellee!s inner oodness to row at the expense of her destructi$e tendencies in the specific pro%lematic situation that she finds herself in& the situation should %e reco nised as it is and taken as an opportunity for $irtues to de$elop and to rise to the challen e. :hile furtherin the counsellee!s self1knowled e can %e re arded as an almost uni$ersally a reed1upon minimum aim of counsellin amon philosophers, we should see it as a mere example from a wide ran e of intellectual and practical $irtues that counsellin encoura es. The $irtues that the counsellee needs may %e hidden from her mainstream thinkin , and as the concept of fosterin implies, philosophers ou ht to help their counsellees to want to open their minds and hearts to these i nored %ut nascent $irtues. 4f course, the purpose is usually not so much to talk a%out the re-uired $irtues in abstracto 1 often it is not e$en necessary to ha$e any specific names for them 1 %ut rather to examine how they could help the counsellee forward on her way of life. )hilosophical counsellin promotes mental health and can %e called therapeutic to the extent that it succeeds in unearthin and stren thenin $irtues; %ut referrin to philosophical counsellin as a therapy "amon others# would %e a mistake, %ecause philosophical discussions do not ha$e a clearly delineated method or techni-ue, and neither are they %acked %y a distinct theory that could %e marketed and tau ht to students. The freedom and open1mindedness of philosophical counsellin is an asset that we should not allow to et lost under any circumstances. )hilosophical counsellin is an in$itation to enter the path towards philosophical practice as exercises and as an entire way of life. At the same time counsellin already is 1 or should %e 1 an exercise of $irtues like impartiality and critical thinkin .

References
classify, explain, or cure them. =D 6ocrates is reported to ha$e taken his physical health seriously, )lato was a wrestler, and numerous later philosophers includin 6eneca and 6chopenhauer ha$e recommended physical exercise. )ierre Hadot remarks that 2the notion of philosophical exercises has its roots in the ideal of athleticism and in the ha%itual practice of physical culture typical of the ymnasia.2 I%id, p. 3FC. He also writes that 2+ust as, %y dint of repeated physical exercises, athletes i$e new form and stren th to their %odies, so the philosopher de$elops his stren th of soul, modifies his inner climate, transforms his $ision of the world, and, finally, his entire %ein .2 Philosophy as a #ay of life, p. 3?5. => Many philosophical counsellors operate outdoors instead of indoor spaces typical of psychotherapy. 6ome of these outdoor sessions in$ol$e mo$ement, mainly walkin . :alkin and philosophy ha$e a lon common history datin %ack to ancient <reece. =E Tukiainen, Arto& 2)hilosophical counsellin as a process of fosterin wisdom in the form of $irtues2, Practical Philosophy 3?, 3, 5?3?.

Achen%ach, <erd 'as leine 2uch der inneren -uhe, Herder 8erla , Frei%ur , 5???. Achen%ach, <erd Lebens !nnerschaft, Herder 8erla , Frei%ur . 5??3. Lrandt, ,aniel Philosophische Praxis* Ihr 2egriff und ihre &tellung ,u den Psychotherapien* 8erla Sarl Al%er, MTnchen, 5?3?. Cohen, /lliot What Would (ristotle 'o? &elf+Control through the Po#er of -eason* )rometheus Looks, Amherst, @J, 5??9. Hadot, )ierre Philosophy as a Way of Life, Llackwell, 4xford, 5??F. Hadot, )ierre What is (ncient Philosophy? Har$ard Ani$ersity )ress, Cam%rid e, Mass., 5??=. 0aha$, 7an Course on Philosophical Practice and Trans+&ophia, a$aila%le at http&GGwww.trans1 sophia.net. 7aa%e, )eter Issues in Philosophical Counseling, )rae er )u%lishers, :estport, Conn., 5??5. 6chmid, :ilhelm Mit sich selbst befreundet sein, 6uhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 5??E.

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