MAXNE SHEETS-JOHNSTONE WONDER AND

PHLOSOPHY
O Wonder is a passion that fuels us towards knowledge and gives us epistemic openness
4 A pan-human universal
O Differences between Sheets-Johnstone and Descartes
4 Similarities:
Wonder is a fuel
Similar priority of wonder
Wonder is not an act; it is a feeling
4 Differences:
Wonder is felt by everyone and even other species
The philosophical act is generated and fuelled by wonder
O Sheets-Johnstone conjoins thinking and feeling the whole time
Sheets-Johnstone says everyone is inclined towards wonder
O Deep and Shallow Wonder:
4 Shallow wonder is our daily decisions:
What to wear today, if it will rain, etc.
Can lead to deep wonder
By giving into deep wonder we are opening ourselves to philosophy
O Being the journey of the "great longing which is a bona fide
philosophical act
4 "Deep Wonder has declined in Western Culture:
Philosophy is becoming detached from experience
O Ex. Dealing exclusively with material and language
Speedy technology takes us away from deep wonder
O Wonder also leads us to questions about who we are:
4 n doing this we are admitting our finitude
4 Our disposition to fix ourselves
What's being fixed or factored out is decision
O Renders us passive
O Epistemic closure
ALLSON JAGGAR OUTLAW EMOTONS
We absorb the standards and values of our society in the very process of learning the
language of emotion, and those standards and values are built into the very foundation
of our emotional constitution.
The idea of our emotional constructs being gendered or implanted with societal
thoughts of our older generations
Within a hierarchical society, the norms and values that predominate tend to serve the
interests of the dominant group.
Whatever our color, we are likely to feel "visceral racism.
Whatever our sexual orientation, we are likely to be homophobic.
Whatever our class, we are likely to be somewhat competitive.
Whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women.
The dominant values are impIied but not directIy expressed in responses taken to be
precultural or acultural, our so-called gut responses.
nsofar as we take these conservative responses to be natural responses, they bIind us
to the possibiIity of aIternative ways of Iiving.
The hegemony that our society exercises over people's emotional constitution is
not total.
People still experience (and thus are capable of cultivating)
conventionally unacceptable emotions, or what Jaggar calls
"outlaw emotions.
Outlaw emotions are more common, in particular, among
groups who pay a disproportionate price for maintaining
the status quo.
MARGARET LTTLE BUREAUCRATC MODEL
O Bureaucratic model
O A central and influential tradition of moral philosophy stemming from the
European Enlightenment is characterized by what Little calls a bureaucratic
model of morality.
O According to this view:
To be objective is to be detached.
To be clear-sighted is to achieve distance.
To be careful in deliberation is to be cool and calm.
Moral wisdom is thus characterized as being dispassionate.
Emotions and desires are not part of the equipment needed to make
considered, sound moral judgments.
Moral agency involves a clear division of labour:
O Reason is responsible for coming to moral verdicts through a
process of detached deliberation.
O Then, reason passes its report on to the will, motivation, or
emotion, which then does or does not issue the appropriate
response.
O Little argues:
4 it is not only a falsely rigid conception.
4 t is also a decidedly gendered conception.
By this she means that the philosophical
conceptions of reason and emotion that operate
within this model are subtly shaped by their
respective associations with certain narrow,
distorted social conceptions of male and female.
Reason is responsible for coming to moral verdicts through a process of
detached deliberation. t reveals the way the world is.
Emotions, will, desire, instructed by reason, move us to respond to the
world with feeling and action.
O According to the separate spheres model of the sexes:
O Man's role is in the public sphere:
Economics, politics, religion, culture.
O Woman's role is in the private sphere
The domestic realm of caretaking for the natural, embodied aspects of
human life.
Woman is understood as existing for man as his helpmate.
O Differences and Similarities:
O n both the bureaucratic model of morality and the separate spheres model of the
sexes, the latter halves of the reason/emotion and man/woman dyads are
devalued.
Woman's association with the body and nature contributed to an image of
woman as a potential source of contamination, infection, and disorder to
man and his public office.
Emotion's association with the body and nature contributed to an image
of emotion as a potential source of contamination, infection, and disorder
to reason and its judicious office.
Little argues that -oth of these
rigidly bifurcated models are 1alse.
Little argues that:
O Emotional distance does not always clarify.
O Dispassionate detachment does not always reveal.
O Oftentimes emotional distance and detachment actually make us
less likely to pick up on the morally salient features of our
experience.
O To see clearly what is before us, we need to cultivate certain
desires, such as the desire to see justice done, and the desire to
see humans flourish.
O But we must also, more particularly, work at developing our
capacities for loving and caring about people.
O Little's Account:
O The attentiveness necessary to sound moral judgment is best ensured when we
care not simply about impersonal moral ideals such as justice, but about people
themselves.
Such care is a crucial constituent of the attentiveness required to see the
morally salient details of the situations we face.
Without such careful attention, one might see all the relevant aspects of a
situation, but those aspects might not appear in the proper moral gestalt,
i.e., one could fail to see the moral meaning the elements carry together.
O Possessing appropriate affecti.e., caring, affective attunement and
responsivenessare a necessary precondition of discerning morally salient
features clearly.
Possessing and comprehending the relevant moral concepts does not
necessarily entail that one will see the moral landscape clearly.
WLLAM JAMES A FEELNG THEORY OF EMOTON
O Common sense vs. Feeling theory of emotion:
4 Common sense:
Thought Emotion Feeling bodily change
4 Feeling theory:
Thought Feeling bodily change Emotion
O Both Descartes and James have a feeling theory of emotion
O Traces curiosity back to an instinct to be attracted to novel objects, along with an
instinctual hesitation towards that attraction
O Phylogenetic: genesis from the history of the species; evolutionary
O Ontogenetic: genesis from individual history
O This feeling theory of emotion allows us to make the conscious decision on how to
respond to our bodily change, if it does in fact overwhelm us then we will indeed have
direct justification for the "feeling part of emotion
MARTHA NUSSBAUM ADVERSARY VEW AND NEO-
STOCSM
O Adversary View:
4 The view that emotions are "non reasoning movements, unthinking energies that
simply push the person around and don't relate conscious perceptions
4 A Stoic view
4 This view is inadequate because:
No consciousness
No agency
t's not meaningful
There is NO NTENTONALTY
4 (*) the terrible power or urgency of the emotions, their problematic relationship
with one's sense of self, the sense of one's passivity and powerlessness before
them
O 5 components of Emotion:
4 1. They are about something; they have an object
4 2. The object is an intentional object
t figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person whose
emotion it is
More internal, embodies a way of seeing
Not so much the identity of the object that might change but how we
perceive the object
4 3. Emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object but complex beliefs
about the object
Not easy to distinguish an instance of seeing x as way from the belief that
x is y
4 4. They are all concerned with value, they see that their object is invested with
value
Because Nussbaum valued her mother is why she felt fear at her death
and hoped passionately for her recovery
4 5. The object of emotion is seen as important for some role it plays in the
person's own life
This doesn't mean that emotions view these objects simply as tools or
instruments of the agent's own satisfactions: they may be invested with
intrinsic worth
O Emotions are eudemonistic
4 The conception of eudemonia includes all that to which the agent ascribes
intrinsic value
O ntrinsic vs. nstrumental value
4 ntrinsic: an end in itself
An intimate relationship to our flourishing
4 nstrumental: means fro some other end
Replaceable
O The Neo-Stoic View:
4 Claims that grief is identical with the acceptance of a proposition that is both
evaluative and eudemonistic
Concerned with one or more of the person's most important goals and
ends
4 All the judgements that identify with emotion are concerned with vulnerable
externalities: those that can be affected by events beyond one's control, those
that are unexpected, those that can be destroyed or removed when one doesn't
wish it
4 The judgements described are necessary constituent elements of the emotion,
but they are also sufficient
This sufficiency should be viewed internally: as that of a constituent part
which itself causes whatever other parts there may be
O Differences between Stoic and Neo-Stoic View:
4 Both views say to look at the valuation of external objects like money, house, etc.
n order to discover why a society is torn apart
4 Nussbaum is more precise about emotion and tends to pay closer attention with
their problems
Underlines that emotions cause evaluative judgements
Emotions are endangered by an individual and how they perceive (the
world, their thinking, etc.)
Emotions are shaped under the specific beliefs of the individual
Emotions are intentional in their nature
Emotions are appraisals or value judgments, which ascribe to things and
persons outside the person's own control great importance for that
person's own flourishing
O Can contribute to self-perception of an individual
One of the main goals is freedom from disturbance that implies a state of
calm detachment resulting from the detachment of external goods
4 Both acknowledge that some emotions can be destructive to human flourishing
MATHEW RATCLFFE CAPGRAS DELUSON
O Capgras delusion:
4 people with this delusion maintain that familiars, such as spouses, have been
replaced by imposters
O Folk Psychology:
4 The central achievement of which is the attribution of internal mental states,
principally the propositional attitudes of 'belief' and 'desire', on the basis of
behavioural observations
4 Facilitated by a theory of the relationships between kinds of mental state and
behaviour
One observes another person, assigns mental states and then explains or
predicts their behaviour accordingly
4 nvolves a combination of both theoretical abilities and simulation routines
4 Neglects the practical relatedness between people
O Horizons:
4 Sets of interrelated possibilities that surround what actually appears, contributing
to the sense that it is and the sense of what it is
4 The inner horizon is made up of aspects of an object that are currently hidden but
offer themselves as possibilities for perceptual access
4 Constituted by bodily dispositions
O Perceptual experience involves an elaborate and dynamic set of correspondences
between what is actually perceived and how potential activities will alter that perception
O Ratcliffe proposes that a sense of artificiality that characterises experiences of the
spouse, due to a lost of distinctively personal possibilities. This is eclipsed by
approaches that focuses solely on actual experiential content, insofar as it fuels the
formation of propositional attitudes, and that construe recognition in a spectatorial
fashion, rather than situating it in patterns of affective relatedness
ANDREAS BRENNER DGNTY AND THE LVED BODY
O Lived vs. Human Body:
4 Lived Body: to feel one's own body constitutes a lived body
A perceived body
4 Human body: corporeal in the sense of being something three-dimensional
O Dignity is described as a perspective from which the perspectives of the possessor of
dignity are made valid
4 This perspective is recognized as radically subjective, founded in the bodily
nature of the respective possessors of dignity
O A pre-reflexive knowledge of the self is a prerequisite and the presupposed for the
reflexive knowledge
4 Authenticity is a prerequisite for autonomy
O Shame reflexively constituted authenticity points further; consequently dignity allows us
to suppose through the essences that are not gifted to reflection, which bring them to
expression in the safeguarded self-possession or "presubjective subjectivity that
defends itself against foreign determination.
SANDRA BARTKEY SHAME AND GENDER
O Women typically are more shame-prone then men, that shame is not so much a
particular feeling or emotion as a pervasive affective attunement to the social
environment, that women's shame is more than merely an effect of subordination but,
within the larger universe of patriarchal social relations, a profound mode of disclosure
both of self and situation
O Moral psychology as currently practiced fails to do justice to the quite common kind of
shame
O Diagnosis of this failure
O Aspects of shame:
4 Recognition
The distress involved in feeling ashamed is called forth only insofar as i
myself identify with the values and perspective of the one whose gaze
has shamed me
4 The cringing withdrawal from others
4 The cringing within
Sometimes felt as a physical sensation of being pulled downward and
inward
4 The necessity for hiding and concealment
O Shame Vs. Guilt:
4 Shame involves distressed apprehension of oneself as a lesser creature
Called forth by the apprehension of some serious flaw in the self
4 Guilt refers to the subjects actions
Called forth by the active violation of principles which a person values and
by which she feels herself bound
Called forth by the consciousness that one has committed a
transgression
4 Shame is felt over shortcomings, guilt is felt over wrongdoings
4 Both of them involve a condemnation of the self by itself for some failure to
measure up; it is the measures that differ
O The Other:
4 A composite portrait of other and earlier classroom teachers who had, in fact,
subjected them but not their male counterparts to consistent shaming behaviour
CHESHRE CALHOUN AN APOLOGY FOR MORAL SHAME
O Shame of the Moral Pioneer:
4 This strategy reconciles shame with autonomy by claiming that mature agents
only feel shame in their own eyes, and only for falling short of their own,
autonomously set standards
4 The price of reconciling moral shame and autonomy this way is the loss of a
plausible depiction of shame
4 Severs the connection between shame and concern for one's standing in a social
world
4 Might result in the inability to feel shame (if no other standards besides your own
are accepted)
O Shame of the Discriminating Social Actor:
4 Reconciles shame with autonomy by claiming that mature agents only feel
shame in the eyes of others whose ethical reactions they respect
4 ncludes the possibility that respected others can shame us with their criticisms
even when we disagree with their evaluation of us
4 They care how they appear to others
Because they have respect for others evaluative commitments, skills at
moral reasoning and perception
O Both make shame suitable for autonomous agent only by reducing the other before
whom we feel shame to a mirror of ourselves
O Both drop from view the fundamentally social nature of shame
O The "weight central to shame is not an epistemic notion. t is instead the "weight that
other people have for us when we acknowledge them as fellow social participants.
4 Practical weight
O The power to shame is a function of our sharing a moral practice with the shame and
recognizing that the shamer's opinion expresses a representative viewpoint within that
practice
O Vulnerability to shame has more to do with our sharing a moral practice with others than
it does with accepting another's criticism
O Dominant practice of morality generally continues to be one of the moral practices that
members of subordinate groups share with others. To share a social practice means that
one finds its moral understandings (at the very least) intelligible
O Thinks the explanatory weight more properly belongs on the representativeness of the
shamer's viewpoint.

MARCA BARON HEAT OF PASSON/PROVOCATON
DEFENSE
O Objective and Subjective components of the defense:
4 Objective: if a reasonable person in a similar circumstance would have been
provoked
4 Subjective: there has to be provocation
O Justification vs. Excuse:
4 Justification: there's nothing wrong if it's justified
4 Excuse: recognizes the unlawful act, however also recognizes that the agent is
not culpable
Partial excuse: mitigates but doesn't extirpate the consequence
Duress: situation centered
nsanity: agent centered (EMED)
Provocation defense seems to be a duress excuse
O The provocation defense also suggests that the provoker is
culpable; which makes the provocation defense a justification
O Suggests the provocation defense has gendered roots that should be abolished
4 Most often used to defend angered males
Defends violence against women
4 Talks about men defending the "invasion of property in reference to men
catching other men or lovers with their wives
Suggests women are property