What use does Marx make of the distinction between political and human emancipation?

In his seminal work On The Jewish Question, Marx explicates a critique of both Bauer's The Jewish Question and the theory of liberal rights. He argues that in Bauer's account of the emancipation of erman !ews, Bauer had failed to make the critical distinction between "political emancipation# and "human emancipation#$ consequently, Marx asserts that Bauer's conclusion %that religion must be abolished& and the concept of liberal rights in general are incoherent with the notion of emancipation. In this essay, I will be arguing that Marx's distinction between the two types of emancipation is 'ustified and he intended to use the distinction as a foundation for his criticism of both Bauer and of liberal rights(. )dditionally, I will suggest that commentators who *iew Marx's distinction in On The Jewish Question as a polemic against the !ewish religion are mistaken. I will conclude that while Marx's distinction and criticism is generally well+founded, his incomplete account of human nature means his account of distinction is not as substanti*e as it could be. In order to understand how Marx's uses the distinction between political and human emancipation, it would be useful to begin with an initial clarification of the distinction. Political emancipation vs. human emancipation Marx argues that political emancipation is primarily an emancipation of the state 'from religion in general' but is an incomplete form of emancipation because the state can exist as a free state without necessarily 'man being a free man'. Marx uses the ,orth )merican states as a prime example of a "perfected# secular political state- he argues that 'we find even in the country of complete political emancipation, religion not only exists, but displays a fresh and vigorous vitality'. Marx's reasoning is that a politically emancipated state, in its *ery nature, creates a di*ision of li*es in indi*iduals into 'a heavenly and an earthly life'. .n one le*el, we superficially adopt what Marx calls mankind's 'species-life' and we lead an illusory life of citi/ens of the 'political state' 0 in other words, we act as communal beings stri*ing for the flourishing of humanity, but the community is simply an illusion. .n the other le*el howe*er, we adopt the 'material life' when we lead a life in 'civil society' 0 in other words, we act as egoistic and atomised indi*iduals. In Marx's conception of the political state, indi*iduals are sub'ect to an internal conflict between li*ing as a member of a community and li*ing as a separate indi*idual with solitary practices %e.g. religion, economic competition&. 1herefore, Marx argues that an increased interest in religion is actually 'inherent in the nature and category' of political emancipation of the state. .ur human "essence# is directed towards forming communities and when religion is banished from the sphere of public law %i.e. when the state is secularised&, religion becomes 'the expression of man's separation from his community' and is re+established in the pri*ate li*es of indi*iduals %Marx, 2333&. .n the other side is Marx's notion of human emancipation. Marx explicitly makes clear that '4t5he emancipation of the state from religion is not the emancipation of the real man from religion'. In direct contrast, when human emancipation is brought about, 'the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen 4and becomes5 a species-being in his everyday life' %Marx, 2333&. By 'the abstract citizen', Marx is most likely referring to the "citi/en of the political state# who is integrated into the community of humanity, pre*iously only possible as an idealised illusion under political emancipation. 6onsequently, when
( 7ue to the purposes of this essay, I will be restricting the ma'ority of my analysis to Marx's use of his distinction, as opposed to critically analysing the accuracy of Marx's claims about liberal rights.

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human emancipation is accomplished, there will no longer be any separation between an indi*idual's ci*ic 'social power' and the communal 'political power' %i.e. pri*ate and public li*es will be united in the communal species+being&. ) possible ob'ection would be that Marx does not pro*ide a clear enough account of human emancipation and therefore, he does not make the distinction between political and human emancipation clear. 1his would ha*e a neutralising effect of Marx's critique as a whole 0 it could be asserted that Marx in fact makes no use %or incorrect use& of this fundamental distinction in his critique of Bauer and liberal rights$ his criticisms would fail because the distinction is muddled. Howe*er, it can be countered that On The Jewish Question is one of Marx's early writings and it is therefore unrepresentati*e of his complete theory of historical materialism 0 Marx's *agueness about the specific properties of human emancipation could be attributed to the relati*e immaturity of his ideas. Indeed, as Marx continues to de*elop his sensiti*ity towards the particular social and economic issues of his time, his conception of human emancipation becomes clearer. 8or example, two years later, Marx impro*es on his notion of human emancipation- 'separate individuals !will be" liberated from the various national and local barriers'$ additionally, the emancipated will gain 'control and conscious mastery' of the powers necessary to maintain a 'world-historical co-operation of individuals' %Marx, 2333&. 9e can therefore pro*isionally conclude that when he wrote about human emancipation, Marx was referring to the general notion of humanity embracing its 'speciesbeing' in order to create a global community without the barriers of class, religion or race with the goal of human flourishing %see :e Baron, (;<(&. 1his conception of human emancipation is set in stark contrast against the conception of political emancipation and the distinction becomes clear. 9hat use does Marx make of this distinction between political and human emancipation= I will argue that the two primary purposes are(. a critique of Bauer$ and 2. a critique of liberal rights. The distinction as a critique of Bauer It is clear Marx's essay is a critical reply to Bauer 0 the distinction between political and human emancipation is highlighted by Marx as the crucial difference between their accounts of the !ewish problem. 1herefore, the distinction is used as Marx's *ehicle for criticising Bauer on two related points, namely the nature of emancipation and the process of emancipation. :et us consider Marx's counter+arguments about the nature of emancipationMarx claims that Bauer's understanding of emancipation %specifically of the political kind& is incorrect and 'entangled in contradictions'. >nder Marx's reading, Bauer claims that in order for the !ewish problem to be sol*ed, the erman !ews need to achie*e political emancipation and religion needs to be abolished. In his reply, Marx explicitly contrasts his distinction to Bauer's lack thereof- 'he does not investigate the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation'. )s a rebuttal of Bauer, Marx uses his notion of political emancipation to show that 'religion is not in contradiction to the perfection of the state' and that religion is actually a symptom of the underlying defect. :et us now consider Marx's counter+arguments about the process of emancipation. Marx argues that the kind of emancipation that erman !ews ultimately need is not 'civic' or 'political' in nature. He argues that one of the ma'or errors Bauer makes is his failure to distinguish between the 'essential intermediary' step of political emancipation and the final goal of human emancipation %Marx, 2333&. Because Bauer does not make the distinction that

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he does, Marx argues that he misses the fact that 'by freeing himself politically, man frees himself in a roundabout way'$ therefore, Bauer is not only mistaken about the nature of the final stage of emancipation, he is mistaken about the role of political emancipation in the process of emancipation. 1his is most clearly seen in Marx's delineation of the political progress of different states. He uses the distinction to establish a crucial relation between theology and politics. By distinguishing a distinct concept of political emancipation, Marx is able to identify the *arying political progresses of states such as the 'purely theological' state of ermany, the incomplete 'constitutional state' of 8rance and finally the 'secular' and 'completely developed' ,orth )merican states$ this is a *ariation that Bauer, according to Marx, fails to accomplish %Marx, 2333&. The distinction as anti- emitic Howe*er, in modern criticism of Marx %and Bauer&, there has been a tendency to posit a completely different reading of his distinction of political and human emancipation. Instead of seeing Marx's writings primarily as a reply to Bauer, scholars ha*e suggested that Marx's distinguished notions of emancipation are in reality used to ad*ocate anti+?emitic *iews. 8or example, 8ischman writes that Marx@s account seems to 'bristle with anti-Jewish sentiments' %8ischman, (;A;&$ Bunes identifies elements of '#arxian Jew baiting' within his essay and draws certain %admittedly limited& parallels between Marx and )dolf Hitler %Bunes, (;C;&. Marx's association with Bauer, who writes about the !ewish religion in a similar %if not more disparaging& way, seems to only worsen the problem. It is not difficult to see where this impression of Marx comes from. )n anti+?emitic reading of the second section of On The Jewish Question would seem to suggest that !udaism stands in the way of human emancipation. Marx states that the secular basis of !udaism is 'practical need, self-interest', the worldly religion of the !ew is 'huc$stering' and that the worldly od of !udaism is 'money'. >ltimately, Marx claims that 'the emancipation of the Jews is the emancipation of man$ind from Judaism' %Marx, 2333& 0 under the anti+?emitic *iew, Marx's account of emancipation is merely used to highlight the obstacle !udaism poses to the ultimate human community. Howe*er, a pertinent reply would be that many anti+?emitic readings of Marx's distinction are, in many respects, short+sighted and superficial. It is important to remember that On The Jewish Question remains a work with a political and philosophical purpose and it is clear that Marx's account of emancipation is 'emphatically not about Judaism %as a religion& and is concerned only secondarily with Jewishness' %)ndrews, (;DA&. 9hile it is clear that Marx did hold certain derogatory *iews about !udaism2, all of the criticisms le*elled at the !ewish belief systems are also directed at the bourgeoisie in general. 1herefore, )ndrews correctly argues that 'The primary aim of .n 1he !ewish Euestion is not an assault on the Jews but an assault on capitalism' %)ndrews, (;DA&. Fiewed in this way, Marx's comments on !udaism in the second section, in some sense, appear to be symbolic. I would also like to argue that Marx actually uses the distinction in question to illuminate the political state of the 9estern capitalist world as seen through the symbol of the so+called 'worldly Jew' %Marx, 2333&. Ha*ing made the distinction between political and human emancipation, Marx seeks to apply the distinction to his current socio+political and economic situation. In contrast to Bauer, who *iews the !ewish problem as a theological one, Marx posits that the problem is a social question, one that can be sol*ed by looking at the !udaism in a different light because religion is a 'phenomenal manifestation of human alienation in general' %)*ineri, (;DG&. 9hen Marx
2 !ewish scholar )*ineri writes- 'That 'arl #arx was an inveterate antisemite is today considered a commonplace which is hardly ever (uestioned' %)*ineri, (;DG&

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talks about !udaism, he is referring to the capitalist %or "bourgeois#& spirit embodied in the 'actual, worldly Jew' %as opposed to the theological ')abbath Jew'&$ therefore, Marx makes pointed criticisms at the capitalist mind+set of self+interest. )ccording to Marx, ,orth )merica is politically emancipated yet the bourgeois spirit is per*asi*e, to the point where a pre*iously religiously %and to a certain extent, communally& oriented state has succumbed to the 'power of money'. 1his example further emphasises Marx's need for a distinction between political and human emancipation 0 through the use of religions as symbols, Marx restates that political emancipation is increasingly not enough because the power of money is too great and 'politics has become the serf of financial power' %Marx, 2333&. The distinction as a critique of liberal ri!hts Marx's distinction of political and human emancipation is also clearly used to critique the notion of liberal rights. He argues that in a politically emancipated state, all indi*iduals are members of egoistic ci*il society, each protected by liberal rights %or 'rights of man'& including 'e(uality, liberty, security, property'. 8or example, security is the 'highest social concept of civil society' because for Marx, it expresses the fact that society exists for the sole purpose of preser*ing an indi*idual, his rights and his property %Marx, 2333&. If indi*iduals in the ci*il society cannot rise abo*e their egoism, the liberal rights are indispensable to protect human beings from harming one another. 1he community of human beings is therefore relegated to a bond of 'natural necessity, need and private interest'. 1he problem with liberal rights, and by extension political emancipation, is that each of them presuppose di*ision and conflict between indi*iduals. In this sense, political emancipation is places in direct contrast to human emancipation, when we would embrace our species+being and our natural communal tendencies. 9e can see clearly that Marx uses his distinction between political and human emancipation to highlight the natural defects in a system that assumes human di*ision and conflict. Howe*er, it could be countered that Marx's use of his distinction is not perfect because Marx does not pro*ide an adequate account of human nature. If Marx is not correct about the species+being of humans %that we are in actuality communal beings&, then the distinction between political and human emancipation becomes more blurred. 6onsequently, while Marx might or might not actually be correct in criticising the notion of liberal rights, he is un'ustified in using his distinction as a sufficient groundwork for the criticism. Marx assumes that the species+being of humanity is fundamentally communal in nature. .n the other hand, he posits that human beings ha*e an egoistic nature that is re*ealed during political emancipation, one that requires liberal rights %such as the right of security& to protect. 1hese two natures seem to be dichotomous and Marx pro*ides no way of reconciling them. )n ob*ious reply would be that we can only fully express our species+being after we ha*e been fully emancipated by way of human emancipation. Het the notion of human emancipation rests on the idea that we ha*e a communal essence %separate from our tendencies of self+ interest& to express, so relying on that idea would be circular reasoning. 1herefore, we cannot use the distinguished notion of human emancipation to pro*e we actually ha*e a communal essence$ consequently, we cannot use the distinguished notion of human emancipation to pro*e that liberal rights are an obstacle at all. ,onetheless, e*en if Marx was not 'ustified in using his distinction between political and human emancipation as a critique of liberal rights, it is apparent that that was his intention. Marx also successfully uses his distinction to critique Bauer's solution to the !ewish problem. 1herefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the importance of Marx's account of emancipation lies *ery hea*ily on the aforementioned distinction.

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Biblio!raph"
)ndrew, I. (;DA. 'Marx and the !ews'. In *uropean Judaism+ , Journal for the -ew *urope, Fol. J, ,o. (, pp. ;+(G. )*ineri, ?. (;DG. 'Marx and !ewish Imancipation'. In Journal of the .istory of /deas, Fol. 2C, ,o. J, pp. GGC+GC3. 8ischman, 7. (;A;. '1he !ewish Euestion about Marx'. In 0olity, Fol. 2(, ,o. G, pp <CC+<<C. Ingram, 7. B. (;AA. 'Bights and Kri*ileges- Marx and the !ewish Euestion'. In )tudies in )oviet Thought, Fol. JC, ,o. 2, pp. (2C+(GC. :e Baron, B. (;<(. 'Marx on Human Imancipation'. In 1anadian Journal of 0olitical )cience, Fol. G, ,o. G, pp. CC;+C<3. Marx, L. 2333. 7. Mc:ellan ed., 'arl #arx+ )elected 2ritings %3nd *dition& .xford- .>K. Moro/iuk, B. K. (;<G. '1he Bole of )theism in Marxian Khilosophy'. In )tudies in )oviet Thought, Fol. (G, ,o. JMG, pp. (;(+2(2. Bunes, 7. (;C;. 'arl #arx+ , 2orld 2ithout Jews. ,ew Hork- Khilosophical :ibrary

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