Abstract

My paper, “Albert Speer – Master of Deception” was written in 2008 for my sixth MALS course

entitled “The Rise of National Socialism and the Holocaust”, taught by Professor James Brophy. This

course was of particular interest to me because I was transferred to DuPont Deutschland in Germany in

the 1970s and while there had the opportunity to discuss German history and politics with those who

had first-hand knowledge of the Nazi period.

The subject of memory was discussed in several previous MALS courses I had taken and was a

lively topic in the course about National Socialism and the Holocaust. After my working tour in

Germany, I read Speer’s book Inside the Third Reich. I wanted to compare what he wrote with what I had

learned from my German co-workers and current historical data. I had also obtained actual personal

letters Speer had written to architect Louis Kahn after his release from Spandau prison. These letters

presented a much different, perhaps a contrite character of Speer.

My research on Speer gave me the opportunity the multidisciplinary qualities promoted by the

MALS program. In addition to the historical focus, my work involved psychological, political and social

aspects. Each of these areas became topics that I wove together in presenting a clearer picture of this

enigmatic character. The more I researched, the more I realized how important it was to develop a

context not only for what had happened but how and why the talented architect Speer became a

Faustian-like character, putting performance ahead of principle, denying to his death, complicity in the

Nazi regime.

David Williamson, January 30, 2009

 Albert Speer – Master of Deception

Albert Speer is probably the only member of Hitler’s innermost circle to have survived the

Nuremberg Tribunal to tell an insider’s view of the Third Reich. Speer thought he would be hanged, but

the court found him less guilty than many of his cohorts and sentenced him to twenty years

imprisonment. Speer’s break with Hitler and his submissive acknowledgment of blame may have swayed

the court, but his honesty throughout his life has been questioned. As Hitler’s favorite architect and

later Minister of Armaments and Munitions, Speer occupied positions of power and influence. There

were even some in the last days of the Third Reich who considered Speer as Hitler’s heir apparent.

Initially, the addition of a non-political type to the cadre of dedicated Nazis in Hitler’s inner circle added

some class to the regime. Speer was a degreed architect, from an upper middle-class family, tall, good-

looking and smart. He proved he was a capable planning manager who could meet or beat deadlines.

Speer’s desire for recognition and ambitions for power were not apparent at first; they surfaced later.

Speer was undoubtedly driven and possessed an uncanny ability to dissimulate with friends, supporters

and enemies alike. I will attempt in this paper to show how and why Speer led a life of denial and

turmoil regarding his role in the Nazi leadership.

There are many questions to ask about Speer. Almost all focus on his ambition, his veracity and

a lack of morality: Was he a patriot, a professional who worked tirelessly for his country? Was he really

disinterested in or politically ignorant? Did he become a sycophant, who abandoned morals for self

aggrandizement? Did he fear losing his privileged position if he spoke out against evils? Did he lie to hide

his involvement in the horrors of the Third Reich, or did he merely turn a blind eye to avoid them?
Finally, in partial defense of him, did he suffer from amnesia or consciously block out the truth in order

to deny his guilt? Examination of these aspects will form my argument of who the real Speer was.

Several authors have written about Speer. Two of them, Gitta Sereny and Joachim Fest had the

opportunity to conduct in-depth interviews with Speer before his death. They were able to develop a

rapport with him which allowed them to question him about his role in the Third Reich that others could

not. As a result, they provide an unparalleled perspective of this enigmatic man. Their work provided

much of what is discussed in this paper.

My investigation of Speer begins in the pre-war years when Hitler chose him to be his personal

architect. It will continue during the war years when he was appointed Minister of Armaments and

Munitions and the post-war years when he was a defendant, prisoner, and, finally, successful author and

talk-show celebrity. In all three periods I will show how he continuously promoted himself, putting

performance ahead of principle. The information available today by Fest and Sereny provides a more

accurate profile of Speer than that which was available for the Nuremberg Tribunal. If the Tribunal had

evidence known today, Speer might have been hanged along with the other Nazis who were sentenced

to death at Nuremberg

On January 21, 1934, Hitler’s architect, Dr.Troost, whom Speer had considered his second

teacher, died after a short illness. Hitler needed another architect and Speer came to his attention

because of a redecoration job Speer did for Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s propaganda specialist. The

relationship of Hitler and Speer was symbiotic, which had not been the case with Troost. Speer took

Hitler’s sketches and began development of architectural drawings and three dimension miniatures for

an extensive redevelopment of Berlin. Hitler’s passion for creating Germania as the world’s greatest

capital was one step closer to reality. At the same time Speer benefitted by getting recognition for his

architectural ability and the power that came with it. At age 29, Speer was euphoric at being picked by a
“Head of State” to work on such important projects as the Nuremberg Rally complex, the Paris

Exhibition and Berlin redevelopment. Speer’s appointment as der Führer’s private architect came only

months after Hitler consolidated his power and at this point in Speer’s career, he was enthralled to be

part of re-establishing Germany’s greatness. There was no hint of what was to happen a few years later.

Few Germans in the early 1930s could have sensed that Hitler’s anti-Semitism would manifest itself in

the genocide of the Jews, but there were warning signs.i

The first few years in Hitler’s inner sanctum could have alerted even the non-political Speer to

the direction Hitler was taking Germany. There were too many clues: renewed conscription in 1935; the

Nuremberg Laws in 1935; reincorporation of the Saar in 1935; reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936;

annexation (Anschluss) of Austria in 1938 and the Munich Pact in 1938.ii All these events could have

been read by Speer that Hitler was headed for war, but Speer was not alone if he did not see what was

to happen; the rest of the world did not know either. Speer was to remain as Hitler’s favorite architect, a

position he claimed was not political until 1942, when he was appointed Minister of Armaments and

Munitions.

After the war at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Speer was tried for his role in the Third Reich. Speer

was tried and found guilty for two of the four counts charged against the defendants. The counts he was

convicted for were Count III: War Crimes involving deportation of slave labor; and Count IV: Crimes

against humanity, including enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any

civilian population.iii Speer’s defense was basically that he was a technocrat. As such he claimed to be

apolitical, did not make policy, broke with Hitler and willingly accepted responsibility in general for his

part of the evil regime.iv

The first hint of any anti-Semitic activity by Speer began when he was the GBI (Inspector General

of Buildings). A series of laws and decrees in 1937 shortly after Speer was appointed GBI, made it
possible in 1938 to deprive Jews, first, of their tenant rights, and then, during the war, their property

rights. Initially Jews who were evicted from their dwellings were to be afforded alternate housing, but

that did not happen. On 20 April 1939 (Hitler’s birthday), a statute “Tenancy Agreement with Jews”v

was enacted that stipulated Jewish tenants could be evicted from their apartment as long as they were

provided alternate housing. When landlords began advising Jews that they were to be evicted, Jewish

welfare organizations were ordered to made arrangements for alternate housing. This activity laid the

groundwork for usurpation of Jewish property. Actual evictions and relocations had accelerated after

the pogrom, “Kristallnacht”, on 9 November 1938, but the tenancy agreement “legalized” the process.

However, relocation accommodations became an administrative activity, therefore not one of Speer’s

daily concerns as an architect. However, since Speer enlisted the Gestapo to administer the

concentration of Berlin’s Jewish population that eventually led to the deportation of the Jews in the war,

he not only helped implement this aspect of anti-Semitic policy but also worked to initiate legal

measures against Jewish renter and property rights.”vi But this information was not made known to the

Tribunal. An analysis of this episode will be clarified when we examine how Speer covered up damning

evidence.

During the period between the surrender of Germany and the Nuremberg Tribunals, Speer was

interrogated more than any other defendant.vii The Allies realized Speer could provide “inside

information” which would help them understand Hitler and other high ranking Nazi officials, military and

civilian. As a defendant at Nuremberg, Speer was viewed as the most open and non-combative of all the

prisoners standing trial. Thomas Dodd, the main prosecutor for the Americans had already condemned

Speer as he wrote home to his wife, “Speer was ripe for plucking -- but it didn’t work out. Of course he

will not escape – we have far too much on him. But we really could have destroyed him - - as he really

deserved.”viii Speer was found guilty, but of lesser crimes than Dodd expected. The tribunal was
influenced by his unforced acknowledgement that he shared responsibility for the crimes of the Third

Reich, his cooperativeness, intelligence and his apparent break with Nazi ideology.

Sereny attended some of the Tribunal and had seen Speer at that time. She recalled he had

been a “cool and controlled” figure. When she read his book, Inside the Third Reich, her image of him

was a much different person, one who was sad and lonely. In the course of interviewing other survivors

of the Nazi period, she realized Speer was held in contempt by many for his disloyalty. When Sereny saw

Speer on talk shows, she saw a different person, one who displayed a sincere moral self-examination,

but she was not convinced he was telling the truth.ix

Authors Gitta Sereny and Joachim Fest were also “taken” by Speer’s demeanor. They both

acknowledged they liked him, but doubted his veracity, especially when they asked him to recall touchy

situations. Joachim Fest, (who assisted Speer with historical facts and editing for Inside the Third Reich)

and Gitta Sereny were able to penetrate Speer’s defenses. They developed dialogues with Speer which

were much less demanding than the Nuremberg Tribunal interrogations. As a result, Fest and Sereny

uncovered many “blind spots” or inconsistencies in Speer’s recollections versus archival records that

survived WWII. The prevailing question they have about Speer is how could this man have known and

vividly remembered so many minute details of activities spanning four decades and still deny awareness

or participation the crimes that were committed all around him. As time passed and more pertinent

records became available, the inconsistencies in Speer’s defense grew. Questions about anti-Semitism,

which Speer disclaimed and which he said had not been a factor, surfaced again and again.

Sereny interviewed not only Speer but Anne Marie Kempf, his secretary who had worked with

him continuously from 1939 to 1945. Like many older generation Germans, Kempf exhibited a “moral

blind spot” when it came to “the Jews.” As late as 1952, Kempf wrote to Speer’s assistant, Rudolph

Wolters, about an Allied program designed to rid Germans of Nazi ideology known as the Denazification
Commission: “The people who may be heading it are a Dr. Lippe and a Dr. Levinsohn(!!)…”x One could

read into her punctuation that she found it ironic that the tables would be turned, and Jews were put in

charge and (Aryan) Germans were the victims!

Speer’s appointment as Minister of Armaments and Munitions, the most important position in

the German war machine, changed his role dramatically. Dr. Fritz Todt, Speer’s predecessor, died in an

airplane crash on 8 February 1942. Todt had been at the Eastern Field Headquarters in Rastenburg, East

Prussia for a private meeting with Hitler. Todt, reportedly a realist, knew Germany could not compete

with the combined manufacturing capability of the Allies now that the United States entered the war.

Prospects of winning the war were getting slim. It is assumed that Todt argued with Hitler to end the

war as Todt was known to be outspoken, about his attitude, whether speaking with Hitler or others.xi

Speer, also at Rastenberg was invited and agreed to fly back to Berlin with Todt, but after a meeting with

Hitler decided to remain at the Field Headquarters. Five hours after Todt’s death, Hitler called Speer to

his quarters and appointed him as Todt’s replacement. There were rumors of an assassination, that the

plane had been rigged with a bomb, or that a self-destruct device was inadvertently activated causing

the explosion. After a short investigation Hitler ruled Todt’s death was an accident and the matter was

dropped.xii

Speer’s appointment to Minister of Armaments and Munitions elevated him from the role as

architect/building inspector to a ministerial position that exposed him to the politics that went with

crises and intrigue. Speer shrewdly asked Hitler to “order” him to accept the post and then asked for

and was granted Hitler’s full support in writing. With such backing, he would be able to overcome the

challenges posed by Himmler, Gőring and others who were eager to make sure this upstart would not

cause problems for them. Also, if Speer failed to perform, Hitler would have to accept the blame. During

interviews with Sereny, Speer said he was initially overcome with anxiety about the prospects of this
appointment, but quickly overcame his fears and was elated. His relationship with Hitler was changed

significantly. No longer was there a “friendly” association. His meetings with Hitler were now formal;

Speer could no longer divert Hitler’s attention from difficult issues by changing the subject to an

architectural topic. But Speer had reached the pinnacle of his dreams: recognition, power, and

authority.

Himmler and Gőring were challenged by Speer in his new appointment. Not only did they resent

the close association Speer had with Hitler, but Speer sought and succeeded in assuming some of the

fragmented authorities previously held by them. Speer gained control of much of the labor force over

which Himmler had control. Speer also took over the armament portion of the Luftwaffe away from

Gőring.xiii At the same time Gőring wanted to assume some of Todt’s responsibilities to his “Four Year

Plan”, but Hitler instead gave all Todt’s jurisdictions to Speer. As a result of these moves, Speer became

a target for Himmler and Gőring.

Faced with the need to increase his labor force, Speer suggested that German women be put to

work in the munitions factories. Hitler would not allow this, as German women were supposed to be

mothers, not workers. Himmler suggested women from the East could be brought in to augment the

labor force. At the Nuremberg Tribunal, Speer was questioned about the use of female prisoners of war

in factories. Speer replied that the regulations of the Geneva conventions did not apply to the two or

three hundred thousand Italian military internees and Russian prisoners of war.xiv Further, using

statistics, Speer clarified that his ministry was responsible for a labor force of twenty-eight million

workers (military and civilian), which included six million foreign workers, two million of whom were in

the armament factories and a mere sixty-thousand were from concentration camps. Speer was able to

disguise his answers to questions, transposing them into non-emotional numbers. His argument was

that less than two-tenths of one percent of his labor force came from concentration camps. This number
would not have been brought to his consideration. He argued that at the time he would not have been

consulted nor was aware of this usage of human labor; he was too busy. He used this argument again

when asked to comment on deportation of Jews to death camps. An example of the latter was the use

of railway cars to transport human cargo to the death camps, when there was a dire need for cars

needed to get supplies to the front. He answered this question again by stating statistics. How could or

would he, sitting in Berlin, be made aware of the use of two-thousand railway cars out of one-hundred-

forty-five thousand cars in the railway system. This was an insignificant number – merely 1.4 percent of

the total.xv

When interviewed by Joachim Fest after release from prison, Speer continued to defend his lack

of knowledge about the Final Solution. In Inside the Third Reich, Speer wrote: “On October 6, 1943, I

addressed the Reichsleiters and Gauleiters of the party. The reaction to my speech signaled a turning

point. My purpose was to open the eyes of the political leadership to the true state of affairs, to dispel

their illusion that a great rocket would soon be ready for use, and to make it clear that the enemy was

calling all the turns.”xvi He went on to stress that in order for Germany to regain the initiative, the

economic structure that employed six million workers to make consumer goods had to be shaken up. He

wanted one and one-half million transferred to armament manufacture. He concluded that if they

wanted to win the war, they would have to sacrifice and if they did not comply within two weeks, he

was prepared to “apply the authority of the Reich government at any cost.” When he mentioned

Reichsfuhrer-SS Himmler’s name in connection with this threat, some took his comments to mean they

would be sent to concentration camps.

The report Speer wrote in his book, Inside the Third Reich did not say where the meeting took

place or that there were other speakers. Fest reported a much different meeting. According to Fest, the

meeting was on October 4 and 6 and that Himmler gave a speech following Speer’s. Himmler’s
seventeen-page speech ended with a description for the first time of the "Final Solution" policy, or

wholesale extermination of the Jews. His speech was recorded on tape or wax disk and eventually

became evidence at the Nuremberg Tribunal. This was the first time many high-ranking civilian

authorities would learn what was happening in the death camps. Fest explained that Hitler wanted to

have all the top ranking military and business and government leaders learn of the Final Solution. Thus,

in the event that Germany did not win the war, they would all be liable as accessories for war crimes. xvii

Here is what Himmler said about the Jews:

“We want to mention another very difficult matter here before you in all frankness.
Among ourselves, it ought to be spoken of quite openly for once; yet we shall never
speak of it in public.”…“I am thinking now of the evacuation of the Jews, the extirpation
of the Jewish people. It is one of those things that's easy to say: "The Jewish people will
be extirpated", says every Party comrade, "that's quite clear, it's in our programme:
elimination of the Jews, extirpation; that's what we're doing."xviii

Fest went on to say that Himmler’s speech was crucial to Speer’s life, because he always

vehemently denied having known about the extermination of the Jews. When confronted with this

account of the meeting, Speer backtracked and acknowledged that Himmler, Hitler and Bormann were

there and that he had left right after giving his talk, so he was not present when Himmler described the

Final Solution policy.xix

When Sereny asked Speer to comment on the Posen meeting, he was shaken. While he

acknowledged the meeting lasted two days and that Himmler was the keynote speaker, he claimed to

have departed without hearing Himmler’s talk. To buttress his version of the truth, he even obtained

written declarations from friends who said he left the meeting before Himmler’s speech. The

declarations were written in 1973, thirty years after the event.xx Sereny believed Speer had to be

present because Himmler spoke directly to Speer, “Of course this has nothing to do with party comrade

Speer: it wasn’t your doing…”xxi

 Sereny’s interviewing method was not as challenging as that which Speer had experienced at

Nuremberg and often focused on what Speer could remember about his activities or those of others.

She was careful when bringing up subjects like the Posen meeting, because Speer often clammed up

when he was “put on the spot”. Sereny also interviewed Speer’s secretary, Anne Marie Kempf, who

after many years remained loyal and basically corroborated Speer’s versions of what took place. With a

lapse of four decades between the war years and the interviews, and the possibility that Kempf had read

Speer’s books, it is not surprising that she confirmed his denial and innocence. There is also the

possibility recollections could have been rehearsed.

Even before the war, Kempf and Speer both said they had little interest or knowledge about the

pogrom “Kristallnacht” which took place 9 November 1938. Speer said he was unaware of what

happened, because he was returning to Berlin on a sleeper train. On arrival, he noticed smoking

synagogues, but other than remarking to himself “this can’t be right: this cannot be the right way.”

“That’s as far as I went.” Kempf’s recollection was similar, “I remember that some was shot in an

embassy abroad, and that Goebbels made speeches, and there was a lot of anger, But that’s all.” xxii

Kempf was in a position to know details that no others would have had known, such as the

notations a secretary made during dictation. She was able to describe minor details, such as an

explanation that letters bearing Speer’s signature (and could be ammunition against him) were indeed

not written by him but by someone else and merely signed by him. She said this was a common practice

to speed up the paperwork flow. When asked about her relationship with Speer, she acknowledged that

she admired him greatly, even loved him, but was quick to clarify such love as platonic not romantic.

Kempf told Sereny details of Speer’s visit to the concentration camp at Mauthausan, near Linz:

When he (Speer) went abroad, some of us were, of course, often with him there, and yes,
he would describe some of the things that had impressed him when he went on his own
 for those drives which scared us to death. He said it was much better than he had feared. I
especially remember that, because I remember how relieved we were. Now of course, we
know that what they showed him was all fake-what they called their ‘VIP treatment’: a
couple of good barracks with, for God’s sake, vases with flowers; shiny kitchens with tasty
food on the stove; immaculate shower rooms; and clean, robust-looking prisoners who
declared themselves well satisfied with their imprisonment. No wonder he said it wasn’t
so bad. How could he know? How could anyone expect to have known that it was all put
on?...Now that you ask, except for one or two occasions, no, he didn’t speak to us about
what we now know were ‘bad’ things.xxiii

Speer told Fest the following about the Mauthausen visit:

(a) guided ‘VIP tour’ with neat rooms, flowers and contented inmates, so that he had
returned home ‘reassured.’ xxiv

Matthias Schmidt’s report of the Mauthausen visit :

When he was Minister of Armaments, Speer’s jurisdiction became so vast that he must
have had more than heresay knowledge about the places to which Jews were being sent
and where these prisoners-in part-helped manufacture armaments items. He must have
had direct knowledge since he kept himself informed about the conditions of
concentration camps. His interest, it seems, was prompted by his dismayed observation
when he personally inspected the Mauthausen concentration camp on March 30, 1943.
Here, where the inmates were laboring for his armaments machinery, housing and other
constructions were being built with a generous use of material…Speer issued an edict in
March 1943, ordering that no more permanent structures were to be put up. The inmate
housing had to be makeshift. The outer and inner walls were to be lightweight, and there
was to be no plastering inside or outside.

Speer’s recollection of events differed from what others recorded, but he was careful not to be caught

telling outright lies.

 Speer avoided the noose at Nuremberg. Had the tribunal known what Sereny and Fest learned, he

may very well have been convicted and sentenced to death. But one of the most telling episodes did not

surface until 1970.

Fellow student, co-worker and long time Speer friend, Rudolph Wolters, kept records of Speer’s

activities from 1941 until 1944, in a diary called the Chronik. When the war ended, Wolters feared that

the Allies would want to see the Chronik, so he buried the original copy in his back yard. A copy that

Wolters had made earlier, found its way to London’s Imperial War Museum. In 1964, Wolters dug up the

original and re-read it. He deleted some “irrelevant and foolish things, especially the few passages that

might incriminate Speer, as war crimes investigations were still being conducted. In 1966 when Speer

was released from prison, Wolters gave him a corrected copy. In 1969, Speer sent this “sanitized” copy

to the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz.xxv

David Irving, a British historian whose focus was on WWII, came across the copy in London’s War

Museum. He compared the uncorrected copy and with the corrected one in Koblenz and contacted

Speer asking for his comments.

Speer contacted Wolters asking him to provide the Bundesarchiv with a photocopy of the

original. Wolters then told Speer of the editing, some of which clearly showed that in 1941, while Speer

was the GBI, 9,500 Jewish apartments were “cleared” or appropriated by the GBI. Instead of relocating

Jewish families in other housing, they were “evacuated to their certain death in the East.”xxvi Now Speer

faced a dilemma, but careful as always, he tried to come up with a solution that would seem reasonable

and not incriminate him. It seemed the best way out was to have Wolters tell the Archives that the

original could not be found. What Wolters really did was to make sure the “lost” original would be made

available after his death. (See Attachment, page 15.)

 In 1979, Matthias Schmidt, a doctoral candidate, contacted Speer for his research. Speer referred

Schmidt to Wolters, who provided Schmidt with any and all the information he desired. Speer died in

1981, and Wolters died in 1983, and Matthias Schmidt’s book The End of a Myth was published in 1982.

In the final analysis, Speer’s life is a tragic one. He squandered his talents and made pacts with

devils for personal gain, had moral and mental lapses to avoid the truth, which he couldn’t deny. For a

few brief years his ambitions went unchecked, and instead of achieving greatness, he fell into the abyss

of self deception from which he could never emerge. Though he helped supply soldiers with machinery

and ammunition, he did so with slave labor. He claimed to have been taken by Hitler’s “spell” and until

the very end did he cut himself loose from Hitler, and even then, it was more for self than country. He

claimed not to be aware of atrocities, yet he said he “sensed” they were being done. He found a way to

survive, but at what a cost to him and many others. Schmidt pointed out that Speer not only lied to the

Nuremberg Tribunal but also to himself throughout his life. His friend and lifelong supporter, Wolters,

finally had enough of Speer’s deceptive behavior and made sure the truth would ultimately be aired. He

lost his friends, his freedom and most of all his sense of right and wrong. Speer may have represented a

prime example of the Nazi idea of Social Darwinism. Sereny probably penetrated Speer’s shield of denial

and understood him best, but in the end, even with her, he kept up his defenses, never really admitting

the truth which might have freed his soul.

Attachment:
 xxvii

i
Stern, Fritz. Dreams and Delusions. NY. Knopf. 1987. p. 13.
ii
Sereny, Gitta. Albert Speer: His Battle With Truth. NY. Knopf. 1995. p. 115
iii
Ibid. p. 564.
iv
Overy, Richard. Interrogations. NY. Viking. 2001. p. 448.
v
Sereny. p. 220.
vi
Jaskot, Paul. The Architecture of Oppression. London. Routledge. 2000. p. 87.
vii
Overy. p. 448.
viii
Dodd. Christopher. Letters from Nuremberg. NY. Crown. 2007. pp. 329-30.
ix
Sereny, p. 6.
x
Sereny p. 165.
xi
Schmidt, Matthias. Albert Speer: The End of A Myth. NY. St. Martin’s Press. 1984. p. 60.
xii
Sereny. p. 277.
xiii
Ibid. p.290.
xiv
Sereny. p. 332.
xv
Ibid. p. 352
xvi
Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich, NY. Macmillan. 1970. p. 312.
xvii
Sereny, p. 288.
xviii
http://www.cwporter.com/posen.htm, 13 May 2008.
xix
Fest, Joachim. Speer The Final Verdict. London. Orion. 2001. p. 187.
xx
Sereny, p. 395.
xxi
Sereny, p. 392.
xxii
Ibid. pp. 164 – 165.
xxiii
Ibid. p. 337.
xxiv
Fest. p. 180.
xxv
Schmidt. p. 16.
xxvi
Jaskot. P. 101.
xxvii
Schmidt. pp. 186-187

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