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DISTRICT COURT, WELD COUNTY, COLORADO Court Address: 901 9th Avenue, Greeley, CO 80631 Mailing Address: P.O.

Box 2038, Greeley, CO 80632 Plaintiffs: HIGH PLAINS LIBRARY DISTRICT; KAREN RADEMACHER, Trustee; LUCILE ARNUSCH, Trustee; JACQUELINE MASLOWE, Trustee; BRIAN LARSON , Trustee; and STAN SAMESHIMA , Trustee; v. Defendants: BARBARA KIRKMEYER, Weld County Commissioner, in her official capacity; MIKE FREEMAN , Weld County Commissioner, in his official capacity; DOUGLAS RADEMACHER, Weld County Commissioner, in his official capacity; WILLIAM GARCIA , Weld County Commissioner, in his official capacity; SEAN CONWAY , Weld County Commissioner, in his official capacity; GARY WHITE, Mayor, Town of Ault, Colorado, in his official capacity; TOM HOLTON , Mayor, City of Ft. Lupton, in his official capacity; SCOTT MOSER, Mayor, Town of Eaton, in his official capacity; RAY PATCH, Mayor, Town of Hudson, in his official capacity; and MIKE SIMONE, President, RE-8 School District Board of Education, in his official capacity; and Other Interested Parties: CITY OF GREELEY, COLORADO; and CITY OF EVANS, COLORADO. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

DATE FILED: April 29, 2014 4:08 PM CASE NUMBER: 2014CV30358

COURT USE ONLY Case Number: 2014 CV 30358 Division: 5

This matter comes before the court on the Plaintiffs Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. The court has considered the testimony at the hearing held April 28 and 29, 2014, reviewed the exhibits received in evidence, and considered argument by counsel. The Court FINDS AND CONCLUDES as follows: 1. This dispute arises from actions of member library districts and the Weld County Commissioners against the High Plains Library Districts (HPLD) Board of Trustees. Specifically, the above entities passed resolutions removing what will be referred to as the current board. In their place, the above entities appointed what will be referred to as the purported new board.

2. The current board, through the named trustees in this action, brought suit seeking Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief. The court granted a temporary injunction on April 14, 2014. This hearing followed.

3. A preliminary injunction may be granted pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65. The granting of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, or otherwise grant emergency relief. The prerequisites to the issuance of a preliminary injunction are as follows: a showing of real, immediate and irreparable injury which will occur pending a final hearing; that the injunction is necessary to prevent such injury or damage, and a showing of the reasonable probability of success on the merit on the part of the plaintiff. Macleod v. Miller, 612 P.2d 1158 at 1160 (Colo. App. 1980). 4. Court notes first that C.R.S. 24-90-108(3)(a), in setting up the board initially, required that the terms duration be one, two, three, four and five years respectively if there are five trustees. If there are six trustees, there will be one trustee for each of such terms except the five year term for which two shall be appointed. If there are seven trustees there shall be one for each of such term except that there shall be two four year terms and two five year terms. Clearly, once established, it was the intention of the legislature that the terms of library trustees be staggered. This provides for continuity, and protects against more than two trustees, at any one time, from being replaced. 5. 24-90-109(5) states that a library trustee may be removed by a majority vote of the appointing legislative body or bodies, but only upon a showing of good cause as defined in, but not limited to, the bylaws adopted by the board. Undisputed here that the board failed to adopt a definition of good cause.

Likelihood of Success on the Merits


6. The court finds that the current board were removed by majority vote of the appointing legislative bodies, 5 of 7 at this time. 7. The court cannot find that Evans should be included as a legislative body for purposes of the Preliminary Injunction given that from 1985 until present Evans, likely due to there not being a library in that city, has not participated. 8. The issue for the court then is whether the removal was proper, that is, whether the current board was removed upon a showing of good cause. 9. Each resolution purported to remove the trustees contains identical language, that the good cause is that the HPLD Board of Trustees has moved away from the original promise to the six municipalities to allow: a. Municipal retention of the title to its library property; b. Continuation of local boards of library trustees to insure local control; and c. The sharing of the library-related mill levies through a 2/3 - 1/3 allocation of the property tax generated from the service area of the municipal libraries. 10. Defense counsel has asserted that the Court can make no determination as to whether good cause actually exists, only that the Court can look to insure that the statutory words of good cause were used. This would render the statute meaningless. The court
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agrees that neither the municipalities, nor the court, are limited to looking at a definition of good cause as defined by the bylaws. By way of example, if the by-laws only indicated removal based upon missed meetings, and it was discovered that a trustee had embezzled money from the organization, there can be no argument that good cause existed. 11. Here, the Court does not second guess whether the reasons stated for good cause are good enough as argued by defense, but does in fact, look at the validity of the stated reasons, as well as whether these were applied to trustees individually. 12. First, the court finds that there is no evidence that the current board ever took any actions to interfere with municipal retention of the title to its library property. T he evidence is contrary, that all current board members recognize absolutely the member libraries rights to retain their property. 13. Second, the issue of whether the current board moved away from the continuation of local boards of library trustees to insure local control of the respective member libraries. There is evidence that the Trustees in February 2013 attempted to strongly persuade Ft. Lupton into becoming a branch library. There is disagreement as to whether it was Ft. Luptons idea first, or the HPLD. It is undisputed that Ft. Lupton has continued as a member library, and not a branch library, and that there has been no reduction in services. Further, these actions preceded at least one of the current trustees participation in the current board. The court cannot find that the board has generally moved away from the continuation of local boards of library trustees to insure local control. There is no evidence from any of the member libraries that there has ever been a discontinuation of services, or limitation of services when there are disagreements specifically with the Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs). 14. Third, the issue of whether the current board has moved away from the sharing of the library-related mill levies through a 2/3-1/3 allocation of the property tax generated from the service area of the municipal libraries. There is no evidence that there has ever been any action on behalf of the current board to move away from the statutory allocation of the mill levies. 15. Further, the court finds persuasive that the County Attorneys own recommendation to certain County Commissioners that a finding as to good cause must be based upon the individual trustee committing some act which would constitute the basis for good cause. There is no information presented which indicates any actions on behalf of any individual trustee which would form the bases for good cause for removal as to any such individual trustee. 16. The court cannot find facts which support the stated reason for good cause, which this Court finds, in order for the statute to have any meaning, the Court must be able to review. 17. In addition, there is no disagreement among the parties at this point that the second resolution passed which nominates the purported board fails to comply in with the
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current by laws. Most concerning to the court is the allocation of all decision making vested in the purported board who, if seated, would represent 14% of the patrons of HPLD leaving 86% unrepresented. The purported board members were not selected in a way that holds them accountable to anyone but the 14% who have taken part in this action. 18. The court finds the process set up by the bylaws and modified through due process in 2005 does, in fact, sufficiently hold the trustees accountable. In addition, the court finds that the entities have consented to the process by sending one, not two representatives when there have been vacancies on the current board. For the entities to claim at this time that they were either unaware, or not consenting to this process is contrary to the evidence.

Irreparable H arm
19. As stated above, the Court has found that the member libraries, and County Commissioners acted contrary to C.R.S. 24-90-108(5). In other words, the current board was removed absent good cause. If the preliminary injunction is not granted, it is virtually certain that the purported board will attempt to act as the library trustee board, and in any event, there would be no clear authority as to who the legitimate Trustee Board would be at that time. The current boards right to due process would be nullified and the import of the statute regarding removal would be circumvented. 20. In addition, Greeleys due process rights have been wholly violated by the actions of the entities representing the member libraries. The court finds this to be persuasive in its analysis, even though Greeley is now a branch library, as opposed to a member library. 21. In addition, there would be a board in place, claiming authority for 100% of the library district constituency, yet only representing 14% of the actual members. The court finds that the due process rights of the user population would also be violated, without adequate remedy at law. 22. Additionally, given the courts findings at this state that the current board was removed without legal authority, and the purported board would be seated without legal authority, to not grant the preliminary injunction sets up the outcome of having an illegitimate board attempting to sit and make decisions when the sitting board (the current board) continues to have the authority to sit. This outcome is untenable. 23. The fact that Greeley chose not to be represented on this purported board is not a substitute for the following of procedure as Defendants would have the Court find. Greeley specifically found that the purported board was not established through legitimate means, including the appointment of their named representative, Mayor Norton. 24. The court finds that there is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law. This is not an action for money damages. There are no money damages which would cure the inequities if the court were not to grant the preliminary injunction. Again, 14% of the
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represented constituency would be representing 100% of the library using constituency, leaving essentially 86% without adequate representation. There is no way for the Court to remedy this disparity, or violation of the 86%s due process. This is an action that can only be resolved through a final ruling as to the declaratory judgment requested.

Public Interest
25. In regards to public interest, the Court finds it is in the public interest to maintain the representation of the district as set forth in the by-laws, which provides equitable representation for all of the members of the library district. The court finds that to allow the purported board the representation they seek would controvert the legislatures intent.

Conclusion
26. The granting of the Preliminary Injunction here is necessary and the only relief available under the law at this time. 27. The court limits the ability of the current board however, given the disputes here. The current board is prohibited from entering into any new contracts without full agreement of all parties involved in this action, or without written Court approval if no agreement can be reached, after hearing. The current board may adopt a definition for good cause. However, the member libraries are not bound by any such definition at this time as the adoption obviously comes as a result of the actions preceding the definitions. 28. Essentially, the current board is authorized to continue implementation of policies or procedures previously adopted. However, the current board is not authorized to begin any new projects, or adopt new policies except for the definition of good cause as stated above. Dated April 29, 2014 . BY THE COURT:

Julie C. Hoskins District Court Judge

This document was filed pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121, 1-26. A printable version of the electronically sig ned order is available in the Courts electronic file .

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