Kantian Objectivity: A Constructionist Interpretation

JEFFREY CARR
Christopher Newport University
Newport News, VA 23606
jvcarr@cnu.edu

Throughout the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant refers to cognitive faculties
in his theory of human understanding as `objective', with notable exceptions. At first reading,
this characterization seems odd, given the enormous influence he gives to subjective factors
in human cognition: it is through a considerable amount of processing that an experience
occurs. Indeed, the program of the "Copernican Revolution", that "We must make trial
whether we have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must
conform to our knowledge",(Bxvi) seems to pose a threat to the possibility of objectivity.
But not so, argues Kant. In the following, I will attempt to define Kant's Copernican notion
of `objectivity', and to suggest some worthwhile ways of interpreting his use of the notion of
'objectivity' in the first Critique according to a constructivist model. By construction I
mean that anything explained within a theory has its explanation developed as the theory
develops, in the sense of Russells theory of logical constructions. (1)
My point of departure into this study is via the notion of `object', on the grounds that
if a cognitive process is to be attributed with objectivity, it is to objects that the cognitive
processes must relate. I have argued elsewhere that Kant's notion of `object' is contextually
defined, throughout the 'Aesthetic' and Analytic, as the theory develops: as new
elaborations of our cognitive processes are introduced, new notions of object are
provided.(Carr, 1989, 1991). Ultimately, objects are place-holders in his system, the
repository of homogeneous or co-located sensations which are synthesized into them
according to rules, the Categories, on the basis of which the object is thought to possess its
nature and attributes, and judgments can be made. By being place-holders I mean that they
are variables whose nature is developed according to the amount of psychological processing
required for their reception to consciousness (or representation). This account of objects
suggests that they are the output of the cognitive process, rather than primary factors that at
the outset are responsible for our thought about things. Indeed, Strawson warns against
supposing that the 'Analytic' starts with the assumption that "experience is necessarily of
independently existing objects forming a unified spatio-temporal system and [believing Kant]
seeks on this basis to establish further necessary conditions of the possibility of
experience"(Strawson, p. 26). Objects are not noumenal givens to our awareness, according
to Kant.
What, one might ask, is the basic factor in Kant's theory of cognition? By "basic", I mean the ultimate
starting point of content for our mental events. For Kant, this is sensation, defined at the beginning of the
Transcendental Aesthetic as "the effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are
affected by it."(A20/B34; Kemp-Smith, trans.) However, here one should take Strawson's warning seriously, in
that Kant tells us later in the text that "sensation is not in itself an objective representation."(A166/B208) What
is missing from sensation (taken as a phenomenon in itself) is the unifying factors contributed by the
understanding.(2) Sensation provides 'appearances' such as the scent of cinnabar, taste of wine, etc. but these are
in need of an object for which they are our experiences of those objects.
In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic,' Kant argues that there are forms of sensibility into which sensations
must be synthesized, in order for there to be possible objects of awareness: these are the "pure intuitions", or
forms of space and time. In the construction of an external object, sensations have to be referred to as "outside
[of the cognitive agent] and alongside one another", that is, in space (A23/B38). In themselves, sensations'
locations are allegedly indeterminate, since they are simply ways in which objects affect us. So as a repository
for the locating of sensible information, space is the "subjective representation, referring to something outer", to
which Kant ascribes transcendental ideality and objective validity (A27/B43). Kant here associates objectivity
with the production of an empirical reality of objects, in the sense that it gives a representational context, albeit
incomplete, for a (so-called) "manifold of sensations".
The other form of sensibility that Kant posits is time, the factor of cognition that "underlies all
intuitions": both the experience of external objects and of personal psychological states must be in the context of
time (A31/B46). To time, as done to space, Kant attributes objective validity with respect to appearances
(A34/B51), although he stipulates that it does not inhere "in things as an objective determination"(A32/B49).
This stipulation grants that time provides a structure for appearances, but is not, as a pure intuition, to be found
in experience. This is fundamental to Kants idealism. With respect to experience, objects are spatio-temporal
(the phenomena), but we cannot say the same of things in themselves (the noumena).
The faculty of understanding provides the most important element in the construction of objects, in
Kant's theory, by the Categories. The Categories are pure concepts of the understanding, which function as
rules for the locating and ordering of sensations in space and time. They do this by the "key to the whole secret"
of metaphysics, that appearances, themselves without objective reality and existing "only in being
known"(A121), stand in need of unification by the synthesis of apperception to become objects of experience
(A110): appearances in themselves do not have a spatio-temporal location to make them proper objects of
cognition. The Categories ('in contrast') have objective validity because "so far as the form of thought is
concerned, through them alone does experience become possible" (A193/B126). Kant's emphasis on this
conclusion is repeated in the B Deduction, in which he reaffirms that all unification of representations demands
unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, all of the flavorful data of sight, taste, etc.:
for us to experience them, it must be because they are a unified object of thought, rather than discrete
appearances. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object, and therefore [constitutes] their objective validity (B137).
Hence, Kant has claimed the objectivity of almost all of the transcendental forms, functions and
faculties of human understanding. However, Kant's construction of experience leads one to ask just in what,
precisely, does Kantian objectivity consist? The answer to this question most frequently given in the literature
is based on comments from the Second Analogy, to do with objective events. There, Kant uses the example of a
ship moving downstream to illustrate the necessity of a conceptual rule by which the understanding can render
one's subjective experience of appearances into an objective succession of experiences of the boat, moving
downstream. For example, Carl Posy argues that the "notion of necessity, of a repeatable rule like arrangement
of the parts of an experience, is for Kant the effective content of the concept of `objectivity.'"(Posy, p. 38)
Rescher concurs, arguing that objectivity "turns on the coherence and orderliness internal to our
experience."(p.9) Again, Aquila argues that for Kant, what "one means by an `objective event' is simply a
`succession according to a necessary rule'."(Aquila, p.6) Finally, Walsh argues that a minimal condition for
objectivity is orderliness; but the objective thing "must be given in experience or connect with what is so
given".(Walsh, p. 51) This characterization of Kantian psychology is not inaccurate, because rule-
governedness is necessary in general for Kant's conception of the experience of an object. However, this
interpretation could have been made stronger by providing an examination of the role of rules in the
construction of an object: they guide the Categories in providing images for the construction of an object in
space. Indeed, Kant asks in the Second Analogy how "does it come about that we posit an object for these
representations" before our mind? The answer is that the Categories provide rules for the construction of the
object out of intrinsically indeterminate sensational material.
Thus the deficiency of the other interpretations may be remedied by interpreting
objectivity as the attribute of a form of intuition, judgment or faculty of the understanding
signifying its necessary role in the grounding of our ability to refer by judgments to objects.
Thus Allison regards objectivity as a definitional feature of judgments in that through
reference to actual objects, they have the capacity to be either true or false. Both Allison and
Strawson also argue for the grounding of objectivity in the unity of apperception; however,
this interpretation will suffer the same defect as the one currently under examination (Allison,
p. 134; Strawson p. 74). The interpretation according to apperception is in part correct,
because knowledge of and reference to objects is judgmental and unified, according to Kant,
and indeed, the Categories, as conceptual rules for the construction of objects (according to
my interpretation) are conceived by Kant on analogy with the logical forms of judgment, the
kinds of statements we make. However, this interpretation leaves a gap in our understanding
of Kantian objectivity, because Kant also refers to the forms of intuition as objective, which
the advocates of this theory cannot sufficiently explain: the spatial and temporal forms of
intuition provide a forum within which judgments can have truth or falsity, but are not
intrinsically propositional.
The alternative which I have to offer is the following: a form of sensibility, pure concept or
transcendental process is objective for Kant, if and only if it plays a role in the construction of the objects of our
representations, and about which we form judgments. Allison remarks that all representations must reflect the
nature of our mental apparatus.(Allison, p.27) Bohme's interpretation goes a step further, telling us "According
to Kant the criteria of objectivity are subjective"(Bohme, p.90). This is because of the constructive
determination of objects. Things like categories and forms of sensibility are objectively valid, according to
Kant, because "so far as the form of thought is concerned, through them alone does experience become
possible."(A93/B126) In my interpretation, the objective validity and objective reality defended by Kant is
logically prior to and prospective of the actual representation of an object: it is attributed to transcendental
conditions necessary for the objects experience by us. Thus the objective validity of space consists in its ability
to contain appearances; the objective validity of time consists in its ability to contain appearances as occurrences
in a sequence, and because it is in time that the rules of the Categories regulate the spatial and temporal ordering
of sensations; as noted, Kant says that the Categories are objectively valid for making experience possible
(A193/B126) (3); the unity of consciousness is objectively valid because it is that through which the Categories
regulate the construction of experiences in space and time, making objects real; judgments are thus objectively
valid by being able to truthfully refer to objects. Objective reality is attributed to these elements when emphasis
is shifted to the relation they have with (non-objective) sensations: the sensational element provides the matter
from which reality is built, i.e. constructed, allowing actual objects to be given in experience. They have real
content.
However, there are still a few anomalous statements by Kant that should be addressed. While setting
down the principles of a transcendental deduction, Kant remarks that

The categories of understanding .. do not represent the conditions under which objects are
given in intuition. Objects may, therefore, appear to us without their being under the
necessity of being related to the functions of understanding; and understanding need not,
therefore, contain their a priori conditions (A89/B121).

Put briefly, I interpret this to mean that while the categories unify and structure the objects in intuition, objects
are given in space and time. Kant provided an example a few lines later in which he discounts the real
possibility of such an unstructured experience, because of its "confusion", in the sensational sense. Also, Kant
in the (first edition) transcendental deduction seems to equate objective validity and truth (A125). In this
circumstance, I think Allison and Strawson's interpretation of objectivity is worth repeating: objective validity is
what makes the truth of empirical judgments possible (Allison,p.148; Strawson, pp.32,89,94,etc.). Indeed, as I
have construed Kant's theory of objectivity, all of the a priori forms of cognition are necessary for the
objectivity of empirical judgments. That they are a priori is different than their objectivity (see Priest) because
although they are universal and necessary, they refer to the some of the same things as the objective, albeit with
different criteria.
However, an important issue arises because of Kant's constructions: it is circular
reasoning for something to be called objective as having application to objects when at the
same time the same thing has played a role in the construction of the object. Our intuition is
that objectivity contrasts with subjectivity by being independent of minds; for Kant, both are
mind dependent. That is, transcendental objects are not part of experience, according to
Kant: as interpreted above, the experience of an object is possible only as the outcome of
complex construction procedures. As such, to say that one of the constructive procedures is
objectively valid is redundant or at least has to be seen in the proper light, because the
operations of the intellect provide the objects of experience in the first place. That is to say,
such conditions are valid in relation to objects because the objects are only actualized in
relation to them.

ENDNOTES
Underwood addresses this as an epistemic view (2003), including the constructivist
interpretation of Dummett and others; this sense of construction is different than
mine.
In the first edition Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant also describes secondary qualities such
as the taste of wine as belonging "to the special constitution of sense in the subject
that tastes it."(A28)
In the preface to the second edition, Kant equates a concept's objective validity with its
"real possibility (Bxxvii)". vs. the categories qua pure "mere forms of thought" are
without objective reality.(B148) The possibility means capable of determining
objects.

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