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Review Article
MARY MARGARETMCCABE
I ChristopherRowe, Bob Sharples and Tad Brennanwere kind enough to read and
criticise a draft of these comments; I am very grateful to them.
2 Old habits die hard; I prefer Politicus (Plt.) to Statesnan, not least to avoid the
Rowe, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag 1995. p. 421. DM 98. ISBN 3-88345-634-9
[hereafterRS]; Plato's Statesman: Selected Papers from the Third SymposiumPlato-
nicum, eds. Peter Nicholson and C.J. Rowe, Polis Volume 12, 1993. p. 220. ISSN
0412-257X [hereafterPSSP]; Plato: Statesman, with translationand commentaryby
C.J. Rowe, Aris and Phillips, Warminster, 1995. pp. vi + 248. ?35/$49.95 hb;
?14.95/$24.95 pb. ISBN 0-85668-612-3 hb; 0-85668-613-1 pb. [hereafter Rowe]. I
have eschewed a detailed summaryof each of the papers in the collections, not least
because the editors provide helpful introductions.
I In RS Nicoll comments on the manuscripttradition,and the OCT editor, Robinson,
The rich disputes which arise in these three volumes are - inevitably - of
a rathermixed character.Rowe's commentaryis, as we should expect, complex
and extremelyscrupulous;it is also, in several respects,thoroughlyprovocative
(notablyin his heterodoxreadingof the myth and in his challengeto a straight-
forwardreadingof the political theory of the dialogue).The paperscollected in
the two volumes are, in some cases, new readingsof individualpassages, and in
other cases synoptic views of the dialogue as a whole (PSSP claims to be pri-
marily interestedin political matters;althoughthat brief is read with a generous
eye). That, of course, is what we mightexpect to issue from a huge International
Congress; and many of the individual papers are both valuable and exciting,
notablywherethey invite us to reconsiderour dustyold views aboutthe Politicus.
Huge InternationalCongressesproducea multiplicityof opinions and interpreta-
tions; they are not always, however,easy to digest - and the wealth of detail to
be found in these volumes is not always such as to producethe synopticview of
the dialogue we need for thoroughreappraisal.In consideringsome of the more
importantcontributionsof these volumes to our understandingof the Politicus, I
shall ask two questionsof a synopticsort:what is the Politicus about?And how
does the dialogue hang together?5
You mightthinkthatthe answerto the firstquestionis obvious- this dialogue,
the second in the trilogy which began with the Sophist and should end with the
Philosopher(an unwrittendialogue),6is aboutthe statesman(is the answerto the
discusses the changes made to the Burnet edition, in particulartwo changes which
affect the myth (at 269e4 and 271d4); see furtherbelow.
I There is a furtherquestion of just how this dialogue is to be aligned with the other
dialogues of the late period; and how it fits with the Republic and the Laws. Against
Owen's radical view of the Politicus (e.g. in 'The Place of the Timaeus in Plato's
Dialogues," in Logic, Science and Dialectic, 65-84) see here Kahn's largely unitarian
account of the place of the Plt. in the Platonic corpus as a whole, RS, and Gill's mod-
erate view of Plato's development, RS (discussed furtherbelow). On the place of the
dialogue in the rest of the corpus, Palumbo considers the relation between the Sophist
and Plt., RS, while several other contributorsdiscuss the relation between this and
other political dialogues. In PSSP there are several papers on the relation between this
dialogue and the dialogues about Socrates' execution: these papers too tend to be uni-
tarian(or else to ignore the possibility that in composing late dialogues about Socrates
Plato is engaging on something more complex and reflective than merely giving us
another chapter in the Socrates story).
6 The importanceor otherwise of the Philosopher, and the significance of the frame
narrativeto our understandingof the Plt. as a whole is little considered by the contrib-
utors to these volumes; even by Rowe. E.g. Arends, PSSP, takes it as simply obvious
that the philosopher is not discussed here. An exception is Ferber,RS, who considers
the question of the Philosopher in the light of the unwrittendoctrines and the views
of the Tubingen School; hence the cryptic reference to "the precise truthitself" 284d2.
I shall argue that Plt. is not so much a coded allusion to doctrines but ratheran invi-
tation to speculate on the activity of philosophising itself.
96 MARYMARGARET
McCABE
I Dixsaut, RS, points out that even this account of the ostensible purpose of the
Plt. may need modification if the final speech of the dialogue is spoken by Young
Socrates and not - as Robinson/Rowe tentatively have it, by Old Socrates. If the last
speech is by OS, the dialogue is closed, by a remark surprisinglybereft of Socratic
irony. Dixsaut prefers YS, on the grounds that this makes the apparentnaivete of the
final remark obvious. For reasons that will appear below, I think the subtle Dixsaut
version is preferable,not least because it maintains the ratherindeterminatestatus of
the final definition.
8 305e2-6. I use Rowe's translationsthroughout.
9 Here see especially Chiesa, Cavini and de Pinotti in RS; also Fattal in PSSP.
10 Here see especially Brisson, Dillon and Ferrariin RS, with detailed comments in
Rowe; also Carone, Naddaf and Steiner in PSSP.
" This passage itself reflects on the first division, indirectly. The first division is
conducted in a rather high-handedway by the ES with YS cantering along behind.
The present section discusses coming to know: and invites us to reflect on two things:
how did the ES know what divisions to make in the first place? And has his making
them resulted in YS knowing anything at all? The characterisationof the interlocutors
is vital to the irony of this point - or else it is reflects the failure of the dialogue as
a whole. On this section see Kato, RS.
12 In the sequel, of course, the model turns into an element of the definition of the
statesman;some part of the work done here in the text is on the difference between
the use of an analogy and the use of an image. xapa6eibyga,extensively discussed at
277dff., is here turnedinto a term of art. Is a napLpa6&cyT a transcendentform? Surely
not: Kato RS is sensible on this, as is Rowe, Introduction.On this passage, of course,
see Owen, "Plato on the Undepictable,"Logic Science and Dialectic 138-147.
13 Lafrance'sessay on this passage, RS, rightly, I think, argues against the view that
here the ES outlines two sorts of measuringskill, roughly approximateto the two sorts
READINGPLATO'SPOLJTICUS 97
(283c-287a) - here at the centre of the dialogue, the ES once again turns his atten-
tion to method: the object of the exercise (285d, 287a) is to make the participants
better dialecticians. With this in mind he embarks on the third division,'4 which
allows the statesman to be separated off from the pretenders (287b-291c).5 Then
there is a long discussion of forms of government (29ld-303d).'6 Finally the dia-
logue closes with an account of the nature of the statesman's expertise (as the
overarching science) and his ability to weave together the disparate virtues in the
state (303d-31 1c).'7
One account of this sequence, then, is that it is designed simply to secure the
final definition; the remarks about method which pervade the dialogue are the
means to that end and nothing else. Now, however, the longueurs of some of
the divisions become almost intolerable; no explanation is given of how the point
of all this is that the ES and the YS may become better dialecticians (285d; 287a);
and the relation between this dialogue and the Republic becomes acutely prob-
lematic. In the Republic, after all, the king is the philosopher. In this dialogue,
apparently, the philosopher is to be the subject of a separate study.
But is that appearance a reality? Did Plato intend to write the Philosopher, but
never get round to it (maybe he was busy with the Laws)? Or does the Politicus
give us a view of the philosopher which supplants its separate discussion? After
all, the interlocutors spend a great deal of their time both discussing philosophical
sions is disputable (on his view, we have the same division throughout,with each
stage modifying, but not rejecting, its predecessor). On his account the statesman is
still a herder at the end of the dialogue, albeit "of a special kind";on my account the
discussions of self-determinationand political structuresuggest that the statesman of
our era is not a herdsman(or a fatherfigure),but rathercloser to an equal, notablywhen
it comes to dialectical discussion. His knowledge may be super-ordinate;but he him-
self is not an autocrat,nor is his authoritydefined in terms of those whom he controls.
' Cf. here Brickhouse and Smith in PSSP.
16 See here Lane, Gill in RS, discussed below.
17 Dixsaut (RS) argues that here the function of the statesman is to be distinguished
from the function of the educator. Her paper is otherwise excellent; but this aspect of
her conclusions does not convince me; nor does it allow her to drive a wedge suc-
cessfully between the Politicus and the Republic. See also Bobonich's detailed analy-
sis of the last section of the dialogue, RS.
98 MARY MARGARETMCCABE
would make sense of the last speech being delivered by YS, who - ex
19 This
hypothesi - would not (yet) have seen this indirect purpose of the dialogue.
20 The discussionof the mythprovokessome importantwork in these volumes, notably
Brisson's fresh account of his re-reading of the myth, RS, and Rowe's similar inter-
pretationof the cosmic cycle; Dillon's paper, RS, on neo-Platonic readings of myth,
which asks just how myths should be interpreted;and Ferrari's suggestion, subtly
argued in RS, on the traditionalaccount of the cosmology of the myth to explain the
way that man is a technological animal.
21 Forwardor backward?The orthodoxy here is that the Timaeus is later than Plt.;
cf. e.g. Kahn, RS. Rowe has a more robust attitudeto chronology;and I remain stoutly
unconvincedthat these mattersare areas where we can know more than Plato intended
us to see. It is, of course, dangerousto suppose that, where we find the argumentsor
the theories of the Plt. unclear, the Timaeus is transparent.
22
At least to Heraclitus and Empedocles, cf. below.
READING
PLATO'S
POLUTJCUS 99
23
But see Rowe's objection to me, above, n. 14.
24
nOoq - Rowe has "state of affairs";the sequel allows this to be, not so much
that the same singular event caused all three phenomena at once, but ratherthat each
of them when it occurred, is to be explained by a single (type of) cause.
25 269d-e is remarkablylike some of the arguments of Metaphysics A.6; compare
the argumentat Phaedrus 245c-e for a similar style.
26 Here the ES uses language familiar from the theory of forms; I shall discuss below
whether we should just map this material onto middle period metaphysics. See here
Bravo's sensible account of how the ontology of the Pit. is related to the discussions
of limit and unlimited in the Philebus, and how both relate to collection and division.
100 MCCABE
MARYMARGARET
27 271a: there is an account here of how those who died in the chaos then also age
in reverse, very quickly dissolving into nothing. This tale may be pessimistic or opti-
mistic, depending on your view: pessimistic if the thought is that disappearinginto
nothing is insult upon the injury of dying by violence, optimistic if in this disappear-
ance all the evidence of violence disappears. The overall question to be asked, as I
shall insist, is whether this kind of growing backwardsand disappearingis held to be
a particularlyunpleasantsort of death (as Brisson and Rowe assume) or a denial of
death altogether.
28 At 271c2 there is a suggestion that some are exempt from this rebirthwhen god
takes them off "to another destiny." Does this refer to the escape of the philosopher
from the cycle of reincarnation?If it does, should it not be what happens in this era?
Both Brisson and Rowe make something of this: but there is no clear implicationhere
that being taken off to some other destiny is a reward.
29 It may make a difference what exactly is involved in retiring to the observation
post. One thoughtmight be that this is a point of vantage outside the ship; but Brisson,
RS 357 n. 29 suggests that it is a lookout on the ship: on his account even when the
universe is left to itself god has not abandoned the universe. Even so there is a
significant contrasthere between the control of god when he is at the oars and his rel-
ative helplessness when he is at the observation post; I shall suggest furtherthat this
theme of control and independenceis exactly the theme, not only of the myth, but of
the dialogue as a whole.
READINGPLATO'SPOLiTICUS 101
Thus over time its control deteriorates, until eventually god, anxious lest his crea-
tion should break into pieces,30 takes up his position again at the steering oars
(273e), and the whole cycle restarts.3' Once the cosmos has reversed into its pre-
sent course, then other things change too. Ageing runs from young to old, growth
from small to large, birth leads to death (273e). And now it is no longer pos-
sible for creatures to grow from the earth "under the agency of others' putting
it together" (274a3); instead human reproduction imitates the self-movement of
the cosmos.32 The crucial point is this (274b). Human beings, in this era, are less
fortunate than their predecessors because they lack both the care of the god and
the nurture he gave us. The beasts are now wild and competitive, and humans
defenceless,33 so that they were at first in great trouble. At this point they received
gifts from the gods - fire, technology and resources for agriculture, and the abil-
ity to teach and learn: these provided the foundations of human society, wherein
humans take care for themselves in exactly the same way as the cosmos does.
And to see that was the point of the myth; as well as to show how they went
wrong in supposing the king to be the shepherd of people (274dff.).34
3 Here the description of the difficulties in which the universe finds itself has some
affinity with the dangers of philosophy: it is in aporia and at risk of falling into the
"infinite/indefinitesea of unlikeness."
31 At 273e3 there is an echo of the metaphysical argumentof 269dff.; by virtue of
the cycle's recurrence,the universe is eternal;here, however, immortalityis conferred
on it by god - being immortal, ratherthan recurrent,is a divine prerogative,and can
only come from god. The dangers of inconsistency here are not, I think, to be pressed
too hard; but they do tell in favour of an interpretationof the myth which treats its
chronological features as allegorical, cf. Dillon RS, Carone, PSSP.
32 The expression here is a1Yxoiparopa Elvac.I shall later argue that this is directly
related to the later thought that the statesman has, where others lack, self-determina-
tion or autonomy. Indeed the Greek expression av&o1cpa&op expresses better the notion
of independencewhich I take to be at issue, than does the expression a tcvo'Vog,which
has ratherthe sense of self-legislating. CompareThuc. 4.63, 6.72, Laws 875b and Pit.
299c for ai6rocpa&tpand Thuc. 2.63, 5.33 for av6ovogto;;LSJ gives the meaning "of
one's own free will" for aurovopo; at Antigone 821; this, I think, is not quite the point.
In the Politicus, moreover, autonomy is defined not in terms of free will, but rather
in terms of independence from the mechanisms of causation. Finally, the notion of
being self-legislating is not really applicable to the statesman of this dialogue, who is
above fixed laws. But there is no English equivalent of avroicpa6cp (autocracy is
something quite different) so I prefer "self-determination."
33 Several commentatorspoint out the similaritybetween this account and the Great
Myth of the Protagoras; see esp. Narcy in RS. The purpose of such a deliberate echo
is less easy to discern. Perhaps the least we are meant to notice is the difference
between the gifts of the gods: for Plato (cf. also Philebus 16c) the gods give us gifts
which are practical or intellectual; for Protagorasthey give us social virtues. In the
sequel, I suggest below, Plato supposes that the practice of intellectual virtue has a
necessary social component.
34 This account of the origins of human intelligence, if the myth is taken literally,
102 MARYMARGARET
MCCABE
The traditionalview of this myth is that there is a two phase cycle, where the
cosmos rotatesnow one way and now in reverse.In the first phase, the reign of
Cronos,thingscome from the earthand grow younger;in the reign of Zeus they
do the opposite,coming from the intercourseof two parents,and dying back into
the ground.Brisson, and after him Rowe, have objectedto this accountof the
cosmic cycle, mostly on the groundsthat this means that the presentcosmos, so
far from imitatingthe benevolentrule of god, actively opposes it; Brisson adds
that this makes a nonsense of the claim that the present era is also divinely
ordered."Moreover,as Rowe pointsout, it generatesa hopelesslypessimisticpic-
ture of the world now, when thingsjust wind down from bad to worse, and the
only hope of salvationis Doomsday;thereis not accountthen to be given of how
the world behaves in a way that fits its being a rationalcreature.Whatis more,
the traditionalview does not explain the chaos which apparentlybegins the sec-
ond era;36for in thatera the deteriorationseems to be gradualfrom a fairly good
beginning;how is that consistentwith its initiationby destructivechaos?37
So on the Brisson view, there are three periods, the age of Cronos,the uni-
verse left to itself and the age of Zeus. In the age of Cronosthe universeis ruled
by god and its partsby the minordivinities(so that in that era the divinitiesare
shepherdsof men); in the time when the universe is left to itself all divine
influencehas retreated;then in the age of Zeus god returnsto the helm, although
tional view, none of which seem to me decisive against a plain reading of the myth,
according to the myth's own canons of simplicity; e.g., Brisson argues that the march
of the ages and sexual reproduction must be separated - for reasons that remain
unclear to me, except that both Brisson and Rowe seem to think there are two differ-
ent ways of being earth-born(a good one, being sown in the earth, and a bad one, as
result of what Rowe calls the "traumaof reversal,"in the former of which there is no
sexual reproduction,but ageing goes in the same directionas in our era); Rowe claims
that "moving in the opposite direction"refers to two differentdirections at 269c and
270b (that "in the opposite direction"should be treated as a relative expression in a
dialogue which is good at relative terms, cf. 283, is hardly surprising,maybe).
READINGPLATO'SPOLUTICUS 103
the minor divinities are no longer closely involved in the life of man.38Rowe
agrees with Brisson'sgeneralprinciplethat the cosmos now shouldbe moving in
the same directionas the cosmos underCronos;so he supposesthat the periods
of movement in the reverse directionare brief catastropheswhich occur (as a
result of inertialmotionof the mechanismof the universe)just when god lets go
of the universe.Thus in an entirecycle, again thereare threephases:the universe
moves first undergod's guidance,then in the reversedirectionas a result of its
corporealnature,then back again in the same directionas the first era, although
this time as a result of the intelligentactivity of the world. Here the movement
is at first ordered,but later deteriorating;eventuallygod takes over again.
Now these constructionsof the motion of the cosmos need not suppose that
the cosmic myth is taken literally, as a sequencethat actually occurs in time.39
However both Brisson and Rowe seem to suppose that they are literal in some
way - these are descriptionsof the cosmos now, which allow us to understand
our own universein teleological terms. This modifiedliteralism,of course, may
not be the right way to read Platonic myths: they may offer more or less alle-
gorical accountsof man's condition;' althoughthey do requireus to supposethat
Plato somehow or othermeans his myths to representthe truth.Nonetheless,the
Brisson/Roweaccount does place some limitationon the (often uncontrollable)
business of interpretingallegory; and it does have some sort of continuitywith
the cosmologies we find elsewhere- notablyin the Timaeus.But it turnsa sim-
ple story (the traditional- one motion forwards,one back) into a complex one
(two motions forward,at least one back); so accordingto the canons invited by
the metaphysicalargumentwhich begins the myth, this complexityhad betterbe
justified. What is more, this account of the myth needs to make sense of its
explicit purpose,namely to modify the definitionof the statesmanas a shepherd
of men and by markinghim off from the pretenders.
38 How, now, does Brisson explains the gifts fromthe gods in this era, whichwere
one of the problems he found with the traditionalview? Brisson argues for this detail
by meansof Dies' readingof 271d, & vbv, cat icaxa t6'xouqTaucov roii,o which,he
argues,proposesan era wheregod is at the helmbut the minordivinitiesare absent:
andthe only erathatcouldbe is theeraof Zeus.Robinson,RS,p. 45, retainstheread-
ing of Campbell 8'a' caKraX T6o'ou; rav6ov ToVXroon the grounds that this fits the
traditionalview; he is followedby Rowe,who does not use Brisson'sdetail(thatin
the era of Zeus god is at the helm, but the divinitiesare absent),but supposesthat
this alludesto the previousera. None of these readingsseems entirelysatisfactory;
andeach demandsa morefundamental understanding of the teleology.
39 I have profitedherefromChristopher Rowe's objectionsto my firstview of his
view.
40 See here Dillon's illuminatingaccountof neo-Platonist of the
interpretations
myth,RS, or other,more generallyallegorical,views, e.g. CaronePSSP. Naddaf,
PSSP, offersthe followingcarelessargument:since Platodid not meanthe mythto
be taken literally, it follows that he never believed that there was a golden age, or a
periodicreversal,or earth-born
men.
104 MCCABE
MARYMARGARET
1' Carone, PSSP, argues that chaos, even intermittentchaos, could never prevail in
a Platonic universe;consequently,she suggests, the myth cannotbe understoodliterally.
42 Here chronology may matter:the consensus of these volumes is that the Timaeus
is late, and a seriously meant, Platonic account of cosmology. Owen's early dating of
the Timaeus is now given little credence (although this seems too easy: one thought
might be that the Timaeus may be later than Owen thought, but even so not so late
as to post-date this dialogue - how we place the Timaeus should depend on what we
think the Timaeus is doing); but there needs to be deeper considerationof just how
the arguments of the Timaeus might fit the purposes of the critical period (it is not
obvious that those purposes must be served by a straightforward,Platonic, cosmol-
ogy). In any case, the interpretationsof the Politicus and of the Timaeus may be
thought to supporteach other; in that case, there needs to be an independentaccount
of what is happening in this dialogue first.
43 Compare e.g. Heraclitus Fr. 31 and 270blO; or the strange claims about god
restoring immortalityto the cosmos at 273e3 with the view of HeraclitusFrs. 30, 36
that fire is etemal, everliving and everdying;or the theme of measure in Heraclitus30
echoed both at 269c6 and then again at 283cff.; likewise Anaximanderon the "ordi-
nance of time," Fr. 1, echoed at 273e3; or Empedocles Fr. 17 with the account of the
double cycle, throughoutthe myth; or Empedocles 62 on the earth born creatures.
Empedocles - as is widely acknowledged - is the main antecedentof the cosmology;
what is less widely acknowledged is how the myth thus constitutes an attack on its
antecedents.
4 Even the initial mention of the age of Cronos is silent on its being a golden age,
269a7.
READINGPLATO'SPOLITICUS 105
divinities have for their charges. In this period, the good care of the gods is
matched by the automatic appearance of the good things of the earth;45given the
abundance and the pleasantness46of the things produced by the earth, the gods'
task is to order everything well.
That was the state of affairs under Cronos, and we know what things are like
now. So, the ES (suddenly) asks, which life47 is the happier? When YS is unable
to answer, the ES's answer is famously surprising and opaque.48
... if, with so much leisure available to them, and so much possibility of their
being able to get together in conversation not only with human beings but also
with animals - if the nurslings of Cronos used all these advantages to do phi-
losophy . . . the judgement is easy, that those who lived then were far more for-
tunate than those who live now; but if they spent their time gorging themselves
with food and drink and exchanging stories with each other and with the ani-
mals of the sort that even now are told about them, this too, if I may reveal how
it seems to me, at least, is a matter that is easily judged. (272b-c)
The ES may mean that the men of the golden age would have been blissful doing
philosophy; even without it they are pretty fortunate compared to us. Or he may
be suggesting that nothing about the easy life of the golden age can make up for
not doing any philosophy.49The rhetoric of the passage tells in favour of the claim
that whoever does philosophy is better off than whoever does not.-I But then how
tion about the happy life is asked over and over again in Plato; and that it is posed,
not as a question about a period of time, or an era, but as a question about the lived
lives of individuals.
I Cf. e.g. Erler, RS, Carone PSSP, Steiner, PSSP.
49 Tad Brennan suggests a stoicising version to me: the good things of life, as they
exactly is that either relevantto or explainedby the myth of the cosmos? And
why is this questionaboutwhat life is best to live posed so abruptlyin the middle
of a myth to modify the definitionof the statesman?5'
If the mythof the cosmos gives us, as Brisson/Rowehave it, two phaseswhich
run in the same direction- the age of Cronos,where the runningof the cosmos
is smooth and pleasant;and the age of Zeus where it is more fraughtand dan-
gerous52- then life now is a poor imitationof life then. Then the choice of lives
is obvious:pick Cronosany time, and with any qualification.If, contrariwise,the
choice of lives tells us that philosophymakes all the differenceto which era we
shouldprefer,then theremay be somethingto be said for the life underZeus after
all. But in that case, is the mythexplainedby havingthe era of Zeus a poor imi-
tation of the era of Cronos?Or by having the age of Zeus run in reverseto its
golden predecessor?
Brisson/Rowe,I suggested,suppose that teleology is either the same thing as
divine creation,or an imitationof it. In the Phaedo, two otherteleologicalclaims
appeared:one an appealto intention("Whyis Socratesstaying in prison?""Be-
cause he decidedto.") and one an appealto order("Showme that the earthis in
the middle because it is best so")." Each of these is distinctfrom, if compatible
with,5'a theistic teleology (consider,for example, that ordinaryhumanpractical
reasoningis teleologicaleven if there is no god; or that naturalecology may be
in itself worthmaintaining,even if the presentbalanceitself evolved by virtueof
antecedentcauses,antecedentcauses which may not includethe divine).The order
of the cosmos underCronosis a good thing eitherbecausegod made it thatway,
or because it is well-ordered.But once god has let go of the cosmos, the order
startsto disintegrateand be threatened.If the secondera is one of decayingtele-
ology, what sort of life could we call happy?And undercircumstanceslike that,
whom shouldwe ask to rule us? If, on the Brisson/Roweaccount,the secondera
s' We should bear in mind that the life worth living is recalled at 300a in an aston-
ishingly independentremarkby YS, that the life in a state with an embargo on inquiry
would not be worth living.
52 Hard to see, of course, why that should be so on Brisson's account, when god is
is worth having just because it is well-ordered, not because god made it that way.
I4 Compatible,that is to say, under some circumstances.If, however, a theistic tele-
ology fully explains or determineseverything that happens, it may be hard to see how
an independent account of practical reasoning could be maintained (the Stoics, of
course, had troublewith this one). And if one cites the value of a naturalbalance, the
claim that it is created may be inimical to the very notion of balance itself (not least,
for example, if the balance is one which changes in a stable way over time). I leave
out of considerationhere a functionalistteleology (such as I take Aristotle's generally
to be) which looks to the proper functioning of each species independentlyof their
place within the whole system. There are, of course passages where Aristotle seems
more inclined to an ecological view; perhapsPhys. 11.8, and also Pol. 1256b15.
READINGPLATO'SPOLITICUS 107
ss Cf. n. 36 above; both Rowe and Brisson suggest that there are two phases of
earth-bornpeople, one of which ages from young to old, the other in reverse. Rowe
treats the emergence of grey-beards as a sign of decaying teleology (as in Hesiod).
But here the greyness disappears as the creaturesgrow younger. Likewise those who
die by violence in the age of Zeus come alive again and then vanish quickly - so that
there is nothing that remains of the murder.That seems to me to be the opposite of
decaying teleology.
"6 There is, I suspect, a telling parallel here with the odd argument of the Par-
menides that when we grow older we grow older than our younger selves. Rowe is
troubled by this, noting an apparentlack of fit between the idea that souls are seeds
at 272e3 and the birth of grey-beardsat 273el0. The interpretationof the grey-beards
as an Hesiodic nightmare,however, is itself to beg the question about the nature of
the teleological claims offered here; and Plato is, of course, quite able to turn or even
to reverse an old story to his own advantage.
S7 Unlike myths, of course: compare the ES' exhortation to the extreme youth of
YS at 268e with his complaint in the Sophist (243aff.) that ancient myths treat their
hearers as children - that is, they patronise them.
S8 Cf. Ferrarion this; compare 270e with the increasing forgetfulness of the uni-
verse in our era, 273b. Tad Brennan objects to me that the thought that memory is
incompatiblewith ageing backwardsdoes not take account of how we remember sto-
ries from the previous era (271a); but here it is people in our era who rememberthen,
not the people then who rememberus.
108 MARY MARGARETMCCABE
one era and from sexual intercoursein the other.59This reflectsthe ways of life
in the differenteras. When man lives on what natureproducesautomatically,he
has no need for social intercourseeither,60since he is safe from dangerand pro-
tected by the benevolentdaimones.In the exigent circumstancesof the age of
Zeus, by contrast,humanbeings need each other, both to reproduceand to stay
alive. It is only in the age of Zeus thatotherpeople matterat all. Of course,Plato
often uses sexual intercourseand reproductionas a metaphorfor philosophical
activity. Here, however,there is a direct and literal parallelbetweensexual and
social intercourseand philosophicaldiscussion;for each activity requiresother
people as partners6'(this is denied for the age of Cronos at 27le; and the gifts
of the gods to the men of this era include teaching and education, 274c).62
Philosophicaldiscussion,moreover,requireseach participantto be able to remem-
ber what has been said and to preserveconsistencyand for each to be able to
interactwith the other.For the backwardscreaturesof the golden age, this would
be impossible.63 So can we judge which life would be happier?
In the Theaetetus Socrates described the life of philosophy: "It is not possible,
Theodorus,for bad to perish;for there must always be somethingwhich is over
against good; nor is it possible for bad to take up residence among the gods;
instead it necessarily frequents mortal nature and this place here. So we should
try to flee this place and go there as quickly as possible. And flight is likening to
god as much as possible; and that likening is becoming just and holy with rea-
son" (176a). Likening to god is not the same thing as becoming the product of
god's good order. The two eras of the myth allow a contrast between the well-
run cosmos and the disordered one; and they allow a comparison between the
ordering activity of god in the age of Cronos and the activity of the philosopher
s9 Cf. n. 37 above. Brisson and Rowe must argue that there is no direct parallel
between the reverse process of ageing and the means of reproduction,because they
both suppose that ageing backwards,which implies being born grey-haired,is decay-
ing teleology. My suggestion is that this is only true when we think about worth in
terms of doing philosophy; in ordinaryterms there would be a great deal to be said
for ageing backwards.Experta dico.
60 The "need for talk" in the golden age is left as an open question at 272d5; but
the starting point of the myth is that in the golden age men had no needs at all.
61 The partnershipof philosophical discussion is parodied,I suggest, in the discus-
sion between the ES and YS; here the opening discussion of the dialogue makes some
suggestions about just what conditions are necessary for a good discussion: it ain't
enough to be called Socrates.
62 Cf. above n. 33. This myth leaves out what Protagorassuggested were the gifts
of the gods: ai&k and ticrq.I suggest that this is because this myth argues that tak-
ing others as partnersis a consequence of the circumstancesof the age of Zeus - that
is, they are explained by the myth, not by the deus ex machina device of gifts from
the gods.
63 It is hard to see, indeed, how they could lay claim to a life at all; they are like
the molluscs of the Philebus which feel pleasure but never rememberor plan.
READINGPLATO'SPOLITICUS 109
' Again, this may reflect on whether the two eras are similar, or contrary;for my
money here the mistake is explained by their contrariety;cf. 274e11.
65 Clark, RS.
66 The title of Clark's suggestive paper, RS, suggests that he has misread this pas-
sage ("Herdsof free bipeds");but the content of the paper shows that he takes Plato's
point. Toney, PSSP, reads 293a, via Skemp's translation,as saying that it is indiffer-
ent to the statesman whether the citizens consent to his rule. Rowe's translation,on
the other hand, suggests that it is indifferent to the question of defining the states-
man whether we consider the consent of the citizens; the preceding speech of the ES,
293a2-4, suggests that his topic is the search for the statesman, not the statesman's
view of his citizens. Rowe seems to be right; the whole dialogue is concemed with
what contrasts are significant for division; so here, the matter of consent (as in the
case of doctors) is tangential to our understandingof their expertise.
67 The theme of inquiry will recur; see below and compare the inquiry which the
people of Cronos should do, 272c3, with the inquiry that is actually being done in the
110 MCCABE
MARYMARGARET
which determine their own ends - it is only the person who determines his own
ends who may count - the argument suggests - as "self-directing." Such a per-
son should also be distinguished from the chimerical figure of the sophist, who
has no self to direct (291c). But the self-determination of the statesman is then
explained by virtue of three features of his expertise: firstly (294ff.) that his knowl-
edge is reflected in judgements which are accurate for the moment and for the
individual case; secondly, that his knowledge is systematic - this is what enables
him to bring the community together (306aff.); thirdly that his knowledge, because
it is complete, enables him to delegate: he is not himself engaged in political
activity, but instead on advising others what to do (310e).7'
What, then, is the political theory of the dialogue? How far is the Politicus
about politics at all? Suppose your doctor suddenly became malevolent, or your
pilot ill-willed; suppose that all the experts, in a sudden revolution, became evil
self-seekers.72We might try to defend ourselves against them by establishing rules
they must not break, or by setting ourselves up to determine what should be the
right treatment, which the best voyage. We might (in this parody of the emer-
gence from the state of nature) even establish democratic institutions; furthermore,
we would - to protect ourselves further - decree that no-one is to do any research
or experiments, on pain of the extreme penalty. This would - as YS is startled
into pointing out - make life not worth living. Worse still, perhaps," would be
the diviner could have a skill at all, where in the Apology they are castigated for their
ignorance. They conclude that Plt. allows that "divinationcan be the source of impor-
tant moral truths."It is, I think, a mistake to try to map isolated argumentsof the Plt.
directly on to the claims of earlier dialogues; Plato's interest in the issue of technai
is neither single nor simple - and at Plt. 279ff. he is worried about the autonomy of
the diviner, not his truths.
71 Cf. the claim in advance at 292b, that this expertise will be "concernedin a sense
poses that it is designed to make us see just how dangerous is the inflexibility of the
rule of law; and how it may lead to the kind of repression described at 300a. Gill, by
contrast, sees the experiment as "bizarre,"if it supposes that there should be commu-
nities which forbid the practice of skills or science; but Athens in 399 may have been
one such.
73 Our understandingof this passage, 299eff., depends on whether we suppose that
the case where someone ignoresboth the expertsand the rule of law; then chaos
will follow.
The issue here seems to be, in part,the purposeof the thought-experiment. Is
it designedas a palliative,a (back-handed)justificationof law? In that case, per-
haps, the emphasislies in the way the experimentconstruesthe expertsas being
capableof malevolence,a returnto the old questionof how far an expertin jus-
tice might be the most competentat doing wrong; alternatively(and consonant
with the earlier claim that the questionof consent is immaterialto the central
definitionof the statesman)it is designedto show just how damaginga general
mistrustof expertise may be (hence the familiar rhetoricof dissatisfactionat
298a2ff.).'4Or is it designedto pointto just how radicalthe claims for the states-
man are in this dialogue?Is the Politicus endorsingconstitutionalism,or reject-
ing it?
Gill argues that the answer to this questionis to be found in the dialectical
strategyof the dialogue,291-303.75The ES firstunderminesYS's unthinkingcom-
mitmentto traditionalviews ("constitutionsare, roughlyspeaking,a good thing,
especiallywhen thereare tyrantsabout")by suggestingthat if the statesmandoes
have objectiveknowledge,then no constitutionhas a claim againsthim. Afterthe
thoughtexperiment,however, the ES suggests that there are indeed groundsfor
endorsingsome kind of constitutionalism.Whereknowledgeis absent,constitu-
tions are all we have; they are "copies"of the ideal.76
Lane77arguesthatthe politicaltheoryof the Politicusis radicallydifferentfrom
the Republic.Firstof all, the art of the statesmanis definedin termsof his grasp
of the xatpo', the rightmoment(his art is, that is to say, irretrievablyparticular
and immediate);for this reason he practisesjudgement;and the particularityof
there is something to be saved for the rule of law: it may be inflexible, but it is based
on some kind of principle:the second voyage is second-best.
71
If we accept the teleology of the central passage of the dialogue, knowledge
knows the right measure, and so producesjudgements which are directed at the best;
it is, of course, always a question whether Plato really ever shows that this implies
that the knower must have a good conscience.
7S Gill persuasively analyses the entire section as a piece of dialectic; and he argues
that the citizens of the fixed constitutionsallow there to be objective political knowl-
edge; but prevent its discovery in their institutions.This still - in my view - makes
these fixed constitutions very grim candidates for "second-best":especially in a dia-
logue which suggests that even the easy life of the golden age would be dismal com-
pared to the life of the philosopher.
76 Lane points to how differently"imitate"is used here from elsewhere in Plato: for
here it is a central feature of the imitation to remain fixed. So this sort of imitation,
at 300e, misses what is central to the knowledge it imitates, namely its sensitivity to
each situation; such an imitation is bound, therefore, to fail. Likewise, Rowe argues
that this fixity is itself inimical to the best life (the same point, perhaps,is made about
the written word at Phaedrus 276ff.).
1 In an excellent paper, RS.
READINGPLATO'SPOLITICUS 113
85 The Republic,on many accounts, says that the philosopher should be the king
because only the philosopher grasps the first principles (the Forms), so that only the
philosopher can be reliably right when it comes to matters of state. The same dia-
logue, however, seems to suggest that the objects of the knowledge of the philosopher
must be clearly distinguished from those of belief, which is the sort of cognition we
can have of the here and now: but then if in the here and now we can only believe,
it is hard to see why the philosopher should be any better off here and now than the
rest of us. If we take even a modified unitarian view of the relation between the
Politicus and the Republic, this two worlds problem is still with us. But the Politicus,
far more than the Republic, is concemed with individual decisions - uncontrovertibly,
the here and now. This may be good reason to reject a unitarianaccount.
I Gill has some sensible things to say on the limitations of comparingon dialogue
with another, given the radically differentpurposes of the Republic, the Politicus and
the Laws. I suggest here, however, that we should do well to contrast the epistemol-
ogy of the Republic and that of the Politicus.
87 There is an old issue here: is Collection and Division reasonably described as a
method? Does it have heuristic value? (cf. the Meno's paradox type puzzle in Kato
RS about how we get an "anticipative grasp of the target";Fattal does not mention
this problem of interpretingCollection and Division.)
116 MCCABE
MARYMARGARET
88 Some, myself included, would argue that any account of the Republic must make
sense of just how the philosophers,who occupy themselves with Forms, can use their
knowledge to rule in the everyday world, which is, on many accounts, only susceptible
to belief.
89 Bravo suggests a returnto immanentforms such as are found in the Socratic dia-
logues. His account of the metaphysics of the Politicus makes it look very much like
(some interpretationsof) the Philebus; but he does not provide an integratedview of
the Politicus itself. Kato is sensibly uncommitted.Of course it is one thing to claim
that collection and division divides objective reality, or that the statesmanhas objec-
tive knowledge (Gill) and quite another to claim that knowledge is of transcendent
forms, or some other degree of reality; to say that something is objective does not
imply its transcendence,or its otherworldliness.
READING PLATO'S POLITICUS 117