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Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2 0 1 2
BIR ISSUANCES


I n s i d e t h i s
I s s u e:


BIR Issuances
1

Jurisprudence
3


JLs Corner
11

REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 9-
2012 issued on June 1, 2012 im-
plements Sections 24(D)(1), 27(D)
(5), 57, 106 and 196 of the Nation-
al Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
of 1997 relative to the non-
redemption of properties sold dur-
ing involuntary sales.

In case of non-redemption of prop-
erties sold during involuntary sales,
regardless of the type of proceed-
ings and personality of mortga-
gees/selling persons or entities,
the Capital Gains Tax (CGT), if the
property is a capital asset; or the
Creditable Withholding Tax (CWT),
if the property is an ordinary asset;
the Value-Added Tax (VAT) and
the Documentary Stamp Tax
(DST) shall become due.

The buyer of the subject property,
who is deemed to have withheld
the CGT or CWT due from the
sale, shall then file the CGT return
and remit the said tax to the BIR
within 30 days from expiration of
the applicable statutory redemption
period, or file the CWT return and
remit the said tax to the BIR within
10 days following the end of the
month after expiration of the appli-
cable statutory redemption period,
provided that, for taxes withheld in
December, the CWT return shall
be filed and the taxes remitted to
the BIR on or before January 15 of
the following year.

If the property sold through invol-
untary sale is under the circum-
stances which warrant the impo-
sition of VAT, the said tax must
be paid to the BIR by the VAT-
registered owner/mortgagor on or
before the 20th day or 25th day,
whichever is applicable, of the
month following the month when
the right of redemption pre-
scribes.

The DST return shall be filed and
the said tax paid to the BIR within 5
days after the close of the month
after the lapse of the applicable
statutory redemption period. The
CGT/CWT/VAT and DST shall be
based on whichever is higher of the
consideration (bid price of the high-
er bidder) or the fair market value or
the zonal value as determined in
accordance with Section 6(E) of the
Tax Code.

REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 10
-2012 issued on June 1, 2012 de-
fines the requirements for joint ven-
tures or consortiums formed for the
purpose of undertaking construction
projects and
prescribes the mandatory enroll-
ment of local contractors in the
Electronic Filing and Payment Sys-
tem (eFPS).

A joint venture or consortium
formed for the purpose of undertak-
ing construction projects, which is
not considered as corporation under
Section 22 of the National Internal
Revenue Code (NIRC), of 1997 as
amended, should be:

a. for the undertaking of a con-
struction project;
1

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Serving your purpose, realizing your dreams..
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2 0 1 2
BIR ISSUANCES


I n s i d e t h i s
I s s u e:


BIR Issuances
1


JLs Corner
11


b. should involve joining or pooling of
resources by licensed local con-
tracts; that is, licensed as general
contractor by the Philippine Contrac-
tors Accreditation Board (PCAB) of
the Department of Trade and Indus-
try (DTI);

c. the local contractors are engaged
in construction business; and

d. the Joint Venture itself must like-
wise be duly licensed as such by the
PCAB of the DTI.

Joint ventures involving foreign con-
tractors may also be treated as a
non-taxable corporation only if the
member foreign contractor is cov-
ered by a special license as contrac-
tor by the PCAB of the DTI, and the
construction project is certified by
the appropriate Tendering Agency
(government office) that the project
is a foreign financed/internationally-
funded project and that international
bidding is allowed under the Bilateral
Agreement entered into by and be-
tween the Philippine Government
and the foreign/international financ-
ing institution pursuant to the imple-
menting rules and regulations of Re-
public Act No. 4566, otherwise
known as Contractors License Law.

Absent any one the aforesaid re-
quirements, the joint venture or
consortium formed for the purpose
of undertaking construction pro-
jects shall be considered as taxa-
ble corporations. In addition, the
tax-exempt joint venture or consor-
tium shall not include those who
are mere suppliers of goods, ser-
vices or capital to a construction
project. The members to a Joint
Venture not taxable as corporation
shall each be responsible in report-
ing and paying appropriate Income
Taxes on their respective share to
the joint ventures profit.

All licensed local contractors are
required to enroll to the BIRs
eFPS at the Revenue District Of-
fice where they are registered as
taxpayers.
2
JURISPRUDENCE

G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Respondent
SECOND DIVISION

FACTS:

On 16 September 1997, Virginia C.
Malolos (private complainant) filed an affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22 against Ma. Theresa
Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint
alleges that respondent issued nine (9) checks
with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six
Hundred Fifty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of
private complainant which were dishonored up-
on presentment for payment.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a
civil case for accounting, recovery of commer-
cial documents, enforceability and effectivity of
contract and specific performance against pri-
vate complainant.
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor
Ruben Catubay recommended the suspension
of the criminal proceedings pending the out-
come of the civil action respondent filed
against private complainant the same was ap-
proved by the City Prosecutor. private com-
plainant raised the matter before the Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ).

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of
Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the resolu-
tion of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and
ordered the filing of information for violation of
BP Blg. 22 against respondent.

Consequently, two counts for violation of BP
Blg. 22, both dated 18 November 1999, were
filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangili-
nan on 3 February 2000 before the Office of
the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC), Quezon City. These cases were raf-
fled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000.

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an
"Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information
and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Ar-
rest" before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.
She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.

The MeTC ruled that the criminal ac-
tions have already prescribed.

On appeal, the RTC reversed the deci-
sion of the MeTC ruling that the criminal ac-
tions for violations of BP 22 have not yet pre-
scribed when the same was filed with the
court a quo considering the appropriate com-
plaint that started the proceedings having
been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on
16 September 1997.

On review, the CA reversed the deci-
sion of the RTC stating that the informations
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and
89152(sic) against the petitioner having been
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Que-
zon City only on 03 February 2000, the said
cases had therefore, clearly prescribed.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-
complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 Septem-
ber 1997 interrupted the period of prescription
of such offense.

HELD:

Yes. The Court found that the CA reversively
erred in ruling that the offense committed by
respondent had already prescribed. Indeed,
Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When
Prescription Shall Begin," as amended, is the
law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Apposite-
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
3
JURISPRUDENCE
ly, the law reads:

SECTION 1. Violations penalized
by special acts shall, unless otherwise
provided in such acts, prescribe in ac-
cordance with the following rules: (a) xxx;
(b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) xxx.
SECTION 2. Prescription shall
begin to run from the day of the commis-
sion of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of ju-
dicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupt-
ed when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dis-
missed for reasons not constituting jeop-
ardy.
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law
that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of
not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation,
it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in
accordance with the aforecited law. The
running of the prescriptive period, howev-
er, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations
were filed against respondent on 16 Sep-
tember 1997. The cases reached the
MeTC of Quezon City only on 13 Febru-
ary 2000 because in the meanwhile, re-
spondent filed a civil case for accounting
followed by a petition before the City
Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings
on the ground of "prejudicial question".
The matter was raised before the Secre-
tary of Justice after the City Prosecutor
approved the petition to suspend pro-
ceedings. It was only after the Secretary
of Justice so ordered that the informations
for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed
with the MeTC of Quezon City.

Clearly, it was respondents own
motion for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings, which motion she predicated
on her civil case for accounting, that
caused the filing in court of the 1997 initi-
ated proceedings only in 2000.


G.R. No. 174156 June 20, 2012
FILCAR TRANSPORT SERVICES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE A. ESPINAS, Respondent.

FACTS:

On November 22, 1998, at around 6:30
p.m., respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving
his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila. Upon
reaching the intersection of Leon Guinto and
President Quirino Streets, Espinas stopped his
car. When the signal light turned green, he pro-
ceeded to cross the intersection. He was already
in the middle of the intersection when another
car, traversing President Quirino Street and go-
ing to Roxas Boulevard, suddenly hit and
bumped his car. The other car escaped from the
scene of the incident, but Espinas was able to
get its plate number and later learned that the
registered owner is Filcar.

Espinas sent several letters to Filcar and
to its President and General Manager Carmen
Flor demanding payment for damages and on
May 31, 2001, Espinas filed a complaint for dam-
ages against Filcar and Carmen Flor.

Filcar on the other hand argued that while
it is the registered owner of the car that hit and
bumped Espinas car, the car was assigned to its
Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor, the hus-
band of Carmen Flor. Filcar further stated that
when the incident happened, the car was being
driven by Atty. Flors personal driver, Timoteo
Floresca.

Filcar denied any liability to Espinas and
claimed that the incident was not due to its fault
or negligence since Floresca was not its employ-
ee but that of Atty. Flor. Filcar and Carmen Flor
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
4
JURISPRUDENCE
both said that they always exercised the due dili-
gence required of a good father of a family in
leasing or assigning their vehicles to third par-
ties.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Filcar, as reg-
istered owner of the motor vehi-
cle which figured in an accident,
may be held liable for the dam-
ages caused to Espinas.

2. Whether or not employer-
employee relationship is re-
quired in order to hold the reg-
istered owner liable for acci-
dent, injury, or death caused by
the operation of the vehicle.

HELD:
1. Yes, Filcar may be held liable.
Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed
the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is
thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in
relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

It is undisputed that Filcar is the regis-
tered owner of the motor vehicle which hit
and caused damage to Espinas car; and it is
on the basis of this fact that the Court held
Filcar primarily and directly liable to Espinas
for damages.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Ar-
ticle 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predi-
cated on an employees act or omission may
be instituted against the employer who is
held liable for the negligent act or omission
committed by his employee.

Based on the above-cited article
(Article 2176), the obligation to indemnify
another for damage caused by ones act or
omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor
himself, i.e., the person who committed the
negligent act or omission. The law, howev-
er, provides for exceptions when it makes
certain persons liable for the act or omis-
sion of another.
One exception is an employer who
is made vicariously liable for the tort com-
mitted by his employee.
Although the employer is not the
actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicari-
ously liable on the basis of the civil law
principle of pater familias for failure to ex-
ercise due care and vigilance over the acts
of ones subordinates to prevent damage
to another.

2. No, employer-employee relationship
is not required in determining the vi-
carious liability of the registered owner.
In Equitable Leasing Corporation v.
Suyom, (437 SCRA 244, 252 (2002)) the
Court ruled that in so far as third persons
are concerned, the registered owner of the
motor vehicle is the employer of the negli-
gent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such
owner.

Thus, it is clear that for the purpose
of holding the registered owner of the mo-
tor vehicle primarily and directly liable for
damages under Article 2176, in relation
with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the ex-
istence of an employer-employee relation-
ship, as it is understood in labor relations
law, is not required. It is sufficient to es-
tablish that Filcar is the registered own-
er of the motor vehicle causing damage
in order that it may be held vicariously lia-
ble under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Thus, whether there is an employer-
employee relationship between the regis-
tered owner and the driver is irrelevant in
determining the liability of the registered
owner who the law holds primarily and di-
rectly responsible for any accident, injury
or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways.

Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
5
JURISPRUDENCE
As explained by this Court in Erezo,
the general public policy involved in motor
vehicle registration is the protection of in-
nocent third persons who may have no
means of identifying public road malefac-
tors and, therefore, would find it difficult if
not impossible to seek redress for dam-
ages they may sustain in accidents result-
ing in deaths, injuries and other damages;
by fixing the person held primarily and di-
rectly liable for the damages sustained by
victims of road mishaps, the law ensures
that relief will always be available to them.

To identify the person primarily and
directly responsible for the damages would
also prevent a situation where a registered
owner of a motor vehicle can easily es-
cape liability by passing on the blame to
another who may have no means to an-
swer for the damages caused, thereby de-
feating the claims of victims of road acci-
dents.

These same principles apply by
analogy to the case at bar. Filcar should
not be permitted to evade its liability for
damages by conveniently passing on the
blame to another party; in this case, its
Corporate Secretary, Atty. Flor and his al-
leged driver, Floresca. Following our rea-
soning in Equitable, the agreement be-
tween Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the
motor vehicle to the latter does not bind
Espinas who was not a party to and has no
knowledge of the agreement, and whose
only recourse is to the motor vehicle regis-
tration.

Neither can Filcar use the defenses
available under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code - that the employee acts beyond the
scope of his assigned task or that it exer-
cised the due diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage - because the
motor vehicle registration law, to a certain
extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by making these defenses unavaila-
ble to the registered owner of the motor
vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the
registered owner of the car involved in the
vehicular accident, it could not escape pri-
mary liability for the damages caused to
Espinas.


G.R. No. 193676 June 20, 2012
COSMOS BOTTLING CORP., Petitioner,
vs.
WILSON FERMIN, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
G.R. No. 194303
WILSON B. FERMIN, Petitioner,
vs.
COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION and CE-
CILIA BAUTISTA, Respondents.

FACTS:

Wilson B. Fermin (Fermin) was a forklift
operator at Cosmos Bottling Corporation
(COSMOS), where he started his employment
on 27 August 1976. On 16 December 2002,
he was accused of stealing the cellphone of
his fellow employee, Luis Braga
(Braga). Fermin was then given a Show
Cause Memorandum, requiring him to explain
why the cellphone was found inside his lock-
er. In compliance therewith, he submitted an
affidavit the following day, explaining that he
only hid the phone as a practical joke and had
every intention of returning it to Braga.

After conducting an investigation, COS-
MOS found Fermin guilty of stealing Bragas
phone in violation of company rules and regu-
lations. Consequently, the company terminat-
ed Fermin from employment after 27 years of
service, effective on 6 October 2003.

Following the dismissal of Fermin from
employment, Braga executed an affidavit,
which stated the belief that the former had
merely pulled a prank without any intention of
stealing the cellphone, and withdrew from
COSMOS his complaint against Fermin.

Meanwhile, Fermin filed a Complaint for
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
6
JURISPRUDENCE
Illegal Dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter (LA)
dismissed for lack of merit on the ground that
the act of taking a fellow employees cellphone
amounted to gross misconduct. Further, the
LA likewise took into consideration Fermins
other infractions, namely: (a) committing acts
of disrespect to a superior officer, and (b)
sleeping on duty and abandonment of duty.

COSMOS, on which the onus of proving
lawful cause in sustaining the dismissal of
[Fermin] lies, failed to prove that the latters
misconduct was induced by a perverse and
wrongful intent, especially in the light of
Bragas Sinumpaang Salaysay which corrobo-
rated [Fermins] claim that [Fermin] was mere-
ly playing a prank when he hid Bragas cellular
phone. Parenthetically, the labor courts dis-
missed Bragas affidavit of desistance as a
mere afterthought because the same was exe-
cuted only after [Fermin] had been terminated.

COSMOS argues, among other things,
that: (a) Fermin committed a clear act of bad
faith and dishonesty in taking the cellphone of
Braga and denying knowledge thereof; (b) the
latters recantation was a mere afterthought;
(c) the lack of material damage or prejudice on
the part of COSMOS does not preclude it from
imposing the penalty of termination; and (d)
the previous infractions committed by Fermin
strengthen the decision of COSMOS to dis-
miss him from service.

On the other hand, Fermin contends that
since the CA found that the penalty of dismis-
sal was not proportionate to his offense, it
should have ruled in favor of his entitlement to
backwages.



ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal was appropriate.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

It must be noted that in the case at bar,
all the lower tribunals were in agreement
that Fermins act of taking Bragas cell-
phone amounted to theft. Factual findings
made by administrative agencies, if estab-
lished by substantial evidence as borne out
by the records, are final and binding on this
Court, whose jurisdiction is limited to re-
viewing questions of law. Theft committed
against a co-employee is considered as a
case analogous to serious misconduct, for
which the penalty of dismissal from service
may be meted out to the erring employ-
ee, viz:

Article 282 of the Labor Code
provides:
Article 282. Termination by Em-
ployer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following
causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or wil-
ful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or his
representatives in connection with
his work;

x xx x xx x xx

(e) Other causes analogous to
the foregoing.









G.R. No. 189999 June 27, 2012
ANGELES UNIVERSITY FOUNDA-
TION, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF ANGELES, JULIET G. QUINSAAT,
in her capacity as Treasurer of Angeles
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
7
JURISPRUDENCE
City and ENGR. DONATO N. DIZON, in his
capacity as Acting Angeles City Building
Official, Respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Angeles University Foundation
(AUF) is an educational institution estab-
lished on May 25, 1962 and was converted
into a non-stock, non-profit education founda-
tion under the provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6055 on December 4, 1975.

Sometime in August 2005, petitioner filed
with the Office of the City Building Official an
application for a building permit for the con-
struction of an 11-storey building of the Ange-
les University Foundation Medical Center in
its main campus.

Said office issued a Building Permit Fee
Assessment in the amount of P126,839.20.
An Order of Payment was also issued by the
City Planning and Development Office, Zon-
ing Administration Unit requiring petitioner to
pay the sum of P238,741.64 as Locational
Clearance Fee.

Petitioner claimed that it is exempt from
the payment of the building permit and loca-
tional clearance fees.

Respondent City Treasurer referred the
matter to the Bureau of Local Government
Finance (BLGF) of the Department of Fi-
nance, which in turn endorsed the query to
the DOJ. The DOJ Secretary declared peti-
tioner to be exempt from the payment of
building permit fees.

Petitioner wrote the respondents reiterating its
request to reverse the disputed assessments
however, despite petitioners plea, respond-
ents refused to issue the building permit so
the petitioner paid the fees under protest, only
then did the respondents issued the corre-
sponding Building Permit, Writing Permit,
Electrical Permit, and Sanitary Building Per-
mit.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the
RTC seeking for the refund of what it has paid
plus interest and in its Answer, the respond-
ents asserted that the claim of petitioner can-
not be granted because its structures are not
among those mentioned in Sec. 209 of
the National Building Code as exempted from
the building permit fee. Since the disputed as-
sessments are regulatory in nature, they are
not taxes from which petitioner is exempt. As
to the real property taxes imposed on petition-
ers property located in Marisol Village, re-
spondents pointed out that said premises will
be used as a school dormitory which can-
not be considered as a use exclusively for
educational activities.

The RTC rendered decision in favour of
the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the
trial courts decision holding that while the pe-
titioner is a tax-free entity, it is not exempt
from the payment of regulatory fees.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner is exempt
from the payment of building permit
and related fees imposed under the
National Building Code.
2. Whether or not the parcel of land
owned by the petitioner which has been
assessed for real property tax is like-
wise exempt.



HELD:
1. No, Petitioner is not exempt.
Exempted from the payment of
building permit fees are: (1) public build-
ings and (2) traditional indigenous family
dwellings. Not being expressly included in
the enumeration of structures to which the
building permit fees do not apply, petition-
ers claim for exemption rests solely on its
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
8
JURISPRUDENCE
interpretation of the term "other charges
imposed by the National Government" in
the tax exemption clause of R.A. No. 6055.

That a building permit fee is a regulatory
imposition is highlighted by the fact that in
processing an application for a building per-
mit, the Building Official shall see to it that the
applicant satisfies and conforms with ap-
proved standard requirements on zoning and
land use, lines and grades, structural design,
sanitary and sewerage, environmental health,
electrical and mechanical safety as well as
with other rules and regulations implementing
the National Building Code. Thus, ancillary
permits such as electrical permit, sanitary
permit and zoning clearance must also be
secured and the corresponding fees paid be-
fore a building permit may be issued. And as
can be gleaned from the implementing rules
and regulations of the National Building
Code, clearances from various government
authorities exercising and enforcing regulato-
ry functions affecting buildings/structures, like
local government units, may be further re-
quired before a building permit may be is-
sued.

Since building permit fees are not charges on
property, they are not impositions from which
petitioner is exempt.

As to petitioners argument that the building
permit fees collected by respondents are in
reality taxes because the primary purpose is
to raise revenues for the local government
unit, the same does not hold water.

2. The real property of the peti-
tioner in question is likewise not ex-
empt.

Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitu-
tions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to
be entitled to the exemption, the petition-
er is burdened to prove, by clear and un-
equivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable
institution; and (b) its real properties
are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLU
SIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and
enjoyed to the exclusion of others; de-
barred from participation or enjoyment;
and "exclusively" is defined, "in a manner
to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclu-
sively." If real property is used for one or
more commercial purposes, it is not ex-
clusively used for the exempted purposes
but is subject to taxation. The words
"dominant use" or "principal use" cannot
be substituted for the words "used exclu-
sively" without doing violence to the Con-
stitutions and the law. Solely is synony-
mous with exclusively.

What is meant by actual, direct and
exclusive use of the property for charita-
ble purposes is the direct and immediate
and actual application of the property it-
self to the purposes for which the charita-
ble institution is organized. It is not the
use of the income from the real property
that is determinative of whether the prop-
erty is used for tax-exempt purposes.

Petitioner failed to discharge its bur-
den to prove that its real property is actu-
ally, directly and exclusively used for edu-
cational purposes. While there is no alle-
gation or proof that petitioner leases

the land to its present occupants, still
there is no compliance with the constitu-
tional and statutory requirement that said
real property is actually, directly and ex-
clusively used for educational purposes.
The respondents correctly assessed the
land for real property taxes for the taxa-
ble period during which the land is not
being devoted solely to petitioners edu-
cational activities.
Volume IV Issue No. 6 J U N E 2012
9
JLs Corner


In the state of nature, indeed, all
men are born equal, but they can-
not continue in this equality. Socie-
ty makes them lose it, and they re-
cover it only by the protection of
the laws.

Charles de Montesquieu (1689 -
1755), The Spirit of Laws, 1748

V o l u m e I V I s s u e N o . 6 J U N E 2012
11