Derong chen: Zhuangzi metaphorically puts forth three meta-questions in epistemology. As an epistemic subject, do I know I myself? do I know others? What can I know about the world?
Derong chen: Zhuangzi metaphorically puts forth three meta-questions in epistemology. As an epistemic subject, do I know I myself? do I know others? What can I know about the world?
Derong chen: Zhuangzi metaphorically puts forth three meta-questions in epistemology. As an epistemic subject, do I know I myself? do I know others? What can I know about the world?
RETHINKING SOME METAPHORS IN ZHUANGZI* The metaphors in the Zhuangzi have a strong appeal to scholars both in China and the West. In this article, I do not intend to discuss the general features of Zhuangzis metaphors 1 nor the all metaphors in the Zhuangzi. Instead, I shall specically argue that Zhuangzi metaphorically puts forth three meta-questions or fundamental ques- tions in epistemology: 1) as an epistemic subject, do I know I myself? 2) Among epistemic subjects, do I know others? 3) What can I know about the world? I shall demonstrate, by reanalyzing some of Zhuangzis metaphors, that the discovery of these three meta- questions is Zhuangzis valuable contribution to epistemology. I. Do I Know I Myself: Self-Identification of an Epistemic Subject Do I know I myself? This is an initial question that we should clarify before dealing with any other epistemological issue. Zhuangzi puts this question in his metaphor of the buttery: Once Chuang Chou [Zhuang Zhou] dreamt he was a buttery, a but- tery itting and uttering around, happy with himself and doing as he pleased. He didnt know he was Chuang Chou. Suddenly he woke up and there he was, solid and unmistakable Chuang Chou. But he didnt know if he was Chuang Chou who had dreamt he was a but- tery, or a buttery dreaming he was Chuang Chou. Between Chung Chou and a buttery, there must be some distinction! This is called the Transformation of Things. 2 What is the meaning of this story as a metaphor? Between the lines many scholars read that this story tells us about the relationships between soul and body, existence and non-existence, being and non- being, life and death, certainty and uncertainty, continuity and dis- DERONG CHEN, Ph.D. in Chinese Philosophy, University of Toronto; Ph.D. in Western Philosophy, Wuhan University; associate professor, Sichuan University. Specialties: modern Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy. E-mail: d.chen@utoronto.ca Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32:3 (September 2005) 493507 2005 Journal of Chinese Philosophy continuity, freedom of the will and spiritual freedom. 3 From the per- spective of epistemology, most scholars have found skepticism in this story. For instance, Feng Youlan characterizes Zhuangzis epistemol- ogy as relativism and skepticism, and thinks that Zhuangzi nally turns to mysticism. 4 Chad Hansen and Russell B. Goodman compare Zhuangzi with Descartes. Hansen nds that Zhuangzis position is, in certain formal ways, similar to that of the Cartesian skeptic of the senses. Hansen notes, Descartes was trapped in a circle of repre- sentations from which he could never escape, but Zhuangzi main- tains that we are trapped by our perspective shaped by linguistic commitments, which we can transcend only by refusing to make judg- ments at all. 5 Goodman notes that the difference between Zhuangzi and Descartes skepticism rests in their goals, not in their forms. 6 Paul Kjellberg thinks Zhuangzi suspects the human ability to know the truth. 7 He thinks, Zhuangzi is skeptical only with respect to intellect; he suspects our ability to gure out what is best or to know the truth in this sense. 8 Lisa Rophals compares Zhuangzis story of the but- tery to the discussion about dreams between Socrates and his disci- ple Theaetetus. She assumes that both Zhuangzi and Socrates use the example of dreams to doubt our ability to know. 9 Conversely, Hans-George Moller, in his analysis of Zhuangzis metaphorical story of the buttery, notes that there are two essential messages to be found: what human beings are and what truth is. In fact, the question What are human beings? is one about identica- tion of human beings as epistemic subjects. But, Moller does not discuss the signicance of this story from this angle. He denies that Zhuangzi doubts his own existence, and also denies the philosophical conclusion that the story illustrates the relativity of distinctions in the world. He says, I rather take it to illustrate the opposite moral: it teaches the importance, the necessity, or the sense of distinctions in the world. 10 In a new study of the Zhuangzi, Youru Wang develops important standpoints. He asserts that Zhuangzi dismantles the iden- tity of the self as a thinking subject, rejecting any absolute distinc- tion between subject and object. He recognizes the relativity of the distinction between I as a thinking subject and other subjects. 11 This point of view has touched upon the issue of the self-identication of epistemic subjects, but we need further investigation along this simu- lating line of thinking. Instead of delving into a discussion about Zhuangzis skepticism, we could argue that Zhuangzi in this story puts forth a meta-question of epistemology: as an epistemic subject, do I know I myself? As we know very well, in the history of Western philosophy, Descartes (15961650) explored the issue of self-identication of an epistemic subject by doubting the existence of everything, and nally 494 derong chen found that I am thinking, therefore I exist (Cogito ergo sum). Seen from the perspective of epistemology, the conrmation of I exist establishes an epistemic subject. If we specically ask, Do I know who am I? we nd that Descartes did not touch upon this topic. However, this is an even more fundamental question, a meta- question in epistemology. Like Descartes, Zhuangzi begins with doubt. He doubts his ability to know himself as an epistemic subject. But, he does not stop; he tries to solve this suspicion by afrming the distinction between the buttery and Zhuang Zhou. Moreover, Zhuangzi stresses the transformation of things. Metaphorically, Zhuang Zhou in the story refers to an epistemic subject when he wonders if he has become a buttery. When he wonders if the buttery becomes Zhuang Zhou the buttery is potentially transformed as an epistemic subject, and Zhuang Zhou becomes an epistemic object. Zhuang Zhou is an epistemic subject as well as an object in the dream. In this sense, Zhuangzis transfor- mation of things hints at the transformation of an epistemic subject into an epistemic object and vice versa. This is a starting point from which Zhuangzi asks whether he knows he is Zhuang Zhou or the buttery. Exploring this question is just exploring the topic of the self- identication of an epistemic subject. According to Zhuangzi, there is no absolute subject or object, and the subject and object change, one into the other. Both Zhuang Zhou and the buttery play roles of epistemic subject and object in turn. When we analyze this story from the particular perspective of an epistemic subject in detail, we may nd that the following three aspects are involved. First, who am I? Second, do I know who I am? Third, how do an epistemic subject and epistemic object transform into each other? First, who am I? In his story, Zhuangzi says that he does not know if he is Zhuang Zhou who has dreamt he is a buttery, or a buttery dreaming he is Zhuang Zhou. Here, Zhuangzi raises a question about the self-identication of an epistemic subject. In the process of knowing, the epistemic subject is the agent of the activity of knowing. Before starting to know, the epistemic subject identies himself by clarifying who he is. No matter how we interpret the term I, we need to establish I as an independent epistemic subject. The best way is to identify I by thinking of who I am. Second, when I identify I myself, I necessarily face another ques- tion: do I know who am I? At this moment in reality I am Zhuang Zhou, but at a previous moment in the dream I was a buttery. How does this I know whether I am Zhuang Zhou or a buttery? Zhuangzi does not give a negative or a positive answer to this ques- tion, but leaves it open. This is an important piece of evidence that three meta-questions in epistemology 495 leads many scholars to regard Zhuangzis position as skepticism in epistemology and methodology. However, this is only his starting point, not his destination. Chung-Ying Chung has noted that Zhuangzi uses skepticism as an instrument to reach a higher and deeper knowledge. 12 This is an approach through which Zhuang Zhou, as an epistemic subject, identies himself. By doing so, Zhuangzi indirectly answers the question of how a subject identies himself. On the one hand, before starting to know all things in the world the epistemic subject could take himself as an epistemic object to know. This is a process by which an epistemic subject identies himself. On the other hand, the epistemic subject could instead take all other things as epistemic objects to know. Third, when an epistemic subject takes himself as an epistemic object he has to face the transformation between himself as an epis- temic subject and as an epistemic object. The buttery in the dream plays the role of the rst epistemic object when Zhuang Zhou knows he is dreaming, and Zhuang Zhou plays the role of the second epis- temic object when he wonders whether he is a buttery or Zhuang Zhou himself. This is thinkers thinking of the thinker himself before thinking of other things. It is also the process of the interaction between an epistemic subject and an epistemic object. Since an epis- temic subject can transform himself into an epistemic object, then an epistemic subject is only a relative subject. Thus, we human beings are epistemic subjects as well as epistemic objects. With this identica- tion, there are two other aspects to be self-identied: rst, the subject discovers he is himself and is an epistemic subject; second, the dis- tinction between epistemic subject and epistemic object is relative. This relativity is a reection of Zhuangzis relativist methodology in his epistemology. 13 But, we should not let the conclusion of relativism close the door of thinking. The most important information in this story is the task and the approach used by epistemic subjects to conduct self-identify. II. Do I Know Others: The Individuality of an Epistemic Subject Following the question Do I know myself? another question logi- cally comes up: Do I know others? This is another meta-question in epistemology, which leads to further consideration of the individ- uality of epistemic subjects. However, in the history of philosophy, most epistemologists have not recognized the signicance of this question. They are used to considering all human beings as a collec- tive epistemic subject. Thus, Descartess I is a big I referring to the 496 derong chen whole human race as an epistemic subject, not simply Descartes himself. The epistemic subject in Kants epistemology refers to human beings, and the twelve categories of understanding belong to all human beings, not to any one individual. The absolute spirit as an epistemic subject in Hegels philosophy is an objectication of the human spirit; it does not refer to any individual epistemic subject. All of these phenomena take the collectivity of the whole of humankind as a single epistemic subject. Individuality and differences among epistemic subjects have been ignored. I would argue that Zhuangzi puts forth the question Do I know others? in the story of the sh enjoyment. This question leads directly to the exploration of the individuality of epistemic subjects. Zhuangzi and Huizi were strolling along the dam of the Hao River when Zhuangzi said, See how the minnows come out and dart around where they please! Thats what sh really enjoy! Huizi said, Youre not a shhow do you know what sh enjoy? Zhuangzi said, Youre not I, so how do you know I dont know what sh enjoy? Huizi said, Im not you, so I certainly dont know what you know. On the other hand, youre certainly not a shso that still proves you dont know what sh enjoy! Zhuangzi said, Lets go back to your original question, please. You asked me how I know what sh enjoyso you already knew I knew it when you asked the question. 14 There are many different explanations of this story from logicians, literary critics, and philosophers. One of the current studies of this metaphor is by Anne Birrell. She suggests that Zhuangzi uses this metaphor to explain difcult ideas of relative perspective, subjectiv- ity, and objective reality. 15 What Birrell reads from this story is the concept of relativity. Nobel Prize winning physicist Hideki Yukawa interprets this story from the perspective of scientic method and logic, and asserts that Zhuangzis point is close to common sense and science. 16 It seems to Russell Goodman that Zhuangzi expresses his idea of anti-skepticism in this story, but that he is not free from skep- ticism. 17 Thus, Goodman takes this story as an evidence of Zhuangzis skepticism. We suggest that the question Do I know others? is the essential idea expressed in the story of the sh enjoyment. This story success- fully draws a picture of the individuality and privacy of an epistemic subject in the practical process of knowing. Zhuang Zhou and Huizi are two different individual epistemic subjects. The question Youre not a sh, how do you know I do not know . . .? clearly distinguishes between one epistemic subject and another. Knowing, in this case, is an individual and internal spiritual activity. Even today, we do not have proof to demonstrate that if A knows how does B know and three meta-questions in epistemology 497 whether B knows in the process of knowing, or vice versa. Although contemporary psychologists and neurobiologists are able to monitor what is happening in a human beings brain when a person is observ- ing or thinking, this kind of experiment still cannot show the contents of observation and thinking. Contemporary epistemologist scholars also announce that knowing is a still unknown process. As David Hammer and Andrew Elby point out, It is not clear, however, with respect either to epistemological beliefs or to conceptual understanding, how best to model what takes place in an individuals mind. 18 Why is it that experimental science still cannot answer Zhuangzis question? We believe that the activity of thinking and the process of thinking are not observable, and that the observable is the physical or biological process of the activity of thinking, but it is not the process of thinking. In this regard, Zhuangzis question is a typical philosophical question, or typical fun- damental question of epistemology. The discussion in contemporary epistemology on the relationship between individuality and collectivism can help us to understand the signicance of Zhuangzis question in the metaphor of the sh enjoy- ment. Contemporary internalism pays attention to individuality. As Goodman states, The fundamental claim of internalism . . . is that epistemological issues arise and must be dealt with from within the individual persons rst-person cognitive perspective, appealing only to things that are accessible to that individual from that standpoint. The basic rationale is that what justies a persons beliefs must be something that is available or accessible to him or her, that something to which I have no access cannot give me a reason for thinking that one of my beliefs is true (though it might conceivably provide such a reason for another person viewing me from the outside). 19 In this claim of internalism, both the individuality of the epistemic subject and the individuality of the justication of beliefs are stressed. As an individual epistemic subject, one has ones personal perspec- tive and standpoint; ones beliefs are built on ones personal knowl- edge of certain objects. Accordingly, any justication must rely on what one has experienced or recognized. In comparing the proposi- tion that I have no access cannot give me a reason for thinking that one of my beliefs is true with the question that You are not me so How do you know I do not know . . .? we may nd that both indi- cate a similar idea, but from two opposite directions: The individual- ity of the epistemic subject and the individuality of the epistemic result consisting of beliefs. Further, contemporary epistemologists have investigated other details regarding the individuality of the epis- temic subject and the result. For instance, George Towner discusses 498 derong chen how an individuals knowledge emerges into group knowledge from the angle of socialization in his book Process of Knowledge. 20 Regard- ing individual knowledge, he says, Knowledge is rst acquired by individuals, 21 but later on individual knowledge is socialized by social organizations. 22 Here, Towner tries to explain the transformation of knowledge from individual to collective knowledge via social organ- izations. Although we do not have reason to conclude that Zhuangzis recognition of the individuality of the epistemic subject has reached the level of contemporary epistemology, we do have reason to assume that what the internalism concerns and explores is the question raised in the story of the sh enjoyment. The internalism provides us with a new version to value the signicance of Zhuangzis question today. But, the signicance of this question has been ignored for a long time. In the stories of the little birds and the big bird Peng, Zhuangzi uses metaphors to portray two different epistemic subjects under the name of little birds and the big bird Peng and further explores the question Do I know others? The Peng is so big that its back looks like Mount Tai and it can y ninety thousand li high. The little birds are so small that they can only y between the weeds and brambles and never get more than ten or twelve yards high. The little birds can never see the vista of the whole world that the big bird can see, so they never understand the big bird. 23 The world in the little birds eyes is no more than the space between the sapwood tree and the ground. In Pengs eyes, however, the world is a huge limitless space. After the narration of the metaphorical story, Zhuangzi asks, What do these two creatures understand? Little understanding cannot come up to great understanding; the short-lived cannot come up to the long- lived. 24 Comparing the metaphor of the sh enjoyment with the metaphor of birds, we nd that Zhuangzi raises the question Do I know others? in the former, but negatively answers the question in the latter. In order to examine the general signicance of Zhuangzis metaphorical story, we should not limit our understanding to the debate between Daoist Zhuangzi and other philosophers of other schools. The differences between the little and the big birds metaphorically indicate the differences between different epistemic subjects. In fact, the differences among different epistemic subjects are subjective reasons for different opinions, beliefs, and visions of the world. Human beings as epistemic subjects are individual as well as collective. One might ask whether Zhuangzi really deals with the dif- ferences between different epistemic subjects by telling the story of the little birds and the big bird. Are we drawing a forced analogy? Zhuangzis following discourse can help us to clarify this question. three meta-questions in epistemology 499 After comparing the little birds and the big bird Peng, Zhuangzi states, Therefore a man who has wisdom enough to ll one ofce effectively, good conduct enough to impress one community, virtue enough to please one ruler, or talent enough to be called into service in one state, has the same kind of self-pride as these little creatures. 25 Zhuangzi here talks about human beings directly and makes an analogy between human beings vistas as epistemic subjects with that of the vista of the little birds. Zhuangzi mentions the birds, but refers to man. He seems to describe the limitations of the viewpoint of the little birds, but metaphorically indicates the variety of a human beings epistemic ability. The essence of the difference between the little and the big is the difference in epistemic abilities among various epistemic subjects. One might argue that for human beings as epistemic subjects there is no such difference among individuals as the difference seen between the little and the big birds. Thus, how it is possible that one cannot understand another? Indeed, biologically, individuals are similar to each other, and there are no such differences such as those between the little and big mentioned above. However, what Zhuangzi stresses is the individuality of epistemic subjects in under- standing. In Autumn Floods Zhuangzi points out, You cant discuss the ocean with a well froghes limited by the space he lives in. You cant discuss ice with a summer insecthes bound to a single season. You cant discuss the Way [Dao] with a cramped scholarhe is shackled by his doctrines. 26 Obviously, the metaphorical references of Zhuangzis little,big, well frog, and summer insect are the epistemic subjects limited to a narrow circle of opinions. The limitation of the cramped scholar is similar to the limitation that Bacon describes in the Idols of the Cave (idola specus). According to Zhuangzi, the cramped scholar is shackled by his doctrines; according to Bacon, people who have pre- disposition of the Idols of the Cave form their opinions based on idiosyncrasies of education and the authority of those whom he respects and admires. 27 Both Zhuangzi and Bacon metaphorically indicate the obstruction that epistemic subjects are bounded up in their narrow and limited visual elds. In general, it seems to Zhuangzi that human beings as epistemic subjects are individual. Following Zhuangzis line of thinking to view studies of epistemology in the past, we nd that regarding all human beings as a single epistemic subject and ignoring their individualities amounts to oversimplied epistemology. 500 derong chen Identifying the differences among various epistemic subjects has become one of the most important issues in contemporary episte- mology: differences in age, gender, and even ethnicity have been taken into consideration and analyzed. For instance, Patricia M. King and Karen Strohm Kitchener have conducted research into the dif- ferences between people of different ages, genders, and ethnicities in models of reecting judgment. 28 Blythe McVicker Clinchy focuses on womens way of knowing. 29 Marcia B. Baxter Magolda, in her article Epistemological Reection: The Evolution of Epistemological Assumptions from Age 18 to 30, examines the differences in episte- mological assumptions at different ages. 30 All of this research, in a wide sense, is concerned with the individuality of epistemic subjects. III. What Can I Know About the World: The Identity of Epistemic Results Zhuangzi warns that it is dangerous for human beings not to rec- ognize the limitations of their knowledge. The exploration of the lim- itation of human knowledge is essentially the question: What can I know about the world? According to the temporal limitation of human beings as epistemic subjects, Zhuangzi indicates, Your life has a limit but knowledge has none. If you use what is limited to pursue what has no limit, you will be in danger. If you understand this and still strive for knowledge, you will be in danger for certain! 31 Just as the summer insects cannot imagine the view of the snow- white world in winter, in Zhuangzis eyes, human beings cannot reach a complete and thorough knowledge of the world. There is a bound- ary between the limited lives of human beings and the unlimited objects of knowledge. Although Zhuangzi just offers a warning, from this we nd that he emphasizes a question: What can I really know about the world? In considering Zhuangzis warning, we nd that he suspects this possibility. Consistently, Zhuagnzi begins with suspect and then explores the possibility of knowing this world. In reviewing Zhuangzis other metaphors, we nd that he suspects, but does not deny the possibility of acquiring knowledge about things in the world. This includes acquiring the highest knowledgedao. Zhuangzi puts the following words into the mouth of Confucius: Dont listen with ears, listen with your mind. No, dont listen with your mind, but listen with your spirit. Listening stops with ears, the three meta-questions in epistemology 501 mind stops with recognition, but spirit is empty and waits on all things. The Way [Dao] gathers in emptiness alone. Emptiness is the fasting of the mind. 32 Zhuangzis claim that we not rely on just our senses and minds does not mean that we should give up the knowledge from our ears and minds. He asks us to not stop at the level of knowledge acquired by the senses. You must keep going through the ears and the mind to the spirit, because the spirit waits on all things. In this discourse, the mind is a link between the senses (eyes and ears) and the spirit. What is the mind? What is its function? Zhuangzi answers us in another metaphor. He explains, The perfect man uses his mind like a mirrorgoing after nothing, welcoming nothing, responding but not storing. Therefore he can win out over things and not hurt himself. 33 In short, only the spiritcan obtain the nature or essence of all things, it even reaches at the dao. Zhuangzi notes the interaction of the mind with the senses and the spirit, and thus outlines three steps in the epis- temic process: sensesmindspirit. These three steps correspond to the three steps of the epistemic process described in the metaphorical story of Cook Ting. Cook Ting was an expert in butchering oxen. One day when he butchered an ox for Lord Wen-Hui, he slithered the knife along with a zing, and all was in perfect rhythm, 34 as though he were performing a beautiful dance or keeping time to wonderful music. Lord Wen-Hui was sur- prised at his skill, and remarked to him, Ah, this is marvelous! Imagine skill reaching such heights! 35 Cook Ting laid down his knife and replied, what I care about is the Way [Dao], which goes beyond skill. When I rst began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And nownow I go at it by spirit and dont look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest ligament or tendon, much less a main joint. 36 From the perspective of epistemology, this story describes a com- plete epistemic process, consisting of three steps. First, Cook Ting rec- ognizes the phenomenon of the ox; at this stage the ox was the ox as a whole in his eyes. He did not know much about the biological struc- ture of the ox, which means that his knowledge about the ox was just at the sensational stage of knowledge of the object. Second, after three years, Cook Ting went beyond the phenomenon of the ox and attained insight into the inner structure of the ox by practicing slaughtering it over and over again. This indicates that Cook Tings knowledge was approaching an understanding of the object through 502 derong chen empirical knowledge. Third, Cook Ting acquired dao of butchering the ox by spirit. When he acquired dao, it became the guidance of his action. In this story, Zhuangzi not only hints that all things in the world, including dao, are recognizable, but also describes the process of the knowing of all things and dao. The knowledge of dao is the highest form of knowledge, and dao exists in all things. He says, But you must not expect to nd the Way in any particular place there is no thing that escapes its presence! Such is the Perfect Way, and so too are the truly great words. Complete, universal, all- inclusive,they are different words with the same meaning. All point to a single reality. 37 That is to say, dao is general. On the one hand, everything shares the dao, so dao exists in the activities of butchering an ox, a horse, or the butchering of other animals. This is the dividedness of dao. On the other hand, when we say that all things and activities share dao we are stressing the sameness of dao. The sameness of things is another expression of the identity of all things. The dividedness and sameness of dao have their metaphysical grounds: the world is one in nature. For this reason, whether you point to a little stalk or a great pillar, a leper or the beautiful Xishi [Hsi-shih], things ribald and shady or things grotesque and strange, the Way makes them all into one. Their dividedness is their completeness; their completeness is their impair- ment. No thing is either complete or impaired, but all are made into one again. Only the man of far-reaching vision knows how to make them into one. 38 Zhuangzi here discusses the relationship between the dividedness and the one. As it seems to Zhuangzi, all of the differences are phe- nomena. Whatever the phenomena are, and however big they are, and however many differences they have, essentially they are one. Indeed, it is easy for people to see differences in things, but it is hard to reach at the knowledge of their sameness. Why are they one? How does dao make them into one? We can understand these questions from two aspects: one is the relationship between dao and all things (the myriad things), and, the other, the relationship between dao and the one. Dao is one. A state in which this and that no longer nd their opposites is called the hinge of the Way [Dao]. 39 The hinge of dao is one in which opposites no longer exist. In this regard, the one is another name of the dao. In the same chapter, Zhuangzi stresses that many things seem to us to be quite different, but in fact they are one. Zhuangzi explains: three meta-questions in epistemology 503 There is nothing in the world bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and Mount Tai is tiny. No one has lived longer than a dead child, and Peng-tzu [Peng Zu] died young. Heaven and earth were born at the same time I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me. 40 According to common sense, the tip of an autumn hair is very small, Mount Tai is very large, the dead child of course was short-lived, and legendary Peng Zu was a long-lived person. As to the heaven and earth, they are actually the signs of forever. How could I as bio- logical living beings, be born at the same time as heaven and earth? How could I as individual persons become one with all things? The literal meanings of all these descriptions correspond neither to real facts, nor to common sense. The basic approach for understanding a metaphor is to go beyond its literal meaning: all the things are equal and all the things are one in essence, not in real space and time. Further, how could it be that all things are one? According to Zhuangzi, it depends on how we discover sameness through the dif- ferences among all things. Zhuangzi points out, If you look at them from the point of view of their differences, then there is liver and gall, Chu [Chu] and Yueh [Yue]. But if you look at them from the point of view of the sameness, then the ten thou- sand things are all one. 41 The liver,gall,Chu (Kingdom Chu), and Yue (Kingdom Yue) metaphorically mean all of the different things in the world. We can discover the differences between liver and gall and Chu and Yue using our senses. We can also recognize the sameness among differ- ent things using our understanding and reason. However, the one, as the sameness of all different things, is general as well as objective. When we look at all things in the world from their dividedness, we know they are different and are individual. But, if we look at their sameness we nd they are one. If we look at them from both their differences and their sameness, we recognize that all things exist indi- vidually and appear different from one another. Meanwhile they are one because they possess the common essence dao. The knowledge of the dividedness of all things is the knowledge of phenomena of all things. The knowledge of the sameness of all things is the knowledge of the nature or the essence of all things. Namely, the latter is the knowledge of dao or of one. Zhuangzis theory of the identity of epis- temic results is built on the metaphysical principle that all things are one. What can I know about the world? The analysis above shows that Zhuangzi takes alternative attitudes. Considering the limitations of epistemic subjects and the un-limitedness of epistemic objects, 504 derong chen Zhuangzi carries a discreet attitude, even a skeptical one. He starts from suspecting, further explores the possibility of knowing particu- lar things in the world. He gives a positive answer to this question at a non-metaphysical level. When he notes that there is a huge gap between the limitations of epistemic subjects and the un-limitedness of epistemic objects, he recognizes the dangers of subjective assertion in epistemology. When he afrms the possibility of knowing dao through recognizing the myriad things in the world, he crosses the boundary between the knowable and the unknowable things in the world. Zhuangzi believes that not only can we recognize the divid- edness of the myriad things, but we can also reach at the knowledge of the identity of the myriad things in the world. Concluding Remarks The analyses above show that Zhuangzi conducts an exploration of the self-identication of epistemic subjects in his discussion of the rst question Do I know myself? He stresses the individuality of epis- temic subjects in his discussion of the second question Do I know others? and afrms the possibility to know the world by discussing the third question What can I know about the world? The key to understanding Zhuangzis answers to the three meta-questions is his idea of the identity of the world: we cannot only recognize the di- videdness of things, but also recognize dao through the recognition of the sameness. According to this line of thinking, when we coherently consider Zhuangzis metaphors we nd that the following are logical conclusions to the three meta-questions: Do I know I myself? Accord- ing to the dividedness of things, I do not know who I am; according to the sameness or the identity of things, I know who I am and I am identied with myself. Do I know others? According to the divided- ness, I do not know others, just as I do not know the shs enjoyment; according to the identity of things, there is no difference between others and me. What can I know about the world? Little under- standing is limited to the understanding of dividedness, while great understanding goes beyond the dividedness of things and reaches at the knowledge of the identity of all things. Thus I know both the dividedness and the identity of the world. This logical conclusion drawn from Zhuangzis metaphors indicates a basic direction for us to explore the three meta-questions in epistemology. Although we have made some progress in different respects, as I mentioned above, there is a long way to go for a deep understanding and thorough clar- ication of these questions. Thus, in the twenty-rst century, when we three meta-questions in epistemology 505 rethink Zhuangzis contribution to epistemology, we nd that the above-mentioned three meta-questions still have important signi- cance. If this article can stimulate a rethinking of these three meta- questions, its purpose will have been attained. UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO Toronto, Canada Endnotes * For improving this work, I am greatly in debt to Professor Chung-ying Chengs invalu- able and numerous advices. Professor Jesse Flemings signicant editorial work is to be deeply thanked. I am also grateful to Dr. Linyu Gu for her prompt and kind correspondences. 1. Most of Zhuangzis metaphors are complete stories, which is different from metaphors in Western philosophy. For instance, Wittgensteins metaphors of lan- guage game, color-words, logical space, logical scaffolding, the tool box of language, etc., all are metaphorical sentences and discourses. See Ludwig Wittgen- stein, Philosophical Investigation, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe 2nd ed. (Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1958), 25e, 226e. 2. Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Chung-Tzu, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 49. For A. Giless translation of this story, see Hans- George Moller, Zhuangzis Dream of the ButteryA Daoist Interpretation, Philosophy East and West 49, no. 4 (Oct. 1999): 439. In this paper, I use Burton Watsons translation. 3. For instance, Professor Kunsheng Liu thinks that the signicance of the story of the buttery lies in the realm of spiritual freedom. See Kunsheng Liu, An Initial Com- ments on the Essential Meaning of Zhuangzis Discussion On All Thing Equal, Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture 29, no. 8 (2002): 722. 4. Youlan Feng, An Initial Draft of the New Edition of the History of Chinese Philoso- phy, Complete Works of Feng Youlan (Zhengzhou: Henan Peoples Press, 2000), 7:350. 5. Chad Hansen, Language and Logic in Ancient China (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1983), 121. 6. See Russell B. Goodman, Skepticism and Realism in the Chuang Tsu, Philosophy East and West 35, no. 3, (July 1985): 232. 7. Paul Kjellberg, Skepticism, Truth, and the Good Life: A Comparison of Zhuangzi and Sextus Empirics, Philosophy East and West 44, no. 1 (January 1994): 111. 8. Ibid., 123. 9. Lisa Rophals, Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and the Theaetetus, Philosophy East and West 44, no. 3 (July 1994): 501. 10. See Hans-George Moller, Zhuangzis Dream of the ButteryA Daoist Interpre- tation, Philosophy East and West 49, no. 4 (October 1999): 439440. 11. Youru Wang, The Philosophy of Change and Deconstruction of Self in Zhuang Zi, Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 3 (September 2000): 353. 12. Chung-ying Cheng, Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese Philosophy, Philosophy East and West 27, no. 2 (April 1977): 143. 13. According to Zhuangzis relativist approach, all things are equals. This includes all things, heaven and earth, birth and death, big and little, long and short, subject and object, and so forth. In other words, there is no so-called birth and death, big or little, long or short, subject or object. The differences are just relative. 14. Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Chung Tzu, 188189. 15. Anne Birrell, Chinese Myths (London: British Museum Press, 2000), 52. 16. Hideki Yukawa, Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 60. 506 derong chen 17. Russell B. Goodman, Skepticism and Realism in the Chuang Tsu, Philosophy East and West, 35, no. 3 (July 1985): 233234. 18. Hammer and Elby, On the Form of a Personal Epistemology, In Personal Episte- mology: The Psychology of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing, ed. Barbara K. Hofer (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 170. 19. Ibid., 222. 20. George Towner, Processes of Knowledge (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 216219. 21. Ibid., 265. 22. George Towner, Processes of Knowledge (New York: University Press of America, Inc., 2001), 265. 23. Zhuangzi, The Complete Works of Chung Tzu, 31. 24. Ibid., 30. 25. Ibid., 31. 26. Ibid., 175176. 27. Francis Bacon, The New Organon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 41. 28. Patricia M. King and Karen Strohm Kitchener, The Reective Judgment Model: Twenty Years of Research on Epistemic Cognition, in Personal Epistemology: The Psychology of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing, ed. Barbara K. Hofer (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 4354. 29. Blythe McVicker Clinchy focuses on womens way of knowing. See Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Revisiting Womens Ways of Knowing, in Personal Epistemology: The Psy- chology of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing, ed. Barbara K. Hofer (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 6387. 30. Magolda, Marcia B. Baxter, Epistemological Reection: The Evolution of Episte- mological Assumptions from Age 18 to 30, In Personal Epistemology: The Psychol- ogy of Beliefs about Knowledge and Knowing, ed. Barbara K. Hofer (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 2002), 89102. 31. Ibid., 50. 32. Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chung Tzu, 5758. 33. Ibid., 97. 34. Ibid., 50. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid., 51. 37. Ibid., 241. 38. Ibid., 4041. 39. Ibid., 40. 40. Ibid., 43. 41. Ibid., 69. Chinese Glossary Ch Png Z Do png Huz X Sh k n Yu L oz Zhu ngz
Does The Intentionalist Theory of Perception Provide A Convincing Expanation of Why The Argument From Illusion Fails? If So, What Is It? If Not, Why Not?