December 2013 Philippine Supreme Court

Decisions on Criminal Law and Procedure

Posted on January 20, 2014 by Dominador Maphilindo O. Carrillo Posted in Criminal Law,
Philippines - Cases, Remedial Law
Here are select December 2013 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on criminal law
and procedure:
1. REVISED PENAL CODE
Falsification of public documents; falsification of local budget preparation forms. To warrant the
suspension of a public officer under section 13 of R.A. 3019, he must be charged with an offense
(1) under R.A. 3019, or (2) under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC, or (3) involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property. Admittedly, petitioner in this case was not charged
under R.A. 3019. Neither was he charged under Title Seven, Book II of the RPC as the crime of
falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the RPC is covered by Title Four, Book II
thereof. The relevant question now is whether falsification of public documents is considered as
fraud upon government or public funds or property. To address the issue, the Supreme Court
(SC) cited Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan. Petitioner therein was charged with falsifying municipal
vouchers which, as used in government, are official documents. He asserted the said offense does
not involve fraud or property; hence, his suspension finds no basis in section 13 of R.A. 3019.
In construing the term fraud as used in section 13 of R.A. 3019, the SC held in said case that
the same is understood in its general sense, that is, referring to an instance or an act of trickery
or deceit especially when involving misrepresentation. And since vouchers are official
documents signifying a cash outflow from government coffers, falsification thereof invariably
involves fraud upon public funds. In the same vein, the act imputed against petitioner constitutes
fraud upon government or public funds. Hadjim Hashim Abdul v. Sandiganbayan (Fifth
Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184496, December 2, 2013.
Kidnapping for ransom; elements. In proving the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the
prosecution has to show that: (a) the accused was a private person; (b) he kidnapped or detained
or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; (c) the kidnapping or detention was
illegal; and (d) the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom. All these were proven in the
criminal case on review. The testimony of Alejandro and Marvelous sufficiently established the
commission of the crime and the accused-appellants culpability. Maca was positively identified
by Marvelous as one of the men who collared her, Marelie and Mae by the bedroom, tied them
up and brought them to the mountains of Bagyangon. He was also identified as the one who left
the group when they were on the mountains to buy food after Con-ui refused. Con-ui, on the
other hand, was identified by Alejandro as the one who was addressed by one of the abductors
with the statement, why did it take you so long in coming back? We were already tired of
waiting for you. Con-ui was also identified by Marvelous as the one who took the key to the
drawer, opened it and took the money in it. Their testimony also established the fact that they
were deprived of their liberty when they were all hogtied and forcibly brought out of the house
and into the mountains. That the deprivation of their liberty was for the purpose of extorting
ransom was confirmed by Alejandro who testified that the abductors asked him for money and
even let him off so he can come up with the P300,000.00 ransom. People of the Philippines v.
Jonathan Con-U and Ramil Maca, G.R. No. 205442, December 11, 2013.
Libel; privileged communication. No libel was committed in this case. The Court of Appeals
(CA) acquitted Muoz of libel because his statement constitutes privileged communication. In
libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the crime. The law presumes that
every imputation is malicious; this is referred to as malice in law. There are few circumstances
wherein malice in law is inapplicable. Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) states the
instances when malice is not presumed. Jurisprudence supplements the enumeration in Article
354 of the RPC. Borjal v. CA and Guingguing v. CA hold that in order to justify a conviction in
libel involving privileged communication, the prosecution must establish that the libelous
statements were made or published with actual malice or malice in fact the knowledge that the
statement is false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. Elizalde S. Co v.
Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr., G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013.
Libel; privileged communication. In this case, the Court of Appeals (CA) declared that the
libelous remarks are privileged. The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a
public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of
Munoz statements were fair comments. Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the
prosecution has the burden of proving that Munoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that
the prosecution failed in this respect. Co assails the CAs ruling by raising arguments that
essentially require a review of the CAs factual and legal findings. However, the Supreme Court
cannot, through the present petition, review these findings without going against the
requirements of Rule 45 with respect to factual matters, and without violating Munoz right
against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on questions of fact.
Elizalde S. Co v. Ludolfo P. Muoz Jr., G.R. No. 181986, December 4, 2013.
Qualified theft; elements.The elements of qualified theft punishable under Article 310 in relation
to Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are as follows: (1) there was a taking of personal
property; (2) the said property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the consent of
the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; (5) the taking was accomplished without
violence or intimidation against person, or force upon things; and (6) the taking was done under
any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of
confidence. Delia Ines Ringor v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198904, December 11,
2013.
Qualified theft; elements.All elements for the felony of qualified theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 308 of the RPC are present in this case. As to the first element, the prosecution
was able to establish that the petitioner, as part of her duty as sales clerk/agent of PCS, received
the payment from LACS in the amount of P66,860.90 for the merchandise delivered to it and that
she failed to remit the same to Ingan. The second, third and fifth elements of qualified theft were
likewise established by the prosecution; that the amount paid by LACS, taken by the petitioner
without authority and consent, belongs to PCS, and that the taking was accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation against persons, or force upon things, is not disputed. Anent the
fourth element, intent to gain on the part of the petitioner was likewise established. Intent to gain
or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of
the thing subject of asportation. Intent to gain on the part of the petitioner is readily apparent
from the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses. Particularly, Ibarra, Ingans brother, testified
that the petitioner told him and his sister that she lost the money she collected from LACS. At
first, the petitioner claimed that she was robbed. Later, she changed her story and claimed that
she lost the money when she rode a mini-bus. Curiously, once Ingan discovered that her story did
not check out, the petitioner no longer reported for work. The foregoing circumstances, coupled
with the fact that the petitioner took the money paid by LACS and failed to remit the same to
PCS, clearly evince intent to gain on the part of the petitioner. As regards the sixth element, the
petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to show that there was grave abuse of confidence on
her part. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the
result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant
and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the
appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is present in this case. Verily, the
petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she
collected from the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money paid by
LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to Ingan the money paid by
LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS. Delia
Ines Ringor v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013.
Rape; elements.For the charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, to prosper, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation, when she was
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented. In the present case, the prosecution established the elements of rape required under
Article 266-A of the RPC. First, the appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA was
straightforward when she testified that the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Her
testimony was supported by Medico Legal Report No. M-257-01 dated April 29, 2001, reflecting
the victims non-virgin physical state. It has been previously held that when the testimony of a
rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis to conclude that there
has been carnal knowledge. Second, the appellant employed threat, force and intimidation to
satisfy his lust. AAA categorically testified that she resisted when the appellant pulled her inside
his house. She also recalled that she cried when the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina.
Nonetheless, she was helpless and afraid to make further noise because the appellant threatened
to kill her. These facts sufficiently indicate that the appellants acts were against AAAs will.
People of the Philippines v. Rogelio Manicat y De Guzman, G.R. No. 205413, December 2,
2013.
Rape; rape charge doubtful only when the delay or inaction in revealing its commission is
unreasonable and unexplained. Jurisprudence states that a rape charge becomes doubtful only
when the delay or inaction in revealing its commission is unreasonable and unexplained. Those
conditions do not obtain in the case at bar since, during the trial, AAA testified that she did not
tell anyone in her boarding house about what happened to her right after the terrible encounter
with appellant because she was afraid of her father. This candid statement from the victim not
only discloses a plausible justification for the delay but it also further manifests her youth or
immaturity which is a personal circumstance that has never prevented the Supreme Court from
upholding the credibility of a witness. Instead, such a condition has been considered as a
cornerstone of a testimony that is worthy of belief. People of the Philippines v. Dalton Laurian
Jr. y Pugsot, G.R. No. 199868, December 11, 2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. Consented or unconsented sexual intercourse with a woman
below 12 years of age is punishable as rape. As such, proof of force, threat, or intimidation is
unnecessary in cases of statutory rape, they, not being elements of the crime. When the
complainant is below 12 years old, the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed as the
law supposes that a woman below this age does not possess discernment and is incapable of
giving intelligent consent to the sexual act. In order to successfully convict an accused of
statutory rape, the prosecution must prove the following: 1.The age of the complainant; 2.The
identity of the accused; and 3.The carnal knowledge between the accused and the complainant.
People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013.
Rape; statutory rape; elements. The first element was established by the prosecution upon the
presentation and submission to the court of a Certification from the Office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong City dated August24, 2004 stating that AAA was born on September
10, 1996. Hence, she was only 6 years old when the rape was committed in February 2003. The
second element was clearly satisfied when AAA positively and consistently identified Banzuela
as her offender. As regards the third element, it is instructive to define carnal knowledge in the
context it is used in the Revised Penal Code: Carnal knowledge, unlike its ordinary connotation
of sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen
be ruptured. The crime of rape is deemed consummated even when the mans penis merely
enters the labia or lips of the female organ or, as once so said in a case, by the mere touching of
the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act. This element was
proven when AAA detailed in open court how Banzuela forcefully inserted his sex organ into her
genitalia in February 2003 and how she felt pain during her ordeal. People of the Philippines v.
Ferdinand Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013.
2. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; in connection with a contract or transaction. In issuing
the questioned resolution, the Sandiganbayan applied the restrictive meaning of the term
transaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 adopted in Soriano Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. In
Soriano Jr., the Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that the investigation conducted by the
petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be construed as
analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves
some consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the
investigation conducted by the petitioner. The State here argues that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the
interpretation of the term transaction in Soriano Jr. considering that the term transaction should
be construed more liberally. The SC did not give credence to the States position. It held that it
does not help the State any that the term transaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is
susceptible of being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering that laws creating,
defining or punishing crimes and laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed
strictly against the State or against the party seeking to enforce them, and liberally against the
party sought to be charged. Hence, the SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not arbitrarily, or
whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth element
of the violation of section 3(b) of R.A. 3019. People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
First Division and Third Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo and
Enest Escaler/People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third
Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo, Enest Escaler and Ramon
Castillo Arceo, Jr., G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063, December 11, 2013.
Evidence; non-compliance of chain of custody rule does not necessarily void the seizure and
custody of the dangerous drugs. In this case, the Supreme Court found that the prosecution
failed to prove the corpus delicti. As a result,the State was unable to discharge its basic duty of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Although the prosecution witnesses
averred that the physical inventory of the seized items was recorded in the police blotter, it did
not bother to present a copy of the same with the required signatures or submit some valid
justification for the omission. What is more, both PO1 Tadeo and PO1 Viesca were uncertain
regarding whether they photographed the seized items. In fact, they failed to produce any such
photograph. This is either sloppy police work or utter refusal to comply with what is required of
them. The prosecution should not have filed the case absent proof of compliance with what the
law requires. The Supreme Court (SC) has of course held that non-compliance with the
procedural safeguards provided in section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR would not necessarily
void the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs for as long as there is a justifiable ground for
it and the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. Here,
however, the buy-bust team did not bother to show that they intended to comply with the
procedure but where thwarted by some justifiable reason or consideration. Accordingly, despite
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, the SC stressed that the step-
by-step procedure outlined under R.A. 9165 is a matter of substantive law, which cannot be
simply brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. Due to the gross disregard of the buy-
bust team of the procedural safeguards mandated by section 21 of R.A. 9165 and its IRR, and its
failure to give justifiable reasons for it, the SC, thus, concluded that the integrity and identity of
the corpus delicti have been compromised. People of the Philippines v. Ferdinand Bautista y
Sinaon, G.R. No. 198113, December 11, 2013.
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs; elements. In prosecuting a case for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs under section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165, the following elements must concur:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified as a prohibited drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug. All the elements in the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs were
established in this case. First, the two plastic sachets containing shabu subject of the case for the
illegal possession of drugs were found in appellants pocket after a search on his person was
made following his arrest in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of shabu. It must be
remembered that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for anything which may have been
used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a warrant. Second, appellant did
not adduce evidence showing his legal authority to possess the shabu. Third, appellants act of
allowing the poseur-buyer to choose one from among the three sachets and putting back into his
pocket the two sachets of shabu not chosen clearly shows that he freely and consciously
possessed the illegal drugs. Hence, appellant was correctly charged and convicted for illegal
possession of shabu. People of the Philippines v. Jay Montevirgen y Ozaraga, G.R. No. 189840,
December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs; buy-bust operation; elements.What determines if
there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence
of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object,
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, which the
prosecution has satisfactorily established. Here, the prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti. PO1 Montefrio
positively identified the appellant as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet of shabu
worth P100 in a buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers in this case. PO1 Montefrio
also identified in court the plastic sachet of shabu he bought from the appellant. The testimony of
PO1 Montefrio was in turn corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Antonio, a member of the buy-
bust team who also categorically pointed to the appellant as the person whom he saw PO1
Montefrio bought illegal drugs from. To further prove that a buy-bust operation was actually
conducted, the prosecution also presented the testimony of P/Insp. Calabocal, the forensic
chemist assigned to the case. P/Insp. Calabocal testified that he dusted the P100 bill buy-bust
money with ultraviolet fluorescent powder prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation. After
the operation, he again examined the P100 bill buy-bust money, as well as the living persons of
PO1 Montefrio and the appellant for the presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder. He stated
that he found traces of said powder on the hands of both PO1 Montefrio and the appellant, which
in this case meant that the P100 buy-bust money was indeed passed on from PO1 Montefrio to
the appellant. People of the Philippines v. Roselito Taculod y Elle, G.R. No. 198108, December
11, 2013.
Illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs; buy-bust operation; elements. For an accused to
be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must
concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possesses the said drug. To prove the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, PO1
Montefrio testified that when he bought shabu from the appellant, the latter took out from his
pocket four plastic sachets. The appellant gave one sachet to PO1 Montefrio and put the rest
back in his left pocket. After the arrest of the appellant, PO1 Montefrio relayed this information
to PO3 Antonio and the latter ordered the appellant to empty the contents of his pocket. The
appellant then brought out the three remaining plastic sachets of shabu, which PO3 Antonio
marked accordingly. PO3 Antonio gave similar account of the events that led to the discovery
and seizure of the three remaining plastic sachets of shabu. Both police officers also identified
the said items in court. People of the Philippines v. Roselito Taculod y Elle, G.R. No. 198108,
December 11, 2013
Illegal sale of shabu; elements.In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu, under section 5,
Article II of RA 9165, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identity of the buyer and
the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti or the illicit drug in evidence. In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale of shabu
were established. PO3 Ruiz, the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as the person he
caught in flagrante delicto selling a white crystalline substance believed to be shabu in the
entrapment operation conducted by the police and MADAC operatives. Upon receipt of the P200
buy-bust money, appellant handed to PO3 Ruiz the sachet containing 0.04 gram of white
crystalline substance which later tested positive for shabu. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummated the
buy-bust transaction.People of the Philippines v. Jay Montevirgen y Ozaraga, G.R. No. 189840,
December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs; elements; corpus delicti. Illegal sale of prohibited drugs, like
shabu, is committed upon the consummation of the sale transaction which happens at the
moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. If a police officer goes through the operation
as a buyer, the crime is consummated when he makes an offer to buy that is accepted by the
accused, and there is an ensuing exchange between them involving the delivery of the dangerous
drugs to the police officer. In any case, the successful prosecution of the offense must be
anchored on a proof beyond reasonable doubt of two elements, to wit: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the identity of the object and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the
delivery of the thing sold and of the payment for the thing. What is material is the proof showing
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the thing
sold as evidence of the corpus delicti. People of the Philippines v. Erlinda Mali y Quimno a.k.a.
Linda, G.R. No. 206738, December 11, 2013.
Illegal sale of prohibited drugs; elements; corpus delicti. The confluence of the above requisites
is unmistakable from the testimony of the poseur-buyer herself, PO1 Montuno, who positively
testified that the illegal sale actually took place when she gave the P100 marked money to the
accused-appellant in exchange for the shabu. The straightforward testimony of PO1 Montuno
about the details of her transaction with the accused-appellant passed the objective test in buy-
bust operations. It is clear from her narration that the following elements occurred: the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment
of the consideration and the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject
of the sale. People of the Philippines v. Erlinda Mali y Quimno a.k.a. Linda, G.R. No. 206738,
December 11, 2013.
Sexual abuse under R.A. 7610; elements. The recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in
the Information that was filed against Roallos clearly makes out a case for the offense of sexual
abuse under section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. The elements of sexual abuse under section
5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows: 1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; 2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and 3. The child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age. The Information that was filed against Roallos alleged that he committed
lascivious acts towards AAA, i.e., that he mashed the breasts and kissed the cheeks of the latter.
It likewise alleged that AAA, at the time she was subjected to sexual abuse by Roallos, was only
15 years of age. Clearly, all the elements of sexual abuse under section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 are set out in the Information that was filed against Roallos. Vivencio Roallos y
Trillanes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Alibi. To counter the clear and categorical declarations of AAA that accused-appellant raped her,
accused-appellant proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally denying that he was at their
house in when the rape happened. The Supreme Court had consistently held that for alibi to
prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when the crime was
committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time. This, accused-appellant failed to do. Although defense
witness Guinonoy testified that he was with accused-appellant in Chapeh on March 10, 2001, he
also acknowledged that the travel time of one to two hours from Chapeh to does not pose an
insurmountable barrier for accused-appellant to actually take the trip from Chapeh to and back
after committing the crime. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for accused-appellant to be
present at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. People of the Philippines v. Lino
Paldo, G.R. No. 200515, December 11, 2013.
Certiorari; reglementary period to file certiorari; recognized exceptions. Section 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within a
period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. While
there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated
filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records
show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due
date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to
the other party, but it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing
rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a
tinge of merit that would deserve leniency. The late filing of the petition was borne out of the
petitioners failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by the
office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency, if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office
tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities which rob the government of millions of revenue
every year. The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to
suspect that the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The
failure to present the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently
and properly identify the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and,
worse, the failure to file this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale
signs of a reluctant and subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in
government service rouses the Supreme Courts vigilance against inefficiency in the
administration of justice. Verily, the lawyers representing the offices under the executive branch
should be reminded that they still remain as officers of the court from whom a high sense of
competence and fervor is expected. People of the Philippines v. The Hon. Juanito C. Castaneda
Jr., et al, G.R. No. 208290, December 11, 2013.
Civil liability of the accused; appeal of by private party. The parties here have conflicting
interpretations of the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC), which
states: The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist. Muoz claims that the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
applies only if the civil liability ex delicto is separately instituted or when the right to file it
separately was properly reserved. In contrast, Co claims that Muoz acquittal of the crime of
libel did not extinguish the civil aspect of the case because Muoz utterance of the libelous
remarks remains undisputed. The Supreme Court rejected Muoz claim. The last paragraph of
section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the
offense charged regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal
action. Undoubtedly, section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC governs situations when the offended party
opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title When
separate civil action is suspended. Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms,
governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto. Elizalde S. Co v. Ludolfo P. Muoz, Jr., G.R. No.
181986, December 4, 2013.
Criminal complaint; crime charged determined by allegations in the complaint or information.
The Supreme Court here held that Roallos claim that the Information filed against him is
duplicitous as it charged him with the commission of two crimes is plainly untenable. The
designation of the crime in the Information is clear Roallos was charged with the crime of acts
of lasciviousness in relation to section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. The mention of the phrase
acts of lasciviousness in the Information does not mean that Roallos was charged with the
felony of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC. The charge of acts of
lasciviousness against Roallos is specifically delimited to that committed in relation to section
5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. In any case, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of
the facts in the complaint or information. Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013.
Evidence; testimonies of rape victims given full weight and credit. Well-established is the rule
that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight and credit. In this
case, the victim AAA was barely eight years old when raped by accused-appellant. In a litany of
cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a
girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape,
because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame,
humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice
and to have the offender apprehended and punished. People of the Philippines v. Lino Paldo,
G.R. No. 200515, December 11, 2013.
Ombudsman; Ombudsman can file appeal or certiorari from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court. Respondents contend that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to file the
petitions for certioraribecause only the Solicitor General could file the petitions in this Court
pursuant to section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code as amended by
E.O. 292. The Supreme Court found respondents contention grossly erroneous. That only the
Solicitor General may represent the People on appeal or certiorariin the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings is the general rule, but the rule admits the exception
concerning all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme
Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of
the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. More
specifically, section 4(c) of R.A. 8249 authorizes the exception, viz: c. Civil and criminal cases
filed pursuant to and in connection with [E.O.] 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Consequently,
the filing of the petitions in these cases by the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, was authorized by law. People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan,
First Division and Third Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo and
Enest Escaler/People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, First Division and Third
Division Hernando Benito Perez, Rosario Perez, Ramon Arceo, Enest Escaler and Ramon
Castillo Arceo, Jr., G.R. No. 188165/G.R. No. 189063, December 11, 2013.
Preliminary investigation; lack of timely objection. The Supreme Court here held that Roallos
claim that he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that
he was not afforded a preliminary investigation is untenable. Here, it is conceded that Villarin
raised the issue of lack of a preliminary investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation.
However, when the Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted
the Ombudsmans verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment and actively
participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled hearings, conducting cross-
examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It was only after the trial court rendered judgment
against him that he once again assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the
Motion for Reconsideration. Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged
absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering his plea, and
actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation.It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any
objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the lack of a proper preliminary
investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has
effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is likewise deemed to have
waived his right to preliminary investigation. Vivencio Roallos y Trillanes v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 198389, December 11, 2013.
Warrantless arrests; arrests in flagrante delicto. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The
circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto, to wit: (1) The
police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush
out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the
natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given
that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the
more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry
for help from it; (2) Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened
door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed
to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without
warrant under the above-mentioned rule. George Antiquera y Codes v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 180661, December 11, 2013.